Conquest and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire, 1880–1974
Editorial Board Preben Kaarsholm, Roskilde University Carola Lentz, University of Mainz John Lonsdale, University of Cambridge
VOLUME 32
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/afss
The Case of the Arsi Oromo
By
Abbas H. Gnamo
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gnamo, Abbas H. (Abbas Haji), author. Conquest and resistance in the Ethiopian empire, 1880-1974 : the case of the Arsi Oromo / by Abbas H. Gnamo. page cm. -- (African social studies series ; v. 32) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-25813-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-26548-6 (e-book) 1. Ethiopia-- History--1889-1974. 2. Ethiopia--Politics and government--1889-1974. 3. Central-local government relations-- Ethiopia. 4. Social structure--Ethiopia. 5. Oromo (African people)--Politics and government. 6. Arsi (African people)--History--20th century. 7. Arsi (African people)--History--19th century. 8. Ethiopia--Ethnic relations. 9. Imperialism. I. Title. II. Series: African social studies series ; v. 32.
DT386.G63 2014 963.05--dc23
2013047240
This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.
ISSN 1568-1203 ISBN 978-90-04-25813-6 (paperback) ISBN 978-90-04-26548-6 (e-book)
Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
∵
List of Illustrations x Preface xi
General Introduction 1 Context of the Study 1 Sources, Methods and Organization of the Book 14
Part 1 Oromo’s Socio-Political Culture and Institutions
1 Democracy without State: Egalitarianism, Justice, and Leadership in an Oromo Polity 23 Introduction 23 The Ideological and Philosophical Basis of Oromo Egalitarianism 27 The Gadaa-Qaalluu System: A Model of Social Organization 34 Democracy and Consensus Building in Oromo Political Culture: Tchaffee and Qixxee 41 The Tchaffee System 42 The Qixxee System 47 Conclusion 51
2 The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure: An Anthropological Analysis 55 Introduction 55 Gosa and Its Salient Characteristics 59 Exogamy 60 Patrifiliation and Territoriality 62 Patrilocality and Patrilineal Residence 63 Autonomy and Cooperation 65 The Socio-Political Functions of Dual Organization 70 Gosa, the Myth of “Tribe” and “Tribalism”: A Critical Insight 87 Conclusion 90
Part 2 The Empire-State, Conquest and Resistance
3 The Concept of Empire: What Makes Ethiopia an Empire? 95 Defining an Empire: A Conceptual Framework 95 The Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 111 The Salient Features of Imperial Domination 118 Conclusion 136
4 The Arsi Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest (1880–1900) 138 Introduction 138 The Critical Role of Firearms: Guns vs. Spears 142 The Beginning and Escalation of the War (1882–1885) 147 The Extermination Phase (1886): The Case of Azule and Anole 151 Conclusion 162
Part 3 The Cultural, Economic, and Political Consequences of the Imperial Conquest
5 The Introduction, Expansion, and Impact of Islam among the Arsi Oromo 167 Introduction 167 The Historical and Political Contexts of the Introduction of Islam 169 The Phases of the Spread and Consolidation of Islam 185 The Impacts of Islam on Oromo Social Organization and Culture 192 Islam and the Gadaa–Qaalluu System 192 Islam and Oromo Kinship Organization 196 Islam and Matrimonial Strategies 198 Islam and the Quest of Oromo Identity: Reflections on Current Developments 203 Conclusion 207
6 Dar Ager: The Making of a Periphery and the Features of Ethiopian Feudal Colonialism in Arsiland (1886–1935) 209 The Concept of Center-Periphery Relations 209 The Aftermath of Defeat: Establishing the Feudal Colonial Order 213
The Naftagna and the Process of Land Alienation 221 Conclusion 241
Part 4 Governing the Empire: Politics, Economy and Society
7 The Nature of Political Administration and the Structure of Domination in Arsiland (1941–1974) 245 Introduction 245 The Aqni: The First Generation of Military Rulers, 1900–1935 246 Governing the Periphery: The Political Administration of Arsi Region (1941–1974) 249 The Ethno-Political Backgrounds of Governors 251 Taxation without Representation 255 The Forms of Corruption and Embezzlement 258 The Informal Structures of Domination 264 Conclusion 271
8 The Socio-Economic Condition of the Peasantry in Arsiland (1941–1974) 273 Introduction 273 The Socio-Economic Structure in the Post-Italian Period, 1941–1974 275 Development and Displacement: The Impacts of Mechanization on Farmers 290 Conclusion 297
Part 5 From Empire-State to Nation? Dilemmas of Change and Identity Politics
9 The Politics of Transforming the Empire-State: Ethnic Identity vs. National Identity in Ethiopia 301 Imperial Nation-Building 301 The Limits of National Integration through Assimilation 315 The Triple Crises of the Ethiopian State 322 The Crisis of State Legitimacy 322 The Demise of the Concept of “Ethnic Core” 328 The Collapse of “Nation-Building” Rhetoric 330
The Paradoxes of Ethnic Federalism 331 Conclusion 337
Bibliography 339 Index 361
Maps
0.1 Oromia Regional Map 5 1.1 Arsi Oromo traditional habitat 26 2.1 The distribution of Arsi Gosa 74 2.2 Arsi Oromo moiety system 80 4.1 Menelik’s conquest of Arsi Oromo 146 5.1 Islam in the Northeast Africa, Sudan and Ethiopia 169 7.1 Imperial political map, 1941–1974 250 9.1 Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia 324
Figures
2.1 Close and distant agnates 58 2.2 Oromo kinship nomenclature 67 2.3 Oromo’s alleged genealogical structure 71 7.1 Imperial government and the structures of regional governance 246
Tables
2.1 Arsi Oromo kinship terms 66 6.1 The Balabbats of Chilalo Province, Arsi 220 6.2 The Balabbats of Fasil Province, Bale 222 6.3 The distribution of land to soldiers in Arsi 236 6.4 Types of land and tax (in Ethiopian Birr) 239 7.1 List of provincial governors before 1935 248 7.2 List of provincial governors, 1941–1974 249
The journey to write this book commenced many years ago with research undertaken among the Arsi Oromo, the largest single group of the Oromo soci- ety inhabiting the vast territory in Southern and Southeastern Ethiopia proper, including most of the Rift Valley, Arsi-Bale massifs, and the adjacent lowlands stretching to Hararghe, Somali territory, Sidama, and Borana, etc. I went to all provinces and major districts of this cultural area. It would have been very difficult and even impossible to undertake such an ambitious endeavor without active support and cooperation from numerous people. I owe a great debt to my informants and elders who made themselves available for hours and days, even weeks for some, to share their encyclopedic knowledge about their culture and history. Their cooperation helped me to overcome many administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to collect original data. The data turned out to be critical given the paucity and poverty of written sources and enabled me to produce original dissertations both at undergradu- ate and graduate levels. Thus, without singling out one of them, I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to all of them for making my fieldwork a success. However, this does not suggest that the quality of oral data gathered both in Amharic and Oromo languages was enough in itself; it was crosschecked with available sources in foreign languages to place the arguments and narratives in a coherent scholarly perspective. The current book is based on diachronic and synchronic approaches and, as such, I used both rich oral tradition and a wide range of literature in history, anthropology, political sociology, chronicles, travelers’ accounts and testimonies, and numerous unpublished dissertations. In fact, the list of my references grew longer with the breadth of my scholar- ship and the issues I have addressed in the different chapters of the book by blending neighboring disciplines, notably history, anthropology, and political science. In this research conducted over a long period of time in different continents (Africa, Europe, North America (Canada)) and in a variety of languages, I have benefited from the support and encouragement of many people including my teachers, supervisors, colleagues, friends, and students. I am thankful to all of them; particularly to those who instilled in me research methods and theories of the social sciences. Professor Tessema Ta’a of Addis Ababa University was the first in shaping my interest in history and encouraged me to dig deep for original sources and provided me with necessary guidance. In France, where I did graduate studies for numerous years, I was fortunate to have wonderful
Dr. Tuma Nademmo as well as Oromo community in Toronto for their interest and constant encouragement. Finally, I thank Brill’s African Series Editors for accepting this project and Ms. Franca de Kort for her helpful guide and timely information throughout the review process and the preparation of the final manuscript. Last but not least, I owe a huge debt to my parents, Haji Gnamo and Warituu Dhaqabo, whose unfailing support and love made me who I am, and this book is dedicated to their memory. My two children, Hawi and Hussein, are an important part of my life and each played a part in the final stage of this book. They accepted to have less time from me during the preparation of this manuscript but also contributed with energy and enthusiasm to its fruition. My daughter was always there to remind me about unfinished tasks and also typed several hand written manuscripts. My son, who is an IT specialist, took over the technical matters in his own hands including formatting, mapmaking, preparing the tables and illustrations, indexing and organizing the bibliogra- phy. His meticulous work has made my task easier and the text professional.
Abbas H. Gnamo Toronto, September 10, 2013
Pagination Style Errors: ______Pagination Corr. Missed out: ______Pagination correction introduce ______QC New Corrections ______
General Introduction
Context of the Study
My journey in writing this book began years ago, at the end of my undergradu- ate studies and, to some extent, goes back to the memories of my childhood. However, this is not about my story: it is the result of many years of scholarly research. My familiarity with the culture, issues, and problems under discus- sion were important in shaping my interest. To put my personal and scholarly journey in perspective, it may be helpful to provide a brief personal note. I was born in Ethiopia, in the Arsi region of Oromia, the province named after the largest Oromo group living there for centuries, in a place called Ethaya, Hetosa district, 150 km from Addis Ababa. It is very fertile and a relatively developed territory, especially due to the introduction of agricultural mechanization since the 1960s. Above all, Ethaya is a part of Arsi Oromo country home to several places of memories, the most important memory being that of Anole and Azule, places that symbolize the imperial wars of conquest and the consequent alienation of the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th centuries.1 I went to a school called Ras2 Birru Wolde Gabriel, one of the rarest elemen- tary and junior secondary schools in the district to honor the son of one of the leading empire builders and influential landowning Shoan nobility, who con- quered the region of Harar, Ittu, and Eastern part of the Arsi country, Dide'a, and Bale. It is not surprising that before the 1975 nationalization of rural land in the country, Ras Birru’s family was said to have been the biggest land owner in Ethiopia. The land the Ras Birru family owned was confiscated from indigenous communities in the regions his father, Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel,
1 Anole is a place where an unknown number of men’s right hands and women’s breasts were mutilated by the Shoan army officers during the last phase of imperial war of 1886 called “harmaf harka muraa Anole.” Azule is place in Central Arsi where more than 12,000 Arsi Oromo combatants were said to have been killed in a single night by the Ras Darghe in the fall of 1886 which sealed the fate of Oromo and the Shoan victory. Anole has become the symbol of Oromo resistance and hundreds of thousands of people congregated to commem- orate those who were killed and victimized in the early 1990s. Etheya is said to have been selected to be home to a Memorial Museum for the martyrs of Menelik’s war and the construction of a multi-million dollar monument is said to have been planned. 2 The term “Ras” (lit. means “Head”) stands for the highest military title in traditional Ethiopia. Other titles include:
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004265486_002
Dejazmatch (literally commander of the door); Fitawrarri (literally commander of the vanguard), Kegnazmatch (literally commander of the right wing); Grazmatch (literally com- mander of the left wing); Balambaras (literally commander of the citadel); Shaleqa (com- mander of 1000); Metoaleqa (commander of 100); Hamsaleqa (commander of 50); and Asiraleqa (commander of 10). 3 Incidentally, the land where my ancestors lived and I grew up was awarded to Ras Birru, who gave five gasha (one gasha stands for a unit of 40 ha) of land to his personal secretary, Bejirwond Haile Golmame, for his service, he sold part of this land in the wake of the Italian invasion to my father and his cousins – they had to buy their own ancestral land in order not to be landless tenants. 4 Cf. Allan Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia: The Dynamics of Cognatic Descent (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973); John M. Cohen, Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia (Assen: Van Gorcum, and Comp. B.V., 1975). 5 It is not surprising if those who benefited from the advent of the empire gave the name of a warlord (Ras Darghe) or a landlord (Ras Birru) to an elementary and high school in the region. For the Oromo who lost the war and suffered the consequences of forced incorpora- tion, the use of the names – Ras Darghe and Ras Birru Wolde Gabriel – was adding an insult to injury as these individuals were responsible for the loss of their sovereignty and land, and the consequent suffering. It was no wonder, therefore, that the first thing the Oromo of dif- ferent regions asked after the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 was to remove these names from their places, schools and hospitals.
during Haile Selassie’s reign, through the means of modern education, the media and administration. Although perhaps more than 90% of the popula- tion in the region and 40% of the Ethiopian population are Oromos, they were not allowed to write and teach in Oromo language until 1991. The Oromo of this region (Arsi-Bale) waged the longest and fiercest war of resistance against King Menelik of Shoa (1865–1889), later emperor of Ethiopia (1889–1913). When I was growing up, the memories of this decade-long war appeared to be fresh in the recollections of elders but I did not know yet that these wars were critical in creating Ethiopia proper by incorporating the independent Southern peoples, kingdoms and territories, Oromo included, to the then expanding Shoan kingdom which became the Ethiopian empire and a much bigger state. Also, I grew up at a time when the Oromo society was undergoing rapid socio-cultural transformation due to the consolidation of monotheist religions, Islam being the main religion in this case, and a modest modernization process. I saw firsthand how they were coping with changes by embracing some cultural elements while consciously or unconsciously rejecting others in order to maintain their distinct cultural heritage of Oromummaa (Oromoness) through processes of social change. Studying continuity and trans- formation has become central focal points to my scholarly research. Politically, the situation had always been tense in this volatile Oromo coun- try, where resistance, small or big, was ongoing particularly during periods of uncertainty and instability at the center. I heard of several local and regional protests against massive bureaucratic corruption, land alienation and exclu- sion, throughout Arsi Oromo country and beyond, one of these protests culmi- nated into the armed rebellion at Southern Arsi, Bale (1963–1970).6 This rebellion coincided with the awakening and birth of a Pan-Oromo solidarity movement known as Matcha-Tulama Association (1963–1967), initiated by the elites but which received a broad enthusiastic and unqualified support in this region and elsewhere. The association brought together the Oromo from every corner of their country to reconnect beyond religious and regional divides.7
6 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century, African Studies Series, No. 72 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Chapter 5; Mindaye Abebe Senbeta, The Oromo of Bale: A Historical Survey to 1974 (M.A. Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 2005), pp. 75–82. 7 “What transformed the association from being a self-help organization in the administrative region of Shawa to a Pan-Oromo Movement was the public meeting held on May 15, 1966 in Arsi at a place called Ithaya. There were tens of thousands of Oromo from different regions, both Muslims and Christians; met and discussed how they were all subject to harsh eco- nomic exploitation and political oppression. It was the beginning of co-ordinated and united Oromo activities and realization about the importance of unity. Those who were at the meeting vowed never to be divided again Muslims ate meat slaughtered by Christians and
Incidentally, the most important public rally of this association took place in my school, Ethaya, where seventy to a hundred thousand Oromo gathered: the discussion focused on Oromo landlessness, humiliation and cultural revival.8 The Ethaya meeting was the largest crowd I had ever seen as a first grade school boy. This association, though banned, set the stage for unity and “horizontal comradeship” as well as the development of nationalism by the fact the Oromo started to imagine themselves in terms of nationhood.9 This was not an inven- tion of a nation but the awakening of the existing old cultural nation, despite minor ethnographic differences, par excellence seeking respect, recognition, and self-determination, the idea put forward since the 1970s by OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and other liberation movements (Map 0.1). As this book will demonstrate, the contemporary conflicts between the imperial center and periphery (the newly acquired regions) have deep roots which go back to the formation of modern Ethiopia, during the second half of the 19th century. Officially, the existence of the Ethiopian empire is seen as a fait accomplis and the country has been portrayed as the oldest independent nation of 3000 years. Many of the wars undertaken by the Ethiopian kings and emperors were just mentioned in passing or in footnotes or just considered as simple campaigns (zamacha) to (re)unite the country and incorporate the peoples, or wars of pacification and punishment of “unruly people” justified by the royal guide called Fetaha Negest. However, as I will be demonstrating in several chapters, “What to many Amhara Tigre was a reincorporation was to most subject peoples outright imperium.”10
the Christians ate meat slaughtered by Muslims. This was an unheard of event in Ethiopia, which outraged the Amhara ruling elites,” Mohammed Hassen, “The Development of Oromo Nationalism.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries, edited by P.T.W. Baxter, Jan Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi (Lawrenceville and Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1996), pp. 67–80, 76. 8 Mohammed Hassen, Ibid.; see also Asafa Jalata, ed., Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopia Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy (Lawrenceville, NJ, 1998); Mekuria Bulcha, Contours of the Emergent and Ancient Oromo Nation: Dilemmas in the Ethiopian Politics of State and Nation-Building (Cape Town: Center for Advanced Studies of African Societies, 2011). 9 Benedict Anderson quotes Seton-Watson who wrote “All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.” Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6. 10 Charles W. McClellan, Reaction to Ethiopian Expansionism: The Case of Darasa, 1895–1935 (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1978), p. 3.
Map 0.1 Oromia Regional Map.
Economically, the 1960s was a period of modernization including the mecha- nization of agriculture and I realized the extent to which “development” meant also displacement of peasants and further alienation of the land for enrich- ment of power elites with connections, land, and capital and there may not have been any place in Ethiopia where the slogan “Land to tiller” had more resonance than the Arsi Oromo country. I remember the last decade of the monarchy, and the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, in which I participated as a student with enthusiasm and hope to seek justice for a people largely expropri- ated and marginalized by the imperial political system and administration. Undoubtedly, the reforms ensuing from the revolution were timely and most welcome and, viewed from Southern perspective, it was difficult to see any objectionable measures taken by the Darg (the name of the military junta) in the first 2 years – perhaps with the exception of handful balabbats (local inter- mediaries) created by Ethiopian feudal colonialism, the Oromo “had nothing to lose.” They welcomed the overthrow of the emperor, who had never been popular in the region, the arrest and imprisonment of high ranking officials, governors and judges and big landowners. Likewise, the Darg regime removed all parachuted governors, judges and corrupt bureaucrats almost exclusively hailing from the north, the core region of the empire, who did not share the culture and language of the people they destined to serve – they administered justice and governed through interpreters (simabelew) for almost a hundred years in a region where they did not give the opportunity to learn the official language they were promoting. Above all, the land was nationalized and redis- tributed to farmers through Peasant Associations. It appeared that the struc- tures of domination were gone; farmers got land and freedom and, under this circumstance, it was no surprise to see the popularity of the Darg during the first few years of its rule. However, 10 years later, after these significant reforms, the most important being the Land Reform of 1975, it was obvious for me, a graduate student then, and any observer that the initial hope was dashed and replaced by the disenchantment, remorse, and frustration. The underlying causes of Ethiopian political contradictions, the nature of the Ethiopian state, and center-periphery relations, did not undergo much change. The land was not entirely given to the tillers, and was still owned in title by the state which imposed forced cooperatives and “villagization” (the regrouping of farmers in a large village) a misguided policy which contributed to alienation and pauper- ization of the rural communities. The revolution, instead of alleviating poverty and raising the standard of landless farmers pauperized lower and middle class peasants – instituting a sort of equality in poverty and destitution. It created food shortage and insecurity in areas such as Arsi-Bale massifs where
this should not have happened. I saw man-made desolation and human suffer- ing in this green and highland plateau of Arsi-Bale massifs and parts of Sidamo and Shoa regions I visited in the late 1980s. Taddesse Berisso’s observation of the Villagization policy and its impact on the Guji-Oromo, Arsi’s neighbors, can be transposable in all Southern regions:
Thus, with all its economic, social, environmental and political ills, villa- gization caused devastating poverty to Guji farmers in a brief period of time…There was poverty without natural cause, crop failure without drought, starvation not witnessed by television cameras, and thus disas- ter without fanfare…For Guji farmers, villagization was the gloomiest of all government policies implemented in the country. Five years after the implementation, the programme which was claimed to be of lasting benefit to peasant farmers could only be assessed in terms of its costs in human suffering.11
Even with the end of the Darg regime in 1991, no one is guaranteed land owner- ship; the land continues to belong to the government,12 which can lease or sell at will to foreign countries and corporations or even to wealthy Ethiopian expatriates who have the money. One can observe that there is a tendency in Ethiopian history to use land as leverage by the state to control, reward or pun- ish, mobilize and recruit peasants for wars, and now elections. In other words, since the incorporation of the South, successive Ethiopian governments have used land ownership as an effective tool to coerce, mobilize, control and gain loyalty in regions where people did not feel they were citizens. The concept of citizens with equal rights and duties does not seem to be known or rarely applied in the country of the “Sun King” and primarily where aristocratic empires have subjects and not citizens in the true meaning of the term. For instance, in the Arsi Oromo country, the authorities used landownership rights as a rallying force of mobilization to resist the Italian invasion of 1936 instead of the concept of citizenship. Accordingly, all bale maret (landowners) were ordered to mobilize and those who did not heed were threatened with the loss
11 Tadesse Berisso, “Modernist Dreams and Human Suffering: Villagization among the Guji Oromo.” In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James et al. (Oxford/ Athens: James Currey/Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 116–132, 132. 12 For an assessment of land policy debate after 1991, see among others, Hussein Jemma, “The Debate over Rural Land Tenure Policy Options in Ethiopia: A Review of the Post-1991 Contending Views.” Ethiopian Journal of Development Research, 23, no. 2, October 2001 and Wibke Crewett and Benedikt Korf, “Ethiopia: Reforming Land Tenure.” Review of African Political Economy, 35, no. 116 (2008): 203–220.
13 See among others, the analysis of René Lefort, “Ethiopia’s Election: All Losers.” Open Democracy, July 2010. 14 For a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution see, among others, Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution: The Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Aristocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington and Indianapolis: India University Press, 1988); René Lefort, Éthiopie: la révolution héré- tique (Paris: F. Maspero, 1981); Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1981).
Mengistu’s victorious faction of the power struggle of the 1970s. Many of them were descendants of the local gentry known under the generic name Naftagna (armed settlers). Although the Darg regime targeted all its opponents, right wing and left wing, from all ethnic backgrounds, it was generally perceived as embodying traditional imperial power and interests, and its defeat in 1991 was deeply resented by the Amhara as the “decline of the Amhara as the national elite of Ethiopia.”15 In brief, the empire was no longer in Revolution but engaged in the task of reconfiguring the state in the name of socialism and “democratic centralism” to ensure totalitarian domination under one party rule – there was no sur- prise that colonel Mengistu was called the “Red Emperor.” As one govern- ment official confided to me, the Ethiopian revolution in the South lasted only few years, the remaining years was the period of reorganization and consolidation of the central power, Mengistu’s personal rule in this particular case.16 For hapless peasants, this period of reorganization manifested itself in scarcity of food, constrained political rights, and essentially left them with no voice or autonomy to run their own affairs (they had to be told what to pro- duce, when to produce and at what price to sell their produce). As a conse- quence, the status quo between the center and the periphery, which this book is set out to address, remained essentially imperial despite the end of the monarchy and the feudal system on which it was founded and the shift in ideological and policy orientation in 1974 and again in 1991. As Markakis aptly stated:
Despite the radical nature of the modifications that these regimes intro- duced in the centre/periphery relationship, neither relinquished the cen- tre’s monopoly of power, although both tried to disguise the fact by declaring war on other iniquitous divisions in society: between social classes for soldiers, between nationalities for EPRDF. The subterfuge was transparent and intensified opposition from the periphery.17
15 Cressida Marcus, “Imperial Nostalgia: Christian Restoration and Civic Decay.” In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James et al. (Oxford/Athens: James Currey/Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 239–256. She wrote about Amhara percep- tion of the post Darg era as follows, “Rancour resulting from the defeat of the Darg deep- ened a bitterness about an issue that heartfelt and analytically fascinating – the decline of the Amhara as national elite in Ethiopia.” 16 For academic perspectives on continuity and change in Ethiopian politics and state, see the analysis of Christopher Clapham, Transformations and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 17 John Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers (James Currey, UK, 2011), p. 14.
There is no denying that some positive developments occurred following the structural changes – new regimes tend to introduce some important reforms to legitimize their power. But, both the revolution and the federal model became an illusion and mirage and national liberation movements and eth- nonational fronts mushroomed everywhere and were able to make a case for self-determination as a way out of imperial domination that are seemingly unchanging and unchangeable center-periphery relations. After the initial euphoria, the Revolution did not deliver its vision but brought upon more suf- fering. As Mohammed Hassen stated, “For seventeen years, the peoples of Ethiopia suffered under brutal military dictatorship, whose historic mission was nothing but destruction. It is believed that no less two million peasants lost their lives between 1974 and 1991, not to mention millions of Oromo who were internally displaced and thousands who were scattered as refugees to many parts of the World.”18 At the same time, it is important to stress that the conflict between the center and periphery is not only about politics, economy and culture, though they are very important, but also about memories, narratives and discourses19 which provide ideological and philosophical justifications for the various struggles waged in the country. Why is one’s hero a villain for others? Why do different peoples have different accounts, memories and understanding of the same events and leaders? This is not the monopoly of political and intellectual elites and to my surprise the answers of my Amhara and Oromo informants without or little formal education to similar questions were different. I realized gradually that the extent to which these memories and historical experiences are important in the way people per- ceive, define, and construct identity in their conceptualization of nationhood and statehood. Collective memories shape, in one way or another, hope or fear and mutual trust or mistrust between communities and individuals in divided societies like Ethiopia. These memories and perceptions have largely influenced the diaspora behavior, political agenda and activism in “hostlands” to effect change in their homeland in such a way to suit group interest, although the discourse may conveniently be embellished by
18 Mohammed Hassen, “Colonial Consolidation and Resistances, 1935–2000.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, 7, no. 1–2 (July 2000): 109–198, 148. 19 For interesting discussions on this matter, see Alessandro Triulzi, “Battling with the Past, New Frameworks for Ethiopian Historiography.” In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialist and After, edited by Wendy James et al. Oxford/Athens: James Currey/Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 176–288. See also John Sorenson, Imagining Ethiopia: Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993).
normative discourse in international politics such as human rights, democ- racy, and justice. For example it is important to explain the reason why Menelik and other “big men” who were praised nationally and among soldier-settlers called naftagna were not perceived in the same way by the Oromo. The name of the emperor and that of his key lieutenants generally evoked anger in the Arsi Oromo country and among other Oromo people. I never heard in any oral tra- ditions that I gathered where he was called “our king,” but rather he was referred to as “their king,” the king of the Amhara, and he was rather ridiculed in Arsi Oromo war songs as he escaped from battlefield on several occasions and narrowly escaped death three times. In fact, the newly conquered people (19th century) hardly comprehend that Menelik II was adored as a gentle and kind ruler by his followers and subjects in Shoa who even took oath by his name. He used to be called emiyye, the affectionate term often used for the beloved mother in Amharic by those who felt empowered by his imperial accomplishments and the consequent distri- bution of reward in honors, titles, land and surplus since there was an abun- dance of resources to go around after the conquest and incorporation of the South. Consequently, Menelik was accused by nationalists of alienating the land from the conquered people while empowering and enriching his own group at the expense of others which is well captured by a Walaita proverb, one of the most oppressed southern peoples, saying “Menelik gave the land to the Amhara and other people to the birds.” Beyond historical facts to demon- strate this, Menelik himself was the first to recognize the extent to which his reign benefitted the Shoan kingdom: one could say that the real beneficiaries were the politico-military elites and ecclesiastic magnates. As a result, the kingdom emerged as the political, military, and cultural hub of the Ethiopian empire in the center at the cost of the periphery.20 It is critical then to under- stand how this divided memory emerged and gave rise to a divided loyalty and the degree of people’s identification with the imperial state and national iden- tity or lack thereof. Here, the argument is that being a nation goes beyond living in the same territory and under the jurisdiction of the same state; it presupposes “the sense
20 I share the view that not every Amhara or Tigrean has benefited from the imperial power and the wealth despite hailing from these groups. Many are still in abject poverty. That is true. That does not make a difference for the colonized their rulers have been alienated, no matter the wealth distributed among their kin or members of their community. Being part of the dominant groups does hurt and even the most destitute members or beggars felt they were superior to the dominated groups.
21 Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (Paris: Editions d’Art E. Pelletan, 1934), p. 88. 22 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), p. 145. 23 Some original sources including royal chronicles were modified and distorted to remove what looked like “divisive elements” in order to come up with a clean and flawless national
about the other side of the story although there are some who are not locked in “old certainty” and understand the concerns of the conquered and disad- vantaged South, the Oromo and non-Oromo alike. The one case in point is the combined legacy, trace and mark left by emperor Menelik II. All writers have highlighted, rightly, that Menelik’s remarkable victory against the Italian invading forces at Adwa in 1896 and its national and global influences were a unique feat in Black history.24 However, what is missing from this big picture and the intriguing question is: How much do we know and how much can we learn about what Menelik and his wars of conquest did to independent kingdoms and societies at the same time? Do we really know how many people were killed, mutilated, enslaved during these bloody wars or campaigns and in the aftermath? How much does it matter to be free from European colonialism but to be enslaved or enserfed in one’s country by neighbors? Do we really know the real impact of anarchic feudal administration and political economy in the newly conquered regions? Are we told that without the Southern peoples, who had no or little rights but obliga- tions, and contributed their resources to the effort that both the victory of Adwa and the survival of independence of this old polity would have been questionable without them? As Wendy James remarked:
Without the contributions of Ethiopia’s Southern peoples, whose sweat and blood go unrecorded in Ethiopianist annals, the Battle of Adwa in 1986 might not have been won and Menelik II might not have gone on to build his empire. Ethiopia might never have played the part it did in the modern political arena, nor might it have become, as it did, an interna- tional symbol of African statehood and civilization.25
Whereas both official historiography and even some scholarship have empha- sized official state nationalism, they completely ignored or minimized the “fact of conquest,” the colonial nature of center/periphery relations and the root
history. The case in point is Menelik’s chronicle written by Gabre Selassie, analyzed by Hussein Ahmed where he compares the original and the edited versions of the same chronicle. Some Problems of Gabre Selassie Chronicle, Addis Ababa University, August 1977. I personally saw the differences between the edited Amharic version and the origi- nal French version. 24 Raymond Jonas, The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 25 Wendy James, preface to The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Anthropology, edited by Donald Donham and Wendy James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Very often, where national identities are freely debated, there is a healthy struggle between those who want to hold up a bowdlerized version of the nation’s history as an extended moral exemplar in Orwell’s sense and those who draw attention to lapses and shortcomings: injustices inflicted on minorities, acts of treachery, acts of cowardice, and so forth. The first group reminds us of how we aspire to behave; the second group point to defects in our practices and institutions that have allowed us to fall short.27
Sources, Methods and Organization of the Book
In this book, as elsewhere in my other previous works, I have always tried to undertake critical interpretations of Ethiopian history with respect to the South, the Oromo. It was in this context that I was able to produce an original essay on the imperial conquest of Arsi Oromo country and its major conse- quences (ca. 1880–1935); and aspects of this was published both in English and French. This, ultimately, served as a stepping stone for my scholarly endeavor that has evolved and developed through years of studies, graduate and post- graduate, research and teaching. In my graduate studies (Anthropology and Political Science) in France, I continued to build on this experience to conduct
26 One of the most popular thoughts widely quoted asserts: “All contradictions are class con- tradictions, the national question is a partial expression of this contradiction. Demolish the ruling class, establish socialist Ethiopia and the national question will be resolved.” Quoted in Amanuel Gebre Yesus, Historical Background to the National Question in Ethiopia (London: Ethio-International Press, 1993), pp. 25–26. 27 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 40.
further research with a more developed conceptual framework. The focal point of this research has been the Oromo region of the Arsi, the largest Oromo group (in the Bale and Arsi regions) on which my Ph.D. dissertation was based. As part of that, I conducted formal interviews both in Amharic and Oromo languages over a long period of time in addition to talking informally to numer- ous knowledgeable informants on different issues – this constituted the major source of the data or information used in these chapters. Also, I consulted some primary and secondary sources in European capital cities (London, Rome, Brussels, and Paris) although colonial and diplomatic archives are less abundant and less helpful in this particular case.28 More importantly, the vari- ous documents at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, perhaps the largest collection on this country, are very useful in this work. Moreover, as the various sections of the book show, I have borrowed and used methods from anthropology, history and political science to analyze and interpret the various data in the different chapters (some chapters are subject to anthropological/ethnographic analysis and others were written by using rig- orous historical methods and I have adopted multidisciplinary approaches when and where necessary). I have tried to enrich my analysis by referring to relevant theoretical insights and authoritative works, published and unpub- lished documents on the issues under discussion. The key chapters are based on my Ph.D. thesis written in French and submitted to Paris University I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), and other chapters were written afterwards. Aspects of my research were published in different journals or presented at confer- ences both in French and English languages. However, a large part of data for this study comes from unpublished original manuscripts. As the title explicitly shows, the book is devoted to the Arsi Oromo society and the Ethiopian empire, their political, military, and cultural encounter and the economic, political and cultural reality that followed. It is not the history of the Ethiopian empire per se, neither is it a history of relations between the Oromo and the Christian kingdom in the distant past. It is limited in scope, time and space. The themes addressed include, but are not limited to, the Oromo’s social organization and political culture, the imperial war of conquest
28 It is obvious that those who study the past of oral societies in Sub-Saharan Africa face major common challenges including the absence of written sources and organized data. James McClellan who under took a historical study of Southern Ethiopia underlines the problem in the following terms: “The most difficult task facing a historian of rural Ethiopia is not the search for an appropriate theoretical model but the collection of source material. Despite northern Ethiopia’s millennium old literary tradition and the depth of scholarship on the area of Ethiopic (Geez language) literature, local history remains very poorly documented in both primary and secondary sources.” Op. cit., p. 7.
empirical historical facts, this chapter will argue that Ethiopia perfectly fits into the category of empire by the fact that it is a state based on conquest, which created a multi-ethnic polity dominated by an identifiable ethnic group, Amhara–Tigreans. The state and unity are based on military force and the monopoly of power, influence and prestige by one of the constituent elements of the empire and this had created the dynamic of revolts, ethnonationalism and resistances. The focal point of the chapter is being the modern empire created at the end of 19th century by Menelik (1841–1913) and inherited by Haile Selassie (1930–1974) and the historical and political contexts of its cre- ation and the salient features of the landed empire which survived European colonialism. Chapter 4 will analyze the war of conquest and resistance during the period corresponding to the European colonization called the “Scramble of Africa” which created Ethiopia proper. Despite significant endeavors by the preceding kings, Tewodros and Yohannes, modern Ethiopia was created under Menelik who gave its current shape and frontiers by conquering and incorporating Southern and South-eastern territories which were added through diplomacy, force or a combination of both. This chapter is a case study of imperial war of conquest and colonization, certainly the longest and one of the most bloody undertaken by Menelik in the 1880s and 1890s. Some of the questions I will examine in this chapter are as follows: Why did it take him so long to defeat his unarmed and uncentralized neighbors despite his superior military prowess, firearms and organizational capacity which enabled him to rout the Italians just in a single day? What were the secrets behind’s the Arsi ability to raise such a huge number of combatants (more than 100,000 according to some esti- mates) to counter Shoan invading forces? Why and how they lost the war and their sovereignty? We will highlight the role of long military traditions and warrior ideology enshrined in the Gadaa system and social solidarity and qual- ity leadership provided in this legendary resistance to be organized by a people without a state. Part Three, explores the political, economic and cultural consequences of the Ethiopian war of conquest. As part of that, Chapter 5 will demonstrate that conversion to Islam was one of the major repercussions of the defeat of the Arsi Oromo. As opposed what one would expect, the expansion of the Orthodox faith, state religion, and the Ethiopian war in Arsi, the ensuing harsh treat- ment, alienation and the animosity toward the state and its policies triggered a sudden spread of Islam in the society which was hitherto the follower of tradi- tional Oromo monotheist religion (now called Waaqafannaa). The chapter explores how Islam has significantly impacted Oromo social organization, values and culture.
Chapter 6 examines the economic and political consequences of the defeat and forced incorporation into the newly emerging empire three times larger than historic Abyssinia: the emergence of the Amhara as the most dominant ethnic group and the loss of sovereignty and expropriation of land from the conquered people. The Oromo land was confiscated and distributed under the different titles to soldiers, judges, and the Orthodox Church, gover- nors and imperial dignitaries for the services they rendered to the imperial state and administration. I will examine the extent to which the conquest destroyed democratic political culture and institutions and in its wake, the creation of local instruments of domination and the introduction of serfdom (Gabbar) and its socio-economic implications. Part Four provides further analysis of the Ethiopian administrative policy and the political economy of feudal colonialism. Chapter 7 is devoted to the political administration, the philosophy and methods of governance of the newly conquered region which was punitive, oppressive and exploitative. As a rule, the governor (aqgni, “colonizer” as he was called) became the first gover- nor of the province he conquered and he appointed his followers or his men in the different parts of the region under his control. None of them followed any organized national policy and the absence of set of uniform national policy led to arbitrary administration. Almost all officials including the governors and judges were Amhara Christians and they appeared to have considered their domains to be “small kingdoms” against which there was no or little recourse. They controlled production and security from Katama (fortified towns which later grew into urban centers) through local agents called balabbats and other informal institutions which were all abolished after the 1974 Revolution and replaced by other structures of domination. Chapter 8 analyzes the economic condition of the peasantry and the extent to which the government imposed a feudal-colonial system, which was abol- ished in 1974. This section examines, in some detail, the fragmentation of land, tenant-landlord relationship and the pauperization of landless peasants and small landowners whose economic conditions became worse following the introduction of a mechanized agriculture in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. The chapter discusses the causes of discontent and protests in this region, the major being the Bale uprising, 1963–1970. The final and concluding Part Five, Chapter 9, addresses one of the thorny issues of modern Ethiopia: the attempt at the transformation of the empire- state to modern nation through nation building and national integration of this polity created and governed under the conditions analyzed in the preced- ing chapters. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, Ethiopia became an empire through a successful conquest and incorporation of numerous peoples with distinct
history, languages, religion and kinship organizations, and so forth. Although Abyssinia is ancient and the state is old, the transformation of old forms of statehood into a modern nationhood is a challenge. Thus, the dilemma of modern empire which took the name of Ethiopia is no different from the expe- rience of post-colonial states in Africa. With the rise of modernization theory and national integration and nation-building the advent of a nation around what was considered to be a core culture, the Amhara culture, language and religion became a national design and policy. The chapter critically reviews the extent to which the political oppression and cultural marginalization contrib- uted to nationalist upsurge and weakened the imperial regime in 1974, its suc- cessor, the Darg regime (1974–1991), and the advent of current regime led by EPRDF/TPLF, as well as the paradoxes of the current experiment called “ethnic federalism.” Without completely dismissing this endeavor, which appears to be an improvement over the preceding imperial policies in some respects, we will critically assess its contradictions and as to why they are not likely to succeed in achieving its projected objectives. The chapter explores the crisis of the Ethiopian state, identity politics, and the challenges of finding a workable solution competing loyalties and disputed national identity. On the whole, the different chapters of this book clearly introduce and elu- cidate the Oromo society, its institutions and socio-political culture which define their nationhood and peoplehood as well as the democratic nature of this polity while assessing continuity and change in their culture after their conquest and incorporation to the Ethiopian empire. The second part of the book brings to light, through empirical and detailed study, the Ethiopian motives and rationales of colonial conquest and Arsi Oromo stiff and resolute resistance, their experiences of confiscation of land, economic exploitation, and cultural marginalization which inspired discontent, rebellion, and the development of national consciousness and political mobilization. The study provides a detailed analysis of the pre-revolutionary period beginning with Menelik, going through Haile Selassie reign, and ending with Darg regime, which remains poorly documented with respect to the imperial periphery. After the Revolution of 1974 the nature of the regimes and the political system changed but many of the problems inherited from the past have persisted despite some important reforms. It is my hope that this study will contribute to a better understanding of Oromo history, culture as well as the beleaguered center-periphery relations, a legitimacy crisis of the state, competing national- isms, the roots causes and development of Oromo nationalism and the conse- quent identity politics and the fragmentation of political landscape in Ethiopia.
PART ONE Oromo’s Socio-Political Culture and Institutions
∵
Chapter 1 Democracy without State: Egalitarianism, Justice, and Leadership in an Oromo Polity
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the functioning of the traditional Oromo society and institutional mechanisms on which its socio-political cul- ture is founded. Some of these institutions, if not all, ceased to exist following colonization and the subsequent Islamization and Christianization as well as other forms of cultural contacts and internal socio-cultural mutations. Kinship institutions, in this case Gosa, is not only still functional but also its role remains important whereas elements or aspects of the vanishing institu- tions continue to manifest themselves in various ways and are fresh in the memories of the Oromo people. The Gadaa system itself is still functioning, in its reduced form, by losing many of its historical and traditional political attri- butes, among the southern Oromo,1 the Borana, Guji, at least in one district of the Arsi country, Kokkosa as well as among some Tulama groups in Shoa and Arsi-Bale Highlands.2 The Oromo have been undergoing rapid religious, cul- tural, economic and political transformations for more than a century. Changes are more profound in some spheres than in others. Yet, it is still dif- ficult to talk of a rupture between the past and present. The process of trans- formation and continuity can be understood through a combination of diachronic and synchronic approaches to bring to light changes in socio- economic structure overtime, religious beliefs and a model of social organization. The diachronic study of Oromo’s social structure, as that of their history, is difficult due to the paucity of sources. This is mainly because the Oromo
1 See, among others, Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society (New York: The Free Press, 1973); Eike Haberland, Galla Süd Äthiopiens (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963); John Hinnant, The Gadaa System of the Guji of Southern Ethiopia (Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Anthropology, The University of Chicago, 1977); Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Pouvoir de bénir et maudire: cosmologie et organisation sociale des Oromo-Arsi.” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, XXXVII(2), no. 146 (1997): 289–318. 2 See instance, Hector Blackhurst, “Continuity and Change in the Shoa Galla Gadaa System.” In Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African Age Organisations, edited by Paul Baxter and Uri Almagor (London: Hurst Company, 1978), pp. 245–267.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi ��.����/�����������86_003 24 Chapter 1 constitute an oral society and, as such, they do not have their own written sources. Oral traditions, though very useful, become less precise when one refers to the distant past. Accounts left by the Abyssinian clergy are not only fragmentary but also biased and ethnocentric as they dealt with the people they identified as their “enemies.” Even the combination of these sources with the testimony of travelers and missionaries cannot give an answer to many questions anthropologists and historians are likely to pose. Yet, by leaving aside their ideological aspects and biases, some of them remain important in the reconstruction of Oromo’s socio-cultural history.3 The hints or indications they give should be used, however, after verification and comparison with other sources. Professor Amarom Legesse demonstrated that in areas like the Borana, where Gadaa memories are relatively fresh and the system is practiced in its reduced form, there is the possibility of tracing back to the 16th century, based on the chronologies of Abba Gadaa who succeeded each other every 8 years. In studying Oromo culture, particular attention must be given to what Lévi- Strauss called the “native model” or give attention to how the Oromo classify their own experiences.4 This consists, among other things, in studying cosmol- ogy, myth, and social organization, etc.5 The Oromo language has not yet been fully exploited as it should be since it is one of the key elements in understand- ing the underlying logic of the Gadaa-Qaalluu system, democratic and egalitar- ian values. In this chapter and throughout this work, I will make a wider use of Oromo linguistic expressions and terms in order to interpret the ethnography and analyze the social system in its past and present settings. As suggested in the title, the themes to be addressed in this chapter are egal- itarianism, justice and democracy. I will examine to what extent the Oromo were (are) egalitarians. I believe, as many anthropologists, there were no per- fect egalitarian societies in history6 and the Oromo cannot be an exception.
3 Here we can mention of two them: Bahrey, “History of the Galla.” In Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593–1646, translated and edited by C.F. Buckingham and George Huntingford (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1954), pp. 113–129 and Asma Giyorgis, The History of the Galla, manuscript in 2 vols. (Addis Ababa: IES, Addis Ababa University, 1913 Amharic calendar) or its English trans- lation by Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shewa (Steiner: Stuttgart, 1987). 4 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale, Vol. I (Paris: Plon, 1958). 5 We tried to use these methods in recent article dedicated to Oromo social organization. See Abbas Haji, “Pouvoir de bénir et maudire: cosmologie et organisation sociale des Oromo- Arsi,” pp. 289–318. 6 See for instance, James Flanagan, “Hierarchy in Simple Egalitarian Society.” Annual Review of Anthropology, XVIII (1989): 245–307. Democracy without State 25
At the same time, it has to be stressed that some polities are less hierarchical and more egalitarian than others. The Oromo social system is based on elabo- rated egalitarian ideologies, values and social practices despite the manifesta- tion of some minimal hierarchy in different forms. It will be argued that the concept of justice is central to the Oromo cosmology, Gadaa and political cul- ture in general. Equality and justice form the bedrock of Oromo democratic ideals/principles, as in the case of western democracies. In the Oromo culture, egalitarianism and justice reside in the myth of foun- dation/creation, which mystifies or gives them religious and temporal dimen- sions. The Oromo law’s (Seera) principal purpose is to serve the justice and the two, justice and law, are inseparable in theory and in fact. We will treat how Seera is prepared (proclaimed) and applied in practice. An important part of the chapter will be devoted to Gadaa-Qaalluu in order to understand Oromo Democracy and socio-political culture. The two institutions along the kinship system were organized in such a way so as to be complementary and contra- dictory, functionally interdependent with checks and balances to ensure the continuity of the social system. Moreover, we will analyze, in the frame- work of the above-mentioned institutions, Tchaffee and Qixxee which consti- tuted laboratories of Oromo democracy. The former was associated with the Gadaa system and its calendars whereas the latter has been a democratic forum for Gosa/lineage members where decisions are taken through consen- sus (Map 1.1). Unless indicated the information and data analyzed here are obtained from Arsi country.7 Here, the word Oromo should be taken for the Arsi and some- times we use the two terms interchangeably. The Arsi may constitute the single largest branch of the Oromo nation, which constitutes according to the various data available about 40% of the Ethiopian population estimated at a closer to 90 million. The Oromo have settled over a large territory in Ethiopia and north- ern Kenya for centuries, which led to the development of regionalisms and minor ethnographic differences thanks to cultural contacts, including religious conversions, Islam or Christianity and attachment to Oromo traditional reli- gion and ways of life, agriculture or agro-pastoralism or pastoral nomadism, etc. Yet, they have retained the essence of their culture through a common language (Oromiffa) which is totally intelligible.
7 Some aspects of this text were presented in the different parts of my doctoral dissertation, Les Oromo-Arsi: continuité et évolution des institutions d’une société éthiopienne, thèse de doc- torat de l’Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 1990. However, it is completely reviewed and combined with previously unused material gathered from the fieldwork in Arsi-Bale Regions, in 1987–1988. 26 Chapter 1
Map 1.1 Arsi Oromo traditional habitat. Source: adapted from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 27, 2013
Thus, although I am convinced that a large part of my analysis can be transpos- able, one should not underestimate some local particularisms developed over centuries by each regional group, due to internal transformations or through contacts with different cultures. This suggests that, in spite of common origins and the underlying rules of the social institutions, some ethnographic details may appear peculiar to the group. After all, the Arsi developed a sense of regional identity (Arsooma which sounds like “Arsi-ness” based on genealogy Democracy without State 27 and social morphology) within a broader Oromo social universe defined by the concept of Oromummaa, an embodiment of Oromo oneness, unity and nationhood. Traditionally, the Arsi are composed of two moieties, Sikko and Mando, which are subdivided into numerous – perhaps not less than 200 – Gosa. In turn, these Gosa are segmented into hundreds or thousands of lineages (bal- bala) covering the whole present Arsi region, all Bale highlands down to the Somali country, the Great Rift Valley, which was annexed and attached to Shoa province by Ras Mesfin Sileshi, Eastern Sidamo and Western Hararghe. This makes the Arsi country the widest of all Oromo provinces with a great variety of reliefs, topography and climate ranging from a cool highland plateau of Arsi- Bale massifs to hot lowlands in the West and East.8 Although there is no an accurate census available, the Arsi are considered to be one of the major branches, perhaps the single largest sub-group, of the Oromo nation. The Arsi ignore the administrative boundaries traced at differ- ent times since the imperial conquest. They simply divide this vast territory into two: Bale and Dide’a. Bale covers all the massif highlands, which include their country of origin, and the adjacent lowlands south of the Shabale River inhabited by all Gosa claiming descent from their mythical father, Arsi, whereas their habitat north of Shabale is known as Dide’a. Bale-Dide’a is, therefore, a continuous geographical reality and a relatively coherent socio-cultural unit in the past and modern times despite different administrative demarcation and arrangements by the successive regimes.
The Ideological and Philosophical Basis of Oromo Egalitarianism
Before going into the heart of the subject, I would like to say a few words about “egalitarian society” which has attracted the attention of many researchers and anthropologists. After decades of theoretical discussions, inspired by evolu- tionism, materialist explanations and a demographic size of a given popula- tion, the question of egalitarian society is still shrouded in mystery.9 It appears, however, that anthropologists agree that there was (is) no perfect egalitarian
8 Martial de Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik: Les Galla (Paris: Oudin, 1901) and Eike Haberland, Galla Süd Äthiopiens (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963). 9 Christopher Boehm, “Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy.” Current Anthropology, XXXIV (1993): 227–254. For detailed theoretical discussions of equality, inequality and hierarchy see Louis Dumont, Homo hiérarchus: essai sur le système des castes (Paris: Gallimard, 1966) and Homo aqualis: genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique (Paris: Gallimard, 1977). 28 Chapter 1 society in the classical meaning of the term. This is mainly because all societies have experienced at least a minimal hierarchy based on the criteria of age, sex and personal characteristic (merit). E. Leach writes: “Almost all empirical soci- eties are societies socially stratified – by social class, by hereditary ‘caste’, by hierarchy of rank, etc., and each status in the system is marked by its own dis- tinctive cultural attributes – linguistic usages, manners, styles of dress, food, housing, etc.”10 In the absence of social classes and hereditary caste, with the exception of non-Oromo groups viewed as different, Oromo social structure clearly depicts that these universal forms of stratification founded on age, sex and the per- sonal quality of individuals. As will be discussed later, the difference of age was not only recognized but also observed as the basis for the distribution or allo- cation of responsibility, status and role. Historically and ethnographically speaking, the Gadaa system was closely associated with the structure of biological/chronological age and generation.11 The transition from one age- set to the next is usually formalized through the rites de passage and ceremo- nies. Moreover, Gadaa, Oromo’s socio-political system, as that of kinship organization, excluded women from political power as well as some important political-ritual functions among which was pilgrimage to the Great Qaalluu and Qixxee.12 Likewise, people with remarkable gifts and capacities (ritual, elo- quence or military bravery and success, etc.) are more respected than others and, as such, enjoyed prestige and influence. Finally, differences in wealth, in this case, the number of cattle, existed and were recognized. The absence of perfect equality in status, role and wealth due to some aspects of temporary hierarchy (age structure) or permanent hierarchy (sex, the order of birth and inherited political-ritual capacity in this case the Qaalluu), does not reduce, however, the importance of egalitarian ideology, values, ethos, democratic political culture and ways of life. In actual fact, dem- ocratic and egalitarian values are deep and are easily observable in Oromo culture and system of thought. This is mainly because egalitarianism and jus- tice are explained and rationalized in the myth of origin. The credo of Oromo religion is based on a basic dogma according to which Waaqa (God) created the universe, man, sky, animals and plants and He attributed to every creature its place and role in the universe.13 The belief in one God antedates their
10 Edmund Leach, Social Anthropology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 43. 11 See Legesse, Gadaa; Paul Baxter and Uri Almagor, eds., Age, Generation and Time. 12 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter II. 13 Lambert Bartels, Oromo Religion, Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understood (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1983), p. 210. Democracy without State 29 conversion to Islam and Christianity, and as such, the Oromo are qualified by some observers as African monotheists.14 Of all beings, God was said to have favored man because he gave his daughter, “Justice” (dhugaa), to him. The Arsi Oromo believe that God does not have his own children, but he begot, symboli- cally, a daughter, “Justice,” and gave her to humans at the dawn of history to maintain peace, equality and harmony as well as common good in the society. So, Justice is synonymous with the daughter of God (Dhugaan ilmoo Waaqa). This early mythical justice known as dhugaa ganama (lit. means the justice of dawn) and serves as a standard and permanent guide against which all justices rendered in the society are measured and checked since man-made laws (Seera) are not as perfect as natural laws (Seera Uumaa).15 Oromo elders maintain that after receiving justice as a gift of God, men asked themselves what was to be done to protect and maintain it. The solution they founded was to formulate and pass on an efficient institutional mecha- nism Seera (Oromo laws) to serve justice. This implies that Seera is not made by God, but by men in the best interest of justice and the society. The Gadaa system itself was organized and functioned according to one of these funda- mental laws known as Seera Gadaa (Gadaa laws). Therefore, Gadaa became one of – perhaps the most important – distributive justice ensuring, and as such, egalitarian principles of social relations, mechanism of representation and participation in the socio-political life and maintenance of social order and peace in the society. The mystification of justice has another important consequence: those who are entitled to administer justice, including Gadaa officers, kinship elders or hayyuu and other prominent individuals, do all they can to avoid a partial or deformed justice. In afaan Oromoo, the word holuu stands for exclusion/favor- itism and holamuu to be excluded or to be deprived of one’s right. It is gener- ally believed that those who exclude others from political, ritual and political participation deserve the curse of God. Partiality and favoritism in justice would bring those who transgress it in a direct conflict with God, who is the guardian of his daughter, Justice; he who violates her would suffer the curse of Waaqa (abaarsa waaqa), a curse which continues to manifest itself for at least seven generations. In the same manner, children or descendants could inherit one’s blessing or curse.16 At this juncture, it is important to note that before
14 Martial de Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik, p. 210. 15 For detailed study of Oromo customary laws see Dinsa Lepisa Abba Jobir, The Gadaa System of Government and Sera Tchaffe Oromo (Unpublished LLB Thesis, University of Addis Ababa, 1975). 16 See Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Pouvoir de bénir et maudire.” 30 Chapter 1 they were influenced by/converted to universalistic religions, the Oromo did not seem to believe in life after death. In fact, there is no Oromo word for con- cepts such as “heaven” and “hell.” After the death of a person, the preoccupa- tion was not what would happen to his soul, but rather what his legacy, curse or blessing, would be for his descendants and for the society at large. Therefore, the concept of curse/blessing and the eventual transmission to successive gen- erations have played a considerable role in the process of social control and the preservation of justice. The other aspect of Oromo egalitarian ideology is enshrined, once again, in the myth of origin. The Oromo believe that all natural resources in this case marga (pasture), madda (spring, fountain, and river) belong to Waaqa. At the same time, the society fully recognizes the role of work and the wealth pro- duced by human efforts which would constitute personal property. So, cattle have always remained private property and people enriched themselves with- out any limit. Enriching oneself in this context must be seen in the context of a pastoral economy where Oromo herders did not have recourse to slave labor and other forms of serfdom – like tributary system as opposed to later develop- ments among the Matcha with the rise of war chiefs and the consequent emer- gence of kingdoms.17 For instance, among the Arsi, there were some herders who owned as many as 5000 head of cattle even in the first half of the 20th century.18 Some observers and commentators made a mistake when they wrote that the Oromo did not like much wealth because that would disrupt their egalitarianism. This is not based on any fact but a pure speculation or imagina- tion which could not be testified by history and ethnography. In actual fact, the Oromo were not collectivists or socialists in the Marxist meaning of the term. They were preoccupied with the question of private and collective property as it is manifested in many prayers and rituals. As opposed to what has been asserted, the Oromo did not have negative attitudes towards successful herders; they were rather respected in the community and there
17 We have excellent studies on this historical process and socio-political transformation among the Matacha during the last century. See Tessema Ta’a, The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia from the 16th Centuries to Early XXth Centuries (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1986); Baissa Lemmu, “The Decline of Gadaa Government in Wallaga: The Rise of War Chiefs and the Shoan Conquest,” contri- bution to be edited; Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, A History 1570–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Herbert S. Lewis, “A Reconsideration of the Socio-Political System of Western Galla.” Journal of Semitic Studies, IX (1964): 139–143. 18 R.P. Azaïs and R. Chambard, Cinq années de recherches archéologiques en Ethiopie (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1931), p. 218. Democracy without State 31 were formal ceremonies where they were distinguished and crowned. This cer- emony, which was organized for every thousand head of cattle attained by a herder, is called kiila lixuu among the Arsi.19 Both de Salviac and a Danish traveler recorded this ceremony in great detail.20 It should be emphasized, however, that the monopoly of thousands of herds and the formal recognition as a rich man have nothing to do with capitalist accumulation neither could it be a source of political power which was exercised by other groups of people (Gadaa classes). Above all, his wealth and prestige would not give any chance or possibility, though it helps to multiply friends and allied groups, to com- mand his fellowmen as Paul Baxter aptly writes about the Boran:
Fathers and husbands have patriarchal authority over their children and wives, but otherwise no Borana may order another about. Seniority by generation, and within generation by age, is accorded polite respect. But even a young stockless client has to be respectfully requested to assist with herding or watering, he is never ordered.21
On the other hand, the attitude of the society towards their leaders, Gadaa officers, Qaalluu and kinship elders, is based on respect for their persons and for the institution they represent. The Qaalluu leaders, Gadaa leaders, fathers, mothers and God form a category of Woyyuu, meaning people should show due respect and esteem. This does not imply, however, a complete veneration and unconditional submission. If the society was dissatisfied with their Gadaa leaders, they organized a special ceremony to oust them and replace them with others. Likewise, it is interesting to note that the Arsi had special rituals to punish Waaqa (God) himself when they were unhappy with him – generally during prolonged drought and famine, disease and war. Although they could not see him directly, they gathered to symbolically punish Him and made a sacrifice to reconcile with Him as they did not have any means to rupture with Him and have someone to replace Him. This suggests that any authority, including that of God, is respected but confronted and challenged when neces- sary. In other words, all forms of authority have legitimacy and raisons d’être as
19 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter III; Abbas Haji, “Pouvoir de bénir et maudire.” 20 Martial de Salviac, Un peuple antique, p. 196; J. Buchhder, The Land of Burned Faces, a Journey to Ethiopia, translated by Maurice Michael from Danish (London: Arthur Ltd, 1955), pp. 129–130. 21 Paul Baxter, “Stock Management and the Diffusion of Property Rights among the Boran.” In Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1966 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1969). 32 Chapter 1 long as they serve the common good and the best interests of the society. The attempt at punishing God is a good example. I entirely share, therefore, the following comments of Asmarom Legesse: “Several ethnographic facts lead me to believe that the Oromo conception of authority is not as awesome as it is among their monarchic neighbors to the north. Neither God, nor the Qaalluu nor the Abba Gadaa are conceptualized in the language of dependence that is pervasive in monarchic culture.”22 Consequently, before their conquest by the Shoan feudal kingdom, the Oromo did not practice inclination, bowing, putting down head, a custom they were forced to embrace when talking to officials particularly during petitions to courts other governments’ agencies. As de Salviac observed: “The Oromo ignore inclinations and prostrations. This free people do not bow down to any- one. Since the conquest, the most gallant bow down awkwardly in the pres- ence of Abyssinian chiefs according to the custom used in the empire.”23 It is interesting to point out that the Arsi Oromo see differences in wealth, status, age, sex, capacities in an extremely relative way. The objective seems to have been geared towards bringing these apparently various elements together to form a whole – Arsi/Oromo society. The analogy they give on the subject is a hand which is composed of five fingers of different sizes and functional inter- dependence. In spite of their different sizes, they need each other; the lack of one or two of them would reduce their efficiency and performance. Likewise, the society is composed of different age groups, younger and elders, seniors and juniors, men and women, rich and poor, etc., who are mutually interde- pendent. Thus, the emphasis is put on the unity, concord and cohesion of dif- ferent elements without which the society would be weak externally and internally. This cosmocentric worldview puts emphasis on equality, unity and cohesion as opposed to a homocentric worldview where individualism/ individual rights are given precedence over community. On the other hand, communal ownership in land does not necessarily sig- nify access to land as universal or open since it was closely associated with the definition of the group’s social universe, i.e., membership to Gosa (clan) and lineage (balbala) as well as marriages alliances. The traditional ownership of land is largely based on the belief, real or imaginary, of ancestral priority on the land in question. Naturally, this is closely related to the history of early population movement and the segmentation/peopling process which the Arsi call baala buusa (literally speaking, placing a leaf). Those who arrived first, pioneers, were said to have placed the leaf which symbolically
22 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa, p. 44. 23 De Salviac, Un peuple antique, p. 189. Democracy without State 33 and practically meant declaring exclusive rights of ownership in relation to latecomers or strangers. The descendants of the pioneer, Abba baala (father of the leaf or he who placed the leaf first), were the masters of a defined territory. Nevertheless, others have the possibility of exploiting these lands thanks to firooma (friendship), Soddooma (marriage alliance) and dhalooma (direct or indirect matrimonial relations both in the distant past and present). This implied that a Gosa, however strong and powerful it might have been, did not have the right to conquer and occupy the land belonging to the descendants of Abba baala, who was said to be the founder of the clan/lineage. Although it may appear vague, the concept of Baala buusa played a crucial role in the defi- nition of communal property rights and in the maintenance of peace and con- cord and contributed to the avoidance of strife and wars among the Arsi, which different Oromo groups experienced in their history. Moreover, when seen in a comparative perspective, the notion of Baala buusa among the Arsi and the Qabiye right (land belonging to those who arrived first) in the Matcha country, Western Oromo, appear to be identical.24 Furthermore, the concept of Abba baala (the father of a leaf) was opposite to the Abba Baalli (father of feather) another name of the president or the Gadaa system (Abba Bokku). As we have pointed out, the former refers to the members of the Gosa directly descending from an ancestor who first occupied the land, whereas Abba Baalli refers to the Gadaa leader, Abba Bokku, reigning or governing for an 8-year term. The former is related to inalienable economic power whereas the latter’s authority and legitimacy emanates from election and are limited in time. His economic right is the same as any member of the Gosa of which was a part. In so doing, the Oromo separated economic sphere form politics, i.e., kinship from Gadaa in order to inhibit the monopoly of political and economic power by the same group of leaders. This brings us to a conclusion: the Gadaa, however sophisticated political-military institution it may have been, has little or nothing to do with the economic structure of the society. The fact that Gadaa leadership was separated from the monopoly and the control of strategic resources, land in particular, might have played an important role in making it a viable democratic and republican system. Had Gadaa officers been given the power to extract resources, to levy tributes and distribute them as they wished, they would not have relinquished their power peacefully as they did for immemorial generations. As opposed to the Abyssinian neighbors where nomination or access to public offices, even the modest ones, gives a tremendous opportunity to enrich
24 Tessema Ta’a, The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia, pp. 45–46. 34 Chapter 1 one to fill coffers, Gadaa office did not give any chance for personal profit and enrichment. Contrary to a popular Amhara dictums which says “He who does not eat when he is appointed regrets when leaves the office,” the objective of Gadaa officers was to serve the community and common interests and stand firm for the common good. Under Gadaa the struggle or war for political suc- cession were unknown thanks to obligatory transfer of power every 8 years, even before the termination of the mandate sometimes, between the in-going and the outgoing Gadaa class. The absence of monopoly of economic power does not mean the office of Abba Bokku, the president of the Gadaa council, was devoid of interest and political power as some tried to suggest.25
The Gadaa-Qaalluu System: A Model of Social Organization
The Oromo social system or culture is founded on three closely interrelated institutions namely Gosa, Gadaa and Qaalluu. Here Gosa denotes kinship organization and relations revolving around the myth of one common, puta- tive and real, ancestors and marriage alliances. As in many, perhaps all traditional societies, the role of kinship is important in the socio-economic and cultural lives of individuals. People get rights and duties and organize solidarities and cooperation by virtue of common descent and matrimonial relations. Beyond this membership, the Oromo developed a supra territorial and extra-kinship socio-political culture widely known under the name of Gadaa. Finally, the Qaalluu institution not only emerged as an intersecting point for the two institutions (Gosa and Gadaa) but also gave a coherence and continuity for the entire social system.26 It is, therefore, difficult to see the three institutions in isolation; neither is it possible to stratify their importance in the functioning of the society although the Gadaa system emerged as the supreme institution in the political realm. Researchers may place a particular emphasis on one or two of them, according to their hypothesis, the objective of their investigation or philosophical premises, but it is difficult to present them in a hierarchical manner. The Gosa system will be analyzed separately in the next chapter and in the following pages I will focus on the Gadaa and Qaalluu system.
25 See my review of A River of Blessing: Essays in Honor of Paul Baxter, edited by David Brokensha (New York: Syracuse University, Maxwell, 1994). The Oromo Commentary, VI, no. 1 (1994): 31–33. By referring to some of Dr. Baxter’s works, some contributors to this book tried to reduce the Gadaa to religious-ritual organization. 26 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. Democracy without State 35
Gadaa constitutes one of – perhaps the most important – traits of Oromo culture, and, as such, attracted the attention of many travelers, missionaries and anthropologists. Since Gadaa encompasses rituals, politics, social organi- zation and military activities or warfare, traditional Oromo social structure cannot be fully understood without it. Thus it can best symbolize Oromo’s national character and peculiar ethnographic characteristics. The different versions of myths and legends about the origins of the Gadaa appear to show the extent to which Gadaa is uniquely the patrimony of the Oromo people although age-set organizations exist in several African societies. For example, the Arsi maintain Gadaa was a gift of God to their Oromo ancestors through his bird (Sinbira Waaqa). They argue that although non-Oromo people can imitate and practice the Gadaa, their Gadaa lacks philosophical and symbolic basis, as it was not originally given to them. Gadaa is central and a corner stone of Oromo social organization and, as such, it is used as a means of classifying experiences of socio-cultural life. For instance, the Gadaa are five, the Qaalluu Gosa are five, clan and Gadaa delegates to pilgrimage or Tchaffee (Oromo par- liament) are five, and the number of an ad hoc committee to investigate into an affair or settle a particular problem is five (shanacha) and even ritual meals served on the occasion of weddings ceremonies, are five, etc. Likewise, the word Gadaa can have different meanings depending upon the context or the intention of the speaker. Finally, Gadaa is the basis of the Oromo calendar, the Jaarraa, and time reckoning; in Arsi, elders still use Jaarraa27 to count their age and to refer to events in the past. For our analysis we will borrow, among others, the definition of A. Legesse: “The Gadaa system is a system of classes (lubaa) that succeed each other every eight years in assuming economic, polit- ical and ritual responsibilities. Each Gadaa class remains in power during a specific term (Gadaa) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony.”28 Here, we leave aside economic aspects of the Gadaa as I believe it is less associated with economic sphere which falls rather in the domain of kinship. On the contrary to the economic functions, the Gadaa system has
27 Jarraa assembly is an assembly where the outgoing Gadaa class transfer power to the in- going Gadaa class and leave the Gadaa system. It is one of the most important ceremo- nies in the Gadaa. As de Salviac wrote: “The assembling of Jarraa is the most solemn of the nation as a result of the contribution made because it serves as a point of reference to the age of estimation of Oromos as the Olympics marked the stages of Greek cycle. To fix his age, Oromos say ‘I saw so many Jarraas and I ate so many harvests of Sorghum,’ and each harvest corresponding to one year.” Un peuple antique, p. 188. 28 Legesse, Gadaa. 36 Chapter 1 other important attributes or functions. First, Gadaa is a symbolic reproductive system. It is evident that the Gadaa ritual process beyond distributing role and status, aims to bring about peace and maintain harmony and prosperity in the society. Above all, the etymological significance and meanings of the five Gadaa grades reflect the symbolic reproduction process. The Arsi have five Gadaa known as Birmaji, Bultuma, Horata, Robale and Bahara. All the names were not given at random but charged with specific symbols – negative or positive – and character. They represent, therefore, peace, prosperity, fecun- dity, long life and rain in the order above. It is important to add that every Gadaa repeats itself at an interval of 40 years and it is not only the Gadaa which comes at this given interval (ideally 5 × 8 = 40) but also events, bad or good, characterizing them. Once again, the fundamental objectives of Gadaa rites, beyond distributing rights and responsibilities between different age-groups and generations, are to avoid or prevent negative events and sad fates, in this case famine (drought), disease and war. This, in a way, appeared to be a method of controlling the forces of nature, and orienting the courses of events and history.29 Secondly, Gadaa served as an important agent of socialization. Some schol- ars developed a hypothesis contending that in societies where the education of children cannot be fully assured by a single family, the process of socializa- tion comes to society through age-set organizations.30 There seems to be some truth in such a hypothesis: in the absence of formal school and other forms of training, the initiation of children in the same category of age, without consid- eration of their kinship affiliation, in the first two phases of the system (from age 1 to age 16) is to initiate and introduce children to the culture and custom of which they are a part. This being done, male children are trained for military activities or war and prepared for political-judicial function at the lubaa stage (from age 32 to 40), the most important phase of the Gadaa system. This does not preclude economic activity, particularly cattle herding and pillage as war- rior classes in their pre-lubaa stage.31
29 Legesse, Gadaa, p. 194. 30 One of those who advanced such a hypothesis was Samuel Noah Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). 31 Since Bahrey, A History of the Galla, this aspect of the Gadaa is widely described by differ- ent travelers, missionaries and anthropologists. See among others, Enrioc Cerulli, “The Folk Literature of the Galla.” Harvard African Studies, III (1922): 1–228; J. Hinnant, “The Guji: Gadaa as a Ritual System.” In Age, Generation and Time, edited by P.T.W. Baxter and U. Almagor (London: Hurst Company, 1978), pp. 207–243. The most coherent study of the generation class is that of Legesse, Gadaa. Democracy without State 37
The third and one of the most important attributes of the Gadaa is its close association with the domain of military/war and politics. Beyond different metaphysical speculations and some legends about the origins of Gadaa, it is likely that it was initiated as any age-set organization, as many similar associa- tions based on age structure widely spread in East Africa, and progressively evolved into a coherent political-judicial system.32 Historically, women were not part of the Gadaa system and perhaps women’s exclusion from the system could be explained in part by their non-participation in the war or campaign which was the preserve of men. In the traditional division of labor, women were not expected to be warriors and the exclusion from military campaigns, could hardly find their place in the Gadaa government although they were active participants and beneficiaries in the ritual process of the system. However, women’s subordinate position and role in the society should be attributed also to a prevailing strong patrilineal and patriarchal ideology of the Oromo people. As we said earlier, Gadaa is a cyclic age-set system. It is said that in the cyclic age-class system of East African people’s military role or warrior ideology is more important than in lineal age-set organizations of West African societies. In the cyclic model military ardor is developed and inculcated among children who are prepared to distinguish themselves in war and pass on an illustrious name to forthcoming generations.33 Although war could be waged at any time, the Buttaa ceremony, which ends the latent phase, i.e., pre-lubaa stages, repre- sented a culmination point in an individual’s military life. Here the point to be emphasized is that following Bahrey’s account of the 16th century34 some observers seem to have misunderstood – and even made a sort of caricature – about the relationship between the Gadaa and war by assuming that in order to be initiated in the Gadaa system one has to campaign and kill enemies. Under Gadaa no rule forces an individual to kill to be initiated or to play a political role. Traditionally, those warriors who distinguished themselves in war were respected by their age group and their Gosa, but they were not ritu- ally obliged to do so.
32 Legesse, Gadaa, p. 50. See also his essay in “protest anthropology,” in the same book, where he criticizes diffusionism and ethnocentrism in social sciences. 33 D. Paulme, ed. (Introduction) Classes et Association d’Âge en Afrique de l’Oust (Paris: Plon, 1971). See also the different chapters of Âge, pouvoir et société en Afrique noire, edited by Marc Abélès et Chantal Collard (Paris: Editions Carthala, 1985). 34 Bahrey, “History of the Galla.” In Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593–1646, translated and edited by C.F. Beckingham and Huntingford (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1954), pp. 113–129. 38 Chapter 1
Secondly, Bahrey thought, perhaps rightly, that every Gadaa age-set promo- tions ended in territorial expansion and acquisition. As Mohammed Hassen analyzed in more detail, this had been facilitated by the prevailing political circumstances: the long war between Islamic principalities led by Imam Ahmed (1529–1543) popularly known as Gragn or “the left handed” and the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia and the consequent weakness of their respec- tive populations to resist massive population movement.35 Otherwise it is dif- ficult to talk about programmed wars and territorial expansion every 8 years. In actual fact wars took place, according to the demographic and economic needs of the Oromo society, not necessarily on a fixed schedule. It is unthink- able that an expansive people would wait every 8 years to make a war and occupy the territory of their neighbors and remain silent during 8 years of Gadaa duration. Moreover, war and expansion at a given period of time cannot be enough in themselves but there must be a lucky circumstance such as the weakness of the society targeted by the attack and their inability to put a strong resistance. Traditional Oromo society was a warrior society par excellence as war was also highly valued among their Semitic and Cushitic neighbors. However, among the Oromo warfare was more institutionalized both in the Gadaa sys- tem and Gosa ideology. Each Gosa claims, rightly or wrongly, it has a presti- gious past in the domain of war and as such one can mention the name of distinguished warriors particularly during the faarsa invocations.36 Here it is important to underline that men took part in wars as the members the same age-set (Hariyya) in the Gadaa system and, at the same, they were considered as warriors of their Gosa (they are members of their clans). Individuals are expected to distinguish themselves not only on the occasion of Buttaa ceremo- nies, but also in hunting (killing a lion, leopard, or other beasts). Wars and campaigns were led by the Abba duula (father of campaign or a military commander). The Arsi Gadaa system was decentralized into many Gadaa areas. Each Gadaa area did not necessarily correspond to a territory of a given Gosa but
35 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, Chapter I. 36 In the Oromo language there is a custom of competition of prestige between different Gosa or moieties, where individuals repeat hymns which glorify their ancestors, and the nature of their exploits in public ceremonies. This is called Faarsa (praise). To this there must be a response by doing the same thing. Faarsa is another way of narration history and a means of inculcating the virtues of war in the mind of the young generation. Another term, gerrersa (war song) is more aggressive and is usually sung after victory or on the battlefield. Democracy without State 39 brought together many Gosa or lineages under the authority of one Gadaa sys- tem, Abba Bokku (the president of the system), and the Abba duula (military commander) and one Gadaa jurisdiction. The Abba Bokku, was elected from the lubaa class, i.e., from the in-going age-set (people in the same biological age initiated collectively and assuming responsibility different Gadaa grades of 8 years). He is supposed to be the most competent and charismatic of his age-mates though he might not necessarily be the wisest man in the commu- nity since the system does not permit the election from another category of age-set or generation class. However, the possible inexperience of the Gadaa leadership cannot be a major shortcoming because it makes use of the advice of senior members of the society called Hayyuu, who have already accom- plished their role under Gadaa and above all by the existence of parallel insti- tutions such as kinship and the Qaalluu. Likewise, the election of the military commander, Abba duula also called Abba looshaa among the Arsi, was strictly based on military bravery, the qual- ity of leadership provided during the preceding campaigns and moral integ- rity.37 In principle, the power of Abba duula was limited to an 8-year term but actually during war and emergencies, successful Abba duulas got the extension of their mandate which could not be inherited by his sons. The military domain appears more prone to meritocracy than political leadership – it appears unsafe to have a weak military leader compared to a relatively weak Gadaa leader. When the latter proved inept he could be replaced, whereas losing a war due to poor leadership would lead to catastrophic implications for the group. The extension of office was exceptional, not a rule, among the Arsi; no institutional mechanism existed to prolong the mandate of Gadaa officers, including the office of Abba Gadaa, the president of the system. However, the most important point to underline is that the Gadaa officers could lose their power, usually in the middle of their term after 4 years in office, if they failed to provide good leadership and were corrupt and unfair. Therefore, 8-year terms did not guarantee power, neither did the officers have carte blanche to impose autocratic rule. De Slavic noted that after half term, the Gadaa class in power convened a general assembly where they presented a report of what they accomplished and failed to accomplish. After receiving criticism they pledged and promised to do better for the remaining period.38 In spite of this institutional possibility to oust or remove from the office this group of leaders before the end of their mandate, the actual overthrow was rare for a variety of reasons. Firstly, incompetence and favoritism and other
37 De Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik, p. 268. 38 Ibid., p. 186. 40 Chapter 1 forms of offense of which the leadership may be responsible could be settled through public confession and warning. Secondly, consciously organized arbi- trary rule was said to have been rare under the Gadaa government by the fact that the leadership did not control the means of production neither over the circulation of wealth and services. Neither could it levy tributes and taxes to be distributed among them. Therefore, both Abba Gadaa and other officers lived and worked as other members of the society. Likewise, ideally justice was not supposed to be manipulated because of its mystical origin analyzed earlier. Also, there were alternative institutions (kinship authority, the Qaalluu in par- ticular) which could give complementary leadership although the Gadaa leader remains the most important and the supreme authority in the commu- nity by virtue of Gadaa laws. Finally, the public kept an eye on the Gadaa lead- ers so as to prevent them from abusing their power. In brief, although there were strong Abba duula in many Gadaa areas, the Arsi did not wage internal war. So, their campaigns were generally directed against “others.” During crises, the neighboring Abba duula united and regrouped their respective forces against aggression or in an offensive war. Traditional warfare and training enshrined in the Gadaa proved to be pro- ductive when the Arsi easily mobilized hundreds of thousands fighters who successfully blocked Shoan colonial expansion for more than a decade. In spite of their influence and prestige, the Abba duula did not really chal- lenge the authority of the Abba Gadaa whose power as a supreme judge and the first magistrate in the community remained undisputed until the country fell under Ethiopian rule and the consequent socio-cultural transfor- mation. Among the Arsi, the Gadaa leader was perceived as Woyyuu, a word standing for high esteem and respect, and his capacity to pronounce capital punishment under rare circumstances was binding. The reasons why the Abba duula among the southern Oromo did not undermine the Gadaa system as compared to their counterparts of the Matcha during the 19th cen- tury can be explained by a difference in their economic transformation, socio-cultural contacts, the introduction and expansion of Islam and above all the war between different Oromo groups and the pre-eminence of assem- blies such as Tchaffee and Qixxee over personal/individual will of military commander.39
39 For these transformation among the Western Oromo, see Tessema Ta’a, The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia from the 16th Centuries to Early XXth Centuries (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1986); Baissa Lemmu, “The Decline of Gadaa Government in Wallaga: The Rise of War Chiefs and the Shoan Conquest,” contribution to this volume edited by A. Legesse; Mohammed Hassen, Democracy without State 41
From the above-analysis one can deduce that Gadaa is a democratic system of government where the governing class is elected every 8 years for a one-term, non-renewable office. During its mandate it was largely accountable to the assembly, Tchaffee and public opinion with a possibility of losing power before the termination of the mandate. The transfer of power, by the end of Gadaa or during Gadaa period, had always been peaceful. I would add that the Oromo were one of the rare democratic polities where the outgoing and incoming Gadaa celebrated Gadaa festivities and the transfer of power together without any rancor and acrimony. As Dinsa Lepisa Abba Jobir suc- cinctly stated: “Not a drop of blood which is shed in the scramble for political power ever occurred and recorded in the Oromo land since the dawn of his- tory. Everything moved with ease and care, in peace and order. The secret lies in the Gadaa system of government’s inbuilt coherent balance of power and its rotational power succession mechanism.”40 Since the power of Gadaa leaders largely resided in the parliament which elected, ousted them if need be, abrogated, amended and legislated laws, we will pay attention to the Tchaffee system (the Oromo traditional parliament). This may allow us to better understand the foundations of Oromo’s democratic and republican political life.
Democracy and Consensus Building in Oromo Political Culture: Tchaffee and Qixxee
What makes the Oromo a democratic society is not only a regular election of leaders at specific periods of time, in this case every 8 years, institutional checks and balances between different institutions but also the existence of an institutionalized system of representation and participation at all levels of the social system. With the exception of some natural laws which are givens, all Oromo laws and important decisions were the result of free discussions and the consequent consensus-building. No decision comes from above, from the will of individual(s), and imposed on the community. The two, distinct, but related assemblies, Tchaffee and Qixxee facilitate the active participation in the decision-making process. The former is closely related to the Gadaa system
The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and H.S. Lewis, “A Reconsideration of the Socio-Political System of Western Galla.” Journal of Semitic Studies, IX (1964): 139–143. 40 Dinsa Lepisa Abba Jobir, The Gadaa System of Government and Sera Tchaffe Oromo (Unpublished LLB Thesis, University of Addis Ababa, 1975), p. 97. 42 Chapter 1 whereas the latter served as an open forum of debate and decision making of the community.
