JAPAN-US A ¥EN TO CONTROL? or-^Law and Order in Asia..." CHRONOLOGY

1945 August-September U.S. defeats and occupies Japan.

1949 October 1 People's Republic of China established.

1950 June 26 Korean War begins.

July 75,000-man Japanese National Police Reserve established.

1951 September 8 Peace Treaty with Japan signed at San Francisco. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and U.S. also signed.

1954 May 1 400,000 Japanese demonstrate against rearmament.

June 2 Japanese Self-Defense Forces created.

1960 January 19 Revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed.

May 16 Over 3 million Chinese demonstrate against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in mainland Chinese cities.

May 20 Lower House of Japanese Diet passes Security Treaty after police evict Socialists trying to block vote with sit-in; thousands demonstrate outside Diet.

May 26 Hundreds of thousands demonstrate against Treaty in Tokyo.

June 16 Demonstrators protesting Treaty charge Diet compound; 870 injured; one killed.

President Eisenhower agrees to Japanese request that his visit to Japan be postponed.

June 19 Treaty ratification becomes effective automatically as Socialists block Liberal Democrat efforts to vote approval in Upper House. Thousands demonstrate against the Treaty.

(continued inside back cover) 1967 November 6-12 Zengakuren demonstrators attempt to prevent Prime Minister Sato's departure for the U.S.

1968 January Violent demonstrations against entrance into the port of Sasebo of the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise.

October 21 International Anti-War Day. Massive demonstrations against Sato Government's support of U.S. policies: 200,000 demon­ strators halt train service at Shinjuku Station, national railway center; 1,000 members of Zengakuren attack offices of Self-Defense Agency. Over 700 arrested, 140 injured.

1969 January 18-19 8,000 riot police clear students from Tokyo University which has been occupied for months.

August University Law passed.

October 21 International Anti-War Day. Tokyo paralyzed; violence erupts in 100 other cities and towns. Nation-wide protests against Security Treaty result in 1,505 arrests and 66 injuries.

November 14 Violent rush-hour demonstration at Ginza Subway Station, Tokyo, against Sato's imminent visit to U.S.

November 15 About 40,000 workers and students demonstrate in Naha, Okinawa against Sato's visit to U.S.

November 17 30,000 riot police guard roads to airport as Sato leaves for U.S. 1,700 students arrested; 77 injured.

21 Nixon-Sato communique released.

1970 June 23 Security Treaty'extends automatically unless terminated by Japan or U.S. 1970 Japan Project

Eighth Floor

777 U.N. Plaza

New York, New York 10017

I 1970 JAPAN PROJECT

Helen Ewer

The Rev, Pharis J, Harvey

The Rev. Richard Heacock

Sonja Hedlund

Betty Pagett

Kathy Stilson

John Travers

William Troy

Grace Williams \ C O N F E N * S Paper Color

1970: Year of Decision in Japan Bill Troy Green

"Sitting as she does as the very keystone of present US economic and military strategy in the Far East, how Japan chooses to define her political existence in the next decade is one of the fundamental pivots on which the future of the region will turn."

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America Blue

Pax Americana & the Future of Asia Ross Terrill Yellow

"At least 950,000 US troops now eat their breakfast in an arc around China, from Korea to Thailand."

A New Era in the Pacific Jerry K. Fisher .... Bright Yellow

"It is ironic that although Japan, the nation state, may greatly benefit from its new partnership with the US, the Japanese people stand to lose the most from the agreements."

Okinawa : Kanashii Monogatari John Travers White

"Nearly one million people are still 'bearing the unbearable burden' which history placed upon them twenty-five years ago."

Ampo Hunsai; Comments on the

Japanese Student Movement compiled by Grace Williams Green

AMPO: A Report from the Japanese New Left, No. 2 White

Action Guide compiled by Betty Pagett...Bright Pink

Excerpts from Vietnam and the Pacific Rim Strategy..Peter Wiley Pink "If the US can continue to keep Japan in the position of a junior partner, while countering the threat of revolutionary national­ ism, it can gain control over the Pacific and organize, its mar­ kets in a way that would not be conceivable in Western Europe."

Japan : Ris ing Sun in As ia Jim Schoch Blue

"The rising sun of the resurgent Japanese empire means only economic stagnation and misery for the countries and people under its rays."

The Eye of the Beholder: Background Notes on the US-Japan Military Relationship John Dower Pink

"Dulles appears never to have given serious consideration to any settlement for Japan which did not involve either a heavily rearmed Japan, US bases in Japan, or both."

Bibliography compiled by Betty Pagett Blue 1970: Year of Decision in Japan Notes on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

by Bill Troy Committee of Returned Volunteers

On June 23, 1970, the Treaty of Mutual Co­ of her former enemies who happened to operation and Security between Japan and belong to the "free world"; the U.S.S.R. the United States of American will be ten and the People's Republic of China refused years old. The treaty, which was signed to sign. The engineer of this diplomatic in an atmosphere of mass protest in Tokyo tour de force, in what has been described in 1960, will on that date enter a new as "perhaps his greatest achievement", phase in which it can be abrogated by either was the negotiator for the United States - side on one year's prior notice. Or, stated Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles. the other way around, after June 23, 1970, the treaty will remain in force indefinitely The treaty was revised in 1960 mainly to until one party, or both together, decides include two provisos urgently desired by to end the treaty, either permanently or for the government of Prime Minister Nobusuke the purpose of establishing a new and re­ Kishi. The first is included in an exchange vised treaty. of notes attached to the treaty. It states that any changes in U.S. armed forces Both the Japanese and American governments deployment or equipment in Japan, and any have publicly stated that they intend to use of U.S. forces in Japan for actions remain silent next June and thus allow the outside the country, shall be the subject treaty to be extended "automatically". This of "prior consultation" with the Japanese will mean that, under the terms of the agree­ government. The original treaty left both ment, Japan will continue to grant to the matters to the discretion of the U.S. The United States "the use by its land, air, and second proviso is written into the treaty naval forces of facilities and areas in itself and is represented by the inclusion Japan" as governed under a separate Status of the concept of mutuality. There was of Forces Agreement signed along with the nothing very mutual about the 1951 document; treaty in 1960. The immodest mandate for the U.S. had all the troops and called all the use of those forces is contained in the the shots. However, the creation of the crucial Article Six in the words "for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1954 - in purpose of contributing to the security in violation of Article Nine of the Constitution the Far East..." Nowhere in the treaty or of Japan which forbids the maintenance of the exchange of official notes which followed land, sea and air forces and renounces the is there any indication of what would right of belligerency - made it possible constitute a threat to the security of Japan, for Japan to cooperate in the maintenance or more importantly, what areas fall within of her own security,. Not only could the the general region designated as the Far East. SDF work with U.S. forces to combat external These matters are left to the considered threats, but they could also assume from judgment of the signatories. the U.S. the burden of repressing insurrection within Japan, a task the government indicated The 1960 treaty is a revised version of the it was not loath to carry out. original Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed on Today the United States maintains over one September 8, 1951 in San Francisco. That hundred military facilities in Japan. They agreement was signed in tandem with the peace are manned by 40,000 armed forces personnel. treaty which restored Japan to the status There are seven major air bases and two of sovereign nation, at least in the eyes major naval ports among these installations. •2-

The command headquarters of the U.S. causing U.S. policy-makers to begin to view Fifth Air Force, which is responsible a revived Japan as a necessary ally in the for operations in the area covering emerging Cold War. From that point in time, Japan, South Korea, and Okinawa is at the Occupation dropped most of its "New Fuchu Air Station in suburban Tokyo. Deal" programs in Japan and launched an The naval ports are available for port urgent effort to revive the Japanese economy, calls by warships of the Seventh Fleet, control the newly authorized labor unions, which patrols the Pacific area. Aside and insure the rise to power of conservative from the massive strike capability leaders who would be warm to U.S. designs. maintained in Japan, U.S. bases are also used for storage, transportation These same conservative leaders, led by of war material, military training, future Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, hospital care, and reconnaisance. Both decided to conclude for Japan the partial the Pueblo and the spy plane shot down peace treaty with the Western powers. This by the North Koreans last year were was accomplished despite vehement protest stationed in Japan. U.S. forces regu­ from leftist forces in Japan, who wanted larly carry out maneuvers and military no part of a treaty which did not include training operations with the Self Japan's most immediate neighbors, China and Defense Forces of Japan. The most the Soviet Union. Although Yoshida notable example of cooperation between argued at San Francisco for a "mutual" the two - in tacit defiance of both security treaty which would recognize Article Nine and the "prior consultation" Japan's right to consult with the U.S. on formula - was revealed by the Japan strategic matters, he was forced to give in Socialist Party in a secret 1959 accord to Dulles' firm intent that U.S. forces in calling for coordination of U.S., SDF, Japan should be an integral part of a total and Republic of Korea forces for the U.S. military strategy in Asia completely protection of the Korean peninsula. controlled by U.S. policy. Therefore, the original security treaty was, in the words The Treaty and U.S. Far East Strategy of Martin E. Weinstein, "simply a base- leasing agreement." Japan's accession to The security arrangement with Japan this formula was hastened at the time by was designed from the very beginning to the actual existence of hostilities in insure that the recently conquered enemy Korea. U.S. bases in Japan were the major would be safely returned to the affairs support base for operation in that war. of nations as a friendly power which would cooperate in American's Asian wall By 1960 important changes had taken place of containment against Communism. The which dictated the terms -of the treaty's 1951 treaty was the logical extension revision. The Japanese economy was well of an abrupt shift which had occurred on Its way toward achieving its present in American Occupation policy around remarkable success, and this development late 1947. Until that time, the emphasis was accompanied by a revived sense of of Occupation policy had been upon national honor which found the 1951 treaty demilitarization and democratization grossly one-sided. Moreover, Yoshida had of a defeated and perhaps still dangerous successfully circumvented the letter of the enemy. But a succession of events constitution and established the Self deemed inimical to U.S. interests took Defense Forces in 1954, These two conditions place in the latter part of the decade - were behind the revisions demanded by the the insurrection in Greece, the revolution Kishi government in 1960. in China, the outbreak of guerrilla wars all over Southeast Asia, the Today, ten years later, the Russian threat emergence of Russia as a Pacific power - to "freedom" is not felt so keenly as it *

was in earlier days, and the treaty is imperialism, but also at preventing the conceived as contributing primarily to rearmament of Japan. It has been U.S. military "security" against China, North policy since the late stages of the Occu­ Korea, and wars of national liberation pation to urge the Japanese government to in Southeast Asia, The proximity of U.S. pursue exactly that course. From Wash­ forces in Japan to the Chinese mainland ington's point of view, while it is is obvious enough and is not at all lost convenient to have access to the bases in upon Peking, which maintains a steady Japan, it would be less costly if Japan would verbal denunciation of the pro-U.S. agree to shoulder more of the burden government in Tokyo. The integration of herself, providing, of course, that she U.S., Japanese, and Republic of Korea used her forces to pursue basically forces for the defense of one of Walt American aims. This is the meaning of Rostow's favorite "enlightened military the suggestion by the Nixon administration governments," South Korea, has already that the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), been mentioned. And while no U.S. strikes presently a regional organization for against the Vietnamese have been launched consultation on political and economic directly from Japan, the Tokyo government problems, should become a military organ has not deemed "prior consultation" for regional defense against Communism, necessary for the transport of troops, with Japan as its major member. In other weapons, and supplies for Vietnam through words, the Washington scenario for the Japan, nor for port calls by U.S. ships future is the replacement of its various such as the U.S.S. Enterprise bound for one-sided military alliances in the area Vietnam duty, nor provocative reconn­ (SEATO, the ANZUS Pact, military pacts aissance missions such as that exercised with Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and by the Pueblo in the North Pacific. More­ Thailand) with a structure that would more over, the American military bastion in resemble NATO, with beefed-up local military Okinawa, which even the American government forces being coordinated to serve American has recognized as legally Japanese aims. territory, is a major base for prose­ cuting the War in Vietnam. Twenty-two So far the Japanese government has stead­ B-52 bombers there are available for twice fastly maintained that it cannot join any daily missions to Vietnam, the island is such regional defense arrangement. The one enormous storage dump for weapons, reason advanced is that the constitution including nuclear and chemical weapons, forbids it. That is indeed the case, and and the north part of the island is a it is also true that public sentiment in major training base for counter-guerrilla Japan in favor of retaining Article Nine warfare. is sufficiently strong to insure that the move into ASPAC would be politically It is important to recognize that political suicidal for the government at this time. protest in Japan is aimed not only at On the other hand, it is probably also true ending Japan's complicity in U.S. military that the government is willing enough at -4- this time to continue to let the U.S. has become an enormously profitable do the work and spend the money for a economic venture for both countries. The military system that thus far has proved United States is far and away the leading profitable to the business giants who market for Japanese exports, accounting control the government. They have in for about 30% of Japan's overseas business. fact made sure that when the time comes Japan, on the other hand, has become the for them to stake out a military presence second largest market for U.S. manufactures in Asia, they will be ready. It would not (after Canada), absorbing about 8% of U.S. be too much to say that in terms of both exports. The Japanese economy, boosted available and potential military man­ back into productive shape by $2 billion power and firepower, the Japanese do in of U.S. air during the Occupation, has fact maintain the third largest military transformed itself from a pre-war economy force in Asia today, inferior to the U.S. which relied on the export of textiles and and Russia, but probably equal to China. cheap consumer goods to a robust heavy The 180,000 troops of the Self Defense industrial economy which leads the world Forces man a military machine which in shipbuilding, is second in the export theoretically is capable only of defensive of iron and steel, second in the production operations. But this machine includes of automobiles, and is a substantial exporter both Hawk and Nike-Hercules missiles of industrial chemicals, electrical equipment, built in Japan under a 1967 know-how and photographic equipment. license with the Pentagon, a fleet of blue-ribbon Phanton F-104 jet fighters The advantage to Japanese business includes which will be increased by 34 on the basis more than her direct profits from trade of a license granted to Japanese manu­ with the U.S. The circle of containment facturers by the U.S. It has been by the U.S. throughout "free world" Asia estimated that the time needed for Japan has provided Japanese companies with to convert its present level of peaceful unlimited possibilities for investment and atomic capability to military purposes, trade in the smaller nations of Asia. and then use its present missilery as an These activities are essential to the atomic delivery system, would amount to continued growth of an economy which is so months. Moreover, the present industrial heavily dependent upon imports of industrial base is more than adequate to produce raw materials and upon maintaining a air and naval forces which would constitute favorable balance of payments. Japanese a major world military force. economic activity in the region is indicated by ventures like a $26 million Japanese It is precisely that kind of rearmament consortium project to develop the Nam Ngum that the U.S. government is encouraging River in Laos, a $10.5 million power Japan to undertake. Washington is transmission network built in Ceylon, a apparently confident that such a military new multi-million dollar expressway on the force maintained by the world's third main island of the Philippines, two car largest and fastest growing economy would assembly plants in Thailand, the Jurong be content to cooperate in U.S. ideolo­ shipyard in Malaysia, a sugar refinery gical and strategic plans. Others are and several oil-drilling contracts with not so sure. Vast numbers of the Japanese Indonesia. All these projects, as well as people are sure that both the present the $60 million per year that Japan paid situation and the scenario for the future out during the sixties in war reparations to are intolerable. various Southeast Asian countries, most of it in the form of technical assistance and The American Lake capital outlay for industrial and infra­ structure projects, has been very carefully The alliance between America and Japan designed to build economic institutions in the receiving countries which in the call for heavy industial trade among the future will trade with Japan. The same more advanced countries in the American principle holds true for the nature of Lake - the U.S., Japan, Australia, and her foreign aid, which she proudly Canada - financed in large part by American declares will soon reach $1 billion banks and carried by ships built in Japan; and will represent 1% of GNP. and for investment by the rich nations in the smaller countries of Latin America and Peter Wiley of Leviathan (June 1969, Asia to extract the rich natural resources Vol. 1, No. 3) believes that American in those areas. Development of these business sees all this activity in terms underdeveloped economies, it must be supposed, of a grand vision for the future of is to be a natural by-product of this inter-locking trade throughout the Pacific international system of division of labor. Rim directed basically by American economic It is clear from Mr. Peterson's statement interests. He quotes Rudolph A. Peterson, that development is not the first aim of president of Bank of America: the program.

When I speak of the Pacific Rim, There are at least two possible eventualities I am putting the broadest possible that would upset Mr. Peterson's grand construction on the term - the design. One involves the long-range western coasts of South America, economic plans of Japanese business and Central America, and our own casts in doubt the proposition that the continent, and extending beyond • Japanese will willingly play the role of Australia and the Far East to junior partner in the proposed arrangement. India. There is no more vast or It would appear from recent Japanese rich area for resource development activity that perhaps they have plans of or trade growth in the world today their own. Not only is an increasing amount than this immense region, and it is of Japanese resources going into Southeast virtually our own front yard... Asia, but Japanese companies are becoming Were we California businessmen to heavily involved in the resource development play a more dynamic role in helping of British Columbia (40% of mineral exports trade development in the Pacific to Japan), Alaska (80% of all exports to Rim, we would have giant, hungry Japan), and Siberia. Moreover, 26% of new markets for our products and Japanese overseas investment is now going to vast new profit potentials for our resource development in Latin America. firms. (Quoted in California Indeed, many American businessmen (not to Business Magazine, Sept-Oct., 1968) mention Canadians and Australians)' are beginning to wonder whether their relation­ The details of this vision, being worked ship to Japanese business can remain out by Bank of America's research mutually supportive or whether indeed the affiliate, the Stanford Research Institute, competitive nature of the relationship will •6-

inevitably predominate. a political power. Sitting as she does as the very keystone of present U.S. A related possibility has been set forth economic and military strategy in the Far by Carl Oglesby in his essay "Vietnamese East, how Japan chooses to define her Crucible: An Essay on the Meanings of political existence in the next decade is the Cold War" (Containment and Change, one of the fundamental pivots on which the Macmillan, 1967). He advances the pro­ future of the entire region will turn. position, based upon his projection of a continuously growing Chinese economy, For more than twenty years Japan has been that the real threat to U.S. interests ruled by one party, the party of big in Asia is economic, and that it lies business. The Liberal-Democrats during in a regional economic system "whose that period have chosen to place Japan's potential and power are inherent in the welfare in the hands of the United States, Pacific situation itself." The basis a policy which has enabled Japan to achieve of his argument rests on the assertion the economic miracle which continues to that there is an as-yet-untapped comple­ amaze the world, but which has also divided mentarity between the economies of the country in a bitter debate about Japan's Japan and China. China in the years future role in world politics. More than ahead will need far more basic industrial half the voters in Japan are currently goods than she is even now importing voting for parties whose programs call for from Japan and Europe, and she can offer a different set of national priorities. to Japan markets in an industrializing These people share a common memory of country, raw materials such as iron and nuclear holocaust and the destruction and coal, and food (chiefly rice), a perennial dishonor of an imperialist war. They do Japanese import. Without question not wish to go down that path again. This considerable pressure has been brought time they will choose peace and friendship to bear upon Japan by the United States with China. They will oppose Japanese for many years to honor the alliance cooperation in American policy so long as by refraining from moving economically it leads to the horror and injustice of toward the natural complementarity campaigns like the Vietnam War. They will her economy shares with China. Within not wish once again to deal with puppet the present Cold War confrontation governments in Southeast Asia in order to that the U.S. has established politically, establish economic empire. They will economically, and militarily in the Far insist upon fidelity to the spirit of their East, to say that Japan will move into peace constitution. And they will do a closer relationship with China is to everything in their power to destroy the say that she will leave the Western unrepresentative and authoritarian power orbit, a prospect which Dwight Eisenhower of the ruling party so that the new Japan commented upon in 1954 when he said: will be a Japan of peace and justice as "The possible consequences of the loss of well as prosperity. Japan to the free world are just incal­ culable."

