Influence of the United Irishmen on the Mutinies at Spithead and Nore
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Eastern Illinois University The Keep Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications 1961 Influence of the United Irishmen on the Mutinies at Spithead and Nore Harvey A. Hurst Eastern Illinois University Follow this and additional works at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Hurst, Harvey A., "Influence of the United Irishmen on the Mutinies at Spithead and Nore" (1961). Masters Theses. 4692. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/4692 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED IRISHMEN ON THE MillINIES AT SPITHEAD AND NORE A Thesis Presented To The Faculty Of The Department Of Social Science Eastern Illinois Univers ity In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Master Of Science In Education by 327044 ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish to thank Dr. Rex Syndergaard for the help and encouragement that he so readily gave me on this thesis . Any ov ersights are ent irely my own. Other than Dr. Syndergaard, I would like to thank Dr. Donald Tingley and Dr. Richard J�llison for the encouragement they have given me as a student at Eastern Illinois University. I hope I will be able to live up to the standards that these three men have set as historians. I would also like to thank Terry Fortman, a future student of Economics. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENT • iii CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF MUTINY , AN INTRODUCTION 1 II THE THREATENING EUROPEAN SITUATION 3 III CAUSES OF THE MUTINY 12 IV HISTORY OF THE MUTINIES 24 Spithead 25 The Mutiny at Nore 38 v AFTERMAT H OF THE MUT INIES 49 APPENDIXES A LIST OF DELEGATES • • • • • • 53 B PETITION OF THE SEAMEN TO THE ADM IRALTY 55 c DYING DECLARATION OF RICHARD PARKER 57 D LIST OF VE SSELS AND-SHIPS CONCERNED IN MUT INY AT THE NORE 60 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 61 Pr imary Sources 62 Secondary Sources 62 iv CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF MUTINY, AN INTRODUCTION Mut iny is as old as authority and it may last as long as authority lasts. What is mut iny? Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language defines it as such: Violent collllllot ion; tumult; strife, Insurrect ion against, or refusal to obey, constituted authority, part icularly.military or naval authority, concerted revolt against the rules of discipline or the lawful collllllands of a superior officer; hence, generally forcible 1 resistance to rightful author ity; insubordinat ion . For another definition of the YJOrd mut iny, The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences says, "In old French mut iny meant any .kind of sedition 2 or conspirative uprising of a revolutionary nature. 11 Fuller says mutiny 3 is personal, int imate, ·and strong men play leading roles. In mast cases o:f :.muftQ.ya man is not only acquainted with, but is in some manner of working relationship with t�e persons against Yjhom the mut iny is directed, The normal objectives of mut ines are: The comp lete ov erthrow of the existing colllllland and the placing at the disposal of the revolut ionary cause of the ship or guns seized s by the mut ineers. 1 C, Neilson, Editor-in-Chief, New International Dictionary of the English Language (Springfield: 1942�p. 16 17. 21'Mut iny,�1 The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1933) , XI, p.166 . 3Edmund Fuller, Mut iny (New York: Crown Publishers, 1953) , p. xii. 4Ibid. 5 11Mut iny," ££.• cit., p. 166 . 2 The forms and characteristics of mutiny are n1.llllerous , The fol lowing characteristics may be found : (1) highly dramatic and chiefly associated with the sea,* but armies have it; (2) may be the spark tliat sets off a revo lution; (3) the more vigorous the authority the more 6 violent the mut iny; (4) may be spontaneous or b.rew for months . Mut iny has three forms: (1) mass disobedience; (2) collective passive resistance; (3) physical assaults .7 Of course, group action is important because of the severity of the punishment that is generally lianiled out . A mut iny is, generally, doomed to failure unless the mut ineers can get t�e support of a polit ically significant body or section of the civil 8 or polit ical population, The mut inies at Spithead and Nore had some of these characteristics, but the mut inies were unique and interesting to this writer. It was remarkab le for its restraint, order, O·rg!'lnization, and it s effect wh ich shook the British Admirality, indeed the nation, to it s very foundat ion. * Fuller says mut iny is more common in navies because: (1) of the hard life of the sailors in the old sailing days; (2) work on board ship was so close and confined. 