The Tchaffee System The word Tchaffee stands for meadow, usually situated in a very green area around an Odaa (sycamore), the Oromo’s most sacred tree. In Oromo cosmol- ogy, green grass (irressa) symbolizes justice and fertility and, as such, the organization of Oromo political-ritual assemblies in such places was not at random. In brief, Tchaffee is an Oromo parliament whose importance grew with the development of Gadaa as a refined political system. Moreover, in many Oromo traditions, Odaa appears to be a place of memories in the sense that important assemblies and decisions and, above all, the segmenta- tion process between different moieties and Gosa are related to a given Odaa, the name of big sycamore trees where parliaments gathered in the distant past, and as such became places of historical memories. As evidence, one can mention Odaa Diniq, Odaa Roba, Odaa Nabe, Odaa Bisil, etc. This would suggest, the more ancient the Tchaffee are in the collective memories, the more they are respected. No one can say with certainty which is the oldest Tchaffee in Oromo history, though it is safe to consider those located in Bale-Sidama, the present Arsi-Borana regions, the cradle of the Oromo nation, as the most ancient.41 As an Ethiopian historiographer, Asma Giyorigis wrote, “The central Tchaffee in old days was in Borana, where once every eight years, all the Oromo met to administer justice, to hear historical and judicial reports of the expiring eight years, to criticize some of the existing laws and legislate new ones, and proclaim the future laws and procedure of the Oromo.”42 One of the consequences of pastoral Oromo population movement was the segmentation of the moieties and the consequent fission of Gosa but also the decentralization of the Gadaa and Tchaffee system. In effect, both Gadaa and Tchaffee had to respond to the needs of a fragmented society which could not
41 There are works and discussions dealing with the genesis of the Oromo. They all tend to consider the present Bale – Sidama as the Oromo’s country of origin. See among others, I.M. Lewis, “The Origin of Galla and Somali.” Journal of African History, VII, no. 1 (1966): pp. 27–46; Braukämper, “Oromo’s Country of Origin: A Reconsideration of Hypothesis.” In Sixth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Tel Aviv, April 1980, edited by Goldenberg and Bodloski (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkama, 1986), pp. 25–40; Habreland, Galla Sûd Athiopiens, p. 772; Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, the first two chapters; Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter I. 42 Bairu Tafla, Asma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 133. Democracy without State 43 necessarily go to their original homeland, where the first Tchaffee was located, for political-ritual purposes. It is important to note that both Gadaa and Tchaffee were not organized hierarchically, but multiplied and functioned as copies of the original model or system perhaps with minor ethnographic innovations. Every regional group, Borana, Arsi, Matcha, Guji, just to mention only a few, developed its own Gadaa, perhaps with slight ethnographic adjust- ments according to its settlement pattern and the consequent social morphology. The key issue for the emergence of a new Gadaa area was demography; as Gadaa is extra-territorial, and extra-kinship institution, what was needed was a reasonable demographic size, not only to fill each grade with people (no grade is left unoccupied), but also the society had to be in a position to defend itself or to wage a war when necessary and a harmonious functioning of the system.43 All these Gadaa areas were independent from each other except for their institutional linkage every 8 years through the delegates (jila or leemmu) of the outgoing Gadaa class. The Gadaa system of some regional groups was subdivided into a number of autonomous Gadaa areas. This was true for the organization of the Tchaffee as there could be no Gadaa without its own Tchaffee, parliament or fixed place of assembly. For instance, in Arsi, there were numerous Gadaa areas each having its own Tchaffee.44 At the same time, there were inclusive big Tchaffees, at the district/province level, although the concept of district/province was less applicable to the tra- ditional Oromo society, where different Gadaa centers came together for fes- tivities to discuss issues of common interests under the presidency of one of the Abba Bokkus usually called Badhasaa.45 The election of this Badhasaa was based on seniority of clans. In other words, there were two ceremonies: one at the Gadaa area level where the rites of passage is performed and the other at common Tchaffees where many Gadaa areas and Gosa came together. Such places are still remembered and respected in the different corners of Arsi Oromo country and other Oromo regions.
43 Professor Legesse indicates the problems that the demographic structure creates in the functioning of the Gadaa and how the Borana try to solve such a problem, but without much success. See Gadaa, pp. 163–167. 44 Hablerland, Galla Süd Athiopiens, the chapter on the Arsi. See also the interesting descrip- tion of the Gadaa areas in Arsi country by Cerulli who traveled throughout Arsiland in the 1920s. Le populazioni del Bacino superiore dello Uabi in L.A. Savoia, ed., L’explorazione dello Uabi-Uebi Scebeli, Milano Mandadori Editore (1932), pp. 135–181. 45 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi, 1880–1935 (B.A. paper in History, Addis Ababa University, 1982), Chapter I. 44 Chapter 1
Finally, the most important Tchaffee was national in character46 since the representatives of all Gadaa classes, Gadaa areas, Gosa and lineage came together to discuss, amend and legislate laws (Seera). In Arsi society it was only this Tchaffee that had an institutional capacity to abrogate and draw laws which should be applied everywhere throughout Arsi country. In theory, every 8 years the law could be changed and amended. But, in practice, the attempt was more to re-enforce the existing laws according to the new needs. After all, the Oromo attached much importance to ancestral laws and ways of life gener- ally called Aadaa Abba (ancestral culture, or tradition) rather than a revolu- tion. When a society does not undergo a revolution or a radical transformation such as the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, there could not be a need to radically alter the existing legal system. It was always possible to criticize the failure or shortcomings of Seera but it applied everywhere until its eventual abrogation/modification at the central Tchaffee. From different legislative parliaments convened since ancient times and legal experts (Abba Seera), traditions only retain one or two legislators perhaps because of the influence these charismatic leaders left on the assembly. For instance, Arsi customary laws were closely related to the name of Bado Ballayyo, a parliamentary speaker in the Tchaffee of Odaa Diniq, Odaa Roba, in Bale. In all regions there are big names closely related to Tchaffee laws because of their oratorical skills and eloquence or quality of leadership. As Asmarom Legesse put it:
There is, in many parts of the Oromo country, the tradition of great law makers who are believed to have formulated some of the laws that serve as the foundation of the Gadaa system and the moiety system. Two well-known examples are Dawwe Gobbo in Borana and Makko Bili in Macch’a. These historic figures should probably not be under stood to be men who single-handedly made up laws and handed them down to the people, as Moses is reputed to have done when he descended from the mountain with his tablets after his encounter with his God. Dawwe and Makko are not bearded old patriarchs with divine inspiration but gifted parliamentarians for their wisdom and/ or eloquence.47
46 The most important study of the Tchaffe system and customary law is that of Dinsa Lepisa, The Gadaa System of Government and Sera Tchafee Oromo. See also Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 61–67. 47 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Press, Inc., 2000), p. 209. Democracy without State 45
One cannot say with certainty when this happened although all informants maintain that Bado Ballayyo lived during the great pastoral Oromo population movement of the 16th century. It was in collaboration with Rayyaa Abeeto, another reputed orator, that Bado Ballayyo proclaimed these series of laws which govern every aspect of social, political, economic, and ritual life. This means that Bado Ballayyo became known as the father of the Arsi Oromo legal system although his predecessors and successors might have greatly contrib- uted to Seera. The Arsi national Tchaffee was located at Odaa Roba eastern Bale, around Ghinir, and it was the only Tchaffee which could legislate – local and provincial Tchaffee discussed laws, settled disputes but did not legislate. That was why the Arsi have uniform laws throughout their country although a large part of their Seera is transposable elsewhere in Oromo regions where people share the same basic values and socio-political institutions. However, the segmentation process and the subsequent development of regional iden- tity with its own Tchaffee and Gadaa system gave rise to some forms of particularism. It must be stressed that the legislation of laws was the result of long discus- sion, debate and arguments and counter arguments. In the Oromo democracy, majority vote did not exist and was unknown. Decisions were made only by consensus (Itti wolii galuu) which would mean a single person can block the decision or at least prolong the session until he gets satisfaction.48 The possi- bility of using a veto does not necessarily mean that a person or a group of persons systematically use or abuse this power. For instance some parliamen- tary sessions were characterized by tight timing in order to get past the consen- sus model. In central Tchaffee, both the debate and decision followed well established rules, calendar and steps. The delegate stayed in the Tchaffee 8 days. Most of the Tchaffee discussion took place during the night. The delegates spoke according to the seniority of their moieties, Gosa and Gadaa grades – this was called tarree galuu (alignment by order). After the consensus on every issue was raised the proclamation of the Murtii or Seera (decision or law) were made during the ninth night of the meetings. It was declared by the Abba Seera, by saying Seeri baye or Seeri buee which means the law came out and descended, respectively. By so doing, he mystifies his declaration (lalaba) by giving the impression that the supernatural force or God gave the law in order to give it a sacred content. This is followed by prayers and sacrifice closing the session by the Gadaa leader. Then the law becomes reality (Seeri tumame) meaning the law is approved or ratified. The delegates memorized these series
48 A. D’Abbadie, “Sur les Oromo: Grande nation africaine souvent désignée sous le nom de Galla.” Extrait des Annales de la société scientifique de Bruxelles, 4e année (1888): 167–192. 46 Chapter 1 of laws and returned to their Gosa, Gadaa and villages where they transmitted them to the Gadaa leaders and the community at large. Such Tchaffee assem- blies were generally attended by tens of thousands or even more than hundred thousand delegates which indicates the central place it occupied in Oromo history and culture. It was thanks to these regular institutional contacts and mechanisms that different segments of the Oromo nation succeeded in main- taining the basic tenets of democratic culture, values and coordinating their ritual and political activities. Strictly speaking, Gadaa and Tchaffee are inseparable in the sense that the former is organized according to Tchaffee laws which puts the Gadaa as the principal/legal institution, at the apex of political system. Above all, it is through Gadaa leadership that Tchaffee laws are maintained and applied. This does not mean that Gadaa leaders have exclusive rights with respect to the application of laws; kinship elders and the Qaalluu themselves use Tchaffee laws as their guide in their ritual and political roles. Likewise, every Oromo adult’s rights and children’s rights and obligations are enshrined in Tchaffee laws such as Seera birmadumaa (the law of human liberty/freedom), Seera rakoo (the law of marriage and divorce), Seera dhaala (the law of succession and heritage), etc. In brief, Tchaffee is an Oromo parliament whereas Seera is an Oromo constitution which ensured, without any ambiguity, rights, duties, equality and justice. An Amhara writer, Asma Giyorgis, himself, wrote of the superiority of Tchaffee laws compared to the Christian Amhara system, “… Nevertheless, the justice administered in each Tchaffee excelled that (which) is possessed by those of us in their vicinity and who claim to be Christians. Their Tchaffee, however, was abolished in the time of Atse Menelik.”49 To this, one can add the observation of d’Abbadie among the Matcha in the first half the 19th century. After a careful analysis of the social system he compared the Oromo constitution (Seera) to English Common Law, “We would have no trouble understanding that the Oromo who do not have written language also have laws as valid as those of the English.”50 Perhaps, another important characteristics of Seera is its flexible nature not only because of its possible modification/amendment, if need be, every 8 years but also it can be interpreted pragmatically by the fact that all the laws cannot always foresee all empirical problems or cases. This is what the Arsi call Murtii/Bultii dichotomy. Murtii is another word for Seera or rule. The term Murtii comes from muruu meaning to cut, decide, etc. Here murtii (decision) stands for established and accepted laws. In contrast, Bultii roughly signifies
49 Bairu Tafla, Asma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 135. 50 D’Abbadie, Sur les Oromo, p. 183. Democracy without State 47 life, reality, condition, etc. The dyad Murtii/Bultii is inseparable since Bultii permits a more flexible and balanced interpretation of justice by opening the door for negotiation and compromise. For instance, the Murtii says the blood price of a homicide (Gumaa) is 100 heads of cattle or capital punish- ment. The Bultii, comes in then as a means of deliberating the causes and circumstances of the murder in order to enable the mediators to propose a compromise – in this case the negotiation leads to the reduction of the fine. In other words, Murtii can remain rigid and absolute without bultii which permits the flexible interpretation of laws according to the problems/issues at hand.51
The Qixxee System Another important public forum of the Oromo society is the Qixxee. The word Qixxee directly emanates from qixxayu, which means to be the same or equal, etc. Qixxee means, therefore, the assembly of equals despite the exclusion of women and to some extent the young generation particularly bachelors. What differentiates Qixxee from Tchaffee is its association with kinship institu- tion whereby the members of Gosa, lineage, community, village come together to discuss a specific problem and decide on the issue by consensus. But, Tchaffee was related to the Gadaa system and as such formalized and even ritualized. Not surprisingly it disappeared when the Gadaa system itself declined and ceased to function. Tchaffee strictly followed established calen- dars whereas Qixxee can be convened at any time when a need arises. Qixxee does not have an institutionally fixed place, though it was common to gather around a prominent Hayyuu/kinship elders or charismatic leader in the community. The importance of the meeting depends upon the agenda; some- times it includes all adult male members of the society or sometimes composed of only senior members and the protagonists particularly in the process of dispute settlement. In some circumstances, when collective security or interests are at stake, many representatives can attend the Qixxee from neighboring communities, even tens of Gosa to adopt a resolution addressing common interests and concerns. Sometime, the Qixxee may deal with a specific subject of interest for the members of a corporate group such as
51 For the details of the procedure of conflict resolution among the Oromo see, among oth- ers, Hamdesa Tuso, “Indigenous Process of Conflict Resolution in Oromo Society.” In Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts, African Conflict “Medicine”, edited by I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). See also Mama Badhane Bariso, Dispute Settlement in Rural Ethiopia, Outside of the Codified Legal System: The Case of Arsi- Bale Massifs (LLB Thesis, University of Addis Ababa, 1986). 48 Chapter 1 mutual aid or solidarity between neighbors. The most important function of the Qixxee seems to be problem solving. As opposed to Tchaffee, which had established criteria of recruitment and participation particularly for central Tchaffee, Qixxee is open to everyone except for women and bachelors. Women are not often invited in all Qixxee assemblies except when they become direct objects of the discussion. This is a testament to Oromo’s strong patriarchal ide- ology and social norms which do not give women a significant political role in the society. Bachelors are not forbidden to take part, but social adulthood through marriage is necessary to become active participants in the discussion. Unmarried men are seen as youth regardless of their biological age and experi- ence. Thus, manhood starts with marriage which permits a man to assume full responsibility (this is what the Arsi call murtii gayuu). Perhaps this is another legacy of the Gadaa system in which men play an active political role after the Buttaa ceremonies, circumcision and marriage. All participants can express their ideas and block decisions. Experienced elders, Hayyuu and wise men usually dominate the debate though they do not do anything to discourage others from speaking.52 In effect, they have the necessary experience and wisdom to debate issues and convince their audi- ence through strong arguments embellished with proverbs taken from empiri- cal and historical examples. These skills and the art of oratory can be learnt over time, although some prove their capacity as orators and leaders when they are still young. Such people are called baatee (meaning rising men or potential leaders) and, as such, were systematically encouraged by elders to give their views. In the Qixxee assembly the debate is chaired by Hayyuu or Hayyicha, a word which was used for retired Gadaa leader, but now is used for any elder, knowledgeable about Oromo laws and reputed for his moral integrity. The term Jarsaa biyaa community leader appears to be the most used in the contemporary Arsi society. Distinguished orators use or hold a whip (alangee) during speech and discussion as the symbol of capacity, authority and judicial power. Among the Oromo, public address is organized in a dialogue form. This is called Qora fuudhuu. When the president of the session presents the agenda, a person asks for permission or is asked to speak. Then the dialogue between the chair and the speaker goes on. Other speakers wait for their turn to speak, whereas the participants listen to them attentively. The discussions continue around the chair until they arrive at a consensus. No one is discouraged from
52 See also the analysis of the H.S. Lewis, “Wealth, Influence and Prestige among the Shoa Galla.” In Social Stratification in Africa, edited by A. Tuden and L. Plotnicov (New York: The Free Press, 1970). Democracy without State 49 offering his views, every speaker is listened to with due respect regardless of the quality of the speech. It is only when he has finished that his idea is challenged by the chair or audience. In principle, every individual can block a decision by saying qabee (I hold, block). But, in order to have recourse to this procedure he must give valid reasons. Even in the case of adequate reasons he is politely per- suaded to renounce his veto qabuu (holding). So, all must be done to convince him to renounce. Otherwise, the decision should be postponed until he says galee (I entered) to say “I agreed with the motion.” Then the assembly arrives at a conclusion or decision. But it is worth noting in some contemporary Qixxee, there appears an Ethiopian autocratic influence where some “Big Men”53 press others to accept their will and tend to monopolize the forum of discussion and try to induce others to follow them particularly on agendas relative to adminis- tration and politics. In this context, by big men, I mean Abyssinian local agents, balabbats, or others who held other minor offices during the imperial regime, and Peasant Association leaders backed by the Darg (the mane of military junta which ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991) bureaucracy and cadres of the regimes in power including the EPRDF. Under both oppressive and auto- cratic regimes, what was needed was to execute and impose orders rather than to allow for consensus building and popular expression. At this juncture, one can point out how the Darg perverted local Oromo democracy and the decision-making process. In Abyssinian feudal system and political culture in general the concept of democracy was unknown altogether and Haile Selassie’s successor, the Darg regime, claimed to have introduced socialist democracy or “democratic centralism.” Accordingly, peasants were regrouped and or organized in Peasant Associations in every 20 Gasha (one Gasha is about 40 ha). Although the leaders were said to have been elected by the people, they were accountable to the government rather than the former. Secondly, the type of democracy introduced was based not only on majority vote but did not give any chance for discussion. Based on government policy initiatives and guidelines, agendas were prepared and presented by leaders who accommodated only few favorable suggestions and then called for vote. Here, no one could talk or vote against any agenda even it was against his or her basic rights and interests – such as forced recruitment of adolescents for the war, forced displacement for cooperatives and collective settlement, etc. Finally, the revolution did not only introduce new values, procedures and forced votes, but also excluded adults, usually illiterate Oromo from local level
53 For the concept of “big man” see M. Sahlins, “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political Types in Polynesia and Melanesia.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3 (1961): 285–303. 50 Chapter 1 politics in favor of literate or semi-literate young peasants. Not only the latter could be receptive of the “language of the revolution” or propaganda as they were easily manipulated. I observed the frustration of all elders who were denied the rights of expression in a forum dominated by pro-Darg “revolution- ary peasants,” supported by political cadres. One of the major purposes of the Qixxee is conflict resolution between indi- viduals, lineages, families and Gosa. In dispute settlement the plaintiff and defendant have the right to refuse any member(s) of their jury. Sometimes, the belligerents or parties in the conflict constitute the judges by suggesting their names. The fact that the judges are nominated by the different conflicting par- ties does not mean that they are representatives of one party or the other. The system of nomination by the parties in conflict was to ensure the impartiality of the justice. Here, I am not suggesting that justice is always done and it is not rare to see one of the parties of both parties dissatisfied with the decision. They have a room to maneuver and even after a constitution of the jury, a party to the conflict can protest if he thinks that justice is not done or done badly and he can ask for the constitution of another jury which can modify or confirm the former judgment. At this juncture it is important to note that there is no an Oromo word for judgment. The only word used for all matters ranging from familial dispute to homicide is reconciliation/arbitration. The objective of jus- tice is not to judge but to reconcile the two parties or rebuild the social fabric damaged by the conflict and discord through sacrifice, rituals and including marriage in the case of homicide if there is no matrimonial prohibition between the two groups. Oromo elders, perhaps as in many traditional societ- ies, pass days and nights, weeks and even months to settle disputes. All cases, regardless of their importance are meticulously analyzed, plaintiffs and defen- dants are given ample opportunities and time to plead their cause and bring witnesses (ragaa) relative to their cause. It is after a long scrutiny and convic- tion beyond doubt that the judges pronounce their sentences disguised under the terms of reconciliation but acceptable by both parties as Knutsson put it, “A good solution is… one which can be accepted by both parties at dispute even if the one who seems to be right must give way a little, and judgment on the one who appears guilty is partly mitigated.”54 It should be noted that the winner hears from the judges or the defendant himself two words dhugaa qabda (literally “you are right” meaning “you got justice”). The quest for truth (dhugaa barbaduu) by the plaintiff is the main objective of any dispute settlement and terms of arara (reconciliation). This moral compensation can be followed by material compensation, if necessary, and rituals of reconcilia- tion among which sacrifice and sharing of food. Normally, conflicts settled in
54 K. Knutsson, Authority and Change, p. 112. Democracy without State 51 such ways are not expected to revive any sentiment of vengeance although one can exclude the possibility that the same people could be in conflict again for a host of other reasons. Here, conflict resolution and dispute settlement among the Oromo may deserve an independent treatment. This brief analysis will permit, however, how justice is administered, the role of participatory/popular democracy and egalitarian values as well as individual and collective liberties in the Oromo’s socio-political system. Above all, Qixxee proved to be a grass root democracy which survived the test of time: conquest, Islamization and socio-economic transformation. The Qixxee system deals with empirical issues as such peace and war, conflict resolution between Gosa, lineages, individuals, and redistri- bution of surplus between agnates and allied groups during crises and emer- gency. Undoubtedly, as a kinship institution, Qixxee must have a long history perhaps antedating the Tchaffee system itself. Compared to family, the oldest human institution, Gadaa may have been of a relatively recent innovation. However, when Gadaa functioned normally or fully according to its rationales, the Qixxee might have had a limited or complementary role to the Gadaa assemblies (Tchaffee). The most important decision-making body was the Gadaa council and, as such, the first magistrate and supreme authority was the Gadaa leader. For instance, among the Arsi, capital punishment existed for some offenses. Although we cannot say to what extent this ultimate sanction is widespread among other Oromo groups,55 only Abba Gadaa had the authority to pronounce death sentences which were accepted by the society. As opposed to some ethnographers who tended to reduce the Gadaa to a simple religious or ritual organization this example shows the authority of the Gadaa officers and the Gadaa system as a source of a real/meaningful political power.
Conclusion
In this survey, we tried to describe and analyze Oromo representative institu- tions (Gadaa-Qaalluu), institutional mechanisms for the functioning of the polity. Here, the attempt was not to find out how these institutions functioned
55 Habreland wrote, “Within each Gadaa area, the Gadaa leader wielded power to a degree unknown among the Galla tribes. He enjoyed almost monarchical status and power over life and death. This may have risen through contact with Wollamo and Hadiya.” Galla Sûd Äthiopiens, p. 784. This is another version of his diffusionist idea which reduces every aspect of Oromo culture to foreign borrowings. However, Arsi Gadaa leaders were neither autocrats nor monarchs who imposed arbitrary rule. They governed and applied Oromo laws (Seera) for a fixed period of time. 52 Chapter 1 but how they permitted the harmonious functioning of the Oromo society per- haps with some functional redundancy due to the absence of clear mecha- nisms delineating the role of representative institutions. I quote at length the insights of Asmarom Legesse, one of the leading scholars, on Gadaa on this point:
In the traditional Oromo polity, it is not possible to determine whether the Abba Gadaa or the Qaalluu is the more senior individual. The Abba Gadaa is elected only for eight years but his authority extends over the entire nation. Each of the two Qaalluus holds his office for life but his authority extends only over half of the nation. The Qaalluu oversees the election of the Abba Gadaa but cannot be elected himself to that office or to any of the other offices of the Gadaa system. These two institutions of the Oromo polity are on the same footing. This is the kind of evidence that led to the formulation of the concept of functional redundancy.56
Thus, we invite the reader to refer to specific studies for detailed analyses of these institutions which should not be taken in isolation or in a hierarchical way for the simple reason that these institutions are embedded in culture, val- ues and system of thoughts.57 They had recourse to different institutions to satisfy their different political, ritual, military, economic needs. For instance, politics and military activity fall in the domain of Gadaa, whereas the eco- nomic domain is the sphere (role) of kinship. The Qaalluus played religious, ritual and political roles although their power was limited to the organization of election and declaration of the result. However, the division of labor between different leaders, Qaalluu and Abba Bokku, the president of the Gadaa leader in power, may not appear clear as one may expect but the social system was organized in a pragmatic way to enable the leaders to have room to maneuver and exercise authority and influence. I argued that egalitarian ideology and justice are rationalized in the Oromo system of thought and cosmology. The Gadaa, which might have been initiated as military or ritual system but evolved into a coherent political organization, is founded on an egalitarian ideology and redistributive justices except with reduced gender roles. Seera, Qixxee, Tchaffee, etc., served as instruments of maintaining equality, justice and harmony of the Oromo polity as well as col- lective and individual liberty. It must be stressed, however, that Gadaa leaders have their legitimacy and authority as long as they respected and preserved
56 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, p. 250. 57 Legesse, Gadaa; Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Pouvoir de bénir et maudire,” pp. 289–318. Democracy without State 53 these basic tenets and ideals of the Oromo people.58 The Oromo constitution stipulates, among other things, the legitimacy of the ruling Gadaa class, lubaa, for a period of 8 years, without guaranteeing a full term mandate. Corruption, nepotism, and serious incompetence can lead to its removal by the assembly to which it is accountable. On the other hand, the power of Qaalluu being of mystical origin, though other traditions consider the Qaalluu as the first Oromo, cannot be an object of election and complaint. The office is hereditary through male descendant of elderly family born from the first wife as seniority is important in the patriarchal culture. Although a man can take more than one of wife, the first wife’s role was considered a veritable wife in the social and ritual realms. Thus, the Qaalluu played a tremendous role at local and national levels as the guardian of traditions and values and checks and balances against the abuses of power. The Oromo of all regions visited the home of the great Qaalluu every 8 years59 through institutionalized pilgrimage in order to render their homage and receive his blessings. Further, historically speaking, when the Oromo were together before their great population movement they might have been organized under one Gadaa system, one Qaalluu leader and Tchaffee system. However, the segmentation of moieties and the consequent formation many Gosa was followed by the multi- plication of Gadaa, Qaalluu and Tchaffee based on the original models. The emergence of these autonomous, but localized, institutions permitted the con- tinuity of democratic political culture on the one hand and largely led to the fragmentation of Oromo polity and power on the other hand. They managed to maintain, however, a formal contact for centuries through their delegates (jila or leemmu) to Abba Muuda or Tchaffee every 8 years to receive political-ritual inspiration which permitted the continuity of the original values. In the same manner, whereas the existence of different forms of power, kinship authorities, Qaalluu and Gadaa leadership served as a system of checks and balances, it contributed, to some extent, to the diffusion of political power among the vari- ous actors. In so doing, it might have prevented the Gadaa from being the only source of power. Moreover, the destruction of Gadaa and other related institutions, whatever the causes might have been, internal or external factors, is deeply regretted by many Oromo elders both in Ethiopia and Kenya.60 This is mainly because with the disappearance of the Gadaa which was an important part of the history
58 For detailed discussion see Asmarom Legese, Oromo Democracy. 59 De Salviac, Un peuple antique au de Menelik; Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter III. 60 Karl Knutsson, Authority and Change; G. Dahl, Suffering Grass: Subsistence and Community of the Wasso Borana (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology, 1979), p. 169. 54 Chapter 1 and culture as well as a thoughtfully built non-western democracy that van- ished away. This nostalgia is explained by the fact that a democratic and sovereign polity suddenly found itself under one of the most ruthless imperial- colonial orders of modern times. Today, Gadaa is attracting the attention of many researchers and people for a variety of reasons. Firstly, for scholars, it is difficult even impossible to understand the cultural, legal and political history of the Oromo without reference to the Gadaa system. Secondly, as historians of nationalism and political scientists indicated time and again, in order for any form of nationalism to exist, there must be a pre-existing culture. Or the Gadaa, with the Oromo language, is the corner stone of Oromo identity and culture which would serve as a rallying point for the nationalists in the quest for unity. The following observation of John Hutchinson appears to be relevant in this context: “Central to ethnicity is the question of origins, the recovery of memory, and of a ‘usable past’ by which to negotiate the problems of the pres- ent. The effect of nationalist movements is often to re-enforce pre-modern institutions and values, particularly religious, which redefine the modern state and conceptions of citizenship.”61 Finally, beyond the role of a unifying factor and a common idiom for a widely spread nation, the Gadaa has immense potential to be used in the construction of a modern political structure based on indigenous tradition. Of course, no one may believe that the system can be re-established in its histori- cal form. Yet, there are quite a number of values, ideals, and practices that are not only relevant but also adaptable to the functions and objectives of a mod- ern democratic constitution. However, the will and capacity of the actors as well as the advent of a suitable political environment to test or apply them in practice remains to be seen – the discussion of this subject should be the object of another work.
61 John Hutchinson, “Ethnicity and Modern Nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2, no. 4 (2000): 651–669, 653. Chapter 2 The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure: An Anthropological Analysis
Introduction
Millions of people, perhaps about 40 million in Oromia, Ethiopia, and the Oromo speaking inhabitants of Northern Kenya claim that they descended from a common ancestor known as Oromo or Orma. But actually, both researchers and Oromo oral historians and informants cannot say with cer- tainty whether this mythical father, Oromo, existed or not, if he was really a biological father of all these branches claiming direct descent, or if being Oromo is rather a linguistic and socio-cultural reality which progressively emerged from an amalgamation of distinct or related communities. For the purposes of this discussion, what is important here is not what happened in the past, but what the Oromo believed to have happened, the way they perceive their identity and the acceptance of the Oromo definition of reality by others. It is generally agreed that membership in an ethnic group is a question of definition emanating from an interaction between self-definition and definitions given by other groups. As Du Toit remarks: “…Ethnicity then would refer to the characteristics and attitudes of those who consider them- selves and are considered by others to form a distinct ethnic group.”1 Yet, in order for a large society to feel it is an ethnic group or named by oth- ers as an ethnic group or a nation, there must be some important precondi- tions. One of these is “having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and cultural focus of one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood.”2 In the case of the Oromo, the criteria of peoplehood, ethnicity and nationality/nationhood reside in their belief in common ancestry, Oromo (Orma), shared collective history before
1 Brian M. du Toit, ed., Ethnicity in Modern Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978, Introduction), p. 9. 2 R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 12. For detailed analysis see Pierre Van der Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier, 1989), pp. 15–36; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1985), Chapter 2.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi ��.����/��������6�486_004 56 chapter 2 and after their conquest by the Ethiopian state. Above all, the Oromo identity is rooted in common representative institutions like Gadaa and Qaalluu, the same cosmology and system of thought despite conversion to Islam and Christianity,3 the same patterns of kinship organization as well as a mutually intelligible common language (afaan Oromoo). Thus, the combination of these factors makes them a formidable cultural nation despite observable local or regional particularism and variation resulting from internal transformation and cultural contacts with other peoples. Yet, in spite of these incontestable ethnographic and historical characteristics and their distribution over well- defined territory, the Ethiopian rulers had difficulty in recognizing the Oromo as a unique nation with a distinct national character, but rather, simply regarded them as “a congeries of related tribes” until recent decades when they emerged as a nation within the state who account for 38 million of the Ethiopian population, estimated at 90.87 million according to July 2011 estimates.4 Among many elements or cultural traits and a set of institutions characterizing “Oromo-ness,” this chapter will discuss kinship organization. Oromo kinship structure is inseparable from what is called Gosa which, with Gadaa, constitute(d), one of the major ethnographic characteristics which define the social organization and fabric and, as such, remains one of the mechanisms defining individual and collective identity. It is fitting therefore, to define Gosa and analyze its salient features in the traditional Oromo social structure. Based on my own research conducted among the Arsi, one of the principal Oromo regional groups, and a body of anthropological data available on the Oromo, I argue that the term “tribe” or “clan” are not good descriptions of Gosa. After describing the basic rules of Gosa (patrilineal-filiation, exogamy, patrilo- cality, etc.), we will show the dynamic nature of the Gosa and its continual formation through the process of segmentation, fission, and fusion implying structural equivalence of the Gosas regardless of their demographic impor- tance. Moreover, I will make a general observation about the dual organization observed in early Oromo social organization and which is still prevalent among the southern groups as well as their socio-political and matrimonial role of the moieties. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role of the Gosa in the
3 For the study of Oromo traditional religion see, among others, M. de Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik: Les Galla (Paris: H. Oudin, 1901); L. Bartels, Oromo Religion, Myths and Rites of Western Oromo of Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1983). 4 The World Factbook, CIA, August 23, 2011. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 57 individual’s life and how it assures rights, duties, statuses, and roles. After the Ethiopian conquest and the subsequent decline and disappearance of Gadaa, Gosa has served or has emerged as the last rampart in the defense of Oromos social cohesion and cultural identity/continuity and, as such, it has become an object of attack by the dominant group who wanted to create a homogenous national identity and nation-state in this multi-national empire (see Chapter 9 for further analysis). Interestingly enough, many peoples in Ethiopia employ the term Gosa in different contexts and with different implications without knowing its mean- ing and significance in Oromo culture. In its ethnographic usage, Gosa is a large category of descent groups which includes all peoples descending or claiming descent from a putative or real common ancestor. There is a confu- sion concerning the usage of the term by missionaries, travelers, and profes- sional anthropologists.5 The concept of “tribe” does not correspond to Oromos’ perception of their own social organization and structure. The Oromo of dif- ferent regions may employ various terminologies to designate patrilineal kin groups. For instance, Professor Herbert Lewis indicates that the Oromo of Jimma utilize the term sanyyi (seed) for any agnatic relationship, and he adds that the term is general, which would mean “people, nation, race, tribe, genes.”6 Among the Matcha of Wallaga, a broad category of agnatic kinship group is denoted as Qomo which some researchers translate either as clan or tribe.7 In the Oromo “folk model,” Gosa seems to mean an extended family. In Afaan Oromoo (Oromo language) the word Warraa denotes both nuclear family and extended family. Therefore, an Oromo speaker uses Gosa and Warraa interchangeably in many areas. For instance, when two individuals who do not know each other meet, the first question they ask each other is not about personal name, but about their membership in Gosa which is expressed as follows: “Warra kam?” or “Gosa kam?,” signifying “which family?” or “which Gosa?,” respectively. Likewise, as discussed earlier, where and when the Gadaa system function(ed), membership in one of the five grades serves as a means of acquiring another identity or status beyond that of Gosa. This indicates not
5 Some translate Gosa to “clan” whereas others use “tribe” to designate it. For a detailed analysis, see Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, contnuité et évolution des institutions d’une société éthi- opienne (thèse de doctorat de l’Université de Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1990), Chapter III, particularly, pp. 102–119. 6 Herbert Lewis, A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar, Ethiopia 1830–1932 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 59–60. 7 Lambert Bartels, Oromo Religion, Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1983), p. 205; Baissa Lemmu, an article quoted earlier translates “Qomo” into tribe. 58 chapter 2 only that Gosa and Warraa have the same signification but also the primacy of collective identity over individual identity and the cosmocentric nature of the Oromo society. Besides, the seven Wollo Oromo groups were identified by the term Warraa plus their specific names such as Warraa Himanu, Warraa Qaallu, Warraa Illu, Warraa Babbo, etc., indicating the term “family” is used for Gosa or a large category of patrilineal group. The Oromo do not have patronymic usage since every individual uses his personal name and that of his father and some- times grandfather (Figure 2.1). In other words, Gosa identity is a kinship identity which, in its restricted sense, should be seen as a sort of a large family encompassing various descent groups which express their collective identity and unity vis-à-vis their neigh- bors by tracing descent from remote mythical common ancestors.8 It goes without saying that considering Gosa as a family implies that its members have rights and duties towards each other. Yet, the way these duties, rights, and solidarities are perceived and empirically organized within the Gosa depends largely on genealogical structure or genealogical distance/nearness. In similar
Figure 2.1 Close and distant agnates. Source: Abbas H. Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, 1990: 120–130.
8 On this point, Horowitz (op. cit.) writes, “The language of ethnicity is that language of kinship. Group members often call each other brothers and call distantly related groups cousins. Harmonious relations among groups are referred to brotherhood, a term with a figurative mean- ing: the word connotes the condition of being like brothers but not actually brothers,” p. 57. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 59 societies created through progressive segmentation, there is a direct relation- ship between genealogical proximity and the degree of sociability. As M. Sahlins emphasizes, “…High and positive in the sphere of close kinship, sociability declines as the sector of social relations expands, becoming increas- ingly neutral in distant circles and ultimately, in the ‘inter-tribal’ field, alto- gether negative.”9
Gosa and Its Salient Characteristics
What is the meaning of Gosa? As mentioned above, Gosa is a collection of patrilineal descent groups and lineages of an unlimited number of genera- tions. This implies that the genealogical depth of a Gosa is extremely variable. Many Gosa claim that their ancestral line goes back to 15–20 generations or so, whereas for many genealogy stops at less than 10. The variation in genealogy could be explained by the chronology of segmentation/fission process: the more ancient the segmentation, the deeper or longer the genealogy. The most commonly evoked ancestral line among the Arsi varies, however, between 10 and 12. This has an important implication as to the use of the term Gosa: it is practically difficult to translate it into conventional anthropological terms like tribe, clan and lineage.10 For instance, the distinction between lineage and clan, which are similar in organization and functioning, is explained by the genealogical depth and accurate reference, or not, to a common ancestor. Thus lineage is used for “accurate memory” whereas clan is employed for vague or unverifiable reference to ancestors in a complex genealogical structure.11 Here, the point is that regardless of the depth of genealogy, people claim accurate memory of their forefathers. Moreover, it is not possible to translate Gosa into “tribe” not only because this term, frequently used in colonial and evolutionist anthropology, is pejorative and negative but also because it does not correspond to socio-cultural reality. Some ethnographers like Huntingford estimated the number of “Oromo tribes” at 200.12 He does not tell us the crite- ria he used to define them nor does he show how he counted them. He might have arbitrarily compiled everything (clans, lineages, moieties) he found in some ethnographic accounts and testimonies of travelers and missionaries.
9 Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 18. 10 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 102–119. 11 Robin Fox, Anthropologie de la parenté et de l’Alliance, translated by Simone Dreyfus and Tina Jolas (Paris: Galimard, 1972), pp. 125–126. 12 Huntingford, The Galla of Ethiopia, pp. 12–15. 60 chapter 2
If he takes Gosa for “tribe” that would suggest that there are about 200 “tribes” in Arsi social universe alone. This could be challenged on conceptual and empirical grounds. For the Oromo, Gosa is used to denote people related to each other through identifiable common ancestors. Even in areas where Gadaa functions and where an individual belongs to both Gadaa and Gosa, the latter may appear as his first identity emblem. This is mainly because he starts by saying his Gosa and moiety before telling his Gadaa affiliation. This does not reduce, in any way, the importance of Gadaa in social life but may simply indicate that Gosa is an older institution than Gadaa, although Gadaa is an essential part of his- tory and, as such, resisted the test of time including colonization, Islamization, and other forms of socio-cultural contact. Generally speaking, Gosa can be seen as a sort of very extended family encompassing various descent groups who express their group identity and unity vis-à-vis their neighbors, both descending from a remote common ancestor and strangers. Among the Arsi, as among all Oromo groups, Gosa is based on some basic rules: (a) exogamy, (b) patrifiliation and territoriality, (c) patrilocality and (d) autonomy and cooperation.
Exogamy Arsi Gosa is exogamous in theory and in fact. With the exception of certain recent innovations observed here and there after Islamization or Christianization of the Oromo, historically, all Oromo groups including the Matcha Oromo of Western Oromia were exogamous.13 A person is not allowed to marry into his patri-Gosa whatever genealogical differences there may be. Among the Oromo of Harar, the Arsi, Guji, and Borana, marrying with a daugh- ter of the same Gosa is unthinkable.14 Particularly in Arsi society, any sexual relation, let alone marriage, with a patrilineal woman, with whom he shares paternal ancestral genealogy, provokes an unpurifiable incest as opposed to other types of incest crimes, which could be purified or “cleaned” with special rites. Among the contemporary Matcha, a person can marry within his Gosa
13 Karl E. Knutsson, Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution among the Matcha Galla of Ethiopia (Gôterberg: Etnografiska museet, Etnologiska Studier 29, 1967), pp. 40–41. 14 R. Chambard, “Sur l’organisation des Oromo du Harar.” Revues d’ethnographie et des tradi- tions populaires, no. 25 (1926), Abbas Haji, op. cit., pp. 102–119; Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa (Introduction). Taddese Beriso, Marriage and Family System of the Guji (B.A. Thesis in Sociology, Addis Ababa University, June, 1983). The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 61 but has to take into account genealogical differences, i.e., beyond seven gen- erations starting from his father. To quote Bartels, “A man cannot marry a woman with whom he shares the seventh grandfather on his father’s side or the fifth on his mother’s side.”15 Even in the case of the Matcha, Knutsson was told by his informants that historically Gosa was exogamous.16 It is clear that the difference of Abba torba (seven fathers or seven genera- tions) serves as a sociological and psychological landmark in the Oromo kin- ship structure by the fact that it defines those within a narrow circle as close relatives and those out of the circle as distant relatives. Patrilineal descent groups beyond seven generations are qualified as Gosa bal’dha (wider Gosa). Being within Abba Torba, or beyond it, does have an important impact on the degree of sociability and solidarity. Likewise, the extension of kinship termi- nologies, which define, in one way or another, attitudes and behavior as well as rights and duties,17 in the society becomes diffuse or loose with a genealogi- cal depth. It is not surprising, therefore, if modernized individuals started to take wives from within the group beyond seven generations after their conversion to Christianity. But, Muslims can marry to both patrilateral and matrilateral cous- ins although it is not the ideal marriage among the Arsi Oromo where marriage within Gosa is not seen positively to this day, despite their Islamization. As far as matri-Gosa (kinship relation through mother) is concerned, marriage is possible by avoiding the closest family circle – ideally four to five generations difference starting from the mother. However, in some areas, as among the Arsi, individuals tend not to renew marriage alliances into the mother’s line to which they are already related by blood relations and a strong sense of solidar- ity and friendship. Rather, they prefer to contract marriage with another Gosa in order to multiply the allied groups. As opposed to the Borana, who observe strict prohibition of marriage not only within Gosa but also within moiety, the Arsi ignore membership or non-membership in moiety in their matrimonial strategy. Although a man inherits his filiation and property or other forms of politico-ritual capacity from his father, he maintains very close relations
15 Lambert Bartles, Oromo Religion, p. 208. 16 Karl Knutsson, Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution among the Matcha Galla of Ethiopia (Gôterberg: Etnografiska museet, Etnologiska Studier 29), pp. 40–41. 17 For analysis of how kinship nomenclatures order social relationship see A.R. Radcliffe- Brown and Cyril Forde, eds. (Introduction), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950). 62 chapter 2 of friendship and solidarity with his matri-Gosa (Warraa haadhaa) in general and his mother’s brothers in particular. The following observation of L. Bartels could be applied throughout Oromo country: “There exists a special relation of sympathy between children and their mother’s brother. Children do often have more friendly relations with their cousin on the mother’s line than with those on their father’s side. Between brothers we find often some latent antagonism, and this operates for the son of the same father.”18
Patrifiliation and Territoriality The second rule of Gosa is patrifiliation. The filiation is always patrilineal/ agnatic and male children inherit a Gosa name, property and political-ritual role/status – if there is any – of their father, without ambiguity although suc- cession and inheritance go to the first-born due to the prevalence of primo- geniture rules and seniority. An Oromo has to refer to his (her) lineal descent through his paternal line (patri-Gosa) without any ambiguity – a son inherits the filiation of his father. In the same way, wealth (richness), politico-ritual authority, and a father’s social status are transmitted to his sons, in this case the first-born (hangafa). In principle, all Oromos identify themselves with paternal Gosa. As Asmarom Legesse notes, “Borana identify the largest kinship unit as Gosa. The term is actually a general designation for kin groups of any genealogical depth” (emphasis is added).19 This suggests that the genealogical depth of the Gosa is unlimited; many Gosas have long genealogies going back to a very remote past – 15 or more generations – whereas the genealogy of some does not exceed 10–12 generations for many others. Yet, in both cases, people claim that their genealogical/descent reckoning up to the alleged founding father is correct or accurate. Perhaps this could be attributed to rigorous methods of teaching or incul- cating ancestral line in the mind of children during childhood. As L. Bartels indicated for the Oromo of Wallagga, the Oromo do have an effective way of teaching and memorizing genealogy: every child repeats before his parents, usually his father, saying “I am the son of A, A is the son of B, B is the son C, C is the son of D, and so on” – A, B, C and D being personal names of father’s ancestors – up to the alleged founding father. This practice is still vigorously carried out and primary school-age children can easily count as far
18 Lambert Bartels, Oromo Religion, p. 225. 19 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa, Chapter I, p. 38. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 63 as 10 generations back until now.20 It must be noted, however, that the preser- vation and memorization of genealogies is stricter among those who have a hereditary office such as the Qaallu, in which politico-ritual authority passes from a father to his first-born, and other senior families – every Gosa has its own elderly family. Among the Arsi all Gosa and major lineages have a defined territory. As we have mentioned earlier, most of land ownership rights go back to the early migration/peopling process. It is important to note that even the Ethiopian imperial conquest which alienated about two-thirds or three quarters of their traditional land did not completely disrupt the social morphology of Arsi Gosa: they exploited, collectively, the parcel of land which remained under their control or bought land from the new masters, or simply continued to use their former lands through different forms of contractual agreements although the situations could be variable from place to place. So, when a person says his residence or place of birth his Gosa affiliation could easily be identified.21 This assertion does not reduce, however, the importance of the dynamic of the segmentation process and that is why we observe the same Gosa names in different areas. Likewise, in spite of patri-local residence rules, individuals can leave their Gosa to establish themselves elsewhere, usually among their mother’s lineage, particularly after marriage. Even in this case, they retain their Gosa identity.
Patrilocality and Patrilineal Residence Another feature of Gosa is the question of residence. In theory, the residence rule is patrilocal among the Oromo, where men are expected to be born, grow up, live, bring their wives to their residence, and die. However, patrilocal- ity is common in areas where the Gosa is territorially defined, as was the case for major Gosa and balbala (lineages). For instance, the territory of the Gosa is so clearly defined that the name of a person’s locality permits one to know his Gosa affiliation. The coherence between Gosa territoriality and the patrilocal residence rule may depend upon various factors such as climate, soil fertility, demographic pressure, or the availability of resources. Otherwise, no rule or custom prohibits individuals and families from separating from
20 Lambert Bartels, Oromo Religion, p. 224. 21 E. Haberland, Galla Süd Äthiopiens, pp. 445–447. He tried to locate more than hundred Gosa. But he confused sub-moieties with Gosa, and lineage with Gosa. He did not take account of the dynamic of segmentation and fission of the Gosa system and the conse- quent settlement patterns. Moreover, his list is not exhaustive. 64 chapter 2 their Gosa and establishing themselves independently with other local groups with whom they claim some kinship ties. As will be seen later, the flexibility of residence rules and the mobility of descent groups, added to the dynamic of the Gadaa system, led to the process of segmentation of the Oromo and the consequent settlement over an extensive territory. All in all, patrilocality or virilocality is an ideal type and the most frequent residence rule among the Oromo. This is mainly because people prefer to live on ancestral land where their forefathers lived, died, and were buried since the Oromo believe that the spirit of dead ancestors continue to live among them. This is generally called Ayyaana Abba and it is believed that it can positively or negatively influence the course of events in the community. So, the Oromo try to maintain harmonious relations through sacrifice in the honor of Ayyaana Abba, usually at given interval, regular visits and pilgrimages to their tombs, etc.22 Above all, living among one’s agnates enables a person to share corporate inter- ests in grazing and agricultural land and ensure economic interdependence and cooperation during ordinary life and emergencies. The following observation of Jan Hultin on the Matcha of Wallaga can apply to many Oromo groups including the Arsi:
Each hill is associated with a patrilineage or lineage segment, and usually the men and the unmarried girls who live on the same ridge are agnati- cally related. Married brothers live as close neighbours, and all the hus- bands on a ridge trace descent from a common ancestor, whereas their wives, who moved there at marriage, do not belong to this descent cate- gory. Upon marriage, a couple will often continue to live in the male’s father’s house until the latter allows his son to build a house of his own, usually upon the birth of the first child.23
Even in nomadic temporary camps in which individuals come together for a season of about 3–4 months and where descent groups are dispersed and mixed, as among the Borana, where they construct their huts people tend to regroup themselves according to their familial affiliation and genealogical proximity.24 Matrilocality is less frequent as individuals strictly maintain their patrifilia- tion. Although matri-kin share corporate interests in grazing or farming land,
22 Karl Knutsson, Authority and Change, p. 60; F. Azaïs and R. Chambard, Cinq années de recherches archéologique en Ethiopie, p. 218. 23 Jan Hultin, “The Land Is Crying: State Intervention and Cultural Resistance among the Matcha.” In A River of Blessing: Essays in Honor of Paul Baxter, pp. 67–83. 24 Asmarom, Gadaa, p. 34. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 65 they do not have any right to inherit or the right of succession through the matrilateral line, even in the absence of direct heirs. Among the Arsi, matrikins are known as ilmaan durbarti (the sons of the woman of the lineage) and, as such, enjoy some rights and duties.25 Uxorilocality (residence in woman’s place) is the rarest type of residence. This can be explained by three factors. The first factor is closely related to the quality of the relationship between parents in-laws characterized by strict mutual respect and positive attitudes which, in some areas, may lead to a custom of avoidance between a son-in-law and mother-in-law, at least during the marriage process.26 Neighborhood and the subsequent daily or regular contacts and interaction between parents in-law (warra soddaa) are likely to affect the relations, usually in a negative sense. So, one solution would be to avoid close contacts, meaning not to live among parents-in-law. The second factor is that a man does not have any chance to inherit his parent-in-law’s property and status through his wife, which renders uxorilocality less attractive. The last and perhaps the most important reason a husband is reluctant to live among his wife’s relatives is that this would reduce and even jeopardize his patriarchal authority over his wife and their common property. In the case of a conflict, a woman can ally herself with her relatives, which would put him in an uncomfortable situation (Table 2.1; Figure 2.2). This does not mean, however, that parents are not interested in the fate of the daughter living out of their territory, i.e., living virilocally. On the contrary, a woman remains a member of her patrilineage and she is expected to partici- pate in its ritual activities and other important ceremonies (marriages, funer- als). Moreover, the marriage contract only transfers the legal control over a woman’s productive capacity (children) and economic activity from wife- givers to wife-takers, but not physical control over the wife. The latter agnates remain concerned about physical and moral damage inflicted on her by her husband or a third party and are ready to intervene any time.
Autonomy and Cooperation Fourthly, Gosa is an autonomous socio-political unit. Of course, when Gadaa functioned, political power was largely in the hands of Gadaa leaders, though other actors (Qaalluu and kinship seniors) had considerable authority. Interestingly enough, the Arsi classify their political culture into two:
25 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 103–104. 26 A. Werner describes some forms of formalized and ritualized attitudes between son in- law and mother in-law. See “The Galla of the East African Protectorate.” Journal of African Society, XIII (1913–1914). 66 chapter 2
Table 2.1 Arsi Oromo kinship terms.
The Level of Generation Kinship Terminologies
Masculine Feminine
Fifth generation Ababili Ababili? ascending (G5) Fourth ascending Akakili Akakili? generation (G4) Third ascending Ababayu = grand grand père Ababayu = grand grand generation (G3) mère Second generation Akakayu = grand mother Aka’o = grandmother Ascending (G2) First ascending Abba = father Haadha = biological generation (G1) mother and espouses of father Abba (wosila) = father’s Adada = father’s sister brother and mother’s sister Abba Gudda = father’s older Soddati = mother-in-law brother Abba Tiqa = father’s younger brother Sodda = father-in-law, in-laws in general Generation of Ego (G) Obbolessaa = brother, Obboletti = sister, paternal cousin paternal cousin Gara = children of same Gara = children of same father and mother father and mother Durbi = cross cousins Durbiti = cross cousins (children of father’s sister (children of father’s and mother’s sister) sister and mother’s sister) First descending genera- Ilma = son Intala = daughter tion (G1) Sodda = son-in law Esuma = daughter of cross cousins Esuma = son of a sister; used Intala lima = wife of a also for mother’s brother son (equally denotes the daughter a son) (Continued) The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 67
Table 2.1 (Continued)
The Level of Generation Kinship Terminologies
Masculine Feminine
Second descending Akakayu = grand children Aka’o = grand daughters generation = the same as (G2) Third descending genera- Ababayu = grand grand Ababayu = grand grand tion = the same as (G3) children daughters G − 4 = G + 4 G − 5 = G + 5
Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu
Aka’o Akakayyu Aka’o Akakayyu
Haadha Abba Esuma Adada Abba Haadha AdadaAEsuma Esuma dada
EGO Obolessa Oboltti Durbi Durbitti Obolessa Obeltti Durbi Durbitti Durbi Durbitti
Ilma Intala Esuma Ilma Ilma Intala EsumaEsuma Esuma
Akakayyu AkakayyuAkakayyu AkakayyuAkakayyuAkakayyu Akakayyu Akakayyu Akakayyu
Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu Ababayyu
Figure 2.2 Oromo kinship nomenclature.
Dhadacha and Qallacha-Tchachu. Dhadacha means an acacia tree, under which people discuss and settle disputes. So, here Dhadacha designates elders or senior members of the society exercising moral authority and influence. They arbitrated disputes and clashes of all nature, starting from familial 68 chapter 2 disputes to homicide. After all, there were no Gadaa courts, not were there any Qaalluu courts or kinship courts. All those who administered justice used Seera, the Oromo constitution, as their guide. The concept of Kalacha- Tchachu refers to the ritual objects that the Qaalluu-Gadaa leaders wear or put on their head as symbols of their power. Among the Arsi, leaders can be known under the name Abba Baalli (lit. father of a feather) or Abba Bokku (father of a scepter) – feather and scepter being ritual objects held or worn by the president of the Gadaa class in office. As was discussed earlier, the Gadaa leader was the most important or the supreme political authority in the community. Here, politically speaking, what is important to emphasize is that there was no hereditary Gosa chief or head, which implies that leadership in Gosa was largely based on seniority and charisma. In fact, some Arsi prominent leaders tried to adopt the title Haxii, when they came in contact with the Amhara, whose king used the title of Atse. Haxii is, therefore, a borrowed and deformed word “Atse” (king, majesty). Particularly, after the conquest and imposition of Ethiopian colonial order, some important balabbat or their descendants claimed that they were Haxiis, they were from princely families, perhaps in order to impress better Abyssinian authorities who could better understand hereditary privileges and ranks than rotating Gadaa titles. However, the Oromo of the South did not develop princely families or a kingdom. Seniority is respected for its own sake and every moiety, Gosa, lineage and family has its own seniors and juniors. For the Oromo, everything, including the five Gadaa grades of 8 year each, has its own seniors and juniors. For instance, in the Arsi Gadaa system, Birmaji is considered as the first Gadaa whereas Bahara comes in the last order. Charismatic leaders have always played a very important role and many individuals who distinguished them- selves as warriors or commanders of the army in the Gadaa system called Abba Duula undermined the Gadaa leadership and in some countries like the Matcha Oromo they succeeded in undermining and destroying the Gadaa system itself. The most important Gosa political assembly is known as Qixxee, a subject which was addressed in Chapter 1. Last but not least, Gosa served as an institutional mechanism of organizing solidarity and cooperation among its members. As a rule, members share cor- porate interests in grazing and farming land. Common ownership in land and unlimited private property (cattle) had always been a source of conflict and clashes among Gosa, lineage or even domestic groups. During earlier periods, the problem of demographic pressure was solved by migration and segmenta- tion. However, in spite of temporary clashes reported in some areas, the Arsi avoided internal wars because of the myth of origin and a web of marriage The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 69 alliances. In effect, although filiation is traced on the father’s side, people remember relatives from their mother’s and grandmothers’ line. When these are taken together, over generations, it would enlarge, considerably, one’s social universe – a large web of relatives and networks of allies. The magnitude of solidarity and economic cooperation during ordinary life and emergency/ crises (funerals, marriage, homicide, etc.) depend on the strength of the web of kinship relations. Of course, sociability and the degree of cooperation depend, among other factors, upon the proximity or distance of the genealogy within the Gosa. As genealogy expands, the solidarity diminishes and with distant relatives, it becomes minimal. The Arsi call it Gosa Baldh’a (wider Gosa) to mean where the concern for a member’s fate more ambivalent as compared to inter-lineage solidarity. But during great crises, in this case wars, they tended to unite and regroup more than ever before. The most important example of this is their long and stiff resistance against the Shoan colonizing forces. In other words, if the Arsi staged this formidable war of resistance against Menelik in the 1880s, it was because of the solidarity and unity of the Gosa and the warrior ideology enshrined in the Gadaa system. Gosa serves as a sort of the last resort during all crises and emergency including marriage, feuds/conflict with another group and funerals. To get married he needs bride wealth which was about six heads of cattle. If he is not in a position to pay this for one reason or another, it is the duty of his Gosa in general, and his closest family circle in particular, to contribute what is neces- sary for this marriage. This may be in accordance with rules of reciprocity – the giver can ask for the gift or contribution even decades later if he is in need for the same objective. For this reason, no one remains a bachelor because of the lack of bride wealth or matrimonial compensation. Likewise, if a person is impoverished and failed to meet his needs, his kins- men make contributions (cows, oxen, goats, transport animals, etc.) in order to elevate him to the minimum standard of life required. Among the pastoral Borana, a man having less than 25 heads of cattle was considered as poor and benefits from a solidarity or contribution of his Gosa.27 The solidarity towards those who were exposed to abject poverty or on the way of pauperization is known as hirpa. In the case of prolonged shortage of milk, to this one has to add the temporary transfer of milk cows from a wealthy family to the needy family which may end in a permanent gift.28 This was one of the means by
27 Asmarom Legesse. 28 Gudrun Dahl, The Suffering Grass, p. 157 and for the details see also, Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 111–115. 70 chapter 2 which the surplus was redistributed and assured the harmonious functioning of the community. On the whole, the question of Oromo kinship identity, social structure and residence rules must be analyzed in relation to two phases of their history; the period during when the Oromo constituted a sovereign society and functioned according to the logic of their republican institutions, and the period when they fell under Ethiopian imperial rule as well as conversion to the monotheist religions which have significant impact on socio-cultural life. One of the dra- matic consequences of the conquest of their country was the loss of three- quarter or the quasi totality of their communal land and the reduction of the Oromo to serfdom. Oromo land was shared among the colonizers (soldiers, administrative officers, the Church, etc.) according to the logic of feudal colo- nialism. This not only deprived the Oromo of their traditional land rights but also broke their social fabric. In this situation, residence rules were secondary compared to survival strategies. Many people were evicted or migrated from their ancestral villages because of the shortage of land to any place they deemed their burden was bearable. This created a new type of social morphol- ogy or demographic structure in which the local community was composed of individuals of heterogeneous origin. The new neighborhood necessitated the adoption of voluntary associations (eddir, mahber, equb, etc.) from the Amhara Christians to maintain the cohesion of amorphous local groups or reinforce the eroding solidarity of lineages.29 Simon D. Messing stresses that this mutual aid within the territorial or kinship unit is a mechanism of improving the sim- ple living standard of the Amhara.30 This seems to have been widely adopted both in rural areas and urban settings.
The Socio-Political Functions of Dual Organization
The definition of Arsi Oromo kinship structure and social universe cannot be understood without taking into consideration the duality of their social
29 Although many Oromo, as other peoples, tend to adopt aspects of mutual aid it was the Christianized and urbanized groups who were influenced by voluntary association. For more details see Herbert S. Lewis, “Neighbors, Friends and Kinsmen: Principle of Social Organization among the Cushitic Speaking Peoples of Ethiopia.” In Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 2–5 May, 1973, edited by Harold G. Marcus (East Lansing: African Studies Center, 1975), pp. 193–207. 30 Simon D. Messing, Highland Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia, edited by Lionel Bender in 3 vols. (New Haven, CT: Human Relation Area Files, Inc., 1985), pp. 72–73. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 71 organization, the moiety system and the dichotomy of Arsi and Hadiya, the pre-Oromo group which gradually integrated to the Oromo culture and became Arsi. Following the writing of the Ethiopian monk of the 16th century, Bahrey, many writers repeatedly indicated the division of the Oromo into two moieties: Borana and Bareetuma or Barentu. This widely known tradition in Oromo history and ethnography maintains that during the Great Oromo popu- lation movement they separated and migrated into different directions, the former to the West and the latter to the East and Northeast and settled in dis- crete territories.31 In several of the chapters in his books (Gadaa and Oromo Democracy), the Dual Organization, Asmarom Legesse challenges most of this thesis. Based on the contemporary Borana social organization and the dispersion of many clans belonging to Borana and Bareetuma, he came up with different hypotheses and developed a series of arguments which chal- lenges the territoriality of the moieties. In fact, many of his thoughtful analyses are convincing. Perhaps, at early stages moieties were not territorial entities as the case of the Borana (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 Oromo’s alleged genealogical structure. Source: Abbas H. Gnamo, Les Oromo Arsi, 1990: 28.
31 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, Chapter II. 72 chapter 2
However, in Arsi country the moieties emerged as a territorial reality. We do not know when this happened. According the various traditions I collected, the division of Arsi into two moieties called Sikko and Mando took place at Odaa Diniq, eastern Bale, during their movement.32 The moieties took differ- ent directions, northern and western, and the subsequent segmentation and settlement of Gosas followed the same pattern. The opposite geographic distribution does not mean, however, that the connection between clans and territory is blurred as it is possible to find clans belonging to Sikko among the opposite moiety and vice versa due to the dynamic of segmentation and con- tinuous population movement. Neither moiety nor Gosa territories had a fixed border. Territoriality was more a way of defining identity or belonging rather than social reality on the ground. Among the Arsi, it is generally accepted that the moieties are territorially located, not mixed, occupying a geographically definable area, although one can find a Gosa claiming membership in one moiety in the territory of the opposite moiety. Population movement had been an integral part of Oromo history. In addition, Arsi moieties, Sikko and Mando, did not seem to have played an important political role as there was no systematic representation of Gosa on the basis of moieties in the socio-political system at the local level. Neither did they have influence on matrimonial strategy: men are free to take wives from both moieties. However, in the common Tchaffee, and pilgrimage to the Great Qaalluu of Bale where Oromos visited every eight years, moieties and sub-moieties were represented and, as such played an active part in a politico- ritual process. Above all, moieties are the most important classificatory organi- zations defining the socio-cultural universe and the seniority of Gosa in a complex clan/lineage structure. Comparatively speaking, there are no univer- sal rules characterizing moieties or dual organizations; they can be exogamous or endogamous, mixed or separate in their settlement patterns, they can be marked by the presence or the absence of political role, they can be hostile and friendly towards each other, etc. Thus, Lévi-strauss, who made an important contribution to the study of the system, argues that the most important crite- rion in the existence of dual organization is that individuals define themselves by their membership or non-membership in the same moiety.33 Whatever its political role might have been in remote past, the contempo- rary Arsi moieties are an important classificatory system defining social
32 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter I. 33 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté (Paris, La Haye: Mouton & Com, 1967), p. 80. See also R. Lowie, Social Organization (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1959), pp. 246–247. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 73 universe and, as such, play some ritual and genealogical role. All Gosa and indi- viduals have to refer themselves either to Sikko or Mando to claim Arsi iden- tity. Traditionally, the Arsi social structure was characterized by Arsi and Hadya dichotomy. Here Arsi is perceived as “true” or “pure Oromo” whereas Hadya denotes many of pre-Oromo populations that were progressively incorporated into Oromo culture. Despite some differences between those who claimed to be original Oromo and those who became Oromo over time, there is no indica- tion that there was a master-servant socio-economic relationship since the Arsi did not develop organized mechanisms of exploitation and domination which could be imposed on the Hadiya as subjects. On the contrary, they co-existed, peacefully, shared resources, largely intermarried, who gave them the Arsi kinship identity including member ship in moieties in order to enable the Hadiya to trace their genealogies back to the founding father, “Arsi.” They were, therefore, completely “Oromized” by losing their Hadiya cultural and linguistic identity. This, added to Oromo egalitarianism and extensive adoption, contributed to effective process of integration and homogenization of the Arsi social universe and the old dichotomy of Arsi/Hadiya progressively disappeared as Braukämper noted: “The more the Arsi moved northward and generally assimilated new Hadiya (Sidamo groups) the more evidently a dualism between the true Oromo and the so-called Hadiya clans crystallized.”34 Finally, the massive conversion of the Arsi to Islam35 and the adoption of a new concept of soli darity has completely reduced the duality of Arsi and Hadiya to the domain of folklore which the senior members of the society evoke in the form of jokes (Map 2.1). This is generally true for many similar “clanic” societies in Africa in which genealogies constitute the basis of social organization and, as such, are pain stakingly preserved for social and political purposes. As G. Balandier argued, genealogies play the role of social charter in many clan-based societies by the fact that they maintain and justify social agency and the distribution of rights and duties.36 Here, our intention is not to testify to the accuracy of genealogy or to explain why the genealogies of some Gosa are longer or shorter but to
34 U. Braukämper, “Islamic Principalities in South-East Ethiopia between the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, I, no. 1 (1977): 17–56, 20. See also his book, Geschicte der Hadiya Süd Athiopiens – von den Anfängen bis zur Revolution 1974 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980). 35 Cf. Abbas Haji, The Islamization of Arsi: Islam versus Christianity, unpublished manuscript. 36 G. Balandier, “Tradition, conformité, hisotricité dans l’autre et ailleurs,” contribution to Hommage à Roger Bastide (Paris: Berger-Lévrault, 1976), pp. 15–38, 25. 74 chapter 2
Map 2.1 The distribution of Arsi Gosa. Adapted from: Urlich Bramkamper, Geschichte der Hadiya sud Athiopiens. Wiesbaden, Granz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1980 The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 75 emphasize that the term Gosa cannot correspond to conventional definitions of lineage, clan, or tribe. In effect, in “Lineage theory”37 clans are understood as “descent groups who trace their ancestry to a common apical ancestor or ancestress, but do not know the precise link to that ancestor.” Lineage differs from clan by the fact that its members remember with certainty their link to their ancestor.38 But clans and major lineages are subject to the same rules particularly in terms of segmentation. This was what might have happened among the Oromo society. As analyzed in the first chapter, when the Oromo were together as a community or a homogenous social cultural unit, they must have had one Gadaa center (repub- lic) and one Tchaffee (traditional Oromo parliament) in which they were said to have taken a Kaka Oromo (Oromo oath) not to go to war against each other. But, with their migration and the subsequent fragmentation, this mythical oath did (could) not survive the test of time.39 It seems, however, that the most southern groups such as Arsi and Borana succeeded in maintaining at least their internal peace up to the present time. According to G. Dahl, “Feuds are not waged between Borana, as a rule conflicts are settled by peaceful arbitra- tion between lineages.”40 Paul Baxter confirms this when he writes: “The main- tenance of the Borana (nagaya Borana) is the constant daily concern of the elders. This peace is a positive pervasive concept and is much more than a mere negative prohibition of strife, but implies active cooperation and con- cord which is most clearly expressed in the cooperative exploitation of limited natural resources.”41
37 Lineage Theory played an important role in the rise and development of anthropology. But some contemporary anthropologists deny the existence of Lineage Theory/Model. The most representative of this A. Kuper who writes the following: “My view is that the Lineage Model, its predecessors and its analogs, have no value for anthropological analy- sis. Two reasons above all support this conclusion. First, the model does not represent folk models which actors anywhere have of their own societies. Secondly, there does not appear any societies in which vital political or economic activities are organized by a repetitive series of descent groups.” Adam Kuper, “Lineage Theory: A Critical Retrospect.” Annual Review of Anthropology, II (1982):71–95. 38 Charlotte Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), pp. 38, 169; Robin Fox, Anthropologie de la parenté: une analyse de consanguinité et de l’Alliance, pp. 125–126. 39 Dinsa Lepisa, The Gadaa System of Government and Sera Chaffe Oromo, p. 132; Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi, pp. 7–8. 40 G. Dahl, The Suffering Grass, Subsistence and Community of the Wasso Borana, pp. 13, 18. 41 Paul Baxter, “Stock Management and Diffusion of Property Rights among the Boran.” In Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1966 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1969), pp. 117–118. 76 chapter 2
For their part, the Arsi proved their social cohesion on many occasions, par- ticularly vis-à-vis the imperial colonizing forces in the 1880s when all the Gosa stood as one body. It is true, the Arsi Oromo, like the Borana Oromo, fought against their neighbors, Oromo or not, occasionally for different reasons. But they avoided internal conflict; internal wars were said to have been rare thanks to their traditional methods of settling feuds and a web of marriage alliances. This, combined with strict respect of internal peace, did not permit the rise of war chiefs (economico-military elite) who might have undermined the Gadaa system and establish monarchical rule, as was the case among the Matcha. Finally, in the political domain, Gosa was autonomous. However, this polit- ico-ritual autonomy depended on many factors such as its physical distribu- tion and demographic size. There are Gosa with a thousand or less members, whereas others may count tens of thousands of individuals. The latter could have its own Gadaa center (republic), whereas the former had to either orga- nize itself with larger Gosa, or form another Gadaa area with similar smaller Gosa. In either case, the Gadaa system was not likely to create hegemony of one Gosa over another, however strong it may have been, for the simple reason that power rotated every 8 years and individuals from any Gosa were eligible for leadership. Above all, the Gadaa class in office, in spite of its legitimacy and the strong power it wielded, did not have an institutional mechanism to extract resources or levy tribute for itself or its family. Each Gosa controlled its tradi- tional land, and its members who governed during the Gadaa period owned private property. In that sense, it is very similar to Western democracies which do not alter rights after elections of new leaders. In brief, membership in Gosa and Gadaa is not necessarily identical. Membership in the former is obtained through birth or descent from a real or putative forefather or through adoption or other ways of voluntary affiliation, as will be discussed later. On the contrary, Gadaa includes kin and non-kin, the most important criteria being age structure and demography, because the Gadaa is composed of five grades of 8 years, each of which must be occupied or filled with a group of children and men belonging to the same category of age. No stage is left unoccupied and it is through these successive grades that children are initiated, socialized, trained for military activity, and finally pre- pared for politico-judiciary functions, i.e., the luba stage. Biological age is so important for harmonious functioning of the system and in order to avoid structural anomaly the society tried to control the demographic structure,42
42 For his part Jan Hultin argued that the failure of relative control on the procreation process permitted the distinctive role and status of generation vis-à-vis the system rendered the Gadaa non-functional or hereditary. “In a situation when nobody was The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 77 through different means, particularly by delaying the age of marriage and childbirth but without success.43 The position a person occupies in the Gadaa is not directly or indirectly associated with his position (status) in the genealogical structure of Gosa. In the same way, adjacent and alternate generations in the Gadaa and ascending and descending generations in the patrilineage are not identical, which means that the allocation of responsibility and rights is not conceived similarly in both systems. The fact that an individual has different statuses and roles by virtue of his membership in Gosa and Gadaa would give room to maneuver through social relations and interactions. Professor Legesse underlined: “The individual is free to take political action as member of age-set or Gadaa or moiety (clan). It is this phenomenon of cross cutting categories that introduces considerable freedom to an individual’s choices into an otherwise rigid pattern of social differentiation.”44 Generally speaking, we have some indication that dual organization in the Oromo social structure is ancient. The first ethnographic information given by Bahrey, an Abyssinian Monk and the author of “History of the Galla,” in the 16th century indicates a division between Borana and Barentu (Baratuma), and thus the existence of dual organization. He wrote:
The Oromo came from the west and crossed the river of their country, which is called Galana to the frontier of Bali, in the time of Aste Wasan Sagad. They are two tribes called Baraytuma and Borana. Baraytuma had six children: the eldest was called Karayu, the second Marawa, the third Itu, the fourth Akachu, the fifth Waranticha, and the sixth Humbena.45
One question arising from the above observation is that Bahrey tells us that Baratuma and Borana were “tribes” immediately after he considers them as individuals who begot 6 and 12 children, respectively. Although he clearly indi- cated that these groups set out together to make war until they quarreled and separated due to an increase in population and animals, Bahrey could not say
in the right position in the Gadaa system to succeed an official, the solutions at hand were either to leave the office vacant or to prolong the mandate.” Hultin, “Political Culture and the Development of Inequality among the Matcha Oromo,” dans la Production pastorale sous la direction de l’Equipe écologie et Anthropologie des sociétés pastorales (Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 283–295. 43 For detailed analysis see Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa, pp. 163–167. 44 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa. 45 Bahrey. 78 chapter 2 when this took place.46 Neither could scholars who studied the subject in more detail solve the problem definitively.47 What is certain is that the Oromo had a dual form of social organization, generally called moiety, which comes from French word “moitié” meaning “half.” As a principle of social organization, moieties are said to have been widespread among various peoples in North America and Melanesia. The emergence of moieties is related to demographic conditions and, as such, they may evolve, appear and disappear constantly. According to R. Lowie, “a moiety system is a form of organization and, in some cases, inevitably arises from demographic condition. In a multiple clan system, the dying out of all but two clans establishes moieties; so does the extravagant growth of one at the expense of others.”48 For Lévi-Strauss, who theorized this system: “The moiety defines a system in which the members of a community, tribe or village, are divided into two divisions which entertain complex relations going from the declared hostility to intimacy (very close) where diverse forms of rivalry and cooperation are associated.”49 This suggests that there is no a unique model characterizing moieties as they could be based on matrimonial or residential rules or simply on ritual relations. It seems that the most important criterion for the existence of dual organization is that individuals define their relations to each other by their membership or non-membership in the same moiety.50 Our knowledge does not permit us to say with certainty the nature of early Oromo moieties (Borana and Barentu). They were either a simple classificatory system defining the social universe or they fulfilled other important ritual and socio-political roles, they gave birth to all Oromo regional groups which, in turn, are segmented into Gosas whose exact number is not yet known. The southern Oromo, the Borana, Arsi, Guji and Garbra, who did not leave or did not move far from Oromo’s original homeland maintained the moiety system51 whereas many other
46 Ibid. 47 Mohammed Hassen seems to believe that the secession between Barentu and Borana took place in the lowland of historical Bali, the Valley of Genale River which goes back to 14th century. See The Oromo of Ethiopia, Chapter II for the details. 48 Robert Lowie, Social Organization, pp. 246–247. 49 Claude Lévis-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, p. 80. 50 Ibid., p. 83. 51 Haberland, p. 784; Asmarom Legesse, pp. 139–140; Abbas Haji, Les Oromo Arsi, pp. 99–102. G. Dahl, The Suffering Grass, pp. 13, 18; John Hinnant, “The Guji: Gadaa as a Ritual System.” In Age, Generation and Time, edited by Paul Baxter and Uri Almagor, pp. 207–243. The Borana are divided into Sabbo and Gona, the Arsi into Sikko and Mando, the Guji into Kontoma and Darmu, the Gabra into Lossa and Yilbo. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 79
Oromo lost it with time or through contacts with other peoples. Even among the Southern Oromo, the actual role of the moieties is extremely different. For instance, in contrast to Borana moieties, Arsi moieties do not have matrimo- nial functions; they are not territorially mixed, and do not practice systematic representation at different levels of the social system in order to assure balanced opposition. Basing himself on the Borana ethnography, Professor Asmarom Legesse wrote:
It (dual organization) is one of the key principles of distributive justice, a structural principle that divides power into two permanently opposed groups, the ultimate stumbling block for would be despots. All Borana assemblies, small or large, low or high, young or old, consist of represen- tatives of the two halves of Borana society. Each luba council, for instance, consists of three members of the senior moiety and three members of the junior moiety. Every local community (olla) forms a representative coun- cil consisting of some members of each moiety…52
It is quite possible that Arsi moieties had the same role as moieties among the contemporary Borana society, their immediate neighbors, early in their his- tory. One can assume also that many functions of Borana moieties were the innovation of later periods. Be this as it may, during their migration in Bale, at Oda Diniq, perhaps during the 15th century, Arsi moieties decided to move in different directions in order to avoid possible conflicts.53 The Sikko groups moved towards the eastern, north-eastern, and central Arsi whereas those of Mando went south, south-west, and north of their present country. On this basis, the Sikko and Mando moieties, segmented into sub-moieties, which in turn gave rise to tens of Gosa.54 As the Gosa settled according to their member- ship in the moiety, it is difficult to coordinate ritual and political activities and, above all, to ensure balanced representation and the opposition of the Sikko and Mando under one political center. Perhaps it was for the same reasons that
52 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, paper presented to the “Conference on Oromo Revolution” (Washington, DC, August 16, 1987), p. 10. I thank the author for sending me this manuscript. See his current book on the subject, Oromo Democracy. 53 For Arsi tradition of their origin, expansion and division into moieties see Abbas Haji, Les Oromo Arsi, pp. 24–34. 54 Haberland, pp. 445–447. He gives a list of more than hundred Arsi Gosa. But this list is very far from being exhaustive and there are a number of confusions between the names of lineages and clans and localities. I think there are more than 200 Arsi Gosa dispersed throughout Arsi-Bale regions, southern Shoa, western Hararghé and eastern Sidamo. 80 chapter 2
Map 2.2 Arsi Oromo moiety system. Source: Adapted from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 27, 2013 the Arsi moieties lost their matrimonial role, unlike the Borana in which an individual should always take a wife from the opposing moiety (Map 2.2). In effect, in order for this prescriptive marriage rule to be respected there has to be “wife-givers” and “wife-takers.” This was the basis for Lévi-Strauss’s “Alliance Theory” as elaborated in “Elementary Structures of Kinship.”55 There are two sound reasons that Borana matrimonial strategy may fit this theory. First, a Borana should not marry a woman of the same moiety, but the opposite moiety. This makes the Gona and Sabbo permanent wife-givers and wife- takers, as both need to exchange wives to ensure their reproduction and continuity. The second reason why this marriage institution was observed and survived could be attributed to the relative demographic equilibrium of the
55 Claude Lévi-strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté and see particularly his “Réflexions sur l’atome de parenté.” In Anthropologie structurale deux (Paris: Plon, 1973), pp. 103–138. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 81 moieties. According to Professor Asmarom Leggesse, the Sabbo and the Gona represent 51% and 49% of the total Borana population respectively.56 If this is the case and under normal conditions – i.e., given that the number of females and males is more or less equal in each moiety – there is a potential wife for each Borana man in the opposed moiety. Besides, the equivalent demographic proportion of the moieties is a key factor not only in the continuity of Borana marriage system but also in the process of participation-representation and balanced opposition. The Guji, immediate neighbors of the Borana and the Arsi, are divided into two major moieties known as Kontoma and Darmu which were segmented into sub-moieties comprised of 18 clans. The state of our knowledge does not permit us to describe the actual political role of the moiety in Guji society; this political role appears quite diffuse in comparison to the Borana social sys- tem. However, it plays a crucial role in defining matrimonial strategies and even sexual behaviors. Marriages within the same moiety or sub-moieties are forbidden among the Gujis and alliances with some sub-moieties preferred, if not prescribed. In brief, it is important to understand Guji dual organization in order to understand their general social organization and their marriage system in particular.57 On the contrary, the different physical distribution (social morphology) of the Arsi would not allow the same matrimonial interdiction and the organization of politico-ritual life around the moieties. For instance, the rule concerning marriage is endogamous at moiety level and strictly exoga- mous at Gosa level, which means marriage is possible both within and out of the moiety, excluding paternal Gosa.58 Moreover, Arsi settlement patterns explain in part why their Gadaa system is different from that of Borana. Whatever the causes of their evolution may be, Arsi moieties continue to play some ritual role and serve as checking points of genealogies and seniority of Gosa in the complex social structure. Above all, to claim belonging to Arsi identity, a Gosa or individuals should be connected to either Sikko or Mando who are supposed to be the forefathers of all Arsi. Likewise, one has to refer to either Sabbo or Gona and Kontoma or Darmu to claim Borana and Guji identity respectively. The Islamic influences in the contemporary Arsi
56 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa, pp. 39–40. 57 Taddese Bariso, Marriage and Family System of the Guji (B.A. Thesis in Sociology, Addis Ababa University, June 1983), pp. 19–20. 58 But one has to take in account that there are some Gosa called miisee (twin Gosa) Qaallu Gosa which Practice strictly matrimonial interdiction though the rule became less strict after Islamization. 82 chapter 2 is in the process of further undermining the classificatory and ritual roles of the moieties, and it has erased the already vanishing concept of Arsi/Garba dichotomy. As discussed earlier, moieties are divided into patrilineal Gosa which in turn are subdivided into at least two lineages, which are made up of numerous descent groups and families. What is important at this juncture is the forma- tion of Gosa itself. From what we know it appears that all Oromo major groups descend from early moieties, Borana and Barentu. But, we do not know when the two moieties emerged – before or during the Great Migration – and when they further segmented. Incontestably, historical development in the region, the bloody war between Muslim principalities and the Christian kingdom dur- ing the first half the 16th Century, and the people’s subsequent weakness to resist, facilitated a massive Oromo population movement and expansion over into what is now their habitat.59 By the same token, this development acceler- ated the process of large-scale segmentation and fusion perhaps unprece- dented in Oromo history and significantly modified the demographic structure of the whole region. In other words, although it took on a new dimension during the 16th cen- tury, because of the conjectural reasons such as the weakness due to the war long wars between Muslim and Christians, the dynamic of segmentation and fusion must have been in operation for a long period of time. Because, as Horowitz aptly summarizes, fusion and fission play important roles not only in the composition and decomposition of a group but also in defining ethnicity:
Ethnic groups can become more or less inclusive. Some small ethnic groups merge with or absorb others or are absorbed by them, producing larger composite groups. Larger groups on the other hand may divide into their component parts or a portion of such a group may leave to form a new small group. Group boundaries thus grow wider or narrower by a process of assimilation or differentiation. New groups are born though old groups do not always die when this occurs.60
What does this mean in the case of the Oromo? Before their great population movement, the Oromo might have constituted a single and coherent group.