That is the real heart of the question in 1970. Which way will Japan go? In a sense the date June 23, 1970, is more significant than simply the question of the fate of the security treaty. It represents the end of the post-war era for Japan and the beginning of her full re-entry into the international world as TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Japan and the United States of America, Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations, Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security, Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all Treasures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any ways the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE K

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of interna­ tional peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the treaty have been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th of January, 1960. ROSS TERRILL

PAX AMERICANA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA

Storm Center of World Politics w\ sia, especially East Asia, might be considered the center of world politics today. It is Vietnam, not Berlin, which keeps the world awake at night. In 1967 Mr. Kosygin flew to see Niagara Falls in a US Air Force jet, while sister US Air Force jets pounded Kosygin's ally, the DRV. But Mr. Kosygin is a European communist, who talks about "development" rather than "revolution." Washington seems to see him more as a Rus­ sian than as a communist. In Asia the communists, to the official American gaze, are rampant, militant, aggressive, hostile (which may be interpreted to mean that they are trying to change their societies). As Carl Oglesby has pointed out1 they are considered to have no nationality, they are like political Mar­ tians. Moscow may threaten and occupy Czechoslovakia: the US shows little concern. But let Peking even write a pamphlet and the US talks about "aggression" and sends another 100,000 troops to East Asia. Troops are withdrawn from Europe. They are hardly home when they are sent to East Asia. At least 950,000 US troops now eat their breakfast in an arc around China, from Korea to Thailand. Johnson has been six times to the Pacific, while president, and only twice to Europe—once for a funeral, that of Adenauer, and once for six hours of religion and refueling in Rome last year. Asia is the center of world politics today because it is the chosen battlefield for the im­ position of the Pax Americana. There is a second reason, which is connected to the first: Asia is the region of greatest poverty in the world. Consequently, communist ideol­ ogy, especially in the form that bases itself upon the peasantry, is a vigorous force, offering to backward societies a kind of path to modernity and national dignity. Marx was wrong to foresee revolution in the most advanced nations first, but Lenin was correct to see communism as suited to a dual struggle against feudalism and imperialism. China's

l Containment and Change, p. 78. CROSS CURREM?S, Fall, 1968 published this article. Reprinted for the packet with the permission of the author. revolution is a good example of this, and semi-feudalism and semi-impe­ rialism are at present the condition of wide areas of Asia. Communist elites are determined upon revolutionary change. US power is determined to prevent it. Hence the real human and social problems of Asia have become overlaid and distorted by the imposition of global struggle. Asia has become the arena in which the central power struggle of the present period for many people—struggle against US im­ perialism—is played out. And Asia has also become the arena where the central problem of US foreign policy—the rise of China to her natural position as the dominant power in Asia—is being played out. The two greatest ideologies in the world today meet on the underbelly of China. One is communism in its East Asian form—peasant-based, Confucian in its genius for social organization, deeply nationalist, pos­ sessed of a truly dynastic patience, and subtle in its psychology, which draws upon Confucian family and social morality. The other is American messianism—based upon the myth of New World virtue that attached to the founding of America, free from the corruptions of Europe, and upon the myth of New World mission, that makes Washington convinced it has a special responsibility to make Asia "safe for democracy and free­ dom." This messianism can be seen in the words of Johnson, as he left for Asia in October 1966: "I have a great many objectives ... for the people of that area of the world." It is the voice of The New York Times, after Britain announced its withdrawal from Asia: "The arc from Arabia to the China Sea becomes virtually our responsibility." Or of LOOK magazine in May of 1967: "The Far East has now become our Far West." The name of the present round of confrontation between East Asian communism and US messianism is Vietnam. Like Spain in the 1930's, it has become the symbol of what the international political struggle is about in the 1960's. Significantly, the Spanish civil war embodied all the key ingredients of European politics thirty years ago—fascism, com­ munism, socialism, Christian reaction. Vietnam embodies the key in­ gredients of East Asian politics today—peasant power, Confucian com­ munism, feudalism, imperialism. The distance from Spain to Vietnam is the distance from a decade when Europe was the center of world politics to a decade when East Asia is the center of world politics. Vietnam, over and above its own heroic dramas, is the focus of political passion and political analysis for many of our generation, as Spain was for some of our fathers.

The Postwar Situation and the Bandung Era Have Passed The essentials of the postwar situation in Asia have radically altered. No one doubts that this has happened in Europe. The two blocs have loosened. The defeated powers arc prosperous again—more prosperous indeed than the victorious powers. National particularity has reasserted itself, especially in France, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. It is less generally realized that the immediately postwar world has passed in Asia too. In 1945 Japan was in ruins; now she flexes her muscles, mainly economic muscles but increasingly political as well. She is the most underestimated power in the world today, very soon to be the third industrial power in the world, after the USA and the USSR. China, too, after her civil war losses of the 1940's, has united herself, thrown off all foreign influence, and "stood up"—to use Mao's phrase- before Asia and the world. Finally, the political and military power of the European colonizers—Britain, France and Holland—has shrivelled to a fraction of its 1945 scale. One must also observe, more regretfully, that the years of Afro-Asian solidarity, the Bandung Era, have also passed. This was the time when the Third World seemed to have a unity about it, when non-alignment was a widespread reality, and when the feeling was strong that the main pre-condition for progressive and immediately successful economic poli­ cies—the elimination of the European colonialists—had already been achieved. One of the many illusions of anti-colonialism was that after the colonizers departed, the former colonies would be free and able, united with each other in common policies, to resist the Power Blocs and promote their mutual economic advance. It has not happened. Nor could we expect it to have happened. It was one of the vanities of colonialism to define Asia by negatives, or by reference to Europe. It was "recently free," "non-white," "backward." But these categories could never describe Asia adequately; they took no account of the reality and diversity of its cultures, and the relation of culture to international conflicts and economic growth. We must also see the importance of the resurgence of the American mission in Asia—carried to such lengths by Johnson that we must compare him with those two classic imperialist presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and McKinley. And the colonialists' analysis did not allow for the fact that China, because of her size, strategic location, and pervasive cultural influence, was bound to pose problems for the rest of Asia in the future as she had in the past, once she regained her unity and independence. Bandung had its meaning and its value in the 1950's, but its concep­ tion was too negative and too moralistic to have survived the 15-year interval between the twilight of European empire, the resurgence of the Pax Americana, and'the "standing up" of China. Today we must con­ sider the prospects of peace and justice in Asia in a way that is less moralistic and more political, that stresses the concrete interests of the ordinary people of Asia, rather than global ideologies, one that is less messianic and more Machiavellian. The American Role The Western position in Asia has progressively declined ever since Japan drove southward in the 1940's. Of all the European possessions that once enabled Paris and London to speak of Asia as their "Far East," only Hong Kong and Macao remain to face the 1970's. It is astonishing to recall that as recently as 1935 the white man ruled 80 percent of the world. Yet there is a paradox here. We cannot speak any more of the "West." European power in Asia has declined, but US power in Asia has enor­ mously increased. At least in governmental and military terms, the change since the non-alignment of the Bandung Era has been most one­ sided—towards pro-American Asian governments, and massive increase in the number of US troops, planes and ships in Asia. Most Asian governments support US policies in one way or another. The long list of Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) powers—ASPAC was formed with active US encouragement—tells the story. Of the truly non-aligned countries which abounded in the 1950's, perhaps only Burma and Cambodia remain. AU other non-communist governments in Asia, if we use mainly the measure of how close they stand to the great capitalist power of the region, USA, are closer to the "West." The US assures the world that it "seeks no war," yet maintains 560,000 troops in Vietnam, 67,000 troops in Thailand, 85,000 troops in Okinawa, 55,000 troops in Korea, 47,000 troops in Japan, 37,000 in the Philippines, 25,000 troops in Guam, and 17,000 troops in Taiwan. In other words, the "West" if taken as a whole, has not lost its hold at all in Asia. A great gap has opened up between traditional western values on the one hand, and US power on the other. European political rule has dis­ appeared from Asia.^but American military imperialism has developed in overwhelming force. We cannot neglect that basic fact, for many things are done today in Asia either out of subservience to or resistance to US imperialism. We would prefer to discuss Asian issues as such: Asia's culture and style of life, the economic and social problems of its people, and what is being done and can be done to meet them. But the reality is less straight­ forward, and less human; international politics in Asia is often highly irrelevant to the real problems of the area, yet it forms the reality within which all other political-^nd social questions are forced to be considered.

China-US Confrontation The Cold War in Asia is not, of course, between the US and the USSR. Washington and Moscow .now seem to weigh each other as powers, rather than as demonic forces. The Cold War in Asia is between those two ideological civilizaiiom, East Asia and the USA, especially China ami the among both Philippine intellectuals and peasant spokesmen, who look for lessons to the Chinese experience, and the same is true in many other Asian countries. The China-USA confrontation exists on many levels. One is thai of ideology. Each propagates, with some arrogance, its notion of what is the political truth by which to live. The US offers Vietnam as a deci­ sive test; what is at stake is "faith in freedom." For China, the Cultural Revolution is the high point of a long spiritual and political struggle against the Pax Americana. There is a radical difference here between Western Europe and the U.S. The rise of China poses a terrible problem for believers in Western liberalism, for Mao came to power upon the ashes of Western liberalism's dreams and ambitions in East Asia. It is only 28 years ago that US Sena­ tor Wherry avowed: "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up, and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City." Europeans are not obsessed spiritually with China the way Dean Rusk is, because they have experienced, in 30 years of war and totalitarianism, die bankruptcy of Western liberalism, and they know in their bones that the liberal myths about harmony, progress and reason are now illusions. In the hotels of Peking you meet European businessmen utterly un­ touched by, and uninterested in, the kind of ideological approach to East Asia that means so much in Washington.

From "Bipolarity" to "International Civil War" Eight years ago, when the World Student Christian Federation last held a world student conference, one of the greatest issues in the Cold War was disarmament. I was then president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Australia, and I remember that few things seemed more important than getting a Test Ban Treaty and Arms' Control. It was then thought that the Bomb was a problem in itself; that the supreme task was the organizational one of extending international order to embrace control of nuclear weapons. Discussion proceeded on the basis of the fact that there were two "superpowers." Many students in the West talked in sober sophistication of the "end of ideology." In 1968, how many of us feel fire in our belly about disarmament? There is now—and it is a step toward realism—a readiness to analyze international politics in political terms, not just in organizational terms, to see international relations not just as a scientific problem, but as a struggle. For an increasing number of Christians there is a refusal to accept the emphasis upon reconciliation, and a readiness to be partisans on the big issues of our time. There is a growing suspicion that it might even be true, as it once was, that Christianity was concerned not just with ad- USA, a confrontation between "American substance" and "Chinese shadow."2 The substance of US presence in Asia is clear. The Chinese shadow is less tangible, yet it is cast far and deep, because for all her unique peculiarities, China has shown a path—not the path, but a path—to satisfy two profound aspirations to be found all over Asia. One is to be fully master in one's own country. After a century of being carved up for the purposes of others, China, whatever else may be said of her regime, is beholden to no one, not even to her former communist father- figures in Europe. The second aspiration is to raise the concrete level of living standards of the people. Despite the setbacks since the Great Leap Forward of 1958, China has probably averaged an annual rate of growth of about 5 percent, very high for a country of 750 million people which was in such a state of disorganization, and such a victim of uneven development, as China was when the CCP took Peking. Certainly China has not exploited these deeply symbolic advances by conciliatory diplomacy in Asia. In the Bandung Era she made some efforts in this direction—Chou En-lai embraced Nehru at Bandung. But Asia has become a much tenser, tougher place politically in the past decade, and China, I believe, is fighting a battle—so far political, but who knows when it will become military?—against the growing power, on her borders, of the Pax Americana. All else has been sacrificed for this end. China is going deep into the roots of her own culture and social being, for Mao believes that China, should the military phase of the struggle come, will have to meet the USA alone. In the absence of Russian support, he believes, China will have to draw exclusively on her own peop'e, her own ideology, and her own civilization, the way she did in fighting Japan from the caves oi Yenan 30 years ago. It is not a posture calculated to encourage any sort of compromise. Despite the uncompromisingly Chinese character of the Cultural Revolution, China retains her immense, intangible influence upon Asia. When in October 1964, she expressed the ultimate intransigence of ex­ ploding an atomic bomb, celebrations in Taipeh, Taiwan, almost rivalled those in Peking itself. I was in Singapore shortly afterwards, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Rajaratnam, told me that pride in China's achieve­ ment of the bomb was equally strong in Singapore. Of course, these are both Chinese states, but the Tunku Abdul Rahman also expressed some admiration, and pointed out to his amazed Western allies that "the Chinese bomb is, after all, an Asian bomb, and the first Asian bomb." Though the Philippine government will have no dealings with Peking —not even to buy rice, which Peking offers at 60 percent of the price she now pays for US rice—there is a determined and impressive minority,

2 See my essay, "Between Shadow and Substance," Motive, November, 1967. monitions about the means employed in politics, but with a vision of the goals fit for human beings. It is also clear, in my view, that there was not, and is not, a situation of two superpowers, but of one. In Asia, at least, there exists not some kind of balance, but rather the Pax Americana and its Asian supporters on the one hand, and resistance to it, militarily, politically, spiritually, on the other. The central political problem of our generation in Asia is how to deal with the USA. There has never, in all history, been a hoax so blatant as that China is a threat to the USA, and that the USA is "resisting aggression" in Asia. The "yellow peril" is an astonishing fiction conjured up by a combina­ tion of fear and public relations campaigns. Yet the "white peril" is a desperate reality for East Asians. A great deal of what is happening in China is due to the problem for Peking of how to deal with the military and political pressures that come, now as for the past 150 years, from the restless, Faustian, expansionist civilization of Christian capitalism. In Asia, the initiating power is the USA. Both Moscow and Peking, in their different ways, are responding to the USA. When in Paris to report the "peace talks," I became convinced that one of the tragedies of Vietnam, from the Vietnamese point of view, is that both Russia and China seem forced to view the Vietnam war primarily in terms not of the merits and needs of the Vietnamese struggle itself, but of the line of policy that each must follow in dealing with the overwhelming power of the USA. Vietnam expresses a widespread reality of Asia in its character as a social—or "people's"—struggle against industrial, imperialist power oper­ ating through a largely puppet government. Government-to-government relations in Asia today do not tell the largest part of the Asian political picture. Domestic and international matters are thoroughly intertwined. Some of the smaller governments—e.g., Thailand and the Philippines —are in varying degrees considered by most observers to be fragile. Peas­ ant and/or patriotic uprising is either a strong possibility or a need. In South Vietnam and Laos, the struggle has become overt and military, and it has the special ingredients of Confucian East Asian civilization to lend it depth and endurance: But there is an incipient civil war situation in some areas, too, with the US and various feudal military and bourgeois forces on one side, and the (as yet disorganized) peasant masses and nationalist elements of the bourgeoisie and intelligentia on the other.

The Future: Japan and China What patterns can we expect to evolve in Asia in the next decade? Certain things are clear. The last remnants of what the British like to call their "presence" will have gone by 1971. This move has brought a welcome fluidity to the pattern of relations in South Asia. It also under­ lines how completely American power has replaced European power in Asia, and how alone the US is, among her Western allies, in her current desire to "keep Asia in control." Australia will become more important in South Asia. One hopes that she will use her power in an independent way, and not tie herself in the future, as she has in the past, to the global concerns of her friends in Washington and London. Japan will emerge gradually from her postwar political reticence, though she is still distrusted, and feared economically, in many parts ol Asia. It is quite unrealistic to talk, as some British do, of another Geneva conference to settle the future evolution of Asia, with Britain and the USSR as chairmen, and Japan not even as a member. Japan will count far more in the Asia of the 1970's than France or Britain. Not only is her economy valuable to other Asian nations—it booms ahead with an annual growth rate of some 8 percent—but the understanding that her people (if not her present government) have for China makes it possible for Japan to be a kind of bridge and broker between the US and China in the post-Vietnam years. The present gulf between China and the rest of the world will, in varying degrees, lessen. There are two reasons. In the first place, the rebuff to the US brought about in Vietnam will in due course reduce the sense of threat that Peking has about the US. A great deal of the rigidity and plain unreasonableness of the Chinese government has been caused by the "siege mentality"3 that they, quite naturally, have felt in being encircled by hostile military power. Secondly, communism, with its stress upon organization, rationality, industrialization and egalitarianism, has drastically transformed the tradi­ tional Chinese "Middle Kingdom" of the Mandarins. It is a paradox, but the very achievements of communism in China are carrying China not further from, but closer to, industrialized capitalist societies such as Japan and the US. The cultured amateur style of leadership of traditional China will give way to professional, expert leadership.'The messianic spirit of the Cul­ tural Revolution will give way to a greater readiness to give "expert" a bigger say, and "red" a smaller say. There will also be a greater readi­ ness to treat other nations as nations, with their own problems and na­ tional pride, rather than as fruit ripe for Chinese-style revolution. Certainly this development will cut across Mao's vision of China as one vast commune, preserving indefinitely the revolutionary spirit of the years of the Long March. The younger Chinese leadership—almost all of which has been trained in the USSR, often in technical subjects- will react severely against Maoism. The reaction will be the stronger,

a Sec my article: "The Sir^e Mentality," in Problems of CùinmunUm, March- April 1907. because of the unfortunate "cult of personality" that has been built up around Mao during the Cultural Revolution, and may even bear some resemblance to the rejection of Stalin and Stalinism that took place after 1956 in the USSR.

Another "Thirty Years War"? The biggest question of the future concerns US policy. We cannot rule out the possibility that the war will not soon end; that it may even escalate to become a general Asian conflict involving China. Although the myths that have surrounded American actions in Vietnam have been vigorously attacked within the US, by able and courageous critics for whom I have deep admiration, yet these myths still persist in vital parts of the governmental machine in Washington, and faced with the col­ lapse of all their messianic hopes, there are hawks in the Pentagon who would sooner solve the problem by escalation than by admitting failure. General Ridgway has told us how close the US was to bombing China at the time MacArthur was in Korea. And General Gavin has told us how the military almost persuaded Eisenhower to invade North Viet­ nam, before the ink was dry on the Geneva Accords of 1954. The hawks want something—US control over Asia—that can never be obtained without decades of war and destruction. As reality dawns at the confer­ ence table with North Vietnam, there is a chance that the hawks will revolt and cover up their failure by pressing for massive escalation. Should that happen, it will not only be East Asia that will be de­ stroyed, but in a different way, the US itself. World War I finished off the social system of Feudal monarchies—the Ottoman, the German, the Tsarist. World War II finished off the European empires in Asia—the British, the French, the Dutch. A new Thirty Years War in Asia would, I believe, finish off the social system of US capitalism. And just as com­ munist Russia emerged from World War I, and communist China from World War II, a massive adition to communist strength, certainly throughout Indochina and possibly in Japan too, would emerge from a Thirty Years War in Asia,,.,,

Asian Security Is a Matter for Asians Alone These are developments we may expect. Are there developments, beyond these, or variations upon these, which we might care to hope for, and strive to bring about? Asian security must become a matter for Asians. Security for Asia should be maintained from within the region. No one pretends that there will be no conflicts in Asia, imperialism or no imperialism. But the conflicts can be kept within small limits only if global ideologies and global power battles are kept out of them. Already Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia are moving toward defense cooperation, free from any entanglements with US or British defense arrangements, and that is good. Japan, India, and Aus­ tralia have made tentative steps towards larger defense planning for the region as a whole, and that too is at least an improvement on re­ liance upon non-Asian military bases. The less the shadow of China and the substance of the US impinges upon the domestic politics of the smaller Asian countries, the better for everyone. More of them may then follow Cambodia's and Burma's suc­ cessful example, and play one off against the other. I believe power is the fundamental currency of politics, and that in­ equality of power between strong nations and weak ones lies at tha root of many conflicts. Consider the Philippines. Tied so closely to the US, and without any ties to the communist world, she has little bargaining power. She is treated worse by the US, to which she has been very loyal, than comparable countries who maintain a healthy interest in the rivals of the US, and have thereby gained a modest leverage over both sides. In this way a smaller country can achieve "room for maneuver," free­ dom to plan her own development according to her own national inter­ ests, rather than according to foreign pressures. This is the only hope for social justice and economic progress alike. It would be preferable if international relations themselves could be guided by the same measure of morality that is sometimes possible in domestic politics, and even more so in personal relations, but that is not yet true. The human cause, in Asia, must be fought for on the level of domestic reality. Only struggle within the nation, drawing upon the resources of culture and solidarity of a people who belong together, can further it. International politics can wreck the enterprise, but can do little to advance it. Room for .maneuver, room to be free, room to decide the issues on their own merits: that is all that foreign policy can generally be expected to .secure. Foreign policy can seldom bring international justice, for there is seldom such a thing as international justice. It cannot bring international socialism, for international socialism (in practice and now even in theory) has ceased to exist. The countries that have made great, sustained, effective progress from distress in the 20th century have not been those who cried out international slogans, but those who turned inward and bent their energies to the social disciplines of na­ tional construction,»,,, , A New Era in the Pacific

