Quick viewing(Text Mode)

PARTY and POLITICS in POLAND by Robin Alison Remington

PARTY and POLITICS in POLAND by Robin Alison Remington

SEARCH FOR THE VANGUARD: PARTY AND POLITICS IN by Robin Alison Remington

1982/No. 41 Europe [RAR-1-'82]

down to "protect state security." If law and order break down, will be. reimposed either totally or piecemeal throughout the coun- try. Military supervision of the areas of the economy and administration deemed vital to state interest will continue, as will military jurisdiction over alleged "anti-state" activity. Anyone caught "sowing disorder" can be dismissed from work and charged with "social parasitism." The announcement that some 700 underground groups had been broken up, and the formal arrest of the seven leading Solidarity activists before "suspension" went into effect, underline both the Polish authorities' intention not.to tolerate any organized opposition and the lack of interest in dialogue. In these circumstances, the appeals for "renewal" and "national reconcilia- tion" beg the question: With whom? How? , more- over, shows no sign of returning to the barracks. Rather, he remains firmly in power as head of the Polish United Workers Party. How did his transition from military man to Party leader occur? What happened to Party-Army relations in Communist Poland during a year of martial law? How will that relationship affect the road to "normalization" of Polish politics? Communist political systems are ideologically committed to the Party dominance so graphically spelled out by Mao Zedong: Power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command 2/RAR-1-'82

the Party. (On Protracted Warfare. at best only feebly begun during the Poland. It was not only that Gierek July 1938) Party's 9th Plenum in July 1982. faced demands from what amounted to a workers' opposition on matters Western analysts looking at Trot- 3. Insights into the Polish dilemma of food subsidies and public policy, sky's methods of rebuilding the are much more likely to come from The deeper problem was a credi- Soviet and the subse- the experiences of military regimes bility gap and the impression that quent ideological and organizational attempting to orchestrate transitions the Party itself was riddled by cor- efforts made to insure Party control to civilian rule than from study of ruption and favoritism. These polit- of Communist militaries have Communist ideological or organiza- ical vices compounded the resent- accepted Mao's statement as factual tional preferences concerning Party- ment that resulted from description, rather than ideological Army relations.5 Gierek's preference. 2 inability to shake off those middle 4. One must take seriously General level, bureaucratic hardliners who When General Jaruzelski declared Jaruzelski's statement, "'1 am first of had successfully resisted imple- on December all a soldier."6 menting genuine reform in any 13, 1981, he reversed what may be sector. There is an underlying assumption considered standard Leninist guide- The declining civilian legitimacy lines for Party-Army relations. At that the political dynamic in Poland was similar to that propelling accelerated the Party's ineffectual the same time, he called into ques- efforts to control the repercussions tion some long-standing academic soldiers into politics all around the world. The fact that we are dealing of the worker riots that followed a assumptions about the infallibility of belated effort to raise food prices in Communist Parties vis-a-vis other with a located in the Kremlin's backyard complicates 1976. The half-hearted repression institutional actors. It is true that the surrounding the 1976 outburst only growing literature on Communist the situation but in no way saves Poland's military governors from the succeeded in generating a loose alli- civil-military relations had begun to ance between dissatisfied workers look more closely at seemingly pressures experienced by military regimes in Latin America, the and intellectual dissidents, among unorthodox patterns in some Com- which the Committee in Defense of munist countries. However, these Middle East, or Africa. This view opposes that of those who argue the Workers (KOR) was to become focused primarily on such countries the most important.gKOR, in turn, as known for that the Polish military is "the and Yugoslavia, Party-in-uniform."7 became a link to Catholic intellec- maverick behavior that would be tuals and, almost imperceptibly, the unthinkable in those countries of How did the Polish military get into Church also became a support base "real socialism" according to Soviet the business of running the coun- for the workers. usage. Despite General Jaruzelski's try-as opposed to defending its replacement of Stanislaw Kania as borders and fulfilling Poland's This is not the place to retell the First Secretary of the Polish United obligations as the second largest dramatic story of the Gdansk Workers Party on October 18, 1981, army in the Pact? If one Charter.lO The workers' right to martial law in Poland has brought looks even cursorily at studies of the strike was achieved along with a with it a new array of institutions phenomenon of coup d'tat, Poland package of decidedly political de- and actors that temporarily have provides an almost textbook ex- mands and the rise of Lech Walesa eclipsed the Polish Communist ample of stimulants for military to national political prominence. Party. intervention in the political process: When those demands became in- stitutionalized in the form of the The is concerned economic crisis, social disorder, following analysis civilian "legitimacy deflation." 