59 For details see Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, Chapter II; Merid W/Aregay, Southern Ethiopia and Christian Kingdom, 1508–1708 with Special Reference to the Galla Migration and Their Consequences (Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1971); Bahrey, J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). 60 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 65. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 83
When they came into intense contact with the Christians and Muslims during the 16th century,61 they were already divided into two groups, Borana and Barentu, which moved from their original homeland towards west and north- east respectively. But this massive movement which separated them did not end Oromo ethnicity and identity. On the contrary, it reinforced it for the following reasons. First, they may have been larger groups, although we do not have demographic data on the pre-Oromo populations, compared to the pre-Oromo population known under the name of “Sidama-Hadya” and Muslim Sultanates.62 Also, one cannot determine whether or not the latter had supe- rior military and political organization. Had they enjoyed this superiority, they could easily have assimilated or incorporated the Oromo, as this is likely to happen when indigenous and non-indigenous populations come into contact. It is often believed “The most usual incorporating process occurs when the indigenous society is very much larger than the non-indigenous society. In such a situation the most probable result is for the larger to absorb the small, all other factors being equal.”63 Here, it was the Oromo, the non-indigenous, who incorporated the local Sidama-Hadya elements. This does not mean, how- ever, that we know what happened in every corner of Oromoland in detail. As Professor Lewis noted:
It is not always possible to say what happened to the pre-existing popula- tion in the lands which Oromo conquered. Some were bypassed, possibly forced into smaller areas and left to live among the groups. Others may
61 Here, we are not suggesting, as imperial official history and many commentators do following the chronicle of Bahrey, that the Oromo arrived during the 16th century but rather that they were there for a long period of time as Merid W/Aregay, pp. 151–152, writes, “What Bahrey and many other missionaries have forgotten to tell is that infiltra- tion by some Galla tribes in Ethiopia had been going on for a long period before Ahmed’s conquest. The general impression of a sudden and overwhelming irruption by a totally unknown people which they have created is unrealistic and legendary.” 62 See among others, Al-Maqrizi, The Book of the True Knowledge of the History of Kings in Ethiopia, translated from the Latin version of 1790 by G.W.B. Huntingford, 1955. He described among others, the size of the kingdoms, their richness, and the number in their cavalry and infantry. See also Al-Umari, Maslik el Absar fi Malik et Amsar: L’Afrique moins l’L’Egypte, translated and annotated by Gauderfroy-Demombynes (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Geuthner, 1927), Chapter 8. See also many important sources on the region Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); U. Braukämper, “Islamic Principalities in South-East Ethiopia between the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, I, no. 1 (1977): 17–56. 63 J. Middleton and R. Cohen, p. 13. 84 chapter 2
have been driven out or absorbed. Undoubtedly, both of these processes occurred. Contrary to the frequent assumption in African literature in no case did conquest states of pastoralists over agriculturists arise, nowhere do Oromo rule over non-Oromo.64
One can take the example of the Arsi Oromo society. According to their many traditions, there was a series of battles and confrontations between the differ- ent Hadya segments and Arsi pioneers throughout what is today Arsi country. The early movements of the Arsi were called diina baasaa or dheebii garba, which mean “chasing out the enemy.” In this context, the term “garba” has nothing to do with the classical meaning. It would mean “stranger” or non- Oromo, although the Arsi widely employ the term “Sidama” for strangers. This is mainly because the victors (the Arsi) did not impose on the Garba any orga- nized form of exploitation or an institutional mechanism reducing them to slavery or serfdom. Many battles were said to have been bloody and lasted for a long period of time. In the end, the Oromo emerged victorious and the defeated Hadya groups were either pushed further north or progressively incorporated into Oromo society and became an integral part of the society.65 It is important to add that, culturally, the Oromo did not decimate or massacre the vanquished peoples. Rather, according to de Salviac, peoples called dhalataa (autochthonous) were adopted. They were not, however, allowed to assume supreme authority nor could they undertake pilgrimage.66 This is mainly because the Oromo strongly believed that Gadaa was given the Oromo forefathers and the Qaalluu was the first Oromo who should be visited by direct descendants. In reality, this lasts in a matter of two or three generations when the new groups fully integrate into Oromo’s system of thoughts and values. The integration of the dhalataa took place through an ancestral custom known as Moggassaa; they were collectively adopted into Oromo culture and identity whereas for others the process was gradual. The dhalataa lived as Garba but at the same time developed intense contacts with the Arsi “pure Oromo” through marriage and socio-linguistic interactions, processes which eroded their own ethnic identity in favor of the Arsi-Oromo identity. These
64 Herbert S. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy, p. 26. 65 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 20–41; U. Braukämper, “Islamic Principalities in South- East Ethiopia between the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, I, no. 1 (1977): 17–56. Following Habarland, Braukämper analyzes many traditions pertaining to the intermingling between the Hadya and Arsi Oromo, Geschichte der Hadya Süd Äthiopiens (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1980). 66 M. de Salviac, p. 153. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 85 processes dashed the old dichotomy Arsi/Garba completely and gave birth to a coherent and homogenous Arsi social universe encompassing millions of peo- ple in Southeastern and south central Ethiopia. This does not signify, however, that the dhalataa lost their identity and cultural traits completely. The original inhabitants of these south-eastern regions were Muslims (see Chapter 5 for further analysis). The important point to be noted, however, is that the fusion process was double-edged or multidimensional. In many areas the Oromo incorporated non-Oromo into their culture due to the combination of different factors, such as their demographic strength and, above all, the flexibility and adaptability of their social structure. When, at times, the Oromo were unable to integrate others to their culture, they simply merged with them to constitute a new group or simply lost their “Oromo-ness,” partially or completely. Research needs to be done about what happened to those Oromo segments which penetrated further into central and northern Ethiopia. Some information at our disposal shows, however, that some of them were submerged within the Christian community. For instance, Arsi elements which spearheaded with other branches the population movement of the 16th century penetrated into the heart of the Amhara country (Wolaqa), where they confronted the army of Malak Sagad. They lost this war and king Susenyos took the survivors to the Achenfer and Denbia, in present day Begemdir, where they were stationed.67 As there is no trace of their community, one could reasonably assume that they progressively became Amhara. In any case, the processes of fusion and fission contradict the notion of both racial and ethnic purity. Ethnic identity and boundaries are not static but are fluid thanks to the processes of fusion and fission, population movements, wars, commercial exchanges, or other types of socio-cultural contacts.68 However, for a long period of time, the concept of “pure Oromo” was an impor- tant factor defining not only the social universe, prestige and some sort of hierarchy, real or imaginary, among both the Arsi and Western Oromo under
67 Asma Giyorgis, Ya Galla Tarik (History of the Galla), Vol. 2 (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1913 Ethiopian Calendar), pp. 64–65. 68 For detailed analyses see Donald L. Horowitz, “Ethnic Identity.” In Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, edited by Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 111–140; F. Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), Introduction. For Africa see Pierre L. van den Berge, “L’ethnicité en Afrique.” In Revue internationale des Sciences sociales, XXIII, no 4 (1971): 539–551; Jean-Loup Amselle and E. M’Bokolo, eds., Au cœur de l’ethnie: ethnie, tribalisme et Etat en Afrique (Paris: La Découverte, 1985). 86 chapter 2 the dichotomy of “Arsi”/“Garba,” and, among the “Borana”/”Gabbaro,” repre- senting purity and mixed respectively.69 After this brief analysis of group formation through fission and fusion, we shall examine the possible causes of segmentation and fission. There could be various factors contributing to the segmentation of a family, lineage, clan, and ethnic group which are directly or indirectly caused by economic, demo- graphic, and cultural situations. Basing on the Oromo tradition and social structure one could suggest some modalities of segmentation of a group. The first, and perhaps the most common way, was pastoral nomadism which means people leave their traditional residence for a given period of time either to lowland or highland areas, usually a season of 3–4 months, in search of pasture and water. The movements to adjacent lands for transhumance activities become permanent when a given family or a fraction of a descent group decided to establish itself definitively there. This is aimed, before all, to avoid conflicts and competition for resources, in this case grazing land, with their kinsmen. Although the Oromo practiced agriculture, particularly highland crops like barley which played a very important role in rituals and ceremonies and cre- ated a stable diet for a long period of time and perhaps before the population movement of the 16th century, they were predominantly cattle breeders.70 The quantity of head of cattle was seen as a sign of richness and prestige. Particularly, a wealthy person whose cattle reached thousands was distinguished by special ceremony and rites. For another thousand he receives another distinction and those who have 5000 heads of cattle are honored five times and as such enjoy tremendous influence and deference in the community.71 However, common ownership in land and unlimited amounts of private property in cattle on the collective land is hard to reconcile for the simple reason that common interests are always in contradiction with individual interests. However, they succeeded in tempering conflicts of interest that the differences were likely to create due to a strong sense of solidarity and a systematic mechanism of redistribution of surplus. This was based on the simple notion that every member of the society, in this case Gosa, has the right
69 Jan Hultin, ed., “Sons of Slaves or Sons of Boys: On the Premise of Rank and Inequality among the Matcha Oromo.” In Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa, November 1984). 70 Haberland, p. 777. 71 This ceremony of distinction of cattle breeders is described by the following authors, Martial de Salviac, p. 196; J. Buchhder, The Land of Burnt Faces, a Journey to Ethiopia, translated by Maurice Michael (London: Arthur Ltd, 1955), pp. 129–130. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 87 to have a decent life. Here, the phrase “decent life” is culturally determined and varies from place to place, from pastoral economy to agrarian economy.72
Gosa, the Myth of “Tribe” and “Tribalism”: A Critical Insight
As analyzed above, Gosa is an Oromo word that designates patrilineal descent groups varying between 7 and 20 generations in genealogical depth.73 In some Oromo dialects the word may include close family circles. Thus, Warraa (fam- ily) and Gosa are employed interchangeably. The term Gosa cannot be ade- quately translated into conventional anthropological terms like lineage, clan, and “tribe.” But one can talk of an “imperial model” for Gosa when it is appro- priated by the official language, Amharic, and the term “Gosa” lost its original significance and took on a new dimension in political discourses in Ethiopia. Ethnographically speaking, the Amhara have a cognatic/bilateral kinship organization74 different from Oromo’s agnatic system and do not have Gosa like family structures. Thus, they borrowed the word Gosa from the Oromo when they came into contact with them, though it is difficult to say the date or when the word took its widespread pejorative connotation. A cursory reading of Amharic literature or official correspondences/letters75 would suggest, how- ever, that it must have evolved into a negative concept after World War II. Nowadays many other Ethiopian people employ the term Gosa. Above all, the political elites seem to have been distraught by the endurance of Oromo’s kinship, linguistic, and ethnic identity in a country when the national design
72 Concerning the Guduru Oromo whose life was based on agricultural economy, Lemmu Baissa quotes the following observation of a traveler, “Plowden noticed that there were neither too affluent nor too impoverished people among the Guduru in the 1840s. All enjoyed a descent self-supported standards of living, based one on a prosperous agrarian economy, under which some influential men existed.” The Decline of the Gadaa Government in Wallaga, p. 7. 73 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa; G.B. Gragg (with the help of Terfa Kumsa and other Oromos), Oromo Dictionary (East-Lansing, Michigan State University, African Studies Center, 1982). 74 For detailed discussions of Amhara social organization see, among others, A. Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia; Simon D. Messing, Highland Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia, edited by Lionel Bender, Vol. 3 (New Haven, CT: Human Relation Area Files, Inc., 1985). 75 On many occasions up to the end of the last century Menelik tended to use “za-bihera” plus the name of a people such as za-bihera Galla, za-bihera Gurage, etc., meaning the Galla nation – although the Oromo never used this term to designate themselves – and the Gurage nation, etc. 88 chapter 2 was the advent a homogenous nation-state. It is not surprising, therefore, if an Oromo word, Gosa, which actually stands for extended family structures and kinship identity, is taken for granted for “tribe” and its derivative linguistic expression “tribalism” and, as such, symbolized the problems of national iden- tity the empire had to face. This denigration of ethnic identity emanated partly from lack of understanding that ethnic bond or allegiance to one’s ethno national group is powerful76 and partly from an overestimation of state capacity to create a single Ethiopian people around and under the dominant culture. One can make a certain parallelism with post-colonial national integration policy in Africa and the difficulty to achieve a coherent national identity. Thus, in the eyes of many western commentators, the states and nations that had newly emerged from the decolonization process continued to be associated with the concepts of “tribe” and “tribalism.” To quote Southall: “The tribal world is the analogue of the Third World…. The West looked upon the tribal world as condemned to inferiority by isolation and simple technology while more and more now recognize the Third World as condemned to backward- ness by conquest, enslavement and exploitation practiced on it by the West.”77 Broadly speaking the word “tribalism,” which has been widely employed to qualify post-independence African politics – but is sometimes extended elsewhere – originates from “tribe,” used by foreign observers, missionaries, colonial administrators and professional anthropologists to designate the tra- ditional societies studied by anthropologists. The word is said to have origi- nated from Indo-European institutions, the Greco-Roman in particular, and was also utilized in the biblical tradition – as in the “tribes of Israel” – to name the ancient divisions/confederation of Hebraic families. In spite of its ancient existence the word was rarely used during the Middle Ages of European his- tory, and as evidence R. Cohen and J. Middleton cite ancient explorers and travelers who did not mention “tribe” except in rare circumstances, but rather talked of “peoples,” “kingdoms,” “customs,” etc. This would suggest that the term “tribe” took on a new dimension during the colonial period; colonial administrators and those who spoke of colonized peoples employed it in dif- ferent forms and contexts, but usually in a pejorative sense. It was closely asso- ciated with the concepts of “primitivism,” “barbarism” and “savagery.” However, as Ottaway correctly underlined: “In reality, Africans were proba- bly no more conscious of their separate ethnic identities than other people.
76 The question of loyalty to one’s national group (nationalism) and loyalty to the state (patriotism) is analyzed in a more detail by W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 77 Ibid., p. 1335. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 89
The difference was that whereas ethnic or national identities were openly recognized as legitimate in many parts of the world, beginning with Europe, they were rejected in Africa.”78 Today the concept of “tribe,” as with other related negative expressions, has become an object of vigorous criticism not only by the intellectual and political elites of the decolonized countries but also by many anthropologists of the Western world. Changes in attitudes among the latter have manifested themselves in a different manner: some writ- ers tend to replace “tribe” by terms such as “people,” “community,” “cultural group,” “ethnic group,” etc., as a sociological choice. But this does not necessar- ily solve the problem, as each of these terms has its own significance and becomes ambiguous when taken out of context. For this reason, some research- ers simply use “tribe” in inverted commas for convenience, without giving any explanation; others avoid it systematically. Finally, there are others like Morton Fried who are categorically opposed to its utilization: “…’tribe’ and its associ- ated linguistic forms may be understood as dirty words no matter what the intention of the speaker.”79 It was to avoid these negative stereotypes and clichés that African national- ist leaders embraced the slogan “We must die as ‘tribes’ so that we can be born as a nation.”80 Paradoxically, the same groups of people who reject the word “tribe” have employed the discourse of “tribalism” to accuse each other, par- ticularly those in power, of practicing nepotism, corruption, and favoritism on the basis of tribal logic or affiliation.81 Upon gaining access to power, they are in turn blamed for the very same practices they had denounced. Moreover, until very recently African authoritarian and dictatorial regimes justified one-party states and structures as effective means of combating “tribalism” and “parochialism,” in order to facilitate state-integration and to bring about economic development. It is true that elsewhere, authoritarian governments and economic development have not been mutually exclusive and a certain level of economic growth and resource mobilization has been achieved. But the political and socio-economic conditions of contemporary Africa clearly indicate that neither economic development nor socio-cultural integration
78 Marina Ottaway, “Ethnic Conflict and Security in South Africa.” In Africa in the New International Order, edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 120. 79 M. Fried, The Notion of “Tribe”, p. 8. 80 Quoted in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild (Introduction) Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1996). 81 For diversified analyses see Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet and Tyrant (Berkeley: California University Press, 1982). 90 chapter 2 has been achieved and the nation-statism of state politicians, inspired by other exogenous models, has not served a great purpose.82 The weakness of states and competing identities or loyalties in many parts of Africa has led to new ways of thinking about the idea of a nation, ethnic identity, and nationalism from fresh perspectives.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed at achieving a modest goal, i.e., giving the general principle or character of Oromo’s kinship organization and socio-cultural identity. The belief in common origin of the Oromo is one of the most important elements of their unity and nationalism. Historically, the concept of nation itself is closely related to common ancestry as W. Connor writes, “When used pristinely, nation refers to a group of people who believe that they are ances- trally related.”83 Naturally, the rise and development of nationalism is based on, or inspired by, the pre-existing structures and socio-political culture. Kinship and Gadaa, as other traits of culture and structure, merit to be studied to understand the functioning of traditional Oromo society and continuity and change in the present socio-economic setting. Whether the Oromo descended from a single father or not remains an open question. What is certain is that from southern Ethiopia, Bale-Sidamo regions, where they lived as a single and coherent group for a long period of time, they were divided into two moieties, Borana and Barentu, which were progressively segmented into many regional groups. This process involved not only segmentation and fission but also fusion. The result of all this is the emergence of patrilineal Gosa, a term which cannot be adequately translated into European language such as clan or tribe. We tried to analyze the significance of Gosa in the native model, its social, political, and economic role (its relation with Gadaa and the Qaalluu) and other characteristics such as patrilineal filiation, exogamy, and residence rules,
82 This was clearly stated by B. Davidson in the following terms: “If the postcolonial nation- state had become a shackle on progress, as more and more critics in Africa seemed to agree by the end of the 1980s, the prime reason could appear in little doubt. The state was not liberating and protective of its citizens, its gross effect was constricting and exploit- ative, or else it simply failed to operate in any social sense at all. Its overall consequences were in any case disastrous.” The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-state (London: James Currey, 1992). 83 W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 212. The Making of Oromo Kinship Identity and Structure 91 etc. We have also tried to dissipate some misconception and misunderstanding revolving around the concept of Gosa and the difference between imperial discourse – the misuse and abuse of the term – and its significance in the Oromo society. This overview does not permit to understand all issues pertain- ing to kinship and marriage partly due to limited space at our disposal. There remains some works ahead to collect and analyze kinship terminologies, as well as the impact of Christianity and Islam on the contemporary social organization.
PART two The Empire-State, Conquest and Resistance
∵
Chapter 3 The Concept of Empire: What Makes Ethiopia an Empire?
Defining an Empire: A Conceptual Framework
To call any polity an empire was at various times instantly to label, praise or condemn it. (lieven, 2000: 3)
The word “empire” originates from the Latin term imperium1 which refers to legitimate authority or dominion. However, it is also used to characterize both Latin and non-Latin socio-political cultures of different epochs of history. Consequently, the concept of empire is not new in history2 and “empires have been the dominant and largest form of a state that the world has known.”3 As Duroselle notes, “As far as we go back, we find empires. The time, place impose their own structures. But the phenomenon is the same: the insatiable conquest, submission of peoples to the domination of other peoples, enlarge- ment, and the imperium.”4 Thus, in its historic context, imperium entailed “the authority given to a magistrate to act on behalf of Rome and its citizens in peace and war.”5 This denotes a dual capacity: waging war as well as making and executing laws. The other connation of imperium is territorial conquest and expansion.6
1 For detailed analyses of the origins and evolution of the concept “imperium,” see Richard Koebner, Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), Chapters I and II; J.S Richardson, “Imperium Romanus: Empire and the Language of Power.” In Theories of Empire, 1450–1800: An Expanding World, Vol. 20, edited by David Armitage (Ashgate: VARIORUM, 1998), pp. 1–11; Maurice Duverger, ed., Le concept d’empire (Paris: Presses univer- siataires de France, 1980); Paul Veyne, L’empire gréco-romain (Paris: Seuil, 2005). 2 For historical analysis of the concept of empire in Western Europe, see Robert Folz, The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to Fourteen Century, translated by Sheila Ann Oglivie (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1969). 3 Charles Tilly, “How Empires End.” In After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building, The Soviet Union and The Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Westview Press, Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), pp. 1–11. 4 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Tout empire périra (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), p. 295. 5 David Armitage, Theories of Empire, 1450–1800: An Expanding World. 6 Stephen Howe, Empire: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford university Press, 2002), p. 13.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/��������6��86_��� 96 chapter 3
With the rise and fall of numerous landed and seaborne empires, the con- cept received both approval and condemnation. As Lieven noted: “…in medi- eval Europe the concept of empire enjoyed almost universal approval. It had connotations of unity within Christendom, as well as of peace and justice within the Christian community of kings and their subjects.”7 This suggests that “the term ‘empire’ in some periods has carried a stigma and in other peri- ods has not.”8 Empire and imperialism took on a new dimension in the second half of the 19th century when European powers colonized a large part of the world’s surface, particularly in Asia and Africa and, as such, made an object of various studies and interpretations. The label empire is used frequently to characterize the 20th century political system, which is generally seen as the “age of empire” and western imperialism as well as the spread of western civi- lization and values.9 Colonizers and empire builders as well as those who admire imperial achievements used the term “empire” in a positive sense, when having an empire and colonial possession represented a sense of pride and glory for imperialist nations during this period in history.10 Although the rationales and objectives of imperialism were endorsed by many of its apolo- gists including the most “zealots critics of violence” perpetrated by European empires, Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot, Kant, Rousseau, to just men- tion a few, were opposed to imperial projects.11 Regardless of these divergent opinions, the “New Imperialism” lasted only briefly, until 1945, when the mod- ern political ideologies such as democracy and self-determination took over the favorable association attached to empire and changed it into negative political discourses.12 This has become more evident since the Second World War and the consequent dissolution of European empires and the rise of
7 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven and London: Yale University, 2000), pp. 3–4; For a detailed analysis see among others Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (London: Fontana Press, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 8 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies, 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 81–136. 9 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of empire: 1875–1914 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987). 10 See among others Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984); Marc Ferro, Histoire des colonisations (Paris: Le Seuil, 1994). 11 For the details, see Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). 12 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The End of Empire? The Transformations of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, Armon, 1997), p. 6. the concept of empire 97 modernization theory which made the nation-state the desired model to achieve in the evolution of political society and the spread of Marxist- Leninist doctrine. As Lieven succinctly notes: “To the twenty-first century mind empire sins against both democracy and modernity: it is both wicked and redundant.”13 Not surprisingly, the end of colonial rule “was almost universally accompanied by an imperial guilt complex in the West which con- demned ‘empire’ as both morally indefensible and politically bankrupt.”14 However, this does not suggest an absence of its contemporary proponents and advocates.15 Historically, the term empire signifies, depending on the context or the intention of the writer/speaker, a pre-modern, pre-democratic, pre-nationalist socio-political system closely associated with oppression and systematic exploitation of conquered peoples, often synonymous with a “prison house of nations.”16 However, over the last two decades, we have observed a revival of interest in empire17 and imperialism and Anthony Padgen states this trend in the following terms:
Empires that once seemed to belong in one of history’s many dustbins… now seem contentious, interesting, highly topical, and perhaps, not all bad. Some of this revised interest is internal. The national historians of the various European imperial powers (and those of the United States) have for too long written as if their respective empires were either of no interest or simply did not exist. Now most historians would agree that
13 Lieven, Empire, p. 413. 14 Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 158–159. See also D. Lieven, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities.” Journal of Contemporary History, 30 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) (1995): 607–636. 15 For instance, Nial Fergusson, a British historian, was quoted as saying, “I am fundamen- tally in favor of empire. Indeed, I believe that empire is more necessary in the twentieth- first century than even before.” See Colin Mooers, ed., The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), pp. 112–135. 16 For pertinent analyses of his narrative see among others Pieter M. Judson, “L’Autriche- Hongrie était-elle un empire?” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 63, no. 3 (2008): 563–596; Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies, 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 81–136. 17 Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism.” Annual Review of Political Science, 13 (2010): 211–235; See also some interesting insights on the same issue: Benoît Pelopidas, “Tout empire ou comment ce concept a perdu sa spécificité et comment la restaurer.” Revue européenne des sciences sociales, no 49/1 (2011): 111–133. 98 chapter 3
modern Britain, modern Spain, modern France, modern Portugal, and the modern Netherlands have all been shaped by their imperial pasts. What was once obvious from a stroll through the centers of London, Paris, Madrid – or Washington – has now found a respectable, and increasingly popular, place on the academic curriculum.18
However, my analysis does not deal with the current controversy and debate revolving around the US Empire19 neither is it a contribution to International Relations theories or imperial hegemony on global scale. It deals with one of these 20th century empires – Ethiopia – and its scope is limited both in space and time, from about 1880 to 1974, this period corresponds with the rise and creation of the “modern” empire and the end of monarchy. As discussed above, the concept of empire dates back to antiquity as a result two schools of thought emerged with regard to imperial studies: those devoted to European seaborne/ maritime empires and the relationship between the center and periphery and those focusing mainly on the great military, absolutist empires which existed since antiquity to the 20th century. In comparison to British and French over- seas empires or a land empire such as Tsarist/Soviet Russia, the Ethiopian empire is small and impoverished. Yet, it shares numerous attributes with imperial polities in history. Interestingly, despite obvious distances in geogra- phy and history, the Ethiopian empire shares striking traits with numerous empires including Russia which Lieven summarized in the following terms:
The Russian Empire was a hybrid. It combined aspects of modern European empires and of the tradition of autocratic land empire which
18 Anthony Pagden, “The Empire’s New Clothes: From Empire to Federation, Yesterday and Today.” (Symposium: Imperia l Trauma, Part 3) Common Knowledge, 12, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 36–46, 36. 19 For detailed analysis on the application of the concept of empire to US hegemonic power, see among others, Michael Cox, “Empire by Denial? Debating US Power.” Security Dialogue, 35, no. 2 (2004): 228–236; Eric W. Robinson, “American Empire? Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power.” Classical World, 99, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 35–50; Michael Mann, “The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 631–653; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: New York: Verso, 2003); Review article by Alexander J. Motyl, “Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?” Comparative Politics, 38, no. 2 (January 2006): 229–249; Colin Mooers, ed., The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006). the concept of empire 99
stretches back to antiquity. It was an important part of the expansion of Europe but itself was in many ways a peripheral and backward economy and society, more similar to some of Britain’s non-White colonies than to Britain itself, even in 1900 well behind China in terms of agricultural tech- niques and productivity.20
In point of fact, the contemporary Ethiopian empire is a hybrid, having a long history of state tradition, autocratic rule and expansion or the memory of expansion. Despite significant accomplishments of the Abyssinian polity in the distant past, the modern empire was founded on a “backward” technology and economy akin to territories, states and empires in Africa, which fell under European colonial rule. It emerged as a viable and strong state as a result of internal developments and in reaction to the rise of European post-industrial empire and imperialism during the second half of the 19th century.21 When the European major powers decided to divide up this African sub-region, the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia became both a victim-survivor and beneficiary by extend- ing its territories many folds. The study of the Ethiopian polity should bring to light the national context or internal developments and the international conditions contributing to its survival and active participation in the partition of the Horn of Africa, during the most intense period of colonization in history commonly known as the “Scramble for Africa” (1875–1900). Exactly what happened to imperial bound- aries, peoples and regions brought together by force and diplomacy, after the end of European colonial rule in Africa is another important point that needs to be explained. The survival and continuity of the imperial state against differ- ent sorts of resistance, uprisings and challenges from its periphery or centrifu- gal forces appear to be partially dependent on the international system, which enabled the post-colonial “quasi-sates” to be recognized and maintained despite their weakness to meet empirical statehood. Robert Jackson writes “…they [the African states] were granted independence by those empires regardless of their empirical conditions and they exist today more by their
20 Lieven, Empire, p. 419. 21 Sven Rubeson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (Heinemann and London: Ibadan Nairobi Lusaka Richard Clay Ltd, 1976); Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974 (Ohio: Ohio University Press; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1969); Harold G. Marcus, “Imperialism and Expansionism n Ethiopia.” In Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960, edited by L.H. Gann and P. Duigan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 420–461; Alain Gascon, La Grande Ethiopie: une utopie africaine, Ethiopie ou Oromie, l’intégration des hautes terres du sud (Paris: CNRS éd., 1995). 100 chapter 3 universal right of independence than by their demonstrable reality.”22 Jackson further notes that the two states in Africa, Ethiopia and Liberia, which man- aged to survive and achieve “fringe player status,” turned out to be “forerunners of a new international phenomenon: quasi-states.”23 The fact that African post-colonial states decided to maintain colonial boundaries inherited from the Berlin Conference explains partly why Ethiopia managed to keep the land it acquired (territorial integrity and unity) during the “scramble.” All official Ethiopian documents referred to the country as an empire up to 1974. Many foreign observers also employed the concept of empire for Ethiopia up to the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. In the period after 1974, some preferred the label of Revolutionary/Socialist Ethiopia up to May 1991. Interestingly, one writer even maintains that the end of the “Solomonic dynasty” was a turning point in world history as it marked the end of all Christian empires: “With the Fall of Ethiopian Empire, Christian empires ceased to exist.”24 Those who abandoned the use of the term “empire” might have limited themselves to a minimal or common definition of empire: “a state headed by an emperor or monarch and including culturally distinct peoples.”25 The fact that the emperor of the “Neo-Solomonic dynasty”26 was gone did not signify that the country was no longer an empire. Russia, whose history is comparable to that of Ethiopia in many respects, was called an empire even after the over- throw of the Tsarist regime in 1917, although Soviet authorities generally rejected the label of empire or colonialism. As Raymond Pearson stated, “By employing the dual capitalist and maritime criteria, Soviet historiography dis- ingenuously exculpated even Tsarist but especially Soviet expansionism from the charge of imperialism.”27 Yet, scholars reject this “Salt Water Theory” and
22 For original on the Quasi and sovereignty or post-colonial statehood and dependence on the international system see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 34. See also, Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The two authors analyze, each in his each way, how African post-colonial survived despite their many weaknesses and their lack of empirical statehood and how the international law and sovereignty regime permitted their continuity and survival. 23 Jackson, Quasi-states, p. 39. 24 Hans Wihelm Lockot, The Mission, The Life, Reign and Character of Haile Selassie (New York: Saint Martin Press, 1989), p. 1. 25 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The End of Empire?, p. 5. 26 Donald Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia,” pp. 13–43, 38. 27 Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 159. the concept of empire 101 argue that both pre-Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary socio-economic formation of Russia perfectly fit into an imperial category.28 According to Lieven, Russians reject the idea that the Soviet Union was an empire as way of denying the enrichment of the metropolis.29 Lieven argues that: “The Soviet Union was an empire. It was based on authoritarian, anti-democratic principle and repressed and exploited its subjects, non-Russian and Russian. Under Lenin and, even more, Stalin the level of repression was massive.”30 Yet, the Soviet leaders were categorically opposed, for ideological/political reasons, to the term empire “as a mere propaganda ploy of the capitalist enemy in the Cold War.”31 Ironically, this has been the position of some groups within the Intelligentsia and politico-military elites of Ethiopia, who firmly contest that Ethiopia was an empire but rather was a “free nation of three thousand years of history.” Thus, in the Ethiopian context, some systematically avoid the label of empire without providing any explanation. Perhaps, they are conscious that empire does not correspond with an ideal type “harmonious nation” or a nation- state which was expected to emerge. There are some, though not many, who are completely opposed to its utilization even for pre-revolutionary Ethiopia.32 Perhaps this may have been dictated by ideological and political reasons to avoid what appears more and more a pejorative concept. There is still one scholar, Messay Kebede, who accepts the concept, but contradicts himself by painting an image of empire without oppression or domination, in the words of Messay Kebede: “Though Ethiopia was an empire, it avoided establishing a structure whereby the center absorbing from the peripheries, underdevelops them to its exclusive advantage.”33 Paradoxically, this appears to be similar with Lord Acton’s assessment of the British Empire “which included various distinct nationalities without oppressing them.”34 Not only did the British
28 Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, L’Empire d’Eurasie: une histoire d’empire russe de 1552 à nos jours (Paris: Fayrad, 2005). 29 Lieven, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities,” pp. 607–636. 30 Lieven, Empire, p. 413. 31 Ibid., p. 288. 32 Mesfin W. Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, pp. 21–26. 33 Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present: A Philosophical Discourse (Lawrenceville-NJ and Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1999), p. 46. 34 Lord Acton, “Nationality” reprinted in The Nationalism Reader, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Humanity Books, 1995), pp. 108–118. See also the intro- duction of the book, p. 6. Here, it is impossible to assess his comments on the legacy of the British and I would an excellent analysis of numerous books written on the British empire by Stephen Howe, “Review Essay: British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, 102 chapter 3 oppress the people who fell under their control but also they prospered and flourished at the expense of their subjects more than any other imperial people in history.35 The United Kingdom got the lion’s share of European impe- rialism. According to Finer, “empire always carries the connotation of domina- tion.”36 Moreover, as Howe indicated, “Most analysts, then, seem to agree that an empire is formed, most often by conquest, out of dominant ‘core’ and a dominated, often economically exploited ‘periphery.’”37 Howe adds that the exploitation led to the decline and demise of the Roman Empire:
The system rested on exploitation: tribute in cash, in kinds, or in slaves sent from the peripheries to the imperial centre. Some contemporary, and many later historians, believed that this reliance on subject peoples to pay for the empire, to sustain the relative wealth of the rulers, and increasingly to fight their wars for them, gradually undermined Roman power and led to the empire’s collapse.38
No empire without domination and hierarchy in history as empire is “a political unit that is large and expansionist reproducing differentiation and inequality among people it incorporates.”39 Also, the “Dependency Paradigm” developed by Latin American theorists, Andre Gunder Frank40 in particular, argued that the notion of center–periphery relations41 is transposable both at regional and national levels. The center-periphery model can be transposable
and Killing Fields.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40, no. 4 (November 2012): 691–725. 35 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain (London: Verso, 1978). 36 Quoted in Lieven, Empire, p. 73. 37 Stephen Howe, Empire, p. 18. 38 Ibid., p. 42. 39 Calhoun quoted in Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism.” Annual Review Political Science, 13 (2010): 211–235, 113. 40 J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment.” Comparative Politics, 10, no. 4 (July 1978): 535–557; Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment.” Monthly Review, 18, no. 4 (September 1966): 17–31. 41 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971): 81–117. Here, empires are conceived as “structurally centralized political systems within which core elites dominate peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for their signifi- cant interactions, and channel resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery,” p. 21. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Great Expansion: The Incorporation of Vast New Zones into the Capitalist World Economy (c. 1750–1850).” Studies in History, 4, nos. 1–2 (1988): 85–156. the concept of empire 103 to other imperial/colonial situations and post-colonial states and traditional empires like Ethiopia, which introduced a well-organized form of oppression and exploitation.42 It is true that there is a difference between an aristocratic empire or “archaic imperialism” based on agrarian economy and an industrial Superpower Empire based on industrial economy and the relationship estab- lished between the central power and its dependencies. In the Ethiopian con- text, the motives of expansion and its relations with its subjects share striking similarities with traditional empires; including historic Britain:
Most traditional empires were dominated by some version of a military aristocracy which seized its neighbours’ land and levied tribute on the peasants who worked it. Sometimes, as in feudal Europe, these aristo- crats themselves settled in the countryside and directly exploited the peasantry. In other empires a monarch levied tribute and distributed its proceeds among his courtiers and warriors.43
Imperial peoples are always beneficiaries of imperial political/colonial systems, whatever forms benefits may take. Regardless of its socio-economic evolution (ancient, classical, historical, aristocratic, bureaucratic, modern, maritime and land empires), it is inconceivable to talk of an empire without domination, injustices and subordination. This chapter and the following chapters will bring to light the relevance of the center/periphery concept in the Ethiopian context. Finally, others, particularly the southerners and nationalists in Ethiopia, waging different kinds of struggles, varying from attempts to establish auton- omy to complete independence, contest the legitimacy of the Ethiopian state and its institutions. They employ colonial empire, empire-state, and imperial politics as a category without explaining the significance of the word and its implication. Is the use of empire a means of vilifying the political order they were opposed to or a label based on historical and theoretical explanations? On the other hand, historians, political scientists and anthropologists accu- mulated a flood of literature on modern Ethiopia in which they analyzed the various aspects of culture, social organization and political economy of the empire. Yet, as far I know, there is no attempt to define and analyze modern Ethiopia in a comparative and global perspective to highlight the similarities
42 Bruce J. Berman, “Clientelism and Neocolonialism: Center-periphery Relations and Political Development in African States.” Studies in Comparative International Development, 9(2) (04/1973): 3–25. 43 Lieven, Empire, p. 92. 104 chapter 3 and differences with other empires. The old idea postulating that Ethiopia is “unique” is being abandoned, although this country is different from other polities in many ways. But scholars may choose to make this comparison in the African context whereas others look for non-African examples. For instance Markakis underlines “in its ethnic and socio-cultural composition, the Ethiopian state is typically African”44 In opposition to this perspective, schol- ars like Brietzke think the absence of 20th century European colonialism in Ethiopia would render the comparison with African states less appropriate. He believes that a comparison between Ethiopia and pre-Revolutionary Russia and European states on the eve of the Industrial Revolution or contemporary Latin America states would be more useful.45 While I acknowledge that the following analysis does not entirely fill the gap in the literature, this chapter seeks to examine the Ethiopian empire from a wider historical perspective without limitation to a given space and time. The questions that I ask, then, are the following: Are there sufficient explanations to characterize Ethiopia as empire? Why do some researchers refuse or avoid the application of this concept? I argue that Ethiopia fits perfectly into the imperial category in both its traditional socio-historical,46 and modern setting. The concept of empire serves as an important analytical tool to better analyze the Ethiopian socio-political institutions and center-periphery relations and the prevailing variants of nationalism and ultimately to analyze the politi- cal conflicts and instability in this country. In order to place Ethiopia in the
44 John Markakis, “Nationalities and State in Ethiopia: An Interpretation.” Institute of Social Studies, The University of Crete Working Papers Series, no. 63 (1989): 1. 45 Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1982), pp. 13–14. See also Allan Hoben, “Family, Land and Class in North Western Europe and Northern Highland Ethiopia.” In Proceeding of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, 1973, edited by Harold Marcus (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, African Studies Center, 1975), pp. 157–170. 46 It is interesting to see that traditional Abyssinia shares many characteristics of aristo- cratic empires which emerged in different parts of the world over a long period of time. This includes agrarian economies where the aristocrats live off the peasants and “com- pete for control of land and peasants, principally by means of war-fare, and their govern- ments serve chiefly the functions of fighting other aristocrats and taxing peasants. Government is not only limited, but invariably highly decentralized, because the lower aristocrats, too, are appropriate to their dual role as exploiters and warriors.” John H. Kautsky, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), Part I, p. 6. For Ethiopia see Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire, 1769–1855 (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1968). the concept of empire 105 categories of imperial polities, we will begin with the following working defini- tion Astrid S. Tuminez:
An empire is an organized political community consisting of multiple national-territorial units, with one unit (the “center”) that exercises control over the effective sovereignty of two or more subordinate units (the “periphery”). This definition includes empires with contiguous territories (e.g., the Russian and Ottoman empires) and those with peripheral components situated away from the “center” (e.g., the British and French colonial empires).47
For his part, Motyl identified three major characteristics of empires: “1) a distinct core elites and a distinct peripheral elite; 2) a distinct core population and a distinct peripheral population; and 3) a dictatorial relationship between the core elites and the peripheral elites.”48 The central thesis of this chapter, developed through several chapters, is that modern Ethiopia perfectly fits the imperial category due to the fact that there is an imperial center organized around the Shoan Kingdom which became an empire at the end of the 19th century. This center was dominated by the Amhara, from 1889 to 1991 when the Tigreans (Tigrean People’s Liberation Front) seized state power. Moreover, there was imperial project, imperial narratives and legitimizing myths,49 impe- rial conquests involving sheer force and diplomacy or a combination of both. The conquest was followed by organized systems of exploitation (land alienation, slavery, serfdom, and tribute), imperial cultural hegemony and political oppression as well as imperial relationships between the core, the dominant center and the newly conquered peoples, kingdoms, nations, regions and provinces. The Ethiopian empire is composed at least of approximately 80 different ethno-national groups, with numerous languages and hundreds of dialects, with different religions, kinship organizations, settlement patterns, systems of thought and production. The politically dominant groups, the Amhara and Tigreans, together do not constitute more than 30% of the population. In this context, considering Ethiopia and other similar states as nation-states or coherent and homogeneous is nothing more than a myth or wishful thinking.
47 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” p. 86. 48 Alexander J. Motyl, “Thinking about the Empire,” p. 22. 49 Donald Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia,” pp. 13–43. 106 chapter 3
However, in spite of all this, official Ethiopian and some intellectual discourses have presented Ethiopia as a coherent nation. They either categorically deny the existence of different nations and peoples by ignoring the concept of empire, or minimize the importance of ethnicity and these differences as a provisional or temporary anachronism, which would be abolished through the politics of assimilation and integration undertaken by the center or “national state” is problematic. Perhaps this reasoning arises from the failure to distin- guish the differences between “state” and “nation” or the failure to fully understand that a nation can exist without (or in the absence of) a state and vice versa. In reality these distinctions exist as the following observation demonstrates:
…“State” is primarily a politico-legal concept, whereas “nation” is primar- ily psycho-cultural. Nation and state may exist independently of one another: a nation may exist without a state, a state may exist without a nation. When the two coincide, when the boundaries of the state are approximately coterminous with those of the nation, the result is a nation-state.50
Based on the conventional definitions and theoretical discussions and through concrete empirical studies, I will analyze the contemporary Ethiopian state.51 Here, I will make a distinction between Ethiopia and Abyssinia.52 The former stands for the contemporary state created by Menelik, Emperor of Ethiopia, during the last quarter of the 19th century whereas the latter represents a historic Christian kingdom of the northern highland plateau including the provinces of Gondar, Gojjam, Wag, Lasta, Northern Shoa, Tigrai. I will deal with Ethiopia, which is three or four times bigger than Abyssinia although refer- ences can made to Abyssinia due to historical and political continuity of the polity over centuries. Those who reject the concept of empire are better represented by Mesfin Wolde Mariam, one of the leading academics, who firmly contests the validity
50 Quoted in Sheldon Gellar, “State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa.” In Building States and Nations, Models and Data Resources, Vol. II, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and E. Rokkan (Beverly Hills, CA, 1973), pp. 384–426, 392. 51 Here, I will use my original research on the Southern Oromo, Arsi, to support my argu- ments. As the same time, I refer to other primary and secondary sources on Ethiopia. 52 Here, I am in agreement with the distinction made between Abyssinia and Ethiopia by Donald Donham, “Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian Empire.” In The Southern Marches of Ethiopia, edited by Donald Donham and Wendy James (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 3–48. the concept of empire 107 imperial category in the Ethiopian case. He wrote the following to support his arguments:
…We have also the term empire, emperor and imperial that actually helps the distinction that writers make between Ethiopia and Abyssinia. Here again we must realize one fundamental fact, namely that we do not have an equivalent for empire, emperor and imperial. It is clear that the term implies not only the existence of more than one nation but also the dom- ination of one over others. Domination and subjection are recognized by clearly defined political, social and economic differences between citi- zens and subjects…Now it is certainly impossible, in the case of Ethiopia to bring historical or contemporary evidence to justify the application of the concept of empire, emperor and imperial.53
This assertion can be challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. One could concede that empires rose, functioned and disintegrated under dif- ferent, geographic, historical and cultural contexts and circumstances.54 Emperors may have different titles, and polities are named after the dominant group or their language,55 and have legitimizing myths and socio-political institutions propping up their power. What is important is the socio-economic arrangement and imperial relationship between the center and periphery although details of conventional definitions of an empire could not be applied everywhere identically.56 That is why some scholars are cautious with respect to the utilization of the concept “empire” even where institutions and political
53 Mesfin W. Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, pp. 21–22. 54 Charles Tilly, “How Empires End,” pp. 2–3; Le delitements des empires, sous la direction de Rene-Marc Pille (Paris: Presses uiversitaires de Paris 10, 2008); Edward Ingram, Empires Building and Empire Builders, Twelve Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1995), Koebner, Empire (Cambridge University Press, 1961); David Armitage, ed., Theories of Empire, 1450–1800: An Expanding World, Vol. 20 (Ashgate, VARIORUM, 1998). 55 See Fanny Madeline, L’empire et son espace: Héritages, organisations et pratiques (Publications de la Sorbonne, Hypothèses, 2007/1), pp. 213–225. See also Dina Rizk Khoury and Dane Keith Kennedy, “Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the British Raj in the Long Nineteenth Century.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27, no. 2 (2007): 233–244; Sanjay Subrahmanyam “A Tale of Three Empires: Mughals, Ottomans, and Habsburgs in a Comparative Context.” Common Knowledge, 12(1) (Winter 2006): 66–92. 56 For a concise analysis of varieties of empires see, among others, Eisenstadt, “Comparative Analysis of the State in Historical Context.” In The State in Global Perspective, edited by Ali Kazancigil (Gower and Unesco, 1986), pp. 20–54. 108 chapter 3 systems seem similar. Istvan Deak, a leading historian of the region, dismissed the concept of empire and nationalities in the case of Austro-Hungarian mon- archy. In a conference debating the issue he was quoted as saying, “It is my contention that the subject of this debate is neither justified nor valid…. I would argue that there were no dominant nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian mon- archy. There were only dominant classes, estates, institutions, interest groups, and professions.”57 However, in contradiction to this assertion, nationalists both in the former Austro-Hungary Empire and the Ethiopian Empire, who consider their respective empire as “prison of nations,” do not share the per- spectives of Istvan Deak and Mesfin Woldemariam. In the case of Ethiopian state, I argue that there are sound theoretical reasons and empirical data to classify Ethiopia as an empire. The Ethiopian case corresponds to the definition of some authoritative dictionaries58 and scholars. For Michael Doyle:
Empire…is the relationship, formal or informal, in which one state con- trols the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process of policy of establishing or maintaining an empire.59
To this behavioral definition one can add that of Raymond Pearson, who sees empire as a “Multinational power of sovereign states in which political, economic and social power is wielded by a steadily identifiable elite for the purpose of the systematic exploitation of an involuntary membership of subordinated colonies and groups.”60 For his part, Seton-Watson emphasizes systematic exploitation and involuntary membership as the salient features of empire.61 Lieven’s definition of empire is in line with this reasoning: “…empire is a specific polity with a clearly demarcated territory exercising sovereign authority over its subjects who are, to varying degrees, under its direct administrative supervision.”62 According to these scholars, and many others, conquest and involuntary memberships do not exclude, however, the collaboration of segments of peripheral people, and the politics of co-optation
57 Quoted in Pieter M. Judson, “L’Autriche-Hongrie était-elle un empire?” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 63(3) (2008): 563–596, 563. 58 See, for instance, Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 128. 59 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 45. 60 Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 161. 61 Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism (London: Bodley Head, 1961). 62 Lieven, Empire, p. 9. the concept of empire 109 and assimilation constitute the other face of imperial politics. No imperial power could exercise effective authority or could last long without some sup- port from intermediaries among the subordinate people, no matter how the obedience may be obtained. According to Howe, “In almost all empires, local intermediaries might enjoy much autonomy within own spheres, and com- mand considerable wealth, power, and status, in return for delivering their people’s obedience, financial tribute, and military services to the center.”63 Thus Michael Doyle has argued that imperial development both created col- laboration and the basis for resistance and revolt.64 Ethiopia is no exception. Some peripheral elites collaborated with the imperial system and also engaged in a relentless struggle to overthrow it. Contemporary studies on empire can be divided into two categories. The first deals with modern European maritime empires implying center/colonial periphery; and the second deals with the great military and absolutist land empires.65 Naturally, my approach could draw relevant analytical categories from the second variant, as the Ethiopian case is closer to the Russian experi- ence rather than French or the British colonial empires. In this analysis, I would follow Maurice Duverger’s66 and Eisenstadt’s67 perspectives. Duverger outlines three major features of empires and imperial system. First, an empire is a state founded on conquest and force. Second, an empire is multinational, where one of its constituting elements, or nation/group, dominates all others due to its military superiority. Finally, the collapse theory resulting from the two preceding characteristics, added to other factors render the empire ephemeral: conquest, domination and oppression provoke contradiction and nationalism of subject peoples eventually leading to its decline (demise).68 Thus, Ethiopia fulfills the above and many other features considered as the essential characteristics of empires.69
63 Howe, Empire, p. 16. 64 Doyle, Empire, p. 363. 65 Lieven, Empire, p. 25. 66 Maurice Duverger, ed. (Introduction), Le concept d’empire (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1980). 67 For the details see N.S. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (London: The Free Press of Glencose, Macmillan Ltd, 1963). 68 M. Duverger, Sociologie de la politique (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973), p. 394. See also Maurice Duverger, ed., Le concept d’empire (Introduction). 69 According to Motyl the three major characteristics of empires are: “1) a distinct core elites and a distinct peripheral elite; 2) a distinct core population and a distinct peripheral pop- ulation; and 3) a dictatorial relationship between the core elites and the peripheral elite.” Alexander J. Motyl, “Thinking about the Empire.” In After Empire, p. 22. 110 chapter 3
One of the aspects of empire is its ephemeral nature. Historians are largely in agreement on the idea that there is no “empire without ends.” But, they may look at the causes of decline and demise from different angles. Tilly provides some causes contributing to the ruin and fall of empires: (1) the empires’ domi- nated polities remain detachable by virtues of weak integration into an admin- istrative web; (2) their viceroys enjoy autonomous power, including the power to defect; (3) subjugated populations retain distinct identities and memories, and grievances; and (4) information indicating that the center has become vul- nerable spreads fast among dominated units and external enemies.70 Other writers, who share the conventional wisdom on the rise and fall of empires stress how the dialectics of an empire implant the dynamic of its downfall including class formation and rising levels of class struggle; the model of nation-state and national tensions along ethnic, regional, and religious lines.71 The following quote provides a convergence of many of the points mentioned above:
The rise and fall of empires has been a repeated refrain in world history. Hardy creatures though they might be – often lasting hundreds of years – empires have disintegrated after internal and external pressures have grown too severe. These pressures might include the defection from the center by elites in the periphery, the consolidation of ethnic identi- ties and the rise of nationalism among constituent units of the empire, military deterioration in the center, internal revolution, and conquest and division by external forces.72
These are major causes contributing to the decay and downfall of empires but are not the only ones.73 In fact, we can mention numerous examples from the annals of history that empires were “ephemeral,” however long they might have lasted and however powerful and prosperous they may have been, because of their structural contradictions (domination, resistance, and revolts). Sometimes the demise or eclipse of empire could be facilitated or
70 Charles Tilly, How Empires End, p. 4. 71 Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation, p. 365. 72 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” p. 81; Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 158–159; D. Lieven, L’Empire d’Eurasie, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities,” pp. 607–636; Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, LEmpire d’Eurasie. 73 In addition to the works provided above one can add two classical works on the rise and fall of empires: E Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, edited by J.P. Bury (London, 1990–1914); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House 1988). the concept of empire 111 accelerated by external factors, which would be the immediate cause, as the case of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires during the First World War and the British and French empires after the Second World War. Very recently, the end of the Cold War precipitated the decomposition of the com- munist empire of Russia although it tried its best to maintain its internal and external empire.74 Thus, by taking into account the destiny of many historical, classical, colonial and communist empires, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle argued in his book Tout empire périra (All Empire Will Perish) that: “The demise of empires appears as a great regularity of history.”75 This chapter does not engage in the business of prophecy or speculation of the future of the existing functional empire. Instead, we will concentrate on the analysis of imperial conquest and domination and the problem of trans- forming the empire in the framework of national integration/modernization, socialism and democracy, the principal focus of the 20th century and Ethiopian imperial discourses.
The Ethiopian Imperial Conquest
Although we could refer to the remote past in Abyssinian history, the scope of this study covers the last 125 years or so (1880–1974). Menelik’s empire, which took the name of Ethiopia and under its present form, emerged largely from the military conquest and diplomatic maneuvers undertaken during the sec- ond half of the 19th century (1875–1900). This was built on the efforts towards centralization and expansion that had commenced with Tewodros (1855–1867) and Yohannes IV (1872–1889).76 Brutal conquest as a means of extending and imposing the state’s authority in Abyssinian polity was not new. One can quote Professor Tamrat’s authoritative work on the subject:
All the Christian provinces in the north were originally acquired by wars of conquest…. He [the king] appropriated all the peoples and their land, and reserved every right to dispose of them according to his wishes. He executed all resistance fighters who fell into his hands, and reduced to
74 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” pp. 81–136. 75 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Tout empire périra, p. 301. 76 For detailed analysis of the survival of Ethiopian independence see, among other works, Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (Heinemann and London: Ibadan Nairobi Lusaka Richard Clay Ltd, 1976); Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia; Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik. 112 chapter 3
slavery other captives of war. These acts of cruel repression were deliber- ately committed…to force the peoples to surrender to give them a terrible example of the destructive force of the Christian army in case of further revolts.77
This is certainly in line with the Fetaha nagast (the Law of Kings) which autho- rizes brutality and harsh treatment against those who resisted against the imperial power and will.78 But repression and violence took on a new dimen- sion during the end of the 19th century with new motives, methods and deadly weapons (firearms). The process of conquest was largely recorded by the royal chronicles,79 official history, and scholars who reconstructed the past from various sources including western archives, travelers’ accounts and oral tradition. However, there are significant, even irreconcilable differences with respect to the interpretations and implications of the “fact of conquest.” As all empires in expansion or with colonial designs, Ethiopia had its own justifica- tions for its conquests. For some it was simply a process of reunification, feudal expansion, incorporation, unification, etc., whereas for others it was nothing less than conquest, colonialism and imperialism. In the words of Waugh:
The process (the creation of the Ethiopian empire) was closely copied from the European model; sometimes the invaded areas were overawed by the show of superior force and accepted treaties of protection; some- times they resisted and were slaughtered with the use of modern weap- ons which were being imported both openly and illicitly in enormous numbers; sometimes they were simply recorded as Ethiopian without their own knowledge.80
Here again, an imperial state is a colonial state and is not based on consent. It is not surprising, therefore, that people who were defeated or were unwillingly placed under imperial authority or simply registered without their knowledge.
77 Taddesse Tamrat quoted in Donham and James, eds., The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, p. 10. 78 Peter L. Strauss, The Fetah a Nagast, The Law of Kings, translated by Abba Paulo’s Tzadua (Addis Ababa HSIU, Faculty of Law: Central Printing Press, 1966), p. 74. Moreover, Fetaha Nagast justifies slavery by the defeat in war “…war and the strength of horses bring some to the service of theirs, because the law of war and victory, makes the vanquished the slaves of the victors.” Quoted in Tibebe Teshale, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, p. 56. 79 Gabre Selassie, La chronique; Asmagiyorgis, op. cit. 80 E. Waugh, Waugh in Abyssinia (London, New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1936), p. 22. the concept of empire 113
It may not be an exaggeration to assert that many imperial subjects hardly know their nationality and that they are “Ethiopians,” even decades after forced incorporation into the empire. One of the commonly held discourses and arguments is that Menelik I par- ticipated in the “scramble for Africa” as regional warlord and tripled the tradi- tional realm of Abyssinia with the encouragement, at the very least with the understanding, of European colonial powers due to their vested geopolitical interests. The Horn of Africa thus underwent simultaneous “Feudal Military Colonialism” of Abyssinia and European imperialism. In this vein Addis Hiwet argues that modern Ethiopia is not older than other countries in Africa; it is a by-product of European imperialism, which produced almost all contempo- rary states like Ghana, Ivory Coast, etc. though the means of their engagement was not the same.81 Keller argued that the creation of Ethiopian modern state was “a result of a unique case of African imperialism.”82 However, it is impor- tant to underline that the Ethiopian variant of imperialism cannot be explained by the two theories of Hobson and Lenin,83 who emphasized respectively the theory of under consumption and the development of monopoly of capitalism to explain European colonialism. Ethiopia was a pre-capitalist polity with tra- ditional technology and economy but the combination of external events and internal needs induced it to participate in the scramble. On the other hand, another perspective was the one maintained by scholars and politicians adhering to official history and official nationalism or an ethni- cally generated national history. One of the commonly maintained positions on the imperial conquest has been the theory Reconquista, which maintains that: “The Amhara were to some extent merely reconquering lands that had been taken from them in earlier centuries.”84 The alleged lost territories practi- cally included everything in the Eastern Africa including Khartoum and Lake Nyaza and particularly all lands inhabited by the Oromo and the Somali peo- ple. This extravagant claim would suggest these lands constituted the Amhara
81 Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution, Occasional Paper, no. 1 (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975) (Introduction). See also Edmond J. Keller, “Revolution, Class and the National Question: The case of Ethiopia,” pp. 43–68. For the interpretation of the South and Oromo views, see, Bonnie K. Holcomb and Sisal Isa, The Invention of Ethiopia (New Jersey and Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1990). 82 Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 45. 83 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1917; John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism, 1902. 84 Donald Levine, Wax and Gold, Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 4. 114 chapter 3
“ethnic homeland” and people who lived there have been “newcomers” and “outsiders.”85 Here, I quote from the Prime Minister of Emperor Haile Selassie, Aklilu’s Habtewold’s statement pronounced at the OAU summit of 1963 in response to Somalia’s claim of Somali inhabited regions:
Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and nation, for more than 3000 years. This is a fact. Second fact: the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact: there is no record in history either of a Somali as a Somali nation. That too is a fact…86
The newly created Somali state in 1960, aspired to unify all Somali speaking population under one state and, as such, claimed the Ethiopian region of Ogaden inhabited by the Ethiopian Somali leading to several skirmishes and major war in 1977 which ended with the defeat of the Somali state. Undoubtedly, this has motivated directly or indirectly Ethiopian repeated interventions in Somalia since the 1990s although there are have been conjec- tural factors. Another motive provided for the conquest was said to have been the sur- vival of the Abyssinian State itself during the “Scramble for Africa.” Given its limited human and material resources, it could not withstand the European threat on its own. Thus, Menelik decided to exploit the southern and south- western territories to buy firearms, and revive his kingdom’s sagging economy, and ensure the hegemony of Amahra-Tigrean and eventually to turn his atten- tion to the defense of his empire against European encroachment as he did at Adwa in 1896 against Italian colonizers.87 As McClellan pointed out:
Ethiopia’s late 19th century expansionism was influenced profoundly by two external events: The European colonial scramble in which Ethiopia herself participated and a burgeoning European industrial capitalism. Emperor Menelik and Haile Selassie sought to preserve their country’s independence in the face of external threats. The former endeavored to acquire the riches of the South to resolve Ethiopia’s internal struggle and
85 See Getachew Haile, “The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(30) (1986): 465–487. 86 Quoted in Mesfin Wolde Mariam, The Background of the Ethiopia Somali Boundary Dispute (HSIU, Department of Geography, 1964), p. 12. 87 Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik, p. 140. the concept of empire 115
to prop up the North’s sagging feudal economy while acquiring a broad territorial buffer zone to protect the nation politically and economically from European encroachment.88
The other explanation for expansion is not based on historical claim/prece- dence but on the political conjecture of the imperialistic era about “the inevi- tability of the conquest”; “if the Amhara had not conquered the other peoples now within the Ethiopian boundaries some European powers might have colo- nized them instead.”89 Thus, if they were destined to be colonies, in an epoch when almost the whole continent was partitioned between Europeans or at their mercy, why not by their black neighbors instead of distant and oversea colonizers? Menelik himself made it clear to the European powers that he could not remain indifferent vis-à-vis imperialist partition of Africa: “I have no intention at all of being an indifferent spectator, if powers hold the idea of dividing up Africa, Ethiopia having been for the past fourteen centuries an island of Christians in a Sea of Pagans.”90 That is why many argue that Menelik participated in the partition of the Horn of Africa as a regional power as Brietzke states:
Menelik expanded the empire to its present ill-defined boundaries in a search for food, tax revenues, and commercial possibilities. Compared to the conquered peoples, the Amhara combined military aptitude and access to an adequate supply of modern arms with relative material poverty. The Amhara conquerors displayed – and to some extent still display – attitudes surprisingly similar to those of European colonists.91
Moreover, there was academic legitimization for the conquest, strikingly simi- lar to the colonial ideology of some western colonial circles (colonial parties in France in particular) as a means of bringing “peace among the warring tribes”
88 Charles W. McClellan (Abstract) “Reaction to Ethiopian Expansionism: The Case of Darasa, 1895–1935” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1978). 89 Ibid. 90 Quoted in Adu Boahen, African Perspective on Colonialism (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 25. Many writers quote also the Famous Menelik’s famous circular written to notify European powers that would not remain inert with colo- nial partition of the time and imperialistic intention when he said “…If God grants me life and power, I would like to colonize the former territories as far Khartoum (Lake Victoria and all the Galla) the name the Abyssinian used to name the Oromo.” 91 Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1982), p. 26. 116 chapter 3 or “tribes which are likely to fight each other.”92 Mesfin Wolde Mariam even suggested that “tribes” who kill each other are not capable of developing nationalism: “It is an utter disregard for the truth to attribute nationalism to tribes that kill each other by the score (of) year.”93 This pax-Amharica view seems to take war as the monopoly of uncentralized or less centralized societ- ies. At the same time, it is silent about the intense war/conflicts among Christian/Amhara or Semitic components of the Abyssinian society: factional- ism, the war between different pretenders, warlords for power, influence and prestige were more bloody and destructive than periodic inter-clan feuds and war. One could quote professor Crummey’s assessment of the armed struggles between Ethiopian key political figures in the second half of the 19th century:
Four men tried to rebuild imperial rule in Ethiopia in the later 19th cen- tury. Their primary instrument was force. The battlefield determined changes of rule. Force of arms backed all challenges to imperial preten- sions, and force of arms turned back those challenges. Generalship and control of the social, economic, and military resources necessary for making war proved decisive factors in the bitter struggle for power which dominated the country during these years.94
Perhaps the so-called Era of Zemana Masafint (the Era of Princes, from the middle of 18th century to the middle of the 19th century) could be the example of this.95 More important again was that pax Amharica resulted in more vio- lence and massacres in the conquered regions during the process of conquest and the subsequent administration than during the alleged “tribal” wars.96 Above all, authors such as Messay Kebede, came up with the two political theses emphasizing the benefits of Amhara conquest: “The massive expansion of the Ethiopian state in the era of colonialism created in the Horn of Africa the opportunity for an important mixture of peoples and cultures.”97 In actuality this did not lead to the mixture of cultures but rather to more
92 Levine, Greater Ethiopia, p. 85. 93 Mesfin Wolde Mariam commenting the Ethiopian dis Somali dispute, The Background of the Ethiopian Somalia Boundary Dispute (Haile Selassie University, Department of Geography, 1964), p. 61. 94 Donald Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia,” pp. 13–43, 37. 95 Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of Prices, The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of The Christian Empire, 1769–1855 (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1968). 96 See Abbas H. Gnamo, “La conquête impériale éthiopienne des Oromo Arsi, Ethiopie.” 97 Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization, p. 24. the concept of empire 117 bi-polarization, the creation of colonial type of plural society and the conver- sion en masse to Islam of many Oromos in the region as a resistance ideology to the Christian state.98 Of course, there was also a substantial number of Oromo who embraced the faith of the Orthodox Church under Amhara influ- ence. Yet, this does not necessarily imply a mixture of culture and people, as was the case of evangelized people under European imperial rule, and the lack of national integration explains the causes of the prevailing ethno-national conflicts. But, the fact remains that empires incorporate people but rarely assimilate them even when they rule for centuries. Otherwise, can we explain the current Ethiopian crisis? The second thesis by Messay Kebede justifies the conquest as necessary for nation–building and to give statehood to stateless societies by the imperial state: “All those who wish to see the truth should concede the extent to which the power of Ethiopia was necessary to bring the Oromo people under one state.”99 What is surprising is not so much the image of Menelik as unifier of the Amhara but to consider him as the unifier of the Oromo, the people he reduced to slavery and serfdom. According to Messay, whose judgment is based on a partial and superficial understanding of the Gadaa system, the Oromo’s major socio-political institution prevented their unification because of its inherent problem of limiting the exercise of power to a limited period of time.100 Consequently, they needed an outsider, a dynasty of “three thousand years,” a never ending rule, to achieve their unity. What Messay fails to realize is that the Gadaa was a democratic institution and Gadaa leader was legitimate for his mandate of 8-year term, and he was not above the law. One can argue that nothing is wrong to live under a demo- cratic system and leadership, whose political power was restricted to an 8-year term. In actual fact, none of the Oromo, including those who were co-opted, saw Menelik as a unifier. Neither did any conquered people see him as their savior as he brought no dignity and prosperity to the people who fell under his control. Even those who surrendered to him “peacefully” or with little resistance did so not by their own volition but by the absence of options in the face of Menelik’s intimidation and superior force. No people trade their autonomous and sovereign existence for slavery and serfs. In fact, Menelik’s
98 Mohammed Hassen, “Islam as a Resistance Ideology among the Oromo of Ethiopia, the Wollo Case, 1700–1900.” In The Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1995); Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia),” pp. 99–120. 99 Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization, p. 38. 100 Ibid. 118 chapter 3 advantage including military aptitude, firearms, foreign support and advice and a coherent ideology supporting his conquest decided the fate of million as will be analyzed in the following chapter. The alleged benefits of conquest maintained by some pro-imperial analysts in the region can be challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds. The legitimizing arguments for the conquest cannot withstand any scholarly scru- tiny, historical and empirical facts. Here I quote Donald Levine’s comments on the features and legacies of Menelik which contradicts to some extent his own premise of “Greater Ethiopia” and that of many others: “…During the great Amhara expansion under Menelik (1889–1913), many peoples were maltreated. Independent tribesmen were reduced to slavery; unique cultures were deci- mated; proud kings were degraded in the dust. Those who held down the Amhara position in these occupied territories seized land from the indigenous peoples and exploited them, as would any invader.”101 As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the concept of empire synonymous with domination and oppression. In the following pages, we will briefly examine the nature of imperial domination in Ethiopia.
The Salient Features of Imperial Domination
The feature of imperial conquest and the consequent structures of domination included alienation of land, serfdom, and cultural destruction of the con- quered people, particularly, those who tried to resist imperial policy and administration. The abject poverty that resulted cannot be regarded as a posi- tive legacy brought to the conquered regions. Thus, as opposed to official nationalism and history, the question of unification and nation building can be approached from another angle. Imperial politics and domination had never contributed to the empowerment and prosperity of the oppressed peo- ple. This experience of alienation tends to unite even disparate people and ethnic groups against empires. The case in point was the development of African territorial nationalism that united the diverse ethnic groups and socio- cultural units to challenge European colonial domination. Above all, in the age of nationalism dominated many peoples and culturally related peoples who were dispersed in different polities or states wanted to be united and have one state, which was their own. Thus, as Gellner argued, the idea that the state and the nation should be congruent is the founding principle of nationalism and nationalistic ideals.102
101 Donald Levine, Wax and Gold, p. 4. 102 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1. the concept of empire 119
In his conquest and territorial unification Menelik was not inspired by dreams that Benedict Anderson termed “imagined communities.” Menelik cannot be compared to Bismarck, or Garibaldi and Mazzini – who sought to bring together a “family of nations” – in the cultural nations of Germany and Italy respectively.103 In other words, Menelik’s conquest was very far from lib- eral Risorgimento nationalism which “serves as a medium from the political fusion of large social groups, the formation of nations and their self-identifica- tion in the national sate.”104 Menelik did not unify the people of the same ethnic stock and culturally related peoples, but carved an empire of tens of disparate ethno-national groups under the hegemony of Amhara-Tigreans. So, Ethiopian expansionism was not more than a classic case of conquest and forced incorporation of unrelated peoples within the jurisdiction of the polity better organized and equipped and aimed at promoting vested dynastic interests and achieving the goal of bureaucratic empires.105 In point of fact, Menelik proved to be diplomatically shrewd and capable of conquering his unarmed, uncentralized or less centralized and divided neighbors, though he was dependent on Europeans in some ways (firearms and diplomatic support) to conquer incorporate and perpetuate his domination.106 To his credit, he defeated those who were better organized and armed than him, namely, the Italians, to become a regional power and leave a trace in the history of modern Africa. Ethiopian feudalism did not give the conquered peoples, particularly those who tried to resist imperial conquest, any benefits or positive contribu- tion perhaps with the exception a handful of collaborators. This becomes more evident when one compares Ethiopian conquest with European colonialism, including Italian colonialism, which introduced and produced innovation in some domains such as communication, and infrastructure,
103 Peter Alter, Nationalism (London and New York: Edward Arnold, Second Edition, 1994). 104 Ibid., p. 19. 105 For the details see N.S. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (London: The Free Press of Glencose, Macmillan Ltd, 1963), p. 17. 106 Antonnelli brings these factors together when he writes: “Menelik needs Europe to have ammunitions and arms without which he would lose all what [sic] he had already done (conquered) in one day, since it is impossible to dominate the Galla [Oromo]without rifles. On the contrary, if they are in a state of equality in traditional arms the Galla are superior to the Amhara. For this reason, Menelik can not stop having political and com- mercial relations with Italy, and we have to help him and make him depedent upon us for the safety and prosperity of his kingdom…” P. Antonelli, “Rapporti sullo Scioa al Ministero degli Affari Esteri (de 22 Maggio 1883 al guigno 1888).” Miscellanea, Etiopia ed Eritrea (Roma, 1889), p. 63. 120 chapter 3 along many negative legacies.107 One may quote Evelyn Waugh, who traveled in many conquered provinces of Ethiopia some decades after their forced incorporation:
The Abyssinians had nothing to give their subject peoples, nothing to teach them. They brought no crafts or knowledge, no new system of agri- culture, drainage or road making, no medicine or hygiene, no higher political organisation, no superiority except in their magazine rifles and belts of cartridges. They built nothing; they squatted in the villages in the thatched huts of the conquered people, dirty, idle and domineering, burning the timber, devouring the crops, taxing the meager stream of commerce that seeped in from outside, enslaving the people.108
In his ideological justification of the Ethiopian conquest, Messay Kebede distorted the reality by confusing the process of “colonization” and “decoloni- zation” when he stated: “After all, what happened in Ethiopia a century ago was to be the model of decolonization, since decolonization granted the status of nation to collections of different ethnic groups and tribes assembled by the colonial power.”109 Firstly, the peoples who were conquered and incorporated into the expanding Ethiopian empire were free and independent. They were organized under different political systems and at different levels of socio-eco- nomic development and their own political systems varied from centralized kingdoms and states, sultanates, lineage based societies, and to societies under democratic forms of government, like the majority of the Oromos. Colonialism means the loss of sovereignty, whatever the nature of political culture of the conquered may be, and the Southern people in Ethiopia lost their indepen- dence at the same time as the African people during the European led “Scramble for Africa.” The Oromo did not ask for any help to be a nation or within national state as all conquered did not invite any of their colonizers to govern them. So, they were colonized, not decolonized, in the true sense of the term. Decolonization, which was said to have been introduced in the 1950s by German scholar, means the end of foreign control and domination and the empowerment of the
107 For a detailed discussion of positive and negative impacts of colonialism in Africa, see A. Adu Boahen, ed., General History of Africa, VII, Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–935 (California: UNESCO, James Currey 1990), pp. 327–338. 108 E. Waugh, Waugh in Abyssinia (London, New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1936), p. 25–26. 109 Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization, p. 18. the concept of empire 121 colonized. In the South, or newly conquered regions, emperor Menelik did not oust foreigners from colonized land but introduced an alien control and domi- nation of his own. What happened in Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century was the beginning of a new imperial era. The conquered peoples were not seen as citizens, but as slaves at worst and serfs at best though the two concepts evolved in the course of the 20th century. The successful conquest, incorpora- tion and administration of the newly acquired territories can be characterized as “imperial sovereignty,” not a “popular sovereignty” that “resides in the political will or consent of the population of a territory, rather than its ruler or government: i.e., the independence of a people considered as a political community.”110 The decolonization of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s did not follow the Ethiopian model of conquest that constituted “feudal colonialism.” The end of colonial rule in Africa was dictated by different factors mostly resulting from WWII: the decline of European imperial powers, the rise of the USA and USSR as super powers, the UN and its principle of self-determination enshrined in its founding charters, the birth and growth of anti-colonial nationalism and so on.111 Postcolonial nationhood and statehood in Africa followed another tra- jectory, the western state system, as African “inheritance elites,” the first gen- eration of nationalist leaders borrowed socio-political institutions of the former colonial empires.112 The Ethiopian Empire itself, which survived west- ern colonialism, did not have an exportable model of political culture else- where, out of the regions it conquered. It had to accept the western system under strong pressure. In other words, the Ethiopian Empire did not have advanced and universally applicable political culture. The feudal autocracy of Emperor Haile Selassie was not an exportable model out of the regions under Ethiopian control where it was imposed and maintained by force. The system was challenged and eventually overthrown in 1974 although nationalists and supporters of liberation movements continue to argue that the politics of empire has not ended, even with the overthrow and end of the monarchy and end of the Darg regime in 1991.