JERRY K. FISHER

APAN'S Prime Minister Eisaku Sato reported to a military force capable of playing a significant J the American press that he was "completely role in Asia. satisfied" with the joint communiqué he and Presi­ Although many of the "Tory" leaders in Japan dent Nixon signed on November 21, 1969. Accord­ still hesitate to state their positions publicly, grow­ ing to this agreement, Okinawa is to be returned to ing numbers of the government party speak openly Japan before 1973. Now that the "Okinawa ques­ of the inevitability of rearmament. Sato stated his tion" has been resolved the United States and views on this subject boldly during his Washington Japanese governments have announced a new age visit by declaring that Japan would participate in a in the relationships between their countries. post-war "peacekeeping" operation in the "Indo­ In his farewell remarks to Sato, Nixon said: "I china area" if requested to do so. believe today there is no question that a new era For many years Reischauer has maintained that begins between Japan and the US, not only bi­ once the US ended her colonial-type occupation of laterally in the Pacific but in the world." Sato ad­ Okinawa and recognized Japan as an indispensable dressed the National Press Club that same day and ally, the Japanese would become a valuable prop gave his view of the nature of this new relationship: of American policy: they would contribute their "I find the shape of a new Pacific age, where a new "fair share" both economically and militarily in the order will be created by Japan and the US, two effort to "stabilize" the Pacific area. "The impor­ countries tied together by common ideals." tant thing now" that the Okinawa problem has The US seems finally to have developed an been solved, according to Reischauer in a Nov. 24 "Asian policy." Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard pro­ interview, "is that the [Japanese] Government must fessor and former Ambassador to Japan, has been now take a firm stand on what its role will be in [its] calling for such a policy for over a decade. Since own defense. Prior to this it has been able to vacil­ writing his book, Wanted: An Asian Policy in 1955, late without taking a stand." Reischauer, and ap­ parently the Nixon Administration, feels that Ja­ he has persistently maintained that the US should pan will rearm. consider Japan the number one Asian power. In our Asian policies, he asserts, friendship and close A third reason the Nixon Administration chose cooperation with Japan should be given the highest to initiate a new era in US-Japanese relations was priority. Though Reischauer has continually point­ undoubtedly because they realized that any delay ed out the common interests, goals and even values would allow moderates, liberals and leftists to de­ that exist between the two countries, the Nixon liver what could have been a fatal blow to the con­ Administration appears to be the first to really re­ servative Sato Government. The State Department gard Japan as a primary ally. felt it necessary to take actions that would support this friendly ministry, imperiled by dissenting con­ stituents. Why the Alliance? As Reischauer has stated, the agreement on Why this sudden preoccupation with Japan? One Okinawa "defuses the dangerous situation that reason is that the predictions of Japanese specialists would have prevailed next spring" when the Mu­ about the potential of their economy have been tual Security Treaty, which allows for the station­ verified and even surpassed. Japan today stands be­ ing of American forces in Japan, is scheduled to be hind only the US and Russia as the world's number renewed. "Militant students will continue to pro­ three economic power. Furthermore, she follows test," stated Reischauer, "but now the heart is gone only the US in such key fields as electronic, chemi­ out of their arguments." cal and automobile production, while she domi­ Nixon and his advisers were not the only ones nates the world shipbuilding industry. who were persuaded by Reischauer-type arguments But perhaps of equal importance to our policy to change US policy towards Japan. On October 7, makers, transfixed with Vietnam, China and other 1969, the Senate Republican Policy Committee dis­ policy tangles, is the growing willingness of the tributed an extremely important memorandum to Japanese Government to rearm. In short, Washing­ Republican Senators. This document, though re­ ton looks forward to the day when Japan will boast ported by the Associated Press, received little cover­ age here. In Japan it was front page news. January 19, 1970 r. ... ,_ , _ . . ' Christianity and Crisis Analyzing the situation, the memorandum stated:

JERRY K. FISHER teaches Japanese and Chinese history at Macalester College. He has spent six of the last nine years studying and teaching in Japan. It is clear Prime Minister Sato considers suc­ cess in the Okinawa negotiations as an abso­ quota restrictions over a broad range of products lute requisite to the maintenance of the pres­ by the end of 1971 is of major importance for the ent Japanese-American alliance, and the con­ industrial world. Western corporations will finally tinuation of his [Liberal-Democratic] party in be able to share significantly in Japan's bright power. Mr. Sato must present a prior diplo­ economic future, and the US is in the best position matic victory to the Japanese people [with] to profit. reversion of Okinawa to complete Japanese For years General Motors, Ford, Texas Instru­ control and administration. If he cannot bring ments and a host of other giant American firms home such a victory, most observers believe have lobbied for the elimination of restrictions on his government would fare poorly in the 1970 the importation of their products and also on then- elections. In that event, the US would have capital investment there. So successful has she been to negotiate the security treaty with an un­ in keeping her economy "Japanese" that until the known and perhaps antagonistic government, and the alliance could well be terminated. mid-sixties not even Coca Cola could effectively penetrate her barriers. Soon American industry will not only have a shot at the Japanese market, but it A Japanese-American Co-Prosperity Sphere Thus a new era of comradeship has been initiated between two great powers in Asia. Like our new­ also will be able to use Japan as a base for research, found trust in the strength of the Saigon govern­ production and sales to Asia, Africa and Australia. ment that allows for the "Vietnamization" of the Faced with a chronic lack of capital funds and a war, the US is now willing to let Sato and his con­ growing shortage of labor, the Japanese stand to servative government "Japanize" the Pacific area. benefit from an influx of American dollars. But whereas the "Vietnamization" policy may be a Obviously, the agreements are highly beneficial to veneer to cover up our calculated disengagement the interests of both nations. By "Japanizing" the from the vicissitudes there, "Japanization" amounts Pacific area, the Nixon Administration believes it to nothing less than the attempt to establish a can neutralize Chinese political, economic and mili­ Japanese-American Co-Prosperity Sphere. tary power and also establish for American industry Nixon and Sato sincerely believe that it is in their a permanent share in Asian economic development. mutual interests to work closely together in an ef­ By assuring the return of Okinawa, Sato hopes to fort to "stabilize" and develop the Pacific area. A quiet some of his domestic foes while pursuing his crude but accurate analysis of their agreement in­ party's long held dream of rearming Japan. dicates that American military might and Japanese With their control in the major urban areas economic power have been combined to rule a vast eroding, the Liberal-Democrats see a strong, govern­ Pacific empire. At first glance it appears that the ment-controlled military force as an important ele­ US has been relegated to the unenviable role of ment of power. The Okinawa agreement gives the policing the area while her friend enhances its al­ Sato regime an excuse to build the Japanese mili­ ready dominant role in the Asian economy. But the tary force to a level where it will be large enough agreements are much more complex and far reach­ to quell domestic "disturbances." ! ing. i From a military perspective, the US has gained Impact on Asia valuable flexibility in the use of her bases in Japan. The agreements mutually support each leaders' American forces will no longer be restricted to oper­ conservative government. But will the "new order" ations in defense of that country. After Okinawa is in the "new Pacific age" benefit other peoples and returned, these forces may also be used to fulfill nations in the Pacific area? Only Japan is in posi­ American security commitments in Taiwan, South tion to mediate between the other great powers in Korea, Viet Nam and other Pacific areas. Further­ the area: China, the US and Russia. more, the US should be able to reduce her expendi­ Up to now Japan's international posture has ap­ tures for military operations in the Pacific area. The peared to be almost a duplicate of the American Japanese are to build up their own forces to a point position. However, she has been extremely careful where we will be able to limit greatly our bases to keep relations with China as open as she can. and troop concentrations in Japan. Increased Jap­ Espousing a doctrine that separates her interna­ anese military strength benefits the US in two ways: tional politics from her international economic the defense budget is reduced and fewer dollars are policies, she has continued to trade with both China • spent abroad. and Taiwan. { Economic factors outweigh military considera­ tions in the recent agreements, but dollars saved on our Pacific "defense" effort are only a minor item. Sato's pledge to remove Japan's residual import The Chinese-Japanese trade and the economic Since the law's passage, large contingents of high­ missions necessary to keep it alive are presently one ly trained riot police were sent into numerous uni­ of China's most important links to what is referred versities to "normalize" them. Some police agencies to by some as the "free world." This small but sig­ now are refusing the pleas of frustrated university nificant door between China and Japan represents officials, who must either "put their houses in order" a possible channel through which relations between or be put out of business. Unless the university these two countries could improve. The long range authorities supply detailed information on dissi­ effect of the Nixon-Sato agreements, however, is to dent students and faculty to the police, the latter render any Chinese-Japanese détente impossible. In will refuse to clean out the student forces still oc­ fact, this is the motivating factor behind the Nixon cupying some buildings. Administration's new Asian policy. Not a few members of the ruling party have im­ While Japanese-Chinese relations are certain to deteriorate as a result of the new partnership, the plied that they would welcome the wholesale shut­ Soviet Union need not feel threatened. Despite Rus­ down of some of the nation's most prominent cen­ sian denunciations of the agreements, she fears ters of learning. As a matter of fact, the Govern­ above all else a Japanese-Chinese alliance. With this ment is moving rapidly to implement its plan to possibility now greatly reduced, Japanese awirtrnca establish a group of "model universities" under the direct control of the Minister of Education. in the development of Siberia may increase sharply in the years ahead. The Sato regime is also extending its law and order campaign to include new restraints on resi­ The future seems inviting for Japan. She not only dent aliens. If the new immigration bill is enacted, has a blank check to extend her economic and po­ it will, in effect, empower the Minister of Justice, litical influence in the Pacific area, but she will play at his pleasure, to declare any act of an alien to be an increasingly significant role in the economic de­ criminal. Thus, he will be able to prosecute a given velopment of Canada, Alaska and probably Siberia alien for an act that is legal for anyone else. The as well. bill also would virtually abolish the right of appeal A "New Pacific Age" with Japan at the helm, in deportation cases. however, is a source of serious concern to most With this law, the Government hopes to stifle Asian countries. Adam Malik, the Indonesian For­ dissent among Koreans who, due to their minority eign Minister, wrote in a recent issue of Asia maga­ status, tend to oppose the Liberal-Democratic Party. zine that Japan will be "more of a vexing problem Many are second- or third-generation residents, but [than China] through its big and overwhelming because of present laws, they are still unable to ob­ economy." Thus, although the present Indonesian tain Japanese citizenship. If deported, they are sent Government came to power as a result of an abor­ to South Korea where they face the probability of tive coup led by the Communist Party, it fears rough treatment by the Park regime. Tokyo more than Peking. Concern of this sort will There is no question where these policies are increase as Japanese companies, beefed-up with leading. "Moral training" has been reinstituted in American capital, extend their domination. the schools, and old national holidays have been reestablished. Despite vigorous opposition by Chris­ Steps Toward Neo-Statism tians and other groups, the anniversary of Japan's mythical founding by the Emperor Jimmu has once It is ironic that although Japan, the nation state, more become a national holiday. The Government may greatly benefit from its new partnership with is presently trying to obtain financial support for the US, the Japanese people stand to lose the most the Yasukuni Shrine where the spirits of Japanese from the agreements. As a result of the Okinawa soldiers and sailors are thought to rest. All of these agreement, Sato generated sufficient prestige for his events are clear steps toward a neo-statism that will regime to remain in power, but the consequences include rearmament. of his party consolidating its control are frighten­ ing. It has passed numerous laws that give the Japanese Christians were among the first to at­ Ministry of Education increased powers in formu­ tack the current growth of fascism. Deeply con­ lation of curriculum and in choice of school texts. cerned about what they consider the failure of the Last August, the University Normalization Law church to stand up to the government in the 1930's was passed, which allows the Minister of Educa­ and early 1940's, many young Christians have taken tion to designate any university, public or private, vigorous anti-government positions. Generally they a "troubled institution." So declaring, the Minister have acted through non-church groups such as the can exercise extraordinary powers to effect the student movement. But the dramatic action of the "normalization" of the designated schools. If such church itself, taken in the wake of the Nixon-Sato an institution is not "normalized" within six agreements, must be considered seriously. months, its charter can be revoked, and it can no longer function legally.

m On November 25, the general assembly of the United Church of Christ in Japan (Kyodan) con­ vened to restudy the UCCJ's decision to participate in the Japan World Exposition in Osaka (Expo '70). The prime movers in calling the meeting were leaders who held that Expo '70 was designed "to manifest the power of big capital and the nation- state, and to avert the attention of the people from the US-Japan Security Treaty." In the September 29 issue of CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS Wayne H. Cowan presented the Reischauer

thesis and warned that "should we continue our present line or return Okinawa only in exchange for trade concessions, the result could be violent anti-American outbursts and a marked strain in relations between the two nations." But if the na­ tion of the United States and the nation of Japan are acting in ways detrimental to the people of Asia, Japan and the US, why should we be con­ cerned about "anti-American outbursts"? I main­ tain that the best possible result of the Nixon-Sato conference would have been for Sato to have gone home empty-handed. The Liberal-Democratic Party GENERAL would have lost its majority and a government less Area friendly to the US would have emerged. But thanks 142,700 square miles, about to President Nixon, this did not happen. one-tenth smaller than Even if the conservative party remains in power, California. marry courageous Japanese will continue to oppose Population unjust actions by their government, both at home 98,281,935 in the census of and abroad. As Christians and as Americans, it is October 1,1965. Early in 1960 imperative that we, too, are aware of the dangers the population passed the inherent in the "New Pacific Age" that the US and 100,000,000 mark. Japan are about to construct. Unlike Professor Climate Reischauer, I foresee a threatening future in our Subtropical in the south; nation's new partnership with Japan. winters are moderately se­ vere on Hokkaido and in the northern part of Honshu. Rainfall is abundant through­ out the country but espe­ cially on the Pacific side. reprinted with permission from: Language Japanese. Capital [SUPERPOWER ROLE Tokyo. CHRISTIANITY Monetary ! IS SEEN FOR JAPAN Unit and CRISIS The Yen, equal to .278 cent, A Christian Journal of Opinion or 360 yen per U.S. dollar. Vast Growth in the 70't 537 WEST 121 ST. • NEW YORK • N.Y. 10027 Predicted by Racine Panel Measures REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Founding Editor Metric. WAYNE H. COWAN, Editor STEPHEN C. SNYDER, Assistant Editor f By EMERSON CHAPIN Mails Sptdal to Tht N«w York Time» (from New York) ordinary RACINE, Wis., Dec. 2 — An first class 13 cents for the impressive picture of Japan as first ounce, 8 cents each ad­ a superpower of the hineteen- ditional ounce or fraction of seventies has been given by a an ounce. Airmail 20 cents panel of experts at a confer for each half ounce. ence here. The three main speakers a symposium sponsored h Japan Society of New Y' An Exchange of Views on Japan

EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER JERRY K. FISHER

In his article "A New Era in the Pacific" (Jan. Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer's response to my arti­ ig issue), Prof. Jerry K. Fisher has presented a cle vividly illustrates the basic differences between thoughtful criticism of the Okinawa settlement and his thought and mine. "Stability" in and "develop­ Japanese-American relations. His point of view, I ment" of the Pacific area being his most vital con­ believe, would be shared by many Japanese Chris­ cerns, Professor Reischauer argues forcefully that tians who sympathize with the position taken on only through the Japanese-American Security Treaty these matters by the Japanese Socialist Party. There and close partnership between the governments of are some assumptions in this position, however, Japan and the United States can these goals be that I feel are open to question, and there are asser­ realized. My "basic error in assumption," he says, tions by Professor Fisher regarding my own views is that I fail to realize the alternatives to this ar­ that I can challenge with even more certainty. rangement. He "gathers" that I "assume" the alter­ The overwhelming reason for the Okinawa settle­ native "would be something along the lines of the ment, from the American point of view, was the 'unarmed neutrality' that the Socialist Party has fact that our political hold over almost one million traditionally advocated." This policy he considers Japanese was stirring up such strong nationalistic "an absurdity." reactions in Japan that the whole of the Japanese- Actually, I agree with Professor Reischauer that American relationship was becoming threatened. the Socialist Party's policy leaves much to be de­ The various alleged reasons Professor Fisher cites sired, and I have long deplored its inability to were either very peripheral compared to this basic break the shackles of dogmatism on this and other reason, or quite wrong. more important programs and policies. But at this In Washington I sense a great deal more fear juncture of history I am more concerned with the that Japan will over-arm than desire for her to concrete actions and clear-cut plans of the govern­ expand her military power. Far from increasing ments of Japan and the US than I am with the American "flexibility" in the use of bases in Japan, chaotic state of the Socialist Party. the Okinawa settlement will put virtual Japanese I deeply regret that Professor Reischauer has so veto control over almost any major American mili­ little to say concerning the major thrust of my ar­ tary action in East Asia. gument: the dangers inherent in the "New Age" The agreement was scarcely needed by the Japa­ being constructed by the US and Japanese govern­ nese Government as an excuse for increasing Japan's ments in the Pacific area. In my article I maintain military forces. It already has all the excuses it that "economic factors outweigh military consider­ needs and sufficient popular support to boot. Japan ations in the agreements" and indicate the intense already has a very considerable military force and fear Asians share of American-supported Japanese one of the world's ten largest military budgets, economic imperialism. Furthermore I describe, in which is increasing almost automatically in step some detail, the rise of neo-statism as engineered by with the rapid expansion of the economy; and for the conservative Liberal Democratic party. many years now this force has been more than ade­ Professor Reischauer's disinclination to deal with quate "to quell domestic 'disturbances.' " these two major problems in his reply and the omis­ Finally, the agreement, far from closing the door sion of "alternatives" to the Japanese-American on any Chinese-Japanese detente, keeps it open, as Security Treaty in my article, indicate a fundamen­ I shall try to explain; and in any case Washington, tal difference in our interests and concerns. He is instead of opposing such a detente, is at long last prone to perceive things first in terms of their effect coming to see that it is desirable. upon the relations, present and future, between The basic error in assumptions in Professor nation state and nation state, while my primary Fisher's article (and in the position of his Japanese concern is "justice" in the day by day life of the friends) concerns the alternative to the Japanese- people of these countries. I am as concerned with American Security Treaty and a close Japanese- inter-national relations as I am sure Professor Rei­ American partnership. While he does not get into schauer is with "justice" for the people, but the this question, I gather from his article that he as­ quantitative difference in our emphases results in sumes the alternative would be something along a qualitative difference in our analysis. (continued on page 38, column 1) International relations is Professor Reischauer's realm, and I sincerely hope his observations are EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER interrupted his teaching at Harvard University (continued on page 38, column 2) to give distinguished service as Ambassador to Japan, 1961-66. He is the author of numerous books on Japan and Asia. His latest, Japan: the Story of a Nation, will be published in June by Knopf. JERRY K. FISHER teaches Asian History at Macalesrer College.

March 2, 1970 37 the lines of the "unarmed neutrality" that the So­ keep the door open to a Chinese-Japanese detente. cialist Party has traditionally advocated. If this were Finally, Professor Fisher's interpretation of my a realistic possibility, a good case might be made for own views. While I fear that the Japanese may his point of view, but even in Japan both expert rearm at a greatly increased rate, I strongly hope and popular opinion is beginning to reject this as they will cnoose not to do so; and I feel that the an absurdity. A major reason for the drastic drop Japanese-American partnership is the best and per­ in the Socialist vote last December was the growing haps the only bulwark against their making this feeling that on this and other matters the Socialist unhappy choice. Party has become immobilized by its own outmoded As to Japan becoming "a valuable prop of Amer­ dogmatism. ican policy," I believe that our relative economic It would be nice if we lived at a time in history involvements in East Asia and our geographic posi­ when the world's third greatest economic power tions make such a concept applicable only to the would feel secure as an armed neutral nation. But past. Japan will certainly develop its policies. The this is not the situation, at least as perceived by question is whether these will be within the frame­ most Japanese. Beyond this, in my recent trips to work of a continuing partnership with the United Japan I have sensed a rising urge among Japanese States or will be entirely unilateral. If the former, to be a great military, perhaps even nuclear, power. Japan will still need to make its own decisions on They have a nagging fear that a nation cannot be a defense matters, but these might be quite subordi­ "great country" (taihoku) merely through economic nate to a broader, more constructive policy. In such strength or cultural influence but must also be a a policy, the US rather than Japan would play the nuclear power. role of "valuable prop." If, on the other hand, If the ruling conservatives were to falter in their Japan decides on a unilateral policy, the result control of Japan, no one feels that they would be will probably be more emphasis on the military replaced by "unarmed neutralists" of the Socialist side and, as a consequence, more tension through­ type. It would probably be a coalition government out East Asia and possibly in trans-Pacific relations of at least as military a bent as the present one. as well. I find it hard not to applaud on Okinawan The alternative to the Japanese-American partner­ settlement that helps minimize these dangers. ship thus is probably a greatly rearmed and possi­ bly nuclear Japan. Such a Japan would be viewed as a very dangerous threat by the Chinese. It is for this reason that I feel the Okinawa settlement helps

Fisher Cont'd. correct when he states that the Nixon-Sato agree­ ment, "far from closing the door on any Chinese- the US economic and military "burden" in Asia will Japanese detente, keeps it open" and that "Wash­ eventually be borne by Japan. ington, instead of opposing such a detente, is at Professor Reischauer states that he supports close long last coming to see that it is desirable." Unfor­ Japanese-American relations because he fears the tunately I fail to see how Sato's statement in the emergence of the right in Japan and that her only joint communiqué that "the security of Korea is salvation appears to be through the moderating in­ essential to Japan's own security" and that "the fluences of American partnership. I cannot share maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan Professor Reischauer's faith in the intentions of area is also a most important factor for the security these two governments. It is the United States that of Japan" leads to more friendly relations between maintains and utilizes the largest military force in Japan and China. Asia today—it is the present conservative Japanese Although Professor Reischauer states in a recent Government that, flushed with its victory in the article for the influential Japanese daily Asahi December election, has just increased its military Shimbun that he is "much heartened" by these spending by almost 20 percent. pronouncements, I am afraid I do not share his I am not at all certain what the future has in view . . . nor am I convinced that Washington has store for the people of Japan. I do know that any interest in a Japanese-Chinese detente. Despite Japan's present government is rapidly moving considerable talk about having a new attitude toward fascism; that the Nixon Administration has toward China, I am afraid the best indication of made the calculated decision to support that gov­ Washington's current position is found in the re­ ernment; and that the successful renewal of the activation of the "yellow peril" thesis in its quest Japanese-American Security Treaty will further con­ for an expanded ABM system. solidate its position. There is one area where Professor Reischauer and Perhaps it is "absurd," as Professor Reischauer I agree. I am surprised by his candid expression of maintains, to look for alternatives to this treaty concern over the rise of militarism in Japan. In and to the type of Japanese-American partnership my article, I state that both he and the Nixon Ad­ outlined in the Nixon-Sato agreements. But I shall ministration looked upon Japan as a valuable prop continue to oppose agreements between these two of American policy, and I implied that they favored governments that contribute to the deprivation of Japanese rearmament. Professor Reischauer has economic and political justice and limit the intel­ clearly shown that he does not hold these views. lectual freedom of peoples in Japan and Asia. But I remain unconvinced that the "Nixon Doc­ trine" he has so strongly defended in his writings is not constructed on the premise that a large share of OKINAWA: KANASHII MONOGATARI by John Travers t The title for this paper was suggested by a Japanese friend whom I met on a boat bound for Okinawa. As many a Japanese college-age person, he wanted to go to Okinawa and see for himself what the story is. We spent the forty-eight hour voyage eating, sleeping, and discussing Japan-U.S. relations, from his point of view and from mine, that of a U.S. citizen who had spent a year in Japan studying language and history. Unfortunately, his suggestion for my report turned out to be correct: the story of Okinawa is truly a sorrowful tale.