8 independent federation, with the consequences of having Solidarity, the situation became the Polish military elite take over the Poland's economy was caught in a immensely more complicated. One job of Communist civilian actors. It vise between the political unaccept- could say that this was the victory of explores a tentative, four-part ability of ending food subsidies and the Polish workers' demand to hypothesis: the pressure of deepening speak for themselves. Somewhat 1. Poland by had to the West. Edvard Gierek had ironically, such a demand could become an example of what Samuel come to power in 1970 on a wave of even be credited to the successful Huntington identifies as political food riots that made him intensely implementation of socialist norms. decay;4i.e., the country's political aware of the political danger of After all, the purpose of the "leading institutions no longer had the rising prices. His effort to avoid role of the Party" in principle is to capacity and credibility tO make unpopular domestic austerity by mobilize the proletariat. Certainly, decisions that could be implemented heavy borrowing backfired under the demand that "commercial in an orderly fashion, thereby the weight of rising oil prices, shops," in which those who could causing political authority and worldwide stagflation, and the poor afford to pay got the better cuts of effectiveness visibly to decline. quality of Polish . East-West meat, be abandoned in favor of dtente had facilitated Polish access was a voice on the side of 2. Any "normalization" leading to to Western banks, but political egalitarianism. final lifting of martial law requires anxieties raised by Soviet troops in reversing that process of institu- Afghanistan made the future of this The Polish Party could survive and tional decline. -In short, "party economic strategy less promising. rationalize failure, however, more renewal" is a euphemism for what easily than deal with this back- must be a major restructuring of the Simultaneously, the Party faced a handed form of success. Parties Polish Communist Party. This was crisis of political confidence within whose basic legitimacy is tied to RAR-1-'82/3

their position as vanguard of the country on strike for the 16 months negotiations before Jaruzelski sub- working class cannot afford to have prior to martial law. stituted martial law and set up his their constituencies decide to repre- Military Council of National Salva- sent themselves. In Poland this By the fall of 1981 Solidarity, like the tion. With both Communist Party, had been the Party and the amounted to an admitted crisis of pushed Trade Union effectively paralyzed by confidence that rapidly became a to the wall. The charismatic hero of lack of the Lenin shipyards in capacity to deal with organi- frantic search for scapegoats. Yet Gdansk, Lech zational pressures and popular de- the replacement of Gierek by Kania Walesa, was rapidly being turned into a his mands, the Polish military stood out as First Secretary did little to stop figurehead; position was as the only cohesive political actor. the identity trauma that paralyzed substantially weakened by the open factionalism at the No amount of rhetoric from all sides the Party leadership's attempt tO two-stage Soli- can change that reality. deal with Solid,arity. Thus b_egan the darity Congress in September/ process by which the Polish Com- . Although it is a Nor was this the first time the Polish munist Party's leading role has been matter of controversy, in my judg- military had been drawn into poli- pre-empted, and the fiction that it ment, Solidarity--like many gen- tics. With the destabilizing impact of continued soon wore thin in uinely revolutionary movements-- the 1953 Soviet succession struggle, Warsaw, , and other East was sliding into a self-destructive Polish soldiers were expected to fire European capitals. extremism, demonstrated by the on Polish workers during the 1956 unrealistic demand December 12, Poznan riot. Although accounts The Polish Party suffered from ideo- 1981 for a national referendum on vary as to whether the regular Army logical-political crises at all levels. Its whether the Communist Party actually did so,17 it is generally leaders rotated on what became should be replaced. agreed that Poznan raised serious known as "the carousel."11 Its In the meantime, the volume of doubts in the Party about its ability members were rapidly defecting to Soviet objections to what Moscow to depend upon the Polish Army as Solidarity. This was a kind of polit- considered"cou nter-revolutiona ry," an instrument of domestic repres- ical hemorrhaging bitterly summed antisocialist, indeed, anti-Soviet sion. These real or perceived re- up by Deputy Prime Minister forces dominating Solidarity be- straints undoubtedly influenced the Rakowski