110 Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape.” Political Studies XLVII (1999): 431–456. 111 For the details see, among others, John Springhall, Decolonization Since 1945 (Palgrave: Saint Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 1–17; Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, Decolonization (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); J.D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa (London: Longman, 1988). 112 For further analysis see Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (London: James Currey, 1992). 122 chapter 3
The newly independent African states did not envisage borrowing anything from the Ethiopian system although they took pride in the survival of one the two black polities, the other being Liberia, during the age of global imperi- alism. Yet, Ethiopia had to undergo transformation to portray the image of modern state which included a fixed capital, in Addis Ababa, fixed state bor- ders (though ill-defined), the consideration of all the collections of ethnic groups and peoples brought together through force and diplomacy as Ethiopian nationals. All this reflects basic criteria of the Western state system (nation- statism). Needless to say that the politics of nation building through central- ization, modernization and national integration has not succeeded, and that some African states have already collapsed or are collapsing and many others are likely to run a risk of disintegration.113 The Ethiopian state has not failed but it is classified among states in danger despite its apparent stability.114 One can even argue that the bases of Ethiopian crisis are deeper and more pro- found than elsewhere in Africa where the states emerged from anti-colonial territorial nationalism and the consequent decolonization. Moreover, as opposed to Messay’s assertion, the motives and objectives of the Ethiopian conquest, as that of many colonizing/expanding states, did not aim to elevate and empower the conquered people as colonial states are oppressive in theory and in fact. It is debatable if pre-democratic polity of Abyssinia knew the modern idea of citizenry or citizenship115 and human rights. Even had this been the case, it would have been still irrelevant for the newly conquered people who were generally dubbed as “non-Abyssinian sub- jects” as opposed to “Abyssinian subjects” belonging to the Christian Amhara- Tigrean populations who had both rights and obligations. The Ethiopian
113 See the following books for detailed discussions of the failure of post-colonial state see among others: Basil Davidson, The Black’s Man Burden; Adebabyob O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, eds., Challenges to the Nation-Sate in Africa, Nordiska Africakainstitutet (Uppsala in Collaboration with the institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 1996), Chapter 1; James S Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., The Failure of Centralized State: Institutions and Self Governance in Africa (San Francisco: ICS Press Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1995); Leonardo A. Velron and Philip A. Huxtable, eds., The African State at a Critical Juncture between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 114 2011 Failed States Index – Interactive Map and Rankings | Foreign Policy: http://www .foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and _rankings. 115 For the analysis of the subject-citizen paradigm as it evolved in Africa, see Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). the concept of empire 123 imperial system introduced a dual form of oppression that took a dimension of class and ethnicity.116 Not only were the conquered people not considered as citizens but they also suffered from racism, ethnocentrism and biases of all sorts at the hands of the dominant society, as often the case of European colonizers. The newly con- quered people were exposed to different exploitative social system and pro- duction relations. For instance, in the north farmers cultivated crops and paid taxes, as opposed to soldiers, clergy and the nobility. However, like lords, peas- ants had hereditary rist lands which could not be alienated; they were not ten- ants. On the contrary, the people in the south, the newly conquered territories, were exposed to a systemically organized and archaic form of exploitation and administration which reduced them to slavery and serfdom.117 The way the serfs were treated and exploited led E. Waugh to write, “Abyssinians are the most notorious administrators of subject peoples in Africa.”118 Likewise another analyst underlined the sentiment of superiority portrayed by Abyssinians vis-à-vis their subjects: “Paternalistic and arrogant, Abyssinians looked upon and treated the indigenous people as backward, hea- then, filthy, deceitful, lazy, and even stupid – stereotypes that Europeans colonialists commonly ascribed to their African subjects. Both literally and symbolically, southerners became the object of scorn and ridicule.”119 For his parts, Brietzke noted that, “The Amhara conquerors displayed – and to some extent still display – attitudes surprisingly similar to those of European colo- nists.”120 Further, one can relate to Albert Memmi’s observations in French colonies of North Africa. Memmi analyzed the complex relations between the
116 As Keller argued, the Ethiopian expansion is introduced a dual form of oppression, “This policy created a class structure with distinctive ethnic undertones. The subjugated ethnic groups became landless peasants and the tenants of politically, economically, and cultur- ally dominant Amhara-Tigre overlords. Direct consequences of the process of coloniza- tion, then, were contradictions based not only on social class but also on ethnicity.” Edmond Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia, p. 45. 117 Gebru Tareke writes “At any rate, the Gabbars were reduced to a dependent state socially, economically and politically, regardless of the nature of their relation to land. In the after- math of conquest the cultivators where assigned to the conquerors-governors, soldiers, clergymen and other servants of the state. The number of Gabbars allotted to each Azmatch (chef commander) and his soldiers varied according to rank and length of ser- vice and also the size of the subjugated population.” Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941–1970, p. 247. 118 E. Waugh, Waugh in Abyssinia, p. 11. 119 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest, p. 71. 120 Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution, p. 26. 124 chapter 3 colonized and the colonizer in Tunisia, particularly the colonial racism which was built on three ideological components: one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; and three, the use of those purported differ- ences as standards of absolute fact.121 As numerous states in Africa and developing world, Ethiopia is comprised of various nationalities, ethnicities and groups within its borders, regardless of how they were brought together, with their distinct culture and languages and religions and, as such, who entertain complex types of relations varying from cooperation to hostility. However, there is one major difference: the existence of an “ethnic core” and a national group closely associated with imperial power and domination for over a century without interruption except during the short interlude of Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941). In effect, the newly created empire, three times bigger than the traditional king- dom of Abyssinia, was dominated by the Amhara and Tigreans – more so by the Amhara until the latter’s takeover of state power in 1991. Hence the empire was sometimes known as the “Amhara Empire,” and was closely associated with the worst form of oppression and domination as Gellner remarks in passing, “The Amhara Empire was a prison-house of nations if ever there was one.”122 Although the northern plateau of Christian Abyssinia can be considered as the “core” of the empire-state, Shoa emerged as the center in the political and geographical meaning of the term.123 Firstly, geographically speaking it evolved at the hub of the empire newly created by Menelik. Secondly, power slipped away from the Tigreans or other pretenders of the Solomonic dynasty after the death of Yohannes IV in 1889, when Menelik I, who hitherto was a vassal king, was crowned emperor of Ethiopia. Thirdly, the best known Ethiopian emper- ors, both Menelik and Haile Selassie, belonged to the Shoan Amhara of Menz, which profited most from the politics of empire. This does not suggest that every ruler claimed royal blood or Solomonic descent neither was it a require- ment. But the Shoan military conquest of the South under Menelik and the
121 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 71. See also Marc Ferro, for European racism and attitude towards the colonized peoples: Colonization: A Global History (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 20–23. 122 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 85. 123 For the rise of Shoa see, among others, K.R.H. Shewa, Menelik and The Ethiopian Empire (1813–1889) (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd, 1975); Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire (1844–1913) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giorgis and His Work, History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shewa (Steiner: Sttutgart, 1987). the concept of empire 125 subsequent administration provided immense opportunities for social mobil- ity, prestige and influence. Without rare exception such as Ras Gobana, an Oromo who joined the rank of empire builders, Menelik’s generals and com- manders came essentially from Amhara districts such as Marrabete, Girru, Derra, Gola, Efrata, Ghedem, Tara, Quimbibit, Minjar and Tegulet.124 This was a key factor in the distribution of land, political and economic powers. Traditionally, the conqueror, called aqni, was given the governorship of the newly acquired territory and the governor then redistributed the land to sol- diers and officers according to their title and services in the army (both in the process of conquest and the subsequent pacification and politico-military administration).125 This creates a network of clients, friends and relatives who shared language, religion and vested interest in propping up the system and exploiting the southern peoples. According to Aberra Ketsela, in Bale, one of the Oromo provinces in rebellion against Haile Selassie, “The Christian minor- ity has dominated the provincial administration until the rebellion, the Endarase, all Awraja governors and most Warada governors had always been Christians. The judiciary is still dominated by Christians. As late as 1970, the registrar and the judges of the high court were all Christians.”126 One point that should be emphasized is that the subject peoples and regions did not entertain the same kind of relationship with the center. The nature of relationships was closely related to the process of the conquest, war and peace- ful submission, cultural resistance, geography and ethnicity.127 But anybody from conquered regions could end up as a slave although some regions and peoples were more targeted than others. The differences were underlined by contemporary observers of Ethiopian social structure and history. For George Montandon, who visited Ethiopia in the beginning of the 20th century, the Abyssinian Empire was composed of four categories of peoples. Although this observation did not have any scientific validity, it seems to have corresponded to the perception of many travelers and ethnographers:
124 Pietrro Antonnelli, “Rapporti sullo Scioa al Ministero degli Affari Esteri (dal 22 maggio 1883 al giugn 1880),” p. 834. 125 The soldiers were rewarded in accordance with their rank and length of service as follows: Wettadder (soldier) 2 to 3 gasha (one gasha as seqela) and 1 to 2 Gabbar; Hamsa aleqa (Chief of 50 men) 5 gahsa (2 gasha as seqela), and 3 Gabbar; Meto aleqa (Chief of 100 men) 10 gasha (3 gasha as seqela) and 7 Gabbar and Shambel (Captain) 20 Gasha (7 Gasha as seqela) and 13 Gabbar and so on. 126 Aberra Ketsela, The Rebellion in Bale, 1963–1970 (Haile Selassie I University Addis Ababa, Senior Essay, May, 1971), p. 13. 127 For detailed discussions see Tibebu Teshale, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, pp. 56–57. 126 chapter 3
1. Free people (Abyssinians or Amhara). 2. Tributary peoples (the Somali and Denakil). 3. Subject (serf) peoples (the Oromo and other southern populations). 4. Slaves (“negroid” peoples called Shankilla).128
Here, what is paradoxical is that while Pan-Africanists and Afro-American pioneer scholars considered Ethiopia as a black country “Ethiopians have traditionally looked upon the dark skinned people as inferiors and given the name of (Slaves).”129 Alberto Sbacchi who assesses the complex relation of Ethiopian emperors, Menelik and Haile Selassie, had with the Black commu- nity noted that “Menelik allegedly considered himself Caucasian rather than Black.”130 In fact, this did not make much sense but reflected the perception of self-identity by rulers. Huntingford, a British ethnographer, followed the same kind of approach, 50 years later, when he roughly classified the Ethiopian people and their demo- graphic importance: Ethiopians, 32.6%. Galla (Oromo) 42%; Sidama 10.1%; Somali 6%; Negroid and Nilotes 6.6% and Afar 2.0%.131 Here what is important is not the accuracy of this demographic proportion, but his distinction between what he called “true Ethiopians,” estimated at less 33%, but who were also expected to forge the national identity in their own image. These people’s experience varied between a relative local autonomy, serfdom, and slavery at least in the first four decades of conquest. Even recent studies indicate the existence of three types of center-periphery linkage: “First, those areas previ- ously independent kingdoms that were made directly tributary to the crown; Second, those where the so-called Gabbar system was established, where the northern governors were appointed and local peoples made into near-serfs and finally those areas in the peripheries inhabited by hunters, shifting cultiva- tors and pastoralists.”132 Moreover, slavery has a long history in Ethiopia and imperial conquest of the South gave a new dimension, as Bahru Zewde wrote: “Slavery and slave trade have been endemic in Ethiopian society since early times. What gave
128 Georges Montandon, L’esclavage en Abyssinie (Genève, George & Co. SA. Librairies- Editieurs, 1923), pp. 27–28. 129 Alberto Bacchi, Legacy of Bitterness, Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941 (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1997), p. 22. 130 Ibid., p. 23. 131 G.B.W. Huntingford (Introduction) The Galla of Ethiopia, the Kingdom of Kafa and Janjero (London: International African Institute, 1955). 132 D. Donham and W. James, eds., op. cit. (Introduction), p. 37. the concept of empire 127 them renewed currency in the early twentieth century was the opening of new and wider possibilities for administration, Menelik’s extension of Ethiopia’s frontiers and the incorporation of new areas only tended to accentuate the predatory tendencies of the ruling class and the soldiery. Southwestern Ethiopia became a hunting ground for humans as well as animals.”133 A French man, Vanderheym, who accompanied Menelik’s of war conquest in 1894 in Walaita country, describes a frantic scene where the soldiers and officials were scrambling to capture and take as many slaves as possible. In fact, he claims to have been given five slaves, according to the Abyssinian custom, from the booty of the war, and he took the slaves to Addis Ababa whom he left to his compatriot who stayed in Ethiopia upon his return to France.134 By 1900, Menelik, the emperor of Ethiopia, and his wife, Taitu, owned 70,000 slaves.135 Even Ras Tafari Mekonnen, the crown prince (1916–1928) owned slaves. He freed his 7500 slaves only in 1923 when he was obliged to abolish slavery under international pressure, which was set as a condition for Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations. The country became a member of the League of Nations not as Ethiopia, but as Abyssinia. Marcus Garvey, who was critical of Haile Selassie’s leadership during the Italian invasion and occupation, accused the emperor of being slow in introducing reforms to educate his people and abol- ish slavery.136 Although officially suppressed, slavery was tolerated by authori- ties in Ethiopia who were great slave owners, on the condition that its manifestation was not visible to visiting Europeans. For instance, a slave could not be sold, but could be given as a gift to someone in the presence of an eyewitness; many secret transactions went under the disguise of a gift. Some travelers did not hesitate to characterize the Ethiopian version of serfdom in the South as “another form of slavery.”137 As will be demonstrated in more detail, theoretically, the conquered people were authorized to keep the control of Siso (one-third of their traditional hold- ings, through their intermediary agents called balabbats). But in reality, the degree of expropriation was significantly greater, depending on the magnitude of resistance put up by the people in question and the fertility of land and demographic pressure. The state (in this case the emperor who theoretically
133 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, p. 93. 134 J.G. Vanderheym, Une expédition avec le Négus Menelik (vingt mois en Abyssinie) (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1896). 135 Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935, p. 75. 136 Alberto Sbacchi, pp. 1–34. 137 Charles F. Ray, Unconquered Abyssinia (London: Seeley Services and Co. Ltd, 1923), pp. 189–190. 128 chapter 3 owned all the conquered lands) redistributed two-third or three-quarter of the confiscated land to his followers, family, the Orthodox Church, and adminis- trative and military officers. The latter did not limit themselves to what they were allotted but used their power and influence to acquire more lands at the expense of the southern population whereas the northern Christian popula- tion, living in a traditional Abyssinian polity, was protected against land alien- ation and the ensuing exploitation. As Gebru put it:
The crucial difference was that in the south, land had been expropriated largely by outsiders who reduced the autochthonous population into ten- ancy. Either by outright seizure, or as in more recent years through the use of courts and legal pretexts, settlers and officials alike usurped lands that belonged to the kin-based corporate groups. They did this to increase their private holdings, generally with the protection from the state. Those who actually tilled paid services and rent that were a higher proportion of their product than was paid by tillers in the rest of the country.138
Nothing makes this clearer than a reported speech of Menelik. In one of his speeches he not only referred to Shoa as “my country” but also boasted of mak- ing it prosperous: “From the whole of Ethiopia, my country was honored, it became wealthy.”139 Menelik redistributed, perhaps not equitably, the surplus coming from the newly acquired territories to his Shoan subjects. It is not sur- prising therefore, if his popularity soared among the Amhara who used to call him called emiyee (affectionate name and the term of address to a beloved mother).140 Haile Selassie perpetuated the same traditions of rewarding and appointing the Shoan establishment or the Shoanization of imperial adminis- tration. For instance between 1941 and 1966, it is said that the portion of Shoan appointed to the rank of vice minister or above was a remarkable 62%.141 This was equally true for the most coveted posts of governor of provinces called endarase (literally like me, meaning emperor’s representative, regent). The Ethiopian modern empire and imperial politics were built by and around the Amhara of Shoa and Tibebu Teshale provides an explanation as to why this group emerged as the dominant actors in the empire-state:
138 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest, p. 20. 139 Quoted and translated in Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, p. 8. 140 Tekle Tsadik Mekuria in Joseph Tubiana, ed., “Modern Ethiopia from the accession of Menelik II to the present.” In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Nice, 19–22 December 1977 (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema, 1980). 141 Donald, Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire, p. 27. the concept of empire 129
The process of centralized state formation in the nineteenth century Ethiopia was most concentrated in Amhara of Shewa. Menelik II was able through warfare and/or diplomacy to form a large political entity that included both so-called historical Ethiopia, Amhara Tigre lands, and the vast South. Being at the geographical center of the empire, Shewa was conducive to central administration. Its advantage was that it was far removed from the war zones of the north, which left warlords in state of ramshackle, and very close to the fabulous wealth of the vast South. Shewa combined the military strength of the north with economic resources of the South. Menelik’s revenue for running state affairs came from tribute.142
Under this circumstance, it is not surprising that the Shoan kingdom and aristocracy and the Church became the main beneficiaries of the politics of empire and as such wanted to maintain the status quo at all cost. The major causes for the fall of Lij Iyassu, Menelik’s grandson and his designated succes- sor, were his attempt to break Shewan hegemony and to reorient the empire by making some reforms and, above all, to tolerate or accommodate Islamic faith in a country where the religion of the state was Orthodox Christianity and where Islam was perceived as a traditional enemy. Iyassu might have commit- ted many mistakes perhaps due to his inexperience and young age. Certainly, the alleged errors could have been easily tolerated, but he erred in challenging the Shoan dominated socio-economic order and policy, which led to his over- throw in a coup d’état engineered by Tafari Mokonnen and the Shoan nobility and the Orthodox Church but supported by foreign powers.143 It was this coup d’état which brought Ras Tafari to the center of power in 1916. He made himself Negus (King) in 1928 and eventually became Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930. He largely undermined Iyassu’s progressive measures and, more, his attempt to integrate almost half of the peoples of the empire into a nation. Iyassu was the first to try to tackle the question of national identity of such a heterogeneous polity.144 This does not suggest that every Amhara in these provinces claimed royal blood or Solomonic descent and was a beneficiary from the Shoan colonialism.
142 Tibebe Teshale, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1900–1970: An Enquiry in Historical Sociology (Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1989), pp. 775–776. 143 Pankhurst, The Ethiopians: A History (Oxford; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 202–208. 144 For detailed analysis, see Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, pp. 120–128. 130 chapter 3
Yet, it is undisputable fact that the Shoan military conquest of the south under Menelik and the subsequent administration provided immense opportunity for social mobility, prestige and influence right from the beginning. With rare exceptions such Ras Gobana who was recruited from the already conquered Shoan Oromo clans and became one of the two key commanders of imperial wars of expansion,145 the Shoan expansionist kingdom started with the Shoan Oromo called Tulama who were at war with each other. Their weakness largely contributed to their defeat and to the rise of Amhara power. As Asmagiorgis wrote:
The Oromo of Galan and Abichu fought for seven years and every time the Galan were the victors. The war began to be of great interest to Shale Selassie. He allied with the Abichu and gave support. By siding with the Abichu he subjugated the Galan, Gidda, Wabaria, Ilamu, Aga, Gerru, Wayyu, Salale…146
The Shoan kings not only used the internal conflicts of Oromo clans to subju- gate and dominate them but also forced every defeated clan to raise a contin- gent of fighters, in the forms of tribute, who were used against other Oromo and non-Oromo alike. This “divide and rule” method added to the promise of reward in land titles in the conquered periphery boosted the Amhara demo- graphically and militarily in their conquest and domination. Many non- Amhara who helped with the empire building and the pacification ended in disgrace. The case in point is Gobanaa Abba Dacci, who joined the ranks of the imperial army from his already conquered Abichu clan of Tulama. He proved to be instrumental in western expansion and as such, attained the highest mili- tary rank of Ras,147 but fell from favor, and died in disgrace when his service was no longer needed.148 Not surprisingly, for many Oromo who are opposed to the Ethiopian empire and state, Ras Gobana became a symbol of treason and betrayal and he continued to be blamed both in folklore and nationalist discourses for being at the service of colonials at the expense of his own people.
145 Pietro Antonnelli, “Rapport sullo Scioa aa Ministro delgi Affai Esteri (dal 22 maggio 1883 al guigno 1880).” Miscellanea Etiopia ed Eritrea (Roma, 1889), p. 834. 146 R. D’Héricopurt, Second voyage dans le pays des Adel’s et royaume du Choa (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1846), p. 178. 147 Bairu Tafla, “Three Portraits: Ato Atsma Giyorgis, Rad Gobana Daci and Tshaif Tezaz Gebre Selassie.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 5(2) (1967). 148 Mohamed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia. the concept of empire 131
Overall, the conquest of the South expanded and consolidated the socio- economic base of the Christian kingdom and revived its sagging economy and eventually to survive European imperialist assault. More than ever before in Abyssinian history the extractive and redistributive role of the monarch was consolidated. Traditionally, in the North his room to maneuver was limited by a web of vested interests, whereas in the South he had a free hand to grant land to his generals, officials and supporters as well as place them in political- administrative posts without any hindrance.149 The array of new types of land grants created and expanded the gult system far beyond its traditional con- fines. The creation of many political, judicial and military posts in the South was aptly described by Markakis as an “economic boom for the Mekwannent [nobility].”150 For his part, Berhanu Abebe indicates that the conquest was a paradise for the Shoan political-military elites and for the emerging empire- state.151 The Shoan Amhara, ardent supporters of the kingdom, had to be com- pensated, although this did not exclude other peoples of different Amhara provinces such as Gondarie (Amhara from Gondar) riflemen who played a very active part in the war of conquest. The other important beneficiary was imperial expansion of the Orthodox Church which had a reciprocal relationship with the state. This is not peculiar to Ethiopia; such relationships can be traced to the Roman empire in which the Church developed a reciprocal relationship after initial conflicts: “If har- mony between the two authorities was to be achieved, reciprocal recognition of the prerogative of each was indispensable: control of the temporal matters should be the Empire’s natural right and own domain, whereas control of spiri- tual matters fell to the Church.”152 The Church played a key role in the functioning of the Abyssinian society where the imperial center possessed an elaborated traditional mythology of political legitimacy and leadership (Solomonic dynasty) as well as the Kebra Nagast (the Glory of Kings) and Fetaha Nagast (the guide of kings)153 these traditions were perpetuated by the Church. However, none of this – imperial authority and legitimacy – was known or likely to be accepted by the
149 C. Clapham, “Ethiopia.” In African Kingship in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Setting, edited by R. Lemarchand (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977), pp. 53–66, 47–48. 150 John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. 151 Berhanou Abbebe, op. cit., p. 33. 152 Robert Folz, The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to Fourteenth Century, translated by Sheila Ann Oglive (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), pp. 7–8. 153 Donlad Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in the 19th Century Ethiopia,” pp. 13–45. 132 chapter 3 non-Abyssinians with different cosmologies and notions of legitimization of political authority.154 For its unqualified ideological support, the church was theoretically given up to one-third of the total land in the empire, and as such, exploited the people in the southern regions, including its own followers.155 The expansion of the state and the consequent incorporation of more human and material resources were in the best interests of the clergy and the feudal order. More than ever before, the interdependence of the Church and the state in the newly conquered territory was consolidated.156 Historically, Ethiopia was a feudal autocracy and when it managed to colo- nize an immense territory under the conditions we discussed earlier, the only mode of production it could impose was the system in operation over many centuries in Abyssinia. One could say, therefore, that the socio-political system was autocratic in the center and feudal colonialism in the periphery. There is a significant body of literature on the magnitude of exploitation and oppression of the South at the hands of soldiers, landowners, and judicial and administra- tive officers. The following paragraph from Waugh may reflect the harsh aspects of imperial reality:
…The pagan peoples of the south and west were treated with wanton brutality unequalled even in the Belgian Congo. Some areas were depop ulated by slavers; in others Abyssinian garrisons were permanently quar- tered on the people, whose duty is to support them and their descendants. Abyssinian officials, with retinues which varied in seize from a royal guard to a standing army, lived upon the work of taxes of the original inhabitants; their function was not to protect but hold in subjection; fighting was the only occupation they recognized. It was not a question of a tolerable system being subject to abuse, but of an intolerable system.157
Furthermore, in the regional and provincial administration, particularly at district level, there was hardly any record of taxes, tributes in kind, or other
154 This subject is too broad to be discussed here. According to Max Weber’s widely cited typology there are three types of legitimacy: the traditional, the bureaucratic-rational and the charismatic. The bureaucratic-rational is related to modern state, the traditional and the charismatic refer to pre-capitalist social formation. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 3 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 954. 155 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, p. 15. 156 S. Messing, Highland Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia, Vol. 3, edited by L. Bender (New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1985), p. 180. 157 Waugh, Waugh in Abyssinia, p. 24. the concept of empire 133 regular and irregular errands, contributions forcefully collected from peasants due to the absence/inadequacy of a system of accounting and control.158 While the country could boast of having a written language, Amharic, most officials were illiterate. Even if they were literate, they did not need to keep any docu- ments as there was no accountability. At early stage of administration, until the Italian invasion of 1936, they were legally authorized to live on the support of local populations. This opened the way for embezzlement, excessive exac- tion, bureaucratic corruption and fraud of all sorts by predatory soldiers and officials.159 The Shums (officials) generally originating from northern Christian Amhara provinces, and their descendants in their later periods, came to the south with one thing in mind: to be served, not to serve, and to be enriched from the office they held, however insignificant the position it may have been. As Markakis correctly noted “…Venality, the hallmark of Ethiopian officialdom throughout the empire, reached its apogee in the conquered areas of the South, where the hapless peasantry had no recourse against it. Northern officials serv- ing in the South hoped to amass small fortunes during their tour of duty, and to acquire land through grant, purchase or other means.”160 Many scholars qualify the Ethiopian socio-economic system, which was extended by force of arms on the south, as “feudal.” This seems to be useful and applicable to a traditional Abyssinian society when one takes into account the classical definitions of feudalism as provided by F.L. Ganshof161 and Marc Bloch,162 although it is difficult to imagine that all traits of European social formations could fit the Ethiopian reality. However, “Abyssinian feudalism”163
158 B.G. Stefasson and R. Starett, Documents on Ethiopian Politics: The Decline of Menelik to the Emergence of Ras Tafari later known as Haile Selassie, 1901–1919, Documentary publication, Salisbury, Vol. I. Inc. USA, 1978, pp. 181–182. 159 Gebru Tareke (Introduction) Ethiopia: Power and Protest; Richard Caulk, “Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia, c. 1850–1935.” International Journal of African Historical Studies, 11, no. 3 (1978): 457–497. 160 John Markakis, Class and National Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 194. 161 F.L. Ganshof, Qu’est-ce que la féodalité? 5e édition (Paris: Tallandier, 1982), pp. 11–12. 162 Marc Bloch, La société féodale (Paris: A. Michel, 1940) (English translation, Feudal Society, Chicago, 1961, p. 466). 163 For detailed discussion of Ethiopian Feudalism see among others, Donald Crummey, “Abyssinian Feudalism,” Past and Present, no. 89 (1980): 115–138; Gene Ellis, “The Feudal Paradigm as a Hinderance to Understanding Ethiopia.” Journal of Modern African Studies, 14(2) (1976): 275–295; Addis Hiwet, op. cit., pp. 24–26; Taddesse Tamrat, “Feudalism in Heaven and on Earth: Ideology and Political Structure in Medieval Ethiopia.” In Proceedings of International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, University of Lund, April 26–29, 1982, edited by S. Rubenson (Addis Ababa, 1984), pp. 195–200. 134 chapter 3 as it was extended to the south not only took on a new dimension but also proved to be colonial in nature in the classical meaning of the term. The impe- rial political and socio-economic system imposed by emperor Menelik led to various forms of antagonism. Professor Crummey summarizes this in the fol- lowing terms.
The class structure, which evolved in Southern Ethiopia in the early twentieth century, contained open antagonisms. The rulers were largely, although by no means wholly, immigrants. Their culture was visibly for- eign. They practiced Orthodox Christianity, which was true of only a small minority of the Southern peoples, and that in a vestigial form; they spoke a foreign language, Amharic; they dressed differently; they ate dif- ferently; they served an alien lord. Thus, in Southern Ethiopia, class tended to assume the character of ethnicity.164
In northern Ethiopia, the core region of the empire, where Muslims shared aspects of ethnicity such as linguistic identity, religious difference played a pivotal role in social stratification, and social-economic marginalization took a different form. According to Abdusamad H. Ahmed:
Economic and social factors increased the distance between Christians and Muslims in Gojjam. Muslims were bereft of landed property which was exclusively in the hands of Christians. For many centuries Muslims had been excluded from holding land in Gojjam as well as the rest of the Ethiopian highlands as they were believed to have come after the Christian Amhara had already been in control of the farmlands.165
In the South, one of the salient features of Abyssinian feudal colonialism lies, however, in the Gabbar system (Ethiopian version of serfdom) and land alien- ation. After the conquest, in a few areas traditional leadership was maintained in exchange for a fixed amount of annual tribute like the case of Wallaga,166
164 Donald Crummey, “State and Society: 19th Century Ethiopia.” In Mode Production in Africa: The Pre-colonial Era, edited by Donald Crummey and C.C. Stewart (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 242. 165 Abdusmad H. Ahmed, Gojjam: Trade, Early Merchant Capital, and the World Economy, 1901–1935 (Ph.D. Thesis, Urbana Champaign, University of Illinois, 1986), pp. 65–68. 166 Tessema Ta’a, The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia: From the Middle of the 16th Century to the Early 20th Centuries (Ph.D. Thesis in History, Michigan State University, 1986). the concept of empire 135 and Jimma, where Abba Jifar was said to have negotiated with Menelik for peaceful submission although the exact terms of agreements were unknown. As Guluma Gemeda wrote:
The details of Abba Jifar’s agreement with Menilek in 1882 are not fully documented. But it is widely believed that Menilek allowed Abba Jifar to retain his position as king of Jimma in return for an annual tribute paid directly to the imperial court. Menilek then assured Abba Jifar that no imperial soldiers would be garrisoned in the region. Apparently Menilek also promised the Sultan that the imperial system would respect Islam and refrain from building churches and sending priests to the kingdom. Thus, although a tributary state, Jimma remained an autono- mous kingdom, while her counterparts in the region totally lost their independence.167
Elsewhere, particularly in those regions where the imperial army campaigned, the state confiscated two-third to three quarter of the total land under the con- trol of local populations. In some areas, such as the Arsi country where the people went to war against Menelik, the state confiscated almost all the land as a punishment for a hostile attitude. Also, land alienation was justified by the fact that it was dangerous for any conqueror to leave the principal means of production in the hands of the conquered peoples.168 Most importantly, the principal motive of the conquest was economic and particularly aimed to “open fresh lands on which to quarter his [Menelik’s] growing armies of hun- gry men who were pressing hardly upon the resources of Shoa.”169 Soldiers were given extensive land and Gabbar (serfs) according to their rank and ser- vice. The Gabbar was obliged to work two or three days a week for soldiers and administrative officers, who received no wages but were allowed to live on the local population. These obligatory services included production, cultivation and harvest, construction of houses, fences and other household activities such as searching for firewood and water, grinding the grain and many other chores. This seems to fit Dobb’s definition of Feudalism:
Feudalism is virtually identical with what we generally mean by serfdom: an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his
167 Guluma Gemeda, Land, Agriculture and Society: Southwestern Ethiopia, c 1850–1974 (Ph.D. Dissertation in History, Michigan State University, 1996), pp. 145–146. 168 Darkwah, op. cit., p. 194. 169 M. Perham, op. cit., p. 161. 136 chapter 3
volition to fulfill certain economic demands of an overlord whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or dues to be paid in money or in kind of work…This coercive force may be that of military strength possessed by feudal superior, or custom backed by some kind of judicial procedure, or the force of law.170
In addition, the Gabbar had to pay tribute to the central government in kind, honey, flour, cattle which had to be transported by his own means up to three times a year. In theory, the Gabbar was free, but in practice his productive capacity and that of his family belonged to soldiers-settlers and he could not leave the land. As Mantel Neicko noted:
Gabbars were not allowed to leave the land and running away was a crime which was punished by local judiciary. Imperial domination then con- sisted of control of the conquered territory by the settlement of soldiers on the land and the introduction of serfdom. Officials of local authorities are here representatives of the dominant ethnic group. Links between the native population and its Amharic administrators were provided by officials at lowest levels.171
This created a vicious cycle of serfdom where the status of the serf was passed on to his children and grandchildren. Thus, when a Gabbar died, his son was under obligation to accomplish the same tasks if the soldier’s family respected his engagement vis-à-vis the state.172 This theme will be developed further in the upcoming chapters.
Conclusion
Based on elaborated definitions and analysis of the concept of empire, this chapter has demonstrated that the Ethiopian polity is an empire due to the
170 Maurice Dobb, Studies in Development of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1978), p. 37. 171 Joana Mantel Niecko, The Role of Land Tenure in the System of Ethiopian Imperial Government in Modern Times, translated by Krysztof Adam Bobinski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwerstytetu Warszawskiego, 1980), p. 141. 172 Mahteme Slassie Wold Maskal, “The Land System of Ethiopia.” Ethiopia Observer, I(9) (1957): 283–301; J. Mantel-Niecko, The Role of Land Tenure in the System of Imperial Government in Modern Times, translated by Adam Bobniski (Warzaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwerstytetu Warszawskiego, 1980); E. Brotto, Il regime della terra nel governo del Harar (Stab. Tip Albino Cassa, 1939). the concept of empire 137 fact that it was founded on military conquest and force and, it has clearly iden- tifiable core/dominant group which imposed its will or hegemony on the periphery or newly conquered regions through well-organized structures of domination. In the following chapters, we will examine the process of con- quest, the nature of center-periphery relations resulting from the Ethiopian conquest and the functioning of the socio-economic system called “feudal colonialism,” due to the absence of an adequate expression. As will be demonstrated in the last chapter of the book, imperial success in territorial conquest, incorporation and domination led to a belief that the empire state created by force and maintained by force would transform itself into a coherent and homogeneous nation-state revolving around a “core” of symbols and cultural codes chosen and imposed by the ruling classes. National integration was simply seen as synonymous to assimilation. Linguistic and cul- tural identities of the nationalities that make up the empire were submerged in order to facilitate standardization – a prerequisite for the formation of a single nation out of the multi-ethnic society. By so doing the political-military elites in power claimed that they were building a nation in the manner pre- scribed by the theory of modernization of the 1950s and 1960s, which viewed the nation-state as the ultimate goal to be attained in the evolution of political society. As will be argued in further detail, the attempt at forced integration exacerbated the political inequalities created during the emergence of the empire and remains one of the fundamental causes of the present crises in Ethiopia. Through the use of original data and the case study of Arsi Oromo country, the following chapters will examine the process of imperial conquest, empire building and resistance as well as both short and long term consequences of the Ethiopian imperial expansion in the cultural, political and economic domain. Chapter 4 The Arsi Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest (1880–1900)
Introduction
If a word could summarize modern Arsi Oromo history it would be resistance, which includes military, political and cultural. The Arsi Oromo stood up in uni- son against the Shoan expanding army by mobilizing all their material and human resources for more than 10 years (1882–1892). This happened in two phases: 1882–1886 in northern Arsi (Dide’a) and 1888–1892 in southern Arsi (Bale). The Arsi Oromo made a collective and conscious decision to form an armed resistance against their invaders and paid a heavy price in order to maintain their independence. Their resistance did not end with their military defeat; they continued to resist assimilation and Amharization through con- version to Islam which was considered an anti-establishment religion in Ethiopia. Their mass conversion to Islam appeared to be a reaction to their military subjugation and the ensuing colonial political economy and policy of the Ethiopian Empire. In this chapter we will analyze in detail Menelik’s war of conquest of Arsi Oromo country which ended the era of sovereign existence and heralded a new chapter in their political and economic life. Several scholars and the official chronicler, Gabre Selassie,1 and the histori- ographer Asma Girorgis2 have written about the war against the Arsi in an extremely partial way, from the perspective of the ruling classes. Also, perhaps they were not aware of the details of a decade-long war which took place in every corner of this vast Oromo country. These writers, as many others who followed them, relegated the decade-long history to a few paragraphs or pages.
1 Gabre Selassie, La chronique de Menenlik II, Rois des Rois d’Ethiopie traduit par Tesfa Selassie publiée et annotée par Maurice de Copet, Paris, Librairie Orientale et Américaine (1930, 1932), 2 tomes. In this text we used the French translation of the original chronicle since the Amharic version of 1959 E.C. was censored by its editors. The censorship concerned Menelik’s war against the Arsi. (For the details see Hussein Ahmed, Some Problems of the Gabre Selassie’s Chronicle (B.A. Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1977).) 2 Astme, Ya Galla Tarik (History of the Galla), Vol. 2 (IES, University of Addis Ababa), trans- lated by Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shewa (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987).
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/�������������_��� Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 139
Likewise, historians of Menelik’s period have been largely based on these sources and other available materials indicated the destructive nature of the war en passant.3 This is mainly because in Ethiopia the tendency is to ignore such wars of colonization and expansion, to treat them as internal wars, or as campaigns of (re)unification, incorporation, and the like. In contrast to the international wars on which entire treatises have been written, these wars of conquest and annexation of neighboring peoples and territories by “landed empires,” such as Russia and Ethiopia have received little attention. In actual fact, the war against the Arsi Oromo by the Shoan kingdom represented not only a classical colonial war but also one in which egregious war crimes were perpetrated by an organized state. I have been working on imperial conquest and its consequences for quite some time which has provided me with the opportunity to examine available sources in Amharic and European languages (English, French, Italian and German) and to interview hundreds of Amhara and Oromo informants of dif- ferent regions, religions and origins particularly among the Arsi who suffered greatly from the war and the ensuing political economy. They have not forgot- ten and perhaps may never forget this crucial period of their history. Their col- lective memory of the war is so fresh that one has the impression that the informants took part in it or saw it with their own eyes. The original oral data obtained in the course of fieldwork is analyzed in detail in comparison with other primary and secondary sources. The following analysis is the summary of Menelik’s decade-long wars and campaigns of conquest and Arsi Oromo resistance.4 According to Asma Giyorgis,5 the first campaign against the Arsi dates back to the 1840s when most of the Tulama clans of Shoa fell under King Sahle Selassie, Menelik’s grandfather, though they did not completely submit until his death.6 Foreign observers, traditional historiographers as well as the writers of the 16th century, Bahrey in particular, dwell on what they believe to be the warlike nature of the Oromo society, on their great passion for victory in war
3 Rexford Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire (1813–1889) (London: Bulter and Tanner Ltd, 1975); Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire, 1844–1991 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 4 Abbas Haji Gnamo, A History of the Arsi (1880–1935); Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 154–191. 5 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 543. 6 Ed. Simone, “The Amhara Expedition against the Shawa Galla (1880–1850): A Reappraisal.” In Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 2–5 May, 1973, edited by Harold G. Marcus (East Lansing: African Studies Center, 1975), pp. 135–141. 140 Chapter 4 and on the continuous internal divisions which weakened them in the face of their traditional enemy. In the words of d’Héricourt:
The Oromo are one of the finest and most vigorous races of Africa. They differ by their religion from the Abyssinians…The Oromo are at the same time farmers and warriors. They have a bit higher passion for war than the Amhara, the love of the glory that is earned in combat. Unfortunately for them, they are divided into so many tribes that are almost always in struggle, and those who live south and west of the kingdom of Shoa can- not object to their old enemies of religion and race.7
This warrior ideology in the traditional culture was underlined by another French man, de Salviac who wrote the following: “Every Oromo is a soldier and he is born with warrior like humour. He does not need our systems of conscrip- tion/levy of troops to enter the profession of arms. As a child he longs for the day when his father put the spear in hand, as much as the nice people of the Middle Ages would like to be knighted.”8 After their success over the Shoan Oromo, Tulama, which were divided and used one against the other, Shoan kings of the first half of the 19th century envisaged southward expansion across the Awash River. But, in contrast to the Tulama (the collective name of the Shoan Oromo), who became weaker through internal feuds and conflict, the campaign against the Arsi was not an easy task. According to Astmagiorgis, the first king to organize an expedition against the Arsi was Haile Malakot, “In the fourth year of his reign, he [Haile Malakot] led an expedition to Arsi. They [the Arsi] fought him hard and repelled him. He could neither kill nor take booty, but saved himself.”9 Shoan expansionism to the South received two major setbacks; first because of the rise of Tewodros (1855–1868) and second because of the sustained resis- tance of the Arsi. The expansion resumed with king Menelik (1865–1889) when his army began its skirmishes and raids against the peripheral Arsi territories, a process which ended in the war of conquest in the early 1880s.10 Why and how Menelik created his empire-state is beyond the scope of this chapter and
7 Rochet d’Héricourt, Second Voyage dans les pays des Adels et royaume du Choa (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1846), p. 175. 8 Martial de Salviac, Les Oromo, p. 268. 9 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 543. 10 M. Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of Princes, the Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire, 1769–1865 (London: Longmans, 1969); Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia; S. Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 141 there is a considerable amount of literature on the subject. We will, however, start our analysis by paraphrasing P.H. Brietzke who argued that Menelik expanded his empire for economic reasons including a search for food, tax revenues, and commercial possibilities thanks to his superiority both in army organization and supply of firearms. Brietzke underscores the economic aim of the conquest, the role of firearms and the Amhara colonial attitude in the newly conquered territories.11 We will develop these points throughout this chapter in relation to Arsi country. The factors stimulating Menelik’s conquest in general and that inspired the Arsi resistance in particular were the follow- ing. Firstly, the Shoan king needed resources for the purchase of expensive firearms which European merchants brought to his court. According to H. Audon, whenever European merchants arrived at Entoto, Addis Ababa of today, Menelik used to leave them there and campaigned to the South to capture booty which he would use to pay off his debts. One of these campaigns brought him up to the Arsi country from where he was forced to return empty handed.12 Secondly, as a vassal king, Menelik had to pay annual tributes in Maria Theresa Thalers (the currency used at the time) and in kind. These obli- gations could not be met by Shoan resources alone.13 Thirdly, one of the most important explanations for the expeditions against the neighboring peoples in the early 1880s was an acute economic crisis in Shoa. Menelik had to launch a war to “offset mounting criticism and dissatisfaction and to defray the cost of the tribute”…Hence, “a large expedition was sent as far south in Arsi country as the frontier of Kambata to return with 100,000 head of cattle.”14 Finally, he was forced “to open up fresh land on which to quarter his growing armies of hungry men who were pressing hardly [sic] upon the resources of Shoa.”15 There were also strategic reasons why Shoan rulers were attracted to Arsi Oromo country. Firstly, the conquest of the Arsi would enable them to control the south-east commercial route, from Guraghe to Harar. Secondly, Menelik contemplated the conquest of Harar, which was under the control of the Egyptians between 1875 and 1885, an occupation which turned out to be of vital economic, political and strategic importance for the kingdom of
11 Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution, p. 26. 12 Henry Audon, “Voyage au Choa (Abyssinie Méridionale), 1884–1888.” Extrait du Tour du Monde, no. 1494 (1889): 113–160, 44–56. 13 Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times, p. 56. 14 Ibid., p. 64. 15 Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1966), p. 161; R. Caulk, “Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia, 1850–1935,” pp. 457–497. 142 Chapter 4
Shoa.16 The defeat of the Arsi in September 1886 at Azule precipitated the fall of Harar; this was also the case for the neighboring Oromo people, after the battle of Chalanqo (1887).17 In addition, Arsi country north of Shebelle served as a stepping stone for the conquest of Bale by Ras Darghe, 3 years after his victories over the Arsi. Finally, it was from Arsi territory that Dejazmatch Mengesha made the first attempt to conquer the Walaita kingdom in 1890.18 Later, in 1894, Dejazmach Tessema, the son of Ras Darghe, the Governor of Arsi, contributed much to the success of the military expedition against Walaita.19 At the end of the 19th century, as a result of internal developments, the evo- lution of international relations and the European arms which he had accu- mulated over the decades, Menelik emerged as the strongest warlord, and defeated one of the European colonizing nations – Italy. In doing so he defended not only the Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia but also the vast south that he had acquired through force, and by directly participating in the parti- tion of the Horn of Africa, he himself claimed colonial power status in his famous letter of the early 1890s.20
The Critical Role of Firearms: Guns vs. Spears
Whatever happens, we have got The Maxim gun, and they have not. hilaire belloc
It is of critical importance to emphasize the role played by firearms in the for- mation of the Ethiopian empire-state and the above quoted poetry reflecting European superiority and confidence toward colonized Africans is equally applicable to the Shoan kingdom. The unequal distribution of firearms throughout the Horn of Africa resulted in the subjugation of poorly armed peoples, without guns, by the armed and organized ethnic groups and the most armed being the kingdom of Shoa. As Tibebe Teshale noted:
16 Darkwah, op. cit., pp. 191–192. 17 Astme, op. cit., pp. 66–67; R. Caulk, “The Occupation of Harar,” pp. 1–21. 18 J.G. Vanderheym, Une expédition avec le Négous Ménélik: vingt mois en Abyssinie (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1896), pp. 138–139. 19 Ibid., p. 171. 20 Addis Hiwet (Introduction) Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution. See also, H.G. Marcus, “Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia.” In Colonialism in Africa, edited by L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 420–461. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 143
The role of firearms in the making of modern Ethiopia can be seen from two angles – internal and external. Internally, superior firepower, and the center that commanded this superior firepower asserted its hegemony over the rest. Shewa was the center of this superior firepower. Generally speaking, the center, Shewa was hegemonic over the north, hitherto the dominant center of arms superiority, and the south.21
If we take the case of the Arsi, the question of armament becomes the central, if not the exclusive, factor behind Menelik’s conquest and successes. As Asma Giyorgis stated, “Although the Amhara and the Oromo fought for 400 years, none of the kings, except Atse Menelik, succeeded in subjugating the Oromo.”22 Perhaps one could mention the role of Abyssinian political culture (central- ized authority), mobilizing ideology (Christianity) and army organization (a sort of hierarchy and command structure) to explain the success of the Shoan kingdom in its colonial enterprise. However, there is no compelling rea- son to believe that Menelik’s era represents any major advances over earlier emperors in any of these areas. The main factor seems to have been his monop- oly of firearms, the national and international circumstances favorable to conquest – The Scramble for Africa – and the diplomatic skills he employed to exploit the differences between European colonial powers. Logically, this depended, in one way or another, on the monopoly of firearms without which the Shoan king did not have room to maneuver in the foreign or domestic arena. P. Antonnelli brings these factors together when he writes:
Menelik needs Europe to have ammunitions and arms without which he would lose all what [sic] he had already done (conquered) in one day, since it is impossible to dominate the [Oromo] without rifles. On the con- trary, if they are in a state of equality in traditional arms they [Oromo] are superior to the Amhara. For this reason, Menelik cannot stop having political and commercial relations with Italy, and we have to help him and make him dependent upon us for the safety and prosperity of his kingdom….23
Therefore, one can argue that without his firearms Menelik could not have created and maintained his empire. Moreover, he also used his arsenal
21 Tibebe Teshale, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1900–1974: An Enquiry in Historical Sociology (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1989), pp. 69–70. 22 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 601. 23 P. Antonelli, “Rapporti sullo Scioa al Ministero degli Affari Esteri,” p. 63. 144 Chapter 4 against those who sold him or gave him the firearms, in particular the Italians. He was able to buy firearms without disposing of his own resources, using the spoils from the South as his principal resource. He was then able to loot the South further to import highly sophisticated weapons, which enabled him to conquer more territory, revive the northern economy and confirm the political and cultural hegemony of the Amhara.24 Thus he had created a seemingly never-ending cycle of using firearms to conquer, occupy, raise tribute and used the wealth generated to acquire more firearms. At the height of the war against the Arsi, Menelik’s forces were overwhelmed by Arsi warriors. He complained in one of his letters to Umberto saying “We cannot fight horse against horse, spear against spear” and urged him to send the promised Italian weapons rapidly. Many Europeans who visited him in the 1870s and 1880s witnessed his obsession with firearms. His purpose was, as he told a French traveler, Borelli, to have the tools with which “to frighten the Oromo” or “pour effrayer les Galla.”25 The firearms did in fact intim- idate most of the Oromo and massacred those, like the Arsi, who dared to go the war. Contemporary foreign observers confirm that without rifles, Menelik’s army was not in a position to subdue the Arsi. Wellby who had been in Arsi country some years after the end of the war of conquest states:
In the eyes of the Arsi Oromo the Abyssinians are a bad lot, this view being possibly based on the fact it took five years to subjugate them…. I have no doubt whatever they would repeat the performance were a chance offered, but whether they would have done me any harm is ques- tionable. It is certain that were the Arsi armed with rifles, they would be a hard nut for Menelik to crack.26
The Arsi themselves were the first to recognize their handicap as demonstrated by the exchange of words between the two protagonists, the Arsi fighters and the Shoan soldiers, on the occasion of one of the bloody battles recorded by de Salviac:
24 Marcus, The Life and Times, p. 40. 25 See, among others, H. Audon and J. Borelli (Ethiopie Méridionale), Journal de mon voyge au pays Amhara, Oromo et Sidamo, Sept. 1885-Novembre, 1888 (Paris: Ancienne Maision Quantin, 1890). 26 M.S. Wellby, Twixt Sirdar and Menelik (London: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1901), p. 121. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 145
The Oromo Army: Your victorious gun swells with pride. So throw on a ground and just mea- sure yourself with me. You will see that I am the strongest. If you agree to drop your gun on land, one of my warriors will be worth five of yours. Only one of my heroes will crush your battalions.
The Abyssinian Army: If I laid my gun on the ground, I know you’d be my winner as before. No, I will not leave my gun…Go and grind flour and measure me the tribute… fall on your knees and give my liege homage.27
We do not need to cite more sources to demonstrate how the balance of power largely favored the Shoan kingdom. The Arsi had no firearms (rifles, cannons, pistols, etc.), which were the monopoly of Menelik. Nor did they have a profes- sional army, centralized authority, or foreign advisors. What they did have was their unity and demographic strength. The Arsi social universe was vast, practi- cally covering the south-central and south-eastern regions of the country. They constituted the largest single branch of the Oromo nation. As indicated earlier, they were organized in different Gadaa grades but tied to each thanks to insti- tutional mechanisms such as the Tchaffee (Oromo traditional parliament) and Qixxee (assembly), a common religious head, the Abba Muuda of Bale, a long military tradition and great capacity for mobilization inherent within the Gadaa system, marriage alliances and, above all, the myth of common descent as well as their determination to fight and die for their land and dignity. The actual number of the Arsi who were mobilized for the war is difficult to determine. The contemporary estimates differ widely, ranging from the low number of 100,000 by de Salviac and the high number of 1,000,000 by Paulitscheke.28 Apart from their demographic strength and capacity of mobili- zation they were determined not to submit to their enemy as their slogans of that period demonstrated: “The Arsi die but never retreat!”29 And “May we die if we fear Darghe!,”30 to quote but a few. In fact they did not appear to believe that they would lose the war against Menelik until the end (1886). In the face of this situation, Ras Darghe, Menelik’s uncle, was risking his military career in accepting the mission of conquering the Arsi. As his biographer, Bairu Tafla,
27 M. de Salviac, op. cit., p. 150. 28 Abbas H. Gnamo, “La conquête impériale éthiopienne des Oromo Arsi, Ethiopie.” Africa, LIV, no. 1 (1999): 85–115; De Salviac, Les Galla, p. 278; Gabre Selassie, La chronique, p. 173. 29 M. de Salviac, op. cit., p. 307. 30 E. Cerulli, The Folk Literature of the Galla, p. 88. 146 Chapter 4 commented: “This was not…an easy assignment for the Arsi [Oromo] were one of the belligerent, fierce fighting and exceedingly evasive people in the reign of Menelik”31 (Map 4.1).
map 4.1 Menelik’s conquest of Arsi Oromo. Source: DRAWN ON THE MAP OF UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 27, 2013
31 Bairu Tafla, “Ras Darghe Sahle Sellassié.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, XIII, no. 1–2 (1975): 17–37. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 147
The Beginning and Escalation of the War (1882–1885)
After a series of skirmishes between the Arsi and the Shoan kingdom from the end of 1870s,32 all of which failed, the first official campaign against the Arsi was organized at the beginning of January 1882, and led by Menelik in per- son.33 Apparently, at this stage, Menelik’s goal was looting rather than perma- nent occupation. There is no indication that he was ready to stay in the neighboring region he was raiding, this was unthinkable given this sovereign society who did not have reason to welcome him. The king led his army towards the Arsi highland through the Rift valley, where he captured cattle and burned houses and crops. Surprised by the attack, the Arsi clans (Gosa) in the area resisted to the death, but failed in preventing the enemy from penetrating as far as Chilalo.34 Menelik met the first organized resistance at Chilalo which forced him to retreat. However, he seemed to have been satisfied with the booty already captured and sent it back to Shoa. From this campaign the Arsi learned a valuable lesson: one clan (Gosa) or some clans together could not be effective in the face of well-equipped enemy forces. In the light of this, they decided to create three coalitions that were organized and coordinated throughout Arsiland (Bale-Dide’a). These coalitions were the Dide’a front (Eastern, South Eastern Arsi), the Gadab- Sirka front (Southwest, Southern Arsi including Bale) and the Tchancho front (Northern Arsi). The existence of these coalitions were mentioned by both Gabre Selassie and Astma Giyorgis,35 and played an important role throughout this war from 1882 to 1886. Although the coalitions that were cre- ated were very strong and could mobilize a large reserve of fighters despite the fact that they did not have a sufficiently centralized command structure to coordinate their activities with any degree of precision. In the early stages of the war every Gosa recruited adult volunteers and sent them to the front although later in the mid-1880s the war involved every able bodied man and woman.36 Women who were not expected to engage in the war, the traditional preserve of men, joined the resistance when the war reached its highest point in 1886.
32 E. Cerulli, The Folk Literature of the Galla, p. 88. 33 Ibid. Gabre Selassie, La chronique, pp. 171–172; Bairu Tafla, “Ras Darghe Sahle Selassie,” pp. 28–29. 34 Informant Galato, one of my best informants remembers the details of this campaign in which his Gossa suffered, many of his relatives died or captured and taken to Shoa. 35 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, pp. 171–173; Astme, op. cit., p. 66. 36 Antonelli, op. cit., p. 96 tells us that in Chilalo and Albasso Arsi women took an active part in the resistance struggle in May 1886, when the war arrived its climax. 148 Chapter 4
There are no indications from Shoan sources that Menelik made the famous “peace offer,” an offer that was supposed to be given to non-Christian subjects, before the first campaign of conquest was launched. To quote the ancient Royal Guide, the Fetaha Negest:
When you reach a city or country to fight against its inhabitants offer them terms of peace. If they accept you and open their gates the men who are there shall become your subjects and shall give you tributes. But if they refuse the terms of peace and after the battle fight against you, go forward to assault and oppress them, since the Lord your God will give them to you.37
Arsi oral tradition suggests that had Menelik given the offer of peace, the peo- ple would not have opted for submission. These data also indicate that after the failure of his campaign of 1882, Menelik invited Arsi representatives to Shoan capital Finfinne, the Addis Ababa of today. The Arsi Gosa did not have a king or a paramount chief who claimed sovereignty over the whole region. As a consequence they democratically elected two well-known political orators and wise men, Suufa Kusoo and Daammu Usuu, to represent them. At his pal- ace (Ghibbi), they were said to have been put under pressure and at times were intimidated. In the end the king asked them to accept his overall authority (reign) in exchange for feudal titles and autonomy. Daammu Usuu, consider- ing it an insult wanted to refuse the offer categorically and immediately, whereas Suufa, a shrewd and politically savvy man, thought correctly that such a response would be suicidal since they were at the mercy of Menelik, because they were in his palace. As a result they told the king that “according to the Oromo custom a chief alone cannot decide on such important issues” and asked if they could have time to consult with their people. Menelik agreed and they went back home. Then they convened the general assembly (Qixxee) in which thousands of delegates of clans (Gosa) participated. After long and acrimonious discussions they saw no reason to surrender and unanimously decided to resist as one man to the end.38 The Arsi understood that Menelik would do as his predecessors had done before him and use the Oromo clans against each other. This was evident since Ras Darghe’s army in particular was composed partially of Oromo from the Selale district of Shoa where he had served as governor.39 The Arsi asked the
37 P.L. Strauss, The Fetaha Nagast, p. 274. 38 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi, pp. 23–24. 39 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, pp. 335–337; R. d’Héricourt, op. cit., p. 178. According to the latter, one of the most important obligations of the conquered Oromo Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 149
Oromo troops in the Shoan army to desert and join their Arsi brothers. Likewise, they called upon Ras Gobana, Menelik’s general at the head of an army of 30,000 men and one of the leading empire builders, to join them. They asked him to help them in their confrontation with the Shoan royal force by remind- ing him of his Oromo origin.40 However, the general made his choice and embraced the Shoan cause and aided in the conquest of the Tulama first and the Matcha Oromo next. Thus, Menelik raised Gobana to the title of the Ras with all honors although he was said to have undergone humiliating treatment and marginalization at the end of his life, when his role and competence were no longer needed.41 So, unlike other great empire builders such as Ras Darghe and Dejazmach Wolde Gabriel, whose families enjoyed immense wealth, Ras Gobana left nothing behind. On the contrary, he was ridiculed in different Oromo folk and gabbar songs and nationalist discourses.42 Oromo political- intellectual elites consider his name to be synonymous with betrayal.43 The Arsi believed, naively, in his imminent intervention in their favor. These diplo- matic maneuvers and the quest for solidarity failed, forcing them to fall back on their own resources and to be more united than ever before. Menelik launched the second well organized campaign against the Arsi in December of 1883; he shifted his zemecha (campaign) from west to east and north-east, the army crossed the Awash River through Sodare (Deggagga), leading to the Qalata River, the main tributary of the Awash, originating from Chilalo Mountain. Here, Menelik encountered the most organized resistance of the Thancho coalition (northern and north-eastern Arsi) under the famous warrior and commander called Gossa Dilamo, who inflicted heavy causalities on the conquering army. Menelik lost many soldiers including his three impor- tant dignitaries (officers). Despite their fierce resistance, the Arsi did not man- age to prevent Menelik advancing up to Qadida, Tchancho, in the heart of
clans by Sahle Sellasse was to send to the King a contingent of warriors who would take part in the subsequent expeditions against other groups. 40 E. Cerulli, The Folk Literature, pp. 89–92. 41 Mohammed Hassen, op. cit., pp. 198–202. 42 Addisu Tolesa, “Documentation and Interpretation of Oromo Cultural Traditions.” In Conference on the Oromo Nation: The Cultural Heritage, Present Struggle for Economic and Political Prospect for a Democratic Future (York University, Toronto, August 4–5, 1990). See also A. Triulzi, “Social Protest and Rebellion in Some Gebbar Songs from Qellem, Wollaga.” In Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Nice, 19–22 December, 1977); J. Tubiana, ed., Modern Ethiopia from Accession of Menelik II to the Present (A.A. Belkama/ Rotterdam, 1980), pp. 177–196. 43 Today some educated Oromo use the word “Gobanism” pejoratively to accuse another Oromo of betrayal of the cause of his people or for collaboration with adversaries. 150 Chapter 4
Dide’a country where he camped for a few days.44 In retaliation for his consid- erable losses he exterminated many people, including women and children, on his way to Dide’a. This time, his brief stay in the heart of Arsi land was known everywhere and all the coalitions mentioned earlier were mobilized to encircle and crush the king at his strategic camp. However, the coalitions were not able to coordinate their movement and the issue of poor communication did not permit them to launch a simultane- ous offensive. As a result of his guns and the strategic errors of his adversaries, Menelik dispensed with each coalition and gained the upper hand. Menelik’s chronicler, Gabre Selassie, describes the outcome in the following words: “It is impossible to count the number of cows captured and the [Oromo] perished that day.”45 On that occasion, Menelik was said to have captured 65,000 head of cattle. In spite of this victory, Menelik was far from being able to envisage per- manent occupation of the country and massive mobilization of the Arsi popu- lation forced him to return to Shoa promptly. Menelik believed that he had dispersed the Arsi resistance and did not expect to meet considerable forces on his way back to Shoa. But Leenjeso Diigaa, the major leader of this resistance, and his forces surprised him at Dodota, about 20 km south of Awash. They succeeded in crushing practically the whole royal force. The king himself narrowly escaped death and was pur- sued on horseback up to the present day Modjo. The extent to which this encounter put the person of the emperor in extreme jeopardy is evidenced by the fact that the Arsi warriors captured the royal drum (negarit) – the instru- ment which announces the emperor’s arrival as he travels across the country. The negarit was taken to Burkunte, the habitat of the Sabiro clan, where they celebrated their success and took an oath to continue the struggle. From that day onwards Leenjeso Diigaa, who distinguished himself in this confrontation, became a recognized leader of Arsi resistance and a decade long struggle.46 After the failure of this campaign, Menelik organized another unsuccessful expedition in 1884. When this campaign was over, not only was he forced to retreat without loot but his three generals lost their camping materials and half of their soldiers.47 Until November 1885, Menelik launched one unsuccess- ful campaign after another – a total of five expeditions in all. Raiding the Arsi
44 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, pp. 171–173. 45 Ibid., p. 173. 46 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi, pp. 29–30. 47 H. Audon, op. cit., p. 150; Astme, op. cit., p. 62. Both confirm the failure of this campaign whereas the chonicler was silent about it since his king lost the battle and came back empty handed. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 151 had become an annual event, and a sort of personal challenge that Menelik set for himself. In spite of some temporary successes here and there and the destruction brought about by looting and pillage, the war was far from over: the belligerents were not ready to compromise or submit. The intermittent nature of the confrontation permitted the Arsi to catch their breath and to mobilize their resources for other engagements, although they still did not have access to firearms.
The Extermination Phase (1886): The Case of Azule and Anole
By 1886, Menelik annexed the western Oromo and decided to concentrate on the south and southeast and bring about a decisive victory. Important changes were made at this stage. First, the responsibility of conquering of the Arsi was given to Ras Darghe (1827–1900), Menelik’s uncle. Secondly, a decision was made to introduce a policy of extermination and mutilation of the recalcitrant populations because it was believed that “otherwise the Arsi would not sub- mit.”48 Thirdly, Menelik made a strong call to mobilize his soldiers and Shoan subjects on a massive scale and those who refused to heed to his words were threatened with confiscation of their property.49 Although Ras Darghe was given the responsibility of conquering and pacify- ing the Arsi, Menelik accompanied him in this campaign of 1886. They left Entoto, king Menelik’s capital, a short distance from Oromia village of Finfinne, which was later named Addis Ababa, on the 13th of May 1886 at the head of a large, well-equipped army and they launched their attacks from the West.50 As in all preceding campaigns, the Arsi put up a formidable resistance as soon as the enemy entered their country. They forced the king and his army to cross and re-cross the Katara River but failed to stop them. Hence, Menelik managed to reach Albasso plain, south of Assalla where he camped for a couple of days. The Arsi saw in this a great opportunity, for the plain was more suitable for the Arsi cavalry than it was for Menelik’s slow-moving army. The Arsi warriors encircled the camp, made a surprise attack during the night, and killed more than 5000 soldiers according to local tradition or 2000 men according to de Salviac.51 Menelik’s own chronicler, Gabre Selassie, who was always silent on
48 Tsehai B. Selassie, Menelik’s Conquest and Consolidation of the Southern Provinces (B.A. Thesis, History Department, Haile Selassie I University, 1969), p. 16. 49 P. Antonelli, op. cit., p. 96. 50 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 763. 51 De Salviac, op. cit., p. 306. 152 Chapter 4 the losses of the Shoan forces, admitted that 700 of the emperor’s soldiers were killed in this single encounter.52 This was the second battle after Dodota and perhaps the most remarkable victory won by the Arsi combatants in their war against Menelik. There are no doubts that, on the occasion of this battle, the Arsi were on the verge of decisive victory. However, the Arsi did not bring their battle to its logi- cal conclusion but instead failed to pursue the enemy and dispersed as if a victory in one battle had ended the campaign.53 What they did not realize was that Menelik came this time not only to raid and pillage and return home with spoils but to establish a permanent occupation. He, therefore, intensified his attacks in all directions and dealt with pockets of isolated resistance. Many people were mutilated indiscriminately. For the first time the Shoan king marched over most of Arsi territory north of Wabe Shebelle (Albasso, Gadab, Kofale, Sirka, etc.), where he captured very large amounts of booty.54 Menelik was aware that the Arsi had not yet lost the war and that their capacity of mobilization remained intact though some important chiefs of Chilalo started to surrender perhaps to avoid the mass mutilations. After a month of war he left for Shoa, leaving Ras Darghe at Azule. The Ras then set- tled his large army at extremely well-fortified camp at Dide’a, in central Arsi, supplied with a large quantity of provisions confiscated from the local popula- tion. He had thousands of armed soldiers at the camp. As the emperor was heading back for Shoa, he was once again surprised at Dibbee about 10 km north of Assalla, by Leenjeso Diigaa. The Arsi leader was at the head of a considerable number of Arsi fighters, coming from the whole of Arsi country. In this engagement, which took place during the night, the bel- ligerents fought hand to hand, spear against spear and the confused Shoan sol- diers shot each other. As a result the royal camp was completely burnt down and the king miraculously escaped death for the third time.55 However, he was
52 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, p. 234. 53 According to de Salviac, op. cit., p. 278, one of the problems of Oromo’s army organization was that they did not remain together for more than a week whereas the Christian sol- diers were prepared to stay in a campaign for many consecutive weeks and even for months thanks to pillage and extortion. 54 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 765. On this campaign of 1886 see also L. Traversi, “Sul Viago negli Arussi, Guraghi.” Bolletino della Societa Geographia Italiana, XXIV (1887): 267–290. 55 The Arsi war song of that day clearly depicts their incontestable victory. “It is me who set fire upon you; Oh! Menelik this is your last lesson not to come back.” See also Astme, op. cit., p. 66 who confirms this tradition. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 153 worried about the destiny of his uncle, Ras Darghe, who was left in the heart of hostile people throughout the rainy season of 1886.56 The latter, who had been entrenched in his camp throughout the rainy sea- son, prepared a strategy of breaking the Arsi resistance once and for all. He succeeded in persuading some Arsi men to serve as his spies. Among these the best known were Halko and Roballe Kulla.57 These individuals played a double role and manipulated the Arsi of the region to attack Ras Darghe at his Azule base. They told him about the Arsi plan of attack. He dug trenches at the gate of the fortress made all the necessary preparations to massacre the Arsi warriors after they entered the camp. They attacked the base on September 6, 1886. Although Ras Darghe had ordered his men not to open fire until all the Arsi had entered the fortress, the soldiers began to fire as soon as they saw the Arsi arriving in great numbers. Many of the horsemen fell into trenches and the foot soldiers who managed to enter the camp were mowed down by Shoan bullets. According to de Salviac58 the number of the Arsi massacred that day was 12,000 and the number of the victims was also said to have been counted by the Shoan soldiers on the order of Ras Darghe.59 The chronicler, Gabre Selassie, estimated their number at 6000. When one compares the two accounts, the chronicler reduced the extent of that massacre by 50%, from 12,000 to 6000 Oromo combatants. I believe de Salviac account is more plausi- ble as the dead body was counted. Yet, Ras Darghe was not satisfied with these numbers as he had planned to exterminate all Arsi combatants present at the battle. He therefore punished his army and his two sons, Dejazmatch Asfaw and Dejazmatch Desta Damtew, for not respecting his order. He then chased the Arsi survivors for many days, killing and mutilating countless people along the way. At this point in the history of the Arsi, the war took on the character- istics of genocide, a deliberate attempt to exterminate men and women. At Azule, the Arsi lost both the battle and the war. For this severe defeat and car- nage, the Arsi naturally blamed those who betrayed their cause, Halko and Roba, and other leaders of that day for their poor leadership.60
56 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, p. 237. 57 In Arsi Halko is known under the name of Halko Darghe. Naturally this does not signify blood or matrimonial relations between the two but to mean the woman who sold the cause of her people and served Ras Darghe. After the Shoan victory Halko was invited to Addis Ababa and was rewarded the land under the title of Maderia for the service she rendered to the state. 58 M. de Salviac, op. cit., p. 307. 59 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, p. 237. 60 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi, p. 37. 154 Chapter 4
One should not forget that since the beginning of the war the Arsi had no firearms and their traditional weapons were no match for the imperial army which had a centralized command and was equipped with European weapons. As the war went from bad to worse, the Arsi war chiefs were not flexible enough to change their tactics. Moreover, 6 years of war transformed the Arsi country into a looted and burnt battlefield. Every campaign resulted in the capture of tens of thousands of cattle. For instance, in one of his campaigns Menelik was said to have captured 150,435 head of cattle as well as an unlimited number of horses, goats, mules.61 Beyond the devastation caused by the pillage, agricul- tural production also failed because of drought. Land remained uncultivated and harvests were not collected by years of generalized war. This combination of disasters hastened the defeat of Arsi Oromo and the occupation of their country. Under these conditions the Arsi’s determination to continue the war could not remain unaffected. Chiefs and war leaders were divided on the attitude to adopt. Most of them realized that to continue the war would be suicidal: too many of their people had suffered and had given their lives. Beginning about 1886, some Arsi leaders started to submit to Menelik and to his generals. Others who had lost their property, houses and relatives denounced the capitulation. The surrender of Suufaa Kussoo, one of the leading Arsi leaders and best known political orators was misunderstood and largely resented by his people who continued the fight and still needed his charismatic leadership. As a result, he was murdered by some radical elements belonging to the Kasheda clan in Dide’a when he was trying to convince his countrymen to stop the war. Another chief who was in favor of surrender, Dilbato Qilxuu, was chased from his home and took refuge in Shoa. However, those who were opposed to sur- render had hardly the means for further mobilization. Had they been able to mobilize, their people would have continued to pay the price, subjected to the punishment meted out by the king’s soldiers that included horrific forms of mutilation such as the severing of the right hand of men and right breast of women which Shoan generals introduced in the last stage of this war as method of pacification and repression. In the end, after much hesitation, Arsi leaders convened a general meeting (Qixxee). It should be noted that the Arsi society was a democratic society where individuals could not make important decisions such as declarations of war and the conclusion of peace on their own regardless of their legitimate authority. Except for Robaa Butta – a very rare important chief whose role in the war was minimal – all the leaders had unanimously decided to resist
61 Hussein Ahmed, Some Problems of the Gabre Selassie’s Chronicle, pp. 26–27. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 155 colonization. Now, at a meeting similar to the one that committed the people to the war, they had decided half-heartedly to suspend the resistance with the hope of, once again, taking up arms when the time was ripe.62 Unlike many of his contemporaries, Robaa Buutaa had an ambivalent atti- tude toward the war partly because his territory, southern Arsi or Bale, was on the periphery of the land which the Shoan army was raiding. Perhaps, he was not confident that the Arsi could triumph over the heavily armed Shoan army, in spite of their undisputed bravery and will. When the war began, he was the first to submit to the Shoans for the purpose of “saving his people from devas- tation” and mutilation. In return he was allowed a certain measure of local autonomy. The warriors who opted for resistance ridiculed his position. Whatever the causes for his submission may have been, Robaa had neither the power nor the influence over the whole Arsi people. He shared both the dis- tress and the hope of his countrymen. For him, the occupation of his country by the Shoans was an interlude of history and he believed that his people would regain their dignity and independence. As he told one of his European guests, du Bourg de Bozas, “…The hour has not come, but it will come. Perhaps our children will see the departure of the oppressor.”63 It was for this cause that he attempted to obtain some foreign aid, firearms in particular, but without success. He proposed an alliance with Europeans to fight against the imperial government. Later in his life, when the fair treatment promised to him by the Shoans was not forthcoming, he regretted his submission without a fight.64 His “autonomy” was abolished when the naftagna successfully occupied the coun- try. At the end of his life Robaa Butta became a militant and an undisputed spokesman for the cause of his people. In contrast to Robaa Butta, who was a diplomat and politician, Leenjiso Diga65 was the most popular war leader who personified Arsi resistance along with tens of war leaders (Abba Duulaa) and tens of thousands of unknown fighters. He was born among the Koloba-Arsi, who inhabit in the north-eastern region, around the present-day Sire. He was said to have distin- guished himself as a man of energy in the early stages of his life. With the passage of time he was recognized as a charismatic leader in his own and
62 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 179–182. 63 Du Bourg de Bozas, Mission scientifique Du bourg de Bozas. De la Mer rouge à l’Atlantique à travers l’Afrique tropicale, Octobre 1900–1903 (Paris: F.R. de Rudeval, 1908), p. 125. 64 Ibid. 65 For the comparison of Roba’s and Leenjiso’s role see Abbas Haji “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats: A Study of Socio-economic Position of Local Chiefs, 1886–1935.” (Presented to Tenth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Paris, 23–26 August 1988). 156 Chapter 4 neighboring Arsi communities. When war was declared he was one of the first to take up arms. He stood his ground until the end and headed the rebels “who had sworn to die rather than surrender.”66 He was the leader in most of the Arsi victories particularly those of Dodota and Dibbee. It was his warriors who captured the negarit and pursued Menelik up to Modjo, and it was his army which burnt the Shoan royal camp, at Dibbee, after a bloody surprise attack. The mythical image of Leenjiso was a source of inspiration for the Arsi war- riors and a nightmare for his enemies. Dodota, his principal base, became mythologized not in the eyes of his followers but also among Shoan soldiers who called it “Dodota yawend bota” or “Dodota the place of men.”67 The Amharic word for “men” in this context implies bravery or heroism and sug- gests that the Shoans too recognized him as a formidable foe.68 Of all Leenjiso’s successes his most highly admired exploit was the last heroic measure he took against the Shoan general Fitawrari Wosane, governor of Eastern Arsi. At the end of the war Leenjiso did not have any means to con- front the Amhara directly. Further resistance would have entailed massive mutilation of the people. Consequently, he submitted to Menelik at Entoto, where he was said to have been pardoned for the “crime” of resisting the Shoan king. But, what Shoan rulers did not recognize was that the submission of this proud man was purely tactical. On his return, Leenjiso organized what was to be Arsi’s last victory of the time. He disarmed the naftagna and, during the battle, he personally killed Fitawrari Wosane. As a result, he became a national hero and a mythical figure in Arsi history. In the final analysis, neither Leenjiso’s valiant leadership nor the fall of thousands of unknown soldiers saved the Arsi from massacre, mutilation and all manner of humiliation at the hands of the victorious Shoan army. As we stated earlier, these measures were consciously introduced on the orders of Menelik and his leading generals notably Ras Darghe and Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel to force the Arsi to surrender. They did not care about how they were applied practically and did not have the means to control the crimes perpe- trated after 1886. A case in point is what happened in Dide’a during Menelik’s campaign of May–June 1886. It was the king who organized the punitive expe- dition and suggested that he was, therefore, in favor of mutilation in principle. However, he was said to have been surprised and shocked by the magnitude of the brutality of his soldiers toward prisoners, children and women. Menelik,
66 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 179–182. 67 Ibid. 68 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 767. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 157 claiming to be a pious Christian, asked his soldiers why they massacred prisoners and warned them that such “actions will make us sinful before Christ.”69 The statement is remarkable for its implied Christian piety, pro- nounced after the fact and without any repercussions for those who commit- ted the crimes. Whatever Menelik’s motive was in making this statement, it is clear that the army was not preoccupied with the afterlife at that moment in history: their purpose was to bring the Arsi under their control by whatever means at their disposal, including the endless cruelty which they meted out on the popula- tion. For example, Dejazmach Wolde Gabriel, who lost many of his men in the war against the Arsi, committed one of the most heinous crimes of the war. De Salviac records the grisly event where he claims to have seen the multination of 400 men in a single day:
Nowhere did they (the Christian armies) suffer such huge disasters other than among the terrible and innumerable tribe of Arsi. This tribe by itself was able to raise over one hundred thousand warriors, and easily crush all the enemy forces…General Wolde Gabriel was long held in check. Furious of this resistance, he mutilated the right wrist of 400 Oromo in one day alone.70
Of all the brutalities committed by the Shoan army and its leaders against the Oromo, the worst was the Anole mutilation known as Harkaaf harma muraa Anole (the mutilation of hands and breasts at Anole) a tragedy on which Ethiopian sources are silent. However, such a phenomenon was neither unique nor new in Ethiopian history as one observer rightly remarked: “Terror has always been used after great deliberation and calculation to ensure maximum damage and psychological effect. It was used as a means of breaking stubborn resistance and of reducing the population of a hostile territory. There was no moral limitation to its use.”71 The mutilation of Anole can be viewed in the framework of this policy. Anole is located about 25 km north of Asalla, an area where most battles took place and where the Arsi inflicted heavy losses on the Shoan army. Anole seemed to have been chosen to avenge Shoan losses and to teach a lesson to
69 Gabre Selassie, La chronique, p. 235. 70 M. de Salviac, op. cit., p. 278. 71 Amare Tekle, “Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Politics.” In The Political Economy of Ethiopia, edited by Marina Ottoway (New York, Westport-CT, and London: Praeger, 1990), pp. 31–52, 39. 158 Chapter 4 the Arsi who still resisted after their shattering defeat at Azule on September 6, 1886. Arsi strong men and women were assembled under the pretext of con- cluding peace. All the men and women present, whose exact number was unknown perhaps more than thousand people, were mutilated; their right hands and right breasts were cut off. As a further form of humiliation, fear and terror the mutilated breasts and hands were tied around the neck of the vic- tims who were then sent back home. This practice did not begin during the war with the Arsi. There are clear indications that Menelik’s predecessors in Shoa as well as emperor Tewodros farther north took similar measures against the Oromo. In particular, the latter used to mutilate the Wollo Oromo and send them back home to frighten the whole society.72 Menelik, it seems, was influenced by such practices during his period of captivity in the hands of Emperor Tewodros. Neither Menelik, nor his uncle Ras Darghe, hesitated to use such cruel practices since they were, in the final analysis, fully authorized by the ancient document of the Abyssinian monarchy, the Feteha Negest, which states that such measures are legitimate methods to be employed against the conquered societies who resist the impe- rial army.73 According to Asma Giyorgis, with the rise of Shoa, the Oromo became fair “game” for Amhara children to kill, loot, and pillage and thereby learn the art of warfare. The following quotation concerning the period of King Sahle Selassie of Shoa gives a vivid picture:
…Expeditions were launched three times a year. There was a compulsory expedition in Teqemt. In Teqemt, every father had to chain his son. All the youths of fourteen, fifteen and above wished to participate in the expedi- tion to kill a Galla, for he who did not put seriti and Shamme (sic) on his neck, would not be counted among men. Furthermore, one who was experienced in the campaign and killing would take away the children of his kinsmen in order to enable them to kill the Galla. When they captured the Galla, and taught the youths to exercise on them how to stab or hit with the blade, there would be great happiness and singing on their return.74
72 D. Crummey, “The Violence of Tewodros.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, IX, no. 2 (1971): 107–125. 73 H.G. Marcus, “Motives, Methods and Some Results of the Unification during the Reign of Menelik II.” In Proceedings of International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1966 (Addis Ababa, 1969), pp. 269–280. 74 Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, p. 533. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 159
To this one could add the testimony of d’Héricourt, an eye witness of Sahle Selassie’s campaign against the Tulama in the 1840s, who described unbelievably barbarous actions carried out by the soldiers: “The Amhara were not content to seize the cattle, they pursued with the ferocity and cowardice women and children…For an Abyssinian, the sign of victory is snatching from the enemy that was defeated the organ of manhood, so he seeks to deprive his enemy to take away that awful trophy.”75 However, in spite of this indisputable fact, recorded alike by Ethiopian con- temporary chroniclers and historiographers and Western scholars, there is a revisionist literature about Ethiopia which portrays the empire in ways that are less odious in the eyes of 20th century society. In Ethiopia there is a general tendency to attribute “barbarism” and “savagery” to the other peoples of the south, Oromo and non-Oromo alike, whereas Amhara society is described as being imbued with Christian virtue. This pattern of misrepresentation of his- torical reality is not new but goes back to the 16th century, to the time of Bahrey, who wrote Zenahu Ze Galla (“News of the Galla”). On this point I quote Merid Wolde Aregay whose judgment seems to be balanced:
If Bahrey and other writers of these periods exaggerated the eagerness of the Galla (Oromo) to shed blood, it is because in one way or another they suffered from the Galla (Oromo) conquest…Judging from the evidence of the chronicles, the brutality of the professional soldiers be it to decapi- tate or emasculate men or to enslave women and children does not seem to have been matched by the reputed savagery of the Galla.76
The mutilation and indiscriminate massacres against the Arsi were very simi- lar to what happened to the Tulama except that the stiff resistance of the Arsi made the soldiers more cruel, brutal and vindictive. The Arsi, weakened by the long war and terrified by massive mutilations did not seem to have any choices other than to surrender and accept Shoan dominance and pay the onerous tribute demanded by the rulers. Even after the society was brought to its knees, the large-scale mutilations and confiscation of property continued unabated. At the end of 1886, when the Arsi lost the war, they saw their cattle captured and their men and women massacred en masse. They therefore suspended the struggle to save whatever could be saved, but with a depth of regret that resulted is captured in the following song:
75 Rochet d’Héricourt, op. cit., p. 188. 76 Merid Wolde Aregay, op. cit., pp. 315–316. 160 Chapter 4
Diina dhufuu hin ollee Nu ka gabbaruu hin ollee Maalif namnii keennaa Azuleetti dhumee?
If the enemy comes to our land, If we become his serfs, Why then did our people die at Azule?77
At the end of 1886, Ras Darghe accomplished his mission of conquering the Arsi north of the Shaballe River and was nominated Governor General of the region, which he divided among his officers, like Tessema Guchi, Denqu Mabraqu, and Zamenfas to name but just a few. Then, in the beginning of December 1886, Ras Darghe crossed the Awash River at the head of a large army to join Menelik who was heading towards Harar. They combined their armies and marched on Harar. At the battle of Chalanqo in January 1887 Ras Darghe did not seem to have played an important role.78 Hence, he was not given the title of the governor of Harar. Instead the coveted title went to Balambaras Mekonnen, the father of Emperor Haile Selassie. Ras Darghe had other possibilities of extending his dominions in the South. Bale, the country south of the Shebelle River, was also the abode of the Arsi and was still unconquered. That is where some Arsi who survived the massacre took refuge. But rivers were not much of a barrier to the Shoan army, nor were the ambitions of the war-chiefs limited by the huge expanse of the empire. The general policy of the conquest was portrayed by the phrase fares endagattah (as far as your horse can take you). Hence, Ras Darghe had his eyes on the remaining Arsi country on the other side of the river. Three years after his deci- sive victory of 1886, he launched his attacks from his base at Azule, against the Arsi of eastern Bale. One has to remember that the Arsi of Bale had already participated in the struggle with their kinsmen since the early 1880s and were already weakened by the experience. Moreover, they could not mobilize and create a strong coalition permitting them to resist longer. Nevertheless, Ras Darghe failed to penetrate to highland thanks to the resistance of the clans of lowland Bale such as the Raitu.79 Surprisingly, all informants, including the Amhara, unanimously maintain that Ras Darghe deliberately introduced infectious disease into the region in
77 Abbas Haji, The History of Arsi, Chapter II. 78 E. Cerulli, The Folk Literature of the Southern Galla, p. 91; Astme, op. cit., pp. 66–67; R. Caulk, “The Occupation of Harar,” pp. 1–2. 79 On the details of the Conquest of Bale, see my thesis, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 183–189. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 161 order to weaken the Arsi. Smallpox whose causes and ways of transmission were not known to the local population spread rapidly, killing so many people that some clans (Gosas) hardly survived the epidemic.80 Whether the disease was introduced or naturally caused its effect was devastating and coming, as it did, on the heels of a protracted war. Under these conditions where the very existence of the society was at stake, organizing the resistance seemed to be of minor significance. Bale was attacked from two directions: by Ras Darghe from the north and Dejazmatch Wolde-Gabriel, the conqueror of the Ittu, from the East. The two generals joined forces at Guranda, the first military garrison in Bale; they pro- ceeded to define and divide their spheres of influence. Ras Darghe took the plateau and the Bale highlands whereas Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel was forced to confine himself to the lowlands adjoining Ittu country which later became the province of Wabe. Ras Darghe then continued his conquest up to Gobba. Although weakened by famine and an epidemic disease, the Arsi of Bale never renounced the war but had to resort to guerrilla warfare. For instance, the chief of Gobba, Arabo, submitted to Ras Darghe and agreed to accommo- date six of his soldiers as a sign of submission. Furious, his clansmen killed the six soldiers at his home. In retaliation, Ras Darghe devastated the district and named the locality (Gobba) where his soldiers were killed as Ya dam maret (the land of blood). Gobba evolved, in later periods, from a garrison to provincial town during the governorship of his son, Dejazmach Asfaw, who was said to have planned to make it the capital of his “kingdom” of the South. It is important to stress that this epoch (1888–1892) corresponded to the Great Ethiopian Famine which affected the country in general and the north- ern regions in particular. It was in this difficult context that most of the gener- als launched their campaigns in the South. They and their soldiers were fleeing from the famine that plagued their land. Soon, however, the South itself was affected. The spread of the famine to the south meant that the economic base that was needed to support the predatory life of the Shoan army was no longer there. The soldiers had nothing to eat or to loot as the drought had destroyed everything – plants as well as animals. The war-chiefs were, therefore, faced
80 When I did my fieldwork, in the early 1980s in the Arsi region I was told that Ras Darghe deliberately introduced the disease to Bale to exterminate the Arsi. But I was unable to go to this province to verify this information. During my fieldwork of 1887–1888 in the Bale region, my Arsi and Amhara informants confirmed clearly that the disease was con- sciously introduced. Informants Yitbarek Goshu, Mesfin Qiba Selassie (Gurnanda); Balambaras Alemayehu Bogashaw (Ghinir) and Bekele W/Yes (Dodola) and Kefencha Arabo (Gobba). 162 Chapter 4 with a difficult choice: return to Shoa or persevere in the South until the crisis passes. In the face of pressing demands of most of his soldiers and officers, the Ras allowed all those who wanted to return, to proceed to Shoa with him, while those who were not ready to do so were permitted to remain in Bale under the command of Fitawrari Denqu Mabraqu. Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel stopped his campaigns and thus the conquest of the South was suspended until the end of the famine. Sometime in 1893–1894 the sons of the two old generals, Dejazmach Asfaw Darghe and Dejazmatch Mekonnen Wolde-Gabriel came back to the south to continue the policy of expansion and consolidation. They had also participated in preceding campaigns along with their fathers. By around 1897, all the region of Bale was conquered, soldiers were stationed at garrison towns, like Guranda, Lajjo, Ghinir, Gobba and Djaffero, to name but a few and Ras Darghe’s son, Dejazmach Asfaw, became Governor General of the region in its entirety up to Bekkoji about 50 km south of Assalla. Parts of the country were under the control of Ras Darghe’s officers. In the following chapter we will analyze the socio-economic consequences of the conquest and of the incorporation of Arsi country into Menelik’s empire.81
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have analyzed the historical and political develop- ments in Arsi-Oromo country from the middle of the 19th century up to the beginning of 20th century with particular emphasis on the Shoan war of conquest, resistance and the consequent massacre and suffering. Obviously, this was the longest and the most protracted war of conquest to be undertaken by Menelik and his key generals. The chapter critically examined the motives and the salient features of Menelik’s war of expansion. The war was not an end itself; it was followed by incorporation of the territory and a permanent occupation and the imposition of a feudal socio-economic relations (confisca- tion of land, feudal serfdom, forced labor) as well as an oppressive politico- judiciary administration (garrison government), a weak and waning form of indirect rule through balabbats – traditional leaders or local agents created by the imperial rulers since the end of the 19th century. In fact, the conquest had profound social, political, economic and cultural implication for Southern societies including the Oromo. As Halliday and Molyneux aptly noted:
81 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 179–182. Oromo Resistance against Ethiopian Imperial Conquest 163
…The main consequence of the conquest was nonetheless the confisca- tion by the imperial state of around two-third of the land…The indige- nous Oromo population suffered more than the Amhara and Tigrean ristegnas (those who have hereditary land rights) of the north. The dues they paid were far higher – ranging up to 50% or even 75% of the crop – and they were ruled as subject peoples by a discriminatory Christian regime that garrisoned an alien force among them and imposed an alien culture.82
By using European technology (firearms) and profiting from internal political circumstances and international relations favorable to conquest and territorial expansion, Menelik created a centralized bureaucratic empire-state. As sug- gested by some writers, Menelik did not create a modern state or nation but a centralized bureaucratic landed empire. In sociological theory the concept of “modernity” is associated with rationality or rational ideas and rational admin- istration, the spread of scientific culture and a break with the Middle Ages. France and Britain modernized in part because the state broke with absolut- ism and feudalism. Menelik, on the other hand, created an a feudal-colonial state which inevitably took a predatory form in the South which a French trav- eler Du Bourg de Bozas – an eye-witness at the beginning of 20th century – characterized as “imbued with a very barbaric and fierce conqueror spirit.”83 Observers of Ethiopian politics and history agree that one of the major dilem- mas for Menelik’s successors, particularly Haile Selassie, was the inability to choose between forced modernization and royal absolutism to which the emperor and the ruling circle were attached, for both policies were founded on contradictory principles, which led to structural conflicts and political crises. Based on facts and figures, this chapter attempted to demonstrate the extent to which Menelik and other architects of the empire were still guided by the Feteha Negest – the medieval charter of Abyssinian kings in which God was said to have given them the directive to crush all those who refused to submit to their authority “…go forward to assault and oppress them [i.e. the heathens], since the Lord your God will give them to you.” The way the Arsi Oromo and other subject people, who were not ready to recognize the divine legitimacy of the Shoan king, were treated during and after the war clearly shows the application of Feteha Negest by the “modern state” of Ethiopia. The Arsi did all
82 Fred Haliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (Manchester: Servis Film Setting Ltd, 1981), p. 64. 83 Du Bourg de Bozas, op. cit., p. 159. 164 Chapter 4 they could to defend themselves against the Shoan kingdom from the first half of the 19th century; they defeated Haile Malakot, Menelik’s father and Menelik himself lost at least in three battles in the 1880s and even narrowly escaped death on two occasions, until the Arsi were defeated, or rather massacred, by Ras Darghe at Azule where 12,000 died on the 6th of September 1886. This was followed by massive mutilation of men and women at Anole under the circum- stances discussed above. The Arsi were not the only people to resist Menelik, but no other group in Ethiopia, whether it had centralized authority or not, raised such a large fight- ing force. In the words of the court historian, Gabre Selassie, the Arsi warriors were “as numerous as the sand of the sea” and that they resisted the well- equipped Shoan army for years without any firearms is an enormous feat in and of itself and speaks to their character and strength. The punishment inflicted on the Arsi after their defeat is painful to narrate, as are the relentless attempts to dislocate the society: the total confiscation of their cattle and land, their exclusion from political life, and in some areas their exclusion even from the office of balabbat – the one administrative role created expressly to medi- ate between the conqueror and the conquered. This harsh treatment contin- ued under Haile Selassie. As John M. Cohen has aptly stated, “The result of fierce Arsi resistance was borne by their descendants.”84 Another important socio-cultural consequence of Arsi’s military defeat was their total conversion to Islam. The psychological and emotional trauma cre- ated by the war, the ensuing catastrophic political economy and above all the destruction of their representative institutions accelerated the process of Islamization. The refusal of Arsi to adopt Christianity, the official religion of the State, widened further the political and cultural gulf between the Arsi and the ruling elites and in the final analysis minimized the possibility of positive interaction. Islam became the official religion of the Arsi Oromo and, as such, became a rallying point for their social cohesion after the disappearance of the Gadaa-Qaallu institutions. This will be the major thrust of the upcoming chap- ters devoted to Islam, the political economy of alienation and the political administration.