This report blames both the United States and Japan for the present conditions in Okinawa. It presents the Okinawa Problem and how it occurred, and demands that each side work for a real settlement of the problem, not because of inter­ national pressures or power blocks but rather because nearly one million people are still "bearing the unbearable burden" which history placed upon them twenty-five years ago. These are the words used by Mr. Chosei Kabira, President of the Okinawa Public Broadcasting System, to introduce his recent lecture in New York City, "Are Okinawans happy about the Sato-Nixon agree­ ment? What responsibility does America have for Okinawa in the 70's?"

The response of Okinawans to the Nixon-Sato Communique of November 21, 1969» has been one of opposition. The situation of the one million people of Okinawa has not changed, they will continue to be oppressed in their own homeland, subject to the U.S. military government on their island until at least 1972. Since November they have demonstrated and petitioned to end the present military rule now and to make certain that in 1972 the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will not come in to fill up the bases which the U.S. forces may vacate. They have been joined in their protest by numerous groups on Japan's main islands:

On November 26, Prime Minister Sato returned to Japan, having clarified the fact that Japan cooperates with the United States in dominating Asia. Prime Minister Sato listened to Nixon's assertion that he will continue armed intervention in the Far East and welcomed American military presence in the Far East. Prime Minister Sato returned, clarifying his intention not only to establish a Riot-Police State in Okinawa as well as on the Mainland, but also to expand militarization of Japan, using the bases in Okinawa. (Beheiren, the Japan Peace for Vietnam Citizens Committee)

Dr. Hideo Hashimoto, Professor of Religion at Lewis and Clark College, returned recently from four months in Japan (August - December, 1969) where he was International Affairs. Representative for the American Friends Service Commit­ tee. The following excerpts are taken from his report "Okinawa: Frustration and Hope":

Even those who anticipated the results of the Nixon-Sato conver­ sation were shocked at the degree to which Sato leaned forward in his posture toward the military policy of the U.S. The Joint Communique was their worst fears materialized.

1 To the leaders of the Reversion Movement in Okinawa, the joy of having success within their grasp has all but been overcome now by a feeling of being betrayed and clouded by a sense of inse­ curity about the future. They demanded "immediate, unconditional reversion." What they got was "by and by," "if" kind of reversion on condition the Vietnam war is over by 1972, the military effec­ tiveness of the U.S. is not "prejudiced" by reunification, etc., etc. What they got was a tying of the Okinawa question to an assurance of U.S. military domination in the western Pacific and the security of the regimes of Park (Korea), Chiang (Taiwan), and Thieu (South Vietnam) and other reactionary, military-dom­ inated regimes in Asia. As the Asahi Shimbun correspondent in Okinawa noted a few days before the Joint Communique, there was a noticeable heightening of "anti-war" emphasis on the part of the Reversion Movement in Okinawa as the intentions of Nixon and Sato governments became clearer. They insisted that there will be no real reversion as long as the American military bases re­ main on the island. And to convert them into Japanese Self- Defense Force bases, committed to the maintenance of "security" throughout Asia (now no longer the Far East, since it includes Vietnam) is hardly any better. A poll taken in Okinawa by Ryukyu Shimpo between November 29 and December 2 reports that only 16% of the people expressed satisfaction with the Joint Communique.

Mr. Ryoshin Nakayoshi, chairman of the Okinawa Prefecture Labor Council, writes in the January, 1970 issue of Sekai magazine:

The content of the Joint Communique represents for the people of Okinawa Prefecture the "very worst kind of reversion."

It can be said that the Joint Communique has converted the present U.S.-Japan Security Treaty into a military alliance by greatly expanding the Treaty. This has been the real purpose of the "Return of Okinawa."

In spite of this opposition to Sato, he dissolved the Diet on December 2 and called for elections. The Liberal Democratic Party won the elections of late December. However, Sato's party did not win on the results of his return of Okinawa, but because of a very complicated and confused set of issues - the price of rice, taxation, pollution, traffic, student protests, etc. - all very close to the life of the common man. Foreign correspondents mistakenly viewed the victory of the Liberal Democratic Party as a show of support for his foreign policy. In actuality, the people's support of Sato declined from k8.Srfo in January, 1967 to kj,7$> in December, 1969. In the future, it will decline even more, once the people of Japan recognize the implications of Sato's present emphasis on military power in direct opposition to the Con­ stitution of Japan.

- 2 - History of Okinawa reveals distinguished record of conquerors. We have honor to be subjugated in fourteenth century by Chinese pirates, In sixteenth century by English missionaries, In eighteenth century by Japanese warlords, \ ^ And in twentieth century by American Marines. "VJ (The Teahouse of the August Moon)

These words aptly describe the "Sorrowful Tale" of the Ryukyu Archipelago. Like many frontier territories, it shares the fate of being too small and too poor to attract attention in times of peace, but doomed to rise to inter­ national prominence during crises among world powers. Okinawa lies equidis­ tant between Tokyo to the north and Manila to the south. From its southern­ most island one can see Taiwan and in the north, Kagoshima. It is 510 miles from Shanghai and 1,750 miles from Saigon. Only k8 of the 6k islands are inhabitable, with 80$ of the total population living on Okinawa, an island 60 miles long with over 100 U.S. military installations. Population density on Okinawa is more than 1,102 persons per square mile. The culture of the islands has a long historical affinity with Japan in language, customs, and religion. Okinawa officially became a prefecture of Japan in 1879 and by 1920 the people enjoyed legal equality with those of other prefectures.

The post-war Okinawa problem was produced by nations who have repeatedly considered the possession of the islands essential to their national defense. The nation most responsible for this is the U.S.

On April 1, 19^+5» nicknamed "Love Day" by the U.S. Marine Corps, a day more appropriately called "Fools' Day," the Allied invasion of Okinawa began. It was one of the bloodiest campaigns in the Pacific. The most severe fighting took place in the southern half of the island, an area of only about two hundred square miles but including Naha, Shuri, and other heavily populated communities. The Okinawans had no part in formulating the military policy of Japan which led to this, and fewer than five thousand trained Okinawan conscripts took part. Nevertheless, nearly half of the estimated 250,000 Japanese killed were Ryukyuan civilians caught helpless between opposing armies. Practically everything in the southern half of the island, including growing crops, was completely destroyed. By the end of the war, nearly 90$ of the surviving population was wandering homeless in the narrow, mountainous northern part of the island. They were confined to this sector until early 1946.

In brief, American policy toward Okinawa quickly shifted through three post­ war positions, each determined by conditions external to the islands, and each calling for new policies within. Okinawa first had military importance vis-a- vis Japan, which brought about its conquest. Next came the years of indif­ ference, the patrol of a minor area used as a dumping ground or place of exile for American personnel unwanted at General Headquarters or in Japan proper. The third position, assumed in 19^9» endowed Okinawa with new importance as a base to be held indefinitely and developed as a stronghold against Russia and rising Communist power in nearby China.

- 3 - Then came the Korean War. A vast program of military base expansion, inaug­ urated in 1950, at once overshadowed plans for civil rehabilitation. The Korean truce and crises elsewhere diverted public attention^ Okinawa was forgotten. Occasional rumors and published stories of Okinawan discontent were condemned out of hand as "malicious Communist propaganda."

In early 1951» the "reversion movement" emerged. By mid-1951, two associations had been established to promote this movement and they jointly launched a non­ partisan signature campaign. Within about three months, more than 199jOOO voters, 72.1$ of the total eligible, signed a petition circulated throughout , Okinawa. The same campaign was carried out in the Miyako Islands, where about 33jOOO signatures, 88.5$ of the entire electorate, were collected in five days. These petitions were forwarded to American and Japanese delegates at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference. In late August, the Okinawa Gunto Governor and Assembly also urged the conference to expedite the political re­ union of Okinawa with the mainland.

Since Okinawa had been a prefecture of Japan, Okinawans and people on the mainland alike expected the islands would revert to Tokyo's control and that the local military bases would come under the general provisions governing other foreign bases in Japan. It was expected that the forthcoming document would spell out conditions for reversion and would name the date terminating U.S. military control of the civil population and economy. At American in­ sistence, Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads as follows:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gen (including the Bonin Islands, Rasario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabi­ tants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 3 roused deep concern among the Okinawans and provoked sharp political criticism in many quarters. India refused to sign the Peace Treaty on the basis that it could not thus signify consent to the continued military occu­ pation of an Asian territory by a Western power. She stated that Japan should be given full sovereignty over the Ryukyus "of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from another country," and that the proposed "arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East." How true these words have proved.

The following comments on Article 3 appeared in the January-February, I968 issue of No More Hiroshimas I, Bulletin of the Japan Council Against A & H Bombs:

- k - Actually, Article 3 of the San Francisco "Peace" Treaty became non-effective and bankrupt in the fourth year after it came into force, which was on April 28, 1952. Japan became a Member of the United Nations in December, 1956 and Article 78 of the United Nations Charter lays down:

"The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality."

As long as the U.S.A. concedes that Okinawa is part of Japan - and on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty, the then Secretary of State, Dulles, was forced to admit that Japan has what he called "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa. By this admission Article 3 of the San Francisco "Peace" Treaty becomes null and void, and no basis remained for the U.S.A. to continue the occupation of Okinawa from the moment Japan was admitted to membership of the United Nations.

Since then, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a "Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial Countries and People." This was on December lk, i960, and it says:

"Any attempt aimed at the partial to total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

"All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial in­ tegrity."

It is clear that Article 3 of the San Francisco "Peace" Treaty, on which the U.S. still bases its occupation of Okinawa, violates this "Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial Countries And People."

Studied from any angle, the U.S.A. has neither grounds nor legal reason for its occupation of Okinawa, but nevertheless it stays on in Okinawa. Why?

Okinawa is the keystone of U.S. military activities in Asia today. U.S. pres­ ence there is the basis of a series of military pacts which the U.S. has con­ cluded (without the consent of the Japanese people) involving the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, and more recently the countries of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. For this reason the U.S. has put off dealing with the problem of Okinawa until recently. The crime of the denial of the rights of one million people can no longer be neglected. The Nixon-Sato Communique provides no solution.

5 - The presence of the U.S. military causes the Okinawan people many grave pro­ blems. The following excerpts are from the-, "Okinawan White Paper" prepared by the Okinawa Prefecture Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs:

U.S. Forces now in Okinawa belong to the Pacific Command...4,000 airplanes and 425 battleships are kept in preparation around the clock for action in any part of Asia. 'There are 4 Commanding Offices, 4 Mace-B sites capable of delivering nuclear bombs, 8 Nike-Hercules sites with nuclear capability, 8 Hawk missile sites, 21 various radar installations, 4 training sites for bombing, 9 training sites for shooting, 4 drilling sites for bombing, 4 drilling sites for guerilla warfare, 4 military posts, 3 drill­ ing sites for paratroopers and 6 airports including Kadena and Naha Air Bases. These installations are well equipped with all kinds of newly developed arms and plans to expand facilities are now under way. At present, there is a remarkable expansion of ammunition storage buildings in Henoko and new construction of ports. It is ironically said that Okinawa is located on the U.S. bases rather than the other way around.

The area used by U.S. military bases occupies arouhd 12.7$ of the total land area of Okinawa.... The U.S. has requisitioned for military use about 915964,405 tsubos (73,571-5 acres)...Out of the total, 32$ used to be farms and paddy-fields in fertile plain areas...Because Okinawa is so small and the land requisitioned by the U.S. forces has been so large, there is less arable land available to the people and agricultural productivity has been seriously affected.

An average farmer who formerly cultivated about 1,740 tsubos (1.39 acres) of land now has less than 1,000 tsubos (0.8 acres). In central Okinawa the situation is more critical. The average farmer in that district used to have 1,890 tsubos (1.51 acres) but the figure has now dropped to only 90 tsubos (0.07 acres) and only 20$ of the people are engaged in farming. Because of the underdeveloped nature of the economy and overpopulation, others not in farming cannot be absorbed by the limited amount of employment. When they are lucky enough to be employed, it is often in unskilled jobs with very low wages. The compensa­ tion for the land requisitioned by the U.S. is too small to supply a stable living....

Basic industries and institutions such as electricity, petroleum, finance and water are controlled by the U.S. Forces through their agencies....

The Okinawan people groan under a terrible tax burden. They are asked to supply through taxes 70$ of the government's annual bud­ get while Americans in the Ryukyus are protected by an ordinance governing the taxation of foreigners. For example, an American pays only $6.67 per year in automobile taxes while an Okinawan is charged ten times as much or $70.

- 6 - In addition, wages are extremely low, working conditions are bad, and the workers employed by the U.S. Army are denied the rights of collective bargaining and striking. Water supplies are polluted with gasoline and oil from U.S. bases, and noise levels around the air bases are unbearable. Okinawans must apply to U.S. military officials for permission to travel to the mainland.

Dr. Hideo Hashimoto concludes his report, from which we quoted early in this paper, with specific recommendations which are as follows:

Okinawa and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be placed in the con­ text of re-assessing the entire U.S. foreign policy: for example, re­ examination of the meaning of security and the concept of commitment; immediate, unilateral, unconditional withdrawal from Vietnam; with­ drawal of the U.S. military from the western Pacific; real, not feigned, efforts toward reconciliation with China. More specifically:

1. The Preparatory Commission for the reversion of Okinawa should in­ clude the representatives of Mr. Chobyo Yara, popularly elected Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (as voting members, not merely advisors).

2. The agreement on reversion of Okinawa should be signed not later than June, 1970.

3. Reversion of Okinawa should not be tied to issues of U.S.-Japanese trade.

4. Bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan should be demilitarized rapidly.

5. All nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, missiles, B-52's, Phantoms, and other means of mass destruction should be removed im­ mediately from Okinawa and mainland Japan.

6. All schools, colleges, hospitals, and other non-military facilities and all land, buildings, ships, equipment, plants and military facilities under U.S. control that can be converted to peaceful use should be left intact and turned over to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Ample subsidies should be given to facilitate conversion to peaceful uses.

7. All Okinawa residents should be compensated for the use of their land in the past 24 years by the U.S. This could take the form of a guaranteed annual income to all Okinawa people from a trust fund estab­ lished by the U.S.

8. The U.S. should establish and fund a commission appointed by Mr. Yara, the Chief Executive, Government of Ryukyu Islands, to plan for conversion of Okinawa from "the Keystone of the Pacific" in the military sense to the keystone of peace in the Pacific in its true sense.

9. The U.S. should notify Japan on June 23, 1970 of her intent to termi­ nate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

7 - U.S.Military Bases in Okinawa

® le-jima (2) Tonaki-jima (D Kerama islands © -1 Tokashiki-jima (3) -2 Kume-jima @ Group of Yaeyama Islands <3) -1 Miyako-jima @ -2 Ishigaki-jima (3) -3 Nishiomote-jima

****************^-x-******#-H-^ Land for military use I Bombing practice ground * \- Nike base 3jJ Anti-guerrilla training ground * ® "Voice of America" broadcasting station * ^^ Hawk base 9 Paratroop (5) Anti-guerrilla warfare training ground, ^^ Mace B base 3rd Marine Division 0f Helicopter base \4/ Naval base * (2) LORAN C base «L Airfield * Radar base ® Anti-rebellion training ground * ^ Air defense control station #

(§) 3rd Marine Division Command ##*•*******####•*•**#•*##*•#•*•#*•*•* ® 7th fleet base QJ) 9 th Army Command (îj) CSG (U.S. Army Composite Service Group) (Ï3) Nuclear bomb depot (Q) Kadena airfield * Reproduced from No More Hiroshimas! # (h^ Army 1st Special Corps * Bulletin of the Japan Council Against* * A & H Bombs, January-February, 1968. * © Naha airfield •a--*****-**-**-*********** u

//

******************************* * In a public opinion survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun * * in September, 1969, respondents were asked to name the * * most frequent topics of recent conversations with family * * members and colleagues. The topic mentioned by the high- * * est number of respondents, 23%, was "university conflicts * * and the student problem." The next highest category was * * "personal matters," named by 19%. * *******************************

The postwar student movement has consistently aimed at the realization of two ideals: peace and democracy. We must remember, of course, that most Japanese people once subscribed to these ideals too; peace and democracy were the cornerstones, the guiding principles, for our fresh start as a nation after 1945- But as the standard of living improved, many lost sight of the need for a wholesome tension between reality and progressive ideals. As people more and more accepted the status quo, their ideals tarnished and became increasingly meaningless. It may well be that student groups alone in Japan have consistently up­ held these basic ideals and have been absolutely uncompromising in their attempts to realize them. While it is true that leaders of the student movement have frequently gone to extremes, the energies of student activists have bubbled forth from a commitment to values held in common by most Japanese in the postwar period.

Ono Tsutomu, Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, December, 1967". ±m$mm Those who are fortunate to succeed in the entrance examination at their first choice institution (who are in fact a small minority) and those who somehow manage to get in a second or third choice institution soon realize that universities are not very exciting places as intellectual communities, and certainly do not deserve their painstaking hard work. They are rather more like factories which sell piecemeal information about various subjects. At the same time they come to realize that the severe competition through which they have come, as well as their studies at universities, are simply the social screening and prepara­ tion of young intellectual laborers for a highly bureaucratic society. Realizing these facts, students come to regard each other not as com­ petitors, but as comrades in the fight against manipulation and ex­ ploitation by the established social system. Kentaro Shiozuki

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03 H et H> H O & '•ö O.P3 c+ CD People began to feel that Japan was moving again towards fascism. P^ H- With the war continuing and the defense force growing and industry 0 expanding abroad, people are afraid. Faced with that, mild pro­ testing - you know, singing and dancing - seems kind of absurd now.

Atsuo Nakamura a Plain Rapper J> October-November, 1969 What they are saying is that in spite of all the superficial prosperity, superficial affluence, superficial freedom, there is a question, a critical problem. They are not saying that everything is unsatisfactory. They are, in a sense, practicing the most important purpose of higher education: that of criticism. But one thing is quite clear - all of them are pointing to one particular issue - American presence in our part of Asia. When the students talk about U.S. imperialism, they mean the new form of control of the fate of other people, mainly by economic pressure, supported strongly by military forces. A bet­ ter term may be economic colonialism. Viet­ nam, the Chinese situation, economic develop­ ment, international trade, our involvement in the economic affairs of Asia, our relation­ ship with our Korean friends, - all this hangs together and stems from this particular issue: U.S.A.-Japan relationships, symbolized by the Mutual Security Treaty, which was signed in 1960 and has to be reviewed, and if necessary, renewed in 1970. Why is this so important? As far as the students are concerned, this Mutual Security Treaty, which is actually a military alliance, contains very dangerous and critical elements....

In our constitution, Article 9 says clearly that Japan denounces all means of aggression by air, by sea, and by land. That means that our military forces can­ not be used for aggressive means. We have military power, but we call it national defense. This is deceiving, for if it is defensive, it cannot be sent abroad, it cannot be used as a means of aggression. In order to transfer political and military responsibilities (as the Americans say) in Asia onto the shoulders of the Asians, they have to somehow adjust this constitutional principle of our country. Building up our military forces, and taking on the role of the U.S. in Asia have a gre

Asia, have a greater share in the U.S. economic involvement in Asia - this is the big assumption which lies behind the Mutual Security Treaty. The students see this in terms of imperialistic exploitation, of oppressing the people in Asia. They see the future role of Japan as a nation within the family of nations in Asia supporting the imperialist forces all around the world and again gradually taking on the role of exploiter towards other nations of Asia. There lies the source of frustration. And they cannot participate in the real decision-making, under the present system or present structure.