when he agreed that the came ever greater and insistent.15 outcome of future political struggles. Party had essentially "disinte- The threat of external force was a Indeed, Korbonski and Terry go so grated." reality, although there is no evi- far as to suggest that the Polish military had the "pivotal role of Which is quite clear since the dence to confirm the suspicion that Commander Marshal political arbiter, especially during the military had to take its place in the various succession crises or Chal- government. Who could deny that it issued an ultimatum while he was in Warsaw the week lenges to the leadership in 1968, went bankrupt, intellectually and 1970, and 1976."18 politically, that it was unable to before martial law was declared. organize the society, to get the This is not to imply that Soviet Jaruzelski's own political history is country out of the disaster, even to pressure did not contribute to the not out of line with these authors' defend the state? In the end you are process. It was undeniably one of conclusion that the Polish military right; we are the ones to be blamed, the precipitants, but only one of an moved step-by-step from co- not Solidarity.12 increasingly compelling array. optation to subordination, accom- When Jaruzelski took over as First modation, and eventual participa- As membership and authority Secretary of the Polish Communist tion in decisions that Communist drained away from the Communist parties above all in principle reserve Party in October 1981, it was evident 19 Party,13 Solidarity reeled from that efforts to restructure the Party for civilian elites. Jaruzelski fought organizational overload. Reportedly at the July 1981 9th Congress had with the Soviet-sponsored Polish the independent trade union grew failed. The General faced a bleak Army in World War II and rose to from 190,000 at the time of the prospect of Party decline, Solidarity the rank of Major General by the age signing of the August 1980 Gdansk intransigence, continued economic of 33 (in 1956). His positions were Charter, to 10,000,000 by Novem- strictly professional military until 14 crisis, social disorder, moral plati- ber. Even allowing for journalistic tudes from the West, and Soviet im- 1960 when he was shifted from the exaggeration, the sudden thrust into plied demands that he take action or job of division commander to head the national limelight along with in- see Poland become a case for appli- of the Polish Main Political Adminis- creasingly unrealistic expectations cation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. 16 tration (MPA), a post that led to his of its swollen membership pressed And soon Jaruzelski's efforts to becoming a member of the Central Solidarity's leadership and organiza- continue negotiation with Solidarity Committee in 1964. Although he left tional abilities to the limit. The trade and the Church would break down the MPA to become Chief of Staff in union had become the symbol of the as well. In the climate of economic 1965, within a scant three years Polish nation; radicalized students, scarcity, institutional degeneration, Jaruzelski assumed two key civil disgruntled farmers agitating for and potential , it is not sur- positions-- Defense Minister and , even the garbage- prising that the Party proved unable alternate member of the . men of Warsaw all jumped on the to work out a genuine national front Thus the General was no stranger to bandwagon. Indeed, as one Polish with the workers and the Church. political roles even before he was scholar on a postdoctoral fellowship pressed into taking on the job of in the U.S. told me somewhat rue- The real surprise was that such Prime Minister in , fully at the end of 1981, no week crippled institutional actors actually then that of First Secretary of the passed without some part of the managed some 16 months of tense Party in the following October. 4/RAR-1-'82

Throughout there is reason to think When martial law was declared on moment the Army became the that the political element in Jaruzel- December 13, 1981, General Jaruzel- backbone of what amounted to a ski's career was less at his initiative ski spoke to the nation as the head truncated Party. than as a response to appeals from of the Polish government and head Despite ritualistic affirmations of successive Party leaderships to lend of the armed forces, referring to the continued dedication to the task of a hand in stabilizing their rapidly Party in what could be charitably Party renewal, Jaruzelski has relied deteriorating situations. called an aside.23 He pointedly on government rather than Party assured his listeners that the Council bodies in his efforts to stabilize the In this context, the General's oft of to National Salvation was to be country. While martial law was in alluded statement of 1976 that composed of "senior officers of "Polish soldiers will not shoot Polish the place, both the powerful SocioeCo- workers''20 Polish Army." And despite some nomic Committee and the Economic may have reflected his earlier held reluctance to use force, or his con- political posts by some Commission were headed by Deputy cern for the of these officers, that seems to be Prime Ministers and directly respon- national prestige of the an accurate military if the regular Army were used characterization of the sible to the Council of Ministers. The against the population. Conversely, 14 generals, one admiral, and five Voivods Convention consisting of such a statement could have been a colonels. 