84 J.M. Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, p. 50. PART THREE
The Cultural, Economic, and Political Consequences of the Imperial Conquest
∵
Chapter 5 The Introduction, Expansion, and Impact of Islam among the Arsi Oromo
Introduction
If Christianity has a long history in Ethiopia, going back to the first half of the 4th century, Islam also has a venerable history, dating back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, since it was first introduced in this part of the Horn of Africa in the early 7th century. Christianity became the state religion and was perpetuated through an established church which furnished unqualified ideo- logical support for the monarchy and for its conquests. Eventually the church also provided the legitimizing ideology for the empire-state.1 For this reason, Ethiopia was seen as “an Island of Christianity in an Ocean of Pagans.”2 The monarchy was inseparable from the Church and the two institutions fully supported each other until the collapse of the monarchy and the disestablish- ment of the church in 1974.3 In this context, Islam – the religion of almost one half of the nation – was believed to have been the anti-establishment religion. It is quite obvious, therefore, why scholars whose research remains close to official Ethiopian doc- trine have a particular view of the role played by the two religions in national life. Some scholars, such as J. Trimingham, have tended to consider Islam as a secondary religion which does not have any significance in the Christian state,4
1 Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270–1527; Steven Kaplan, “Christianity and Early State in Ethiopia.” In The Early State in African Perspective: Culture, Power and Division of Labour, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt, M. Abitbol, and N. Chazan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 148–168. 2 Gebru Tareke, op. cit., pp. 14–16. 3 Despite some changes in discourses and approaches towards Islam-Christian relations, Ethiopian Foreign policy tends to portray the old Image “Ethiopia as a Christian nation.” As Hussein put it, “The vision of Ethiopia as a Christian island, no matter how out-of-date it has become, has continued to shape domestic politics and foreign policy in Ethiopia” Seifuddin Adem Hussein, “Islam, Christianity and Ethiopia’s foreign policy.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 17(1) (1997): 129–139. 4 J.S. Trimingham, “The Expansion of Islam.” In Islam in Africa, edited by Kritzeck and B.H. Lewis (New York, Toronto, London, and Melbourne: Van Nostrand de Reinhold, 1969), pp. 13–34, 21.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/������������6_���
5 Edward Ullendorf, The Ethiopians (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 112. 6 For a critical assessment of this bias, see Hussein Ahmed, “The Historiography of Islam in Ethiopia.” Journal of Islamic Studies 3, no. 1 (1992): 15–46. 7 Enrico Cerulli wrote, “But the historical situation of Ethiopia and the long struggle of several centuries of the Ethiopian empire against Islam and the Muslim invasions, have attracted the attention of researchers on Ethiopian Christianity…rather than Islam as it is implanted in Ethiopia, even as the result of propaganda activity or war. We must recognize that even today the Ethiopian Islam is not well known and sometimes unknown.” “L’Islam en Ethiopie: sa signification historique et ses mjthodes.” Correspondance d’Orient, NE 5 (Colloque sur la Sociologie musulmane, Bruxelles, Septembre 1961), pp. 317–329, 319. 8 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter III; “Le rôle du culte de chaikh Hussein dans l’islam des Arsi.” l’islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara, no. 5 (1991): 21–42.
La Mekke Wadi Haife Djeddan Saudi Arabi
Donola Sawakin
Berber
Quz Rajab Soudan Shendi Kassala Massawa Yemen Kartoum
Kordotan Bare Aubayyid Yemen SUd
Ethiopia OromoDjibouti Djibouti
Yifat-Argobba wolla
Awash Beni Shangul Harrar Shawa O. Addis Abeba Ri ValleyBarentu O. Macha o. Gurage Ashab Uthman Hadiya Kambata Arsi Oromo Ka a Alaba Bale
Gamu Sidama Madji Darassa Gudji O.
Ri Valley Burdji
Somalie
Kenya Borana O. State border Limits of Islamic expansion Routes of Islamic penetration
Map 5.1 Islam in the Northeast Africa, Sudan and Ethiopia.
The Historical and Political Contexts of the Introduction of Islam
The major thrust of this chapter is to examine the dialectical relationship between the conquest of the Arsi country and the Islamization process. Islam is said to have been adopted by all those opposed to the Christian state, as an instrument of resistance. For instance, Trimingham argues that “…Islam’s force
For the Oromo in Wallo, Abyssinian domination and Christianity were synonymous. As Christianity was one of the pillars of Abyssinian unity, Islam became a major unifying factor for the Oromo in Wallo. From the beginning, Islam for the Wallo was part of their cultural life and a mark of their independence. It was a powerful symbol of their identity as a people and reliable fortress against Abyssinian nationalism.13
Islam is not a new religion in Ethiopia and in the south-eastern regions. The cultural area under study (the present Arsi country) corresponds to the geographic location of Islamic principalities for which we possess ample litera- ture.14 The present Arsi country was a country of seven Islamic principalities,
9 J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 101. 10 E. Ceulli, “L’islam en Ethiopie,” p. 123. 11 Asmagiyorgis, Ya Galla Tarik (The History of the Galla), Amharic manuscript in 2 vols. (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1902 E.C.), pp. 11–12. 12 Hussein Ahmed, Clerics, Traders, and Chefs: A Historical Study of Islam in Wallo (Ethiopia) with Special Emphasis on the Ninetieth Century (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1986). 13 Mohammed Hassen, “Islam as a Resistance Ideology among the Oromo of Ethiopia, The Wollo Case, 1700–1900.” In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1995), p. 84. 14 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia; J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia; Merid W. Aregay, “Political Geography of Ethiopia at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century.” In 4 Congresse internationale di studi Etiopici, 10–15 April, Roma, 1972 (Accademia Nationale dei Lined, 1974), pp. 613–631; L’Islam en Ethiopie des origines au XVIe siècle (Paris: Nouvelles
Éditions Latines, 1981); U. Braukamper, “Islamic Principalities in South-Eastern Ethiopia between the 13th and the 16th Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, 1–2 (1977): 1–44. 15 Al-Omari, Masalik el-Absar fimamlik el Amsar, l’Afrique moins l’Egypte, raduit et annoté par Gaudefroy Demombynes (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Geuthner, 1927), Chapter 8, p. 4. 16 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, pp. 18–47. 17 For the details see Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia; U. Braukämper, “Islamic Principalities in South-Eastern Ethiopia between the 13th and the 16th Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, nos. 1–2 (1977): 17–55, 1–44. 18 Braukamper, “Vestiges Médiévaux et renouveau musulman sur les hauts-plateaux éthiopiens.” In Les voies de l’islam en Afrique orientale, edited by François Constantin (Paris: Karthala, 1987), pp. 19–33.
As previously examined, there existed two dichotomies or classifications in the social universe of the Arsi. These are Arsi-garba or pure Oromo-Hadiya and Awama-Islama. The word garba may signify “non-Oromo or a foreigner.” Awama is from unknown origin.19 However, it seems to mean “traditionalist, non-Muslim, non-Christian,” etc. Although it turned out to be negative in the eyes of the Islamized Oromo, “the True Oromo” – in this case the Arsi – were “Awama” practicing the Gadaa and other Oromo rituals; while Islama stands for the Hadiya socio-cultural category as well as the Awa clans who were not organized under the Gadaa institution but whose role was important in the election and the legitimization of the Gadaa officers. The Qaalluu clans of the Borana who do not claim Islamic origin assume the same role.20 The popular tradition on the Awa identity maintains “Awan Islama, Awaan shan, Awan Ibida” which means “the Awa are Muslims, the Awa are five, and the Awa are fire” and respectively depicts the existence of Islamic communities – at least of nominal Muslims among the traditional Arsi society. Apparently, this rudimentary knowledge and traces of Islam from pre-existing cultures and societies appear to have contributed to its expansion since the last quarter of the 19th century.21 What appears paradoxical in this matter is that the diffusion of Islam among the Arsi directly coincides with the political and religious expansion of the Christian state under Menelik II. In fact, the Church – in this case Orthodox priests – accompanied the principal campaigns against the Arsi and the Shoan generals, most particularly Ras Darghe and Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel, built churches in areas where they obtained military success or were sure of victory. Ras Darghe constructed these churches at Koloba, Sire, and Tchange while Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel built churches in the Bale lowland, Ghinir, and Guranda. After the end of the war the government not only multiplied the con- struction of churches in all Katamas and centers where the Christian popula- tion was significant, but also attempted to evangelize the Arsi by all means including persuasions, rewards, and destroying mosques.
19 E. Cerulli, “Le popolazioni de bacino Superiore dello Uabi Scebelli.” In L’esplorazione Dello Uabi-Uebi, edited by Luigi Amedo di Savoia Aosta (Milano: A. Mondadori, 1932), pp. 135–181. 20 Asmarom Legess, Gadaa, pp. 233–238. 21 For Arsi Oromo of Bale see two M.A. dissertations: Teshome Amenu, The Rise and Expansion of Islam in Bale of Ethiopia: Socio-Cultural and Political Factors and Inter- religious Relations (M.A. Thesis in Religious Education at Norsk Lærerakademi (NLA), Bergen, Norway), May 2008 and Mindaye Abebe Senbeta, The Oromo of Bale: A historical Survey to 1974 (M.A. Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 2005), Chapter 5.
As mentioned earlier, there have been strong historical and ideological ties between the Church and the historic Abyssinian state and society. During con- quests and expansion “Christianity was one aspect of the civilizing mission which the Amhara saw as their imperial duty.”22 Gebru Tareke underlines the role of the Church in the following terms:
By extolling the virtue of social hierarchy, the Orthodox Church helped to stabilize the Abyssinian social formation; it was the continuing edge of relations of exploitation…Central to the Church’s code of morality was the belief in divine omnipotence, the sanctity of royal authority, the justness of overlordship. Supported by a tradition of awesome antiquity, enjoying direct access to land and the product of the peasants, and exer- cising a virtual monopoly in education, the Church affected every facet of rural life.23
There is no surprise that the Ethiopian state tried to expand, support, or impose the Orthodox faith on the conquered and territories.24 But, not all conquered people, in this case the Arsi Oromo, were attracted towards the Church of their conquerors and they opted for a competing religion, Islam, for the following reasons. First and foremost, the Arsi society faced an unprecedented social and political crisis. This was a direct result of Menelik’s war of expansion, which lasted about a decade (1882–1892)–(1882–1886) against the northern Arsi, and 1889–1892 against the Arsi of Bale. Armed confrontations with Christian soldiers, massacres, pillages etc., during the war and their negative economic and political consequences did not attract the Arsi to the Orthodox Church.25
22 J. Sorenson, Imagining Ethiopia: Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993), p. 13. 23 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 15. 24 As Messing stated: “This [the role of the Church] was recognized and promoted by emperor Menelik II, who had priests carry the tabot into newly incorporated Oromo, Sidamo, and other Pagan and Semi-Muslim areas of the empire, giving his military con- quest the character of a crusade. Churches were built in the these areas, guarded by troops of occupation, made permanent by feudal grants under which the local popula- tion made the Gabbar (serf) was permitted to remain on the land as sharecroppers and peon of the feudal Church.” Highland Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia, 3 vols., edited by L. Bender (New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1985), p. 180. 25 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 189–219.
Second, as different writers have unanimously emphasized,26 imperial con- quest neutralized the Gadaa, the Oromo’s socio-political institution, the foun- dation of societal constitution and of the administration of justice and social control. Even its ritual role was weakened due to structural contradiction inherent within the system and external influences. Under this circumstance, the Arsi seemed to have been obliged to look for a new form of ideology and cultural identity in order to maintain their social cohesion through the process of economic and social change. The search for spirituality was already evident and felt when the Arsi invoked the name of Sheikh Hussein during the wars of 1880s, in their war song in order to obtain his spiritual protection. After the end of the war, therefore, Islam found itself in a better position to give an opportu- nistic choice to the people in search of an institutional framework that would serve as a rallying point for its members. This argument is in entire agreement with the observations of Paul Baxter and Uri Almagor:
Where age-systems have faded rather than suddenly collapsed we suggest that enquiries may show that ecestatic cult or Pentecostal sects may have flowered. Cults differ in many ways from sects, but may offer individuals as a culmination to their ritual life which brings blessing and dignity. Certainly folk Islam can adapt ritual which seeks to promote fer- tility and rain. Among the Arsi, the Borana of Isiolo district and the Tana cult group such as those adherent of Sheikh Hussein have insinuated themselves as Gadaa declined.27
Another factor which seems to have facilitated the process of Islamization is the concept of a Sky-God (Waaq/a) among the Cushitic speaking peoples.28 Though the concepts of monotheist religion and Cushitic religion are not by any means identical, the fact that Waaqa is considered as creator, father, and guardian of the universe meant that the notion of Allah could be assimilated into the already existing system of thought. For the Arsi, even today, Waaqa and Rabbi (Allah) are identical and these terms are employed interchangeably in daily life and prayers.
26 E. Cerulli, “The Folk Literature of the Southern Galla” and U. Braukamper, “The Islamicization of the Arsi Oromo” (presented at the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 23–26 November, Addis Ababa, 1984). 27 Baxter and Almagor, eds., Age, Generation and Time, p. 24. 28 I.M. Lewis, “Sufism in Somali Land.” In Islam in Tribal Societies from the Atlas to the Indus, edited by Akbar S. Ahmed and D.M. Hert (London: Rutledge & Paul Kegan, 1966), pp. 127–168; Islam in Tropical Africa (Published for IAI by the Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 149–151.
Beyond the political events and sociological factors which facilitated the penetration and the progress of Islam, Braukamper attempted to develop, on different occasions, a sort of ecological argument for the Arsi’s conversion to Islam rather than to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church which was introduced simultaneously.29 Here one can concede that conversion to Islam could bring about economic consequences: prescription of some kinds of food and prohi- bition of others and, in the final analysis the type of production and exchange.30 However, his empirical examples are questionable. In the first place, while col- lective evangelization of the Arsi of Bale-Kokossa is true, their first experience of fasting and their abandonment of their Christian faith was due to the absence of stable diet (meat) cannot be established.31 In the second place, con- sidering the camel meat as one of the factors for the Islamization of the Arsi is an exaggeration. In effect, a great number of the Arsi are highlanders. Traditionally and at present, camel does not have a great ritual and economic role to play even to the lowlanders. The consumption of the camel meat, in certain cases, in some parts of lowland, is the consequence of Islamization not the cause of Islamization. However, Braukämper provides a more plausible explanation when he high- lights the impact of “deformed” Islamic ritual practices among the Arsi and the Hadiya “Medieval Islamic survivals,” and the extent to which these pockets of cultural traits stimulated the process of (re-)Islamization of the region in the 19th century:
…The expansion of the non-Muslim Oromo people during subsequent centuries mostly eliminated Islam in those areas. But some Muslim pock- ets, although cut off from the Islamic centers in the Horn of Africa, con- tinued to exist, and in the folk religions of those areas, Muslim beliefs and practices survived in various degrees of adulteration. These leftovers
29 U. Braukamper, “The Islamicization of the Arsi Oromò” and “Vestiges Médiévaux et renouveau musulman sur les hauts-plateaux éthiopiens” dans études réunies par F. Constantin, Les voies de I’islam en Afrique orientale (Paris: Editions Carthala, 1987), pp. 29–30. 30 G. Nicolas, Dynamique de l’islam au Sud du Sahara (Publications orientalistes de France, 1981), p. 16. 31 Probably the author did not get full information or he had deliberately left out a part. The fact is that the Pope told the Arsi that they need not observe the prohibitions of food (protein) for 7 years, the transition period which would permit them to change their nutrition and consumption patterns. The reason for rejection of Christianity lies rather in cultural and political opposition.
from Medieval times…acted as stimulating factors in the (re-Islamiza- tion) of southeastern Ethiopia since the XIXth century.32
During their movement, the Oromo were neither Muslims nor Christians and fought against both. Moreover, as indicated above, the Arsi call their Pre-Islamic society “awama” a term of unknown origin which does seem to mean non-Christian, non-Muslim, traditionalist. At the same time, they referred to those Arsi clans who were not organized under the Gadaa institu- tion as “Islama (Muslims).” These were the five Awa clans who always claimed Islamic origin though they had neither religious centers for their cult nor con- tacts with the Islamic world in the Horn of Africa or beyond. Here, what is important is not the depth of the faith of the Awa but the survival of Islamic names and ritual practices, which served as a historical antecedent and a soci- ological base on which the new Islamic community could be built. In other words, Islam had roots from which it could grow again in the region and could use its new-found strength to counteract Christianity. Perhaps one could argue that elsewhere in Oromo country, for instance among the Tulama and the Matcha, where ancient Islamic influences did not exist, the expansion of the Christian faith appeared smooth and unopposed whereas among the Arsi and the Oromo of Harar where there was an old Islamic presence, Christianity failed to gain a foothold. The second factor for the spread of Islam in Arsi is closely related to its his- torical role in resisting the expansive tendencies of the Christian kingdoms of Abyssinia. In response to the threat which these kingdoms posed for southern Ethiopia, Islam resumed its role as an instrument of survival for the Cushitic peoples of the South (Oromo, Afar, Somali, etc.). In the words of Enrico Cerulli: “Islam cannot face the official religion of the kingdom of Aksum, but however, by moving to the southern regions beyond the borders of the Christian state, it was the easy part, because it easily becomes the strength of popular resistance against the South Cushitic territorial expansion of the northern kingdom.”33 Until Menelik’s war of conquest, most of the Arsi were officially under the Gadaa institution. Apart from the inhabitants of Sheikh Hussein’s shrine and the people inhabiting Eastern Arsi – influenced by Islam coming from Harar – none of the Arsi were Muslims. Thus, Arsi resistance had no direct linkage with the Jihadic tradition of Islam although they invoked the name of
32 U. Braukämper, Medieval Muslim Survivals as a Stimulating Factor in the Re-Islamization of Southeastern Ethiopia (Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschtaft, Band 137-Hft1, Stuttgart, 1987), p. 22. 33 E. Cerulli, “L’Islam en Ethiopie,” p. 319.
34 E. Cerulli, The Folk Literature of the Galla, pp. 88–92. 35 According to Mesfin Q/Selassie (Guranda, Bale), one of my principal informants, the Amhara used to go to war with their tabot of St. George who was believed to be the most powerful saint in helping them to win victories. They brought it with them to Walaita, Arsi and Adwa during the battle of Adwa. He claims that his grand-father carried the tabot during Ras Darghe’s campaign to Bale and after the victory he became the first priest in the Church constructed in Guranda, Bale. 36 They were even given to some of some churches located out of the region. Some years ago I met in Dide’a a few former gebbar of Entoto Mariam, one of Addis Ababa’s Churches.
Gadaa, the Qaalluu, and the Tchaffee. This forced them to find a new cultural identity, different from that of their rulers – an identity that would help them to maintain their social cohesion. Thus, Islam became a rival of Orthodox Christianity. It gave the Arsi a choice and provided them with the rallying point which they badly needed after the weakening or erosion of their representa- tive institutions. By so doing, Islam also hastened the decline of Gadaa whose principles were incompatible with its dogma. For its part, Islam played a considerable role in the disappearance of the Gadaa for a number of reasons. First of all, the Gadaa institution and Islam could hardly coexist, for the latter is based on the principles and traditions dia- metrically opposed to the theology of the former. Islam in Arsi did not tolerate any of the principles or the rituals that was related to the Gadaa system. On the contrary, Islam introduced other forms of ritual practices and spiritual forms of expression. Thus, all those who accepted its five Pillars – it is sufficient to pronounce the first two to be Muslim – were forced to abandon the Gadaa rites which were important in the functioning of the system. So it could not survive without those rites (initiation, power transfer ceremony, etc. which served as a means of legitimizing authorities and distributing status and role) which every Oromo had to undertake throughout each individual life cycle.37 In addition, the period of marriage and circumcision, important in the functioning of the Gadaa system, were not respected. The combination of imperial politics, i.e., the systematic destruction of local institutions and Islamic hostility towards Gadaa rituals progressively uprooted the ideological bases of Gadaa. Hence, the institution lost its socio-political role and in the final analysis its raisons d’être. On the other hand, when we say that Islam rejected Gadaa we do not mean that popular Islam cannot coexist with elements of local culture. On the con- trary, as elsewhere in Africa, it incorporated many pre-Islamic practices and beliefs which could adapt themselves to Islam’s ritual practices and theology. A case in point is the Qaalluu institution and the associated pilgrimages (Muuda) which continued by taking another form acceptable to the Shari’a. Why popular Islam avoided virulent attacks on the Qaalluu, as opposed to what it did against the Gadaa can be explained by two factors. Firstly the Arsi Qaalluu (the Awa as they are called) claimed to be Muslims and tried to con- nect their genealogies to Arab-Islamic saints or to the family of the Prophet.38
37 For details discussion and analysis of the Gadaa system see Professor A. Legesse’s classical work Gadaas, p. 197. 38 Abbas Haji, “Le rôle du culte de Chaikh Hussein dans L’Islam des Arssi, Ethiopie.” L’Islam et sociétés au Sud du Sahara, no. 5 (1991): 21–42, 24.
The introduction of Islam at the end of the 19th century strengthened their claims that they were of Muslim origin and that their power of karama – the power to curse or to bless – was inspired by the Sufi order in Islam. Secondly, the decline of Gadaa and the abandonment of its ritual practices directly affected the power of the Abba Muuda and the importance of the pilgrimages undertaken in his honor. No longer did the jila (pilgrims, delegates) continue to come to the Abba Muuda every 8 years. As a result, Gadaa ceased to function partly because the Ethiopian imperial government banned the movement of delegates coming from non-Islamized Oromo provinces as the meeting of hundreds of thousands of Oromo at the same place perceived to be a threat to the empire. The logical consequence of this development was that the cult of Sheikh Hussein replaced the Abba Muuda institution and became a rallying point not only for Islamized Oromo but for the Cushitic populations in the Horn of Africa as well. The site of the Muuda (pilgrimage) changed from Dallo, Genale Doria, and Southern Bale to Anaa Jinaa and Eastern Bale in the heart of Arsi country. The difference was, however, that all age groups could make the pilgrimage to Sheikh Hussein’s tomb once or twice a year, whereas the only pilgrims to Abba Muuda were the members of the out-going Gadaa class, representatives of all Gadaa classes, and all the clans. Traditionally, women and people of foreign origin were not accepted in the Muuda (pilgrimage) to the Qaalluu. In the case of Abba Muuda pilgrimage, litanies and invocations were cited in honor of the Qaalluu and Waaqa,39 whereas the pilgrims to Sheikh Hussein’s shrine repeated (repeat) hymns in the name of Sheikh Hussein and through him they praised Allah and his Prophet.40 Many pre-Islamic and Cushitic cultural elements, which pilgrims observed from their departure to the return to their village, were incorporated into the cult of Sheikh Hussein and other cults of saints and popular Islam in general. Oromo rituals devoted considerable effort to assure production, rain, prosper- ity, and peace and to achieve these blessings through pilgrimages and Gadaa rituals. Such rituals went on even after Islamization as P. Baxter and U. Almagor have suggested: “…Certainly folk Islam can adapt rituals, which seek to
39 M. de Salviac, op. cit., p. 159; Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 61–67. 40 B.W. Andrejezewski, “Allusive Diction in Galla Hymns in Praise of Sheikh Hussein of Bale.” African Languages 13 (1972): 1–31; Abbas Haji, “Le rôle du culte de Chaikh Hussein dans l’islam des Arsi,” pp. 21–40; Jeylan W. Hussein, “The Functions of Arican Oral Arts: The Arsi-Oromo Oral Arts in Focus.” African Study Monographs, 26(1) (2005): 15–18; Elisa Pelizzari, “L’islam popolare in Etiopia: il pellegrinaggio di Shaikh Husayn.” Africa 48(3) (Roma, 1993), pp. 382–395.
41 P.T.W. Baxter and U. Almagor, eds., op. cit., p. 24. 42 Bairu Tafla, Asma Giyorigs and His Work, pp. 687–689. 43 Ibid.; see also R.A. Caulk, “Religion and the State in the Nineteenth Century Ethiopia.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, X, no. 1 (January 1972): 23–41. 44 Ibid., p. 31. 45 H.G. Marcus, “Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia,” p. 450. 46 Jon Abbink, “Transformations of Islam and Communal Relations in Wollo, Ethiopia.” In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, edited by Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 65–85, 70.
Granted, Menelik refrained from using force to convert some of the con- quered population when it was politically expedient to do so. It is equally clear that he did everything he could to discourage and obstruct the expansion of Islam in areas where there was no such political expediency. For example, in Arsi, mosques were systematically destroyed and churches were constructed on the same site as the destroyed mosques. Such, for instance, was the case of the Church of St. George at Sire.47 Few attempts were made to convert the Arsi through their balabbat. But, as opposed to the Matcha, where the conversion of local elites was followed by mass evangelization, the Arsi opted for Islam.48 I am told by Arsi informants that some Arsi captives who were taken to Shoa in the 1880s were baptized and sent back as ‘priests’ to evangelize their people. The best known such convert was Assalafi Chemere, who succeeded in convert- ing one of his kinsmen, Dejazmach Deksiso Badhaso, the balabbat of Assalla.49 The few Arsi balabbats who became Christians did so for two sound reasons. Firstly, as local intermediary agents, the balabbats had to have regular, if not daily, contacts with Christian military and administrative officers. These encounters involved the sharing of food and drink. However, in traditional Ethiopia, Muslims and Christians do not eat from the same table and, in par- ticular, they do not consume the meat of an animal slaughtered by a member of the opposite religion. Hence, the food taboos were a major problem for the balabbat. One could mention some examples from south-eastern (Muslim) regions characterized by a marked cultural gulf and political distance with the center. A few ambitious balabbats were even converted to Orthodox Christianity – as opposed to their kinsmen who chose Islam en masse – in order to assure their social mobility and acceptability by integrating themselves to the religion and culture of the ruling classes.50 No sooner had the revolution abolished the monarchy and the relations between the Church and the state that these balabbats realized that this development heralded the end of their dreams and ambitions and they abandoned Christianity in favor of Islam.
47 O. Newman, “From the Somali Coast through Southern Ethiopia to the Sudan.” Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (Washington, The Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 778–779. 48 Tessema Ta’a, op. cit., pp. 172–173. 49 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi: 1880–1935 (B.A. Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 1982), Chapter IV. 50 For the detailed discussion see Abbas Haji, “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats: A Study of Socio-Economic Position of Local Chiefs in Southern Ethiopia, 1886–1935.” X. Conférence Internationale des Études Éthiopiennes, Vol. 1, edited by Claude Lepag (Paris: Société Française pour les Études Éthiopiennes, 1994), pp. 585–592.
In Arsi and Bale Regions, where I conducted research, the quasi totalities of Arsi Christianized balabbats were (re)converted to Islam and reintegrated into their community. Above all, many of the so-called assimilated elites became militant nationalists of their respective national groups although they share religion and some traits of culture with the Amhara. These individual strate- gies should be understood in the light of the Amhara culture itself, whereby individuals easily change alliances and allegiances, both in war and politics, and side with a group or individuals where their interests are better served.51 Furthermore, traditional Abyssinian feudalism, in particular the gult system was not extended to include Muslims: they had no status in the feudal hierar- chy, no possibility of upward social mobility, and no likelihood of being socially accepted by the dominant community. Getachew Haile confirms this when he writes: “…When the policy of centralization was implemented in XIXth and XXth centuries, no mechanisms was instituted whereby Ethiopian Muslims could be full partners in the administration of national government.”52 This confirms the status of second class citizens for Muslim population. More importantly, as part of a feudal socio-economic system, even Christianized Oromos felt alienated by the Orthodox Church. This may be understood from the following reflection which may indicate Oromo percep- tion of the Ethiopian Church:
The Orthodox Church can hardly be proud of its past relations with the Oromo people. Abyssinian priests never came to Oromia as the messen- gers of God and peace. They (priests) came as conquerors with Menelik’s generals, ‘blessing’ the massacre that the latter and their soldiers inflicted upon the Oromo People. They shared with the emperor, his generals and soldiers booties plundered from the Oromo. The clergy were given land that was confiscated from the Oromo peasants and became landlords; they owned Oromo peasants as Gabbars (serfs) and thrived upon their labor.53
In fact, Muslims were not considered as partners even at the level of regional and local administration. Hence, the local balabbats with some ambition had no alternative but to become Christians, learn Amharic, and accept other
51 D. Levine, Greater Ethiopia, p. 154. 52 Getachew Haile, “The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(3) (1986): 465–487, 485. 53 Mekuria Bulcha, “Priests, Religion and Language in Ethiopia.” The Oromo Commentary, IV, no. 1 (1994): 8–11.
54 On the exclusion of Arsi Muslims from Political life in general and national representa- tion in particular please see the article by Professor Baxter, who witnessed Parliamentary election in Arsi and how the incontestable election of an Arsi Balabbat to the Chamber of Deputies was simply canceled by the Governor General, Sahlu Defaye, and was replaced by one of the latter’s men. “Always on the Outside Looking In: A view of the 1969 Ethiopian Election From a Rural Constituency,” Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, 45(1–2) (1980): 39–59. 55 I obtained this information from Balambaras Genna Hamda, an Arsi Balabbat who took part in this ceremony.
The most spectacular failure, however, concerning the evangelization process in Arsi was the Kokkossa case. Kokkossa is a district of Gennale prov- ince, on the frontier of Sidamo. This region was the only area which strongly resisted external influences, including Islam and Christianity, and to our knowledge it is the only place in Arsi country where Gadaa was practiced or at least observed ceremonially every 8 years up to the present day. In the 1950s, the Christians hoped to evangelize this district which was reputed to be still “pagan.” The Ethiopian patriarch came to Kokkossa in person to give Holy Communion and the Arsi were ordered by balabbats to participate in the cer- emony. Many were said to have refused to do so and those who came without knowing why they were invited were collectively baptized and given collective Christian names. Some individuals tried to argue that their pastoral economy did not permit them to be Christians or to observe the Orthodox food prohibi- tion on milk, butter, meat which are strictly observed during the fasting season. They were unable to dissuade the authorities from performing the cer- emony. The clergy were, however, surprised to learn that all the converts had abandoned their new-found Christian faith soon after the mass baptism.56 Moreover, it was not only the Orthodox Church that the Arsi rejected but also Christian missionaries of all denominations. A case in point is the Sudan Interior Mission which was established at Kuyera, around Shashemene. When the Seventh Day Adventist School was founded, the Arsi of the Rift Valley were not yet fully Muslims and it was hoped that the establishment of the college which offered various social services would lead to evangelization. However, in spite of the many important changes it brought about in economic development, in health improvement, and above all in the expansion of educa- tion, its presence had the paradoxical effect of consolidating Islam which the Arsi embraced in great numbers. Samuna Rakisso, the author of a detailed study on the subject, argued that if the Adventist Mission failed to convert the Arsi it was because it was seen as another branch of Orthodox Christianity which they rejected in great numbers.57 One can argue also that the Arsi were very reluctant to accept Islam before the imperial conquest and that such reluctance continued in those areas where the traditional institutions were more or less functional, as in the case of Kokkosa. However, even this region was unlikely to escape the fate of other
56 This rejection is attributed largely to political and socio-cultural factors as well as some ecological arguments. For some ecological arguments for Arsi’s choice of Islam rather Christianity see U. Braukämper, “The Islamicization of the Arsi Oromo.” 57 Samuna Rakiso, Kuyera: A History of Ethiopian Adventist College (Senior Essay in History Addis Ababa University, 1985), p. 76.
Arsi groups, after the disappearance of their Gadaa institution. According to all informants early Sheikhs who came from neighboring societies to diffuse Islam suffered and were chased away; sometimes local opposition ended in tragedy, as in Dide’a where the eminent Sheikh Faqih Issa was slain by indi- viduals hostile to his religious activities.58 Likewise, the first Muslims under- went isolation and physical punishment from their own community.
The Phases of the Spread and Consolidation of Islam
As discussed in the preceding pages, during the period that concerns this chap- ter, the expansion of Islam was pacific, i.e., through trade, in some areas, and mostly through cultural contacts with Islamized neighbors by the intermedi- ary of scholars, Ulama’a. This peaceful expansion in the region can be con- trasted with the methods of Christian evangelization: “[…] while Christian expansion in the Horn took place essentially by conquest, Islam spread mainly by peaceful means. Thus, there is no tradition of an aggressive Islam in the region, and consequently, Islam fundamentalism cannot spread easily.”59 The process of diffusion and consolidation by voluntary conversion took generations. Islam does not exert the same influence on all Arsi districts, vil- lages and communities. This Islam, so to speak, was tolerant and popular in nature, and has co-existed with local/indigenous culture sometime in contra- diction, and at times in harmony. As far as agents of Islamic expansion were concerned, one has to bear in mind that trade and trade routes did not play a great role in Arsi, although they served as an important agent in the penetration and expansion of Islam in Africa and some other parts of Ethiopia.60 It was introduced by the Muslim scholars (Ulama’a) coming from the missionary center of Harar,61 from Somali areas62 and even from Wollo. Teachers like Sheikh Ahmed of Wollo and Sheikh Abbas of Argobba were pioneers who came to Arsi at the end of the 19th cen- tury. Almost all these Sheikhs established themselves among the Arsi of Dide’a and at the shrine of Sheikh Hussein, Ana Jina, which was an Island of Muslims
58 Abbas Haji, A History of the Arsi: 1880–1935 (B.A. Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 1982), Chapter IV. 59 A.C. Huliaras, “Islam: Promise or Peril?.” The World Today, 51, no. 12 (1995): 242–245. 60 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia, pp. 162–195; H.S. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy, Jimma Abba Jiffar, Ethiopia, 1830–1932 (Madison University of Wisconsins Press, 1965). 61 Trimingham, op. cit., p. 18. 62 Du Boug de Bozas, op. cit., p. 170.
63 O. Newmann, op. cit., p. 778; W.C. Harris, The Highland od Aethiopia (London: Longsman, 1944), pp. 257–258. 64 E. Cerulli, Il Popoplazioni, p. 142. 65 Quoted in Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 137. 66 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter III.
Italian occupation, the major phases of Islamization were completed.67 As well, the Italian support for Islam in the northern regions, where the religion had strong roots, appears to be obvious. As Abbink noted:
During the Italian occupation (1936–1941), the Muslim community in Ethiopia was supported by the Italians, who wanted to break the power and institutional role of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, which they identified with Ethiopian nationalism and which they thought was not strong among Muslims. The Italian promoted the building of mosques… and in general furthered the interests of Muslims in public life to “bal- ance” the two faiths.68
The fourth phase was the post-Italian period beginning with the fall of the Italian colonial army in 1941. During this period, Islamic studies centers led by Arsi Sheikhs who completed their study of Islamic sciences and Arabic language (Fiqih and Nahwi) multiplied reinforcing Islam’s impact on the social organization and daily life of the people. Oromo Muslims, as other Muslims in the region, are Sunni Muslims, the variant of Islam largely practiced by the majority of Muslims of the globe. They have close relations with Saudi Arabia, not only because of geographic proximity but also because this country is where the Muslim holy places are located. Over the last decades an increasing number of Oromo left for pilgrimage (hajj) and advanced studies in Islamic Universities. Many Ulama’a (religious scholars) successfully completed the cycles of Islamic sciences in the Wahhabi tradition, an official Saudi doctrine, and have returned to their country of origin. Some ended up there just as immigrant workers during the oil boom as others may have made their way to North America and Western Europe, and even Australia. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia was built on a historical alliance between the House of the founder of the Wahhabi movement, his descendants, and the house of Sa’ud, the royal clan. When the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was set up in 1932 by Abdul Aziz, Wahhabism became its official doctrine. It is closely linked to Muhammed b. Abdul-Wahhab (1703–1787), the Najdi religious reformer.69
67 An exception to this was analyzed earlier. 68 Jon Abbink, “Transformations of Islam and Communal Relations in Wollo, Ethiopia.” In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, edited by Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 65–85, 69. 69 T. Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 208–212.
Wahhabism is generally known for its calls for orthodox interpretation of Islam, its restoration in its original purity – or as it was – and practiced during the life and times of the Prophet and his immediate successors, the Caliphs. One of the main objectives of this Islamic school of thought is to combat against suspect innovations and popular superstitions, mysticism, and Sufism which are perceived to be contradictory to the Shari’a enshrined in the Qur’an and the Hadith.70 Saudi Arabia’s government and political culture have been founded on the Shari’a, Islamic laws and many observers and writers in the West consider it as an officially fundamentalist state. The attempt of imple- menting this orthodox and strict interpretation of Islam in African society raises a number of problems and challenges.71 In any case, this phase, which roughly began in the 1950s, has been characterized not only by the conscious conversion of the Arsi but also by the disappearance of the Gadaa everywhere except in Kokkossa. The Abba Muuda institution followed suit and completely died out when the last Abba Muuda (descendant of the great Qaalluu of Bale) himself became Muslim in the late 1920s or in the 1930s before the Italian invasion and adopted the name of Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu. It is interesting to note that by adopting the name Mohammed, he tried to embrace Islam or to appear Muslim in the eyes of his Oromo followers. On the other hand, by maintaining the name Gadaa and Qaalluu, the two key institutions which embody Oromo identity and personality, he proved to be the sustainer or the guardian of the past, tradition and political culture, as well as collective memory of his people in general. Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu was born in the 1890s in Bale, Dallo, around Wolabu, Oromo’s cradle land. He was the first son of Abbeyoo, the great Qaalluu, to which the Oromo in general and the eastern Oromo in particular made the institutional pilgrimage of every 8 years. The birth of Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu coincided with the conquest and fall of Bale under Menelik’s General, Ras Darghe and his son, Dejazamch Asfaw. One of the dramatic consequences of the conquest was the ban of the Qaalluu institution by the imperial government which prohibited the pilgrims (jila) visiting the Qaalluu although some Gosa and groups of individuals continued to perform their ritual and political obligations in a dispersed manner.
70 H. Laoust, Les schismes dans l’Islam (Paris: Payot, 1977). 71 For the current developments in some parts of Arsi Oromo country, Bale, see a detailed analysis of Terje Østebø, Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
After successfully occupying the region, Bale, the Italian fascists realized, perhaps after reading Cerulli who wrote about the institution in the early 1930s or asking local populations, that the Qaalluu institution was central in the Oromo society. So, they restored the authority of the Qaalluu, and its last descendant Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu as Oromo’s legitimate political and spiritual figure and, as such, he enjoyed prestige. Many Oromo who were still practicing the Gadaa resumed their pilgrimage to his village between 1936 and 1941. However, his power was not to last long. In effect, when Haile Selassie returned from exile in 1941, Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu, and many notables of the province refused to recognize his imperial legitimacy and authority. As John Markakis wrote:
Understandably, the reimposition of Ethiopian rule in 1941 was not wel- comed. Indeed, it provoked an uprising that brought Arsi and Somali together against the common enemy. Its focus was Delo district in the south-western corner of Bale, which borders on Sidamo, it became known as “Jeghir”, a Somali coined term denoting the shaving of hair at the back of the head, which was the symbol of recognition among the rebels. Their nominal leader had been deposed by the Ethiopians, then reinstated by the Italians, and now faced deposition once again.72
Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu, who was not supposed to be a fighter by tradition, became the leader of the rebellion which the regional governor, Captain Demise Amberbir, failed to suppress. The latter even suffered a humiliating defeat. This serious setback induced the government to take a large offensive composed of the Naftagna (armed settlers) coming from many districts of Bale under the command of Dejazmatch Mekuria Yirgu, the governor of Bale province. This campaign, as the preceding one, was doomed to failure and the imperial authorities did not have much choice except negotiation. The rebels were persuaded, through prominent Arsi leaders, to depose their arms in exchange for amnesty.73 However, as has often been the case in the region, the amnesty was a dis- guise or a false promise to put the rebels under control. When Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu and his 45 friends, including his 12 years old son, surrendered to
72 Markakis, Class and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, pp. 193–194. 73 As opposed to Markakis assertion who maintains that the government succeeded in defeating the rebels after a year of fighting, our informants claim that the government failed to quell the rebellion which forced it to have recourse to a false amnesty to capture Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu and his fighters.
Notice, when the Amhara occupied our country with the help of European imperialists in 1885–1889 many of our people were massacred. Then the survivors were allotted like slaves to the settlers who partitioned our lands amongst themselves. Remember that they plundered and distorted our historical legacy that is widely known; that they violated our dignity, calling us the filthy Galla. Do you realize how many times you have been denied justice in the courts of law? You, Muslims, your religion has been denigrated and you do not share equality with Christians. Innumerable
74 Some of this information was gathered during my fieldwork in Bale in 1987. A part of the information was borrowed from Urjii, Amharic Weekly August 19, 1997, 4. This article was sent by someone who claimed to have known Mohammed Gadaa Qaalluu and visited him and his friends in Gobba’s prison.
crimes that have not been committed by European colonialists on the African peoples have been perpetrated upon you. You have been crushed for eighty years now.75
In this instance it is clear that religious discrimination was one of the sources of discontent and grievance narratives among the Arsi. Religious oppression had always been the root cause of conflict between the Arsi and the Shoan royal establishment. The most remarkable illustration of this fact came from the end of the reign of the royal prince, Lij Iyyassu, the heir of emperor Menelik who also descended from the Muslim royal house of Wollo.76 He succeeded emperor Menelik between 1913 and 1916 as the sovereign but was later dethroned because he was accused of having ties with the Muslim communi- ties in Ethiopia and beyond. The Arsi expressed their solidarity with the prince and sought to give him their support. Iyyassu was extremely popular in Arsi. His name was associated with Islam, the possibility of peace, and the introduction of reforms – including such reforms as the removal of unpopular governors, the reduction of tribute, and the creation of opportunities for the people to gain greater access to land. He was said to have promised a fair and just administration to the Arsi notables who met him in Adama. When they heard of his dethronement the Arsi decided to embrace his cause. According to our informants, Iyyassu met the Arsi delegation at Chercher, just after his overthrow in 1917. This delegation was led by Kabir Manza Mame and was composed of well-known Arsi notables like Haji Wulle Sadiqo, Roba Mohammed, Haji Mamma Bori, Haji Mohammed Arus, Omar Turo, Haji Hussein Qame and many others. The principal objective of this meeting was to discuss the possibility of organizing a revolt in solidarity with Iyyassu which would restore him to the throne. In return, the prince would help them dislodge the naftagna from their own territory. The chief of the delegation was given the title of Dejazmach by the prince and came back with many rifles and the necessary ammunition. After they returned to Dide’a, they formed a movement called Allah Da’imuu, an expression composed of Arabic word Allah and the Oromo word da’imuu meaning “to crawl,” or “to creep.” Da’imuu means to crawl for Allah, to fight against the Naftagna, and reinstate Iyyassu. The word for crawling is said to have been used to indicate the balance of force largely in favor of the naftagna and to say that those who fight for justice and the right cause will win, however
75 Quoted in Gebru Tareke, op. cit., p. 131. 76 We treated this subject in detail in our earlier works: Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter IV. See also Abbas Haji, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle éclater?.”
The Impacts of Islam on Oromo Social Organization and Culture
After analyzing the introduction and expansion of Islam among the Oromo of the South, we will discuss the social and cultural consequences of conversion, with a particular emphasis on the impact of Islam on social orga- nization. Social organizations could be defined in different ways. In the con- text of our discussion, we must examine the Gadaa-Qalluu system and kinship organization.
Islam and the Gadaa–Qaalluu System The Gadaa – a subject for which we have ample literature – provided an institutional framework for the functioning of Oromo traditional soci- ety. This pluri-functional institution is not only an age generation and age-set system, but it is also the foundation of socio-political organization. That is why traditional Oromo society and culture cannot be fully under- stood without taking into consideration the role it played throughout its history.
Here, we argue that Islamization is equivalent to the disappearance of the Gadaa system and there is a dialectical relationship between the decline of the Gadaa and the introduction of Islam that hastened its downfall and it filled the institutional gap created by this transformation. Among the Arsi, the eradi- cation of the Gadaa proved to be a sine qua non condition for the propagation of Islam. This point seems to be in contradiction with general observations on African Islam which tended to absorb the pre-existing belief system and reli- gious practices.77 While this is the case for different aspects of beliefs and ritual practices, the Gadaa system is in complete contradiction with Islamic theol- ogy (Shari’a) and could not be tolerated for the following reasons. First of all, Gadaa is an elaborated military, political, and ritualistic social system. Cycles of rites (initiations, rites of passage, power transfer ceremonies, etc.) according to precise calendars and recruitment for social and political responsibilities on the basis of age and generational structure is the founda- tion of the institution. In brief, the Gadaa system was inconceivable without ideological/religious foundation including rituals and ceremonies. No sooner than it was introduced that Islam refused to make any compromise with the Gadaa; most of the symbols associated with it were completely forbidden. All converted individuals were encouraged to abandon all ritual manifestations based on the Gadaa in favor of Islamic ritual practices or other beliefs dis- guised under a new form of ritual cloaks. For any Arsi, Shahadaa fuudhuu (the declaration faith or accepting the Shahada) meant rupture with the Gadaa.78 The second important consequence of Islamization is the decline and dis- appearance of the Abba Muuda ceremonies. This institution – which is not as well studied as it should be – played a central role in the traditional Oromo religion, in the continuity of values and in culture in general. More concretely, the institutionalized pilgrimage (Muuda) every 8 years by the outgoing Gadaa class (jila) and other delegates of clans to render homage to the ritual father and to get his blessing was considered to be an integral part of the Gadaa system. It is after the return from this pilgrimage that the class in power made the sacrifice of Jaarraa, one of the most important ceremonies in the Gadaa system that served as a point of reference in the Oromo calendar.79 As Mohammed Hassen correctly stated:
77 N. Tapiero, “Evolving Social Patterns.” In Islam in Africa, edited by J. Kritzeck and W.L.B. Lewis (New York, Toronto, and London: Reinhold Company, 1969), pp. 54–84, 74. 78 The Shahada is the most important of the five pillars of Islam as it signifies the act of embracing Islam by recognizing Allah and Mohammed as his Prophet. 79 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Continuité et évolution des Institutions d’une société éthiopienne (Thèse de doctorat de l’Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1990),
The Jila were considered “men of God”, the concept that enlivened them was a “sacred quality,” men without sin, a parallel concept with Muslim pilgrims to Sheik Hussein of Bale of Mecca.…The concept of ritual purity on the part of Jila and their families seems to have parallels with the concept of “cleanliness”, which is paramount among the Muslims who go to Mecca. In order to show their peaceful intentions they did not carry spears, the mark of manhood. Instead, they carried other insignia.80
The indirect result of decline and disappearance of Gadaa-Qaalluu institu- tions was the consolidation of the cult of Sheikh Hussein – and the cult of Islamic saints in general – who might have lived in Anajina, Eastern Bale before Oromo population movement in the beginning of the 16th century. We do not know the exact extent of the impact of his cult on the Oromo since the 16th century, but it is after the Islamization of the Arsi that it and other Islamic shrines in the region got greater importance. The cult of Sheikh Hussein combined Islamic prayers inspired by the Sufi orders with Oromo’s traditional ritual practices, including those of the Abba Muuda.81 Nevertheless, despite the popularity of the cult of Sheik Hussein among the Muslims of the Horn of Africa, the Wahhabis Sheiks have tried, and are trying, to oppose the cult of saints, the pilgrimage to Sheikh Hussein being their main target. For the Oromo, this pilgrimage (Muuda) represented a sort of continu- ity between the past and the present. In effect, when they abandoned the insti- tutional pilgrimage every 8 years to the Great Qaalluu, the cult of the Sheikh became a rallying point and an important factor in their spiritual life and worldview. Thus, despite relentless struggles of the Sheikh of Wahhabi orienta- tion to condemn this cult as non-Islamic or apostasy, Sheikh Hussein has not lost influence. According to many informants, it was even reinforced; tens of thousands even more than hundred thousand Muslims continue their annual
Chapter III; “Le rôle du culte de chaikh Hussein dans l’islam des Arssi” dans l’islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara, no. 5 (1991): 21–42; E. Cerulli, “Le popolazioni de bacino Superiore dello Uabi Scebelli” in l’esplorazione dello Uabi-Uebi; A. Mondadori, Editore (1932): 135–181. Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia 1500–1850 with Special emphasis on the Gibe Region (Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London) (published under the title of The Oromo of Ethiopia 1570–1860, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); De Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Menellik. 80 Mohammed Hassen, “Islam as a Resistance Ideology among the Oromo of Ethiopia, the Wallo case, 1700–1990,” p. 81. 81 Abbas Haji, “Le rôle du culte de Chaikh Hussein dans L’Islam des Arssi, Ethiopie,” pp. 21–42.
When Gadaa was destroyed they left Gadaa. The bull refused to mount the cow, men no longer respected justice…There were no real leaders and few children were born. The cows gave birth to deformed calves. Pregnant women gave birth to their children at the wrong time. Lambs were borne without forelegs and without tails…When Gadaa did not exist everything else was also destroyed. The crops that were cultivated no longer grew. And the oxen refused to fatten. The man who had formerly respected truth and justice abandoned them.83
In addition, for the younger generation and intellectuals, the Gadaa system is a point of reference for the Oromo cultural identity and a source of inspiration for the construction of a democratic future for their society; as Mohammed Hassen states, “I believe the Gadaa system of accountability, term limits, checks and balances, separation of powers, extensive political debates, the process of compromise and consensus and power sharing are treasures that have to be exploited if democracy is to flourish in Ethiopia.”84 The works of some scholars, especially of Asmarom Legesse, indicate the relevance of underlying principles of Gadaa to modern constitutional thoughts:
Oromo Democracy is one those remarkable creations of the human mind that evolved into a full-fledged system of government, as a result of five centuries of evolution and deliberate rational legislative transformation. It contains genuinely African solutions for some the problems that democracies have had to face.…Institutions that reached maturity in the 16th and 17th centuries…cannot be transplanted wholesale into the 21st
82 G. Dahl, The Suffering Gras, p. 169. 83 K. Knutsson, Authority and Change, p. 180. 84 Mohammed Hassen.
century where the Oromo nation faces a different set of challenges. Nevertheless, we can derive some of the principles critical to the demo- cratic philosophy of the Oromo and present as a source material for contemporary African constitutional thought.85
Islam and Oromo Kinship Organization The other point of discussion pertaining to Islamic influence is the domain of kinship. In our view the Islamic impact on kinship organization, most particularly on clan and lineage structure, is less significant because nothing in the Shari’a is in contradiction with the existence of clan structure such as the case of Somalia. On the contrary, after the advent of Islam, we observe the survival of extended families, of “tribes” and “sub tribes” in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.86 In the same way, the Berbers, whose contact with Islam goes back to the 7th century, preserved their “tribal” organization.87 Whatever the difference between Arab “tribes” and African clan structure may be, reli- gious authorities do not have any justification for attacking traditional lineage structure. On the contrary, for the Arsi, one could say that Islam consolidated the role of kinship in the functioning of the society by weakening the Gadaa which used to furnish an institutional mechanism in social relations and inter- actions. Moreover, the fact that patriliny is emphasized in Islam is susceptible to strengthen the already existing “patrilineal ideology” and the notion of masculinity. As we have analyzed earlier, the Arsi are divided into two classificatory (sociological) but non-matrimonial moieties called Sikko and Mando which are divided into hundreds of named patrilineal Gosa (clans) which are again sub-divided into clusters of lineage (balbala) occupying, in most cases, geographically defined areas. These segments are not only independent or semi-independent of one another but also are structurally equiva- lent, for the simple reason that all of them were created through a progres- sive segmentation process which can be traced. On the other hand, the ancient dichotomies between the Hadiya clans and “True Oromo” have van- ished away.
85 For further discussions, Asmom Legesee, Oromo Democracy, Chapter V, pp. 195–196. 86 P. Bonte, “Tribu en Afrique du nord et au Moyen Orient.” L’Homme, no. 102 (1987): 7–11; I.M. Lewis, ed., Islam in Tropical Africa (Published for IAI by the Oxford University Press, 1967). 87 J. Greenberg, “Islam and Clan Organization among the Haussa.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 3 (1947): 193–211.
Traditionally, the Arsi Gosa are not totemic. The presence of some aspects of “totemic practices” among some of them does not presuppose a generaliza- tion for the whole society. For instance, the descendants of the “true Oromo” are not supposed to eat Irree (muscle of an animal).88 There were also a num- ber of Gosa who avoided the consumption of a specific part of meat for reasons closely related to their ancestors. This laguu (taboo) signified the particularity (uniqueness) of the Gosa in question and directly concerned its descendants of both sexes. Islamization meant the disappearance of this taboo, for no Muslim can refuse under the pretext of laguu – to eat the meat of ritually slayed animals. On the other hand, Islam played an ultimate role in the integration of the whole Gosa traditionally classified as Hadiya/Arsi and Awama/Islama. The dif- fusion of Islam also consolidated the social prestige of the Awa clans who claim to have been the original Muslims and try to connect their genealogies to Sharifs, descending from the Quraysh, and to the lineage of the Prophet in particular. As elsewhere in many similar societies, among the Arsi, kinship organizes, among other factors, the circulation of wealth, solidarity, and cooperation in time of crisis.89 The fact that solidarity and much-elaborated forms of reciprocities characterize their social structure, the Oromo do not have a lot to learn from the notion of Umma, a general concept which has its origin in the Quranic version: “All believers are brothers.” This signifies solidarity and sympathy towards Muslims – both kin and non-kin. The popular term for the Umma is “Ummata Muhammed” an Oromized Arabic expression which means the community of Muhammed, the Prophet. The other term which stands for a Muslim out of definite kinship relation is oboollessa aakiraha. It is a combination of an Oromo word obboollessa (brother) and that of the Arabic a’khir (last) to say, the brother of the last day. Accordingly, a stranger could be welcomed, fed, and helped as a Muslim. It is on this basis that students of Islamic sciences who come from neighboring or far regions are sheltered and accommodated by individual families. This practice known as nafaqah is arranged on the demand of an Imam or a student himself and remains one of the popular mechanisms which permit the training of reli- gious leaders and the expansion of Islam without any form of external aid and subsidy.
88 E. Haberland, Galla Sud Athiopiens, pp. 443–444. 89 For example, blood compensation, death and marriage are occasions when solidarity is compulsory.
Islam and Matrimonial Strategies Another interesting point to be analyzed is the impact of Islam on contem porary marriage and matrimonial alliances. In effect, after Islamization, traditional marriage rules and matrimonial strategies could not remain untouched. Most often, one tends to expect the introduction of some new elements into traditional marriage systems, such as endogamy and marriage of cousins (patrilateral or matrilateral cousin). This is not widely implemented among the Arsi as Arabic marriage is in complete contradiction with the traditional Oromo marriage rules, which is based on the following basic rules:
1. The Gosa (clans) are exogamous in theory and practice. A person cannot marry into his Gosa – regardless of her relative position in the genealogical structure, close or distant, marriage/sexual relations with a woman descending from the same patrilineal Gosa provokes impuri fiable incest. This suggests that other forms of incest can be ritually purified. 2. While renewing alliance into the mother’s Gosa is not prohibited, it should be out of closest circle of relatives ideally three to four genera- tions starting from his mother. 3. Misee clans cannot enter into marriage alliances (a handful of Gosa should avoid each other matrimonially due to a belief that any marriage between them would lead to sterility). 4. Marriage with “caste” groups is forbidden. 5. Qaalluu (Awa) clans are not supposed to marry each other due to fear of sterility.
These rules being commonly observed, individuals are free to choose their partners from all groups. In the beginning, or at an early stage of Islamization, the sheikhs did not dare to contest these regulations to replace them with “Arab marriage” (cousin marriage) for this had very little chance of being achieved. However, since the 1960s, this Cultural Area is undergoing a strong wave of Islamic influence through sheikhs educated in Saudi Arabia or through their students trained locally. Inspired by this movement based on strict inter- pretation of Islam, they attempted (and attempt) to transform social institu- tions or to render them more compatible with “pure Islamic tradition and laws.” Hence, they started to talk of lineage endogamy. Some of the sheikhs married within their own lineage to serve as an example, though they did not dare to introduce marriage of cousins. In some areas, like Hetossa where they got some audience, hundreds of such marriages were organized. Nowadays,
90 N. Tapiéro, “Evolving Social Patterns.” Islam in Africa, pp. 13–34.
Moreover, the Oromo society functions, in large measures, according to its customary laws, Seera, although the Shari’a is applied in some aspects of social life. In other words, in spite of their endorsement of some Christian or Islamic ethics, after their conversion, the Oromo are still attached to their beliefs, traditional religion, culture, and ancestral laws described by a number of observers.91 Thus, we think that the model of Arab marriage failed for the following reasons: Firstly, it is in complete contradiction with local matrimonial strategy and culture. Secondly, religious leaders themselves are not unanimous on this issue. For the sheikhs that are apparently moderate, exogamy like endogamy is legal and justified in Islam. If this is the case, they do not see the necessity of imposing endogamous marriage for which the society is not yet ready and resists resolutely. On the contrary, most reformers or radical sheikhs influenced by the doctrine of Wahhabiyya maintain that refusing endogamy in favor of exogamy could mean attachment to non-Islamic practices. A good Muslim should accept the Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet) which includes endog- amy and the marriage of cousins. Secondly, The Wahhabi Sheikhs are against bride wealth (matrimonial com- pensation) which they wish to replace with the Mahr (dowry). They failed again on this point as real marriage cannot be conceived without bride wealth, however modest it may be because, as elsewhere, among the Arsi Gabara (bride wealth) aims at transferring certain rights from the woman’s kin to that of the man’s kin. Though there is no limit for bride wealth, it is considered to be a symbol of alliance. Here, I am not suggesting that aspects of traditional Oromo marriage rules and Islamic laws are incompatible. In fact, traditional matrimonial strategy and most of the procedure continue to be observed by Oromo Muslims. For instance, the Oromo’s traditional milki (omen), a sym- bolic interpretation of positive and negative signs before engagement in the marriage process, and about two or three ceremonies are necessary. But, the observation of Oromo rites is not an end in itself; they are forced to have recourse to the Shari’a to legalize the marriage which requires four fundamen- tal principles.92
91 M. de Salviac, Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik: Les Galla (Paris: Arthur Bertrand, 1901); de L. Bartels, Oromo Religion, Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1983). The two books provide an excellent review of Oromo religion and cosmology. See also my “Pouvoir de bénir et de maudire: cosmologie et organisation sociale des Oromo-Arsi, Ethiopie,” pp. 289–318. 92 These rules are: Wali, a representative of the woman (girl), the Mahr, the capacity of partners and a formula pronounced in Arabic by Wali such as “I marry,” “I give as spouse,” “I give dot” in the presence of a witness and the She sheik.
In principle, the Mahr is not limited by the Shari’a, but the Arsi fixed it to four heads of cattle. The husband promises these cattle in the presence of an eyewitness; if not, the proposed animals are brought to the residence of the wife’s family to be shown to the public. Instead of the Rako, traditional cere- mony which legalizes marriage, Oromo Muslims finalize marriage through Nikah – the Islamic prenuptial contract. Though the Nikah and Rako are similar by the fact that they give to the husband his right over his spouse and her children born during their union in the event of separation, the Rako does not recognize the dissolution whatsoever. Marriage by Rako is for life. This is the case among the Borana up to now.93 Therefore one of consequences of Islamization is the legalization of divorce and its subsequent rise among the Arsi. In Islam, divorce is not only recognized but is also considered as the weak point of Islamic marriage.94 In effect, every Muslim husband can, at any moment, send his wife away without any motive and indemnity through one of three procedures: the judgment by the Qadi, on the demand of one of the partners, by mutual agreement, and unilateral cancellation by the husband. This theoretical innovation and the permission of divorce did not bring about radical change in the Oromo traditional method of arbitration which is still highly operational. One has to remember that marriage is not concluded by the couple but by their relatives and their closest parents, who are interested in the continuity and stability of the alliance, for divorce is equivalent to the rupture in the social solidarity and affinal relationship established. Moreover, the fact that a man continues to pay matrimonial compensation restricts his right to divorce unilaterally under all circumstances. In the same way, women do not always use their right of divorce accorded by the Shari’a for various reasons. Firstly, though the status of divorced women has changed, the attitude of the Arsi towards the divorced women remains negative. The latter are married either to a widower or as a second wife. There is no bride wealth for such women or quasi symbolic bride wealth. Secondly, the Arsi confound the dowry with the Mahr and woman’s marriage gifts with the common prop- erty of the husband and wife. So, women are not supposed to take away their property in the case of divorce. This limits the possibility of separation, and Oromo’s traditional cycles of reconciliation and arbitration during husband- wife conflicts play a very pivotal role to this date. Another aspect of social organization that did not undergo change is the practice of polygyny and secondary marriage. Traditionally, the Oromo society
93 Asmarom Legesse, Gadaa, p. 18. 94 V. Monteil, L’Islam noir (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964), p. 173.
95 It is important that Islam did not eradicate the pre-existing matrimonial strategies. For instance, leviratic marriage (dhaala) and widow replacement (benbeeto) which seem to have been ancient in the Oromo society survived Islamization. These practices, which are disapproved of if not disallowed, are gradually accepted as legal marriages if other criteria – mentioned elsewhere – are fulfilled. For example, a man could inherit a wife of his deceased brother after 40 days, as opposed to local custom which does not permit widow’s inheritance before a year. 96 I.M. Lewis, ed., Islam in Tropical Africa (Published for IAI by the Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 49. 97 In theory what circulates in the form of matrimonial compensation is not quantified. But, what is received in form of bride wealth and given in form of marriage gift (dowry) is relatively proportional. If not, the status of the girl and her parents is fragile and inferior vis-à-vis the takers of the woman.
But, Gudrun Dahl, a Swedish anthropologist, notes among the Boran of Kenya, there is no consensus on the inheritance of women: sometimes, they are given one-tenth of their brothers’ share and sometimes they are denied all rights when the demand is made by their husband.98 We can say, therefore, that Islam did not improve the status of women significantly.
Islam and the Quest of Oromo Identity: Reflections on Current Developments
Despite their Islamic faith and its impacts on the socio-cultural life, there is no political Islam among the Oromo. I argued elsewhere99 that Oromo Muslims are not or less familiar with modern Arab intellectual history, which has influ- enced militant Islamic resurgence in the Arab world.100 On the contrary, that Oromo nationalism is inspired by secular nationalism rooted in the Bale upris- ing (1963–1970) Matcha-Tulama Association (in the 1960s), and later by the Oromo Liberation Front founded on secular ideology with support from Muslims, Christians and traditional believers. The objectives of decades-long struggle and resistance against the successive imperial governments have never been to build a religious state or to empower any specific religious groups but to win religious equality and collective political rights for the Oromo people. The formal and official recognition of Islam was just one of the consequences of the Revolution of 1974, which precipitated the collapse of the monarchy and consequent divorce between the Church and the state. Having communist orientation, the Darg regime tried to curb religious influences. Its successor, the RPDRF government was said to have been open and tolerant towards Ethiopian Muslims: “The policies of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which assumed power in 1991, aimed to secure the rights of the country’s many ethnic and religious groups, both recognis- ing their diversity and seeking to enhance equality within that diversity.”101 However, two decades later, the same government is accused of intervening in religious affairs and the persecution of Muslims and their leaders raise
98 G. Dahl, The Suffering Grass, p. 11. 99 Abbas Gnamo, “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia),” pp. 99–120. 100 M.I. Abu-Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 101 Terje Østebø, “The Question of Becoming: Islamic Reform Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia.” Journal of Religion in Africa 38 (2008): 416–446, 421.
Although sufficient data are lacking, it is highly likely that a vast majority of the Oromo people support the views and policies of OLF, and it is simi- larly clear that the Oromo Salafis are equally supportive of OLF’s objec- tives. For example, when the OLF soldiers took control over Bale in 1991,
102 Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia),” pp. 99–120. In this article, I tried to analyze the relationship between Oromo nationalism, and the two monotheist religions and traditional institutions. 103 The case in point is Abdul Karim Haji Ibrahim, the founder and leader of the Islamic movement, himself adopted the name of Sheikh Jaarraa. Apparently this choice was not made at random; Jaaraa is the name of the ceremony marking the end of the Gadaa cycle, where the lubaa, outgoing Gadaa class, passes power to the incoming Gadaa class, lubaa. Jaarraa is also the basis of the Oromo calendar based on the 8 years term and passage to paternity or fatherhood and a sort of retirement from active political life after covering the five Gadaa grades, each lasting 8 years. The word (Jaarraa) itself comes from jaaruu, which means getting older. By combining the title of Sheikh, meaning religious leader or chief (in some contexts) and Gadaa, he was trying to reflect or to marry the past with the present, Gadaa and Islam. This demonstrates the importance of the past in Oromo’s political thought.
the political preferences of both the Muslim population and the Salafi ulama became apparent. During that summer, the main mosque in Robe (the provincial capital of Bale) was decorated with OLF flags and banners and the ulama were explicitly voicing their support for the movement. Describing the existing fervour when the OLF soldiers entered Robe, one of the sheikhs of Robe said; ‘had it not been for the laws of Islam, we would have danced with joy’. Today, OLF enjoys similar support, from both the people and the religious leadership, revealing the strong posi- tion of Oromo ethnic nationalism in Bale…104
Likewise, in the 1960s, the most massive and unconditional support for Matcha- Tulama Association came from Arsi Muslims, as their objective was not to emancipate a particular religious group, but the Oromo nation as whole. Thus, right from the start, the Oromo nationalist movement has not been rooted in Umma (Arabic word standing for community of believers or community of the faithful) but in Oromummaa (being/belonging to/or becoming Oromo).105 This involves a more inclusive definition of identity based on common origins, idioms, history, memory, and more importantly, a common experience under an oppressive state and the consequent aspiration to transform this cultural nation into a political nation as the guarantee for developing and preserving their identity and culture. As opposed to Oromummas based on nationhood and a specific territory, Oromia (i.e., the land inhabited by the Oromo speakers), the concept of Umma does not recognize the idea of nation and nation-state.106 For political Islamists, the territorial state is the invention of the West, a creature of imperi- alism, alien to Islamic notions of authority, exercise of political power, and the organization of political society. As Sami Zubaida noted: “They seek a ‘truly Islamic state’, applying the Shari’a and unifying the fragmented Umma under a revived caliphate, thus providing for justice and the sovereignty of God. The primary model for such a state is contained in the ‘sacred history’ of the
104 Terje Østebø, “The Question of Becoming: Islamic Reform Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia,” p. 437. 105 P.T.W. Baxter, J. Hultin, and A. Triulzi, eds., Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries. 106 For contemporary developments and interesting discussion on religious transformation among Arsi of Bale see Terje Østebø, Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia (Leiden: Brill, 2012). Many interesting insights were injected in the analysis based on the author’s experience and research in Bale, Robe. But, the data lacks breadths to generalize about the spread of what the author call “Rural Salafism” among all Arsi Muslims.
107 Sami Zubaida, “Is Iran an Islamic State?” In Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 103–119, 104. 108 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, 2000, p. 195. 109 Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia),” pp. 99–120.
Conclusion
In this chapter we argued that Islam had a long history in the southern-eastern regions of Ethiopia, among which lies the Arsi country, but declined following the Muslim and Christian war of the 16th century and the consequent massive movement and settlement of the Oromo – a subject which was analyzed in greater detail by Mohammed Hassen in the work quoted earlier. However, its sociological roots and aspects of rituals survived in one way or another. In other words, one of the particularities of Islam in the region is its disappear- ance as an established entity since the first half of the 16th century, its survival in a deformed manner, and its resurrection at the end of the 19th century, as well as its rapid expansion. During the second half of the 19th century, with the rise of the Christian kingdom of Shoa under Menelik, Islam revived and resurrected to counteract
110 Jon Abbink, “Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim–Christian Polemics in Ethiopia.” In African Affairs, 110/439 (2011): 253–274.
The Concept of Center-Periphery Relations
The concept of center-periphery is very useful in understanding the relations between the Ethiopian state and the newly conquered regions as well as the political economy of the empire. As discussed in Chapter III, all empires have dominant center and periphery and they maintain their control or hegemony on subordinated regions and peoples through well-organized structures of domination and linkages and “if these links are eliminated, the empire will soon break apart.”1 Ethiopia has clearly identifiable dominant center or core and the dominated periphery. This chapter will examine the nature of these center-periphery linkages from political, economic and social perspective. The center-periphery paradigm,2 a counter-modernization perspective3 which provides an excellent alternative explanation of the causes of underde- velopment on a global scale, has been made an object of numerous discussions and debates for over 50 years.4 Some scholars have started to go beyond the simple dichotomy between developed north and underdeveloped/developing south to explain inequality, marginalization or exploitation in post-colonial states. In fact, classical dependency theorists received strong criticisms for neglecting/or minimizing the political dynamics or domestic politics of the
1 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” pp. 81–136, 86. 2 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle- L’Ouverture Publications, 1972). 3 For modernization theory, see Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics, 49, no. 2 (1997): 155–183. 4 B.N. Ghosh, Dependency Theory Revisited (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001); Richard Peet, Theories of Development: Contentions, Arguments, Alternatives, 2nd edition (New York: Guilford Press, 2009); Jorge Larrain, Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism, and Dependency (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, 1989); Ricardo Munck and D. O’Hearn, Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm (London: Zed Books, 1999).
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/������������6_��8 210 Chapter 6
“Third World” states including dictatorships of all kind, inherent inequality, civil conflict, corruption, etc. They have indicated the existence of a periphery within periphery itself. Among these one can quote Johan Galtung’s pioneer- ing work: “The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery. Hence, our concern is with the mechanism underlying this discrepancy, particularly between the center in the Center, and the periphery in the periphery.”5 Moreover, in Africa, where European colonialism ended about 50 years ago, post-colonial states are engaged in dual forms of center-periphery structure and linkage which Bruce Berman summarized as follows:
Center-periphery relations possess a dual meaning in the study of contemporary Africa. On the one hand, there are the relationships within African states between the centers of economic and political power and the peripheral hinterlands; on the other hand, there are the relations of these states, as peripheral nations in the world capital- ist system, to metropolitan centers of power in Western Europe and North America. These internal and external dimensions of center- periphery relations are structurally similar, interlocked and mutually consistent.6
Undoubtedly, when viewed from the perspective of both classical/radical dependency theories and World System Theory as well as many development indicators used by different agencies including UN, Ethiopia has always been a periphery in the international capitalist system. Yet, it has had its own domi- nant center and dependent periphery. The center controlled military power to claim the monopoly of violence, in Weberian meaning of the term, but also controlled and distributed resources and labor, often according to pre-modern logic, to groups and classes identified with the center or in the service of the empire. The center is associated with power (economic, political, and cultural) whereas the periphery is synonymous with powerlessness, exclusion, subordi- nation and marginalization. Therefore, I entirely share Markakis’s definition and insight on center-periphery relations in Ethiopia:
5 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971): 81–117. 6 Bruce J. Berman, “Clientelism and Neocolonialism: Center-Periphery Relations and Political Development in African States.” Studies in Comparative International Development, 9(2) (1973): 3–25. Dar Ager 211
What defines the centre is the monopoly of power and the hegemonic position it occupies in the state…What defines the periphery is its mar- ginal position in the power structure of the state, or more precisely, its exclusion from state power. Normally, exclusion from power translates into lack of access to state resources, as well as the loss of native resources appropriated by the state and transferred to the centre. Equally impor- tant is the denigration of social cultural accomplishment of societies and the expectation in the name of national integration that they give place to superior cultural accomplishment of the centre.7
Further, one can argue that Ethiopia is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa where a single national/ethnic group – no matter how one defines ethnicity or group identity – and central power elites are identified both with the tradi- tional state and modern/modernizing state, national identity and, by the same token, try to promote and impose its sense of identity on the periphery which is very different in terms of languages, religions and socio-economic organiza- tions. In addition to its superior military force that enabled it to conquer and control, the Center’s claim to power, influence, and prestige was predicated on traditional myths, legends and, above all, what Professor Crummey calls “Neo- Solomonic Ideology” of the ruling class. Yet, these legitimizing myths and ide- ology were not recognized nor accepted in the periphery either by enlightened central elites who had been looking for alternative ways to legitimize state power. This ultimately led to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974 without much resistance and there appears to have been no real interest and/or effort to restore it ever since. This point will be developed further in the last chapter. It will suffice to quote this interesting insight from Crummey: “…Neo-Solomonic ideology glorified Semitic speech and culture and the Christian religion in a country which predominantly spoke Cushitic languages and observed either Islam or indigenous religions. Semitic-speaking Christians are a minority in today’s Ethiopia as they were in the later 19th century.”8 Consequently, it is no surprise, therefore, to see those in a position of imperial power, imposing or trying to promote their culture, language, religion, lifestyle, etc. which they considered “superior” on the newly created periphery at the end of the 19th century. In fact, in the second half of the 20th century, the center has com- menced to use modern myths and discourses such as “National-Building” and “National Integration” along these old legitimizing myths.
7 John Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, p. 7. 8 Donald Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia,” pp. 13–43, 38. 212 Chapter 6
Methodologically speaking, the examination of Center-periphery relations is important in understanding the process of state-building, nation-building and state-society relations as well as the interaction or conflict between central and peripheral elites.9 Stein Rokkan, one of the leading theorists of state-building and nation-building highlights the importance of understanding of this intri- cate center-periphery linkage and has suggested the following methods: • Fist we have to study their centers, the gathering places where the major decisions are made, where the dominant actors in the system, their families, and their friends interact most frequently; • Next we have to inform ourselves about the areas controlled from these cen- ters, the peripheries, the territorial populations dependent in one way or another on the decisions made at such centers; • Finally, we have to chart the transactions among the centers and between centers and peripheries.10
In Ethiopia center-periphery linkage is complex given the geographic, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the empire. Even occasional travelers and ethnogra- phers in Ethiopia observed the complex nature of this polity, and tried to make sense of this diversity based on the existing hierarchy through real or imagined categorization. According Georges Montadnon, who traveled to Ethiopia a century ago, the Ethiopian empire was comprised of four categories of people: (1) Free people (Abyssinians or Amhara); (2) Tributary peoples (the Somali and Denakil); (3) Subject (serf) peoples (the Oromo and other southern popula- tions); and (4) Slaves (“negroid” peoples called Shankilla).11 Over the last few decades historians and anthropologists working on Ethiopia in general and the South, in this case the conquered and incorporated people in particular, came up with a more refined typology of center-periphery linkages of the empire. Despite the difficulty to put numerous ethnic groups with different economic organizations, demographic size, social morphology, and geography/habitat and, above all, their distance from Shoa, the political and geographic hub of the newly carved empire, they introduced analytical typology by dividing the periphery into three categories. The first group of scholars, Donald Donham and Wendy James, classified the three groups as follows:
9 Bruce Berman, “Clientelism and Neocolonialism,” pp. 3–25; Tomasz Zarycki, “An Interdisciplinary Model of Centre-Periphery Relations: A Theoretical Proposition.” Regional and Local Studies Special Issue, 2007. 10 State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan, edited by Peter Flora with Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 108–122. 11 Georges Montandon, L’esclavage en Abyssinie, pp. 27–28. Dar Ager 213
First, those areas previously independent kingdoms that were made directly tributary to the crown; Second, those where the so-called Gabbar system was established, where the northern governors were appointed and local peoples made into near- serfs, and Third, those areas in the peripheries inhabited by hunters, shifting cultivators and pastoralists.12
More recently, in his latest book quoted above, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, Markakis introduced a new typology that divides the periphery into two cate- gories, “High Periphery” and “Low Periphery” based on a geographic reality and the degree of integration/interaction with the center.13 It is true that each region has its own peculiar history, memory and experi- ence of encounter and relationships with the imperial center from the time of conquest, through military force or diplomacy. Moreover, the fertility of the soil, climate and demography play an important role in shaping the nature of periphery linkages. Using typology along these lines is interesting although all elements do not necessarily fit in these “ideal type” models when closely scru- tinized. Regardless of this caveat, one can say that the “high periphery” and “Regions of Gabbar system” look very close to the regions under study. Lastly, as I will illustrate later, in some Ethiopian literature the Arsi Oromo country is classified as Dar ager (borderland, periphery). Here, the borderland signifies political and cultural, not a geographic, distance from the center since the Arsi Oromo country is the immediate neighbor of Shoa.
The Aftermath of Defeat: Establishing the Feudal Colonial Order
From an economic perspective, the outcome of the conquest of the 1880s was the “initial expropriation of land and continuous alienation of land.”14 As we
12 Donald Donham and W. James, eds., The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, pp. 37–38. 13 He gives his premises in doing so: “A clear distinction is made in this work between the high lands that are the natural extension of the Ethiopian plateau southwards, called here the ‘highland periphery’, and the lowland zone that drops abruptly from the escarpment and surrounds the plateau on all sides, called here the ‘lowland periphery’. There is a world of difference between the two, and the difference is clearly reflected in their interaction with the centre over the past century. The process of integration proceeded at a different pace and made uneven progress over the two dissimilar terrains, making it necessary for us to treat them separately.” John Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, p. 12. 14 Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, p. 137. 214 Chapter 6 discussed earlier, the Fetaha Negest justifies the oppression and enslavement of unruly peoples. In the eyes of Shoan authorities, no people deserved punish- ment and the application of the Fetaha Negest principle more than the Arsi Oromo, for going to war and inflicting heavy causalities on their army. Over and above all the punitive measures taken against the Arsi, the region was also made the object of total confiscation following the war. However, the expro- priation of the whole region at that stage proved to be economically irrespon- sible and counter-productive. It would have destroyed the very economic base on which the imperial state was built. Something had to be done to ensure that the population had a subsistence base while confiscating a large portion of the land. The expropriation of land from the local people and its reallocation to the newcomers took place for various reasons. First and foremost, it was done to reward soldiers and administrators for the service they had rendered during the wars of conquest and the ensuing administration.15 Second, it was argued that unless the subjected people were dispossessed, no effective control could be exercised over them.16 Third, the need to quarter soldiers, the speed of con- quest, the distance from the capital and the difference in culture between the newcomers and the local people necessitated this development.17 The introduction of a new feudal system or feudal-colonial relations also brought about an unprecedented land tenure system, which gave rise to extremely exploitative production relations. Until this period, as in most egalitarian or non-hierarchical societies, private ownership of land was unknown among the Arsi. The Arsi Gosa occupied definite geographic areas and all members had equal rights to use the pasture and land of their clan. This did not exclude a person from getting access to land outside of his clan, though this was only possible with the understanding and agree- ment of the people already in possession. The Arsi believed the Marga (pasture) and Madda (springs) belonged to Waaqa (God) and the mutual and collective utilization of these natural resources would bring about peace and providence. Therefore land was not inherited nor bought or sold, and cattle were the only form of private property and the only source of social differentiation.