Professor H. Shinmi Asian Student Christian Seminar c=9 Geneva, 1968 'The most important of Japanese student movements, the Zengakuren (an abbreviation of Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai So Rengo, All Japan Federation of College Student Governments), was organized on September 18, 1948, with affiliated units in 168 national, 31 municipal, and 6l private universities. Zengakuren had 300,000 members in 1948, when the total enrollment in all the higher institutions was about 440,000. The first central committee was controlled by the Communist Party. The agreement adopted at the foundation assembly of Zengakuren in Tokyo read as follows :

Zengakuren, with the objectives of realizing all justifiable demands of all students by democratic methods and of contributing to the foundation of a democratic Japan through movements for restoring ^ I« education, shall emphasize the following programs: 1) security and improvement of student life, and equal opportunities for education; 2) defense of academic freedom and national culture; 3) thorough democratization of educational administration; 4) security of right *7 of autonomy of faculties; 5) unification and enlargement of students' fronts; 6) defense of peace and democracy; and 7) support of all other kinds of movements necessary for realizing the federation's objectives. Michiya Shimbori in Daedalus Winter, 1968

Y On Sept. 5, 1969, the All Japan Zenkyoto League was officially established at Hibiya Outdoor Concert Hall in Tokyo. The Zenkyoto has recently emerged in an attempt to resolve the serious factionalism within the student movement.

ince last year, more than seventy universi­ single-minded seriousness. One Todai man ties all over Japan, beginning with Tokyo told me, "Many students are attracted to the University (Todai), have experienced campus Zenkyoto because they appear so lacking in it sstruggles . Only now has it become clear how egoism." Although the members of Zenkyoto basic are the questions raised in the process themselves often doubt the thoroughness of of these conflicts by the students of the their own self-negation, the group is without zenkyoto. They have called into question the doubt almost unique in its lack of self-interest.. very existence of the university itself; the People who are so lacking in egoism pose a meaning of learning, even their own existence.. threat to those within the establishment who In doing so they have assigned themselves— cling to security by affirming the status quo, or and therefore, every one of us as well—a by adopting an attitude of lukewarm reformism. crucial task: to push ahead on the road of To force a return to fundamentals by means thoroughgoing "self-negation," and never to of a radical repudiation of self means the stop looking for the "essential starting-point." collapse of the latter's everyday, commonsense,. By this fundamental questioning of their own stable way of life. The Zenkyoto students' long existence they hope to create a completely new journey through struggle in search of the thing "self-identity." So radical is their questioning they have lost aims at a state of affairs that can that it debunks everything phony and de­ only be restored through this radical repudia­ nounces egoism in every form. tion of self. The challenge of such an attitude The students of Todai symbolize the radical triggers every kind of egoism into action. The justice inherent in the above questioning. With veil of superficiality is ripped away: all that "success" assured them on graduation, they remains is to work together defensively in order knew only too well the role of "oppressor" to preserve each one's ego. for which they were being trained. By repudiat­ ing such a self-image they revealed their own Toshikazu Takao Japan Christian Quarterly, Fall, 1969 Reprinted in Motive, February, 1970 The so-called "Sasebo Bloodshed Incident," which spanned a period of one week starting January 17, completely changed the image which the citizens of the city of Sasebo had of the Zengakuren. This change was not limited to the people of Sasebo alone. It may be said that not a few Japanese experienced the same change of heart.

During the week in question, the nucleus of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the 75,500- ton nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, entered Sasebo Port.... Early on the morning of January 17, two days be­ fore the arrival of the Enterprise, several hun­ dred students went by train to Sasebo. Practically all the students who stepped off the train onto the platform at Sasebo were helmeted and wore crumpled trousers and jumpers and coarse-knitted cotton gloves. In other words, the students were in "battle dress," or what they themselves call "gewalt gear." The Zengakuren have borrowed this German word "gewalt" (force or violence) to des­ cribe their use of force in clashing with the police. In order to escape police detection, the students had surreptitiously loaded hundreds of two-by-two-inch square poles, five feet in length, onto the train at an intermediate station en route. No sooner were these poles thrown onto the plat­ form than each student rushed to arm himself. Then, as the leader blew a whistle, the students promptly lined up in precise ranks on the plat­ form. The leader, helped by two students, climbed on their shoulders and made a one-minute speech: "We have finally reached Sasebo. Let us fight with our lives to prevent the entry of the Enter­ prise into Sasebo Port, to prevent Japan becoming a nuclear base..."

Then came the sprechchor, as the students shouted in unison:

"The Zengakuren will fight I" "We'll stop the Enterprise!" "We •11 stop the Enterprise at Sasebo!" "We '11 fight together with the workers!"

After the sprechchor, the students suddenly head along the railway tracks toward Hirase Bridge, without going through the ticket turnstiles. On the other side of that bridge lies the U.S. naval base. In the middle of the bridge a barricade of barbed wire and heavy timber has been set up. At the other end of the bridge, on the side nearer the base, several armored police cars and a police task force of over 1,000 men stand waiting. The students immediately start demolishing the barricade. Where and when they managed to get their tools, no one knows. But the students produce wire-cutters and hammers and use their poles as levers in tackling the barricade.

A little later, the police open up with high-pressure streams of water from fixed 7 nozzles mounted in small revolving turrets on the roofs of their armored cars. IP Students hit full blast by the water are sent sprawling for about 50 feet. 2 Canisters of tear gas are shot from tear-gas guns. The students cannot keep their eyes open. Next comes tear gas dissolved in the water shot at them. The students ward off the streams of water with billboards snatched from theater fronts. They pick up smoking cans of tear gas, run right up to the front line and throw back the canisters deep into the ranks of the police. Girl students look after students who have been hurt. All the time, the students keep breaking down the barri­ cade bit by bit. A long rope appears, as if from nowhere. It is tied to the barricade and dozens of students start pulling down the barricade.

Up to this point, neither the citizens of Sasebo nor the reporters assigned to cover the incident had changed their evaluation of the Zengakuren. To the spectators and the newsmen, the Zengakuren were simply "rioters," persons who had forgotten their original identity as students shouldered with the task of studying and who had armed themselves and were engaged in violence against the police....The change in everyone's attitude to the Zengakuren took place the very next moment; to be exact, in the five minutes beginning 11:45 a.m. on ^/"l January 17, 1968.

A moment before the barricade was about to fall, a task force of over 1,000 police converged suddenly on the rear of the students from all three, streets leading away from the bridge toward Sasebo Station. At about the same time, the police on the opposite end of the bridge, on the side nearer the U.S. base, went over to the attack. The students were trapped, like mice in a bag, between numerically superior police forces, advancing on them from four directions, wielding night sticks. The next instant police brutality erupted. The police kept raining blows on the students who, taken by surprise, were running around defenseless, and kept beating the students until they fell unconscious and lay motionless on the ground. Furthermore, even after the order to halt the attack had been given, several of the police, as they withdrew from the scene, kept hitting and kicking students lying senseless on the pavement. Despite the fact that over 100 people were injured, including several reporters, only a total of 27 persons were arrested. Thus, it can be said the police, completely engrossed in their violence, had forgotten to make arrests.

Beginning the next day, the citizens of Sasebo converged on the site of the student-police clash and vociferously criticized the police while shouting their support of the students. At times, the citizens shielded behind their backs stu­ dents being chased by the police, and, at times, moved spontaneously as if of one accord, to isolate the police from the students....

During the latter stages of the Enterprise visit, the excitement of the people of Sasebo reached abnormal heights and people broke through police picket lines and threw rocks at the police. The only explanation for such actions is a re­ flection of the anti-war sentiments of the Japanese people. A large number of Japanese had the uneasy feeling that the visit to Sasebo of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise might involve Japan with America in the war in Vietnam; a war which the majority of Japanese think is wrong.

The people of Sasebo, who had not been able to translate their unrest into a protest movement, perhaps because of their realization that they owed their livelihood to the existence of the U.S. base in Sasebo, seem to have been set afire by the actions of the Zengakuren. Usami Sho Japan Quarterly April-June, 1968 The current rise of the [Japanese] movement started in late 1967 with a series of violent confrontations on the street between the student militants and riot police. These street battles should be distinguished from the violent clashes between police and student mass demonstrators in the anti-Security Treaty struggle in 1960. The 1960 clashes were apparently spontaneous, and whether or not the student leaders intended them to occur was uncertain. But in 1967 it was evident that a relatively small number of the radicals had initiated the confrontations. In so doing, they succeeded in launching a new tide in the movement on many campuses in 1968. In this context the first two clashes - the Haneda incident of October-November, 1967 and the Sasebo incident of February, 1968 - are worth examining.

In both cases the issue was the Vietnam War and Japan's cooperation in it with the U.S. Although the anti-Vietnam War campaign had been waged very actively by leftists and pacifists and had successfully drawn the moral support of the Japanese people, the rallies and non-violent mass demonstrations had become routine and apparently had not had any vital impact on the nation or the govern­ ment. Against that background, the militant anti-war struggles by student radicals at Haneda and Sasebo opened a new stage not only in the student move­ ment but in the Japanese leftist movement in general.

The Haneda incident consisted of two major street battles between riot police and the student radicals of the Sampa Zengakuren, who attempted, in "armed demonstrations" with helmets and staves, to rush into Haneda Airport and pre­ vent Premier Sato's departure for Saigon (October 8) and Washington (November 12), The significance of the Haneda struggle in terms of the student movement is that it was the first time the radicals implemented their militant tactics of jitsur- yoku soshi (literally, "prevent by using force"). Although these tactics are now common among student militants throughout the world, it should be pointed out that the theory and strategy behind their use in the Haneda incident were unique. So-called "confrontation tactics" are usually employed by radicals in order to expose the brutal aspect of the power structure so as to "politicize," or fur­ ther radicalize, mass bystanders. Recognizing the overwhelming strength of the police force, the militants know that they will be defeated in confrontations. If by promoting violent clashes they seem intentionally to seek brutal suppres­ sion by the police, it is because they are generally much more concerned with the political effect their tactics will bring than with victory in the immediate confrontation.

However, in the Haneda incident the Japanese radicals were primarily concerned with achieving their political purpose by winning the anticipated battle with the police, even though they acknowledged the ultimate invincibility of the police as the repressive organ of the state.•..Jitsuryoku soshi tactics, then, are based on the revolutionary philosophy that people should take direct action to prevent the realization of politics which they strongly oppose. But it should also be pointed out that guerrilla-type action or terroristic measures were definitely repudiated by the Japanese radicals, as is demonstrated by their openly announcing their intentions prior to the incident....

With respect to the first "armament" with helmets and staves, it cannot be denied that self-defense was a crucial motive for the radicals, who had long been dealt with ruthlessly by the riot police. But the aggressive aspect of their motives should also be considered. What happened was that 2,500 militants attacked the police cordon near the gate of Haneda Airport with rocks and staves. Although the student demonstrators won out over sections of the police in sev­ eral skirmishes, they were finally beaten up and repulsed with heavy losses (one dead, 600 wounded, and 58 arrested).

/ In terms of their jitsuryoku soshi tactics, the students must be seen as having been defeated on both occasions in the Haneda struggle, as they could not break through the police cordon and thus failed to attain their original goal, the prevention of Sato's departure.... But the radicals were soon able to confirm how great their impact on the nation had been. That they had had considerable success in "politicizing" the people and radicalizing the students became clear in the following Sasebo struggle on the street as well as in student revolts on many campuses.... ±®$Mmûmt&

A wave of radicalism has surged onto campuses since April, 1968, and campus rebellions have erupted, one after another, throughout the country. There is no doubt that these revolts have been initiated by the anti-JCP radicals, who have brought back their militant confrontation tactics from the streets onto the campuses.

Among the many campus rebellions in 1968, the cases of Tokyo University (Todai) and Nihon University (Nichidai) should be noted not only for the scale of the battles but also for the way in which the revolts developed. The process of development is typical of all the current campus turmoils in Japan.

The Todai and Nichidai disputes differed from each other in many respects. Todai is Japan's most prestigious national university, designed to train the elite in government and industry. It has high academic standards, a tradition of academic freedom, and, simultaneously, an active leftist movement under a relatively liberal administration. In contrast, Nichidai is a multiversity type of private university with an enrollment of 100,000. Its educational facilities and curricula are relatively poor, but most of the students are apathetic and rather conservative, laboring under stern restrictions imposed on student activities by a repressive administration....

On both campuses the rebels occupied the administration and other campus build­ ings to gain their demands by force, and both administrations took the same hard-line approach of announcing disciplinary punishment for the protesters and calling in the police. These actions by the campus authorities in the earlier stage of the turmoils resulted in pushing the previously uninvolved mass of students toward the radicals. Some of them became participants in the struggle, some became sympathizers or supporters, and the conservatives became neutral....

The final campus confrontation at Todai on January 18 and 19 turned into a full- scale battle between 8,000 metropolitan riot police and the hard-core militants of the anti-JCP groups who had been mobilized nationwide to fight with the Todai radicals....

The impact of the "battle of Todai" on the general mass of students in Japan was the greatest and most direct in the history of the movement. Immediately after the final showdown many new campus rebellions erupted in succession throughout the nation, and the number of strife-torn campuses soared from 33 in mid-January to 77 in March (according to the survey by the National Police Agency).

Ichiro Sunada s Asian Survey, June, 1969 PNPO

A Report from the Japanese New Left

8 to's return: u day of mourning AMPO 70, part 2: The Deal 2 From the Sato-Nixon Joint Massive Armed Uprisings Mark Communique 8 Sato's Departure for U.S 3 14,202 Students Arrested 9 AMPO Interviews Yoshikawa 4 Self-Defense Forces 10 Crisis in the Courts 5 Deportation of Political Student Murdered by Riot Poli ce...6 "Undesirables'* 10 AMPO 70 Part 2 : THE DEAL The signing of the Nixon-Sato joint statement in pointed out that Japan lacked its own foreign ministry. Washington on November 21 puts the finishing touches Yet the Yoshida strategy was not to rely on American on the imperialist camp's strategic reorganization of military power indefinitely. Despite* the constitu­ the Pacific by restoring Japan to the status of a full- tional prohibition against rearming, using the pretext fledged imperialist power. The mass media and of the Korean War, the Japanese government began to government propaganda in Washington and Tokyo, insist­ train its own military force. Until recently, the ing that the basic issue is the "return of Okinawa to Japanese Self-Defense Forces were.considered supple­ Japan," have hailed Washington's vague, condition- mentary to American military forces in Japan and ridden promise to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereign­ neighboring Asia. The latter was the mainstay of the ty in 1972 as a triumph of Japanese statesmanship and imperialist police force responsible for preserving the American largesse. Yet analysis of the joint state­ economic and political framework of capitalism and ment confirms that its major preoccupation is not the repressing revolution throughout Asia. The postwar return of Okinawa but creation of the political and Japanese people, rightwing critics frequently observed, military context for joint Japanese-American domination lacking any higher national objective, concentrated on of Asia. The joint statement, while affirming the becoming "rich and comfortable." This view, exagge­ automatic extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty rated to be sure, nevertheless is suggestive of an (Ampo) beyond June 1970, actually is tantamount to the important facet of postwar Japan. In Asian eyes, a signing of a new treaty. Pakistani leader remarked, Japan is an "economic The return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty with its animal" whose leader (former Premier Ikeda) was a • counterrevolutionary strategic position preserved and salesman of transistor radios and who had no politics. indeed strengthened is the touchstone for the new Nixon- From the point of view of American congressmen, Japan Sato strategy spearheaded against Asian revolution. has been a "free rider," reaping the rewards of Americas Unfortunately, that mode of "returning Okinawa to Japan Asian wars while raking in the profits from lucrative directly violates the wishes of the Okinawan people who military contracts. In the words of a prominent have suffered for twenty-four years under American Japanese business leader, Japan remains a "semi-state," military rule. Significantly, on November 13, four economically powerful yet dependent on the United States days before Sato's departure for Washington, the for its police, military forces and diplomacy. Okinawan people, whom Sato intended to ingratiate, rose (Kiyoshi Sakurada, director of the Employers' Associa­ in powerful, determined protest against the Prime tion) Each of these observers, in his own way, points Minister's deal over Okinawa. They saw through Sato's to a basic element of postwar Japanese capitalism. design to turn Okinawa from a U.S. strategic base Japan's postwar development has occurred within a into a U.S.-Japan joint military base, thereby binding framework of American military domination of Japan and the Okinawan people even more tightly to the chariot Asia predicated above all on the full military control of militarism. of Okinawa as the "keystone of the Pacific." To understand the full significance of the strategic turn taken with Okinawa as the fulcrum, we must examine, if briefly, the meaning of Sato's statement on the AMPO I960 occasion of the Prime Minister's first visit to Okinawa in 1965. He said then that "Japan's postwar period The Sato-Nixon accord providing for the return of will not end until Okinawa is returned." On the one Okinawa and joint Japanese-American military activity hand, Sato sought to appease the Okinawan people who throughout Asia marks the end of Japan's postwar era had chafed under American colonial rule while demanding of dependence on the United States. It was the post­ their rights as Japanese citizens. On the other hand, war mode of existence that Sato determined to end when Sato was driven by a personal sense of mission to he took the initiative of "solving" the issue of inaugurate a new stage in the postwar development of Okinawa. To understand the Sato policy it is reveal­ imperialist Japan. ing to consider the Japanese government's approach to the Okinawa problem 10 years ago before the i960 Ampo was signed. In the course of negotiating the i960 Ampo Treaty, then Foreign Minister Fujiyama suggested THE "ECONOMIC ANIMAL" JAPAN that Okinawa's return to Japan would be accelerated by treaty provisions Including Okinawa within the Japan- For Japan's ruling elite, the term "postwar period" U.S. defense perimeter. But suddenly, as the signing Implies a specific stage of development in which a of the I960 treaty approached, all reference to weak Japan was forced to depend on American military Okinawa disappeared. It was later reported that the and political power. Shlgeru Yoshida, who has been United States had posed three conditions for the return called the Adenauer of Japan as Prime Minister during of Okinawa: and after the American Occupation, was the principal Japanese architect of the course of development for 1. That Japan assume primary responsibility for her the defeated and devastated Japanese Empire. The own defense; diplomatic expression of this policy of reliance on 2. That Japan assume primary responsibility for the and subordination to American power was the San security of the Far East north of the Philippines; Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 which surrendered 3. That Japan drastically increase its economic aid Okinawa indefinitely for exclusive use by U.S. military to Asian countries. forces. The first Security Treaty with the United In the explosive political context of I960, to have States, signed simultaneously, provided for extensive accepted such conditions would have brought an uncon­ U.S. bases and the stationing of troops throughout trollable upsurge of public opposition. Aware of this, mainland Japan. While accepting the framework of the Kishi Cabinet, after trying to broach the issue of American military power, the emphasis of the Yoshida Okinawa, suddenly dropped it like a hot potato. strategy was on economic development. In the mean­ The significance of this episode lies in the fact while, Japanese diplomacy followed the lead of the that ten years later, the Sato government, determined America State Department so blindly that observers often to secure Okinawa and to expand Japan's military role (Continued on page 7) PNPO MASSIVE ARMED UPRISINGS MARK SATO'S DEPARTURE FOR U.S. throughout Japan — 25,000 of them in Tokyo alone. The airport itself was literally taken over by an occupying army of 3,000 riot police. All entrances were sealed off, and all individuals except pass- carrying airline employees were prevented from even approaching the airport. At first, the police had stated that they wished to avoid invoking the Crime of Riot {aöranzai), but their attitude stiffened as the days went by. On October 28, the Metropolitan Police Department announced that this law would be applied without hesitation if the situation called for It, and that the police would use their pistols if explosives were used against them. As it turned out, the Riot Law was not Invoked, and pistols were not used. Nevertheless, these extra-strict security measures netted immense numbers of victims. The massive police dragnets resulted In 1,689 arrests (229 of them women) in Tokyo alone on November 16. The nation-wide total of arrests made on this day alone was 1,857 persons (237 women). This total exceeded the previous all- time high for arrests made on a single day; the previous record was reached on October 21, 1969> when 1,505 persons were arrested throughout the country. On November 17 also, 288 arrests were made through­ out the nation (including 17 women). 252 of these arrests were made in Tokyo. The "weapons" confiscated on these two days reached Immense proportions. This was particularly true in Tokyo, where literally thousands of Molotov cocktails were seized. The Japanese police once again displayed the.awesome efficiency of their security system, based on a well organized information gathering system and the quick- moving mobilized riot police. The clashes in Tokyo on November 16 and 17 resulted In 82 injured, four seriously. They included 28 policemen, 19 students, three firemen and 32 others, mostly bystanders, two of whom were seriously injured. These figures include only the casualties officially reported as having been hospitalized. The actual number of injuries must have been much greater. * » » • * In calling for a determined effort to prevent Prime Minister Sato's departure, the Japanese New Left groups were unanimous In their belief that the key to victory in the struggle would be to create a state of violent Kamata on the morning of November 17. insurrection in the Kamata area, a region in Tokyo near the Haneda Airport. They hoped to be able to engulf the general populace of the area and to create a state of siege surpassing that produced during the As we described in our last issue, October 21, 1969 Shlnjuku struggle on October 21, 1968. This would, marked the beginning of the Japanese New Left's month- they believed, plunge the nation into a crisis, bring long campaign against the visit of Prime Minister Sato about a fluid political state, and make It Impossible to the United States. This struggle reached its climax for the Prime Minister to leave the country as planned. on November 16, the date before Sato's departure from However, they were not successful In attaining this Tokyo's Haneda Airport. The fierce street fighting goal. The stiff security measures prevented many resulted in more than 2,000 arrests. After the tear from getting to Kamata. Other groups arrived there gas had cleared up, it became evident to most observers too late. In other cases, groups of militants were that the New Left had been unable to win a victory in intercepted by riot police on the platforms of Kamata the face of the unprecedented police-state tactics used station and arrested before they could go into action. by the authorities. What, then, had been accomplished by the radicals in this massive confrontation? When the Kamata struggle was at its height — from 4r00 to 7:00 PM on November 16 — there was a throng AMPO gives here a factual run-down in this exclusive of thousands in the plazas near the east and west exits article based on Japanese newspaper reports and eye­ of Kamata station. However, there was a clear-cut witness accounts. distinction between the militant demonstrators and the » * * * » crowds of onlookers. After nightfall, the riot At 10:0*) AM, November 17, 1969, Prime Minister Sato's police at two places used water cannons to spray blue- special airplane, the DC8 "Seto," left Haneda Airport tinted water onto the demonstrators who had been amid a heavy rain, carrying the Prime Minister and his surrounded. The order was then given to arrest all wife to the United States. That same morning, 80 those with garments stained by the tell-tale bluish domestic and 60 international flights at the airport water. The demonstrators were then trapped by squads had been either cancelled or rescheduled, so that the of riot police who had been lying In wait in the side airport's functions had come to a complete standstill. streets around the station. Militant students and The severity of the security precautions taken by workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees the riot police completely broke all precedents, even (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) were pursued by the riot police for riot-torn Japan. During the five days from (Continued on page 11) November 13 to 17, 75,000 riot police were mobilized AVFO