6Fuller, .££· cit,, p. xi. 7 1'1-lut iny," �· cit., pp , 166-167. 8rb id. CHAPTER II THE THREATENING EUROPE/iN SITUATION When the news of the mut iny became known, surprise� grief, and terror appeared in the faces of Englishmen; for "the safety of the realm 1 depended on the navy ," which was deemed impotent by a mut iny . The consequences of these mut inies can best be illustrated by the statements .of the fo llowing distinguished men of the times. R. B. Sheridan, of the House of Commons, said: "If there was , indeed, a rot in 2 the wooden walls of old England, our decay would not be very distant . 11 In the words of Lord Mo rnington: How discip line and subordinat ion are ever again to be restored on any permanent basis, surpasses my understanding to conceive.3 Alexander Hood, or for our purpose, Lord Bridgeport, the commander of the mut inious fleet at Spithead, had this to say about the mutiny: "Someone 4 connected with it almost deserves the over-worked title of Genius. 11 Like everyone else, the commercial and moneyed interests were also effected. In January of 1797, the Three Per Cent s were at fifty- 5 seven; and in April, May, and June they had fallen to fo rty-seven. 1 william Hunt , The History of England: From the Accession of George III to the Close of Pitt 's First Administrat ion (New York: Longi:nans , • Green, and Company , 19 05) , p .39 0. 2charles Knight , The Popular History of England (London and New York: Frederick Warne an d Company, 1883) , VII, p. 341 . 3�. 4 Fuller, �· cit., p. 42 • 5 . Knight , .2£.•...£.!!.·• p. 342. 4 From this one can deduce the fee ling that had befallen England. Mutiny to a nation dependant on sea power fo r safety creates a state of alarm; but when the fleet mut inied at Spithead and Nore these mut inies could have had castastrophic consequences. A look at the European scene will tell of the increasing danger that England was to be faced with . Spain had left the First Coalit ion in 1795 and joined France in. August, 1796 . (The coalition had been fo rmed to combat the French Revolution.) Two months later, Spain joined with France in w�r on 6 Kngland. The combinat ion of these two European powers presented England with a fo rmidable foe to face. In October of 1796, William Pitt, the Prime Minister of England, sent the Honorable Lord Malmesbury to France to secure a peace settle- ment i·iith the French . The terms that were presented by the English and the French are of no· concern to th is paper. It will be enough to say that there was no peace settlement , and the Right Honorab le Lord Malmesbury was requested to leave France on a forty-eight hour not ice, 7 or by December 22, 1796 . The fact that England sent Malmesbury on this peace mission seems to indicate how serious the English postion was becoming. It was , also, during this same period of time that France signed 8 a treaty with Naples . England, whose prob lems we re just beg�nning to start , was slowly being isolated from her European allies . 6E. H. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century (New York: D. Appleton and Company , 1891), VII, p. 386 . 7A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on the French Revo lution (Boston:Little, Brown, and CompanY:-1898) , I; pp . 240-241. 8Ibid., p. 218, 5 During the French expedition to Ireland in December of 1796, and January of 1797, the Engl ish channel fleet was comp letely ine ffective. It was not unt il January 3, 1797, that the channel fleet saPed down the channel looking for the French . By this time the French had already left Bantry Bay and started to sail back to France. For all intent and purpose the English should have s�ayed at Portsmouth. For a month they sailed after the French fleet, but it was to no avail; they did not even 9 sight the enemy . It goes without saying that England should have lost Ireland to the French. For her defense, England had two guns an d tWo thousand troops at Cork to protect naval stores which were worth a million and a half sterling . England had only twe lve thousand newly trained Dragoons and Fencioles to throw up against Roche 's fi fteen thousand well-trained veterans. The English would have been short work for Hoche and his 10 veteran troops. The French expedit ion thus failed, but it was not due to the efforts of the British fleet .