12 members from the regions and major cities and set up by the straightforward professional assess- This is not to say that civilian politi- ment that his troops would not obey General in his role as Prime Minister cal elites disappeared from sight. was to advise the Council of Min- such orders. There is also a possi- Rather, Jaruzelski appears to be bility that he did not say it, that the isters and government economic working closely with handpicked agencies. In a partial list of presum- quote is actually a rumor started by committees of former high-ranking those with a vested interest in ably the most important institutions Party members. Still, the imposition created after martial law, only the keeping the Army untarnished and of martial law interrupted whatever available to bail out the Party. Or Factory Social Commissions were remained of "normal" functioning described in such a way as to imply such a rumor could even have of the Polish Communist Party even begun as wishful thinking by those an attempt to re-establish Party as as it cut short the development of opposed to state authority.26 who desperately wanted him to say Solidarity. Although early reports it. from Warsaw that two members of Seen in this context, the leadership What is more to the point is that the July 1981 Politburo were among reshuffle at the 9th CC Plenum July whatever his reasons, Jaruzelski had those arrested and that this top 15 and 16, 1982, at best symbolically the reputation of throwing his Party body had not been consulted set the stage for a return to civilian weight behind political solutions. In before the declaration of martial law control. These changes did con- and outside Poland it was generally cannot be verified,24they are siderably more to consolidate believed that he kept the Army on believable in light of how the Polit- Jaruzelski's personal position than the sidelines both in 1970 and buro was subsequently pushed to strengthen the Party institution- 1976,21 thereby forcing the Party to aside. Nor is it an exaggeration to ally. The dropping of presumed opt for reform instead of repression. say that when the Party Central Soviet favorite Stefan Olszowski Right or wrong, this impression in- Committee met at the end of and a "moderate" Hieronim Kubiak creased the military's credibility as a February 1982, it convened to from the Secretariat may well be a political force, while Jaruzelski him- rubberstamp the General's decision wise move in terms of keeping a self was the only candidate to to continue martial law. balance between conflicting policy receive more votes than Kania in his perspectives.27 Combined with the re-election to the Central Committee With martial law the militarization of elevation of his personal aide 22 Polish politics steamed ahead. Two Manfred Gorywoda to that body, at the star-crossed 9th Congress. other Undeniably throughout 1981 Jaruzel- high-ranking members of the the Party Secretariat would appear ski had been a Military Council for National Salva- ever more in the pocket of its First defender of Party tion are renewal against both internal critics deputy members of the Secretary, who we must remember and Soviet skeptics. Politburo, while there has been what also remained Prime Minister, de Weydentha! calls "progressive Minister of Defense, and Chairman Nonetheless, even before martial penetration" of other levels of the of the Military Council of National law, the Army had moved in to rein- Party structure.25 Officers have Salvation. Nor is the full Politburo force the sagging political fabric. appeared as secretaries of "voivod- membership accorded a politically Such key ministries as Energy and ships," regional administrative units, unknown foreman from a plant in the Interior were taken over by gen- with emphasis on such sensitive Poznan, Stanislaw Kalkus, likely to erals. No sooner had Jaruzelski areas as and the explosive give workers a more independent become First Secretary than he was coastal region. Others have filled voice at the top of the Party. Indeed, joined by General Tadeusz Dziekan leadership positions in local com- if one takes the view that a cult of as head of the Central Committee's mittees in towns and factories. This personality is intrinsically incom- Cadre Department. Soldiers is in addition to those "military patible with genuine political in- marched into villages and towns to commissars" appointed by the stitutionalization, the Polish Party wage war against corruption and in- National Defense Committee and was weakened, not strengthened, in efficiency. Conscripts went into the sent into the countryside and cities J u ly 1982. mines. At all levels the military in October and November to shape presence was making itself felt amid up the performance of local admin- Another not implausible interpreta- the clamor for Solidarity, while the istrative bodies and get the economy tion might be that General Jaruzelski Party faded from view. moving. In short, at