15 Richard Pankhurst, Land and State in Ethiopian History (Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 137. 16 R. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813–1889 (London: Butler Tanner Ltd, 1975), p. 37. 17 Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935 (Assen: Van Gorcum and Comp. B.V., 1975), p. 37. Dar Ager 215
After a successful colonization of the region, the government intro- duced Siso, its well-known policy of land seizure.18 The word Siso liter- ally means “one-third” although in practice it meant three-fourth or one-quarter. The ambiguity is an integral part of the room for maneuver that the sys- tem allowed to those who were supposed to put it into force. Siso was an institutional mechanism whereby the state officially confiscated one-third or three-fourth of a conquered territory, leaving the remainder under the control of local people. The land was administered through the mediation of the balabbats who were local agents entrusted with the job of serving as liaison officers between the rulers and the ruled. At the same time, the balabbat became responsible for the administration and distribution of the land remain- ing under the indigenous population known under the name of ya balabbat meurt (the land of the balabbat). These officers were supposed to choose the Siso land that remained under the control of the local population. Part of this land was also known as ye balabbat dersha (the share of the balabbat). It is interesting to see the creation of the salient feature of this institution (balabbat). Balabbat is an Amharic word widely used in Shoa since the 17th century and extended to some Shoan Oromo clans in the first half of the 19th century.19 In the north, the word is conceived as “a term of collective identity” signifying “inherent right of inherence to both community and country.”20 The Arsi Oromo who did not have an equivalent institution borrowed the word with a slight modification to adapt to the Oromo language: Balabbata (singular) and Balabbatota (plural). However, as some words and practices extended to south- ern Ethiopia, the significance of the term Balabbat was also changed. Unless used very carefully, even the general definition of the Balabbat cannot give the same meaning in the south and it may be misleading. According to Berhanou Abebe, Balabbat is “Someone from a good family…of noble birth who by right succeeds his father…a native. In the southern and western regions, this desig- nated the important native – non-Abyssinians (Oromo, Sidama etc.) as opposed to Abyssinian Shoums or any chief of Abyssinian feudal hierarchy”21 (Author’s translation).
18 Ibid., p. 154. 19 Mantel Niecko, “The Division of Ethiopia into Region’s According to the Native Typology in at the Turn of the XIX and XIX Centuries.” In Modern Ethiopia from the Accession of Menelik to the Present, edited by J. Tubiana (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkena, 1980), p. 473. 20 Behanou Abbede, Evolution de la propriété fonciere au choa (Ethiopia) Du regne de Menelik à la constitution de 1931 (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste paul Geuther, 1971), pp. 33–38. 21 Ibid., p. 34. 216 Chapter 6
This definition might correspond with some realities in the south. However, its application to the Arsi is highly questionable for the following reasons. Firstly, after the end of the war of colonization of 1886, the then-holders of supreme power in the socio-political structure – the Gadaa officials – were not brought into the new socio-economic order. Secondly, in Arsi, as in most Oromo country, traditional leaders known as Abba Biyya (father of the coun- try) waged war against Menelik, which meant all territories where they fought against the Shoan army were subject to confiscation at the start. But the gov- ernment decided to introduce a new land tenure system and invited the local people to participate in local government structure for some sound reasons. First and foremost, although Shoa did possess a hierarchical administrative structure which could be stretched to local levels, during the early years of administration they faced some structural problems such as lack of communi- cation, ignorance of local culture and language and the absence of necessary manpower to run local affairs.22 It was necessary to use traditional leaders or any local intermediaries in order to make their authority felt. The second explanation was obviously an economic one. It is clear that one of the princi- pal motives for Menelik’s conquest was economic. To realize this objective he seemed to have been convinced that a total exclusion of the indigenous people from local level politics and a parcel of traditional land would have an adverse effect. As a result, like other newly incorporated regions, one-third or in some cases one-quarter of the total land was left under the control of the balabbats was created. Prior to their contact with the Shoan army, the Arsi did not have the balab- bat institution or any office like it. As a result, the election of balabbats created some difficulties. The traditional legitimate rulers, the Gadaa officers, were not willing to serve as state agents. Almost all the prominent Arsi leaders and “strong men” took part in the resistance struggle and they could not countenance the possibility of collaborating with their bitter enemies. Fur thermore, no one knew the fate reserved for the recruited balabbats: would they be killed or have their right hands cut off whenever they did something that antagonized their rulers? In the face of Arsi reluctance to choose the bal- abbats, the Amhara recognized as balabbat anyone who presented himself as a representative of a given Gosa (clan) or of a given territory. In particular, those who first brought tribute to Entoto, the emerging seat of the imperial govern- ment, or simply met and interacted with the occupying force were made balabbats.23
22 Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935, p. 154. 23 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter 4. Dar Ager 217
Among some groups, however, such as the Sheedama, the election of balab- bats corresponded with the traditional leadership: Fitawrari Bu’ie, the father of Fitawrari Wolde Mikael, one of the leading Arsi balabbats in Bale region, was directly chosen by his clan.24 In some areas, the Arsi were said to have sent anyone who volunteered for this task which was viewed with contempt – serving as an intermediary between the conquered and conquerors. A case in point was the representation of the Tiijo and Gilinsha clans, who protected their prominent leaders by sending volunteers who were ready to serve regard- less of the circumstances. Sometime later, when the office of balabbats proved to be economically rewarding and socially advantageous, would-be leaders presented themselves as the legitimate balabbats but without success.25 In the final analysis, both elected and self-made balabbats became the local agents of the government within the new colonial order and relations. It is important to note the uniqueness of the Arsi experience concerning not only the origin but also the functioning of the balabbat institution. For exam- ple in the conquered regions of southern Ethiopia, whether the balabbats got their siso share or not depended on the attitudes of the governors whose influ- ence at a regional level sometimes eclipsed national policy. The vindictive class of naftagna (armed settlers) was not satisfied with the three-quarters or two-thirds that was granted to them by the state. Hence, they decided not to leave the 25% or 32% share in the possession of the local popu- lation.26 To dispossess the Arsi, they invented a notorious pseudo-legal pretext called wirsh [inheritance]. This was a mechanism whereby the balabbats, and in most cases, under the threat of force, but sometimes through persuasion, were led to renounce his balabbatship and his land rights, in favor of the gover- nors, military officers or leading state dignitaries in Addis Ababa.27 The ques- tion is, however, why did they need protection and from whom? The only enemies the Arsi had were those who occupied their land and were now trying to take away the little that remained in their possession. All informants I interviewed in many districts of the Arsi country confirm that all of the balabbats, being the product of an illiterate society, did not seem to understand the significance of a signature placed on a document and still
24 Informants: Haji Ejero Logomo and Datu Shashu (Dodola). 25 Informant: Balambaras Ganna Hamada (Assalla). 26 John Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, The Ethiopian Experience and the Debate (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), p. 54. He notes, “In Chilalo, Menelik’s representatives denied to recognize the validity of Arsi clan ownership and confiscated all the land.” 27 Abbas Haji, The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats, pp. 585–592. 218 Chapter 6 less the text of the contractual agreements they were made to sign, written in a language they did not understand: what they were told about the agreement was entirely different from what was actually written in the text. One is strongly reminded of a similar ploy perpetrated by the Italian colonizers against Ethiopia. The “Wuchale Treaty of Friendship and Peace” was signed between Ethiopia and Italy in May 1889. In the Amharic version it was a treaty of friend- ship but the Italian version turned Ethiopia into a virtual protectorate of Italy. The resulting controversy between the two countries inevitably led to the bat- tle of Adwa of 1896, where Italian forces were crushed.28 This victory permitted the country to remain independent from the European powers, retain its already acquired territory and continue its own colonial ventures and expan- sionism further south. How then can Africans who chafe at the way Italy con- ducted itself in its relationship with them turn around and conduct themselves in a similarly dishonorable fashion toward other Africans whom they colo- nized? It is obvious that the two situations are not fully comparable because one case refers to a treaty between two sovereign states and the other concerns treacherous methods employed by a victorious army to dispossess a newly sub- jugated people. The parallels are, nonetheless, striking. They are both pseudo- legal hoaxes perpetrated by unscrupulous means and by a more literate people against their less literate adversaries. On the other hand, the Arsi case suggests that the Balabbatship was not a monopoly of the local people, as opposed to “Abyssinian officials” or officers of the Abyssinian feudal hierarchy. The data we possess on land ownership shows that even the leading northern dignitaries, including the emperor and the empress, had the title of the Balabbatship.29 This happened in the following way. As was explained earlier, sometimes after the war, the Balabbats were given the right of Ya Balabbat meret (one quarter or one-third) of the total land in possession of their clansmen. But within a short period of time, some of the dignitaries were asked to renounce their title and rights in favor of Shoan dig- nitaries living in the region and in Addis Ababa. For this inexplicable homage and friendship they received nothing in return except some traditional nobles’ dress and about 10 gasha (one gasha = 40 ha) of land under the title of Yemetoria meret (the land for retirement). This process of systematic expropriation began as early as the 1890s when Ras Darghe was governor of Arsi. The first balabbat to be manipulated was Miiloo Mamaa, generally known as Abba Heenna, the leader of Hetosa, a very fertile country northeast of Assalla. He “gave” all his land to Fitawrari Zamenfes who passed it over to Menelik; the emperor gave it
28 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974, pp. 72–79. 29 Abbas Haji, The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats, pp. 585–592. Dar Ager 219 to Ras Birru Wolde Gabriel, one of the most important courtiers at the ghibbi or imperial palace and the leading landowner in the country.30 After he was swindled out of hundreds of gashas of land, Miiloo Mama was left with five gashas, which was sometimes known as ya metteria meriet (the land by which one is called), or at other times called ya mettoria meriet (pen- sion land). Miiloo, and others who followed his example, became the new and very unusual class of awrash balabbat, or the local agents who “bequeathed” their land to the rulers. Other balabbats followed suit – they were also pres- sured to give up most of their land. For example, Gamada Shati of Sudee, in Ticho province was forced to renounce his rights and land in favor of Ras Darghe, which made the descendants of the latter de facto the balabbats of this territory. In the final analysis the concept of balabbat had lost all of its original meaning in northern Ethiopia but, more significantly, it was stripped even of the meaning it had in other parts of the colonized South. Table 6.1 demon- strates the land distribution in 1967. Nevertheless, at an early stage of imperial administration the retention of more land or passing it to the Mekwannent (the nobility) seemed to have little effect. This was due to several reasons, firstly, the Arsi were predominantly pas- toralists and the proportion of land in relation to the Arsi population of the time did not seem to create demographic pressure. Secondly, the land controlled by the state itself was not measured and hence was not distributed for soldier-set- tlers, officials or the church. Until 1896, when they were called in on the eve of the battle of Adwa, the Arsi region was controlled by Ras Darghe’s personal army which were stationed at fortified camps (Katamas) such as Tchange, Sire, Azule, Seru, Endato, etc. from where they controlled security and production. Moreover, in the last decade of the 19th century and the first two decades of the next century, one cannot talk of northern settler communities dispersed among the Arsi, since the latter were still on disagreeable terms with the newcomers. So, regardless of who owned the land formally, the Arsi had access to all lands for their traditional use provided they paid an annual tribute. Surprising as it may appear, the leading Amhara landowners in the empire made themselves balabbats in Arsi country and “inherited” the small portion of the land that had been set aside for the subsistence of the conquered popu- lation. After having obtained the title of Balabbatship these absentee landlords were represented by Balabbat agents called Ya Balabbat Wakil who performed
30 E. Brotto, “Il regime della terre nel governo del Harar,” Addis Ababa (1939): 95. He says that Millo gave his land directly to Menelik whereas the Arsi informants maintain that the former was manipulated by Dejazmach Zamenfes who took the land and then transferred it to Menelik. 220 Chapter 6
Table 6.1 The Balabbats of Chilalo Province, Arsi.
Woreda Balabbat area Population Area in km2 Population density in per km2
Dodata Emperor’s agents 13,100 177.8 74 Grazmatch Usman 7422 32.3 230 Qabato Genna Tedecha 3344 11 304 Binya Gudi Hetosa Ras Birru’s Heirs 40,741 511.4 80 Menelik II Heirs 1571 13.6 116 Genna Hamda 3293 95 35 Tiyo Balmabaras Gamada 756 16.4 46 Hedeto Li’elt Yeshiwork 2260 25.4 89 Deksiso Bedhaso 5909 103 57 Bedhaso Wake 8414 168.3 50 Daddefo Dhakabo 3186 56 57 Dubiso Uke 851 22.2 160 Assalla town 12,325 13 63 Degalu-Tiyo Emperor 11,838 374 32 Bekele Ogato 20,454 596.7 40 Daddafo Dhakebo 4950 102.5 48 Haile Mariam 102 22 5 Grazmatch Tekle 80 20 4 Basha Yirdachew 52 18 36 Grand total 144,173 22,977 63
Source: Imperial Ethiopia Government, Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. Report on the Land Tenure Survey of Arsi Province, Addis Ababa, August 1967. local Balabbat routines and consulted with them in Addis Ababa or elsewhere on serious issues. Therefore, the emperor had many Balabbat agents over dif- ferent parts of Arsi, and so did the Ras Biru family, Ras Kassa, etc. As far as the initial landowner was concerned, he was called Awrash Balabbat (the Balabbat who passed over his right) and would retain some Gasha of land ranging from 3 to 10 gasha – depending upon circumstances – which he was expected to divide with his clansmen. This treacherous plan was applied in Bale as well and was formally signed; the Balabbats were never allowed to alter their alleged Dar Ager 221 agreement, to renounce their ownership and to reclaim their ancestral land. In point of fact this method of expropriation deprived the Arsi of what they could claim even under the Ya balabbat Dirsha (the share of the balabbat). The above analysis of the Arsi region renders the definition of balabbat questionable and even less relevant given that traditional legitimate leaders were not made balabbat. Instead the Abyssinian officials themselves became balabbat, thus depriving the Arsi of the minor local post accessible to con- quered peoples elsewhere in southern Ethiopia. Surprisingly, the emperor too was considered to be a balabbat in some districts, although the title was granted to local chiefs and these chiefs became the emperor’s local agents with respect to the administration of the land. On the other hand, the Amhara intervened in one way or another in the recruitment of balabbats: sometimes by suggestion, sometimes by direct impo- sition of individuals that they believed to be loyal and obedient. This made the office of balabbat more vulnerable to pressure and more responsive to impe- rial duties than local demands. Some Arsi opportunists who were chosen by the colonists to become balabbat tended to be more accountable to the gov- ernment than to their own community. The problem faced by all those who held this post was that they served contradictory interests: that of the colonial feudal state, whose objective was to exploit the region as much as possible, and that of the local community which was trying to ensure its own survival. Table 6.2 illustrates the institutions of Balabbats in Bale.
The Naftagna and the Process of Land Alienation
During the early stages of colonization, up to 1918, while the feudal system was being installed, the administrative structure was one of indirect rule31 whereby balabbats linked the Arsi to the malkagna (administrative officers) and the naftagna (soldiers) camped in the garrison towns (Katama). This was a period when neither northern migrants and farmers nor soldiers settled among the Arsi, who remained resolutely hostile to any alien presence on their soil. After 1919 the Ethiopian administration became more direct and more overtly interventionist. The Arsi country, notably the Arsi-Bale region, was declared to be the maed bet (literally “kitchen” or “pantry”) of the emperor. In other words, it was the
31 For administrative typology of the newly conquered regions at the turn of this century see D. Doham and W. James, eds. (Introduction) The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, pp. 37–38. 222 Chapter 6 Occupied (E.C.) Year 1923 1947 1917 1908 1932 1908 1945 1931 1950 1945 1945 1955 (Continued) Origin of Ownership ” ” Inheritance ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” SA – 51 20 39 27 72 17 27 85 19 – – – – – – – 258 370 279 284 466 430 150 – 800 700 750 659 649 318 Size ofSize Domain Gasha 2239 1239 1094 Name Name of Territory Fasasa Agarfa Shaifla Lajjo Alii Anbentu Saimanna Qasoo Sanbiitu Ajjaa Sinana Wilshe Oberra Dawdona Hamida Garora Kabira Name ofName Main Balabbats Qanazmatch Abdulqadir Aliye Qanazmatch Balambaras Kadir Abdro Balambaras Empress Etege Empress Qnazmatch Burqa Batiro Burqa Qnazmatch Gazmatch Mohammed Siraj Gazmatch Grazmatch Sani Mamme Grazmatch Grazmatch Qasim Bilo Qasim Grazmatch Balambars Hussein Kadiro Ato Kedir Usman Kedir Ato Ato Hussein Abba Jama Ato Ato Fanto Shanko Fanto Ato Graztmach Mohammed Graztmach Aminisha Balambaras Jundi Mamme Balambaras Balambars Adem Hammu Balambars Adem Balambaras Geleto Mame Geleto Balambaras Balambaras Kedir Hussein Kedir Balambaras Balambaras Galam Kadu Balambaras asil Province, Bale. asil Province, Distr. Gasera Agarfa ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” Sinana ” ” ” ” ” ” The Balabbats of F ” Fasil Prov. ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ”
16 No. 1 Table 6.2 17 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Dar Ager 223 Occupied (E.C.) Year 1938 1927 1933 1935 1954 1935 1949 1914 1941 1907 1944 1919 Origin of Ownership ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” Balabbat rep. Inheritance SA 19 49 05 90 71 05 53 08 15 27 – – 295 Size ofSize Domain Gasha 193 193 215 80 161 281 933 335 198 2000 3000 Name Name of Territory Koloba Shedema Watchu Alisa Keddu Fasil Kormamida Debayo Kajawa Awetu Awetu Megalo Awetu Dawe Name ofName Main Balabbats Balambaras Aliye Kadde Aliye Balambaras Qanazmatch Abubakar Darga Qanazmatch Balambars Ebbu Subie Gramatch Hamu Sheka Gramatch Gramatch Tilmo Naji Gramatch Gramatch Abdi Raqie Gramatch Gramatch Hussein Gebre Hussein Gebre Gramatch Medhin Qanazmatch Qanazmatch Mohammed Yabe Gramatch Hussein Leta Gramatch Qanazmatch Tahir Dube Tahir Qanazmatch Gramatch Aliye Robaa Aliye Gramatch Qanazmatch Mile Aga Qanazmatch Distr. ” Gobba ” ” ” ” ” Goroo ” ” ” ” (Continued) ” Prov. ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ”
No. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Table 6.2 Sources: Undated Bale Provincial administrative document or record in Amharic. document or record administrative Bale Provincial Undated Sources: 28 29 224 Chapter 6 rural domain where production and revenues were destined for the support of the royal household.32 Strictly speaking, these regions constituted royal prop- erty, where the naftagna seemed to have been given carte blanche to act as they wished vis-à-vis the gabbar. In the absence of a monetary economy – at the end of 19th and at the beginning of 20th century, tribute was paid in kind: beef cattle, which had to be accompanied by other kinds of contributions in honey, butter, flour etc., at least three times per year. It appeared that there was no institutional mechanism to fix the tribute and if it existed no one applied it. Tribute was imposed arbitrarily to satisfy the needs of both the ruling classes residing outside the region and garrison soldiers in the katamas (towns). The latter received no remuneration other than the wealth they extracted from the conquered population.33 The alleged modest reforms by Ras Tafari (later Emperor Haile Selassie) before and after the Italian occupation never reached Arsi. To cite a clear example, the Arsi continued to pay the asrat (tithe), until the 1970s, when, in fact, it had been abolished decades previously in other parts of the empire.34 Soldiers demanded beef cattle, horses, and other types of livestock, or sim- ply took them under the threat of arms whenever they wished and without offering an explanation. They even advised foreign travelers to do so. For exam- ple, the wife of Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel, governor of eastern Bale, advised a group of French travelers not to buy cattle from the Arsi but to use force to obtain what they needed. She was reporting, “Here, as elsewhere, the Abyssinians exercise full rights of requisition and a friend of Abyssinians can claim as themselves.”35 Another European contemporary traveler, Wellby observed the same situation where the naftagna and northern settlers claimed ownership of the land, the people and their labor and even advised foreigners not to pay anything for any product and services provided by the Oromo. He recounted:
Every morsel that the Oromo brought us I paid for in dollar at the market rate, which perhaps encourages them to increase their supplies beyond the powers of our consumption. The Abyssinians cried out bitterly against such an unheard-of procedure. “Why do you pay them?” They
32 Behanou Abbebe, L’évolutiuon de la propriété foncière au Choa, p. 12. 33 Charles F. Rey, Unconquered Abyssinia (London: Seely Service and Co. Ltd, 1923), pp. 189–190, 52. 34 Arne Lexander, The Changing Rural Society in Arssiland: Some Findings from a Field Study 1966–67 (CADU, March, 1967). 35 Du Boug de Bozas, op. cit., p. 107. Dar Ager 225
asked “They are bad people. The food is not theirs; it belongs to Janhoy (His Majesty) and Janhoy is sending it to you.” “Oh,” I replied, “it is merely the custom of the Engliz (English) to give as well as to receive. Your cus- tom in some ways differs from mine, so don’t cry out.”36
The state was not concerned about the predatory behavior of the soldiers,37 since it was itself committed to the same objective. Du Bourg de Bozas, who witnessed the impact of a brutal and anarchic Ethiopian administration, com- mented: “Last but not least, the strange method of Abyssinian conquerors that seems to have based their ultimate methods of rule on the looting led all to the misery and weariness. We have to hope a better future for the Oromo. This (Abyssinian rule) does not give them what they deserve.”38 In the same way, some governors of Arsi country like Fitawrari Tessemma, who claimed to be more liberal or open, condemned the way the Abyssinian officials (shum) and their soldiers treated the people.39 In principle, every sub- ject of the empire, including the non-Abyssinian officers and judges to higher authorities, had the right to take their appeals all the way up to the emperor. In reality, however, soldier-settlers and state agents always united against the Gabbar under all circumstances and at all levels.40 Brietzke, an American law- yer, adds: “In the south, justice was seen as the prerogative of the descendants of Menelik’s armies, who dominated the courts and used them to expropriate additional lands. Even today, the social distance between Amhara and non- Amhara in the rural areas is so great that little social change can take place through peaceable interaction.”41 Even the king, who was presumed to be the “ultimate judge” of the nation, took the side of the naftagna in their conflicts with the Gabbar.42 The stable bonds of loyalty between the emperor and his colonial officers precluded any possibility of judgments against them, however unjust their conduct might be. The emperor is not the guarantor of justice but an embodiment of impe- rial ideology and politics. The Arsi called such justice murtii diina (the justice of the enemy). Understandably, they avoided bringing their internal problems
36 Wellby, Twixt Sirdar and Menelik (London and New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901). 37 R. Caulk, “Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia,” pp. 457–497. 38 Du Bourg de Bozas, op. cit., p. 107. 39 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapter 4. 40 Rey, op. cit., pp. 189–190. 41 Brietzke, op. cit., p. 27. 42 Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik, p. 197. 226 Chapter 6 to the political-military courts and settled their disputes by their own meth- ods, using their own language and customary laws as the legal and moral stan- dard. They were not regarded as citizens, but subjects, who had no means of obtaining justice from politico-military elites in the region, and the emperor who presided over an oppressive system. Above all, they were not allowed to express their concerns through their language. As Paulos Milkias stated:
In Haile Selassie’s court, a non-Amhara citizen was not allowed to speak directly with a judge in his mother tongue even when the latter himself did not know the official language. By law there had to be a simabelew (interpreter) in between despite the fact that neither would under- stand the Amharic translation; they continued to listen to each other which was illegal but could not be avoided. In time, the position of the official language of the country, supported and promoted by an autocratic state, had become so pervasive that the majority Oromos, or any other major linguistic groups were denied a say in anything even remotely related to it.43
In addition, the Arsi, like other societies in the South, were not only deprived of justice but also of arms, which might have enabled them to resist the extor- tionist conduct of the local authorities. One should not forget that the ques- tion of firearms was critical both in the process of conquest and the ensuing political-military administration. Conscious that their superiority and “legiti- macy” came from the barrel of a gun, the Amhara forbade their subjects to use or to hold firearms.44 In the case of the Arsi, they were even forbidden to hold spears, knives and other traditional weapons in towns and market places until the fall of the Ethiopian monarchy in 1974. The purpose of this measure was clearly not to avoid internal Arsi conflicts, for they did not wage internal wars, but to render them defenseless and submissive vis-à-vis the naftagna. The con- querors had strong memories of the amount of resistance that the Arsi were able to put up with the aid of simple traditional weapons and believed that they would not hesitate to use them again if the opportunity arose. From the perspective of the imperial rulers, all conflicts with the Arsi were over and the country had been conquered and pacified (agar qanna) by their military victories and iron-fisted style of administration. From the Arsi point of view, however, the war was far from over, only suspended and postponed.
43 Paulos Mikias, Haile Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia (Youngstown and New York: Cambria Press, 2006), p. 56. 44 G. Montandon, Au pays Ghimira, pp. 402–403. Dar Ager 227
Nothing could be more representative of Arsi sentiment after the conquest of their country than Robaa Butta’s statement to Du Bourg de Bozas: “The hour has not come but it will come. Perhaps our children will see the departure of the oppressor.”45 As Robaa’s sentiment was representative of many strong men who dreamt of rising again after a shattering defeat, let us analyze it in greater detail.46 As I briefly discussed in the preceding chapter, it would be useful to further dis- cuss the early experiences of the two Arsi key leaders who took different deci- sions during the Shoan war of conquest. The two leaders we will consider as a case study are Robaa Butta, who submitted to Menelik peacefully and was rec- ognized as autonomous ruler, and Leenjeso Diiga, the principal leader of Arsi war of resistance. We have the testimony of European travelers notably that of the French mission of Du Bourg Du Bozas on Robaa Butta,47 a very strong leader who did not resist Menelik’s force as all of his counterparts. He was said to have under- stood the catastrophic nature of the struggle and paid homage to the king, though he never renounced the possibility of continuing the struggle when- ever the opportunity presented itself. Thus his country was exempted from pil- lage and paid the tribute fixed by the king which Robaa’s subjects (clansmen) shared. He became a highly autonomous ruler with tremendous influence over the vast territory, as he himself declared to Bourg du Bozas: “My people (the Arsi) are devoted to me…go through the whole country, there where the sun rises and where it sets, in the mountain of the north and the steppe of the south, and you will see my warriors of tomorrow. If they take an oath, they will do it Ba Robaa (meaning in the name of Robaa) not Ba Menelik (in the name of Menelik),” and, at the same time he nuanced his power when he stated: “I am the vassal of the negous (king). I accepted this status freely. But Menelik is not willing to give the position of a Shum (Official). Sometimes, however, I admit that my submission is inadmissible.”48 Two conclusions can be drawn from this declaration of Robaa. Firstly, he seemed to have been satisfied with his position, as he boasted of influ- ence, prestige and the vastness of his territory. Five years after his submission he had already adopted a new type of orientation toward power and authority
45 Du Boug de Bozas, op. cit., p. 125. 46 Abbas Haji, “Arsi Oromo Political and Military Resistance against the Shoan Colonial Conquest, 1881–1886,” pp. 1–21. 47 Du Bourg du Bozas, Mission Scientifique Du Bourg du Bozas. De la mer rouge à l’atlantique à tavers l’afrique tropicale, Otobre 1900-mai 1903 (Paris: F.R. de Rudeval, 1906). 48 Ibid., p. 125. 228 Chapter 6 unprecedented in the Oromo’s political culture. Secondly, the last part of his declaration indicates that Robaa was dissatisfied and disillusioned with the fact that Menelik did not consider him a shum, but a mere colonial agent responsible for colonial subjects in his realm. It is evident that he felt that his political power was small compared to the vast economic resources he controlled, Robaa sought to use his influence and newly found strength to oust the oppressors. As well, he had some occasions to meet with Europeans who might have told him what was happening else- where. Being convinced of the importance of modern weapons, which was a Shoan monopoly at the time, Robaa was asking Ferenji passing through his country to help him change the status-quo. He said, “I would like to take some adventures, to have some friends among the Ferenji (whites). I had proposed an alliance with the one who came before you (B. Erlanger). But he would not agree.”49 Assessing the balance of power, he concluded that even if the Ferenji were willing to help him the hour had not come to dislodge his oppressor. The hour he was waiting for never came. His autonomy gradually faded away, and his country came under direct administration. This development could be the result of intervention on the part of local authorities or the evolution of the Ethiopian Empire itself, which discouraged the existence of such autonomous regions. Another historical figure we consider here is a man who shaped major events in Arsi and left a profound impact on local tradition and Oromo history in particular. Leenjeso Diigaa belonged to the Koloba clan of northeastern Arsi.50 He distinguished himself as warrior among his clansmen when he was still a teenager. It was during the wars of expansion in the 1880s that he became known in the whole region. Leenjeso was among the first leader to put up armed resistance against the Shoan invasion and with the passage of time he became its unchallengeable leader. His presence was felt everywhere though his principal base was in northern Arsi. Dodota was an area familiar to the Shoan soldiers as “Dodota ya wond Bota” (Dodota a country of men). Even after the defeat of the Arsi, in September 1886, he resorted to guerilla warfare at the head of very few but determined rebels. He finally submitted to Menelik in 1887.51 As he was well known among Shoan authorities as the principal foe (awra), Leenjeso’s submission was expected to mark the end of the resistance and to be counted on for the stability and the security of the region. He was appointed
49 Ibid. 50 Abbas Haji, The History of Arsi, pp. 40–41. 51 Atsme, History of the Galla, manuscript (IES), Vol. 2 (1913. E.C.), pp. 65–66. Dar Ager 229 as a sort of special advisor and to Fitawrari Wosene’s office, Menelik’s represen- tative and governor of the region. It was unclear if he was appointed as a shum and balabbat, as many others were. However, shortly after they started to work together, conflict occurred on the treatment of local people. Leenjeso, who perceived that the use of his name was a pretext to keep his own people under oppression, decided not only to abandon his function, which he saw as a stooge, but also to kill Fitawariari Wossene himself. Unlike Robaa Butta, who was expecting modern weapons from outside, he used the only weapon available – a sword – to kill Fitawrari Wossene in the marketplace of Boollo. In his communication with Menelik on the incident, he is said to have uttered the following words: “Kormi lama moonaa tokkoti himooyuu,” which means “two bulls cannot reign in one Kraal.”52 This illustrates the difficult nature of Balabbat-shum relationships. Leenjiso set an example of resistance against invasion and non-collaboration with feudal-colonial rule. All newcomers were thought of as diina (enemy), and the Arsi tried to avoid all social contacts with the Naftagna who were now re-grouped and settled in garrison towns and who were unsafe among the Arsi society even decades after the end of the war. One of the songs sung by the wives of naftagna, who settled in Arsi, while staying in Shoa, shows a permanent insecurity:
Awash mado ka hone betu Yiblagn le-innatu
If his domicile is across the Awash, Sorry for his mother.
This is a testament to insecurity in Arsi region due to Arsi Oromo hostility toward newcomers; they had not yet renounced the struggle and no alien felt safe in any part of the region except towns (Katama) where the local people were not allowed to be armed with spears and/or knives. Thus, even farmers hailing from the north settled in separate villages to act as self-reliant commu- nities. Contacts were maintained with the communities through their repre- sentatives.53 However, despite some threats, the newcomers felt good about the new opportunity provided by the conquest, and they totally shared and identified themselves with the state and imperial projects. This appears be
52 Informants: Lelesso Kawo, Adamo Hamada and Galato Kawo. 53 These representatives were called chiqa shum “literally the chief of mud” – a type of village leadership from the North A. Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia, pp. 77–78; Berhanou Abbebe, op. cit., p. 120. 230 Chapter 6 analogous with the Russian peasant settlers in the imperial periphery. As Willard Sunderland observed: “The Russian settler could feel at home wher- ever he went (given certain environmental limitations, of course) and this ran parallel to the lofty idea, so trumpeted by Russian elites, that Russian coloniza- tion itself was a just and entirely natural process. In the same sense then Russian peasant settlers were consummate colonizers.”54 He adds, “Certainly peasant settlers were well aware that they were serving the interests of the state. Peasants frequently expressed this awareness in their petitions to the government, reiterating that they moved to their new homes with special priv- ileges and the blessings of the Tsar and ‘his excellencies’ the ministers of finance or state domains.”55 The balabbat’s dominion was divided into many chiqa shum units. In these communities the balabbat’s role was to mobilize forced labor for the naftagna, state farms (hudad), to collect tribute, to pass down orders and supervise their implementation. The offices of balabbat, chiqa chum and atbia dagna (local judge) became the instruments through which the state maintained local security, controlled production, as well as mobilized and redistributed resources in accordance with the policies of the feudal-colonial order. What happened to the Oromo representative institutions? Immediately after its military victory, the imperial government took measures to suppress Oromo institutions. It banned the Tchaffe (traditional parliament) throughout Oromo land and the pilgrimage of every 8 years to Abba Muuda was completely forbidden.56 As Tchaffe and Muuda (pilgrimage) were integral components of the Gadaa institution,57 the latter simply became a tree without roots. From the imperial state’s point of view, this interdiction had both short-term and long-term objectives. In the short term, it would avoid trouble and revolts that such great gatherings – more than 100,000 according to some testimonies – would cause. By destroying the symbol of their unity and the institutions that held the Oromo together, the government attempted to keep the Oromo divided and weak. In the long term, the eradication of Oromo representa- tive institutions was expected to accelerate their conversion to Orthodox Christianity. But, as was discussed earlier, it was Islam which profited more
54 Willard Sunderland, “An Empire of Peasants: Empire-Building, Interethnic Interactions and Ethnic Stereotyping in the Rural Word of the Russian Empire, 1800–1850s.” In Imperial Russia: New Histories for Empire, edited by Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington and Indian Polis, Indian University Press, 1998), p. 181. 55 Ibid., p. 179. 56 M. de Salviac, op. cit., and Bairu Tafla, Atsma Giyorgis and His Work, op. cit., p. 133. 57 Abbas Haji Gnamo, Les Oromo-Arsi, Chapters II and III for a detailed analysis. Dar Ager 231 from the weakening and disappearance of the Gadaa-Qaalluu institutions and ended up by establishing itself as the religion of a great majority of the Oromo population. Moreover, the Gadaa as a political system functioned in a sovereign society without alternative institutions, state or any other form of centralized author- ity or alien rule. In the context of our discussion, when the Arsi lost their inde- pendence, the Gadaa system naturally lost its political importance. At most it was subordinated to the imperial system or simply continued to function through ceremonial and ritual practices in areas untouched by Islam and less affected by a massive naftagna presence. The balabbats, who were created by the imperial state, were recruited on principles that were the antithesis of the traditional institutions. The legitimacy of Gadaa officers came from the peo- ple, who elected them from among the rightful candidates. They served their community without material advantages for a fixed period of time, ideally 8 years. By contrast, the balabbats got their legitimacy from above, from the new rulers who recognized and protected their privileges and power. Even when their clan or local community selected them, it was according to a logic alien to the local cosmology, system of thought and legitimate political author- ity.58 Naturally, the influence of a balabbat neutralized the authority of Abba Bokku. The latter had neither the means to decide any issue of political signifi- cance nor the power to enforce whatever he decided though his was the embodiment of authentic leadership and tradition. Until 1896, the occupying forces in Arsi were Ras Darghe’s personal soldiers, who were summoned to take part in the Battle of Adwa where the massive Ethiopian forces confronted and defeated the Italian colonial army. Some of them remained behind in Arsi to serve as administrative and judicial officers, or as security forces. Others took part in the Italo-Ethiopian war and returned after the battle under the various categories of soldiers such as Yafares Zabagna (the guardian of horses) or the quslegna (the war-wounded). Northern peas- ants also continued to arrive in small numbers to settle in the region. At this stage, the immigration was not large enough to cause a serious land crisis or shortage. In effect, in spite of the theoretical confiscation of land and its allot- ment to soldiers, administrative officers, and clergymen of the Orthodox Church, this did not seem to have deprived the Arsi Oromo of their traditional grazing land. This was true firstly because the Arsi were predominantly pasto- ralists and the proportion of land in relation to the existing population did not seem to exert significant demographic pressures. Secondly, the land controlled
58 Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Pouvoir de bénir et de maudire,” pp. 289–318. 232 Chapter 6 by the state itself was not measured and hence was not distributed to soldier- settlers, officials, to the church and other social groups.59 For a decade after the decisive battle in 1886, when they were called in on the eve of the Battle Adwa,60 the Arsi region, north of the Shaballe River was conquered and controlled by Ras Darge’s army. They were stationed at the for- tified camps such as Tchange, Sire, Azule, Titcho, etc., from where they con- trolled security and production. Moreover, in the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, one cannot speak of northern- settler communities dispersed among the Arsi Oromo communities since the latter were still on bad terms with the newcomers. So, regardless of who owned the land formally, the Arsi had access to all lands for their traditional use (pas- toralism and scattered cultivation), provided they paid tribute annually.61 However, this does not conceal the harsh nature of the Naftagna-Gabbar rela- tionship and arbitrary administration. In spite of its geographic proximity to Shoa, the Arsi region was classified as Dar Ager62 (periphery) and the system of administration and political econ- omy imposed was similar to other southern regions,63 which C. Clapham com- pares with the northern regions as follows:
The imperial government made comparatively little of indirect rule tech- niques, and most of the southern provinces were administered from Addis Ababa…the emperor was consequently much freer to make appointment in the conquered provinces of the south than in the high- land areas where he had to take account of a closely textured pattern of local customs and authorities. By the same token, he could grant south- ern land without hindrance to his generals and supporters whereas in the north he could have been restricted by a web of vested interest…64
The division between state land (75%) and the share of the balabbat (25%) was based on a form of measurement called ayna gamad (eye measurement) or,
59 The Shoan Oromo officers were also rewarded for their participation in the war against the Arsi. 60 Informants: Tadesse Desta, Tefers W/Aregay. 61 The tribute was paid in kind, fatten oxen, honey, butter, etc. but rarely in Maria Theresa for it was not widely used at the time. 62 E. Brotto, p. 92. 63 D. Donham and W. James, eds. (Introduction) The Southern Marches. 64 C. Clapham, “Ethiopia.” In African Kingship in Perspective Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Setting, edited by René Lemarchand (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1977), pp. 47–48. Dar Ager 233 more literally, eye rope. Originally a rope was used to measure land. In the tur- moil caused by rapid conquest, however, the officers simply guessed what might have constituted a gasha of land – a unit of land measurement esti- mated to be about 40 ha. The unit varied according to the quality of the soil, the topography, the climate, and the proclivities of the measurer who “eye- balled” the plot. The state was said to have measured the land north of the Shaballe River in 1918 for different political and economic reasons. First of all, the imperial gov- ernment decided to define private property rights in order to allocate the land to different social groups according to the role they played during the process of conquest and in the ensuing political-military administration. This form of measurement, called qalad, was far from perfect. Its purpose was to facilitate the collection of tribute (later taxes) and the selling of land which would encourage the migration of the northern population toward the South. The government earnestly desired such migration for demographic, political and cultural reasons.65 The settlement of these destitute northern peasants in the fertile South was expected to produce supplementary revenues for the state in the form of taxes. Finally, the colonization would not be effective if it had to rely only on the control of the naftagna stationed in the garrison towns alone. It also required the support of strong Christian communities among the local population to spread the language and religion of the empire and to help the soldiers quell sporadic uprisings.66 From the Arsi perspective, the sole purpose of qalad measurement was to expropriate their property and to alienate them further from the land so as to create conditions favorable for immigration. In effect, at the end of every measurement (qalad) they lost a part of their remaining plot under the pretext that it was tirf meret or “excess land.” Since there was substantial varia- tion in the way the land was measured in the first instance, upon re-measure- ment the land held by the Arsi was said to be in excess of the standard and the “surplus” was expropriated. These variations opened the door for abuses, cor- ruption and favoritism on the part of surveyors (qalad tay). Wherever regional or local authorities wanted to reduce the possessions of local people, the most important judicial pretext they could evoke was the measurement and re- measurement of land. Conscious of the purpose and effect of this practice, the Arsi did all they could to prevent the measurement of their land. Hence from 1918 right up to the fall of the monarchy in 1974, every qalad measurement pro- voked local opposition which usually led to the death or arrest of many people
65 J. Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, pp. 111–112. 66 Abbas Haji, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle eclater?” pp. 239–284. 234 Chapter 6 in many corners of Arsiland. Over a period of 12 years between 1918 and 1930, the qalad was imposed on Arsi three times, i.e., in 1919, 1924, and 1930. This fact is an index of the extraordinary degree of official harassment to which the Arsi were subjected. However, things radically changed after 1919. In effect, 1919 was a turning point in the history of the region due to the consolidation of the feudal serf- dom in Arsi country. In addition to the army of occupation that was already entrenched in the territory, the imperial government decided to send an even larger army there known as mehal sefari. This was the core of the imperial army and it was sent to the region for two different reasons. The first relates to the general imperial policy of stationing the rapidly growing army in newly con- quered territory in order to permit them to live “off the land.” The second was to punish the Arsi for the rebellious attitude they continued to exhibit after their defeat, and particularly their open revolt of 1917 in solidarity with the royal prince Lij Iyyassu and in opposition to the Shoan establishment which was trying to dethrone him. Apparently the Arsi saw Lij Iyyassu’s reign as a period of respite and emancipation after years of humiliation. They sang in praise of the young prince before and after his overthrow from the throne. Moreover, a delegation of Arsi leaders was said to have met with Lij Iyyasu in Chercher, perhaps late in 1916 or early 1917. After this encounter, they formed a politico-religious movement called Allah Da’imu in Dide’a where they killed many naftagna and burnt a number of churches.67 But this uprising was thwarted in its early stages when the supporters of Iyyassu lost the war in the North. Being on the side of the loser, the Arsi became, once again, the object of naftagna wrath and vengeance (see the chapter on Islam). The revenge-seeking victors, under the leadership of Ras Tafari, planned to devastate Arsi country. Fitawrari Habte Giyorgis, who was then the Minister of War, recommended a policy of military repression as opposed to the policy of complete destruction desired by the ruling circle.68 According to very knowl- edgeable informants his argument was mainly economic. He was said to have declared: “Arsi region is the maed bet or (kitchen) of Shoa from where beef, cattle, honey, butter and cereal come and we should not destroy this maed bet.” He suggested, therefore, the dispatching of the mehal sefari to be dispersed among the peasants. Officially, this was to reward them for their service to the empire and their loyalty to the emperor. It is worth noting, however, that the strategy had another purpose, which is reflected in the concept of mehal sefari. The phrase is made up of two Amharic terms: mehal meaning between, among,
67 Abbas Haji, Les Oromo-Arsi, pp. 131–133. 68 Abbas Haji, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle eclater?” pp. 239–284. Dar Ager 235 middle and sefari meaning settler. In other words, the soldiers were supposed to settle betwixt and between the indigenous populations and perform the function of infiltration and control from within the communities.69 Fitawrari Habte Giyorgis was probably using the mehal sefari to achieve other political goals as well. At the turn of the 20th century, the mehal sefari were in the process of being transformed into a professional army directly accountable to the emperor and thus bypassing much of the feudal-military hierarchy. They were openly supportive of Ras Tafari – the future emperor Haile Selassie – in the power struggle with his more conservative rivals, includ- ing Habte Giyorgis.70 In consequence, one can legitimately ask whether the Fitawrari was deliberately sending them off to the imperial periphery so as to remove them from the political power game then unfolding at the hub of the empire. However, from the perspective of this study it is not necessary to arrive at a definitive interpretation of the motives of various players in the imperial court. The more relevant issue is to expose the social and economic conse- quences of imperial policy for the Arsi region. The mehal sefari arrived in Arsi in 1919 under the general command of Dejazmatch Wolde Tsadik, father in law of Ras Kassa71 and grandson of Ras Darghe. At that time, the government imposed the first qalad measurement, land grants and gabbar servants were distributed among the soldiers, the administrative personnel and the clergy. The clerical hierarchy of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was one of the main beneficiaries of this re-distribution. The soldiers were rewarded in accordance with their rank and length of service as indicated in Table 6.3.72 It is interesting to note that seqela was land allotted to soldiers for residen- tial purposes only; it was the plot on which the soldier was to build a perma- nent home. As such it was not supposed to be sold, mortgaged, or exchanged. Undoubtedly, this method was intended to sedentarize the nomadic and pred- atory army, to encourage the soldier’s physical presence on the land allocated and to render colonization more effective. In practice, however, the imperial government did not have any means of controlling whether the seqela acreage
69 The information on the Mehal Sefari was obtained from well informed Nafttgna descen- dants whose parents arrived in the Arsi region as the Mahel Sefari and served in the hier- archy of this category of the army. To mention only a few of them: Taddesse Desta, Teferra W/Aregay and Yemane G/Sellassie. 70 R. Caulk, “Armies as Predators,” pp. 488–489; Bahru Zewde, “Economic Origins of the Absolutist State in Ethiopia (1916–1935).” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, XIII (1984): 1–29, 11. 71 Charles F. Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile, p. 48. 72 E. Brotto, op. cit., p. 96. 236 Chapter 6
Table 6.3 The distribution of land to soldiers in Arsi.
Rank No. of gashas No. of seqela land No. of gabbar (serfs)
Wettadder (soldier) 2–3 1 1–2 Hamsa aleqa (chief of 50 men) 5 2 3 Meto aleqa (chief of 100 men) 10 2 7 Shambel (captain) 20 7 13
Source: Abbas Haji Gnamo, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle éclater?: Conflits politiques, économie et société en pays Arsi (1900–1935).” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, XXXII-2, no. 126 (1992). was sold or not.73 Finally, what was given to them officially in the form of land grants and indigenous tenants did not signify that their control was limited; they were free to use their power creatively to extend their domain at the expense of the Arsi. The Northern settlers in general and the soldier-settlers in particular realized that their identification with Orthodox Christianity and state objectives would help to enhance their interest. They effectively manipu- lated their “Amhara/Ethiopian identity,” although all them might not have been of Amhara ethnic stock, and the association with state objectives (per- manent colonization and exploitation) permitted them to feel at home, pro- tected and empowered against the local population by all means, including military and political. In Bale, the soldiers-settlers were known under the collective name of denbegna or “regulars.” Here, land grants and the distribution of the Gabbar followed the same logic as in Arsi. The only difference was that the denbe- gna received less land and fewer Gabbar than the mehal sefari. For instance, a shambel (captain) in Arsi could claim up to 20 gasha, whereas a denbe- gna officer of the same rank in Bale would get only up to four gasha. Similarly, an ordinary soldier in Arsi got two to three gasha, whereas this right was fixed at half to one Gasha in Bale region.74 This appeared paradoxical given the vastness of Bale. The problem of soldier-settlers in Bale at that time and, to some extent in later periods, was not the shortage of land but the lack of a labor force, as the region was thinly populated. This had some major consequences. Firstly, in areas where the population was sparse some sol- diers were forced to work the land allotted to them. Secondly, in areas where
73 Ibid., p. 95. 74 Informants: Debtara Mesfin Qiba Sellasie, Yitabarek Goshu, Haji Kefencth Arabo and Haji Ejero Logomo. Dar Ager 237 the population was not dense the presence of many soldiers and the local population tried to avoid the military garrisons and forced labor as much as possible. The mehal safaris were considered as embryonic nucleus of a profes- sional army and political pressure groups,75 settled throughout the Arsi highlands and other climatically suitable areas. Others started to abandon old strategic garrison towns and moved to more accessible agglomerations among the local population as the Arsi resistance ceased to represent a physi- cal threat. This development forced some of the Arsi to completely aban- don their traditional high plateau for the lowlands to escape from the naftagna settlers and their unlimited demands for forced labor. The Arsi Oromo opted for the lowlands in spite of the fact that the area was infested with malaria and had irregular rainfall. It was unfit for cultivation but good enough for them to graze their animals. One would think that the people would be less vulnerable to harassment once they had reverted to pastoral nomadism. The evidence indicates, however, that the population was still preyed upon by the soldier-settlers since feudal privileges were equally applicable whether the subjects were sedentary or nomadic, engaged in farming or herding, in upland or lowland environments. In the words of Rey: “The hotter and the more unhealthy the place, the more energetically is the system pressed upon the population for the highland Abyssinian hates the low country and wants to collect as much as he can as quickly as possible to get to the mountains.”76 After the arrival of the mehal sefari, every Oromo family was given to a fam- ily of soldier-settlers. According to Cerulli, who traveled throughout most of the Arsi country in the 1920s, when the Gabbar system was fully functioning between the Albaso plain and the Awash River, an area corresponding to the present Chilalo province, every family of soldiers had an Oromo family which was forced to cultivate its land without pay and to give other services for a cer- tain number of days per week. A gabbar’s obligation in the master-servant rela- tionship did not come to end with the soldier’s death; it went on provided the soldier-settler’s family respected, in its turn, its commitments to the state.77 Bahru Zewde considers the Ethiopian system as evolved in the first half of the last century was parallel to “Western Absolutism” and the modest reforms
75 See Bahru Zewde, “Economic Origins of Absolutist State in Ethiopia (1901–1935).” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. XVIII (IES, Addis Ababa, 1984), p. 11. 76 Charles F. Rey, The Real Abyssinia, p. 172. 77 E. Cerulli, “Il popoplazioni del bacino superiore dello Uabi.” In L’esplorazione dello Uabi- Uebi Scebelli, edited by L.A. De Savoia-Aosta (Milano: Mandadori, 1932), pp. 138–139. 238 Chapter 6 introduced at the center before 1935 and even 1941 were not applied in the newly conquered regions.78 Given the Ethiopian socio-economic setting, the majority of the peasantry was reduced to the status of Gabbar. In this condition, the lands they inhabited were subject to various dues, different taxes and the people were forced to ren- der personal services to government officials. In addition to this, the gabbar provided the soldiers’ family with water, fire, and wood; they also built their granary and ran errands for them.79 F. Rey, an English traveler who observed the Gabbar system at work in Arsi, says that the governors were not paid any salary, but had to derive income from the people they administered. The num- ber of Gabbar each governor controlled depended upon his rank, and a sub governor might have 200–300 Gabbar. He concludes that the Gabbar system was no different from slavery.80 As a rule, soldiers lived in towns (katama) in the newly conquered regions where the occupying force was making strategic retreat during the war of con- quest and from where it later controlled security and production:
The Abyssinian dominance over conquered peoples showed remarkable similarity with contemporary European colonialism in Africa in its rami- fications. Katamas (colons) were established in the classical colonial fashion in these newly annexed territories. The naftagna, who were mainly the agents of the state, priests and businessmen resided in the Katamas more or less separated from the local people. Even ordinary set- tlers did not live on the land for reasons of safety and comfort.81
Under this context, the concept of “serfdom” in the feudal order appears to be a reasonable approximation to the situation we have described in Arsi during the first half of the 20th century. M. Dobb’s definition of serfdom applies to the Arsi situation without any qualification:
Feudalism is virtually identical with what we generally mean by serfdom: an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his voli- tion to fulfill certain economic demands of an over lord whether these
78 Bahru Zewde, “Economic Origins of Absolutist State in Ethiopia (1901–1935)”. 79 Mahteme Sellassie, p. 284; Charles W. McClellan, “Perspective on the Naftagna Gabbar System: The Example of Darasa,” 1978. 80 Rey, op. cit., pp. 52, 189–190. 81 Makuria Bulcha, Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and the Problems of Integration (Uppsala: Scandinavian African Studies, 1988), p. 59. Dar Ager 239
demands take the form of service to be performed or dues to be paid in money or in kind of work. This coercive force may be that of military strength possessed by feudal superior, or custom backed by some kind of judicial procedure or the force of law.82
All observers of the beginning of the 20th century unanimously underlined the important differences between the two parts of the country and stressed that the term “serf” was not applicable to the Christian northern population.83 This variation was attributed to cultural, historical and ethnic factors. The Gabbar in the north was an “Abyssinian subject” who cultivated crops and paid taxes as distinguished from soldiers, clergy and the nobility. Like the lords, he had hereditary rist rights in land and if he paid taxes and accomplished corre- sponding obligatory services his right in land was inalienable. He was therefore not a tenant.84 The rights and obligations associated with his citizenship ema- nated from the fact that he shared the same moral and legal codes, the same language, culture and religion with the ruling classes (Table 6.4). By contrast, the peoples of the conquered southern regions were distinct from the Amhara-Tigreans in their language, religion, way of life and their socio-economic organization and, as such, they were classified as non- Abyssinian subjects – as second-class citizens without or little rights but with many obligations. Some were enslaved and others were reduced to the status
Table 6.4 Types of land and tax (in Ethiopian Birr).
Types of tax Lem (fertile) Lemtef (semi-fertile) Tef (poor)
Asrat 35 30 10 Gibir 15 10 5 Education 15 12 4.50 Health 15 12 45 Total 80 64 24
Source: The Changing Rural Society in Arussi Land: Some Findings from Field Study 1966–7.
82 M. Dobb, Studies in Development of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1978), p. 37. 83 B.G. Stefanson and R. Starett, eds., Documents on Ethiopian Politics. The Decline of Menelik II to the Emergence of Ras Tafari later Known as Haile Sellassie, 1909–1919, Vol. I (Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publication, 1976), pp. 180–181. 84 A. Hoben, The Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia, pp. 5–7. 240 Chapter 6 of serfs. Their property was confiscated; even the small part (1/4) of their tradi- tional holdings they were supposed to keep was appropriated by the settlers and officials. They were excluded from political power, denied justice and cul- turally marginalized. It is therefore absolutely correct to distinguish classical Abyssinian feudalism85 from modern feudal colonialism as it was imposed on the southern societies during the reign of Menelik, and maintained thereafter by force of arms.86 This brief analysis clearly demonstrates the extent to which the conquest of the south expanded and consolidated the socio-economic base of the Christian kingdom and revived its sagging economy. More than ever before in Abyssinian history the extractive and redistributive role of the monarch was consolidated. Traditionally, in the north his room for maneuvering was limited by a web of vested interests, whereas in the south he had a free hand to grant land to his generals, officials and supporters and place them in political-administrative posts without any hindrance.87 A whole array of new types of land grants was created that expanded the gult system far beyond its traditional confines. The creation of many political, judicial and military posts in the South was aptly described by Markakis as an “Economic boom for the Mekwannent [nobil- ity].”88 For his part, Berhanu Abebe indicates that the conquest was a paradise for the Shoan political-military elites and for the emerging empire-state.89 In the context of this political economy, Arsi country was not much more than a peripheral colonial region and the imperial government itself classified it as dar agar, or “frontier or border country.” The peripheral character of the region does not have much to do with economic importance, nor with its dis- tance from the center, since most of Arsi country is only 2 days journey (about 100 km) from the capital. Rather, the distance should be understood in cultural, ethnic, and political terms. The policy followed in Arsi by Menelik and his successor, Haile Selassie, was particularly vindictive and oppressive. From the perspective of the Shoan rul- ing classes the crimes committed by the Arsi were; (a) their war against Menelik
85 D. Crummey, “Abyssinian Feudalism.” Past and Present, no. 89 (1980): 115–138. 86 P. Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (London: J. Friedman, 1975), p. 102; J. Markakis and Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (London: Spokesman, 1978), p. 25. 87 Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia.” In African Kingship in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Setting, edited by R. Lemarchand (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977), pp. 53–66, 47–48. 88 John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. 89 Berhanou Abbebe, op. cit., p. 33. Dar Ager 241 and their continued resistance after their defeat; and (b) their mass conversion to Islam which they regarded as the religion of the traditional enemies of Christian Abyssinia. The combination of the two factors aggravated the ani- mosity created by a bloody war and widened the political cleavage and cultural distance between the Arsi Oromo and the Amhara. The reason why the Arsi adopted Islam so rapidly instead of Christianity is an intriguing question which was addressed elsewhere.90
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which the people who resisted the Shoan conquest and rule were punished; the Arsi who put up a decade- long stiff resistance paid the price for doing so. Punishing severely those who resisted was clearly justified and legitimized by Fetaha Negest: “When you reach a city or country to fight against its inhabitants offer them terms of peace. If they accept you and open their gates the men who are there shall become your subjects and shall give you tributes. But if they refuse the terms of peace and after the battle fight against you, go forward to assault and oppress them, since the Lord your God will give them to you.”91 Thus, the immediate consequence of the defeat in 1886 was a total confisca- tion of their land. But, at the same time, the major objective of the conquest was economic and total expropriation of land which made no sense at that point. The imperial government decided to leave one-quarter or one-third of the land under the control of local people. It introduced new local governance structure called balabbats, a practice which did not exist in this democratic society where leaders were elected in the framework of the Gadaa system. The Balabbats were responsible for implementation of decrees and policies under the control of government representatives and officials who had differ- ent titles and roles. The balabbats were entrusted with the task of collecting annual tributes and transferring to local representative (Malkagna or Mislene). They were also responsible for maintaining order and security in the territory assigned to soldier-settlers and recruiting local people during wars. Above all, they participated in the measurement, allotment and transaction of land as witnesses and organized forced labor for government officials and soldiers who were not paid in salary but lived on free labor of peasants. Each soldier,
90 Abbas H. Gnamo, “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia),” pp. 99–120; “Le rôle du culte de Chaikh Hussein dans l’Islam des Arsi, Ethiopie,” pp. 21–42. 91 P.L. Strauss, The Fetaha Nagast, the Law of Kings, p. 274. 242 Chapter 6 official and Church was given gabbar (serfs) who worked for them at least 3 days a week. The farmers’ duties towards soldiers passed over to his children as long as the soldiers respected their commitments to the state. Theoretically, the Gabbar were not slaves but in practice the system was not different from slavery as noted by the British traveler, Rey, in the 1920s. The Gabbar system was abolished by the Italians during their brief occupation of the country (1936–1941) and Emperor Haile Selassie did not restore it although that did not have much impact on the relations of land owners, and the majority of the local people who were alienated from their land and labor. Moreover, as will be analyzed in the following chapters, the Ethiopian administration was feudal, disorganized and arbitrary, where there was no legal mechanism to redress the injustice perpetrated by soldiers (Naftagna), government officials and judges who appear to have been given carte blanche to rule and extract resources for the themselves and the state. As a contempo- rary observer reported:
Justice according to the European idea may also said be practically non- existing in Abyssinia. There are native courts, but as their decisions are based upon unwritten laws capable of being influenced by bribes and decisions even where given are often not respected by litigants and offi- cials of the branches of the government, it may be understood the obtain- ing of proper justice is not possible.92
The system did not introduce any form of record and accountability which pressed heavily on peasants who were de facto serfs. The problem took on a new dimension after settling a category of soldiers called Mahal safari and fur- ther parcelization of land in 1919. In the conflicts opposing the serfs and sol- diers, officials, all the government bodies, including the emperor, were united as they were all committed to the same goal, controlling and exploiting the newly conquered regions as much as possible.93 In the following chapters, I will analyze continuity and change in imperial systems of government and center-periphery relations between 1941 and 1974.
92 B.G. Stefenson, R.R.K. Starett, eds., Documents on Ethiopian Politics, p. 192. 93 For justice administration see Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik, p. 197; Charles F. Rey, Unconquered Abyssinia, p. 51. PART FOUR Governing the Empire: Politics, Economy and Society
∵
Chapter 7 The Nature of Political Administration and the Structure of Domination in Arsiland (1941–1974)
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we analyzed in detail the process of imperial con- quest and colonization, and the aftermath of the defeat and the consequent economic, political and social situations until 1935. We will proceed with the analysis of imperial politics and the structures of domination by covering the period between 1941, when Emperor Haile Selassie was restored to power and 1974, when he was overthrown during the Revolution. In the political realm, we will demonstrate the extent to which the Ethiopian method of administration had many features of colonialism, with feudal and pre-capitalist variants, and the status of the province as a periphery by the fact that governors, top officials and minor government servants and even clerks at a district levels were ethnically and culturally aliens to the local people. The ruling elites were all tied to the center and the aristocracy through client-patron relationship or ethno-cultural bonds. Accordingly, the governor- generals, all judges and other high-ranking officials of the region were Amhara or a handful of Amharanized individuals who proved their loyalty to the impe- rial cause. Yet, as indicated earlier, the service and cooperation of local people were needed to reduce the cost of administration and to better control the local communities. Creating and maintaining local collaborators and interme- diaries has been one of the salient features of empires. Ethiopia had to create its own version of local agents or representatives. This appeared to be akin to the British policy of indirect colonial rule although the local chiefs did not enjoy the same privilege and recognition as those in British colonies and the system was less institutionalized. We will demonstrate the role of the Oromo, both in the local and national government and the nature of the relationship between the administrators and imperial subjects (the rulers and the ruled). In so doing, the analysis will bring to light the extractive, exploitative and oppres- sive nature of the administration in the newly conquered regions in general and those that attempted to resist the Ethiopian state in particular. Moreover, we will point out how the local people such as the balabbats who joined the feudal system and local government structure benefited from the system at the expense of their fellowmen (Figure 7.1).
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/������������6_��9
Figure 7.1 Imperial government and the structures of regional governance.
The Aqni: The First Generation of Military Rulers, 1900–1935
One of the features of Ethiopian administration in the conquered provinces was the colonizing warlord assumed governorship, and who was often suc- ceeded by his son or closer associates/officers. They called themselves Aqni (colonizers) which refers to those who directly took part in the military cam- paigns and their immediate successors whose task was both pacifying, institut- ing and consolidating imperial authority on the ground. The major Aqni claimed the top position for himself and he then appointed other officers of lower or of the same rank to different administrative areas which were not clearly delineated. They were given the right to live on the efforts of the local population since the government did not pay any salary. This led to intense competition and jealousy between officers as they all coveted the best land. At the start, they all settled in garrison towns (katama) from where they main- tained order and security and collected tribute for themselves and for the state. They also claimed other forms of gifts called gesta bereket.
The documents and oral information at our disposal show that after the conquest of Arsi, Ras Darghe assumed the governorship of the region from 1886 to 1896 and assigned his officers and his sons to different districts. The central regional administration for northern Arsi was located at Titcho, a forti- fied town in Albaso, until the Italian invasion in 1936 and even for 3 years after restoration in 1941 when Assalla was chosen to be the new regional capital thanks to its relative accessibility and closeness to the Ethiopian capital and Shoan province (Assalla is only 175 km from Addis Ababa). But, in the absence of any coherent policy framework, it is difficult to establish the administrative linkage between different garrison towns (Katama) from where the officers controlled production and security. The administrative structure took a new shape after 1966 when a quasi-hierarchical administration was put in place under the name of Tekqlay gizat (Regional administration), Awraja (province), Woreda (District) Mezagajja (municipality), Malkagna (sub district), Chiqa shum (village representative), Atbia dagna (local judge), etc. As we stated earlier, a large part of Bale has been the traditional habitat of the Arsi and many northern Arsi people escaped to Bale when they were defeated in the second half of 1880s and their country north of the Shebelle River fell under the total or partial control of the Shoan kingdom. But they did not realize that the empire’s design was limitless as the generals were guided by the policy dubbed as fares enda getah (as far as your horse can take you). So, in 1889 Ras Darghe and his two sons, Dejazmatch Asfaw and Dejazmatch Tessema conquered Bale from Central Arsi in 1889–1892. However, the con- quest was interrupted and the terrible drought and famine (The Great Ethiopian famine) forced Ras Darghe to suspend the campaign. After the end of the Great Famine, Dejazmatch Asfaw and Dejazmatch Mekonen Worlde Gabriel returned to Bale and completed the colonization of the entire region by 1897.1 Also, Dejazmatch Asfaw is remembered for campaigning further south and raiding Borana where he was said to have looted countless heads of cattle and distributed them to his followers and local communities in Bale. It is important to bear in mind that Dejazmatch Asfaw was the cousin of Menelik and, as such, had a dream of carving out his own kingdom in Southern Ethiopia which included part of the current Arsi province and Bale. His father, Ras Darghe, Menelik’s uncle and loyal counsel, kept his eye on his son due to his ambition. After the death of his father, Dejazmatch Asfaw was forced to return to Shoa where he became governor of Salale. Finally, he was accused of insurrection and conspiracy and arrested, and jailed in Magdala in 1901, where he died in 1906.2
1 Abbas Haji Gnamo, “Les Oromo Arsi,” Chapter IV. 2 Bairu Tafla, “Ras Darghe Sahle Selassie, 1827–1900,” p. 36.
Dejazmatch Asfaw was replaced by Ras Leulsagad, another key general of Menelik who conquered Konso and Amaro. He was known for his confronta- tion with Italian forces on the southern border, Bale, without any authorization from the emperor. Consequently, he was recalled and returned to Shoa to par- ticipate in the battle of Sagale in 1916 (opposing the camp of Lij Iyyassu, the grandson and heir of the emperor, and the Shoan aristocracy led by Ras Tafari, the future emperor Haile Selassie).3 But, Ras Leul Sagad returned to Bale a year later. During the reign of Zewditu the governor of Bale was Ligaba Beyene who was replaced by another Shoan General Fitawrari Wolde Gabriel. He was trans- ferred to another post in the same year (1910). The other feudal lords who assumed the governorship of the province before the Italian invasion of 1936 were Dejazmatch Haile Selassie Abayneh, followed by Dejazmatch Nasibu Ze-amanuel in 1931 and he was succeeded by Dejazmatch Beyene Merid in 1935 which coincided with the Italian invasion. This demonstrates how all top offi- cials serving the newly conquered regions were ethnic Amhara and directly appointed from Shoa who monopolized political, economic and military power and the extent to which the newly conquered regions were a mere colonial periphery. After 5 years of Italian occupation, the government of Haile Selassie took up his pre-invasion imperial policy from where he left off and appointed the following governors between 1941 and 1974. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide the
Table 7.1 List of provincial governors before 1935.
Bale Arsi
Dejazmatch Asfaw Darghe Ras Darghe Sahle Selassie Ras Leulsagad Fitawrari Denku Mebraqu Ras Nadew Ras Abate Belew Ligaba Beyene Dejazmatch Wube Atsnafe Sagad Fitawrari Wolde Gabriel Dejazmatch Yilma Mekonen Dejazmatch Haile Selassie Abayneh Ras Kebede Mengesha Dejazmatch Nasibu Ze-amanuel Dejazmatch Habte Mikael Tafesse Dejazmatch Beyene Merid (1935) Dejazmatch Wondrad Dejazmatch Wolde Gabriel Dejazmatch Amda Mikael
Source: Provincial archives of Bale and Arsi regions.
3 For details see Bahru Zewde, History of Ethiopia, pp. 120–127; Richard Pankhurst, The Ethiopians, pp. 195–218.
Table 7.2 List of provincial governors, 1941–1974.
Bale Year Arsi Year
Dejazmatch Mekuria 1941–1943 Dejazmatch 1942 Banteyirgu Amda Micheal Dejazmatch Letyibelu 1944–1947 Bitoweded Negash 1943 Gebre Bezabeh Captain Demise Anberbir 1944 Ras Asrate Kassa 1952 General Kebede Geber 1948–1949 Ras Mengesha Seyoum General Nega Haile Selassie 1950–1952 Tsahafi Tezaz Wolde 1955 Giorgis Wolde Yohannes Fitawrari Taddesse Negash 1952–1953 Dejazmatch Geresu Duki Dejazmatch Demisse 1955 Dejazmatch Daniel 1950s Wolde Amanuel Abebe Dejazmatch Merid Beyene* 1955 Dejazmatch Sahlu 1965–1974 Difaye Dejazmatch Mano Seyoum 1956–1960 Fitawrari Abebe Gebre 1960–1963 Dejazmatch Worku Enqu 1963–1967 Selassie Brigadier General Worku 1967–1968 Metafaria General Wolde Selassie 1968–1971 Bereka General Jagama Kello 1971–1974
* The grandson of the emperor who never came to Bale but governed from Addis Ababa. Source: Provincial archives of Bale and Arsi regions. ethno-cultural origin and religious affiliation of governors and the power and influence the Amhara exercised over the periphery or newly acquired regions after the conquest of the late 19th century.
Governing the Periphery: The Political Administration of Arsi Region (1941–1974)
After the 5 years’ occupation of Ethiopia, the Italians were defeated during the Second World War and expelled from the country by British forces and
ERITREA Red Sea YEMEN TIGRAY Mekele GONDER
SUDAN Gonder WELO DJIBOUTI Gulf of Aden Dese GOJAM Debre Markos
Addis Harar WELEGA Ababa SOMALIA Nekemte SEHWA Gore Jima ARSI Asela HARERGE ILUBABOR Goba KEFA Awasa Arba Minch BALE GAMA GOFA SIDAMO
UGANDA KENYA INDIAN OCEAN Map 7.1 Imperial political map, 1941–1974.
4 Abbas Haji and John M. Cohen, Rural Change in Ethiopia, p. 109. 5 Christopher Clapham, Haile Selassie’s Government (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 21; Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1969), pp. 343–345.
The Ethno-Political Backgrounds of Governors After the restoration, Haile Selassie’s government resumed Menelik’s policy of appointing Shoan officials to the various provinces. The governor-generals as a rule had little or no modern education, but were selected by virtue of their unconditional loyalty to the throne and long service and experience in the administration.8 So, all governors of Arsi from 1941 to 1974 were of Amhara and Tigrean origin, as the preceding policy of 50 years. A brief description of these governors may enable us to understand the class and ethnic composition of the ruling elites and the men who were in the key position of the region in order to prove the continuity of imperial system and the exclusion of the Oromo from all meaningful political and judicial power. The first Governor General appointed to Arsi on May 29th 1942 was Dejazmatch Amda Michael. He was governing the region on the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935. After the outbreak of the war, he fought the Italians in Arsi at the head of 10,000 soldiers.9 When Haile Selassie’s government was reorganized, he returned to his former post of Governor General. Later, as a member of a wealthy family, he was appointed to the Crown Council from 1943 to 1953.
6 Ye aghar Ghizat Mahset, Journal of Ministry of Interior, Fourth year, no. 1–2 (Addis Ababa, 1958 E.C.), p. 21. 7 Ibid. 8 Ye Aghar Ghizat Mashet, Journal of Ministry of Interior, Fourth year, no 4 (Addis Ababa, 1957 E.C.), pp. 7–9. 9 J. Markakis, p. 293.
The second governor appointed in August 1943 was Bitoweded Negash Bezabeh, a descendant of the royal house of Tekle Haimanot. The emperor kept his eye on royal pretenders from different provinces (Shoa, Godar, Gojjam, Tigrai, etc.) whom he managed to marginalize or eliminate progressively. Thus, Bitoweded Negash was accused of plotting to kill the emperor and sentenced to death though this sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in Jimma.10 The third governor sent to Arsi in 1952 was Ras Asrate Kassa, a prominent member of the Shoan royal family who played a crucial role in propping up the regime by quelling the 1960s coup against the emperor.11 Above all, his appointment in Arsi was politically significant as he was the grandson of Ras Darghe who conquered and ruled the province both the current Arsi region, and eastern Bale, also inhabited by the Arsi Oromo. He served as a Governor General of several prov- inces including Begemder, Wollaga and Shoa. He also held the position of the vice president and president of the Senate (1957–1964) and the emperor’s repre- sentative to Eritrea. He was replaced by Ras Mengesha, the grand grandson of emperor Yohannes, Haile Selassie’s son-in-law who Governed Sidamo and Tigre (his native land) and he also served as the minister of Public Works.12 Following Ras Mengesha, the administrator appointed to Arsi in May 1955, was Tsahafi Tezaz Wolde Giorgis Wolde Yohannes. His background was differ- ent from that of his predecessors. Though he was also a Shoan Amhara, he was born into a humble family. He worked his way up to join the aristocracy and ended up by distinguishing himself as a shrewd politician who dominated the Ethiopian politics for about 20 years (1934–1954).13 He had been able to win the confidence of the emperor and by being the Minster of Pen, wielded all kinds of power. This enabled him to win international reputation and was even called his “Eminence Grise” by Europeans.14 In the end, however, he fell out of favor. The Shoan aristocrats who were critical of his spectacular rise right from the start, his other opponents and rivals, the empress, the crown prince, his fellow commoners led by Mekonen Habtewold all came together to oust him. To his surprise, the emperor, his only patron, turned against him as well. This combined hostility became too much to bear for a man of a common origin, and in 1955 he was removed from the office and demoted to the governorship of Arsi province.15
10 Angelo Dell Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935–1941, translated by P.D. Cummins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 116. 11 For details see Bahru Zewde, History of Ethiopia, pp. 211–215. 12 Cohen, pp. 518–519. 13 Ibid. 14 Clapham, p. 110. 15 Ibid., p. 91.
In fact, this development had great repercussions both on national politics as well as on the administration of Arsi. The defeat of Wolde Giorgis’s faction – though not very strong he had his own supporters – in palace politics gave rise to the predominance of Habte Wold’s family (namely, Mekonen Habtewold and Aklilu Habte Wold) and their followers in Ethiopian politics until the Revolution of 1974. The immediate consequence of Wolde Giorgis’s defeat was his banishment to Arsi where he presided over one of the most oppressive and corrupt administrations in the region where maladministra- tion was already a common place. On the other hand, the rise of Aklilu Habte Wold brought to the political scene of the region, Dejazmatch Sahlu Difaye, a client of Habte Wold’s family, the most corrupt, unpopular and notorious Enderassie16 who governed this region from 1965 to 1974, as we will see later. Dejazmatch Geresu Duki, one of the figures in the resistance against the Italians, was made governor of Arsi in the 1950s and then was succeeded by Dejazmatch Daniel Abebe, the son of Ras Abebe Aregay, a well–known guerilla leader during the Italian occupation. It appears as if the policy was to reward notable figures against occupation and, in the process, to relieve some pressure from the emperor whose role and atti- tude during the invasion and occupation was disputed by some patriots.17 To put it briefly, all governors listed above were representatives of three groups or categories of people. The first group consisted of the royal family of Shoa, Gojjam and Tigre. Secondly, the other group included guerrilla activists who had already won some reputation as patriots or a patriot’s son. Daniel, the son of Abebe Aregay, himself claims to have been fighting against the Italians when he was injured.18 The third category of governors consisted of self–made individuals like Wolde Giorgis and Shalu Difaye who rose from modest origins and became the members of the oligarchy of the empire. Although all these governors were corrupt and addicted to embezzlement, the degree of their exploitation, the impression and the legacy they left in the area varied. Government officials had the same orientation towards authority and power. All of them seemed to adhere to Amharic traditional dictum that says “Sishom yalbella sishar ye kochwal” meaning “he who does not eat when he is appointed will regret when he is deposed.” This feudal sentiment
16 Ibid., p. 116. 17 It is beyond the preview of this work to analyze the alleged emperor’s negotiations during occupation with B. Mussolini where he appears to have considered the colonization as the fait accompli and pleading to the Shoan kingdom, the historical, political base of the newly created empire. 18 An Amharic term meaning “like me” or “on behalf of me.” So, The Enderassie was the emperor’s personal representative and political appointee to the region.
19 A. Dell Boca, pp. 243–244. 20 Gebru Tareke, Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941–1970, p. 81.
Taxation without Representation Governor-generals were sent to administrative regions with the view of main- taining the status quo, keeping law and order, controlling rebellions and collect- ing taxes. In the case of Arsi, as Cohen has pointed out, “the administrators used their powers to gain land and settle tenants on them to squeeze illegal revenues out of local people and collect taxes for the central government which were rarely returned to the areas in the form of public expenditure.”21 The question is however, the discrepancy between what was collected and returned to the region in form of public expenditure. Surprisingly instead of allocating the money obtained from taxation for the development of the region, the govern- ment forced the people to raise funds for projects in other regions. This was given a name of Mawacho fund raising (self-help fund). The peasants, whether owners of land or not, were required to pay a fixed amount of money for the building of schools, health centers, roads etc. The people of the three Awraja had contributed to the proposed projects on different occasions, ideally after every harvest. In most cases the method of raising funds was vague, unac- counted for and ultimately, created an endless cycle of embezzlement.22 The money collected was hardly allocated for the alleged projects of com- mon goods (schools, road, hospital, etc.).23 The people were tired of these end- less forced “self-help funds” which were organized under different names and they openly used to complain that their money was “eaten up” by the gover- nors and officials of all ranks. To refute this alleged gossip and paint a rosy picture opinion, Dejazmatch Sahlu said that public money was raised properly and was invested on the planned projects for which the funds were raised. Therefore, he added, he and his subordinates were free from any charges of embezzlement.24 The misuse of these resources, however, was disclosed after the Ethiopian Revolution. According to Addis Zemen, an official newspaper, the Arsi people
21 Ya Aghar Ghizat Meheet, Journal of Ministry of Interior, Third year, no. 3 (Addis Ababa, 1956 E.C.), pp. 13–14. 22 The people of Arsi witness that the Awraja or Woreda governors used to came suddenly with police to surround the market where the peasants had come to sell their produce and buy what they wanted. Since no one could escape, every person had to make a contri- bution assessed by the Chicka shum, the lowest intermediary between a village and in the local administration and who knew the economic status of the peasants and what they could pay on the spot. But no receipt was given for the money paid. 23 Cohen, p. 113. 24 Some of the things that were said to have been done by public fund are mentioned in Sahlu Difaye, Ye Arussi Hizb Limatina Edget. The Arsi Peoples’ Development and progress (Addis Ababa: Berhanina Selam Printing Press, 1996).
25 Ibid., p. 109. 26 Dessalegn Rahmato, op. cit., p. 45. 27 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 521–523.
28 Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstract (Addis Ababa, 1972), p. 196. Moreover, the students from Arbagugu and Ticho provinces needed to travel to 4 days’ journey to reach Assalla. By and large, the absence of communication and the problem of maintaining oneself economically in town precluded the majority of the students from pursuing their education beyond primary or junior secondary level. So, they usually returned to their villages to shoulder the yoke of feudal exploitation with their parents. 29 Addis Zemen (Tahsas 15, 1967 E.C.), p. 1. 30 Cohen, in the same way the people from eastern Arsi had to come to Nazerth and then went to Assalla.
The Forms of Corruption and Embezzlement In the Woreda administration, other administrative channels and the lowest formal judiciary and administrative structure, the Amhara outnumbered the other groups. For instance, out of 22 Woreda governors, only three were Arsi Balabbats in the mid-1960s,36 who neither spoke nor read anything written in Amharic. Yet, some Arsi balabbats seemed to have benefited from the feudal
31 Shalu Difaye, p. 81. 32 Ibid., p. 189. 33 Cohen, pp. 521–523. 34 Dessalegn Rahmato, “Condition of the Ethiopian Peasantry.”Challenge, X, no. 2 (1970), p. 43. 35 See Sahlu, the list of officials and administration and the list of 10 Woreda governors of Chilalo province in 1970s. Cohen, p. 533. All of them were non-Arsi. 36 After the outbreak of the revolution, Bekele Ogeto took to the bush and after sometime the government soldiers killed him.
37 Abbas Gnamo, “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats,” pp. 585–592. 38 Salhu Difaya, op. cit., looks at the names of the 22 governors. 39 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 534–536. 40 Ibid., p. 556.
41 It was a common practice that an elder or a village head or people’s spokesman usually raised money from the people in order to give to officials. 42 Cohen., op. cit., p. 536. 43 Ibid. 44 P.T.W. Baxter, “Always on the outside looking in: A view of the 1969 Ethiopian Election from a rural constituency.” In Working Papers on Society and History in Imperial Ethiopian. The Southern Periphery from 1880–1974, edited by D.L. Donham and W. James (Cambridge: African Studies Centre, June 1980), p. 219.
45 M. Perham, op. cit., pp. 69–71. 46 C. Clapham., op. cit., p. 140. 47 Ibid., p. 141. 48 Baxter, op. cit., p. 212. 49 Sahlu Difaye, op. cit., p. 127. Grazmatch Deksiso Bedhaso and Kanazmatch Turii Tuula were among five well-known cattle breeders.
50 P.T.W. Baxter, “Always on the outside looking in: A view of the 1969 Ethiopian Election from a rural constituency,” p. 211. 51 Ibid., p. 215. 52 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 519–523.
53 Sahlu called upon his fellow governor-generals to follow his suit and prepare a handbook of their respective regions. Indeed, given the fertility of the land, a farmer or cattle raiser could have been at least self-sufficient if not rich provided he was free from any form of exploitation. However, he did not farm for himself and consume the fruits of his labor. A great portion of his produce passed over and bribe. As member of the Ethiopian ruling class who used to boast that Ethiopia was the “Bread Basket” for others when millions of its citizen starved to death, it is no wonder, that Sahlu said that “all are rich” for this would be his own contribution to prop up the decaying Feudal system. 54 Baxter, op. cit., p. 217. 55 Dessalegn Rahmato, op. cit., p. 47. 56 Randi F. Balsvik, Haile Selassie’s Students Rise of Social and Political Consciousness (sub- mitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tromso, 1979), pp. 482–483.
The Informal Structures of Domination The other important informal office – local authority not recognized in the law – to which we draw our attention is the institutions of Balabbat which was put in place in the South, South–East and South–Western Ethiopia from about 1900 to 1974. As we discussed earlier, in most Southern societies the term was new in the traditional social structure and was borrowed after the imperial
57 John H. Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years (Algonac, MI: Reference Publications, 1984). 58 Informant: Balamabras Degafa a well-known advocate who represented many dispos- sessed groups of peasants in Assalla. 59 The emperor was said to have been refraining from making decisions on his own because of his personal ambiguity, see Clapham, op. cit., p. 49.