fiNPO interviews AVPONO. 2 YoshikawaYuichi A Report from the Japanese New Left AMPO is produced by Behelren (The Japan "Peace for Vietnam!" Committee) and Galkokujin Behelren, Its affiliate organization on Gl Resistance. for foreign residents in Japan. AMPO is a movement publication designed to overcome the fact that the Japanese Left, one of the Editor's note: The unprecedented upsurge of resistance most articulate and active movements In the world, is covered by within the U.S. military all over the world has been a blanket of silence in all languages but Japanese. particularly important in Japan, and has had signifi­ cant effects on the Japanese movement. To obtain an Send correspondence to: Hake checks payable to: account of the present state of affairs we Interviewed AMPO, Ishii Building AMPO, Account No. OO61656 Yoshikawa Yulchl, the General Secretary of Behelren. 6 - M Kagurazaka Kagurazaka Branch, Yoshikawa has the memory of an elephant, and so inter­ Shlnjuku, Tokyo, Japan Mitsubishi Bank viewing him is roughly equivalent to doing empirical A six-months subscription costs: research, only a lot easier.. Excerpts from that Overseas (by airmail) $6 interview follow. Japan for ordinary readers ¥1,500 " for activists ¥600 Change in the G.I. Resistance Movement AMPO is not copyrighted, and Movement publications are welcome — indeed urged — to reprint any articles or pictures without restrictions. Non-Movement publications should contact us first. AMPO: Behelren has been known as an organization that We trust you to know who you are. helps American deserters, but it seems to me that now­ It is our specific hope that this magazine will contribute to adays the scope of the activities of Behelren has unified action In 1970 against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, expanded to include cooperation and united action with which is an enemy of the people of both countries, ana of the people of all Asia. those GIs who are opposing the war within their bases. Any suggestions — either Tor this magazine or for unified Is this correct? action — will be greatly appreciated. Yoshikawa: Yes, exactly. Since the Intrepid Four case, Editorial Committee: Makoto Oda, Yulchl Yoshikawa, Yoshiyukl which gave such a shock to the Japanese public, the Tsuruml, Ichiyo Muto, Lafcadio Black, Gerry Winstanley number of deserters seeking Behelren's assistance has greatly increased. This increase reflects the wide­ spread sentiment among the G.I.s against the war and, the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (the Nixon-Sato state­ more than that, their determination to fight against ment), and to the American Military occupation of Oki­ the war. And so in accordance with that change JATEC nawa, and demanded the dissolution of the Self-Defense (Japan Technical Committee to Aid Anti-War Deserters) Forces. While this Is an Individual case, it is not an and Behelren have come to have two functions....two Isolated one, In the sense that it symbolizes a new parallel functions. The second and new function is tendency wltnln the Japanese military. We have been cooperation and assistance to the resistance movement fighting for a long time nnd in various ways against the within the American military. In accordance with that, existence of Japanese military forces, but these the domestic style, or mode of activities, of JATEC his struggles have teen all based on the premise of the un­ changed. Previously JATEC was concentrating on secret constitutionality of those forces. Or else they have activities... locating people who can conceal G.I. demanded the basic human rights of soldiers be respected, deserters. Now JATEC has realized clearly that it must referring to the frequent censorship by the authorities conduct its activities on a mass basis. For that pur­ of publications which can be read by soldiers. However pose a new publication, called the Deserters Eulletln this new case Is quite different...What this soldier has '(Dassohei Tsushin) was inaugurated this spring. said amounts to the argument that the very existence of the Self-Defense Forces is a reflection of Japanese imperialism, that the SDF are Imperialist forces whose Recent Activities aim is to suppress the Japanese people and to Invade and suppress other countries of Asia, such as Korea and Yoshikawa: To give some of the outstanding examples... China....there has never been a single case in which an at Klsawa Alrbase in Aomori Prefecture...a very Import­ SDF soldler Bald euch a thing. And this event corres­ ant strategic base in relation to the Soviet Union and ponded exactly with the appearance of the new stage of the northern regions... fifteen G.I.s gathered around the Japanese imperialism...the stage which has Just been flagpole (on October 15 Moratorium Day) to hold an over­ entered with Sato's trip to Washington, the Joint State­ night meeting. Eventually they were discovered and dis­ ment, and the decision to preserve the Security Treaty persed by the MPs. That group is a highly conscious System through the '70s. In that sense this event is group of resisting G.I.S; they are putting out an under­ highly significant... ground, newspaper called Hair, of which three issues have already been published. Hair Is not the only G.I. paper This soldier s fight is closely connected with... in Japan...for example at one of the bases in Tokyo area is influenced by ...the activities of JATEC and Behelren there is a paper called Kill for Peace, written and edit­ and the Intrepid Four Association directed toward Ameri­ ed by the G.I.s there. And there is another paper called can G . 1.8 We Got the Brass, which is the Asia edition of the Second Front International, and which has been distributed at dozens of bases from Hokkaido to Okinawa. Along with Balloon Attack these activities by G.I.s in their camps, there are parallel movements of anti-war Japanese going on outside As an example of a different style of movement, when the bases. A typical example is the Oizumi Citizen's American bases are opened to the public on some...memo­ Group, which is located near Camp Asaka. They have rial day or something...some Behelren enter the bases established a "radio station" there called "Radio Camp- and put flowers on the weapons and airplanes, with the Must-Go," which broadcasts regularly into the base inscription "flower power", or distribute papers like through loudspeakers. Their broadcasts include anti-war "We Got the Brass." songs (folk and rock), comments on topical issues, mess­ Here Is an example from the Japanese base, Nlho; ages from deserters. There has been a very favorable when the base was opened to the public, several Eehelren response from inside the camp: many soldiers respond members prepared many balloons and stood by the entrance. with the "V" sign, while others have approached the On the balloons they painted slogans such as "Ampo Fun- group after the broadcasts offering to cooperate. Now sai", "Dissolve the Self-Defense Forces", and so on. joint meetings are held between these soldiers and the These balloons were given to children entering the base Citizen's Group. to see the airplanes, and so the base was soon filled with children holding slogan balloons. So the SDF people noticed this and tried to take away the balloons Resistance in the Self-Defense Forces at the entrance. But the children cried and wouldn't give up the balloons. The officers bought candy, and ...This incident is not about American G.I.s, but it offered it in exchange for the balloons, but the child­ is related. Several days ago a Japanese soldier public­ ren liked the balloons better than the candy, and so ly announced his opposition to the Security Treaty, to they failed. This is a tactic that could be used any- (Continued on page 11) ANPO

However, in grouping the defendants for separate CRISIS IN THE COURTS trials, the court made extensive investigations of their personal backgrounds. For instance, the court inquired into the universities they attended, the political — Hundreds of Rebel Students to be groups to which they were affiliated, their status of leadership within the group, whether they had signed a Sentenced in Absentia — confession or not, their previous record of arrests, and the role they played In the activities under Indict­ The Tokyo University Struggle ment. The defense lawyers argued that this preliminary January 18 and 19, 1969 are dates which will never investigation and the grouping of the defendants in this be forgotten In the history of Japan's stormy anti- biased manner clearly indicated that the court had establishment movement. On these two days, after many abandoned all pretense at impartiality in the case. hours of fierce fighting, some 8,500 riot police Such a system of classifying the defendants was clearly succeeded in expelling hundreds of militant students prejudicial to their interests and deprived them of all who had been occupying a number of buildings on the possibility of a fair trial. Tokyo University campus. Some 10,000 cannisters of In the meantime, the courts were proceeding with the tear gas were fired, and immense quantities of liquid hearings of the 175 "repentant" defendants who had hired and powdered tear gas were used. 369 students were separate lawyers and had accepted separate trials. The injured, 76 of them seriously. One student was sentences for all of these "penitent" students were permanently blinded, and the burns from the liquid tear handed down in March, 1969, and all of the defendants gas were found to be especially serious. were given suspended sentences. Altogether some 786 arrests were made In the various incidents occurring both on and off the campus on these Separate Hearings Begin two days. More than 540 students were later indicted The Tokyo District Court, overruling the objections on a variety of counts such as "breaking into a of the defense, began its hearings of the separate building," "refusal to obey orders to evacuate public groups on May 27. At that time, more than 300 of the premises," "obstruction of the performance of public defendants were still being held in detention. The duties," and "illegal assembly with dangerous weapons." courtroom atmosphere was entirely abnormal from the very These are all comparatively light criminal offenses, outset. The few defendants who had been released on bearing maximum penalties of two or three years. It ball were, of course, obliged to attend the hearings, would be natural to expect suspended sentences to be but they and the defense lawyers voiced loud protests meted out In nearly all of these cases, especially for against the unfairness of the separate trials and first offenses. repeated their demands for a unified trial. All the defendants in detention boycotted the trials completely, Demand for Unified Trial refusing to leave their prison cells when summoned by On February 13, a group of lawyers formed a defense the guards. Frequently the Imprisoned students would panel for the students. A majority of the defendants remove all their garments and soak them In water in — 469 of the 540 indicted — demanded a unified trial their cells so that the guards could not carry them out of their cells forcibly. Invoking Article 286 of the (toitsu saiban), arguing that they had acted together for a common goal, shared a common Ideology, and Criminal Procedure Code, the courts ruled that the wished to make clear in public hearings the basic Issues defendants were absenting themselves from the courtroom which motivated them in their struggle. However, the without due cause and that the hearings would be held Tokyo District Court turned down their demand for a in the absence of the defendants. This led to the very unified trial and divided the 469 defendants up into rare phenomenon of "trial in absentia" (keeseki saiban). 37 groups'of 10 to 13 each. The defense lawyers continued to use every possible opportunity to remonstrate with the Judges, but they In demanding a unified trial, the defendants and were repeatedly silenced, ordered out of the courtroom, their lawyers acted upon well established precedents in and even fined and Imprisoned for obstructing courtroom Japanese legal history. They argued that the Tokyo procedures. University struggle [Tödai tosö) was an Ideologically motivated movement. It would be senseless for the Spectators in the court galleries — relatives and court to consider only the Isolated actions of the friends of the defendants as well as concerned citizens separate defendants (such as: who threw a rock at a — were naturally appalled by the abnormal atmosphere policeman, or who was holding a pipe or pole in his reigning in these courtrooms. Many spectators would hands at the moment of arrest), distorting them out of rise to their feet and attempt to protest, but the their entire ideological context. Separate trials Judges would order them removed or would even call In (bunkatsu saiban), they pointed out, would make It the riot police (who, it appeared, were waiting in an impossible to evaluate the actions of the defendants in adjoining room) to evict spectators or arrest them. On relation to the whole picture. The District Court, it July 2, a 53-year old mathematician and writer, Mr. seemed to them, was attempting to treat the Tokyo Nagaoki Mononobe, was sentenced to seven days' imprison­ University struggle as a bunch of minor legal technica­ ment by a judge for making a disturbance in a courtroom. lities, as a series of Incidents of gang violence, rather His crime? He asked the judge a question: "Are you than as an immense mass movement aiming at revolutionary familiar with the Constitution?" Jirö Yamane, a 32- change in society. The court showed no Interest at all year old defense attorney, was twice fined ¥30,000 In considering the background and the causes of the (about $83) and was on two occasions sentenced to campus disturbances which had been rocking Tokyo Univer­ imprisonment (for terms of five days and three days, sity for many months. respectively) for failing to obey the orders of the In refusing the request for a mass trial, the District judges. Court argued that it would be difficult to find a court­ The hearings continued to be boycotted by the room large enough to accommodate such a large number of defendants and the lawyers. Even If the lawyers had defendants. There would be difficulties in keeping wished to appear at all the hearings, it would have been order in the courtroom, and a mass trial might continue physically impossible for them to do so, since four or for years. (Japanese court cases have, in fact, been five hearings were held simultaneously in as many known to drag on for 17 years before the first verdict!) different courtrooms. The group of 14 or 15 defense The purpose of the court, it was explained, was to lawyers could do little more than make the rounds of determine the extent of the individual guilt of each the courtrooms and voice their protests in turn to each defendant, weighing the evidence in each separate case.

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of the judges until they were ousted, amid loud cries of angry protest from the spectators. In the absence of defendants and defense attorneys, STUDENT MURDERED BY RIOT POEIGE IN OSAKA the hearings proceeded extremely smoothly. The only persons present were the prosecutors, the Judges, the Three Osaka riot policemen have been accused of court clerks, and the prosecution witnesses — usually killing Takayuki Kasuya, a 21-year old student of the riot policemen who made the arrests. The Judges Okayama University, who succumbed on November 14 after showed little Interest in safeguarding the rights of having been arrested in a clash with riot police in the defendants. In some cases, they called In the Osaka on the previous day. parents of the students or attempted to display their Kasuya was arrested around 6:30 PM on November 13 impartiality by saying that they would consult several near the öglmachi Park in Osaka. The police who books about the Tokyo University struggle. arrested him are accused of beating him repeatedly on the head, face, arms, and legs with night sticks, Lengthy Detention Protested giving him a skull fracture and severe bruises. As The defendants, arrested in January, remained In a result, Kasuya died at 9:00 PM the following day. detention for extremeiy long periods of time in view of Kasuya had attended a rally at Oglmachl Park to the relative lightness of the offenses with which they protest Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington. were charged. It has been pointed out that there is Some 30,000 labor unionists and students attended the a tendency for the courts to hold student defendants rally In the park, and there were clashes with the for disproportionately lengthy periods of confinement. riot police afterwards. 58 persons were arrested, As of July, 323 of the defendants still remained in and almost all of them were Injured. Eye-witnesses detention, and over 260 were still detained as of said that the police action was especially brutal. August 20. A large percentage of the defendants Many demonstrators were beaten repeatedly with night refused to accept release on ball even when this was sticks and Duralumin shields, and some were dragged offered by the Judges (who Intended in this way to by their feet across the pavement. force them to attend the separate hearings), and as of December 6 there were still some 120 in detention The Kansal Legal Aid Center and the defense lawyers refusing ball. They argued that to accept ball under on December 13 lodged a complaint with the local these conditions would oblige them to appear in court prosecutors' office against three riot police members: and would constitute recognition of the separate trials. Yukio Araki, Akio Akamatsu, and Tokihito Sugiyama, In July, 173 members of the Tokyo University faculty charging them with brutality and manslaughter. Their signed a petition protesting against the lengthy complaint charges that -the three policemen forced the detention of most of the defendants In the Tokyo critically injureu student to walk handcuffed about University case. They argued that lengthy detention one kilometer to the Sonezaki Police Station, where he of more than six months constituted in fact a prison was photographed and questioned. At the police term in anticipation of the verdict. They noted that station, he complained of being unwell and collapsed'. considerations unrelated with the trial were involved; Even after he haa lost consciousness, he was given no the authorities were obviously Interested in keeping first aid, but was left lying on the floor in a the defendants in custody as a kind of "preventive corridor. He was taken to the Yukloka Hospital two arrest," so that they could not resume their political and a half hours after his arrest. activities. Another consideration was that The hospital to which Kasuya was taken by the police practically all of the defendants had availed themselves had no facilities for brain surgery, and the doctor of their constitutional right (Article 38 of the who operated on him there was a plastic surgeon, not 6 Constitution) to maintain silence under questioning to a specialist in brain surgery. In fact, Kasuya was avoid self-incrimination. To subject them to lengthy left for six hours without being given any medical detention simply because they exercised their right to treatment. The doctor who conducted the autopsy silence (mokuhi-ken), it was argued, constituted a reported that death resulted from brain damage caused virtual denial of their constitutional rights. One by blows on the head. The lethal instrument was said female defendant, famous as "Klkuyabashl No. 101" (the to be a hard, blunt Instrument applied with great number of her cell at the Klkuyabashl Police Station), force once or twice. has steadfastly refused to reveal even her name to the authorities, and on June 13 the Supreme Court officially ruled that she was not entitled to appoint a lawyer Kasuya was the fifth per­ unless she disclosed her name. son to lose his life in stu­ dent demonstrations since i960. He was affiliated Verdicts in Absentia with the Proletarian Student These extraordinary court cases are now coming to an League (Purogakudo), the end one after another. Judge Isao Okagaki completed student organization of the all of his hearings on November 5 and sentenced seven Communist Workers Party defendants on November 28, more than 10 months after (Kyösanshugl Rödösha Tö), they were arrested. The Judge sentenced them to and was a leader of the periods of 18 to 20 months at hard labor. Only two of Zenkyoto struggle committee the defendants had their sentences suspended, and the in his class at Okayama Uni­ other five will have to spend nearly a year In prison. versity. A mass meeting (In some cases, some of the time spent in detention was held to protest his during the trial was deducted from the total term to murder at Tokyo's Hlbiya be spent at hard labor.) In three of the cases, the Park on December 14. penalties assigned by Judge Okagaki were even harsher than those demanded by the prosecution. Of the spectators who protested the sentencing on November 28, five (including one woman) were arrested In the court­ Takayuki Kasuya room and sentenced to seven days In detention by Judge Okagaki for making a disturbance in his courtroom. A Selected Bibliography ol Japanese Books about tne Tokyo University Struggle: It was noted that Judge Okagaki had relied heavily on Inoue Kiyoshl, Tödai tôsô, sono Jijitsu to ronri [The circumstantial evidence in reaching his decision, as Tokyo University struggle, its facts and logic] only one defendant had confessed to having thrown - jcks Tokyo, Gendal Hyöron Sha, 1969. at the police. There was no clear evidence about the Tödai Tösö Bengodan, comp., Todai iban [The Tokyo others, but the prosecutors had claimed that the University trial] Tokyo, Tabat Shoten, I969. presence of piles of rocks in the vicinity proved that Tödai Zengaku Kyoto Kalgl, comp., Toride no ue ni the other defendants had either thrown them or had at warera no eekai wo [Our world on the barricades] least transported them. The defense attorneys pointed Tokyo, Aki Shobö, 1969. out th .; these stiff sentences were obviously intended Todai Zenkyoto Keizal Daigakuin Tösö Iinkai, comp., as a deterrent. Even if the defense had presented its Hond de egaku henkaku no ronri [The logic of own evidence and arguments, they said, it was quite revolutionary change drawn in flaming letters] probable that the same penalties would have been forth­ Tokyo, Jiyü Kokumin Sha, 1969• coming as long as the defendants had not expressed Yamamoto Yoshltaka, Chisei no hanran [The rebellion "repentance. " (Continued on page 7) of the Intellect] Tokyo, Zen'ei Sha Kanna Shobö, 1969. The Japanese Government through its spokesmen repeated­ ly insists that "anti-nuclear weapons" is a policy and AMPO 70 not a principle. Sato himself, when he Invited the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to visit Japan (Continued from page 2) in I960, declared that the "nuclear allergy" of the in Asia, was able and willing to accept all of the Japanese people should be eliminated. There is in conditions posed earlier. It is true that Japan-U.S. fact a concerted government effort to overcome the negotiations for the "return of Okinawa" began in 1965. anti-nuclear "sentiment" of the Japanese as a prelude However, those negotiations centered not on the three to new Japanese policy departures. Once this has been basic conditions publicly proclaimed by Sato, but accomplished, the U.S. government will be quick to rather on creating an official façade for the Okinawa deploy nuclear weapons throughout Japan. deal to minimize popular and legislative opposition in Yet even this Is an innocent interpretation of the both countries. Sato's pledge to stand by his three text. For no one in Japan knows or is in a position slogans of "return In 197*," "return without nuclear to know what kind of American weapons are deployed in weapons," and "the same status for Okinawa as for Okinawa now. The U.S. government has never officially mainland Japan" was designed to appease the peace and. acknowledged the presence of nuclear weapons there. anti-nuclear sentiment of the Japanese people as well Even In the case of mainland Japan, we do not know as the nationalistic feeling of the Okinawan people. whether there are nuclear weapons or not. We are The American government, facing a different kind of simply asked to believe that the Japanese Government Congressional pressures, had to emphasize virtually the -is "convinced that there are no weapons of the kind." opposite aspects of the Okinawa deal. The United The meaning of Sato's bombastic statements about States thus had to secure the Japanese promise to allow preserving Japan's non-nuclear posture is clear. The free use of Okinawa for American military operations U.S. Government's recent announcement that MACE-B against the Vietnamese people as well as to permit the missiles, believed to have nuclear warheads, will be American nuclear presence to continue after 1972. The removed from Okinawa by the end of 1969, is all that is immediate political propaganda lines in the two count­ meant by a "nuclearless" Okinawa. It is well known ries were so different that their close coordination in that MACE-B is an outmoded winged missile flying slower wording the accord was essential. But whatever the than sound. For several years the Pentagon has stated name they might give to the future status of Okinawa, that these obsolete missiles should be scrapped. The the future reality of Okinawa as desired by the leaders announcement of the removal, however, made at the height of the two countries was one and the same — the of Sato's election campaign, has been widely publicized strengthening of Okinawa as the strategic counter­ to prove that the United States has accepted the revolutionary military base in Asia on the basis of a "denuclearization" of Okinawa. new policy of Japan-U.S. joint control and management. while Sato was busily creating a façade to hide the real meaning of the Okinawa deal and the new Japanese- American military alliance, very significant political developments were occurring within Japan. The essence NUCLEAh ARMAMENT IN JAPAN of the Okinawa question lies not in the rhetoric of the That the façade given to this reality was insignifi­ Washington declaration but in these concrete political cant is clear from the wording of the statement Itself. The statement contains no assurance that nuclear wea­ pons will be eliminated at the time of Okinawa's rever­ processes. The major developments are the following: sion. Indeed, It does not even acknowledge the 1. The hasty formulation of the Fourth Defense Build­ existence of nuclear weapons on the islands. The up Program to start in 1972, coupled with an Okinawa president took note of the Japanese people's strong defense program. sentiment against nuclear weapons (point 8), but his 2. Bold statements by Sato and other government and avowed intention to follow a nuclear policy consistent business leaders openly inspiring nationalism connect­ with that of the Japanese government provides no ed with the military buildup. assurance that nuclear weapons will be eliminated. 3. Increased overseas economic "assistance" pledged on several occasions, most notably during the June meeting in Japan of the Asian Pacific Ministerial Conference (ASPAC). (Continuée from page 6) 4. Rampant and indiscriminate use of police repres­ In the meantime, the courts and the bar associations sion to crush the university struggle and a virtual were applying pressure on the defense lawyers. On reign of terror, culminating in the "emergency situ­ November 5, a Kobe lawyer, Kazuo Nakal, lodged a ation" declared In October and November to deter complaint with the prosecutor general against defense ordinary citizens from taking part in the anti-Ampo lawyer Jirô Yamane, charging the latter with having struggle. repeatedly obstructed court procedures. Nakal also 5. The practical revision of the existing Security complained to the Bar Association, seeking Yamane's Treaty so as to facilitate freer use of American expulsion. The disciplinary committee of the Tokyo military bases in Japan and to allow Japanese military Bar Association is now investigating seven defense attorneys, who may possibly be punished by suspension, troops' intervention in Korean affairs. reprimands, or even expulsion from the Association. At any rate, Japanese courts have now, for the first time in their entire history, handed down -kesseki THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM hanketsu, or "verdicts in absentia." This judgment by default is quite unprecedented and has called forth a wave of protest. The judges In these cases claim adamantly that their trials are perfectly legal. These actions, taken hastily and with a sense of However, many legal authorities have pointed out that urgency in a short period, were coupled with a powerful trials held In the absence of the defendants and of propaganda campaign centering on the drive to secure defense counsel are a travesty of justice. Such the reversion of Okinawa. These were not mere trials may be "legal" according to the letter of the coincidences, but part and parcel of the Sato plan to law, but few would call them "fair" in the accepted resolve simultaneously the problems of Okinawa and sense of the word. The militant student defendants, Japan's resurgence as a military power. The Fourth carrying on the Tokyo University struggle In the Defense Plan coupled with the return of Okinawa, solitude of their prison cells, have clearly won an charts Japan's changing role from that of a semi-state Important victory. They have plunged the Japanese dependent on America's military and political Initia­ court system Into a serious crisis. What is more, tive, to a full-fledged and aggressive member of the they have completely erased the illusions still linger­ ing in some minds about the "Independence" and "neutrality" of the Japanese courts and about the "impartiality" of bourgeois justice. /WPO