least for the has no intention of withdrawing to RAR-1-'82/ the barracks with the end of martial to power only with the army as its Glemp's November 8, 1982 meeting law, but of following what might be vanguard. This will have completed with General Jaruzelski in which considered the Egyptian pattern the process of turning Leninist both men expressed concern for under Nasser. The Military Council guidelines on Party-Army relations "social order." There is the com- of National Salvation disappears as upside down. promise over the Pope's visit now did Egypt's Revolutionary Com- set for June 1983. Catholic involve- mand Council, leaving a former And what of the workers? Commu- ment in the Patriotic Movement for General firmly in place as head of nist Parties are supposed to be National Revival is signaled by the State and Party. Certainly, from the vanguards of a working class, a job fact that the head of PRON's interim Soviet view that would be an im- for which a militarized Party blamed national council is a veteran Catholic provement over the earlier situation for the banning of Solidarity seems writer. Although freed physically, in which the Army had visibly singularly unfit. Walesa is increasingly isolated. rel',aced the Party. From the Although it is certainly too soon to beginning Moscow stressed Jaruzel- tell, the Polish military may eventu- But to return to the General's prob- ski's role as leader of the Party,28 ally find itself in a situation lem of Party building. In his inter- and there is no reason to assume analogous to that of Peru. For many view with Orianna Fallaci, Deputy that is less con- years Peruvian politics suffered Prime Minister Rakowski insisted cerned about Party dominance than because only the Apristas had "This party still exists with its ideals was . Within Poland popular authority and this group and its members--not all of it is to the Soviet line was not followed be- was the one unacceptable alterna- be thrown away."3 Even given the cause the Party had lost credibility. tive in the eyes of the Peruvian mili- disappearance of more members tary.31 In the Polish context, that since the Rakowski interview in That Jaruzelski presided over a ses- February he is Except sion of the Warsaw Pact on January problem is compounded by the 1982, right. unacceptability of Solidarity in that at a minimum, two parties exist. 4, 1983 in civilian clothes instead of is dedicated to reform that his customary military uniform indi- Moscow as well. His attempts at One union building notwithstanding, seems more and more of an illusion cates his willingness to make con- context of cessions to such concerns abroad.29 General Jaruzelski's inability to in the the banning of Indeed, the General may genuinely bring about a reconciliation with a Solidarity. The other is a party to lift. restyled Solidarity may prove ex- advocating hardline solutions that, want martial law. He may long violations of human rights under for those days when he was first of ceedingly costly. For no matter how well he succeeds in other sectors martial law notwithstanding, Jaruzel- all a soldier and plan to return to ski has not favored. them. Yet despite the successful improvement in the economy is aborting of the Solidarity strike crucial. As of this writing, Jaruzelski appears for planned the anniversary of the Before the suspension of martial both in command of a strictly con- declaration of martial law in trolled "normalization" process and December and law, there was some improvement 1982 the appearance in output and food stocks. Yet in favor with the new Soviet leader- of a sullen calm, it is highly unlikely ship, headed by Andropov.3a that the this is in the overall context of Polish General is going to production that fell 14 percent in get out of politics soon or painlessly. 1981 (estimated to have gone down Yet an unpleasant reality remains. Military rule in Poland, as elsewhere, another 5% in 1982), and price hikes Martial law in Poland papered over has severely limited political associa- totaling 140 percent in 1982. The and exacerbated deep popular hos- tion within as well as outside the real problem is not the underground tility. It did not unite the Party. If Party.30 The call to parliament to lift Solidarity activists, whatever their anything, the split frequently re- martial law on November 22, 1982 annoyance value, but the fact that ferred to in oversimplified terms as came not in the name of the Party the Polish work force is essentially between moderates and hardliners but of the General's own attempt at demoralized, without incentives, may have deepened as well. Incre- a popular front, the Patriotic Move- and quite capable of continuing low mental repression can still backfire. ment for National Revival (PRON). levels of productivity as an ongoing All around the world, the bottom In these circumstances, that move passive . Dialogue with line of military rule is more military can hardly be seen as contributing Solidarity would offer some hope of rule. What if the lesson of martial to reviving party credibility. preventing massive "internal em- law is not enough? As the official Steps to return the Party to a igration" of the Polish working Polish Communist Party newspaper "leading role" will depend far more class. Without it, the chances for bluntly put it, "The worst possible on when General Jaruzelski and his economic national revival at any rate effect of lifting martial law...would advisers feel the Party is ready to don't look good. be the necessity of reimposing it."34 resume such responsibility than Meanwhile, although the Church upon exhortations from anxious may continue to stand publicly for (January 1983) Warsaw watchers in the Kremlin. much of the substance that My own guess would be that such a Solidarity once represented, it is move is likely only when the military accommodating to the political has "penetrated" Party institutions reality, if there is not to be a three- to such an extent that the Army is sided dialogue between the gov- simultaneously the most cohesive ernment, Solidarity, and the Church, element within both government the Church appears increasingly and a "renewed" Party. In sum, the willing to settle for a two-way Polish Communist Party will return discourse. Note Archbishop Jozef 6/RAR-1-'82

NOTES 1. Eric Bourne, Christian Science Relations, North Scituate, MA: Duxbury 16. S. Kovalev, Pravda, September 26, Monitor, December 21, 1982. According Press, pp. 8-30, provides a concise 1968. Put forward to justify Soviet inter- to the latest figures at the time this summary. vention into , this doc- Report was written, as many as 1,500 trine claimed that if socialism in any Dissent in and individuals may still be locked up "for 9. Poland: Reports socialist country was in danger or if de- London: political reasons," including 7 top Documents, Association of velopments within such a country Students and 1977. leaders of Solidarity and 5 leaders of Polish Exiles, For threatened the internal stability of other analysis, Peter Raina, Political Oppo- KOR. Polish government spokesman socialist countries, Moscow reserved sition in Poland, 1954-1977. London: Jerzy Urban also has confirmed the the right to intervene militarily. Poets and Painters' Press, 1978. existence of "a military training center" 17. am grateful to Jan B. de Weyden- that the Church reportedly describes as 10. A comprehensive picture of events thai for to my attention a recently "a penal colony" for Solidarity activists. surrounding the Gdansk Agreement can calling New York Times, January9, 1983. be found in William F. Robinson, ed., published book by Jaroslaw Maciejewski ed., Poznanski August 1980: The Strikes in Poland. and Zofia Trajanowicz, in 2. For a concise description of the Munich: RFE, 1980. Czerwiec, 1956, published Poznan, totalitarian/penetration model, see Eric 1981 that includes eye-witness accounts A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Mili- 11. George Sanford, "The Response of to the effect that regular troops were tary Coups and Governments, Engle- the Polish Communist Leadership and first sent to put down the revolt.-How wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977, pp. the Continuing Crisis (Summer 1980 to ever, this does not specifically contra- 15-19. the Ninth Congress, July 1981) Per- dict M.K. Dziewanowski's report that sonnel and Party Change," in Jean "the soldiers of the Poznan garrison 3. See Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Civic Woodhall, ed., Policy and Politics in remained passive and in some cases Soldier in Cuba" in Catherine McArdle Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure, willingly handed their weapons to the Kelleher, ed., Political Military Systems: and Crisis. London: Francis Pinter, 1982, crowd," The Communist Party of Comparative Perspectives, Beverly Hills, p. 44 correctly points out that for the Poland, 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA: London: Sage Publications, 1974, pp. participants it must have been much Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 265. 209-239; A. Ross Johnson, Role of the more like riding a rollercoaster without Military in Yugoslavia: An Historical any idea when or if one would get to the 18. Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah Sketch, Rand Memorandum P-6070, end of the line. Meikeljohn Terry, "The Military as a January 1978; and Robin Alison 12. Oriana Fallaci's exclusive interview Political Actor in Poland" in Roman Remington, "The Military as an Interest with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., Group in Yugoslav Politics," in Dale R. Mieczyslaw Rakowski, The Times Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil (London), February 23, 1982. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Military Relations in Communist Sys- and Modernizing Societies. London: tems, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 13. According to unofficial reports, Allen Et Unwin, 1982, p. 160. 