60 Dassalegn Rahmato, op. cit., p. 44. 61 Quoted by Jacques Bureau, “A diachronic study of two Gamo titles.” In D. Donham and W. James, eds., op. cit., p. 183. 62 For the details, see Abbas Gnamo, “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats: A Study of Socio- Economic Position of Local Chiefs in Southern Ethiopia, 1886–1935.” 63 John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, pp. 107–108. 64 Brotto, op. cit., p. 92.
65 Abbas Gnamo, “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats,” pp. 585–592. 66 Markakis, op. cit., p. 107. 67 Ibid., pp. 107–108. 68 Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, Report on the Survey of Land Tenure of Arussi Province (Addis Ababa, 1967), p. 4.
In order to distinguish them from ordinary people (masses), the govern- ment gave the balabbats traditional Amhara titles.69 In Arsi, most of the balab- bats had the title of Balambaras – the lowest rank – and very few reached intermediate ranks such as Qagnazmatch and Grazmatch. No evidence sug- gests any appointed balabbats rose above these titles. In any case, all these titles could serve the purpose – being recognized and considered above ordi- nary farmers and laymen. To create and strengthen their class alliance and amicable relations with the ruling groups, some of the balabbats did not resist the temptation of assimilation to the Amhara culture.70 Undoubtedly, those who were Christianized did so not because of any religious piety and commit- ment, but to improve their political, economic and social status and to be accepted among Christian ruling circles.71 Beyond achieving social mobility one’s status through socialization, eating and drinking with the Christians at the same table seemed to have given an impetus to Christianization. Traditionally, the Muslims and Christians did not (and still do not) eat the meat of animals slaughtered by non-members of their religion. Probably this was difficult for those who usually met or worked together or interacted frequently. The conversion of some balabbats started as early as the first decade of the 20th century and went on until 1974. Yet, it is clear that the balabbats superfi- cially converted to Christianity as most of them renounced after the revolution of 1974. The case in point was a certain balabbat of the Habura clan who was converted to Orthodox Christianity. As he was approaching his old age, he had many sons and daughters from his wives, notables often married to many wives. Some of his sons and wives converted to Christianity while others refused to do so. After the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime, perhaps a decade after his conversion, it became evident that Christianity would not serve as a criterion for social mobility and attainment of politico-economic
69 Cohen, pp. 537–538. 70 In Arsi, where the process of Islamization began since the second half of the 20th century and speeded up by Menelik’s conquest, the Balabbats did not succeed in bringing their fellow men to Christianity. In most cases, a Balabbat remained the only Christian in Islamized Gosa. The conversion of these Balabbats to Christianity aimed at improving their socio-economic status. In fact, it turned out to be the best means of achieving social status and material want. For example, the only two Arsi Balabbats fit Bekele Ogato and Fitawrari Wolde Michael Buie attained the post of the Awraja governors before 1974 were orthodox Christians. Particularly after 1974, when they lost their privilege and their impor- tance, most of the Christianized, balabbats seem to have faced what one could call “iden- tity crisis” and we are told that many of them are reconverting to Islam. 71 Abbas Gnamo, “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats,” pp. 585–592.
72 Markakis, op. cit., p. 107. 73 Praising heroes and witty people and ridiculing undesirable behaviors norms such as for- wardness and selfishness.
74 Abbas Haji Gnamo, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle éclater?” pp. 239–284. 75 Arne Laxander, Land Ownership, Tenancy and Social Organization in Waji Area, no. 50 (CADU Publication, March 1970), pp. 86–87.
At the start, the Golmassa function was sub-ordinated to the balabbat and Chicka Shum institutions and the Golmassa were to carry out the role of mes- sengers, i.e., to communicate government orders from Woreda offices to vil- lages. With the passage of time, the role of Golmassa turned out to be crucial in connecting the government ruling bodies with rural populations. They did a great deal in pressuring the people to pay the taxes on time, controlling crimi- nals, arbitrating local conflicts, organizing the afarsata,76 passing information from above to the people, collecting data from the local communities, and in raising “self-help funds.”77 In short, each Golmassa was in a position to follow up every activity in his area. For this practical reason, the Woreda governors tended to ignore the bal- abbats and depended upon the Golmassa, as a more effective channel of com- munication compared to both the balabbat and the chicka shum. But, it has to be stressed that the Golmassa, like the people they represented, were power- less; they were simply messengers of an oppressive district administration. Moreover, since the office of the Golmassa was informal and experimental, the law did not recognize their rights and duties. The Golmassa’s role was limited to executing orders and providing information to his superiors on what occurred in his 20 Gasha. However weak the power of the Golmassa may have been, he had access to bribery and treacherous method of extracting money for himself and some incentive from the authorities for collecting taxes. He also used to serve as a go-between in receiving bribes from peasants and hand- ing them over to officials. There was no way of checking what reached the offi- cials and what was left in the hands of the Golmassa. Another type of informal leadership observable under Shalu’s administra- tion was the Shimagile (elders). Dejazmatch Sahlu learned that in traditional societies, elders exerted considerable authority and influence over society. The Arsi were no exception in this regard. So, he carefully deflected the traditional role of Arsi elders to supplement and reinforce his administrative agents, both formal and informal, in the region. He reported that there were 1213 elders who were elected from every 20 Gasha throughout the region. The elders played an important role in implementing governmental orders and detecting crimes at the local level.78 After the Ethiopia revolution, the peasant associations in Arsi were organized along the already existing Golmassa territory (areas) with slight modification and readjustments.
76 Ibid., pp. 83–86. 77 Aferrsata seems to have been originated from an Oromo word, which means “sit down” it is a traditional way of investigating criminals. See Yeager Gazta Meshet, Third year, no 3 (1975 E.C.). 78 Cohen, pp. 540–541; Lexander, op. cit., p. 84.
The Chicka Shum79 was another important office of local government. This office was in operation in most parts of the country.80 It required peasant land- owners to serve as Chicka Shum on a rotational basis for specific periods of time. The duration of service was determined by the size of land one possessed. That is, for one gasha 1 year of services was required, and if one’s possession were smaller, the period of the services would be shorter accordingly. The Chicka Shums were subordinates of the balabbats and carried out the various functions which faded away with the advent of the Golmassa in the 1960s. It became redundant in the face of more motivated Golmassas who were serving a longer term as opposed to rotating task of unmotivated landowner Chicka shum. The Chicka Shums were not paid any regular salary. However, for every hundred Birr they collected, they were given a commission of one Birr. Moreover, they used their power to acquire illegal income in the form of bribes and labor services from tenants for serving as intermediaries between the dis- trict administration and the local communities.81
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, we briefly assessed what imperial policies, regional politics and feudal institutions looked like, the way they worked, and the impact of the administration on the Arsi Oromo who always considered the imperial rule as oppressive and unfair. But, the Ethiopian method of administration permitted the government to control, maintain order, extract revenues and mobilize resources in the region despite its anarchic and anach- ronistic nature. As discussed in details, after the successful conquest, the commanders of the invading army were given the governorships. Then they appointed their high ranking officers to different provinces and districts. Each officer and his men were not paid any salary but were allowed to live on the work and free service of the local population. Theoretically, there was a sort of hierarchical administration but in reality there was no clear administrative linkage and functional relationship between different levels of government. It was a decen- tralized feudal colonialism where each Shum (official) considered his domain or the territory under his control as his min-kingdom and ruled and managed
79 Sahlu Difaye, op. cit., p. 95. 80 Literally it means, “Mud official” used pejoratively to belittle the importance of these duties, imported from Amhara regions to the South. 81 Markakis, op. cit., pp. 312–315; M. Perham, op. cit., pp. 274–276.
Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine further the socio-economic structure of the society by focusing on the landlord-tenant economic relations and resultant peasant pauperization and alienation. Based on facts and figures, I will bring to light the nature of Ethiopian feudal-colonial system and center-periphery relations, demographic change as a result of natural growth and government induced immigration en masse after 1941 and the extent to which it altered the traditional settlement patterns, social morphology, and interethnic relations. Particular emphasis will be placed on the condition of landless peasants and small land owners and the extent to which the system exposed them to exploi- tation, arbitrary eviction and dehumanization. Land alienation and the deterioration of the condition of farmers took on a new dimension with the introduction of modern/mechanized agriculture. In fact, development appeared to mean displacement for many landless peasants or small landown- ers. The data are based on oral information gathered from fieldwork1 as well as relevant written material and official documents. Also, I was born and grew up in the province and pertinently know the impacts of mechanization on peas- ants in Chilalo province. As was examined in Chapter VI, in its economic aspect, the outcome of the conquest of 1880s was the “initial expropriation of land and continuous alien- ation of land.”2 The expropriation of land from the local people and its reallo- cation to the new comers took place for various reasons. First and foremost, to reward soldiers and administrators for the service they had rendered during the wars of expansion and the ensuring administration through the attribution of gult and rist land.3 Secondly, it was argued that unless the subject people
1 The period we are discussing is relatively recent. Therefore many informants have closely observed or taken part in the events we are addressing. They give us invaluable information emanating from their [fresh] memories. But, although I talked to many of them formally or informally, in order to give them privacy their names are not mentioned throughout the paper. 2 Markakis, p. 137. 3 Richard Pankhurst, Land and State in Ethiopian History, p. 137.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/������������6_�1�
4 Rexford Henry Kofi Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire, p. 37. 5 Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935, p. 37. 6 E. Brotto, op. cit., p. 96. 7 Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskal, “The Land System of Ethiopia.” Ethiopian Observer, I, no. 9 (1957): 283–288; Mi RA, op. cit., p. 1. 8 Mahteme Sellassie, op. cit., p. 284; Charles W. McCellan, Perspective on the Neftenya Gabbar System. The example of Darasa. 9 Rey, op. cit., pp. 52, 189–190. 10 Cited in Pankhrust, Economic History of Ethiopia, p. 156.
The Socio-Economic Structure in the Post-Italian Period, 1941–1974
As discussed in the preceding chapters, up to the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935, the Gabbar system the dominant form of economic organization. But after their successful occupation of Ethiopia, of the south in particular, the Italians began to undermine this system in order to win over the Gabbars to their side. The soldiers and settlers and their associates who were mainly the beneficia- ries could not keep the Gabbar system in existence. In effect, the already estab- lished master-servant (naftagna-Gabbar) relationship ceased to exist and in its wake animosities and wars between the two communities led to heavy loss of lives. Although the Gabbar system began to fade away in the 5 years of occupa- tion, its official demise came with the proclamation of 1941 issued by Emperor Haile Selassie.11 But the question is: was the Gabbar system abolished or maintained under different forms? What did the peasant condition and distribution of wealth look like after 1941? Although Arsi region is named after the people inhabiting that area for centuries and although they still constitute by far the large major- ity, there is considerable concentration of Amhara and Shoan Oromo clans in both countryside and towns. The Gurage and few Tigreans are also found in urban centers. The Amhara began to settle immediately after the war of con- quest as soldier-settlers, administrators and government officials of various ranks. In subsequent decades more Amhara settlers arrived from their home area as descendants of soldier-settlers, their relatives or independent farmers. Moreover, some Shoan Oromo clans took part in Menelik’s war of expan- sion, most involuntarily as they were more forcefully recruited from the already conquered districts during the war of expansion. Therefore Menelik was said to have rewarded some of them for the service they rendered during the war even though it was known to be involuntary. But, there is no evidence that they received any significant parcel in newly conquered regions. However, the Gullalle, the former inhabitants of Addis Ababa were evicted from their land, Finfine, and were granted a large area of land south of Assalla where one-third of the clan is said to have moved.12 In fact, this was not related to the war but to just cleanse the original inhabitants from Addis Ababa, the newly created capital of the empire. The rest, however, came in groups due to the shortage of land and exhaustion of resources in Northern Ethiopia. These people were mostly poor and were mainly interested in making a living. Gradually they were followed by many others when the fertility of Arsiland became widely
11 Gebru Tareke, op. cit., pp. 94–95. 12 Arne Lexander, The Changing Rural Society in Arussi Land, p. 13.
13 Markakis, op. cit., p. 112. 14 Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Minilik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 194.
One cannot say that the Shoan Oromo in general and those in Arsi in par- ticular were Amharanized in the real sense of the term. As a result of long- lasting contacts with the Amhara, they underwent changes in aspects of culture and values; however, most of them could not understand and speak Amharic. Like their ancestors, they continued to practice their traditional Oromo beliefs and rituals. The Gadaa system has persisted among the Shoan Oromo clans to this date although it faded away in most Oromo societies including the majority Arsi. A British anthropologist, who conducted his research on Shoan Oromo among the Arsi in 1970s tells us, that they still prac- tice the contemporary Shoan Oromo Gadaa system, which has five grades. He also analyzes their social organization and economic life.15 I personally saw the celebration of the Gadaa system every 8 years although their Gadaa was reduced to rituals and ceremonies. Yet, it shows their distinct Oromo identity and cultural heritage despite formal conversion to Ethiopian Christianity. In addition, Shoan Oromo and the Amhara in Arsi, live in agnatically based residential units and hamlets, i.e., in most cases they reside in separate areas. However, in most cases, the Shoan Oromo lived among the Arsi Gosa without any difficulty as they shared basic tents of Oromo culture and values. Economically, the Shoan Oromo groups were farmers with a good knowledge of soil cultivation. Consequently, they successfully exploited the virgin lands they settled, and some of them became rich peasants and owners of their own land. The latecomers, however, were unfortunate since they could not get any land in the form of grant or through purchase, because the price of land was beyond reach. So, they become chisegnoch (tenants) and were exposed to abject poverty. In some areas studied in Arsi, most of the peasant-tenants were the Shoan Oromo.16 The Shoan Oromo community in Arsi did not seem to have been active politically. In the first place, they were not entitled to hold the office of Balabbat, who were recruited mostly from the Arsi Oromo clans as well as Amhara notables. Secondly, they were not educated or integrated into Abyssinian administrative machinery and political culture to be able to fit in the bureaucracy. As a consequence, the participation of Tulama immigrants in the local government structure and administration was minimal. For instance, if one looks at the list of candidates for the chamber of deputies in imperial Ethiopia in the 1960s and 1970s, the contest largely took place between the Amhara politico-military elites and Arsi notables.17 It is true, however, that
15 Hector Blackhurst, “Continuity and Change in Shoa Galla Gadaa System.” In Age, Generation and Time, edited by P.T.W. Baxter and Uri Almagor (1978), pp. 246–250. 16 Lexander, Land Ownership, p. 18. 17 Cohen., op. cit., p. 603; Sahlu Difaye, pp. 89–90.
18 Markakis, op. cit., p. 294. 19 Unless one goes into genealogy sometimes it is very hard to identify the Gurage separately from Amhara for the former usually adopt Amhara name. 20 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 250, 221–222. 21 Haberland, op. cit., p. 784. Karl Knustsson who studied the Arsi of the rift valley, argues that the Arsi used to subsist on a trans human pastoral economy that took them to the highlands around Chilalo. But after the conquest of the last century veteran Amhara and Shoa Oromo soldiers were given land on the Arussi plateau. This stopped the transhu- mance of the pastral of Arsi Oromo and they were forced to remain in the lowlands. See, Karl Knutson in F. Barth, op. cit., pp. 88–99. 22 Cohen, op. cit., p. 97.
23 Markakis, op. cit., p. 116. 24 Lexander, The Changing Rural Society in Arussi Land, pp. 10–11.
25 Cohen, op. cit. 26 Markakis, op. cit., p. 170. 27 Henok Kifle, Investigation on Mechanized Farming and Its Effects on the Peasant Agriculture, no. 74 (CADU Publications, 1972), pp. 12–13.
28 Ibid. 29 Gebru, Tareke, op. cit., p. 454; Dessalegn Rahmato, op. cit., p. 45. 30 Milra, op. cit., p. 1. 31 Ngussay Ayele, “Is There Feudalism in Ethiopia?” In Conference on Feudalism in Ethiopia (organized by the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, March 20, 1976), pp. 9–11. 32 Allan Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia, p. 131. 33 Ibid., pp. 182–189.
34 Mahteme Selassie, op. cit., Arne Lexander, Land Ownership, pp. 7–8. 35 Milra, op. cit., p. 20. 36 Ibid., p. 21.
37 Lexander, Land Ownership, pp. 46–67. 38 Urlich Brankamper, Geschichte de Hadiya Sud-Athiopiens (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980), p. 437. 39 Laxander, Landownership, p. 9.
40 Gebru Tareke, op. cit., p. 99; Dessalegn Rahmeto, op. cit., p. 35. 41 Gebru Tareke, op. cit., p. 95.
42 Usury may take different form, but its existence in highland areas of the various commu- nities is without doubt. 43 The people who did not have another way out borrowed money, whatever the interest may have been. The major moneylenders were landowners and rich peasants. So, the former squeezed the peasants not only through formal production relations, but also through usury.
44 Addis Zemen (Tahsas 15, 1967 E.C.), p. 9. 45 Cohen, op. cit., p. 218. 46 Balsvik, op. cit., p. 507. 47 Arne Lexander, Land Ownership, p. 77.
Despite using the land, the co-owners did not receive any receipt for land taxes they paid and their names were not recorded on the list. Therefore, they had no legal document supporting or referring to their ownership rights. Some selfish owners and their heirs did not hesitate to deprive the co-owners of their undeniable rights by abrogating their verbal understanding. Some balabbat heirs also were said to have done the same things to claimants who occupied the land for years, but did not have written evidence regarding their claim. For this reason, the victims were reduced to the status of tenants or had to re-purchase the land at a higher price; such cases were the major causes of dissension and conflict within Arsi society and even within kin groups. Boundary conflicts and inheritance problems were the other common source of dispute.48 As far as inheritance was concerned, in traditional Arsi society, daughters were not allowed to share the patrimony of their parents except for dowry which they took with them upon marriage. But, with the introduction of the rist system (hereditary land rights) all sons and daughters could claim their parents’ land although they rarely did.49 Moreover, the elder son’s (hangafa’s) role of arbitrarily allocating the father’s possession (cattle) to his younger brothers was threatened.50 In brief this is the best indicator of disorganization of the old social fabric, values and social practices in Arsi society. The conflicts over land were rarely solved by arbitration regardless of the elders’ attempts to settle them. Arbitrating issues such as rist ownership and other related problems had nothing to do with the customary laws and mediators were not vested with legal powers to enforce their decisions if the dissatisfied party took his cases to court. The courts were hierarchically organized from village courts (Atbia Dagna)51 to provincial courts. The judges of these courts (Woreda, Awarja, and provincial high courts) were appointed by the emperor, on the recommendation of the ministry of justice. What we mentioned in the case of public administration is applicable in the domain of the administration of justice. Like the administrators, the judges had little formal education, and were corrupt as well as biased, and inefficient.52
48 Milra, op. cit., p. 21. 49 Until the introduction of the feudal tenure system, the concept of and practice of rist was non-existent in Arsi society. So, the partition of land was out of question for both males and females. 50 Asmarom Legesse, op. cit., p. 25. 51 Lexander, Landownership, pp. 81–82. 52 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 553–554.
One of the means of squeezing the poor and illiterate peasants was through the notorious system of delaying decisions for a long period of time. It was not uncommon to delay cases for 5–10 years. It seems that if the peasants could not meet the judges’ demands for bribe, the judges postponed their cases under various pretexts so as to share the peasants’ annual produce in the form of bribery and presents in kind. The worst aspect of this system of bribery con- sisted in the fact that the judges were said to have received bribes from both parties – plaintiff and defendant. In theory the loser had the right to appeal to higher courts up to the emperor’s Chilot (highest Court of Law in the country). In practice, he would be subject to the same system in every court. So, decades would elapse before such cases reached their final conclusion. Of course, there were occasions in which the plaintiff or defendant died in the course of time and the cases directly passed on to their sons. Therefore, the sons or daughters either did inherit land or court cases or sometimes both. In general considering the large sum of money invested and the amount of time expended, and since the plot of land claimed was sometimes very tiny, one could reasonably conclude that the expenditure was largely greater than the actual price of the land in question. Here we emphasized land cases other than criminal cases simply because conflict over land was the principal source of most crimes, dissension and social injustice in Arsi. For instance, the reported number of civil cases and criminal cases in Arsi in 1964/1965 was 151, 146 and 135,574 respectively.53 Local authorities could not cover up this fact. Sahlu Difaye himself tells us Arsi was one of the provinces where dispute over land reached its climax.54 This was mainly because the land proved to be the source of life, prestige and influence. To be an Abba lafa (landowner) meant to be influential. I will quote one song, which reflects the attitude of the society towards Landownership.55 Ownership of land seemed to decide an individual’s social status and role. For example land served as a criterion for marriage. In the arrangement of marriage, one of the main questions asked about a person (suitor) was “did he (his parents) have rist land?” and the answer to this question had an impact on the matrimonial strategy.
53 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 553–554. 54 Sahlu Difaye, op. cit., p. 84. 55 “Ya abba lafa originale, Lafa gayee hidhu bolalle Bahar gamatu hin argamu namni si challee.” This means: “Oh/father of land, who is original, wear long trouser, which touches the earth. There is no one comparable to you even across the Sea.” This song emphatically declares land and landowners were highly valued in Arsi society. The word “Originale” is Italian. The song seemed to have been sung after the departure of Italians and after the value of land increased.
The other factor that contributed a lot to intensification of bribery and destitution of the peasantry was the multiplication of presenters of court cases known as Tebekas (advocates). Most of Tebekas did not attend or complete their primary education let alone professional training. So, one can call them “self-professed lawyers.” Arsi informants assert that there were no advocates in their traditional political system and the Shoans in the first half of the 20th century introduced it. Hence, some Tebekas began to assist the people in different rudimentary courts. After 1941, there was an increase in civil and criminal cases, a consequence of inherent social contradictions, and the role of Tebekas became indispensable. It was hardly possible for a peasant to run his case short of advocates, since most peasants did not speak Amharic, the official language by which courts administer justice. Moreover, peasants did not know how to present their case before the courts in accordance with the written laws. The advocates who claimed to know the ins and outs of the legal system demanded a large sum of money from the peasantry depending upon the nature of the cases. In particular, well-experienced and reputed advocates at Awraja and provincial high court level obtained hundreds of birr for minor issues. Like all other corrupt officials they also did receive gifts in kind such as honey, grain, butter, beef etc. the judges and advocates worked hand in hand for they had common interests and mutual understanding regarding causes presented to court. Being an advocate was not the only means of earning money but was a good ladder to achieve prestige, influence and to get access to land. The fact that the judges and advocates were at the center of the very complicated issue of land enabled them to have enough experience in distorting facts and acquire land easily through different treacherous methods. As this profession became prestigious, some members of the middle class especially those who could read and write Amharic were busy in studying criminal and civil codes, attending court proceedings at different levels to become advocates. Most of the well-established advocates developed much experience and knowledge and some Arsi were able to become Tebekas due to their personal cases which dragged on for years. According to the data given in the 1960s by official statistical abstract, there was such a number of advocates at court of different level in Arsi that the Arsi region stood second only Shoa administrative region in this respect.56 This clearly indicates the intensity of social conflicts and the consequent exploitation of the majority by the minority.
56 Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstract (Addis Ababa, 1970), pp. 224–225.
Development and Displacement: The Impacts of Mechanization on Farmers
In the late 1960s, the Arsi administrative region, particularly the Chilalo prov- ince, entered a new phase of economic growth and alienation. This was mainly thanks to the introduction of a package program called Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) which came into being as a result Ethio-Swedish cooperation agreement. However implicit in its initial aims may have been, the project was intended to bring about socio-economic development by raising the production of small-scale landowners in view of improving their standard of living.57 In addition, its other main objectives included research, agricultural extension, and the provision of inputs, credits, and marketing of outputs, train- ing and development of infrastructure and other sector of rural development.58 Undoubtedly, as one of coherent models of rural development programs in Ethiopia, CADU has had both far-reaching positive and negative impacts on the social and economic conditions of the Arsi region. Consequently, it attracted the attention of many scholars and development experts who dis- cussed its objectives, organizational set up, success or failure and ineffective- ness. For our own purposes, we shall examine briefly the social impact of mechanization of agriculture on the peasantry which was one of the side effects of the project. The necessity and effectiveness of such a project where feudal economic structure prevailed is an intriguing issue which could be viewed from different perspectives. As one of CADU’s policy makers argued, from a purely economic consideration, it was necessary because it would increase production of the marketable surplus and labor productivity despite its adverse effects on unem- ployment. Secondly, such a development scheme could be seen as inevitable for a transitional society whose economy was commercialized and monetized. On the other hand, from the perspective of the tenants and small-scale farm- ers, it could not be regarded as desirable for its resultant effects have been the eviction of tenants, shifts in tenancy relations in favor of the landlord (due to the increase in the value of land), the progressive diminution of pasture land and the blocking of traditional tracks and routes used by the communities for going to market centers and other regions or neighborhoods.59
57 CADU Annual Report, 1970–1971 (CADU Publications), pp. 1–1. 58 Aregay Waktola, Assessment of the Development, Diffusion and Adoption of Package of Agriculture Innovations in Chilalo Ethiopia (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio University, 1975), pp. 86–87. 59 Henoki Kifle, op. cit., p. 2.
In Arsi, commercial and mechanized farming was in existence before the advent of CADU. Big commercial farmers such as Tedla Abebe, Asres Abay, Tesfaye Rede and Merid Biru showed that mechanized farming was a lucrative source of income. The first three invested their capital on rented land, whereas Merid Biru put his own land under sophisticated modern farming. Although other people with capital and land were on the process of following suit, the idea of mechanization did not receive wider acceptance until CADU had clearly demonstrated its profitability. At the start, some landlords were not enthusiastic60 about innovations introduced by CADU such as improved seeds, fertilizers, simply because they saw them as a threat to established land- lord tenant relationships. But, it did not take them long to realize that CADU’s presence would be more beneficial to them than to the tenants for two sound reasons. Firstly, the increase of production as a result of new techniques would invite many people to rent their land at a very high price. Secondly, they were convinced that if they put their land under mechanized cultivation, they would receive lucrative returns. On the one hand, the tenants and semi-tenants with their traditional meth- ods of farming were not in a position to compete with mechanized farmers who used tractors, combines, fertilizers, and improved seeds. Hence, they could not meet the land’s new prices or could not satisfy the landlords’ expec- tation with their produce. This hastened the breakup of tenancy relations. Therefore, the most suitable land for machinery was brought under commer- cial farming. The people who used to cultivate these areas were evicted or were reduced to status of daily laborers. This condition was similar to what F. Engels wrote about English farmers when capitalism was developing in England. He observed, “The farm-hands have become daily laborers almost everywhere, are employed only when needed by the farmers and therefore often have no work for weeks together especially in winter.”61 This was what experienced by Arsi farmers. Some of them were forcefully expelled and migrated to nearby towns to become daily laborers. In fact, this was the choice of bachelors and people with little or less responsibility of ensuring the basic needs of their families. So, the logical option for evicted farming households was to migrate to a new environment where land could be rented or bought at a reasonable price. As a result, the neighboring administra- tive regions of Bale and Hararge became the target and destination of tenants’ migration during this period (1967–1974). The former region was and is sparsely
60 Some of them thought that (though, not incorrectly, that) the government would give their land to foreigners. 61 Frederick Engles, The Condition of the Working Class in England, p. 263.
62 The width of Bale is 198,300 km2. Its population is 902,900 which makes the inhabitants per km2 7.0. See Yegar astedader Zana, pub 1–51 by Ministry of Interior, public Relation May, 1983 and year, no. 10, p. 43. 63 Markakis, op. cit., p. 135.
64 Henok Kifle, op. cit., p. 23. 65 Merid Birru, the son of Ras Birru Wolde Gabriel, one of the leading landowners in Ethiopia started the action around Etheya. 66 In areas where the supply of labor power was very high the nominal wage tended to fall below 0.75 birr. On the contrary, when labors were badly needed during Kremt and where adequate numbers of laborers were not found, the price used to rise as high as 3 birr.
67 In Arsi the people who did not have their own heads of cattle, sometimes served the rich person. In this case they were not paid in cash, but were given a heifer as Handhura (Navel) in order to enable they to possess their own cattle. Within a short period of time they would begin to raise herds independently. 68 Even though there is special Amharic term, which is known as Yeqan sira (daily labor) which is used in some areas giornata was widely accepted and used in this period. 69 The Cabos (foreman) were usually the relatives of employers, but sometimes were oppor- tunist persons who would never sympathize with workers. As a result, he would earn a relatively a better payment.
In such over-crowded areas, with some under employment of the labor force and of oxen too quick an introduction of the widespread use of tractors could be too costly and will further increase underemployment. The same holds true where big landowners change from renting out their land as small tenants’ holdings to large-scale commercial farming with tractors. In certain circumstance such a transformation presents advan- tageous features, but it can also be very dangerous.72
As we analyzed earlier, rich peasants, landlords and government officials, were in a position to buy their own tractors, combines and trucks. The government also gave considerable subsidy and encouragement to any endeavor pertaining to mechanization.73 Small-scale commercial farmers which included middle peasants, government employees and traders hired the machinery from the groups we cited above. Therefore big mechanized farmers obtained their profit not only from agriculture, but also from the rent of tractors and harvesters. The profitability of mechanized farming was beyond doubt. Nonetheless, it is difficult to say that the rate of profit was constant throughout mechanized farming in Chilalo. This is mainly because of variations in the fertility of land,
70 Even though the Arsi were not highly affected by urban influences, the Shoan Oromo and Amhara family life was worsened and disintegrated, because a break up of family led to considerable immigration where some person turned to prostitutions. 71 One of positive effects of the projects was the wider opportunity for employment. Many schools led men and professionals were employed in various sectors (sections) of the project although the peasants were unwanted. In many of the these other than manual labor and mostly employed as waiter (guard). 72 Cited in Gene Ellis, Men or Machine, Beast or Burden: A Case Study of the Economic of Agricultural Mechanization in Ada District, Ethiopia (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Tennessee, 1972), pp. 146–147. 73 Henok Kifle, op. cit., p. 13.
74 Cohen, op. cit., p. 203. 75 Peasants were denied justice everywhere for all police officers, judges, and administrators were major investors. All conflicts between the mechanized commercial farmers and the forcefully dispossessed peasants usually ended in favor of the former. In this manner they safeguarded their interests and property until 1974. 76 Argay Waktola, op. cit., p. 246. In 1970–1972 over 97% of the total participants of credit were small farmers. 77 Cohen, op. cit., p. 198.
The constraints of feudalism, an uncommitted national center, lack of mutuality of interests between donor and donor government, and a land tenure system which concentrated the principal source of agrarian wealth in the hands of a provincial elites, limited the change so that growth in yields, infrastructure and rural amenities primarily benefited the large farmers and merchants, tradesmen and other provincial elites of the town.79
The expansion of commercial farming at an alarming rate in the 1970s would have resulted in the virtual displacement of the remaining small cultivators from all geographically cultivable areas. However, after the revolution, the land proclamation of 1975 altered the course of events by explicitly declaring the nationalization of rural lands. This did not only abolish the feudal socio- economic base but also stifled the development of capitalist socio-economic structure until the process of liberation process of the 1990s.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the post-Italian period, from 1941 to 1974, until the end of the long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie and the consequent revolution- ary change. We indicated how the Emperor restored the political economy of feudal colonialism upon his return from exile. This period was characterized by the consolidation of the emperor and his absolutist power, with enhanced extractive and distributive role, and further alienation and marginalization of the periphery. He was free to reward his supporters and courtesans under the name bale wulata (clients, allies) who got more land grants and were also placed in the key political positions without any hindrance. At the same time, Feudalism was evolving into a sort of nascent capitalism which some called “Feudo-capitalism” (a transitional socio-economic system which was neither entirely feudal nor capitalist). The beneficiary of the
78 Henock Kifle, op. cit., p. 32. 79 Cohen, op. cit., p. 421.
∵
Chapter 9 The Politics of Transforming the Empire-State: Ethnic Identity vs. National Identity in Ethiopia
Imperial Nation-Building
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Ethiopia did not only survive west- ern colonialism but also expanded its realm. The second Italian attempt at colonization (1936–1941) was thwarted when the independence was restored thanks to national resistance and British help during the Second World War. Moreover, Ethiopia benefited from the post war situation not only by acquiring more territories in the east and the north, but also by winning sympathy from Western public opinion as a victim and survivor of fascism, as well as newly emerging African nationalists and the Black Diaspora all over the world, as a symbol of independence, hope and dignity. More importantly, at the national level, Adwa – the place where Italy was defeated in 1896 and the consequent pride – led to what an Ethiopian scholar, Tibebe Teshale, called the “Adwa mentality” and the “complex of superiority.” He argued, “The victory created that so called typical Ethiopian mentality, superiority complex on the part of Ethiopians towards ferengi (whites)…This self–image of superiority which can be called the Adwa complex, extend to every facet of life in aristocratic Ethiopia.”1 It is important to stress that the post-colonial political climate in Africa saw the creation of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) with Ethiopia’s very active role, and its charter that defended boundaries that were inherited from colonialism and helped Ethiopia to keep her territorial acquisition, which was much larger than the historical polity. M. Ottaway summarized the implica- tions of these policies for the whole of Africa in the following terms:
…The Organization of African Unity and the overwhelming majority of African countries rejected aspirations to statehood or territo- rial claims based on national identity. Respect for colonial borders was the fundamental principle of inter-African relations. The right to
1 Tibebe Teshale, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1900–1975, pp. 69–70. For Ethiopia’s ambigu- ous relations within the Black diaspora, see Alberto Sbacchi, The Legacy of Bitterness, pp. 1–34.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi ��.����/�������������_���
self-determination, in the African context, meant decolonization, not the right of different national or ethnic groups to have a country of their own. The only nationalism regarded as legitimate was one embracing the entire population of a country and seeking to coax the diverse popula- tion into becoming a nation. The state was expected to build a nation, but nations were not given the right to create a state.2
In this context, decolonization in the African continent came to mean an end to European rule (both in terms of colonial administration and apartheid), so that only those movements or insurgencies fighting against white minority domination were recognized as “liberation movements.” Thus, reducing colo- nial domination to white race and imperialism to European overseas empires appears to have exonerated the Ethiopian empire from imperial power status and as such the outside world knew little about the “Real Ethiopia” beyond the portrayal of mythical image of an independent nation. Yet, the liberation from Italian fascism and the restoration of the “Solomonic dynasty” did not signify the end of servitude and subjection for the peoples composing Menelik’s empire. This suggests that historic Abyssinia remained sovereign during the European colonial era, except for a 5 year occupation, but simultaneously exer- cised “imperial sovereignty” on neighboring peoples and territories, the oft- repeated nationalist claim seeking the right to self-determination. Robert Jackson explains the concept of imperial sovereignty in the following terms:
…Imperial sovereignty is thus a denial of local sovereignty in foreign countries. Sovereignty gave imperial states independent status in their foreign territories while simultaneously imposing a dependent status on the populations of those same territories. That denial of equal status is often the seed of the demand for political independence on grounds of national self-determination.3
It is important to note that the Italian occupation (1936–1941) exposed the weakness and contradiction of the Ethiopian empire in the newly conquered regions where the Ethiopian state exercised imperial sovereignty. The Italian colonialists who were conscious of Ethiopian history and the unfair treatment of its subjects, did all they could to take advantage of conflict between the center and periphery by attacking the symbols of the Ethiopian feudal
2 Marina Ottaway, Ethnic Conflict and Security in South Africa, p. 121. 3 Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape.” Political Studies, XLVII (1999): 431–456, 441.
4 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest 1941–1970, pp. 288–289. 5 Ibid. 6 In the beginning of the war, in 1935, the people of all provinces were mobilized through their balabbats and all landowners were required to defend the country. Some fought the best they could but others had a hard time to understand why they had to fight on the side of their oppressors, the Naftagna. With the defeat, the Oromo and Naftagna fighters turned the guns against each other to settle their old disputes and the ensuing civil war led to heavy causali- ties. The fighting continued throughout Arsi-Bale regions until the Italians successfully occu- pied the country and restored a fragile peace. 7 Mindaye Abebe Senbeta, The Oromo of Bale, pp. 71–74.
Oromo chiefs succeeded in forming Western Oromo Confederacy under the leadership of Dejazmatch Habte Mariam in June 1936. From the 1880s, when the Oromo were conquered, to 1936, when Italians occupied Ethiopia, it was assumed that the Amhara ruling class’s policy of divide and rule hopelessly divided the Oromo. However, the Oromo showed unity among themselves and solidarity with others by standing together for the common goals of freedom. What brought about this condition was the emergence of a leadership, which sought to liberate the Oromo both from the defeated Ethiopian colonialism and the victorious Italian fascism. The leadership of the Western Oromo government included tra- ditional leaders (i.e., Chiefs) as well as young educated leaders.8
In fact, many letters were written to the British authorities and the League of Nations to express Oromo aspirations and the following letter from hereditary chiefs of Leka-Arjo-Jimma makes this case very clear:
We the undersigned hereditary chiefs declare herewith, that our defi- nite decision is that we wish to be placed under British Mandate, and we appoint Dadazmatch Habte Mariam as our head-chief, and we agree to accept that agreement which he will make and sign with the British Government, that the mandate remains until we achieve self- government.9
For many Oromo, the restoration of Haile Sellassie was not the restoration of their sovereignty that they lost five decades earlier, but the re-establishment of the oppressive and exploitative feudal order which was even more oppres- sive than the Italian system. The return of the unpopular emperor and the
8 Mohammed Hassen, “Colonial Consolidation and Resistances, 1935–2000.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, 7, no. 1–2 (July 2000): 109–198, 113. 9 A translation of a letter written in Amharic on May 25th 1936 and signed by many chiefs in Western Oromia: FO 371 20206 HN 09582.
Mataan amamaa baree miilli kofchammaa baree mal taatu ya Arsii negufni keessan galee
The head is used to turban The feet are used to shoes what will happen to you, the Arsi The king is back10
This song simply shows a relative respite during the Italian occupation when the Gabbar system, forced labor and exaction were abolished although the Italians imposed their own. Furthermore, the Italians were not opposed to Islam, a religion which was embraced by the Oromo in this region as well as the restoration of the Qaalluu institution and pilgrimage banned by the imperial regime (see Chapter V on Islam for further analysis). In other words, the impe- rial treatment of the subject people was harsher and more exploitative than the Italian invaders although this colonial benevolence can be considered as a deliberate strategy of “divide and conquer” policy. After occupation and con- solidation of their rule, there is little doubt that the Italians would have imposed their own version of colonialism which would have been different from Ethiopian feudal colonialism; they made many promises but achieved very little.11 It is well known that colonizers do not establish colonies to protect the wellbeing of their colonial subjects and in this instance was certainly not their primary motive or goal. Be that as it may, in the post-Second World War era, the desire for self-deter- mination of colonies under European domination was encouraged and sup- ported by the United Nations founding Charter12 and the newly emerging superpowers, USA and the USSR (due to ideological, political and strategic considerations of their own), the question of Ethiopian subjects who were
10 For detailed discussion see my article, Abbas H. Gnamo, “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle éclater?,” pp. 239–284. 11 Alberto Sbacchi, The Legacy of Bitterness, Chapter 5, pp. 103–121. 12 For further analysis, see Cameron G. Thies, “National Design and State Building in Sub- Saharan Africa.” World Politics, 61, no. 4 (October 2009): 623–666.
13 For a detailed analysis of British and American support for Ethiopia see, among others, Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941–1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 14 For the evolution of US foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia see Hamdess Tuso, “Oromo Problems and the US Foreign Policy.” In Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-determination in Ethiopia, edited by Seyoum Hameso and Mohammed Hassen (The Red Sea Press Inc., Publishers & Distributors of Third world Books, 2006), pp. 149–202. 15 For detailed discussion and analysis on the war on terror and counter-terrorism including the role of Ethiopia, see the fowling works: Robert I Rothberg, ed., Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2005), Chapters I and 5; Andre Le Sage, ed., African Counter Terrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub Regional Initiatives (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies and National Defense University, 2007); John Davis, ed., Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror (UK: Lexington Books, 2010).
The central question faced by the empire builders and their successors remained the transformation of this disparate polity into a nation and the cre- ation of a coherent national identity. Two strategies appeared to be necessary to achieve this goal: assimilation and modernization. Imperial authorities and their supporters upheld the first whereas the second was the result of a widely spread normative discourse in international politics and nation building para- digm after the rise of modernization theory in the 1950s. Let us quote a repre- sentative view on assimilation from Mesfin Wolde Mariam a former professor of Geography at Addis Ababa University and one of the key opponents to the current Tigrean dominated EPRDF regime:
Conquest and assimilation have been the rules by which all countries of the World have become what they are…The process of nation building involves a lot of bloodshed. Extermination is another method by which some nations were born…let us be clear about one thing, no country in the world was carved by God and given boundaries and a name, Most countries…have extended their domain and enlarged their nation by force and rarely by persuasion.16
This perspective suffers from theoretical and historical shortcomings. Firstly, it simply maintains how conquest and assimilation create a nation, but ignores, deliberately or not, the essence of human history: conquest, and the attempt at reassembling territories and peoples together, administrating, integrating and their failure. Perhaps, the failed attempts at colonization and assimilation largely outweigh successful experiences of assimilation. In other words, not all conquests led to the emergence of a nation and a single identity and there is a question of whether this is ever possible. Secondly, it is plausible to argue that states were based on conquest and expansion in history. Yet, colonization and force do not necessarily give birth to a coherent nation and national identity in modern times. This is mainly because the contemporary world is characterized by the age of nationalism and national awakening, and when combined with the principle of national self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter, it makes “conquest and assimilation” an impossible ideal. It is even more difficult to assimilate national minorities into another nation despite the efforts of many multi-ethnic states. The prevailing internal/civil conflicts in contempo- rary Africa and beyond can be mentioned as examples. Thirdly, Mesfin Wolde Mariam surprisingly ignores other positive argu- ments of nation building such as modernization theory or nation building
16 Mesfin Wolde Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, pp. 25–26.
17 W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). See particularly the chapter reprinted from World Politics, 1972 “Nation Building or Nation-Destroying.” 18 Cf. Charles Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 601. For different insights on the Nation-State see also chapters in Michael Mann, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
What if everything we have said about Western Europe is valid, but irrel- evant to the contemporary world? We may have ruled out its validity already, if only by having said contradictory things about European state making. We certainly have not ruled out the second possibility: irrele- vance. In fact, we have called attention to a number of changes in the world situation which make it quite unlikely that the exact sequences of events we have lovingly reconstructed from the European record will ever occur again.19
In spite of this, some commentators and state politicians seem to have been interested in the idea that diversities in culture, language and religion, etc. could be overcome by force or assimilation and replaced by the culture, lan- guage and ways of life of the politically dominant ethnic group (center). This is less evident in the contemporary world and the present state system for the simple reason that all colonized peoples and territories were decolonized – or is destined to be so through the right of self-determination – and or aspire to be sovereign despite the complexity of allowing all nations to obtain these rights. The attempt of the “Nation-Building School” as it was developed and elaborated since the 1950s is to find, from Western category of state, some solutions as to how these entities, with different levels of socio-economic evolution, modernize and develop national institutions facilitating the emer- gence of a nation. For them, a key factor resides in a national development that leads to “national assimilation,” itself, a direct consequence of “the process of social mobilization which accompanies the growth of markets, industries, and
19 Charles Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” p. 601. For detailed discussions see also the contribution of Stein Rokkan, “Dimension of State- Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variation within Europe,” pp. 562–600; Aristide R. Zolberg, “Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England.” In The State in Global Perspective, edited by Ali Kazancigil (Paris, France: UNESCO, 1986), pp. 72–106; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974); William Wallace, “Rescue or Retreat? The Nation-State in Western Europe, 1945–1993.” In The Contemporary Crisis of the Nation- State? edited by John Dunn (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 52–76.
All too often scholars of nationalism have grossly overestimated the givenness of states and their capacity to provide meaning for and to exer- cise dominance over their populations. One of the faults of these inter- pretations is of an over coherent model of what is called modernization process. According to this, populations are increasingly mobilized in sup- port of a nation-state (either existing or as a project), and, once formed, a nation-state operates as a unitary society, directing development from a centre.21
Whatever criticisms one may formulate towards this Nation Building School and theorists, especially their marked neglect of ethnicity, their premises for nation-building does not call for bloodshed or extermination. Surprisingly, Mesfin did not even allude to contemporary debates about nation-building; neither did he develop other positive arguments to convince us as to how Ethiopia could transform itself from empire to nation or nation-state. Despite the nascent modernization process and structural limits of Ethiopia, some continued to believe that the creation of a single national identity around the Amhara was possible. That notion was founded on a series of arguments. The first is a “core culture” or referent culture argument. According to this dis- course, Ethiopia has a referent and “superior culture,” which can rally all peo- ple and forge a national identity. The assimilation of the Oromo, the largest national group, appears to be at the top of the agenda to achieve this goal. This was shared by both traditional and modern elites and the following quote may capture the view of generations of educated power elites in Ethiopia:
The policy of assimilation should be at the top of our reforms; for without the union of the Amhara and Galla, it is impossible to visualize the future with certainty or enthusiasm…It is for the Galla to become Amhara (not the other way round); for the latter possess a written language, a superior religion and superior customs and mores.22
20 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), p. 188. 21 John Hutchinson, “Ethnicity and Modern Nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(4) (2000): 651–669. 22 Quoted in Bahru Zewde, The History of Modern Ethiopia, pp. 132–133.
Thus, the Amhara claim to embody this “ethnic core,” around which the nation was to be built as they were incontestable power holders in the empire for a century and their politico-cultural hegemony appeared unshakable even for keen observers. The second argument was ethnographical: “The Amhara proved to be politi- cally successful largely because their societal community was defined by as a nation rather than a tribal or sub-tribal entity.”23 In actual fact, the Amhara cognatic system of filiation has nothing to do with being or not being a nation; neither could it explain why the Amhara were/are only capable of integrating others. It is illogical to maintain that the so-called “tribal” system cannot inte- grate others. A people with an agnatic descent system have institutional capac- ity to absorb others or be absorbed by them. Yet, some scholars such as Clapham assert the contrary: “They [the Amhara] are capable of forming the core element of a multi-ethnic state, however, only because – again like the English – their own ethnicity is so weakly defined. Unlike the great majority of the African peoples, they do not constitute a tribe – a group, that is to say, defined by mythology of common descent from a single common ancestor.”24 This claim is based on the assumption that anybody can easily become Amhara by accepting basic cultural codes such as Orthodox Christianity, the Amhara language and marriage alliances. This assimilative process can occur in many cultural areas, regardless of descent rules, except in caste like or closed social systems. However, these observers omit that many societ- ies have more elaborate ways of integrating foreigners into their society. All factors being equal, the Amhara system was no better suited to assimi- late more peoples than other social systems. Asmarom Legesse makes the following comparative statement about the Oromo and Amhara system of assimilation:
Whereas the Oromo assimilate other populations they culturally recog- nize their indebtedness to those they have assimilated, Amhara rarely make such recognition. The Shoan dynasty was in the habit of marrying their enemies after they conquered and baptized them. Within one gen- eration, however, that fact was rubbed out. The assimilé changed not only their names, they sometimes went back and changed the names of their parents as well.25
23 Donald Levine, Greater Ethiopia, p. 15. 24 Christopher Clapham, Transformations and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, p. 23. 25 Asmarom Legesse, Oromo Democracy, p. 7.
This form of assimilation was closely associated with power hierarchy and reward structure whereby anyone who wants to become Amhara has to negate his/her roots, his/her own group and identity, religion, tradition and history. This self-denial was unlikely to encourage the majority to accept assimilation. It is true that some peripheral elites who were successfully assimilated were rewarded and obtained upward social mobility and a handful of them attained some prestigious position and status available in the empire. In other words, if individuals accepted assimilation and renounced their identity from the end of the 19th century to 1974 – this process is more ancient for the northern Oromo – it was mainly because the Amhara seized the reins of political and economic power. They punished and marginalized those who refused assimi- lation and rewarded – although very few of them got this chance – those who were Amharanized. The relationship between the process of assimilation and reward structure became more evident just after the Ethiopian Revolution, when many of the so-called “assimilated individuals” openly claimed their ori- gins and started to identify themselves as such – once there was nothing to gain from hiding ethnic and cultural roots or they did not want to identify with rejected imperial past. The changes since the 1990s and the consequent cur- rent identity politics amplified this trend – there appears to be no “scramble” for assimilation. On the other hand, urbanization in the southern Ethiopian context did little or nothing to facilitate positive inter-communal interaction or to contribute towards successful state integration. One should not forget that Ethiopia was a rural pre-capitalist society. Less than 10% of its population was composed of urban dwellers, of which the majority belonged to Amhara and Tigrean ethnic group. Likewise, before 1974, only 8% of children attended primary school throughout the country and among those who had attained at the university level, individuals of Tigrean and Amhara ethnic stock represented a great majority.26 Modest imperial attempts to expand education among the con- quered peoples were in an apparent contradiction with the interests of the Naftagna, armed settlers, for whom education and acculturation meant equality which would threaten their exclusive privileges, “Northerners firmly
26 Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, pp. 71–72. For instance, in the 1960s 80% of the students enrolled at the Addis Ababa University were Amhara and Tigreans even though the two ethnic groups form less than 30% of the population. On the other hand, it is said that only 10% of the college and university students were Oromo. For detailed discussion of language and education policies, Mekuria Bulcha, “The Language Policies of Ethiopia Regimes and the History of Written Afaan Oromoo: 1844–1994.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, 1, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 91–115.
27 McClellan, quoted in Paul Baxter, The Problem of the Oromo or the Problem for the Oromo? p. 38. On his part, Mekuria Bulcha remarked, “the contradictions and paradoxes which characterized the attitudes of the settlers was a significant hindrance to a consistent implementation of the policy. Certainly amharization was not always in the best interest of the naftagna as it involved some share of power and privileges with non-amhara groups. Hence their endeavours to amharize the indigenous were unconcerted and half- hearted.” Flight and Integration, p. 60. 28 Ethiopia is one of the rare African countries which did not have even an official governing party until 1974, whereas the quasi totality of African states had one party systems. 29 John Breuilly, op. cit., p. 241.
To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observ- able cultural differences, there exists the probability that the disadvan- taged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantaged core. This may help it to con- ceive of itself as a separate “nation” and seek independence. Hence, in this situation, acculturation and national development may be inhibited by the desires of the peripheral group for independence from a situation perceived to be exploitative.31
It is evident that economic exploitation, discrimination and power disparities, between the center and periphery have been used as a rallying cry of national- ists and grievance narratives served as a catalyst in galvanizing centrifugal forces and ethnonational movements. The alleged political and economic dis- crepancies could easily be demonstrated by facts and figures. Yet, economic inequality cannot be seen as the sole genesis of ethnonational conflict. Criticizing this as “an unwarranted exaggeration of the influence of material- ism upon human affairs,” W. Connor wrote, “…the theory of relative economic deprivation offers an unsatisfactory explanation for ethnonational dissen- sion. The growing tendency of peoples to resent and resist being ruled by those deemed aliens appears to operate quite independently of the economic
30 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1563–1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975). (See also the author’s summary of his book and a reaction to some of his critics in French, under the title of “Le colonialisme interne: revu et corrigé.” Pluriel, 3, no. 32 (1982/1983): 18–128.) 31 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, p. 10.
The Limits of National Integration through Assimilation
As analyzed above, Ethiopian imperial politics based on alienation, and mar- ginalization, and exploitation towards the newly conquered people did not ensure the subject people to feel that they were citizens and that they belonged to the nation. Yet, the government tried to undertake selective assimilation. Individual assimilation was an exception and not a rule and has had a very limited impact on the formation of national identity. Brietzke makes a perti- nent point on this subject:
Many conquered peoples saw little reasons to adopt Amhara culture and, like English colonists, the Amhara did not allow themselves to become assimilated by local groups. Only a few non-Amhara were absorbed by the Amhara political system, and their participation was limited to dis- tinct and subordinate roles, or localized functions within a system of indirect rule and more recently to those of an educated but locally iso- lated group of modernizers within the bureaucracy.33
Even though the co-optation of elites and assimilation of individuals (tradi- tional or modern) turned out to be relatively successful in some areas or was believed to be under way, the attempts to erase ethnic boundaries through assimilation or a large population transfer from north to south was a failure. To the knowledge of this author, no ethnic group or significant community in contemporary Ethiopia – whether Christianized or not – lost its identity by merging into the Amhara identity. For example, the Shoan Oromo who had
32 W. Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 152–153. 33 Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution, pp. 22–23.
34 J. Breuilly, op. cit., p. 309. 35 Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization, pp. 40–41. 36 C. Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, pp. 24–25. He argued, “…it is precisely because Ethiopia has this core identity, associated with one
people but also claiming a special national status, that it suffers from much more intense problems of national identity and integration than other African states….” 37 Gebru Tarke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest, p. 71. 38 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 71. See also Mac Ferro for European racism and attitude towards the colonized peoples: Colonization: A Global History (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 20–23. 39 Willard Sunderland, “An Empire of Peasants: Empire Building, Interethnic Interaction, and Ethnic Stereotyping in the Rural World of the Russian Empire, 1800-1850s,” p. 186.
The recently assimilated place themselves in a considerably superior position to the average colonizer. They push a colonial mentality to excess, display pride and disdain for the colonized and continually show off their borrowed ranks, which often belies a vulgar brutality and avidity. Still too impressed by their privileges, they savior them and defend them with fear and harshness; and when colonization is imperiled, they pro- vide it with its most dynamic defenders, its shock troops, and sometimes its instigators.40
As a proof of success story in the assimilation process and trend, some histori- ans and writers tend to give examples of “Oromo integration” and involvement in imperial affairs which permitted some individuals and elites to play an important role at the heart of Abyssinia, this is true in both in Wollo and Gondar, particularly during the so-called the Era of Princes.41 But they failed to examine critically the social economic situations and the root causes of rebel- lions and identity politics in Ethiopia and nationalist aspiration and demands for self-rule, autonomy, and even self-determination. Generally speaking, the national design to create a single nation, “one Ethiopia” around Amhara history, culture, political culture, values is doomed to failure and political developments over the last two decades made it a very remote ideal, an impossible ideal. One can reasonably argue that the imposi- tion of Amhara identity, conception of history, values and language in the name of Ethiopia contributed to fostering competing views of national iden- tity and history and ethnonationalism throughout the country, including among the Tigrean elites which led to the overthrow of the Amhara-dominated socio-political system and the current ethnic politics. In other words, the pro- liferation of nationalist movements and the aspiration for self-determination directly reflect the failure of official and state nationalism, which the authori- ties tried to promote and uphold over decades. The identification of a single group with the state power, nation and national identity and the attempts to impose this identity in multi-ethnic society can result in the crisis of national identity. As F. Deng notes:
The crisis of national identity emanates not only from the conflict between the exclusive and inclusive notion of national identity, but also
40 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, p. 16. 41 Richard Pankhrust, The Ethiopians (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), pp. 124–126. See also Fikre Tolossa, “Nobles of Oromo Descent Who Ruled Ethiopia,” http://www .ethiopianreview.com/content/33633, October 1st, 1992.
from the tendency of the dominant and hegemonic group to try impose their identity as the framework for the national identity and a basis for power sharing and resource allocation. This inevitably provides ground for discrimination, national integration or both.42
It is obvious that Ethiopian state has tried to transform itself since the end of the 19th century in order to survive in the world dominated by international capitalism and the “western state system.” Hence, Emperor Haile Selassie regime was usually referred to as the “modernizing autocracy.” The commit- ment to modernization, initiated by Menelik and taken up by Haile Sellassie, was half-hearted, partial and defensive. In effect, internally, the emperor had to be sure that his innovations would not arouse opposition on the one hand, and they would increase or consolidate his own power on the other.43 Externally, it aimed to attain double objectives. First, the emperor wanted to give a positive image of the empire, dignified to remain sovereign and independent. Second, the emperor wanted to get recognition from the international community, par- ticularly among the leading western powers, as a modern and progressive monarch. It was in this perspective that he was said to “have given the constitu- tion of 1931” to his subjects but actually aimed to reinforce his absolutist power and divine kingship through the rhetoric of liberal democracy. As Bahru Zewde argued: “The constitution of 1931 set up the juridical framework of emergent absolutism.”44 Throughout his long reign, the emperor attempted to reconcile “royal absolutism” and feudalism with forced modernity and liberal values; he largely succeeded in maintaining himself in power, but structural contradic- tions emanating from this unhappy marriage between different ideals and principles undermined the ideological bases of the monarchy and the whole system. In reality, the constitution and other partial measures taken by his gov- ernment before 1935 and after 1941 had little impact on the political and eco- nomic life of the peasantry and were completely unknown or unimplemented in the newly conquered parts of the empire. However, Haile Selassie destroyed the so-called autonomous regions in order to consolidate his absolutist power over a unitary state. He was also obliged to abolish slavery under international pressure; this was set as a condi- tion for Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations in 1923. Although it was
42 Francis Deng, et al., “Sovereignty” as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: The Brooking Institutions, 1996), p. 20. 43 Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia,” pp. 16, 44. 44 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, p. 140. See also Bahru Zewde, “Economic Origins of the Absolutist State in Ethiopia (1916–1935),” pp. 1–29.
45 George Montandon, op. cit., p. 10. 46 Colin H. Williams, ed., National Separatism (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982), p. 2. 47 Quoted in Colin H. Williams, ed., Ibid., p. 3.
48 Abbas Haji, “L’Etat et les crises d’intégration nationale en Ethiopie contemporaine.” Travaux et Documents, no. 37 (Centre d’Etude d’Afrique noire, IEP, Université de Bordeaux I, Talence, 1993). 49 The scholarship in the service of the empire is diverse which could be classified in three categories. The first concerns the scholars who identify themselves with imperial policies due to their membership in the ethnic core or shared interests (cultural, linguistic, eco- nomic and political) with the ruling caste and try to prop up the status quo. The second is composed of some expatriate academics, who by interest or religious persuasion or by a certain form of “romanticism” espoused the imperial thesis (cause) and propagated it to the world and academic community. Finally, the contribution of a third group of scholars to the imperial cause was indirect, they might have believed that the theory of nation- building could be applied to the Ethiopian empire and diversities would give way to homogeneity by the politics of assimilation and integration. 50 The different theoretical perspectives on ethnic nationalism are summarized by Anthony H. Richmond, “Le nationalisme ethnique et les paradigmes des sciences sociales.” Revue internationale des sciences sociales, 111 (1987): 3–19. We will make wider use of the works the leading authorities like Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Penguin Books, 1991) and many other works and particularly the various writings of Walker Connor which largely
The Triple Crises of the Ethiopian State
Today, Ethiopia is undergoing a series of interconnected national and structural crises which have put an end to both old certainties and wishful thinking. The first is the crisis of state legitimacy. The second is the demise of the concept of “Ethnic Core.” The third is the collapse of “Nation-Building” rhetoric. In the following section, I will discuss these interrelated crises further.
The Crisis of State Legitimacy The Ethiopian government lacks any of three Weberian sources of legitimacy (traditional, charismatic and legal-rational) shared by all people constituting this polity. Traditionally, the imperial rulers claimed descent from the “Solomonic Dynasty,” although this myth was not recognized by many people who had different political cultures and legitimizing sources of authority. The collapse of the ancien regime with the overthrow of the emperor in 1974 made that myth a thing of the past; the end of the “Solomonic Dynasty” left the impe- rial center without a legitimizing myth and the Darg tried to fill the void with nationalist tautology such as “Ethiopia First” and later with Marxism-Leninism. The military junta claimed “revolutionary legitimacy” and the current govern- ment has tried to justify its power by “Popular Sovereignty,” “Revolutionary Democracy,” and recently “developmental state” though it is clear that its legiti- macy emanates from victory over the collapsing Darg regime and a military capacity to govern the country (no fair, honest and free elections have taken place in Ethiopian history). The reality is that it is mainly ethnocratic-authori- tarian regime dependent upon the TPLF/EPRDF’s superior military muscle and not the political consent of the majority people in Ethiopia.51 Its social and political base remains too narrow to claim any sort of popular legitimacy. As Clapham put it, “The EPRDF has never been able to rid itself of the sense that this is essentially a Tigray government. Though it has selected ministers from a wide range of nationalities, the core of the regime has always lain in the TPLF that created it. Tigray, with some 10% of the population, provides much too narrow a base from which to govern Ethiopia...”52
inspired us, see Connor, Ethnonationalism. This book includes his important articles pub- lished in different journals over the last 30 years. 51 John W. Harbeson “A Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: Is Ethiopia Democratic?” Journal of Democracy 9(4) (1998): 62–69. 52 See an interesting commentary by Christopher Clapham, Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis (University of Cambridge, Centre of African Studies, November 14, 2005), p. 1.
Colonel Mengistu, one of the principal actors behind the scenes from 1974 to 1977 and the head of the junta and the state after 1977, inherited the power of absolute monarchs, as well as many imperial myths and legends from the past which were selectively married to the new ideology.53 By so doing he combined feudal autocracy, absolutism and totalitarian dictatorship.54 Since the Abyssinian traditional political culture was said to have been founded on factionalism, repression and manipulation55 the introduction of Stalinism to such a political system would only render it more perverse, oppressive and repressive. With respect to the national question, the junta adopted Leninist discourse without totally imitating the Soviet principles. It reduced Ethiopian problems of national identity to class conflict and class contradiction. The Darg might have believed that the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974 and the consequent abolition of feudalism and changes in the mode of production, i.e., nationaliz- ing land, the basis of Ethiopian feudalism, and its redistribution to cultivators (peasants), added to the promise of equality and the fight against the “common enemies of Ethiopia,” would solve the national question. For example, Article 5 of the program of National Democratic Revolution of 1976 underlines among others, “…The unity of Ethiopia’s nationalities will be based on their common struggle against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and all reac- tionary forces.” However, in the eyes of the disadvantaged nations and national groups, the “three enemies of Ethiopian peoples” – feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism – as they were called, were associated with the domination of the center. The abolition of feudalism did not bring an end to the basic contradiction between the center and periphery in spite of the tem- porary satisfaction and initial enthusiasm of the peasantry (Map 9.1). In other words, by embracing Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Darg regime adopted, unsurprisingly, the Leninist principle on the national question which stressed class identity and the “indispensability of class struggle” and the “right of self-determination up to secession.” But, basing itself again on other Marxist thoughts, the regime tempered the principle of self-determination. Firstly, it adopted the Stalinist definition of a nation who wrote: “A nation is a histori- cally evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.”56 Each group
53 Christopher Clapham (Introduction) Transformations and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. 54 Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1987. 55 Paul Brietzke, Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution. 56 Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question.” In The Nationalism Reader, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Humanity Books, 1995), pp. 192– 197, 197.
Map 9.1 Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia. Source: Adapted from UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, March 2000. was seen in the light of these criteria to be considered a full nation. All nations in the empire were qualified as nationalities, not yet achieved the status of nationhood, and cannot enjoy the rights to self-determination. Secondly, a nation or a national movement aiming at separation from “Revolutionary Ethiopia” was viewed as a reactionary one, and it could not have the right to leave the “progressive camp” to join the capitalist camp. In other
Relations between the center and the ethnic peripheries remained basi- cally imperial that is, inequitable and based on a subordinate relation- ship to the Russian center. After the revolution, these relationships were
57 Anthony Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London, Sydney, and Wellington: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 3. 58 Christopher Clapham, “The State and Revolution in Ethiopia: Ethiopia 15 Years on.” Review of African Political Economy, London, no. 44 (1989): 4–17, 16.
disguised and justified by reference to a supranational ideology and com- pelling vision of history that sanctioned the rule of the communist party.59
In the context of Ethiopia, the Amhara appeared to be what the Russians were in the Soviet Union, with some important differences however. In Russia, the republics, however fictive they might have been, had some local power and the possibility of developing their culture whereas Ethiopia was a unitary state with no devolution of power to regions and nationalities.60 On the contrary, after 5 years of confusion, repression of the civilian oppositions and resistance against Somali aggression, the new Ethiopian state that emerged from the rev- olution gave the impression of the Amhara state more than ever before. This became more evident after Ethiopia adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology and started to organize the ruling party in 1979. For instance, in the Commission for Organizing Ethiopian Workers Party which transformed itself into the Workers Party, out of 123 central committee members 109 were Amhara or those who claimed Amhara identity.61 Moreover, 13 out of 14 Party delegates or party sec- retaries of regions were Amhara in the 1980s. During my field work in Arsi-Bale regions in 1987–1988, I realized that practi- cally all party secretaries at all levels were Amhara. The revolution dashed old imperial methods of elite co-optation, notably the balabbat institution with- out creating any coherent system susceptible to encourage the participation of nationalities and nations in the national and local affairs. The mass organiza- tion (peasant, youth and women’s associations) did not serve a great purpose. They were rather instruments of control and mobilization for governmental policies. Peasants could solve local conflicts of different nature, which was usually done without the revolution or mass organization, but in most cases they did not even decide what to produce, when to produce, to whom and at what price to sell. This led to a great disillusion and discontent. The totalitarian assault on the periphery through the 1970s and 1980s exac- erbated old tensions, created new ones, provoked famine and misery in one
59 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: University Press, 1993), p. 112. 60 The Darg created, by the constitution of 1987, 24 regions out of which the so-called five autonomous regions (Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden) were created to appease armed nationalists. This was seen as a masquarade and rejected categorically by all groups. This was one of the last desperate attempts on the part of the regime to settle the crises. But to its surprise, it aggravated the fighting. 61 STORM (Somali, Tigrai and Oromo Resistance Monitor), no. 2 (1981): 1.
62 For example, Raymond Pearson defines empire as a “Multinational sovereign state in which political, economic and social power is wielded by readily identifiable elite for the purpose of the systematic exploitation of an involuntary membership of subordinated colonies and groups Raymond Pearson”, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 161.
The Demise of the Concept of “Ethnic Core” The second crisis is the demise of the concept of an “ethnic core” around which a single nation was supposed to emerge. Even if one accepts the concept of the organic evolution of nation, at least on conceptual grounds, the question of a time factor should not be underestimated. Such a historical process necessi- tates a long period of time and favorable circumstances in different epochs, which are unlikely to repeat themselves.63 For instance, it is said that more than seven centuries were necessary to make the French nation while the pro- cess of making a Frenchman was not completely over until the 20th century,64 and the debate about national identity/community is still going on in France. Moreover, those who might have adhered to the theory of amnesia (according to which the conquered peoples may progressively accept the cultural and political hegemony of the conquerors as something normal and justified and eventually become the accomplice of the dominant group in the eradication of their own identity) have forgotten that people will not forget their cultural identity and history overnight. It is, therefore, unrealistic to believe that the empire-state created by Menelik can transform itself into a coherent nation under his immediate successors, whatever methods may be used. On the other hand, the Center (in this context the word center stands for the dominant groups, Amhara-Tigreans, and at times the state) is more fragile than it might have appeared at first. The so-called center or “ethnic core” consists of two distinct, but culturally related, ethno-linguistic groups (Amhara and Tigreans). Needless to say, with the rise of the Amhara under the Shoan kingdom the center ceased to be Tigrean. This was particularly so after 1889 when Menelik became emperor of Ethiopia after the death of Emperor
63 Cf. Charles Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 601. For different insights on the Nation-State see also chapters in Michael Mann, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 64 For details, see E. Weber, La fin des terroirs: la modernisation de la France rurale (translated from English) (Paris: Fayard, 1983); Aristide R. Zolberg, “Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England.” In The State in Global Perspective, edited by Ali Kazancigil (Paris: Gower & UNESCO, 1986), pp. 72–106.
Yohannes IV – although the Tigreans participated in the exercise of imperial power. Unsurprisingly, Amhara culture and values were taken as a standard culture to be imposed or disseminated throughout the empire, including among the Tigrean people, who might have felt a threat to their cultural and linguistic identity.65 Therefore, the first opposition or nationalist upsurge against the imperial homogenization and “standardization” policy came from within: the Tigreans were not willing to be dominated by the Amhara, their distant cousins but also rivals. This, along with several other factors (economic, political, ecological, etc.), led to the rise of an armed resistance which culmi- nated in the creation of the Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front, a group which made important contributions to the overthrow of the Darg regime and the creation of the Tigrean-dominated EPRDF government.66 Here, the point is that the center was far from being homogeneous, nor was it in a position to unify itself culturally before trying to homogenize others. Further, had it succeeded in its cultural unification and taken the form of a cultural nation, the center did (does) not amount to more than 32% of the population and only constitutes a demographic minority in the empire to this date. This unfavorable demographic condition is true for the distribution of resources as well. The center is less advantaged than the periphery (although there are some rich provinces) albeit with significant disparities. Above all, the center has had no superior technology, industries or any other advantage with which to enforce the dependency of other peoples and regions. Not only does it have nothing or little to give but also the very survival of the Ethiopian state and the continuity of its fragile economy may be questionable without the resources of the regions and peoples conquered since the second half of the 19th century.
65 For detailed analysis of the objective and development of TPLF see Aregawi Berhe, “The Origins of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.” African Affairs, 103/413 (2004): 569–592. According to this author and one of the founders and leaders of this movement the objec- tive was “At the foundation of the TPLF, ‘self-determination’ was understood to mean autonomy or self-rule for Tigray in a democratic, poly-ethnic Ethiopia. Later, in the early days of the struggle, self-determination was interpreted by an ultra-nationalist group within the emerging TPLF to mean secession from the Ethiopian nation-state, with the aim of establishing an independent republic of Tigray, as declared in the TPLF manifesto of 1976.” 66 See the chapters dedicated to Tigrai in the following works: John Markakis, Class and National Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century; Aregawi Berhe, “The Origins of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.” African Affairs, 103/413 (2004): 569–592.
The Collapse of “Nation-Building” Rhetoric The third crisis is the demise of modern myths – that is, nation-building rhetoric. In effect, the building of a nation-state through modernization and national integration turned out to be not only a dream but also the root causes of even greater division, instability and war. Comparatively speak- ing, what was intended to be “nation-building” in many multinational states instead resulted in “nation-destroying,” in the words of W. Connor.67 The latter is critical of developmentalist paradigms which consist of neglect- ing or undermining ethnicity as a minor impediment, destined to disappear. Professor Connor convincingly argues that the process of modernization (urbanization, industrialization, modern education and communication net- works, etc.) would not guarantee the withering away of ethnicity or ethnic consciousness, but would instead augment it. The numerous ethnonational conflicts in many contemporary multinational states and empires, including Ethiopia, have proved his insights to be true as opposed to the optimistic visions of nation-building theorists – indeed terms such as “national integra- tion” and “assimilation” are practically disappearing from the current writings of the latter. To this one can add the more recent observation of Yinger on the subject:
Ethnic lines will not disappear in the foreseeable future. In many parts of the world strong forces are drawing those lines more sharply…In the midst of collapsing states and empires, old dreams of their nation-state become vivid for many long-suffering ethnic minorities. In less conflict- ful settings, the continuing need for a more personal identity in a cultur- ally complex and rapidly changing world persists.68
In the face of the reality of the failure of modernization and organic evolution to produce a coherent nation-state, the challenge for multinational states has always been how to deal with diversity. In actual fact, of 195 or so UN member states only 15–20 qualify as nation-states. On the other hand, another debate is on the future of nation-states and national sovereignty in the context global- ization, which has led to “boundary-broadening” as opposed to nation- statism’s purported “boundary-heightening.” The paradox of boundary- broadening does not, however, imply the end of identity politics and other ongoing struggles in many multinational states. Many deadly intrastate
67 See his widely read article “Nation-Building or Nation Destroying” reprinted in his Ethnonationalism, 1994. 68 J.M. Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? p. 343.
The Paradoxes of Ethnic Federalism
The EPRDF/TPLF government, which toppled the Darg, has recognized the rights of nations and nationalities including the right to self-determination. In some ways, it appears that ethnic federalism policy seeks to implement the Darg’s past promises with more concrete measures. In fact, beyond the politi- cal and cultural resistance against a single “Amharacized” nation from periph- eral collectivities, Ethnic Federalism seems to be a huge blow to the concept of the nation-state. Although it is extremely doubtful that this policy will create both a workable federal structure and a multinational democracy capable of settling the inherent socio-political conflicts of the empire and improving inter-ethnic relations, it has nevertheless appeared to render the nation-state a less relevant issue on the national agenda. Meles Zenawi, the key architect of the ethnic politics justifies a paradigm shift as follows:
69 For detailed discussion see F. Halliday, “Nationalism.” In The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 359–373. T.R. Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnonational Conflict and the Changing World System.” International Studies Quarterly, 30 (1994): 347–377.
…People in Africa feel that they can wish away ethnic difference. Experience in Rwanda has taught us this is not the case. Experience in Liberia has taught us that this is not the case. What we are trying to do in Ethiopia is to recognize that ethnic differences are part of life in Africa, and try to deal with them in a rational manner. Rather than hide the fact that we have ethnic difference, we are saying people should express it freely. That, I think, pre-empts the type of implosion we’ve had in Rwanda.70
At an early stage, “ethnic federalism” – despite the problems of its practical implementation – appeared genuine and was acceptable to historically disad- vantaged groups as opposed to the advantaged national group, the Amhara, who have many reasons to object to it:
Amharas faced the converse problem: whereas they had been accus- tomed to regard being Amhara as virtually coterminous with being Ethiopian, it was now no more than a constituent identity within a larger state, in which they enjoyed neither political power (which rested largely with Tigreans) nor numerical predominance (which fell to the Oromo) and in addition inhabited one of the poorest, and least developed and most environmentally degraded parts of the national territory…71
However, the problem is not so much the Amhara’s aspiration to return to the status quo ante and their fierce opposition to decentralization and ethnic fed- eralism for ideological and political reasons but also the TPLF itself which refuses to implement the federal constitution it introduced and loosen its grip on power. As J. Young so aptly put it: “One of the biggest obstacles to Ethiopia benefiting from the EPRDF’s devolutionary policies does not lie, as the govern- ment’s actions seem to suggest, with Amhara chauvinists wanting to resurrect a past ethnic hegemony which is surely buried, but with the Front’s contuma- cious implementation of the policy, and its effort to control virtually every facet of the political process.”72 All scholarly and empirical studies conducted in the federal regions indi- cated the extent to which the TPLF/EPRDF discredited the constitution and
70 Quoted in Abdi Ismail Samatar, “The Ethiopian Election of 2005: A Bombshell & Turning Point.” Review of African Political Economy, 32, no. 104/105 (2005): 466–473. 71 Christopher Clapham, “Controlling Space in Ethiopian.” Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, pp. 9–32, 29. 72 J. Young quoted in Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region,” pp. 1131–1154.
73 Ibid. and see also Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 19. 74 The most extremist view went too far by denying even the existence of the Amhara peo- ple, perhaps as a way of denying “others.” 75 For the intention and political program of the TPLF see the analysis of John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia.” Review of African Political Economy, 23, no. 70 (December 1996): 531–542.
…As an ethnic liberation movement representing a group that comprised at best 10 percent of the Ethiopian population, the TPLF could not hope to rule the country without facing the same ethnic revolts that had put an end to the previous regime. Having decided that Tigray should not secede, and having no intention to surrender power, the TPLF needed to reorga- nize the country in order to govern. The formation of an ethnic federa- tion served such a purpose.77
In other words, the tentative plan to transform the empire-state into a nation- state has failed and the current “centralized federalism,” as conceived by the TPLF-led government, is not likely to succeed because of imperial temptation where an identifiable ethno-national minority wields all power and the coun- try functions more or less as undemocratic unitary state.78 In fact, Ethiopian ethnic federalism is criticized by major national groups and political forces albeit for different reasons. As International Crisis Group noted:
Furthermore, ethnic federalism has failed to resolve the “national ques- tion”. The EPRDF’s ethnic policy has empowered some groups but has not been accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. For Amhara and national elites, ethnic federalism impedes a strong, unitary nation-state. For ethno-national rebel groups like the ONLF (Ogaden National Liber ation Front; Somalis in the Ogaden) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front;
76 See the account of Leenco Lata, who was among the writers of the transitional Charter as a representative of OLF in 1991 before boycotting the elections of 1992 and withdrawing from the government. Lata, The Ethiopian State at the Crossroad: Decolonization and Democratization or Disintegration (Lawrence, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1999). 77 Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders, p. 19. 78 See Edmond J. Keller, “Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Political Transitions in Ethiopia: Historic and Contemporary Processes.” In Self-Determinations and National Unity, edited by Francis Deng (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, 2010), pp. 57–90; see also Lovise Aalen, The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia.
the Oromo), ethnic federalism remains artificial. While the concept has failed to accommodate grievances, it has powerfully promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups.79
On the other hand, some would think that the present solution appears to be inspired by the déjà vu politics of Lenin and Stalin in the former Soviet Union although the authorities do not make direct reference to a supranational ideol- ogy and Marxism-Leninism.80 In fact, the current ethno-federal institutions, authoritarian state structure based on ethnicity, and recognition of the right of self-determination in the constitution – this principle was also acknowledged in all the constitutions of the “Eastern Bloc” but was applied nowhere – appear very much like the Russian policies towards nationalities seen in the last seven decades before its collapse through a series of revolutions from below.81 Another striking example of Leninist heritage is that the Ethiopian govern- ment frequently employs, perhaps unconsciously, terms such as: “Voluntary Union of Nationalities and Nations,” which Lenin used after the Bolshevik Revolution as an ideological justification to maintain the subjection of the for- mer Tsarist peoples in the USSR. In actual fact, no one asked the former Tsar subjects what they wanted, but the Soviet leadership claimed to have known their will. When the “nationali- ties” got the opportunity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they expressed clearly that the union was not based on their desire or consent.82 Soviet “ethnic politics” and federalism turned out be paternalistic, undemocratic and elu- sive, though they were still more progressive than Tsarist policies towards the
79 International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents.” Africa Report, no. 153–154 (September 2009): ii. 80 Christopher Clapham explains this ambiguity in the following terms, “The EPLF in Eritrea, EPRDF in Ethiopia, had perhaps the most deeply rooted Marxist formation of any African insurgency, and as late as 1989, the EPRDF leader Meles Zenawi was looking to Albania as a model of autonomous socialist development. Much of this formation was ineradicable, and continued to affect the behaviour of both regimes after their victories in 1991; but as an official ideology for two deeply impoverished states in a world order domi- nated by the United States, it was simply unsustainable.” Africa and the International System, p. 243. 81 Hélène Carrère D’Encause, La gloire des nations ou la fin de l’empire soviétique; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past, p. 112. 82 Even M. Gorbachev, the last soviet reformer, could not understand that things were falling apart when he talked of “The Union of Socialist Nations as Unique formation” and “Soviet Patriotism” and concluded: “we will still further strengthen the Union and Brotherhood of free peoples in a free country.” Quoted in Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 145.
By introducing ethnic federalism, but at the same time retaining tight central control over regional government, the EPRDF found itself caught between two stools. On the one hand, Ethiopian nationalists (by no means restricted to Amharas) were deeply concerned at what looked like an attempt to replicate the failed nationality policies of the USSR, and was often regarded as a divide-and-rule policy to the advantage of Tigray; on the other, representatives of historically disadvantaged nationalities (notably the Oromo) felt that the EPRDF had promised a level of auton- omy that it had then totally failed to deliver.86
The possible failure of the present experience in Ethiopia does not necessarily mean that there will be a way back to the nation-state, i.e., the idea of a homo- geneous nation. A state structure based on ethnicity would create ethno- nationalism where it does not exist and consolidate it where it has developed; it is even likely to prepare an embryo of many micro-”nation-states” based on ethnicity. In either case, no national group will be ready to sacrifice its identity for the advent of a nation-state.87 In brief, the three successive ethnically dom- inated regimes embraced the prevailing views (national integration and mod- ernization under Haile Selassie, though he was not fully committed to these
83 Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire; Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empires and Its Rivals for detailed analysis of the Russian empire. 84 For detailed analysis, see Henry E. Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethno Federal State Survival.” World Politics 56 (January 2004): 165–193. 85 Kostas Oukeris, “Contending Political Ideologies in Ethiopia after 1991: The Role of Intellectuals.” Polis, Revue camerounaise de science politique, 12, numero special (2004–2005). 86 See an interesting commentary by Christopher Clapham, “Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis,” p. 1. 87 Leenco Lata, The Ethiopian State at the Crossroads, p. 236.
Conclusion
In this brief analysis, we tried to assess the crises of the Ethiopian state and the prevailing identity politics. The problems encountered in transforming a mul- tinational empire based on conquest and characterized by a tormented state of center-periphery relations is very complex. We have discussed some of the political dilemmas and impasses – particularly nation-statism and neo-impe- rial politics disguised under the rhetoric of federalism – to find a genuine, just and lasting solution. Pseudo-democracy and pseudo-federalism are unlikely to solve the country’s underlying political and identity crises. The problem can be addressed when imperial politics and domination are eradicated, in one way or another, through self-determination or free and democratic elections in which the peoples can express their desire and the governing institutions are recognized as representative and legitimate. The government has to clearly choose between ethnocracy and democracy as the two are philosophically
88 Hamdesa Tuso, “Ethiopia: New Political Order and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era.” Africa (Roma), Anno LII-N.3 (1997): 343–364. See also Sandra Fullerton Joireman, “Opposition Politics and Ethnicity in Ethiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35, no. 3 (September 1999): 387–407. 89 Rene Lefort, “Ethiopia’s Election: All Losers.” Open Democracy, July 2010; See also J. Abbink, “Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath.” African Affairs, 105/419 (2006): 173–199; Theodore M. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post- Cold War African State (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Ethiopia since the Darg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance (Synopsis), edited by Siegfried Pausewang, Kjetil Tronvoll, and Lovise Aalen (London: ZED Books, 2002); Kjetil Tronvoll, “Briefing the Ethiopian 2010 Federal and Regional Elections: Re-establishing the One-Party State.” African Affairs, 110/438 (2011): 121–136. Kjetil Tronvoll and Tobias Hagmann, eds., Contested Power in Ethiopia: Traditional Authorities and Multi-Party Elections (Brill, 2011).