Imperialist camp. rity of South Korea is "essential to the security of The first draft of the Fourth Defense Buildup Program Japan," it clearly augurs the deployment of Japan's own •was brought to Washington in Foreign Minister Aichi's troops to the area. This danger was recently pointed portfolio In June this year at the time of preliminary out by Shulchl Matsumoto, a leading diplomatic trouble- negotiations. Its size in terms of budgetary outlay shooter who was dispatched as the government's envoy is in fact double the Third Defense Buildup Program. to South Korea in 1965. By changing the exclusive Yet even this fourth program in its present form is focus of the Ampo treaty from Japan's internal security regarded as insufficient by important Liberal Democratic to her overseas military expansion, the basic provisions leaders who Insist that the "defense expenditures" of the peace constitution have been discarded and the should be raised to four per cent of the national Income way opened to an aggressive Japanese military role in from the present one per cent. The plan explicitly Asia. A strong parallel can be drawn to the Bay of departs from the previous posture of subordination to Tonklng Resolution, regarded as Innocuous at the time American military might by charting a new forward but later used to legalize the subsequent military posture for Japanese forces. The plan's major operation of U.S. troops in Vietnam. features, announced in May by Defense Agency Director Japanese troops assuming primary responsibility for Arita, are as follows: the situation in South Korea means 'nothing less than (1) Henceforth defense efforts should be promoted the emergence of Japan again as a full Imperialist more positively in view of Japan's changing internal power in this area. This is the direct consequence of and external situation, expanding national strength, the agreement for the reversion of Okinawa as the and heightened world status, so that Japan can cope, bastion of oppression in Asia. As Sato frankly said effectively and flexibly, with intermediate and in his Washington Press Club speech (regarded by immediate aggression. Washington as part of the Sato-Nixon accord), Japan (not Okinawa alone) is going to be the "keystone of the (2) With the return of Okinawa, Japan will assume the Pacific." "From now on, our defense forces are the prime responsibility for the defense of Okinawa.... masters, with Ampo (meaning U.S. troops) playing an Japan should build up as quickly as possible the auxiliary role." necessary defense forces for this area of the country. This is in fact an application of Nixon's Guam (3) Japan is surrounded by the sea and depends on doctrine. The war in Vietnam is to be "Vietnamized." International trade. Consequently, it is vital to The direct role of American forces is to be minimized. maintain the safety of our country's maritime transport. For us Japanese, Vietnamization in a way means Efforts should be stepped up to strengthen the maritime Japanization of colonial wars In Asia, particularly defense force so that the Japanese fleet can serve as Japanlzation of South Korea. Most significantly, the convoy for the merchant fleet. Japan is no longer passively following U.S. policy but (4) In order to defeat enemy invasions in their is determined to enter the "Pacific era" (Nixon and initial stage, land, sea and air defense capabilities Sato) of its own accord and to fulfill its own imperi­ should be combined so that the Invasion can be defeated. alist interests. With its fast growing economy For this purpose, a striking force against ships and (Japan's GNP doubles every five years), there is tasks forces on land should be strengthened. irresistible indigenous pressure for full expansion overseas. So far, this pressure has been expressed through economic channels (the stage of the "economic THE NEW JAPANESE IMPERIALISM animal"), but it has by now become so colossal that the Japanese state feels an active urge to equip itself with the full apparatus of an Imperialist state. This is no longer a military program advanced to satisfy American demands that Japan shoulder a larger defense burden. It is a program to prepare Japan for direct confrontation with Asian people's revolution, though still in co-operation with the United States. More dangerous is the fact that the defense program as well as the economic and political strategy of the new Japanese state is explicitly spearheaded against South Korea. In the last Issue, we explained the "Three Arrows" operation, based on the supposition that disturbance in South Korea develops into an interna­ tional conflict involving Japan. It is precisely for such an eventuality that all "security" measures and V From the Sato-Nixon Joint training of the self-defense forces are being prepared under the Sato Cabinet. Communique (November 21, 1969) This special Japanese interest in South Korea (coin­ ciding of course with Washington's interest in the area) has prompted a major revision of the Security 3. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged Treaty through agreement reached in Tokyo this summer. frank views on the current international situation, The negotiations, conducted by Assistant Foreign Minist­ with particular attention to developments In the Far er Togo and U.S. envoy Schneider, resulted In complete East. The President, while emphasizing that the accord about changing the interpretation of the "prior countries in the area were expected to make their own consultation" clause In the Security Treaty to facili­ efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance tate Japan-U.S. joint military operations for suppress­ that the United States would continue to contribute to ing future disturbances in South Korea. The Japanese the maintenance of international peace and security in side promised to say "yes" in any prior consultation the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations concerning the deployment of U.S. troops from mainland In the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the Japan to South Korea. The Japanese government agreed determination of the United States, stressed that it to regard the security of South Korea "as Japan's own was important for the peace and security of the Far security," and consequently to guarantee full support East that the United States should be In a position to for U.S. operations In the area. This has a special carry out fully its obligations referred to by the meaning against the background of the long practice of President. He further expressed his recognition that, the treaty. Previously, prior consultation was in the light of the present situation, the presence of required before U.S. forces in Japan could be deployed United States forces in the Far East constituted a anywhere in the Far East. The new interpretation of mainstay for the stability of the area. the Sato government is that the security of South 4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically Korea should no longer be regarded as that of the "Far noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. East," but as an Integral part of Japan's own security. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping This is tantamount to regarding Japan's former colony efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated as part of the Japanese territory. that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential The Sato-Nixon declaration, however, goes beyond to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Japan's agreement to drop the prior consultation clause Minister shared the hope that Communist China would In tr.e case of Korea. By proclaiming that the secu­ adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude In fiNPO its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and Just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should 14,202 STUDENTS ARRESTED IN I969 — peace In Vietnam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the REPORT UNDERSCORES SOCIAL TURMOIL two Governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that For most of us, the year's end is a time to take reversion would be accomplished without affecting the stock of our accomplishments and to try to foresee United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese what may be coming in the new year. This is what people the opportunity to determine their own political Japan's National Police Agency (Kelsatsu-chö) did in future without outside interference. The Prime its 1969 White Paper on Security, which was released minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she on December 12. Police statistics must, of course, could play In bringing about stability in the Indochina be approached with a certain amount of caution, since area. they are slanted so as to minimize the strength of the anti-Establishment forces. however, they QO make 6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the interesting reading, and AMPO gives here a brief time had come to respond to the strong desire of the resume of the NPA report. (All figures quoted for people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to I969 are those applying as of November 30, 1969.) have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to First of all, the White Paper provides convincing Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the confirmation of a fact which AMPO readers already knew United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa — the fact that 1969 surpassed all previous years In to its normal status. The President expressed Japan's history for the number of campus disputes, the appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The number of police intrusions on campuses, the number of President and the Prime Minister also recognized the people participating in demonstrations, the number of vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in riot police mobilized, and the number of students the present situation in the Far East. As a result of arrested. In other words, 1969 was a year of their discussion It was agreed that the mutual security unprecedented social turmoil, and the police are interests of the United States and Japan could be prepared for even more unrest in 1970. accommodated within arrangements for the return of the There is at least one figure in the White Paper administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They which even AMPO is willing to accept trustfully. This therefore agreed that the two Governments would is the number of students arrested. The police are Immediately enter into consultations regarding specific the only ones who know this number, and it is 14,202 — arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of more than twice the number of students arrested during Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far 1968. Campus disputes also spread during 1969. East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite According to the police report, student strikes were the consultations with a view to accomplishing the held, buildings were occupied, or barricades were 9 reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of erected at 152 universities. these specific arrangements with the necessary legisla­ There was also a big increase in the number of tive support. In this connection, the Prime Minister street demonstrations organized by radical student made clear the Intention of his Government, following groups. The biggest ones were Okinawa Day on April reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for 28, the anti-ASPAC demonstrations in June, Anti-War the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's Day on October 21, ana the November demonstrations defense efforts for her own territories. The against Sato's visit to the U.S. According to the President and the Prime Minister agreed also that the police estimates, 440,000 students marched in 2,363 United States would retain under the terms of the demonstrations during I969. This far exceeded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military 1968 totals of 240,000 stucents who participated In facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the 1,504 demonstrations. If one adds to the 10b9 total mutual security of both countries. the members of the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen 7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, Seinen Iinkai) and the Behelren, the total number of upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of participants in New Left street demonstrations Mutual Cooperation and Security and Its related increases to ^70,000 persons. arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification The police estimates of the present strength of the thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister radical student movement are also interesting. The affirmed the recognition of his Government that the White Paper says that the number of student self- security of Japan could not be adequately maintained government associations controlled by New Left student without International peace and security in the Far groups has increased from lBO in i960 to 209 (an East and, therefore the security of countries in the increase of lb%) . The number of New Left student Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. activists has increased from 8,300 to 14,200 (if true, this is a phenomenal increase of 71?), and the number The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of students whom New Left groups can mobilize in of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Govern­ demonstrations has grown from 33,700 to 44,000 (a 31% ment, the return of the administrative rights over increase). Interestingly, tne number of students Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not hinder arrested (14,202) parallels the estimatea number of the effective discharge of the international obliga­ activists. tions assumed by the United States for the defense of countries In the Far East including Japan. The The student groups affiliated with the Japanese President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's Communist Party, the police report says, control 355 view. student self-government associations, have 14,200 8. The Prime Minister described in detail the activists, and can mobilize 47,600 students in their particular sentiment of the Japanese people against demonstrations. Thus, it would seem that the New Left nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Govern­ student groups are approximately equal in strength to ment reflecting such sentiment. The President the pro-JCP groups. expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime An upsurge of student activism was noted also at the Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the high school level. According to the report, campus United States Government with respect to the prior disputes broke out in 163 high schools, and in 62 of consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual these cases school buildings were occupied and Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa barricaded by the students. 30,000 high school would be carried out in a manner consistent with the students participated in demonstrations in the streets, policy of the Japanese Government as described by the and 602 of them were arrested by the police. Prime Minister. /WPO

The White Paper reports an escalation in the This infringes upon the Just rights of the people to "weapons" used by militant radicals. The report states that 136 bombs and other explosives, 16,777 advocate their own opinions." Molotpv cocktails, 17,825 wooden staves, 6,165 steel Konishl reportedly produced three editions of his pipes, fr85 bottles of acid, and 207 tons of rocks leaflet. The first he placed on bulletin boards in were either confiscated by the police or used against three places inside the base. The second he them. In spite of all of this, only one policeman distributed outside the base and also tacked on the died from injuries sustained in a clash with students. walls of hallways inside the base. The third he The White Paper notes that young workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) pasted by the entrance to the mess hall and placed are playing an increasingly active role in militant on the seats of parked army buses. struggles. It estimates their strength at about Konishi explained his motives to his lawyers as 17,000 and says that they are strengthening their follows: "While living the life of a Self-Defense ties with radical student groups. Force soldier, I noticed that there were a number of The General Council of Trade Unions (Sôhyô) has been stepping up its strike activities, which reached their contradictions inside the SDF. Around the beginning high point during 1969 in the United Action on of September, it was announced that riot-control November 13, in which 58 local Industrial unions practice, under the* name of 'Special Police Training, participated, mobilizing about 890,000 unionists. would be carried out, even here at the Sado base. This number exceeded even the number mobilized in Ideological Indoctrination also began, dealing with the massive General Strike held on June 4, I960 to oppose the ratification of the Security Treaty. such questions as: 'What is a demonstration?' and The police agency's White Paper concludes with the 'What sort of group is the New Left?' As the prediction that the movement of the Japanese Left training proceeded, I began to realize that If we will continue to pick up momentum in 1970 and will were called out for anti-riot duty, we would have to probably reach a new height in June, 1970, when there confront the general populace. If worst came to will be a General Strike to protest the extension of the Security Treaty. worst, we would even have, to kill our fellow citizens. When I realized this, I simply couldn't stand It any longer, and on October 18 I refused to participate in SELF-DEFENSE FORCE MEMBER the training. I printed up the leaflets myself, hoping that there might be others who would agree ARRESTED FOR ANTI-WAR ACTIONS with my ideas."