181-200. party membership dropped drastically from 3.2 to 2.5 million between . Ibid., p. 28. For details see the P. Huntington, "Political 4. Samuel 1980 and December 1981, Eric Bourne, chapter on the Polish military in A. Ross Development and Political Decay," Christian Science Monitor, January 14, Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alex- World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1982. Even more serious than the ander Alexiev, East European Military 1965): pp. 386-430. Establishments: The Warsaw dwindling membership was the fact that Pact Northern Tier. New York: Crane Russak, an estimated one million of those 5. Such as the analyses in the earlier 1982, pp. 17-61. American Universities Field Staff study, remaining party members had also Howard Handelman and Thomas G. joined Solidarity and far from carrying 20. Korbonski and Terry attribute this statement to "personal interviews Sanders, eds., Military Government and the party's message to the trade union in June and the Movement toward Democracy in were agents of the workers' demand for Warsaw, 1976" despite reservations it is South America, Bloomington, IN: party reform. Edwina Moreton, "The firmly entrenched in the literature, Johnson, et al., Indiana University Press, 1981. and Poland's Struggle for ibid., p. 53. Self-Control," International Security, 21. Note the mid-1981 poll that 6. The Statesman (Delhi), February 12, showing Vol. 7, No. (Summer 1982), p. 91. the Polish Army stood behind 1981. just the 14. The Statesman (Delhi), November Church and Solidarity as the third most 7. Amos Perlmutter and William M. 17, 1980. respected institution in the country, LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Kultura (Warsaw), June 21, 1981. Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Rela- 15. On December 4, Pravda printed a 22. A. Ross Johnson, Crisis in Poland. in Communist Political Systems," Tass dispatch from Warsaw quoting tions A Rand Note, N-1891-AF, July 1982, The American Political Science Review, Olszowski's charge that Solidarity was p. 12. Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982): pp. "against the Socialist System." This 778-789. appeared amid a barrage of Soviet 23. Moreton, p. 101. For substantial attacks associating the trade union with excerpts of Jaruzelski's decree see The 8. For more information than most Kulak led subversion and preparations International Herald Tribune and The academics require on this matter, see for "'an open struggle for power," Times (London), December 14, 1981. Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A Prac- Pravda, December 9, 1981. For an un- tical Handbook, Fawcett World, 1972. ambiguous sample in English, see The 24. Roger Boyes of The Times and Chapter two of Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Brian Mooney of Reuters dispatch from Arthur K. Smith's text, Military Role and XXXIII, No. 49 (December 30, 1981): Warsaw, The Times (London), Decem- Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military pp. 5-8. ber 17, 1981. RAR-1-'82/7

25. Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Martial his Politburo membership and also took civil-military relations through the Law and the Reliability of the Polish over the position of Minister of Foreign present day," p. 149. Although that is Military," in Daniel Nelson, ed., The Affairs. He continues to be a potential less clear some eight years later, that Soviet Allies: Issues of Reliability, challenge to Jaruzelski's consolidation profound hostility did dominate Peruvian Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983, forth- of power. politics for a good 45 years. coming. 28. Tass, quoted by the International 32. The Times (London), February 23, 26. RFE-RL Background Report Herald Tribune, December 14, 1981. 1982. (Poland), Roman Stefanowski, "'A Par- Soviet coverage of Jaruzelski's visits to tial List of Martial Law Institutions," 33. Note the reference to Poland in the Moseow in February and the Crimea in recent Warsaw Pact Political Declara- September 7, 1982. When the Economic August 1982 is even more emphatic in Commission was dissolved in a leader- tion stressed that "Polish internal affairs this regard. will.., ship reshuffle at the end of October be decided only by Poland" and 1982, its functions were taken over by 29. New York Times, January 5, 1983. assured "Socialist Poland" of the moral, the government presidium and a This was in line with the General's political, and economic support of planning commission headed by deputy August 1982 visit to the Soviet Union "fraternal socialist countries." TASS, premier Janusz Obodowski. Although it out of uniform and may be seen as Prague, January 5, 1983. This wording is too soon to tell whether or not this another step in his own "civilianization" suggests that the signers of the declara- emphasis on state rather than party Egyptian style as speculated above. tion no longer considered it necessary to organs will continue, it is indicative that imply even by omission (as with the ,the new Minister of Culture, Professor 30. de Weydenthal's forthcoming chap- December 6, 1980 statement of Warsaw Kazimierz Zygulski, reportedly is not a ter provides excellent detail in this Pact leaders) that military support might Communist Party member, and indeed, regard. be a consideratjon. a veteran of the anti-Communist Polish 34. (Warsaw), December during World War I1. 31. Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, consider the mutual enmity of the 3, 1982. 27. RFE-RL Poland Situation Report, APRA party and the military to be "the JFB, July 27, 1982. Olszowski retained most significant element in Peruvian

Top View