90 Many national groups, including the Tigreans, perceived the Ethiopian State as an expres- sion of the Amhara nation. But the Tigreans are falling into the same trap; in spite of their official rhetoric, the present state is seen, wrongly or correctly, as an expression of Tigrean interests and as such can no longer be more legitimate than its predecessor.
Aalen, Lovise. The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and Mobilisation under Ethnic Federalism. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011. Abbas Haji Gnamo. “Arsi Oromo Political and Military Resistance against the Shoan Colonial Conquest, 1881–1886.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. II, No. 1–2 (1995): 1–21. ——. “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia).” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, 165 (2002): 99–120. ——. “L’Etat et les crises d’intégration nationale en Ethiopie contemporaine.” Travaux et Documents, No. 37, Centre d’Etude d’Afrique noire. IEP, Université de Bordeaux I, Talence, 1993. ——. “Le rôle du culte de chaikh Hussein dans l’islam des Arsi.” L’islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara, No. 5 (1991): 21–42. ——. “La conquête impériale éthiopienne des Oromo Arsi, Ethiopie.” Africa, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (1999): 85–115. ——. “L’Ethiopie va-t-elle éclater? Conflits politiques, économie et société en pays Arsi (1900–1935).” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, Vol. 32, No. 126 (1992): 239–284. ——. “Pouvoir de bénir et de maudire: cosmologie et organisation sociale des Oromo- Arsi, Ethiopie.” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, Vol. XXXVII, No. 146 (1997): 289–318. ——. “The Dilemma of Arsi Balabbats: A Study of Socio-Economic Position of Local Chiefs in Southern Ethiopia, 1886–1935.” X. Conférence Internationale des Études Éthiopiennes, Vol. 1, edited by Claude Lepage. Paris: Société Française pour les Études Éthiopiennes, 1994: 585–592. ——. A review of “A River of Blessing: Essays in Honor of Paul Baxter.” Edited by David Brokensha. Syracuse University, Maxwell, New York, 1994. The Oromo Commentary, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1994): 31–33. ——. A History of the Arsi, 1880–1935. B.A. paper in History. Addis Ababa University, 1982. ——. Les Oromo-Arsi, Continuité et évolution des Institutions d’une société éthiopienne. Thèse de doctorat de l’Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 1990. Abbink, Jon. “Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath.” African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 419 (2006): 173–199. ——. “Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim–Christian Polemics in Ethiopia.” African Affairs, 110/439 (2011): 253–274. ——. “Transformations of Islam and Communal Relations in Wollo, Ethiopia.” In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, edited by Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2007): 65–85. Abdusmad Haji Ahmed. Gojjam: Trade, Early Merchant Capital, and the World Economy, 1901–1935. Ph.D. Thesis, Urbana Champaign, University of Illinois, 1986.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004265486_012
Abélès, Marc and Collard, Chantal, eds. Âge, pouvoir et société en Afrique noire. Paris: Editions Carthala, 1985. Aberra Ketsela. The Rebellion in Bale (1963–1970). Senior Essay, Haile Selassie I University Addis Ababa, May, 1971. Abir, Mordechai. Ethiopia: The Era of Princes, the Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire, 1769–1865. London: Longmans, 1969. Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Addis Hiwet. Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution. London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975. Addis Zemen (Tahsas 15, 1967 E.C.). Addisu Tolesa. “Documentation and Interpretation of Oromo Cultural Traditions.” In Conference on the Oromo Nation: The Cultural Heritage, Present Struggle for Economic and Political Prospect for a Democratic Future. York University, Toronto, August 4–5, 1990. Al-Maqrizi. The Book of the True Knowledge of the History of Kings in Ethiopia. Translated by G.W.B. Huntingford, 1955. Alter, Peter. Nationalism. Second Edition. London, New York: Edward Arnold, 1994. Al-Umari, Ibn Fadl Allah. Maslik el Absar fi Malik et Amsar: L’Afrique moins l’Egypte, translated and annotated by Gauderfroy-Demombynes. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Geuthner, 1927. Amanuel Gebre Yesus, Historical Background to the National Question in Ethiopia. London: Ethio-International Press, 1993. Amare Tekle. “Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Politics.” In The Political Economy of Ethiopia, edited by Marina Ottoway. New York, Westport, CT, London: Praeger, 1990. Amselle, Jean-Loup and M’Bokolo Elikia, eds. Au cœur de l’ethnie: ethnie, tribalisme et État en Afrique. Paris: La Découverte, 1985. Andargachew Tiruneh. The Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1987: A Transformation from Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1991. Andrejezewski, B.W. “Allusive Diction in Galla Hymns in Praise of Sheikh Hussein of Bale.” African Languages, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1972): 1–31. Antonelli, Pietrro. “Rapporti sullo Scioa al Ministero degli Affari Esteri (de 22 Maggio 1883 al guigno 1888).” Miscellanea, Etiopia ed Eritrea (Roma, 1889). Aregawi Berhe. “The Origins of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.” African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 413 (2004): 569–592. Aregay Waktola. Assessment of the Development, Diffusion and Adoption of Package of Agriculture Innovations in Chilalo Ethiopia. Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio University, 1975.
Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Asafa Jalata., ed. Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy. Lawrenceville, NJ, 1998. Asmagiyorgis. Ya Galla Tarik (The History of the Galla), Amharic manuscript in 2 vols. Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1902 E.C. Asmarom Legesse. Gadaa: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. New York: The Free Press, 1973. ——. Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Press, Inc., 2000. Audon, Henry. “Voyage au Choa (Abyssinie Méridionale), 1884–1888.” Extrait du Tour du Monde, No. 1494 (1889): 113–160, 44–56. Azaïs, François and Chambard, René. Cinq années de recherches archéologiques en Ethiopie. Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1931. Bacevich, Andrew J. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. Bahrey, Abba. “History of the Galla.” In Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593–1646, translated and edited by C.F. Buckingham and George Huntingford. London: The Hakluyt Society (1954): 113–129. Bahru Zewde. “Economic Origins of the Absolutist State in Ethiopia (1916–1935).” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. XX (1984): 1–29. ——. A History of Modern Ethiopia (1855–1974). London: James Currey, 1991. Bairu Tafla. “Ras Darghe Sahle Selassie, 1827–1900.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1975). ——. “Ras Darghe Sahle Sellassié.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1–2 (1975): 17–37. ——. “Three Portraits: Ato Atsma Giyorgis, Ras Gobana Daci and Tsehafi Tezaz Gebre Selassie.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 5(2) (1967). ——. Atsma Giyorgis and His Work: History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shewa. Steiner: Stuttgart, 1987. Baissa Lemmu. “The Decline of Gadaa Government in Wallaga: The Rise of War Chiefs and the Shoan Conquest.” Unpublished manuscript. Balandier, Georges. “Tradition, conformité, historicité.” In L’autre et ailleurs: Hommage à Roger Bastide, textes présentés par Jean Poirier et François Raveau. Paris: Berger- Levrault (1976): 15–38. Balsvik, Randi F. Hail Selassie’s Students: Rise of Social and Political Consciousness. Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tromso, 1979. Bartels, Lambert. Oromo Religion, Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1983. Barth, Fredrik, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. London: Allen and Unwin, 1969.
Baxter, P.T.W. “Stock Management and the Diffusion of Property Rights among the Boran.” In Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1966. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1969. ——. “Always on the Outside Looking In: A View of the 1969 Ethiopian Election from a Rural Constituency.” Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 45, No. 1–2 (1980): 39–59. Baxter, P.T.W. and Almagor, U. eds. Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African Age Organization. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978. Baxter, P.T.W., Hultin, Jan, and Triulzi, Alessandro, eds. Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1996. Berhanou Abbebe. Évolution de la propriété foncière au choa (Éthiopie) Du règne de Ménélikk à la constitution de 1931. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuther, 1971. Birch, Anthony. Nationalism and National Integration. London, Sydney, Wellington: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Blackhurst, Hector. “Continuity and Change in the Shoan Galla Gadaa System.” Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African Age Organizations, edited by P.T.W. Baxter and U. Almagor. London: Hurst Company (1978): 245–267. ——. “Ethnicity in Southern Ethiopia: the General and the Particular.” Africa, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1980): 55–65. Bloch, Marc. La société féodale. Paris: Albin Michel, 1940. Boahen, Adu, ed. General History of Africa, Vol. VII, Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–935. California: UNESCO, James Currey, 1990. ——. African Perspective on Colonialism. Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987. Boehm, Christopher. “Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy.” Current Anthropology, Vol. XXXIV (1993): 227–254. Bonte, Pierre. “Tribu en Afrique du nord et au Moyen Orient.” L’Homme, Vol. 27, No. 102 (1987): 7–11. Borelli, Jules. Ethiopie Méridionale: Journal de mon voyage au pays Amhara, Oromo et Sidamo, Sept. 1885–Novembre, 1888. Paris: Ancienne Maison Quantin, 1890. Braukamper, Urlich. Geschichte de Hadiya Sud-Athiopiens. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980. ——. “Islamic Principalities in South-East Ethiopia between the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.” Ethiopianist Notes, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Vol. I, No. 1 (1978): 17–56. ——. “Oromo’s Country of Origin: A Reconsideration of Hypothesis.” In Sixth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Tel Aviv, April 1980, edited by Goldenberg and Bodloski. Rotterdam: A.A. Balkama (1986): 25–40. ——. “The Islamization of the Arsi Oromo.” Presented at the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 23–26 November, Addis Ababa, 1984.
——. “Vestiges Médiévaux et renouveau musulman sur les hauts-plateaux éthiopiens.” Etudes réunies par F. Constantin, Les voies de I’islam en Afrique orientale. Paris: Editions Karthala (1987): 19–33. ——. Medieval Muslim Survivals as a Stimulating Factor in the Re-Islamization of Southeastern Ethiopia, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschtaft, Band 137-Hft1, Stuttgart, 1987. Brietzke, Paul H. Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution. London: Associated University Presses, 1982. Brotto, Enrico. “Il regime della terre nel governo del Harar.” Rivista di diritto coloniale, Vol. 2, No. 2–3, Addis Ababa (1939): 349–365. Buchhder, John. The Land of Burned Faces: A Journey to Ethiopia. Translated by Maurice Michael. London: Arthur Ltd, 1955. Bureau, Jacques. “A Diachronic Study of Two Gamo Titles.” The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Anthropology, edited by D. Donham and W. James. Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986. CADU Annual Report, 1970–1971, CADU Publications. Carrère d’Encausse, Hélène. La gloire des nations ou La fin de l’Empire soviétique. Paris: Fayard, 1990. ——. L’Empire d’Eurasie: une histoire de l’empire russe de 1552 à nos jours. Paris: Fayard, 2005. Caulk, Richard. “Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia, c. 1850–1935.” International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1978): 457–497. ——. “Religion and the State in the Nineteenth Century Ethiopia.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. X, No. 1 (January 1972): 23–41. ——. “The Occupation of Harar: January 1887.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1971): 1–20. Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstract. Addis Ababa, 1970. Cerulli, Enrico. “Le popolazioni de bacino Superiore dello Uabi Scebelli.” L’esplorazione dello Uabi-Uebi. A. Mondadori, Editore, 1932: 135–181. ——. “L’Islam en Ethiopie: sa signification historique et ses methods.” Correspondance d’Orient, NE 5 (Colloque sur la Sociologie musulmane, Bruxelles, Septembre, 1961): 317–329. ——. “The Folk Literature of the Southern Galla.” In Harvard African Studies, Vol. III, Cambridge, MA: The Cambridge University Press (1922): 1–228. Chambard, R. “Sur l’organisation sociale des Oromo du Harar.” Revues d’ethnographie et des traditions populaires, No. 25. Paris, 1926. Chamberlain, Muriel E. Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires. Oxford, New York: B. Blackwell, 1985. Clapham, Christopher. Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis. University of Cambridge, Centre of African Studies, November 14, 2005.
——. “Controlling Space in Ethiopian.” Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James, Donald L. Donham, Aisei Kurimoto and Alessandro Triulzi. Oxford: James Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2002. ——. “Ethiopia.” In African Kingship in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Setting, edited by René Lemarchand. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977. ——. “The State and Revolution in Ethiopia.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 44 (1989): 6–17. ——. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. ——. Haile Selassie’s Government. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969. ——. Transformations and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Cohen, John M. Integrated Rural Development in Ethiopia: CADU after 1974. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University, 1986. ——. Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia. Assen: Van Gorcum and Comp. B.V., 1975. ——. Rural Change in Ethiopia: A Study of Land, Elites, Power and Values in Chilalo Awraja. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1971. Cohen, Ronald and Middleton, John, eds. From “Tribe” to Nation: Studies in Incorporation Process. Scranton Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970. Connor, Walker. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Cox, Michael. “Empire by Denial? Debating US Power.” Security Dialogue, Vol. 35(2) (2004): 228–236. Crewett, Wibke and Korf, Benedikt. “Ethiopia: Reforming Land Tenure.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2008): 203–220. Crummey, Donald. “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in the 19th Century Ethiopia.” Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, Vol. XXVIII, No. 109 (1988). ——. “Abyssinian Feudalism.” Past and Present, No. 89 (1980): 115–138. ——. “State and Society: 19th Century Ethiopia.” In Mode Production in Africa: The Pre- colonial Era, edited by Donald Crummey and C.C. Stewart. Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1981. ——. “The Violence of Tewodros.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1971): 107–125. D’Abbadie, Antoine. “Sur les Oromo: Grande nation africaine souvent désignée sous le nom de Galla.” Extrait des Annales de la société scientifique de Bruxelles, 4e année (1888): 167–192. D’Héricourt, Charles E. Second voyage dans le pays des Adel’s et royaume du Choa. Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1846.
Dahl, Gudrun. The Suffering Grass: Subsistence and Community of the Wasso Borana. Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology, 1979. Darkwah, Rexford Henry Kofi. Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813–1889. London: Heinemann Educational, 1975. Davidson, Basil. The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-state. London: James Currey, 1992. Davis, John. ed. Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror. UK: Lexington Books, 2010. Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, eds. The End of Empire? The Transformations of the USSR in Comparative Perspective. New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, Armon, 1997. De Bozas, Du Bourg. Mission scientifique Du bourg de Bozas. De la Mer rouge à l’Atlantique à travers l’Afrique tropicale (Octobre 1900–1903), Paris: Edité par F.R. de Rudeval, 1906. De Salviac, Martial. Un peuple antique au pays de Ménélik: Les Galla. Paris: Oudin, 1901. Dell Boca, Angelo. The Ethiopian War 1935–1941. Translated by P.D. Cummins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Deng, Francis et al. “Sovereignty” as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brooking Institutions, 1996. Dessalegn Rahmato. “Condition of the Ethiopian Peasantry.” Challenge, Vol. X, No. 2 (1970). Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966. Dinsa Lepisa Abba Jobir. The Gadaa System of Government and Sera Tchaffe Oromo. Unpublished LLB Thesis, University of Addis Ababa, 1975. Dobb, Maurice. Studies in Development of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers, 1978. Donham, Donald L. and James, Wendy, eds. The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Donham, Donald L. “Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire: Themes in Social History.” In The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History, edited by Wendy James. Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 3–48. Doyle, Michael W. Empires. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1988. Du Toit, Brian M. ed., Ethnicity in Modern Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. Dumont, Louis. Homo aequalis: genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique. Paris: Gallimard, 1977. ——. Homo hierarchicus: essai sur le système des castes. Paris: Gallimard, 1966.
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. Tout empire périra: théories des relations Internationales. Paris: Armand Colin, 1992. Duverger, Maurice, ed. Le concept d’empire. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1980. ——. Sociologie de la politique. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973. Eisenstadt, Samuel Noah. From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956. ——. “Comparative Analysis of the State in Historical Context.” The State in Global Perspective, edited by Ali Kazancigil. Gower/Unesco (1986): 20–54. ——. The Political System of Empires. London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Macmillan Ltd, 1963. Ellis, Gene. “The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1976): 275–295. ——. Men or Machine, Beast or Burden: A Case Study of the Economic of Agricultural Mechanization in Ada District, Ethiopia. Ph.D. dissertation: The University of Tennessee, 1972. Engles, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. Etherington, Norman. Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital. London, Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984. Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire. New York: Penguin Press, 2004. Ferraro, Vincent. “Dependency Theory: An Introduction.” In The Development Economics Reader, edited by Giorgio Secondi. London: Routledge, 2008. Ferro, Marc. Colonization: A Global History. London, New York: Routledge, 1997. ——. Histoire des colonisations: des conquêtes aux indépendances, XIII–XX siècle. Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 1994. Fikre Tolossa. “Nobles of Oromo Descent Who Ruled Ethiopia,” http://www .EthiopianReview.com. October 1st 1992. Flanagan, James. “Hierarchy in Simple Egalitarian Society.” Annual Review of Anthropology, XVIII (1989): 245–307. Folz, Robert. The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to Fourteenth Century. Translated by Sheila Ann Ogilvie. London: Edward Arnold, 1969. Foreign Policy. “Failed States Index: Interactive Map Rankings,” (http://www.foreign policy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and _rankings). Fox, Robin. Anthropologie de la parenté et de l’Alliance. Translated by Simone Dreyfus and Tina Jolas. Paris: Galimard, 1972. Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies in Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969. ——. “The Development of Underdevelopment.” Monthly Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (September 1966): 17–31.
Fried, Morton. The Notion of “Tribe”. New York: Cumming Publishing Company, 1975. Gabre Sellassie, La Chronique de Ménélik II, Rois des Rois d’Ethiopie traduit par Tesfa Sellassie publiée et annotée par Maurice de Copet. Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine (1930, 1932) 2 tomes. Galtung, Johan. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1971): 81–117. Ganshof, François L. Qu’est-ce que la féodalité? 5e édition, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1982. Gascon, Alain. Identité culturelle et contrôle de la Terre, Matcha (Ethiopie de l’ouest cen- ter de l’ancien régime à la révolution). Thèse de doctorat de troisième cycle, Université de Paris I, 1982. ——. La Grande Ethiopie: une utopie africaine, Ethiopie ou Oromie, l’intégration des hautes terres du sud. Paris: CNRS éd. 1995. Gebru Tareke. Ethiopia, Power and Protest, 1941–1970: A Study of Three Rebellions. Ph.D. dissertation in History, Syracuse University, 1977. ——. Ethiopia: Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Gellar, Sheldon. “State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa.” Building States and Nations, Models and Data Resources, Vol. II, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and E. Rokkan. Beverly Hills (1973): 384–426. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983. Getachew Haile. “The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1986): 465–487. Ghosh, B.N. Dependency Theory Revisited. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2001. Gibbon, Edward. History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, edited by J.P. Bury. London: Methuen, 1909–1914. Gilkes, Patrick. The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia. London: J. Friedman, 1975. Gragg, Gene B. Oromo Dictionary. Michigan: African Studies Center, 1982. Greenberg, Joseph H. “Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vo1. 3 (1947): 193–211. Gulliver, P.H., ed. Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of Tribal Elements in the Modern Era. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1969. Guluma Gemeda. Land, Agriculture and Society: Southwestern Ethiopia, c 1850–1974. Ph.D. dissertation in History, Michigan State University, 1996. Gurr, Ted R. “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30 (1994): 347–377. Haberland, Eike. Galla Süd Äthiopiens. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963.
Hale, Henry E. “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethno federal State Survival.” World Politics, Vol. 56(2) (2004): 165–193. Halliday, Fred and Molyneux, Maxine. The Ethiopian Revolution. London: Verso, 1981. Halliday, Fred. “Nationalism.” In The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith. New York: Oxford University Press (1997): 359–373. Hamdesa Tuso. “Ethiopia: New Political Order and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era.” Africa (Roma), Anno LII, No. 3 (1997): 343–364. ——. “Indigenous Process of Conflict Resolution in Oromo Society.” In Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts, African Conflict “Medicine,” edited by William Zartman. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. ——. “Oromo Problems and the US Foreign Policy.” In Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-determination in Ethiopia, edited by Seyoum Hameso and Mohammed Hassen. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc., Publishers and Distributors of Third World Books, 2006. Harbeson, John W. “A Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: Is Ethiopia Democratic?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1998): 62–69. Hargreaves, John D. Decolonization in Africa. London, New York: Longman, 1988. Harris, William C. The Highlands of Aethiopia. London: Longman Brown, 1844. Hechter, Michael. “Le colonialisme interne: revu et corrigé.” Pluriel, No. 32 (1982/1983): 18–128. ——. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1563–1966. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975. Hinnant, John. “The Guji: Gadaa as a Ritual System.” In Age, Generation and Time, edited by P.T.W. Baxter and Uri Almagor. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978: 207–243. ——. The Gadaa System of the Guji of Southern Ethiopia. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Anthropology. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1977. Hoben, Allan. “Family, Land and Class in North Western Europe and Northern Highland Ethiopia.” Proceeding of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, edited by Harold Marcus, 1973. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, African Studies Center, 1975. ——. Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia: The Dynamic of Cognatic Descent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire: 1875–1914. New York: Pantheon Books, 1987. ——. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Hobson, John Atkinson. Imperialism. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1938. Holcomb, Bonnie K. and Sisay Ibsa. The Invention of Ethiopia. New Jersey, Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1990.
Horowitz, Donald L. “Ethnic Identity.” In Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, edited by Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1975): 111–140. ——. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. London, Los Angeles, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Howe, Stephen. Empire: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2002. ——. “British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, and Killing Fields.” Review Essay. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No. 4 (November 2012): 691–725. Huliaras, Asteris C. “Islam: Promise or Peril?” The World Today, Vol. 51, No. 12 (1995): 242–245. Hultin, Jan. “Political Culture and the Development of Inequality among the Matcha Oromo.” Dans La Production pastorale sous la direction de l’Equipe écologie et Anthropologie des sociétés pastorales. Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme et Cambridge University Press, 1977. ——. “Sons of Slaves or Sons of Boys: On the Premise of Rank and Inequality among the Matcha Oromo.” In Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, November 1984. ——. “The Land is Crying: State Intervention and Cultural Resistance among the Matcha.” A River of Blessing: Essays in Honor of Paul Baxter. Edited by David Brokensha. Syracuse, New York, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1994. Huntingford, George W. The Galla of Ethiopia, the Kingdom of Kafa and Janjero. London: International African Institute, 1955. Hussein Ahmed. “The Historiography of Islam in Ethiopia.” Journal of Islamic Studies, 3 (1992): 15–46. ——. Clerics, Traders, and Chiefs: A Historical Study of Islam in Wallo (Ethiopia) with Special Emphasis on the Ninetieth Century. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1986. ——. Some Problems of Gabre Selassie Chronicle. B.A. Thesis, Addis Ababa University, August 1977. Hussein Jemma. “The Debate over Rural Land Tenure Policy Options in Ethiopia: A Review of the Post-1991 Contending Views.” Ethiopian Journal of Development Research, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2001): 35–84. Hussein Jeylan. “The Functions of African Oral Arts: The Arsi-Oromo Oral Arts in Focus.” African Study Monographs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005): 15–58. Hussein, Seifuddin Adem. “Islam, Christianity and Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1997): 129–139. Hutchinson, John. “Ethnicity and Modern Nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2000): 651–669.
——. Modern Nationalism. London: Fontana Press, 1994. International Crisis Group. “Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents.” Africa Report, No. 153, 4 September 2009. Ingram, Edward. Empire-Building and Empire-Builders: Twelve Studies. London: Frank Cass, 1995. Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl. Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet and Tyrant. Berkeley: California University Press, 1982. Jackson, Robert H. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge University Press, 1996. ——. “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape.” Political Studies, Vol. XLVII (1999): 431–456. Joireman, Sandra Fullerton. “Opposition Politics and Ethnicity in Ethiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (1999): 387–407. Jonas, Raymond. The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. Judson, Pieter M. “L’Autriche-Hongrie était-elle un empire?” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, Vol. 63(3) (2008): 563–596. Kaplan, Steven. “Christianity and Early State in Ethiopia.” In The Early State in African Perspective: Culture, Power and Division of Labour, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt, M. Abitbol and N. Chazan. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988. Kautsky, John H. The Politics of Aristocratic Empires. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 1997. Keller, Edmond J. “Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Political Transitions in Ethiopia: Historic and Contemporary Processes.” In Self-Determinations and National Unity, edited by Francis Deng. Trenton, Asmara: Africa World Press, 2010. ——. “Revolution, Class and the National Question: The Case of Ethiopia.” North East African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1980–1981): 43–67. ——. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic. Bloomington, Indianapolis: India University Press, 1988. Keller, Edmond J. and Rothchild, Donald, eds. Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rinner Publisher, 1996. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1988. Khoury, Dina Rizk and Kennedy, Dane Keith. “Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the British Raj in the Long Nineteenth Century.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2007): 233–244. Kifle, Henok. Investigation on Mechanized Farming and Its Effects on the Peasant Agriculture, No. 74, Assalla: CADU Publications, 1972.
Knutsson, Karl. Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution among the Matcha Galla of Ethiopia. Gôterberg: Etnografiska museet, Etnologiska Studier 29, 1967. Koebner, Richard. Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Kramer, Gudrun. “Islamist Notions of Democracy.” In Political Islam, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. Berkeley: University of California Press (1997): 71–82. Kuper, Adam. “Lineage Theory: A Critical Retrospect.” Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. XI (1982): 71–95. Larrain, Jorge. Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism, and Dependency. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, 1989. Laoust, Henri. Les schismes dans l’Islam. Paris: Payot, 1965. Leach, Edmund. Social Anthropology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Leenco, Lata. The Ethiopian State at the Crossroad: Decolonization and Democratization or Disintegration. Lawrence, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1999. Lefort, René. Éthiopie: la révolution hérétique. Paris: F. Maspero, 1981. ——. “Ethiopia’s Election: All Losers.” Open Democracy, July 2010. Le Sage, Andre, ed. African Counter Terrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub Regional Initiatives. Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies and National Defense University, 2007. Lenin, Vladimir I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. London: M. Lawrence, 1934. Levine, Donald. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. ——. Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture. London, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Anthropologie structurale deux. Paris: Plon, 1973. ——. Anthropologie structurale, Vol. I. Paris: Plon, 1958. ——. Les structures élémentaires de la parenté. Paris: La Haye, Mouton & Co., 1967. Lewis, Herbert S. “A Reconsideration of the Socio-Political System of Western Galla.” Journal of Semitic Studies, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1964): 139–143. ——. “Neighbors, Friends and Kinsmen: Principle of Social Organization among the Cushitic Speaking Peoples of Ethiopia.” In Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 2–5 May 1973, edited by Harold G. Marcus et al. East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1975. ——. “The Origin of Galla and Somali.” Journal of African History, VII (1) (1966): 27–46. ——. “Values and Procedures in Conflict Resolution among the Shoan Oromo.” In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1989.
——. “Wealth, Influence and Prestige among the Shoa Galla.” In Social Stratification in Africa, edited by A. Tuden and L Plotnicov. New York: The Free Press, 1970. ——. A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jiffar, Ethiopia, 1830–1932. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Lewis, Ioan M. “Sufism in Somali Land.” In Islam in Tribal Societies from the Atlas to the Indus, edited by Akbar S. Ahmed and D.M. Hert. London: Rutledge & Paul Kegan (1966): 127–168. ——. Islam in Tropical Africa. Published for IAI by the Oxford University Press, 1982. Lexander, Arne. The Changing Rural Society in Arussi Land: Some Findings from Field Study 1966–7. Assalla: CADU Publications, 1968. ——. Land Ownership, Tenancy and Social Organization in Waji Area. CADU Publication No. 50 (March 1970): 86–87. Lieven, Dominic. “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1995): 607–636. ——. Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. London: John Murray/Yale U.P., 2000. ——. “Dilemmas of Empire 1850–1918: Power, Territory, Identity.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1999): 163–200. Lockot, Hans Wihelm. The Mission: The Life, Reign and Character of Haile Selassie. New York: Saint Martin Press, 1989. Lord Acton. “Nationality.” Reprinted in The Nationalism Reader, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay. New York: Humanity Books (1995): 108–118. Lowie, Robert. Social Organization. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1959. Madeline, Fanny. L’empire et son espace: héritages, organisations et pratiques, Publications de la Sorbonne, Hypothèses, Vol. 1 (2007): 213–225. Mahteme Selassie Wolde Maskal. “The Land System of Ethiopia.” Ethiopian Observer, Vol. I, No. 9 (1957): 283–288. Mama Badhane Bariso. Dispute Settlement in Rural Ethiopia, Outside of the Codified Legal System: The Case of Arsi-Bale Massifs. LLB Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1986. Mamdani, Mahmoud. Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Mann, Michael, ed. The Rise and Decline of the Nation State. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. ——. “The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2004): 631–653. ——. Incoherent Empire. London, New York: Verso, 2003. Marcus, Cressida. “Imperial Nostalgia: Christian Restoration and Civic Decay.” In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James et al. James Currey, Oxford: Ohio University Press (2002): 239–256.
Marcus, Harold G. “Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia.” In Colonialism in Africa, edited by L.H. Gann and P. Duignan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Vol. I (1969): 420–461. ——. “Motives, Methods and Some Results of the Unification during the Reign of Menelik II.” In Proceedings of International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1966 (1969): 269–280. ——. Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941–1974: The Politics of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. ——. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Markakis, John. Nationalities and State in Ethiopia: An Interpretation, The Huge: Institute of Social Studies: The University of Crete Working Papers Series, No. 63, 1989. ——. Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. ——. Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers. UK: James Currey, 2011. ——. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Markakis, John and Ayele, Nega. Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. London: Spokesman, 1978. McClellan, Charles W. Reaction to Ethiopian Expansionism: The Case of Darasa, 1895–1935. Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1978. Mekuria Bulcha. “Priests, Religion and Language in Ethiopia.” The Oromo Commentary, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1994): 8–11. ——. “The Language Policies of Ethiopia Regimes and the History of Written Afaan Oromo: 1844–1994.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1994): 91–115. ——. Contours of the Emergent and Ancient Oromo Nation: Dilemmas in the Ethiopian Politics of State and Nation-Building. Cape Town: Center for Advanced Studies of African Societies, 2011. ——. Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and the Problems of Integration. Uppsala: Scandinavian African Studies, 1988. Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965. Merid Wolde Aregay. Southern Ethiopia and Christian Kingdom, 1508–1708 with Special Reference to the Galla Migration and Their Consequences. Ph.D. Thesis. SOAS, University of London, 1971. Mesfin WoldeMariam. “The Background of the Ethiopia Somali Boundary Dispute.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July, 1964): 189–219. ——. An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam, 1972. Messay Kebede. Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present: A Philosophical Discourse. Lawrenceville, NJ; Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1999.
Messing, Simon D. “Highland Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia,” edited by Lionel Bender, Vol. 3. New Haven, CT: Human Relation Area Files, 1985. Miller, David. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Mindaye Abebe Senbeta. The Oromo of Bale: A Historical Survey to 1974. M.A. Thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 2005. Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. Report on the Survey of land Tenure of Arussi Province, Addis Ababa, 1967. Mohammed Hassen. “Colonial Consolidation and Resistances, 1935–2000.” The Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1–2 (July 2000): 109–198. ——. “Islam as a Resistance Ideology among the Oromo of Ethiopia, the Wollo Case, 1700–1900.” In The Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1995. ——. “The Development of Oromo Nationalism.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries, edited by P.T.W Baxter, Jan Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Lawrenceville, NJ; Asmara: The Red Sea Press (1996): 67–80. ——. The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, 1570–1860. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Montandon, Georges. L’esclavage en Abyssinie; rapport rédigé́ à la demande de la Ligue suisse pour la défense des indigènes. Genève, George & Co. S.A. Librairies-Éditeurs, 1923. ——. Au pays Ghimira, Récit de mon voyage à travers le massif éthiopien, 1910. Paris: Challamel Attinger frères éditeurs, 1912. Monteil, Vincent. L’Islam noir. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964. Mooers, Colin, ed. The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006: 112–135. Motyl, Alexander J. “Thinking about the Empire.” In After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. ——. “Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?” Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January, 2006): 229–249. Munck, Ronaldo and O’Hearn, Denis, eds. Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm. London, New York: Zed Books, 1999. Muthu, Sankar. Enlightenment against Empire. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003. Nairn, Tom. The Break-up of Britain. London: Verso, 1978. Newman, Oscar. “From the Somali Coast through Southern Ethiopia to the Sudan.” Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, 1903.
Nicolas, Guy. Dynamique de l’islam au Sud du Sahara. Paris: Publications orientalistes de France, 1981. Niecko, Joana Mantel. The Role of Land Tenure in the System of Ethiopian Imperial Government in Modern Times, translated by Krysztof Adam Bobinski. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwerstytetu Warszawskiego, 1980. ——. “The Division of Ethiopia into Regions according to the Native Typology in at the Turn of the XIX and XIX Centuries.” In Modern Ethiopia from the Accession of Menelik to the Present, edited by Joseph Tubiana. Rotterdam: A.A. Balkena, 1980. Nigussay Ayele. “Is There Feudalism in Ethiopia?” Conference on Feudalism in Ethiopia organized by the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, March 20, 1976. Olukoshi, Adebabyob O. and Laakso, Liisa. Challenges to the Nation-Sate in Africa, edited by Nordiska Africakainstitutet, Uppsala in Collaboration with the Institute of Development Studies: University of Helsinki, 1996. Østebø, Terje. Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia. Leiden: Brill, 2012. ——. “The Question of Becoming: Islamic Reform Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia.” Journal of Religion in Africa, 38 (2008): 416–446. Ottaway, Marina. “Ethnic Conflict and Security in South Africa.” In Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1996): 119–133. ——. Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. Oukeris, Kostas. “Contending Political Ideologies in Ethiopia after 1991: The Role of Intellectuals.” Polis, Revue camerounaise de science politique, Vol. 12, numero special 2004–2005. Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933. Pagden, Anthony. “The Empire’s New Clothes: From Empire to Federation, Yesterday and Today.” Common Knowledge, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 2006): 36–46. Pankhurst, Richard. Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800–1935. Addis Ababa: HSIU Press, 1968. ——. Land and State in Ethiopian History. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1966. ——. The Ethiopians: A History. Oxford; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. Paulme, Denise, ed. Classes et Association d’Âge en Afrique de l’Oust. Paris: Plon, 1971. Paulos Mikias, Haile Selassie. Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia. Youngstown, New York: Cambria Press, 2006. Pausewang, Siegfried, Tronvoll, Kjetil and Aalen, Lovise, eds. Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance. London: ZED Books, 2002.
Pearson, Raymond. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire. New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1998. Peet, Richard. Theories of Development: Contentions, Arguments, Alternatives. New York: Guilford Press, 2009. Pelizzari, Elisa. “L’islam popolare in Etiopia: il pellegrinaggio di Shaikh Husayn.” Africa (Roma), Vol. 48, No. 3 (1993): 382–395. Pelopidas, Benoît. “Tout Empire: ou comment ce concept a perdu sa spécificité et com- ment la restaurer.” European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2011): 111–133. Perham, Margery. The Government of Ethiopia. London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1969. Pieterse, Nederveen. Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale. New York: Praeger, 1989. Pille, René-Marc (sous la direction de). Le délitement des empires. Paris: Presses uiversi- taires de Paris 10, 2008. Przeworski, Adam and Limongi, Fernando. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997): 155–183. Pitts, Jennifer. “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism.” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 13 (2010): 211–235. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. and Forde, Daryl, eds. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Renan, Ernest. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Paris: Editions d’Art E. Pelletan, 1934. Rey, Charles F. Unconquered Abyssinia. London: Seeley Services and Co. Ltd, 1923. ——. In the Country of the Blue Nile. London, Southampton: The Camlot Press Ltd, 1935. Richmond, Anthony H. “Le nationalisme ethnique et les paradigmes des sciences soci- ales.” Revue Internationale des sciences sociales, Vol. 39, No. 111 (1987): 3–19. Richardson, J.S. “Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of Power.” In Theories of Empire 1450–1800: An Expanding World, Vol. 20, edited by David Armitage. Brookfield: Ashgate, VARIORUM, 1998: 1–11. Robinson, Eric W. “American Empire? Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power.” Classical World, Vol. 99, No. 1 (2005): 35–50. Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972. Rokkan, Stein. “Dimension of State-Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variation within Europe.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe: 562–600, edited by Charles Tilly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. ——. State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan, edited by Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Rostow, Walt W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Rothberg, Robert I, ed. Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2005. Rubenson, Sven. The Survival of Ethiopian Independence. Heinemann, London: Richard Clay Ltd, 1976. Sahlins, Marshall. Tribesmen. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968. ——. “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Polynesia and Melanesia.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. V, No. 3 (1961): 285–303. Sahlu Difaye. Ye Arussi Hizb Limatina Edget (The Arsi Peoples’ Development and Progress). Addis Ababa: Berhanina Selam Printing Press, 1996. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. “Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy Versus control in the Somali Region.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2004): 1131–1154. ——. “The Ethiopian Election of 2005: A Bombshell & Turning Point.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105 (2005). Samuna Rakiso, Kuyera. A History of Ethiopian Adventist College. Senior Essay in History. Addis Ababa University, 1985. Sbacchi, Alberto. The Legacy of Bitterness, Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1997. Schermerhorn, Richard A. Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Seton-Watson, Hugh. The New Imperialism. Chester Springs, PA: Dufour Editions, 1961. Seymour-Smith, Charlotte. Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology. London, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990. Simone, Ed. “The Amhara Expedition against the Shawa Galla (1880–1850): A Reappraisal.” In Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 2–5 May, 1973, edited by Harold G. Marcus. East Lansing: African Studies Center (1975): 135–141. Smith, Anthony D. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995. Sorenson, John. Imagining Ethiopia: Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993. Southall, A. “Tribes.” In Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 4, edited by David Levinson and Melvin Ember. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996. Spencer, John H. Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years. Algonac, MI: Reference Publications, 1984. Springhall, John. Decolonization since 1945. Palgrave: Saint Martin’s Press, 2001. Stalin, Joseph. “Marxism and the National Question.” In The Nationalism Reader, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R Ishay. New York: Humanity Books (1995): 192–197. Stefasson, B.G. and Starett, R. Documents on Ethiopian Politics: The Decline of Menelik to the Emergence of Ras Tafari later known as Haile Selassie, 1901–1919, Vol. I. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publication, 1976.
STORM (Somali, Tigrai and Oromo Resistance Monitor), No. 2, 1981. Strauss, Peter L. The Fetaha Nagast, translated by Abba Paulos Tzadua. Addis Ababa: HSIU, Faculty of Law, Central Printing Press, 1966. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. “A Tale of Three Empires: Mughals, Ottomans, and Habsburgs in a Comparative Context.” Common Knowledge, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 2006): 66–92. Sunderland, Willard. “An Empire of Peasants: Empire Building, Interethnic Interaction, and Ethnic Stereo Typing in the Rural World of the Russian Empire, 1800-1850s.” In Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire, edited by Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel. Indiana University Press (1998): 174–181. Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Taddese Beriso. Marriage and Family System of the Guji. B.A. Thesis in Sociology, Addis Ababa University, 1983. ——. “Modernist Dreams and Human Suffering: Villagization among the Guji Oromo.” In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James et al. Oxford: J. Currey; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press; Athens: Ohio University Press (2002): 116–132. Taddesse Tamrat. “Feudalism in Heaven and on Earth: Ideology and Political Structure in Medieval Ethiopia.” In Proceedings of International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, University of Lund, April 26–29, 1982, edited by S. Rubenson. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies (1984): 195–200. ——. Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270–1527. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Tapiéro, N. “Evolving Social Patterns.” In Islam in Africa, edited by J. Kritzeck and W.L. Lewis. New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1969. Teshome Amenu. The Rise and Expansion of Islam in Bale of Ethiopia: Socio-cultural and Political Factors and Inter-religious Relations. M.A. Thesis in Religious Education at Norsk Lærerakademi (NLA), Bergen, Norway, May 2008. Tessema Ta’a. The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia: From the Middle of the 16th Century to the Early 20th Centuries. Ph.D. Thesis in History, Michigan State University, 1986. The World Factbook, CIA, August 23, 2011. Thies, Cameron G. “National Design and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 4 (2009): 623–66. Tibebe Teshale. The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1900–1974: An Enquiry in Historical Sociology. Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton (1989): 69–70. ——. The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896–1974. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995. Tilly, Charles. “How Empires End.” In After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation- Building, The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, edited
by Karen Barkley and Mark Von Hagen. Westview Press: Harper Collins Publishers (1997): 1–11. ——. “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation.” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Traversi, L. “Sul Viago negli Arussi, Guraghi.” Bolletino della Societa Geographia Italiana, Vol. II, XXIV (1887): 267–290. Trimingham, John S. “The Expansion of Islam.” In Islam in Africa, edited by J. Kritzeck and B H. Lewis. New York, Toronto, London, Melbourne: Van Nostrand de Reinhold, 1969. ——. Islam in Ethiopia. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. Triulzi, Alessandro. “Battling with the Past, New Frameworks for Ethiopian Historiography.” Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by Wendy James et al. James Currey, Oxford: Ohio University Press (2002): 176–288. ——. “Social Protest and Rebellion in Some Gebbar Songs from Qellem, Wollaga.” In Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Nice, 19–22 December, 1977. Tronvoll, Kjetil and Hagmann, Tobias, eds. Contested Power in Ethiopia: Traditional Authorities and Multi-Party Elections. Leiden: Brill, 2011. ——. “Briefing the Ethiopian 2010 Federal and Regional Elections: Re-establishing the One-party State.” African Affairs, Vol. 110, No. 438 (2011): 121–136. Tsehai Berhane Sellassie. Menelik’s Conquest and Consolidation of the Southern Provinces. B.A. Thesis, History Department, Haile Selassie I. University, 1969. Tubiana, Joseph, ed. “Modern Ethiopia from the Accession of Menelik II to the Present.” In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Nice, 19–22 December 1977. Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema, 1980. Tuminez, Astrid S. “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies (JCWS), Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 2003): 81–136, 86. Ullendorf, Edward. The Ethiopians. London: Oxford University Press, 1960. Urjii, Amharic Weekly August 19, 1997. Valenzuela, Samuel J. and Valenzuela, Arturo, “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (July 1978): 535–557. Van den Berghe, PierreL. “L’ethnicité en Afrique.” Revue Internationale des Sciences sociales, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (1971): 539–551. ——. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier, 1989. Vanderheym, J.G. Une expédition avec le Négus Menelik (vingt mois en Abyssinie). Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1896. Velron, Leonardo A. and Huxtable, Philip A., eds. The African State at a Critical Juncture between Disintegration and Reconfiguration. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Vestal, Theodore M. Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.
Veyne, Paul. L’empire gréco-romain. Paris: Seuil, 2005. Wallace, William. “Rescue or Retreat? The Nation-State in Western Europe, 1945–1993.” In The Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State? Edited by John Dunn. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers (1995): 52–76. Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press, 1974. ——. “The Great Expansion: The Incorporation of Vast New Zones into the Capitalist World Economy (c. 1750–1850).” Studies in History, Vol. 4, No. 1–2 (1988): 85–156. Waugh, Evelyn. Waugh in Abyssinia. London, New York, Toronto, Longmans: Green and Co. Ltd, 1936. Weber, Eugen. La fin des terroirs: la modernisation de la France rurale: 1870–1914. Translated by Antoine Berman and Bernard Géniès. Paris: Fayard, 1983. Weber, Max. Economy and Society, Vol. 3. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. Wellby, Montagu. Twixt Sirdar and Menelik: An Account of a Year’s Expedition from Zeila to Cairo through Unknown Abyssinia. London, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901. Werner, A. “The Galla of the East African Protectorate.” Journal of Royal African Society, Vol. XIII, No. 51 (1914): 262–287. Williams, Colin H., ed. National Separatism. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982. Wunsch, James S. and Olowu, Dele, eds. The Failure of Centralized State: Institutions and Self Governance in Africa. San Francisco: ICS Press Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1995. Ye Aghar Ghizat Mahset (Journal of Ministry of Interior), Fourth year, No. 1–2, Addis Ababa, 1958 E.C. Ye Aghar Ghizat Mahset, Addis Ababa, Fourth year, No. 4, 1957 E.C. Ye Aghar Ghizat Mahset, Addis Ababa, Third year, No. 3, 1956 E.C. Yinger, J.M. Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Young, John. “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 531–542. Zarycki, Tomasz. “An Interdisciplinary Model of Centre-Periphery Relations: A Theoretical Proposition.” Regional and Local Studies Special Issue, 2007. Zolberg, Aristide R. “Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England.” The State in Global Perspective, edited by Ali Kazancigil. Paris: UNESCO, 1986. Zubaida, Sami. “Is Iran an Islamic State?” Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997.
Aadaa Abba 44 Aklilu Habte Wold 253 Arsi Qaalluu 178. see also Abba Baala 33 Albaso 247 Awa clans Abba Baalli 33, 68. Aleqa 125, 236, 274, 286 Arsi-Bale 3, 7–8, 23, 25, see also Abba Bokku Allah Da’imuu 191–192 79, 171, 177, 221, 303, 326 Abba Biyya 216 Amhara 2, 8–11, 17–19, 34, Arsi–Bale massifs 7 Abba Bokku 33–34, 39, 68, 70, 85, 87, 123–126, Arsiland 43, 147, 209, 52, 68, 231 128–134, 139–141, 143–144, 234, 245, 266, 273, 275, Abba Duula 38–40, 68. 156, 158–161, 170, 177, 199, 277–279, 281, 283, 285, see also Abba looshaa 208, 212, 216, 219, 221, 287, 289, 291, 293, 295, 297 Abba Gadaa 24, 32, 225–226, 229, 236, 239, Arsooma 26 39–40, 51–52 241, 245, 248–249, 251–252, Asafa Jalata 4 Abba Heenna 218. see 258 259, 261, 265, 267, 271, Asma Giyorgis 24, 42, also Miiloo Mamaa 280–281, 292, 295, 303–304, 46, 85, 139, 143, 158 Abba looshaa 39 310–318, 321, 325–326, Asmarom Legesse 23, 32, Abba Muuda 53, 145, 179, 328–329, 332–334 34, 44, 52, 60, 62, 69, 71, 188, 193–195, 230. see also Amharanization pol- 77–79, 81, 87, 128, 195, 201, Qaalluu icy 2, 331. see also 206, 287, 311 Abba Seera 44–45 Assimilation Asres Abay 291 Abba Torba 61 Anajina 194–195 Assalla 2, 151–152, 162, Abbink, Jon 180, 187, Anderson, Benedict 4, 181, 183, 217–218, 220, 207, 337 12, 119 247, 256–258, 264, Abiyotawi Sadad 8 Anole 1, 151, 157, 164. 274–276, 280 Absentee landlords 219, see also Harkaaf harma Assimilation 82, 106, 109, 264, 280–281, 283, 298 muraa Anole 137–138, 267, 307–313, Absolutist Empires 98. Apartheid 302 315–316, 318, 320–321, see also Aristocratic Aqgni 125, 246. see also 325, 330 Empire Ager Aqgni Atbia Dagna 230, 247, Abyssinia 18–19, 38, 104, Arababini 171. see also 287 106–107, 112–113, 120, Islamic Principalities Atse 46, 68, 143 122–124, 127–128, 132, 142, Arara 50 Audon, Henry 141, 144, 176, 224, 237, 241–242, Archaic imperialism 103 150 302, 318 Argobba 180, 185 Austro-Hungary 108 Abyssinian clergy 24 Aristocratic empire 103 Autonomy 9, 60, 65, Abyssinian political Arsi Gosa 60, 63, 74, 76, 103, 109, 126, 148, 155, culture 143 79, 148, 186, 197, 214, 228, 272, 318, 325, 329, Addis Hiwet 113, 133, 142 251, 277 332, 336 Adona 278 Arsi Oromo 1, 3, 11, 14–15, Awa clans 172, 176, 197 Adwa 13, 114, 177, 19, 26, 29, 32, 43, 45, 61, 66, Awama 172, 176, 197 218–219, 231–232, 301 70, 76, 80, 84, 137–139, 141, Awash River 140, 149, Afaan Oromo 16 154, 163–164, 167–168, 160, 237, 274 Afar 126, 176 172–174, 177, 183–184, 190, Awra 228. see also Afarsata 270 199, 202, 206, 208, 213–215, Leenjeso Diigaa Agar qanna 226. see also 229, 231–232, 237, 241, 252, Awraja 125, 247, 250–251, Colonization 261, 264–266, 268, 271, 254–259, 264, 267, Ager Aqgni 2 277–279, 298, 305 289, 292
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004265486_013
Awrash Bartels, Lambert 28, Centre 9, 102, 211–213, Balabbat 219–220 56–57, 61–63, 200 260, 310, 321–322. see also Ayna gamad 232 Battle of Adwa 13, 177, Centre-Periphery Ayyaana Abba 64 218–219, 231 Relations Azule 1, 142, 151–153, 158, Battle of Sagale 248 Centre-Periphery 160, 164, 219, 232 Baxter, Paul 23, 28, Relations 212 31, 34, 64, 75, 78, 174, Cerulli, Enrico 36, 43, Baala buusa 32–33. see 256, 313 145, 147, 149, 160, 168, 170, also Qabiye right Begemder 252 172, 174, 176–177, 186, 189, Baatee 48 Berhanou Abebe 215 194, 237, 274 Badhasaa 43. see also Big men 11, 49 Chalanqo 142, 160 Gadaa leaders Bilateral 87 Chercher 191, 234, 292 Bado Ballayyo 44–45 Birch, Anthony 325 Chilalo 147, 149, 152, 217, Bahara 36, 68 Birmaji 36, 68 220, 237, 258, 261, 273, 278, Bahrey, Abba 24, 36–38, Bishooftuu 280 290, 295–296, 298 71, 77, 82–83, 139, 159 Bisil 42 Chilalo Agricultural Bahru Zewde 99, 111, Bitoweded Negash 249, Development 126–127, 129, 140, 218, 252 Unit 290, 298 235, 237–238, 248, 252, Bloch, Marc 133 Chilot 288 310, 319 Boollo 229 Chiqa Shum 229–230, Bairu Tafla 24, 42, 46, Boran 31, 75, 203 247 124, 130, 138–140, 143, Borelli, Jules 144 Chisgnoch 281. see also 145–148, 151–152, 156, 158, Boru Meda 180 Tenancy 180, 230, 247 Braukamper, Urlich 171, Clapham, Christopher 9, Balabbat 68, 164, 181, 183, 174–175 100, 131, 232, 240, 250, 215–221, 223, 229–232, 258, Brietzke, Paul H. 104, 115, 252, 261, 264, 311, 316, 259, 261, 264–272, 274, 277, 123, 141, 225, 315, 323 319, 322–323, 325, 332, 287, 326 Brotto, Enrico 136, 219, 335–336 Balambaras 2, 160–161, 232, 235, 265, 274 Class conflict 14, 323 183, 217, 222–223, 267 Bultii 46–47. see also Cognatic system 311 Balambaras Murtii Cohen, John M 2, 83, 88, Mekonnen 160 Bultuma 36 164, 217, 250, 252, 255, Balandier, Georges 73 Bureaucratic 257–260, 262–263, 267, Balbala 27, 32, 63, 196. capitalism 323 270, 277–278, 280, see also Gosa Buttaa 37–38, 48 286–288, 296–297 Bale 6–8, 15, 18, 23, 42, Buttaa ceremonies Collectivization 327. see 44–45, 72, 79, 90, 138, 142, 38, 48 also Villagization 145, 155, 160–162, 171–173, Colonel Mengistu 9, 323 175, 179, 182, 186, 188–190, Cabo 294 Colonial empire 103 194, 203–205, 220–224, CADU 224, 269, 280, Colonial feudal state 221 236, 247–250, 256–257, 290–291, 295–296. see also Colonial rule 97, 99, 121, 272, 286, 291–292, 297, Chilalo Agricultural 229, 245, 269 303, 326 Development Unit Colonization 17, 23, 60, Bale maret 7 Captain Demise 99, 120, 123–124, 139, 155, Bale wulata 297 Amberbir 189 177, 215–216, 221, 230, 233, Bali 77–78, 171 Centralized 235–236, 245, 247, 253, Bareetuma 71 federalism 334 307, 317–318 Barentu 71, 77–78, Centralized state 122, Connor, Walker 88, 90, 82–83, 90, 169 129, 325 308, 314–315, 321–322, 330
Conquest 1, 11–19, 27, 30, 151–153, 157, 179, 194, Deng, Francis 318–319, 32, 40, 51, 56–57, 63, 68, 200, 230 334 70, 83–84, 88, 95–96, 102, Decolonization 88, Denqu Mabraqu 160, 105, 108–127, 130–131, 120–122, 302, 334 162. see also Fitawrari 134–135, 137–149, 151, Dejazmatch Amda Denqu Mabraqu 153, 155, 157, 159–163, Michael 251 Dependency 168–170, 173–174, 176–177, Dejazmatch Asfaw Paradigm 102 180, 183–186, 188, 208, Darghe 248 Developmental state 322 213–214, 216, 226–227, Dejazmatch Beyene Dhadacha 67 229, 233, 238, 240–241, Merid 248 Dhalataa 84–85 245, 247, 249, 258, Dejazmatch Daniel Dhalooma 33 265–267, 271, 273–275, Abebe 251, 253, 256 Dhugaa ganama 29 278, 298, 307–308, 316, Dejazmatch Deksiso Dhugaan ilmoo 320, 337 Badhaso 181 Waaqa 29 Containment Dejazmatch Desta Diachronic 23, 265 Liberalism 306. see Damtew 153 Dibbee 152, 156 also Truman Doctrine Dejazmatch Geresu Dide’a 177, 234 Core culture 19,310 Duki 249, 253 Dide’a front 147 Cosmocentric Dejazmatch Haile Selassie Diina baasaa 84 worldview 32 Abayneh 248 Dilbato Qilxuu 154 Country of Zeila 171 Dejazmatch Mekonnen Diniq 42, 44, 72, 79 Coup d’état 129 Wolde–Gabriel 162 Dinsa Lepisa Abba Crummey, Donald 100, Dejazmatch Mekuria Jobir 29, 41 105, 116, 131, 133–134, 158, Yirgu 189 Divide and conquer 305 211, 240 Dejazmatch Dobb, Maurice 135–136, Cultural engineering 313 Mengesha 142 238–239 Dejazmatch Dodota 150, 152, D’Abbadie, Nasibu 156, 228 Antoine 45–46 Ze–amanuel 248 Doyle, Michael D’Héricourt, Charles Dejazmatch Sahlu W. 108–109 E. 140, 148, 159 Difaye 253, 256 Du Toit, Brian M. 55 Daammu Usuu 148 Dejazmatch Dual Organization 56, Dahl, Gudrun 53, 69, 75, Tessema 247 70–72, 77–79, 81 78, 195, 203 Dejazmatch Wolde Duroselle, Jean– Dar Ager 209, 211, 213, Gabriel 1, 156, Baptiste 95, 111 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 225, 161–162, 172, 177, 224, 248 Duverger, Maurice 95, 227, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, Dejazmatch Wolde 109 239, 241 Tsadik 235 Darg 6–7, 9, 19, 49–50, Democracy 4, 8, 11, Eddir 70 121, 203, 256, 298, 320–323, 23–25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, Egalitarian ideology 28, 325–327, 329, 331, 337 39, 41, 43–45, 47, 49, 30, 52, 208 Darmu 78, 81 51–54, 71, 79, 96–97, 111, Egalitarian society 24, 27 Dawaro 171. see also 128, 195–196, 206, 306, 311, Egalitarianism 23–25, Islamic Principalities 319, 322, 331, 333, 337–338. 27–28, 30, 73, 208 De Bozas, Du Bourg 155, see also Gadaa system Eisenstadt, Samuel 163, 185, 224–225, 227 Democratic central- Noah 36, 106–107, De Salviac, Martial 27, ism 9, 49 109, 119, 167 29, 31–32, 35, 39, 53, 56, Denbegna 236, see also Ekul 282 84, 86, 140, 144–145, Naftagna Ekul Arashoch 282
Elections 7, 76, 261, 322, Ethiopian Orthodox Fitawrari Bekele 333–334, 337 Church 175, 177, 235, Ogato 183 Emiyee 128 263, 266 Fitawrari Denqu Emperor Ethiopian People’s Mabraqu 162 Amda–Siyon 171 Revolutionary Fitawrari Habte Emperor Menelik II 13, Democratic Front 8, Giyorgis 234–235 173 203, 327 Fitawrari Midhakso Empire 6, 8–9, 11, 13, Ethnic assimilation 320 Nabi 183 15–19, 32, 57, 88, 95–121, Ethnic core 124, 311, 316, Fitawrari Teshome 265 123–125, 127–143, 149, 321–322, 328 Fitawrari Tessemma 159–160, 162–163, 167–168, Ethnic Federalism 19, 225 171, 173, 177, 179, 183, 190, 331–336 Fitawrari Wolde 209–210, 212, 214, 219, Ethnicity 54–55, 58, Gabriel 248 224–225, 228, 230, 82–83, 85, 106, 123, 125, Fitawrari Wossene 229 233–235, 240, 247, 134, 211, 278, 310–311, 330, Fitawrari Zamenfes 218 253–254, 274–275, 333–337 Folk model 57 301–317, 319–321, Ethnocracy 333, 337 Frank, Andre 323–325, 327–329, 331, Ethnonationalism 17, 88, Gunder 102, 209 333–337 90, 308, 315, 318, 322, Fried, Morton 89 Empire-state 16, 103, 124, 330, 336 Fusion 16, 56, 82, 85–86, 128, 140, 142, 163, 167, 240, European colonial- 90, 119 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311, ism 13, 17, 104, 113, 119, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 210, 238 Gabbar 18, 125–126, 325, 327–329, 331, Exogamy 56, 60, 90, 134–136, 173, 177, 186, 333–335, 337 199–200 213, 224–225, 235–239, Endarase 125, 128 242, 274–275, 281–282, Entoto 141, 151, 156, 177, Faarsa 38 294, 303, 305 216 Fact of conquest 13, 112 Gabbar system 126, 134, EPRDF 8–9, 19, 49, 203, Family of nations 119 186, 213, 237–238, 242, 307, 322, 327, 329, 331–332, Faqih Issa 185 274–275, 303, 305 334–337. see also Fares endagattah 160 Gadaa 23–25, 28–48, Ethiopian People’s Federal model 10 51–54, 56–57, 60, 62, Revolutionary Felasha 281 64–65, 71, 75–78, 81, 84, Democratic Front Felege Berhan 280 87, 90, 117, 145, 164, 172, Equb 70 Ferenji 228 174, 176, 178–180, 184–185, Era of Princes 116, 140, Fetaha Negest 4, 148, 188–190, 192–196, 201, 318 214, 241 204, 206, 208, 216, Ethaya 1–2, 4 Feudal autocracy 121, 230–231, 241, 266, Ethiopia First 322 132, 323 276–277, 316 Ethiopian Empire 2–4, Feudal colonialism 6, 18, Gadaa and 11, 15, 19, 98–100, 104–106, 70, 121, 132, 134, 137, 209, Tchaffee 42–43, 46 108, 112, 120–121, 124, 128, 240, 271, 297, 305 Gadaa areas 38, 40, 130, 138–139, 142, 168, 212, Feudalism 119, 133, 135, 43–44 214, 228, 272, 274, 285, 163, 182, 238, 240, 281, 285, Gadaa class 34–35, 39, 302, 314, 321 297, 319, 323 43, 53, 68, 76, 179, 193, 204 Ethiopian feudalism 119, Finfinne 148, 151 Gadaa grades 36, 39, 45, 133, 323 Firooma 33 68, 145, 204 Ethiopian govern- Fission 16, 42, 56, 59, 63, Gadaa leaders 31, 40–41, ment 322, 335 82, 85–86, 90 46, 51–52, 65, 68, 266
Gadaa officers 29, 31, Gossa Dilamo 149 Horn of Africa 10, 99, 113, 33–34, 39, 51, 172, Gubbo 259 115–116, 133, 142, 167, 173, 216, 231 Gullalle 275 175–176, 179, 189, 194, Gadaa system 17, 23, 25, Gult system 131, 182, 240 306, 329 28–29, 33–41, 43–45, Guluma Gemeda 135 Hudad 230 47–48, 51–54, 57, 64, Gumaa 47 Hultin, Jan 4, 64, 76–77, 68–69, 75–77, 81, 117, 145, Guranda 161–162, 172, 177 86, 205 178, 193, 195, 206, 231, 241, Huntingford, George 276–277 Haberland, Eike 23, 27, W. 24, 37, 59, 83, 126 Gadaa–Qaalluu 16, 63, 78–79, 86, 197, 278 Hutchinson, John 54, 24–25, 34, 51, 190, 192, Hadith 188 96, 310 194, 231 Hadiya 51, 71, 73–74, 169, Gadaab 152 171–172, 175, 196–197, 283 IES 24, 138, 228, 237. Gadaab Sirka front 147 Haile Malakot 140, 164 see also Institute of Galtung, Johan 102, 210 Haile Selassie 3, 17, 19, Ethiopian Studies Gamada Shati 219 49, 100, 114, 116, 121, Ilmaan durbarti 65 Gamna 269 124–129, 133, 151, 160, Ilman (sagni) Gamu Gofa 257 163–164, 189–190, 224, 226, balabbata 269 Ganshof, Francois 133 235, 240, 242, 245, Imagined communi- Garba 82, 84–86, 172 248–252, 254, 257–259, ties 4, 12, 119 Gasha 2, 49, 125, 218, 261–265, 267, 272, 275, Imperial conquest 14, 27, 220, 222–223, 233, 236, 297, 319, 321, 336 63, 111, 113, 118–119, 126, 266, 270–271, 274, Haji Hussein Qame 191 137–139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 280–281, 296 Haji Mamma Bori 191 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, Gebertel 274 Haji Mohammed 161, 163, 168, 174, 184, 208, Gebru Tareke 3, 123, 128, Arus 191 245, 264–265, 320 132–133, 167, 173, 191, 254, Hamdesa Tuso 47, 337 Imperial Politics 16, 103, 275, 284, 303, 329 Hamsa Aleqa 125, 236, 109, 118, 128, 178, 245, Gellner, Ernest 118, 124 274 315, 337 Genale Doria 179 Hangafa 62, 202, 287 Imperial sovereignty 121, General Waqo Gutu 190 Harkaaf harma muraa 302 Gesta bereket 246 Anole 157 Imperial state 11, 18, 99, Ghibbi 148, 219 Haxii 68 112, 117, 163, 214, 230–231, Ghinir 45, 161–162, 172 Hayyuu 29, 39, 47–48 321, 325 Gilinsha 217 Hechter, Michael 314 Imperialism 96–97, Giornata 294 Hetosa 1, 218, 220, 265, 99–100, 102–103, 108, Gobanaa Abba Dacci 130 292, 296 112–113, 122, 142, 180, Gobba 161–162, 190, 223 High Periphery 213 205, 210, 302, 323 Gojjam 106, 134, 252–253 Hirpa 69 Imperium 4, 95 Golmassa 269–272 Hoben, Allan 2, 87, 104, Income Tax Gona 78, 80–81 229, 239, 281 Proclamation 283 Gondar 106, 131, 318 Holamuu 29 Institute of Ethiopian Gosa 16, 23, 27, 32–35, Homocentric world- Studies 15, 85, 170, 281 37–39, 42–47, 50–51, view 32. see also Intelligentsia 101 53, 56–65, 68–69, Cosmocentric Internal Colonialism 314 72–77, 79, 81–82, 86–88, worldview Irbo 282 90–91, 147–148, 186, Homogeneous Ethiopian Irressa 42 188, 196–199, 214, 216, nation 320 Islam 3, 17, 25, 29, 40, 56, 266–268, 277 Horata 36 73, 82–83, 91, 104, 116–117,
129, 135, 138, 140, 164, Kinship terms 66, 199 Mahber 70 167–208, 211, 230–231, 234, Knutsson, Karl 50, 53, Mahr 200–201 241, 267, 305 60–61, 64, 195 Malak Sagad 85 Islamic Principalities 38, Kofale 152, 186, 207, Malkagna 221, 241, 73, 83–84, 170–171, 208 257, 262 247, 303 Islamization 23, 51, Kokkossa 184, 188 Mando 27, 72–73, 78–79, 60–61, 73, 81, 164, 168–171, Koloba 155, 177, 223, 228 81, 196 174–177, 179, 186–187, Kontoma 78, 81 Marcus Garvey 127 193–194, 197–198, Kuyera 184 Marcus, Harold G. 9, 70, 201–202, 267 99, 104, 111, 114, 124, 127, Italian occupation 124, Laguu 197 139, 141–142, 144, 158, 180, 186–187, 224, 248, 253, Lalaba 45 225, 242, 276, 306 302, 305 Land Reform 6, 220, 261, Marga 30, 214 Italo–Ethiopian war 231, 266, 297–298, 327 Maria Theresa 251, 275 Landed empire 17, 163 Thaler 286 Itti wolii galuu 45 Leach, Edmund 28 Maritime empires 98, Ittu 1, 161 League of Nations 127, 109 304, 306, 319 Markakis, John 9, 104, Jaarraa 35, 204 Leemmu 43, 53 131, 133, 189, 210–211, 213, Jackson, Robert H. 89, Leenco Lata 334, 336 233, 240, 251, 265–266, 99–100, 121, 302 Leenjeso Diigaa 150, 268, 271, 273, 276, Jarsaa biyaa 48 152, 228 278–280, 292, 329 Jila 43, 53, 179, 188, Leninist principle 323 Marxist–Leninist 193–194 Levine, Donald 113, 116, ideology 323, 326 Justice 6, 11, 16, 23–25, 118, 182, 311 Matcha–Tulama 28–30, 40, 42, 46–47, Lewis, Herbert S. 30, Association 3, 203 50–52, 68, 79, 96, 168, 174, 41–42, 48, 57, 70, 83–84, Matri–Gosa 61–62 186, 190–191, 195, 205–206, 167, 174, 185, 193, 196, 202 Matri–kin 64 225–226, 240, 242, 254, Liberal democracy 319 Matrilocality 64 263–264, 287, 289, 296 Liberal Risorgimento Mawacho 255 nationalism 119 Mehal sefari 192, Kaka Oromo 75 Lieven, Dominic 95–99, 234–237 Kambata 141, 251 101–103, 108–110, 336 Mekuria Bulcha 4, 182, Karama 179 Ligaba Beyene 248 312–313 Kasheda clan 154 Lij Iyassu 129 Mekwannent 131, 219, Katama 18, 221, 229, 238, Lij Merid 265, 294 240 246–247 Lij Mesfin 265 Memmi, Albert 123–124, Kebra Nagast 131 Lineage 25, 32–33, 44, 317–318 Keller, Edmond 8, 89, 47, 59, 63–65, 68–69, Menelik II 11, 13, 128–129, 113, 123, 334 72, 75, 86–87, 120, 149, 158, 172–173, 220, 239 Keremt 278, 294 196–198, 202 Merid Biru 291, 293 Kiila lixuu 31 Low Periphery 213 Merid Wolde Aregay 159 King Menelik 3, 140, 151 Lubaa 35–37, 39, 53, 204 Mesfin Wolde King Sahle Selassie 139, Lubaa stage 36 Mariam 106, 114, 158 116, 307 Kinship authority 40 Madda 30, 214 Messing, Simon D. 70, Kinship institutions 23 Maderia 153, 274 87, 132, 173 Kinship Maed bet 221, 234 Meto Aleqa 125, 236 nomenclature 67 Magdala 247 Mezagajja 247
Middle Ages 88, 140, 233–234, 237–238, 242, New Imperialism 96, 108 163, 309 258, 275–276, 294, 303, Nigusay Ayele 281 Migration 63, 68, 75, 79, 312–313 Nikah 201 82, 233, 276, 291–292, 298 Naftagna–Gabbar 275, Non-Abyssinian Miiloo Mamaa 218, 265 294 subjects 122 Milki 200 Nagaya Borana 75 Miller, David 14 Nation building OAU 114, 301, 306. see Misee 198 paradigm 307 also Organization for Mislene 241, 250 Nation-building 4, 19, 95, African Unity Modern Ethiopia 4, 106, 117, 212, 301, 308–310, Odaa 42, 44–45, 72 16–18, 99, 103, 105, 111–113, 313, 316–317, 321–322, 330 Odaa Bisil 42 125, 127–129, 140, 143, 149, Nation-Building Odaa Diniq 42, 44, 72 215, 218, 301, 310, 319 School 309 Odaa Nabe 42 Modernization 6, 19, 97, Nation-state 57, 88, 90, Odaa Roba 42, 44–45 101–102, 111, 116–117, 120, 97, 101, 106, 110, 121, 137, Official Nationalism 12, 122, 131, 137, 163, 209, 232, 205, 308–310, 316, 321, 113, 118 240, 258, 298, 307–308, 328–331, 334, 336 Ogaden 114, 326, 334 310, 316, 319, 330, 336 Nation-statism 90, 337 OLF 4, 204–205, 334. Modernization National Democratic see also Oromo theory 19, 97, 209, Revolution of Liberation Front 307–308 1976 323 Omar Turo 191 Modjo 150, 156 National identity 11, 19, Oral traditions 11, 24 Mofer zemet 284 57, 88, 126, 129, 211, 301, Organic evolution 308, Moggassaa 84 307–308, 310, 315–319, 321, 328, 330 Mohammed Gadaa 323, 325, 328, 337 Organization for African Qaalluu 188–190 National integra- Unity 301, 306 Mohammed Hassen tion 18–19, 88, 111, 117, Orma 55 4, 10, 30, 38, 40, 42, 71, 78, 122, 137, 190, 211, 308, 313, Oromia 1, 5, 16, 55, 60, 82, 117, 149, 170–171, 185, 315, 319, 325, 330, 336 151, 182, 205, 304 193–195, 207, 304, 306 National question 14, 113, Oromiffa 25 Moiety system 44, 71, 323, 325, 331, 333–334, 337 Oromo constitution 46, 78, 80 Nationalism 4, 12–14, 16, 53, 68. see also Seera Montandon, 19, 54, 88, 90, 96–97, 101, Oromo cosmology 25, 42 Georges 125–126, 212, 104–105, 109–111, 113, Oromo democracy 25, 226, 320 116–119, 121–122, 124, 170, 44–45, 49, 52–53, 71, 79, Muhammed 187, 203–206, 209, 241, 128, 195–196, 206, 311. B. Abdul–Wahhab 187 272, 302, 307, 310, 314, see also Gadaa Multi–ethnic state 311 318, 321, 323, 325–326, Oromo kinship Murtii 45–48, 225 331, 333 identity 16, 55, 57, 59, Murtii diina 225 Nationalities 9, 101, 104, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69–71, 73, 75, Murtii gayuu 48 108, 124, 137, 320–326, 331, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91 Muse Koster 190 335–336 Oromo Liberation Muuda 53, 145, 178–179, Nationhood 4, 10, 12, 19, Front 203–204, 334 188, 193–195, 230 27, 55, 121, 205, 324 Oromo social system 25, Native model 24, 90 34 Nafaqah 197 Nativization Policy 325 Oromo society 3, 15–16, Naftagna 9, 11, 155–156, Negarit 150, 156 19, 23, 32, 38, 43, 47, 52, 58, 177, 189–192, 217, 221, Neo–Solomonic 75, 84, 90–91, 139, 189, 192, 224–226, 229–231, dynasty 100 200–202, 208, 266
Oromummaa 3 Principle of self- Red Emperor 9 Orthodox Church 18, 117, determination Renan, Ernest 12 128–129, 131, 168, 173, 175, 121, 323 Revolutionary 177, 182, 184, 203–204, 206, Pseudo-democracy Democracy 322 208, 231, 235, 241, 263, 266 337–338 Revolutionary Ottoman Empires 105, Pseudo-federalism legitimacy 322 111 337–338 Revolutionary/Socialist Ethiopia 100 Pastoral nomadism 25, Qaalluu 16, 24–25, 28, Rift Valley 27, 147, 184, 86, 237 31–32, 34–35, 39–40, 46, 251, 278 Patri–Gosa 60, 62 51–53, 65, 68, 72, 84, 90, Risorgimento Patrifiliation 60, 62, 64 172, 178–179, 188–190, 192, nationalism 119 Patrilineal 37, 56–63, 82, 194, 208, 231, 269, 305 Rist gult 274 87, 90, 196, 198, 202 Qaalluu leaders 31 Rist system 2, 287 Patrilineal ideology 196 Qabiye right 33 Ristegna 281 Patrilineal kin groups 57 Qadi 201 Rites de passage 28 Patrilocality 56, 60, Qalad 233–235, 268 Roba 42, 44–45, 153, 63–64 Qalad tay 233 155, 191 Patron-client logic 313 Qalata River 149 Robaa Butta 154–155, Pax-Amharica 116 Qixxee 25, 28, 40–41, 227, 229 Peasant 3, 6–7, 49, 173, 47–52, 68, 145, 148, 154 Robale 36 230, 265, 271, 273, 275, 277, Qixxee system 47, 51 Roballe Kulla 153 280–281, 283, 285–286, Qomo 57 Rokkan, Stein 106, 289, 292, 296–298, Qora fuudhuu 48 212, 309 326, 329 Quasi-states 100 Royal absolutism 163, Peasant Associations 6, Qur’an 188 319 49, 270, 298 Quslegna 231 Royal chronicles 12, 112 People’s Democratic Organizations 333 Rabbi 174 Sabbo 78, 80–81 Periphery 4, 6, 8–13, 19, Ragaa 50 Sadad 8. see also 98–99, 102–105, 107, Rako 201 Abiyotawi Sadad 109–110, 126, 130, 132, 137, Ras Abebe Aregay 253 Sahlins, Marshall 49, 59 155, 209–213, 230, 232, 235, Ras Asrate Kassa 249, Salale 130, 247 242, 245, 248–249, 254, 252 Salt Water Theory 100 258, 260, 273, 297, 302, Ras Birru Wolde Sanyyi 57 313–314, 323, 325–326, Gabriel 2, 219, Seera 25, 29, 44–46, 329, 331, 336–338. 265, 293 51–52, 68, 200 see also Centre- Ras Darghe 1–2, 142, Seera birmadumaa 46 Periphery Relations 145–149, 151–153, 156, 158, Seera dhaala 46 Permanent hierarchy 28 160–162, 164, 172, 177, 188, Seera Gadaa 29 Popular sovereignty 121, 218–219, 231, 235, 247–248, Seera rakoo 46 322 252, 257 Seera Uumaa 29 Populations 38, 73, 83, Ras Gobana 125, 130, 149 Seeri baye 45 110, 122, 126, 133, 135, 151, Ras Kassa 220 Seeri tumame 45 171, 179, 189, 212, 235, 270, Ras Leulsagad 248 Segmentation 16, 32, 302, 310–311 Ras Mesfin Sileshi 27, 42, 45, 53, 56, 59, 63–64, Power transfer 35, 178, 251 68, 72, 75, 82, 86, 90, 196 193 Ras Tafari Mekonnen 127 Self-determination 4, 10, Pre-lubaa stage 36 Rayyaa Abeeto 45 96, 121, 272, 302, 305–307,
309, 318, 323–324, 329, 331, Siso 127, 215, 217, 266, Tekqlay gizat 247 335, 337 274, 282 Temporary hierarchy 28 Self-rule 304, 318, 329 Slavery 84, 105, 112, Tenancy 128, 269, Semon 177, 274 117–118, 123, 126–127, 238, 281–284, 290–291, 298 Seqela 125, 235–236 242, 272, 274, 319–320 Territorial national- Serfdom 18, 30, 70, 84, Smallpox 161 ism 118, 122 105, 117–118, 123, 126–127, Social morphology 16, Tesfaye Rede 291 134–136, 162, 168, 177, 234, 27, 43, 63, 70, 81, 212, 273 Tessema Ta’a 30, 33, 40, 238, 281, 303 Socialist Ethiopia 14, 134, 181 Serfs 117, 121, 123, 126, 135, 100, 306 Tewodros 17, 111, 140, 160, 182, 236, 240, 242 Socio-political 158, 180 Shabale River 27, 195 culture 16, 19, 23, 25, The constitution of Shanacha 35 34, 90 1931 319 Shankilla 126, 212 Sociological theory 163 The Ethiopian Shari’a 178, 186, 188, 193, Sodare 149 Revolution 2, 6, 196, 199–202, 204–205 Soddooma 33 100, 298 Sharka 171 Solomonic dynasty 100, The Scramble for Shashemene 184, 251, 124, 131, 302, 322 Africa 143, 306 257 Somali 27, 42, 113–114, Theory of amnesia 328 Sheikh Abbas 185 116, 126, 174, 176, 181, 185, Theory of Sheikh Ahmed 185 189, 212, 303, 326, 332 Reconquista 113 Sheikh Hussein 174, Soviet Union 95–97, 101, Tibebe Teshale 112, 129, 176–177, 179–180, 185, 105, 110–111, 209, 306, 142–143, 301 194, 256 325–327, 335 Tigray Peoples Liberation Shoa 3, 7, 11, 23, 27, 48, State legitimacy 322 Front 327 79, 106, 124, 128, 135, Sufi 179, 194 Tiijo 217 139–142, 147–148, 150, 152, Sunderland, Willard Tinsaye Berhan 280 154, 158, 162, 177, 180–181, 230, 317 Tirf meret 233 192, 207, 212–213, 215–216, Sunna 200 Titcho 232, 247 229, 232, 234, 247–248, Suufa Kusoo 148 TPLF 8, 19, 322, 327, 251–253, 256–257, Synchronic 23 329, 331–334. see also 277–279, 286, 289, Tigray Peoples 292, 316 Tabekas 289 Liberation Front Shoan kingdom 3, 11, 105, Tabot 173, 177 Tribalism 16, 87–89 129, 139, 142–143, 145, 147, Taddesse Berisso 7 Tribe 16, 56–57, 59–60, 164, 247, 253, 328 Tarree galuu 45 75, 78, 87–90, 157, 311 Shoanization 128 Taxes 40, 123, 132, 233, Tributary peoples 126, Shum 227–229 238–239, 254–255, 259, 212 Sidamo 7, 27, 73, 79, 90, 265, 270, 272, 274, 276, Trimingham, John S 82–83, 144, 173, 184, 189, 250, 252 285, 287, 313 167, 169–171, 185–186 Sikko 27, 72–73, 78–79, Tchaffee 25, 40–48, Truman Doctrine 306 81, 196 51–53, 72, 75, 145, 178 Tsehafi–tezaz Sikko and Mando 27, 72, Tchaffee and Qixxee 25, Wolde–Giyorigis 78–79, 196 40–41 Wolde–Yohannes 183 Simabelew 6, 226 Tchaffee laws 44, 46 Tulama 3, 23, 130, Sinbira Waaqa 35 Tchaffee system 41–42, 139–140, 149, 159, 176, Sire 155, 172, 177, 181, 219, 51, 53 203, 272, 277–278, 316 232, 276 Tchancho front 147 Tuminez, Astrid S 96–97, Sirka 152 Tedla Abebe 291 105, 110–111, 209
Ulama’a 185, 187, 208 Warraa Illu 58 Wuchale Treaty of Ullendorf, Edward 168 Warraa Qaallu 58 Friendship and Umma 197, 205 Waugh, Everlyn 112, 120, Peace 218 UN Charter 307 123, 132 Unitary state 319, 321, Weber, Eugen 132, 328 Ya Balabbat meret 218 326, 334 Wellby, Montagu 144, Ya balabbat meurt 215 Uxorilocality 65 224–225 Ya balabbat Wakil 219 Western Oromia 16, Ya beta kristian Villagization 6–7 60, 304 meret 177 Virilocality 64 Western state system Ya dam maret 161 121–122, 319 Ya fares Zabagna 231 Waaqa 28–31, 35, 174, 214 Wirsh 217 Ya fat 180 Waaqafannaa 17 Wolabu 188 Ya ketema Bota 274 Wabe Shebelle 152, 278 Wolaqa 85 Ya metoria meret 218 Wahhabism 187–188 Wollo Oromo 58, 158, Ya metteria meriet 219 Walaita 127, 142, 177 170, 180 Ya semon meret 177 Warra Dube 278. see also Woreda 220, 247, Yinger, J. M 330 Adona 250–251, 254–255, Yohannes IV 111, Warra Soddaa 65 258–260, 262, 269, 124, 329 Warraa 57–58, 62, 87 285, 287 Warraa Babbo 58 Workers Party of Zemana Masafint 116 Warraa Haadhaa 62 Ethiopia 8 Zemecha 149 Warraa Himanu 58 Woyyuu 31, 40 Zenahu Ze Galla 159