SELF-DEFENSE FORCE UNITS WILL BEEF UP RIOT POLICE

Early In November, the Japanese Defense Agency and the National Police Agency agreed that the Self- Defense Porces can transport riot police and lend them tear gas and other riot control equipment even In situations where the Prime Minister has not issued an order for the SDF to go into action to maintain law and order. The agreement Is sure to rouse heated debate, since it means that the stage has been set for full-scale SDF aid to the police In maintaining law and order even though the Prime Minister has not issued a mobilization order. According to Article 78 of the Self-Defense Force Law, the Prime Minister can order action by part or all of the Self-Defense Forces when he believes that police power cannot cope with "Indirect aggression" or other emergencies. In the meantime, the Self-Defense Forces have been pushing ahead with their program to build up their preparedness against expected civil disorders. ¥75 million worth of weapons and protective gadgets such as shields, tear gas cannlsters, and wooden sticks have been purchased and distributed among the SDF bases. The same amount of money is expected to be appropriated for the same purpose in the next fiscal year. The SDF authorities are also stepping up their programs for practice in riot control. The divisions in charge of guarding the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas now spend one-third of their total training time in preparing for mobilization in riot control. DEPORTATION OF Makoto Konishi POLITICAL "UNDESIRABLES" A sergeant In the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces, Makoto Konishi (20), was arrested in Sado, Nllgata On December 7, 1969, Roger Scott, an American English Prefecture, for distributing leaflets inside his base. teacher from Lubbock, Texas, was deported from Japan He was charged with violating a prohibition against for his political activities. Scott was accompanied political activity by members of the Self-Defense by his bride, Yuko, whom he married during a brief two- Force, and also with "instigating others to neglect day release from the Immigration Department's Detention their duties." Center (read: prison) at Yokohama, where he hadbeen The former noncommissioned officer at the 46th incarcerated for over a month. Aircraft Control and Warning Group on Sado Island in Scott has engaged in no violent activities nor broken the Sea of Japan was arrested October 18 for posting any Japanese laws, other than overstaying his visa... leaflets denouncing Prime Minister Sato's visit to a tautology since his visa was refused for his political the U.S. and calling for abrogation of the Security activities. He has marched in peace demonstrations Treaty. This is the first time a member of the SDF and spoken at rallies, but his principal "offense" was has ever been arrested and prosecuted for security his joining Dr. Earle Reynolds and other Americans in reasons. an attempted goodwill mission to China on the peace According to the indictment, Konishi's leaflet read yacht "Phoenix" last summer. The government, despite in part: "Is it not true that the SDF forces are its claim to wish improved relations with China, took robots, servants, and slaves of the bourgeoisie? such a dim view of this journey that It refused reentry Refuse training for the repression of demonstrations! visa to three of the crew members (the only three who intended to remain in Japan): Scott, Zen Buddhist priest Brian Victoria, and Dr. Reynolds himself. Since their return, the three have been waging a court battle to stay in Japan. Handling their cases (Continued from page 3) with magnificent bureaucratic confusion, the Justice and by vigilante committees of local residents wielding Ministry has Jailed them, released them, rejailed them, wooden swords. offered deals, reversed decisions, made vague promises, Vigilante committees of this type made their first and maintained throughout an attitude of prim self- appearance in Shinjuku on October 21, 1969. Local righteousness. The American Embassy, though bond by "self-defense" organizations were organized in several law to make efforts to protect the rights of its districts around Kamata and Haneda after powerful police urging. Wearing yellow caps and arm-bands, citizens, has been only insulting. The Ambassador's the vigilantes went about patrolling in groups, carrying first words to Scott, telephoning from prison: "I paper lanterns and holding brand-new wooden swords and understand you hate not only America but Japan too." baseball bats. Brawny young vigilantes kept a watchful Scott: "Now Mr. Ambassador, that's a pretty childish eye on the movements of the students and workers, thing to say." The Embassy representative's first supplying Information to the riot police. When the words to Victoria, who had demanded that he be released students and workers were fleeing from the riot police, from solitary confinement at Yokohama (where he had the vigilantes would overpower them and hand them over been placed for organizing a demonstration inside the to be arrested. prison): "Well Mr. Victoria, you say this is solitary, » * * * « but we take the view that it is only isolation. After 3:00 PM on November 16, militant students and Solitary is a.. ..black hole." (Perhaps he was workers began to engage In simultaneous guerrilla referring to the fact that in Victoria's cell the light actions at many places, such as the two Kamata stations was kept burning 24 hours a day.) (of the Japanese National Railways and of the Kelhln Though Scott and Victoria were not treated particu­ Kyjïkô Line), near the Shinagawa station, at Tokyo larly well In prison, they found that, according to the station, and elsewhere. Numerous railway lines were Justice Ministry's systematic discrimination, prisoners thus brought to a stop. from Asian countries were treated even worse...for About 4:20 PM, some 400 students of the Chükaku example by receiving a far smaller food allotment per faction stopped an electric train bound for Kamata on day. Many, whom the authorities can decide neither the Keihin Töhoku Line. Alighting from it, they ran to release nor to deport, have been rotting in prison along the tracks to Kamata station. Breaking out of for years....never, of course, having been charged, the station, they emerged Into the plaza in front of indicted, or tried for any violation of law. the station, where they Joined the students and workers While Scott lost his appeal and was deported, who were already there. Large numbers of Molotov Victoria has been released in what will hopefully be an cocktails were thrown at the Intersection in front of Important precedent-setting decision...that a foreign the station, and the area was transformed into a sea resident cannot be imprisoned merely on suspicion of of flames. having violated immigration laws. Thus he is free at About the same time, the Kamata station of the Keihin least while his court case is pending...which may take Kyükö Line also was attacked with Molotov cocktails, years. Reynolds, who lives in Hiroshima, is also and the trains were brought to a stop. In the vicinity awaiting the results of his appeal. of both these Kamata stations, exchanges of Molotov AMPO is planning to run a series of articles on the cocktails and tear gas volleys continued until late at Japanese Immigration laws, including reports on the night. Also near the Kamata and Ikegaml stations of pending deportation cases, on the shocking and the TSkytl Ikegaml Line, hundreds of students attacked discriminatory treatment of Asian residents.... police boxes and built barricades of buses. 11 especially Chinese and Koreans....and an analysis of At Tokyo station, some 500 students jumped off the the new and even tougher Immigration Bill which has platform onto the tracks at 3:53 PM. Some of them been drawn up by the Government. broke Into the central signaling center, and the Yamate Loop Line and other lines were brought to a stop temporarily. After 5:00 PM, about 500 students belonging to the ML faction got off trains at Shinagawa station and threw Molotov cocktails into the Shinagawa police station. Part of the entrance to the police station Yoshikawa Interview was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, they seized a (Continued from,page 4) bus near the police station and rammed it into a police water-cannon truck. wnere tnert is a base. Another example...on the last Memorial Day of the Japanese Navy, Yokosuka Behelren... * » * * * gathered at the station and, together with a Folk Gue­ Japanese Socialist Party rilla group, began a march toward the base. The fcas« The Japanese Socialist Party had planned to hold, on authorities were shocked, and closed down the base to the morning of November 17, an on-the-spot meeting of all visitors long before the scheduled closing time, protest near Haneda, to be followed by a march towards claiming "bad weather". the airport. However, on the day before this scheduled meeting, the Party decided at the last minute to On Future Strategy cancel the meeting and demonstration. It based its decision on "high-level political judgment" that if it First of all we have to distribute sucn papers as were involved in "extremist action," this would be We Got the Brass as widely as possible, and urge sold­ disadvantageous for the Party in the forthcoming iers to edit and publish their own papers. Through these general elections. This decision came in spite of the papers they should try to organize a unified national fact that, on November 15, 80 percent of the delegates network of resisting soldiers. Then, taking some oppor­ to a national conference had voted In favor of holding tunity... say for example Feb. 7 of next year, the the on-the-spot meeting. The executive1 committee in anniversary of the date when the bombing of the North charge of organizing the November 17 rally refused to began...express their opposition to the war by taking accept this decision and went ahead with the meeting unified action inside their camps in cooperation with and demonstration as planned. The demonstration on the Japanese movement, which will stage demonstrations the morning of the 17th was attended by some 1,500, on the seme day. ...And in particular, as the Japan-U.S. and there were clashes with the riot police. Joint Statement made clear, the leaders of the two countries consider the Korean situation to be "very The Japanese Socialist Party views its protest dangerous", which means that fighting in Korea may erupt actions through November 17 as having been successful. after the Vietnam War has ended, or even before it has It laid particular emphasis on its Central Rally of ended. In that case Japanese Self-Defense Forces will November 16, which was attended by about 50,000 persons. probably be sent to Korea. Thus the activities of GIs The Socialist Party's demonstrations all ended In South Korea are becoming more and more important. peacefully. And Just as it le becoming more important strategically The General Council of Labor Unions (Söhyö) had no It is becoming more active in fact; there is a growing particular plans for taking any action on November 17. resistance movement among the GIs there, which we expect However, about 800 members of the National Railway soon to make contact with resisting GIs here, and event­ Locomotive Engineers' Union (Döryokusha Rödö Kumial) ually with the movement Inside the Japanese military. held an Independent meeting and demonstration on the /wro morning of November 17 to protest the brutal suppression If we Include unions which took protest actions such as by the riot police of their demonstration on the night shop meetings, the total number of participating unions of November 16. At that time, they had suffered one would be about 67 unions. The central Issues were arrest and more than 100 Injuries. political ones, such as protests against Sato's visit General Council of Labor Unions (Söhyö) to the United States, demands for the return of A3 its first effort in the 1970 struggles, Söhyö Okinawa, and demands that the Security Treaty be carried out a United Action on November 13. The abrogated. The November 13 United Action had the transport unions carried out an early-morning strike, largest number of participating unions in any political and strikes were held also by the Teachers' Union and strike since the Security Treaty struggles of i960. other government employees, by employees of public However, most of the strikes ended within one or two enterprises such as the Postal Workers' Union and the hours, and they were not very broadly based. As a Telegraph Workers' Union, as well as unions of workers result, the strikes had almost no effect on the general in private industries. Altogether 51* local Industrial situation. unions Joined the strike, which began in the morning Okinawa vand continued until the afternoon all over the nation. A protest strike was held all over the Islands by the By the east exit of the Shinjuku station, some 1,500 Okinawa Reversion Council (Sokoku Fukkikyo). According Behelren demonstrators joined bystanders to form a crowd to figures tabulated by the sponsors, altogether 64 of about 5,000. About 7:30 in the evening, persons unions with 57,000 members participated in strikes on in this crowd threw Molotov cocktails at the police. November 13. In addition, 40 organizations belonging * * * * to the Reversion Council, with about 40,000 members, Behelren also participated in some form of protest activities In the afternoon of November 16, the Tokyo Behelren on November 13. A big rally of some 100,000 people sponsored a mass rally at Hlblya Amphitheater to was held on November 13 at a public park in Naha. oppose Sato's visit to Washington. The Metropolitan After the meeting protesters marched to the Naha Naval Police Board earlier had prohibited a Behelren demon­ Base, where clashes occurred between demonstrators and stration that day, but Behelren immediately filed a riot police. 86 persons were reported injured, three lawsuit against this action. On the morning of of them seriously. 47 of the Injured persons were November 16, the district court ruled that the police policemen. prohibition ought to be canceled and tJhe demonstration On the evening of November 17, a rally was held by permitted. However, 30 minutes after the Court ruling the Reversion Council near the U.S. Kadena Air Base to was handed down, the authorities resorted to a notorious protest Sato's Washington visit. It was attended by emergency measure: the Prime Minister's right of an estimated 55,000 people. Students belonging to the "objection," from which there is no recourse. Chükaku and Kakumaru factions attacked the Kadena Air Consequently, it was impossible for Behelren to Base and nearby police boxes with Molotov cocktails carry out the day's demonstration legally, even though and battled with the police. Ten students were more than 15,000 people packed the Hlblya Park. reported arrested, and several were bitten by dogs A characteristic feature of the day's action was the released by the U.S. security forces at Kadena. fact that vast numbers of "non-sect" radicals (meaning The slogans adopted by the Reversion Council for Its people who are radical but have no affiliation with rallies indicated that the Okinawa Reversion movement political groups) were unable to participate in the is moving away from emotional demands for Okinawa's "armed struggle" because combat groups were organized return to Japan; attention is now being focused on strictly along the line of the political groups. opposition to the Ampo system itself and on demands These multitudes of students, workers and citizens for the removal of military bases. flowed into Behelren's rally, and then organizing them­ Rallies on November 15 and 16 selves into several major groups started their own On the afternoon and evening of November 15, altogether spontaneous actions for the rest of the day, and some 21 citizens' demonstrations took place in Tokyo and of them until the morning of November 17. other cities in response to an appeal from the June There were about 5,000 Behelren students who formed Action Committee Opposing the Vietnam War and the a unified contingent. After the rally they boarded Security Treaty. On the same day, workers belonging railways and appearing here and there all through the to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) night engaged in street guerrilla fighting in Shinjuku, held their own rally at the Amphitheater in Hlblya Shinagawa, Yokohama and elsewhere. Early In the Park to protest Sato's visit to America. More than morning of November 17, they joined workers and citizens 10,000 militant workers and students attended. who held the last demonstration for the whole campaign On November 16, meetings and demonstrations opposing near Haneda. Sato's visit were held all over Japan. They Included Citizens' contingents and local groups, despite the rallies sponsored by the Socialist Party and Söhyö, police ban, staged demonstrations In the city center, the Communist Party, and Behelren. creating several street rallies In front of the Asahi * * « * * Shimbun building and in the Ginza areas. What was the over-all meaning of the events of November 13 - 17? First of all, both In Okinawa and in the main islands of Japan proper, there was an unprecedented upsurge of popular militancy. All observers agreea tnat tactics of revolutionary SUBSCRIBE TO AMPO! violence — Including the use of explosives and Molotov cocktails — are becoming more and more widely accepted among militant students and workers. At the same time, the oppressive actions of the riot police Our financial position is very simple. We raised the are also being escalated. Police techniques now money to put out the first two Issues. That money is include lock-outs of entire portions of Tokyo, now gone,-and from this time forward we must support increased use of checkpoints to keep unauthorized ourselves by subscriptions. We sent out many free persons out of sensitive areas, random searching of copies of issues one and two in order to gain readers. personal baggage carried by pedestrians, cancellation AFTER THIS ISSUE NO MORE FREE. ISSUES OF AMPO WILL BE of airline flights, the organization of vigilante bands SENT OUT. Sorry, but we just don't have the money. to help the police hunt down demonstrators, as well as If you want to continue receiving AMPO, please send the usual tactics of mass arrests and Indictments of money, or, if you are a publication, write us about demonstrators, followed by protracted terms of deten­ an exchange subscription. tion and court battles for most of them. Thus, the Japanese New Left has demonstrated again $6 for six monthly issues airmail outside Japan. that it is capable of mobilizing thousands of young ¥1,500 for six monthly issues in Japan. workers and students for fighting pitched battles against the authoritarian power structure. However, Address: AMPO, Ishli Building this alone Is not enough. Such tactics of mass 6-44 Kagurazaka violence can succeed only If they sweep up large Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan segments of the general public and create a political crisis so serious that the reactionary government is forced to back down. This point was not reached by the struggles culminating in November 17. /Xc&frnJ ZU^UUÙOUJ

This packet is designed to give information and to help you respond to the issues introduced. To change policy, or images, or understandings of history means action in your community.

What can you do?

1. RESEARCH THE POWER AND RELATIONSHIPS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: who holds power and with what commitments? what is the relationship of your community to Asia? what is the federal government involvement in your community? what are the industries military bases, etc. which shape the economy of your area? what is in your school curricula about Asia? What is in the libraries? What is in the media - radio, TV, newspapers? who controls the media and with what commitments? Look at the churches - where does their money come from and where does it go? What involvements do the churches have in Asia?

Here are some materials which will help you in your researching:

"The Care and Feeding of the Power Structure" by Jack Minus, 150 SCEF, 3210 West Broadway, Louisville, Ky. NACLA RESEARCH METHODOLOGY GUIDE, 250 North American Congress on Latin America, P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, New York 10025 The University-Military Complex: A directory and related documents $1.25 (NACLA - see above) Where It's At, A Guide to Community Organizing $1.00 New England Free Press, 2^5 Roxbury Street, Boston, Mass. 02119 How to Research Your Own Hometown 150 REP, Box 56l-A, Detroit, Michigan 48232

2. BRING ATTENTION TO THESE ISSUES IN YOUR COMMUNITY AND SCHOOL: here are a few ideas for doing that - - look to JUNE 23 (the day the Security Treaty extends automatically unless terminated by either party) as a day for some action in your community: a teach-in? "spontaneous" theatre in the shopping centers or schools? leaflets? August 6, Hiroshima Day, is another important day to use for raising issues before the wider public. Some of the materials attached are included to show you what other groups have done.

- after your research, or as you research your community, what do you find which you would like to share with a wider public? Use that as a key to education, e.g. if a military installation in your area is a link you have with the massive military presence in Asia, perhaps that is a good place to center your actions, and begin your public education.

- study groups, teach-ins, alternative classes, are important if we are to under­ stand new realities and to educate others. Perhaps this packet, with its brief bibliography could be the beginning of what you could learn in a group about the U.S. in Asia. Topics of a study or teach-in might be such areas as: Japanese expansion in Asia, the student revolt in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, Okinawa, Vietnam and its relation to the issues of «apart and the U.S. in Asia, church mission activity in Asia. Set up an alternative curriculum for a class at the high school, which you think has failed up to now to deal with the issues of Asia and the U.S. Recomment that the library (public and high school)

4 subscribe to materials listed in the bibliography or journals and newsletters listed in the guide, and have those materials available in their stacks.

- clip advertisements and articles in your local newspaper about Asia - what kinds of counter-information does your community need to be informed? How can you provide that kind of information? How can you challenge the reporting and the images in the local news media?

These four groups are involved in the issues of this packet and have people and resources to assist you in your study/action:

Concerned Asian Scholars their bulletin is $4 general subscription Room 305, 1737 Cambridge Street a year; the CCAS has some chapters about Cambridge, Mass. 02138 the country also, they are developing educational materials.

Committee of Returned Volunteers includes many young people who have served National Office - Box 380 abroad in Peace Corps, mission projects, etc. Cooper Station, New York, N.Y. 10003 Particular concerns are U.S. policy toward Asia, Africa and Latin America; monthly news­ letter, studies on various issues, a number of local CRV groups in various cities.

Asian Americans for Action Newsletters and other publications; groups 225 Lafayette Street, Room 713 around the country New York, New York 10012

Pacific Studies Center $5 subscription to their magazine which 1963 University Avenue includes articles on their research work; East Palo Alto, Calif. 9*601 an important alternative source of infor­ mation and action suggestions. C**tm#tf*#fc *# Concerned /Vs/ari Scholars

Purpose & POLICY STATEMENTS Japan Policy We oppose continuation of the U.S.­ Japan security treaty, which has compro­ mised Japanese independence by turning Statements Japan into a bulwark of American empire in Asia and forcing her into a posture of hostility to China.

(In response to requests from readers, we We support the efforts of Japanese are reprinting the CCAS Statement of Pur­ who seek to reduce rather than heighten pose and the Policy Statements formulated tensions in Asia by opposing nuclear at the CCÀS conference in Boston, March armaments and the remilitarization of 28-30, 1969) Japan.

We also support the reversion of STATEMENT OF PURPOSE Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the removal of American bases from the Ryu- We first came together in opposition kyus. Meanwhile, immediate measures to the brutal aggression of the United should be instituted to assist the popu­ States in Vietnam and to the complicity lation of Okinawa and other areas now or silence of our profession with regard used as military bases to readjust their to that policy. Those in the field of economy to peaceful pursuits. Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. Vietnam We are concerned about the present unwil­ lingness of specialists to speak out against The CCAS calls for an immediate end the implications of an Asian policy com­ to the bombing of Vietnam, an end to the mitted to ensuring American domination of genocidal war in that country and a with­ much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy drawal of U.S. troops to begin immediately. of this aim, and attempt to change this Because it has been pursued without regard policy. We recognize that the present to the social and historical realities of •structure of the profession has often Vietnam, the U.S. intervention has been perverted scholarship and alienated many racist and imperialist. Racist, because people in the field. of strategic and tactical decisions to reduce American casualties at the cost The CCAS seeks to develop a humane of innumerable Vietnamese lives and hopes. and knowledgeable understanding of Asian Imperialist, because the only government societies and their efforts to maintain the U.S. will tolerate in Vietnam is one cultural integrity and to confront such which serves as an agent of its policy. problems as poverty, oppression, and im­ Despite pretenses that negotiations are perialism. We realize that to be students being pursued in earnest, the U.S. govern­ of other peoples, we must first understand ment has not altered the misconceptions our relations to them. and predilections which led to involvement in Vietnam. The CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on We call for: Asia which too often spring from a paro­ chial cultural perspective and serve 1. Withdrawal of troops to begin selfish interests and expansionism. Our immediately; organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for 2. Immediate removal of all support both Asian and Western scholars, a pro­ from the Thieu-Ky regimç in order to vider of central resources for local chap­ allow the re-establishment of poli­ ters, and a community for the development tical balances,in Vietnam; of anti-imperialist research.

49 3. Recognition of the National Li­ beration Front as a participant in a broadly-based government of national union.

China We favor a new policy toward China, a policy of peace. On practical, politi­ cal, and moral grounds, we deplore United States attempts to subvert the People's Republic of China through policies of military encirclement and economic blockade.

We call for an end to America's twenty-year intervention in China's civil war, withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, and termination of all mil­ itary aid to the dictatorship of the KMT Government.

We urge diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China by the United States and normalization of eco­ nomic and cultural relations with that country. China should be admitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations and assume its rightful place on the Security Council.

Anti-Ballistic Missiles

The United States Government initially adopted the ABM as a counter to so-called Chinese "irrationality." As scholars of Asia, we consider this interpretation erroneous, and reject it as a basis for the ABM. Furthermore, the overwhelming superiority of American nuclear arms makes irrelevant an ABM deterrent.

Vol 3E, No. I, Och rie*?, êùfi$ ßillthn THE JOINT STATEMENT OF TWO PEOPLES ACROSS THE PACIFIC

Tokyo, Japan November 21, 1969 Washington, DC, USA November 21, 1969

We, citizens of Japan and citizens of the United States, denounce the results of this week's negotiations between the prime minister of Japan and the president of the United States as they are expressed in the joint commu­ nique issued from the White House earlier today.

It is clear that the negotiations regarding Okinawa have not been conducted in the interests of the people of Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the rest of Asia, but rather in the interests of perpetuating and extending American mili­ tary presence in that part of the world. The communique reveals an intent to bolster the American security system in Japan, and the economic and political controls that go along with it. It also insures that the people of Okinawa and mainland Japan, after many years of vigorous protest, will continue to see their homeland used as a staging area for military campaigns like the War in Vietnam.

Okinawa has been a military colony of the United States since the end of World War II. With almost total disregard for the dignity and livelihood of the people, the American command has militarized their island and enjoyed free use of the bases there for operations throughout the Pacific. The people of Okinawa have been exploited economically, politically, and culturally by a system which is, at its core, both racist and undemocratic. They live in constant danger from the existence of American military facilities, which include both nuclear stockpiles and chemical and biological weapons.

The agreement reached today (11/21/69) in the joint communique clearly violates the consistent demand of the people of Okinawa and mainland-Japan for immediate and unconditional reversion to Japanese administration. By trans­ ferring legal title of Okinawa to Japan while leaving the military capacity of US bases substantially intact, both governments hope to mute opposition to the entire security system represented by the US-Japan Security Treaty. On the other hand, today's agreement, by allowing for special arrangements regarding nuclear weapons and prior consultation vis EI vis the bases in Okinawa, establishes the possibility that the same conditions might later be applied to the bases in mainland Japan. The apparent "Japanization" of Okinawa, in this sense, will in fact lay the basis for the "okinawanization" of Japan.

The US-Japan Security Treaty, which provides for the stationing of over one hundred American military facilities in mainland Japan, infringes on Japanese sovereignty, jeopardizes the life and property of the people, and implicates Japan in US military operations throughout Asia. Its effect is to increase the insecurity of Japan by setting-that country's interests over against those of ther Asian neighbors. It forms the basis of co-operative neo-colonial exploitation of other Asian countries by the US and Japan. In addition, the military alliance based on the Security Treaty, accopmanied by the strengthening of the military forces of Japan, will be a direct threat to the independence of other Asian countries. A majority of the Japanese people oppose the treaty, and masses of them are actively struggling to block its renewal next June. Joint Statement, 11/21/69 page two

We therefore urge both American and Japanese people to make known their opposition to the deal which has just been negotiated in Washington. * We call for support of the demands of the people of Okinawa and mainland Japan for immediate and unconditional reversion, and for an end to the Security Treaty. We call upon both governments to undertake the rapid dis­ mantling of the US military in all parts of Japan, in accordance with Japan's "Peace Constitution." We believe this would lead to the recovery of full independence for Japan and would end present American domination and prevent future Japanese domination of East Asia, especially Korea and Taiwan.

Signed:

Stewart Meachan, Co-Chairman, New Makota Oda, Chairman of Mobilization Committee to End the Beheiren, Japan War in Vietnam Marcus Raskin, Co-Director, Howard Zinn, Professor, Boston Institute for Policy University Studies Noam Chomsky, Professor, MIT David Dellinger Norman Wilson Norma Becker, Co-Chairman, Fifth Pacific Rim Coalition Avenue Peace Parade Committee Assian Americans for Action Franz Schurman, Professor, UC, Committee of Concerned Asian Berkeley Scholars Barbara Reynolds, Author Committee of Returned George Willoughby, Chairman, A Volunteers Quaker Action Group Ernest Young, Professor, University of Michigan *** *** *** I wish to add my name in support of the above statement, the liberation of Okinawa and an end to the US-Japan Security Treaty.

Name (pr int) S ignature Address Organization 1.

2..

3.

Please return to the PACIFIC RIM COLAITION, Box 380 Cooper Station,tfïC 10003 Schedule of Events The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. view Thursday,- 7:30 p.m. Analysis each other only across the Pacific. Franz Schurmann - Imperialism in the China, Japan and all of southeast Pacific Carol Brightman - Our People's War Asia border upon it. The Pacific is "the last dimension of indi­ Friday genous Asian power' and Asia is T« a « K - X* 9:30 Films over one-third of the world's land area containing two-thirds 10:30 Workshops on: of the world's people. Inevitably, Thailand Latin America & the the Pacific is the central target Vietnam Pacific Rim for America's imperialist thrust. Laos International Monetary Japan System Former Secretary of State Rusk Korea Foreign Aid once stated that 'the U.S. must Micronesia Japanese Student Move- control every wave of the Pacific.' Malaysia & ment Singapore Revolutionary War Theory- The weapons of domination in the Philippines & Practice imperialist arsenal are varied; 6 Indonesia MO ™ C ounter-insurgency foreign aid, development banks, 12:30 - 1:30 lunch and corporate investments all function under the shadow of the 1:30 - 3:30 continuation of largest military machine ever Work si ops assembled. The extent of American Li:00 - Analysis: domination and intervention ranges Makoto Oda - "Okinawa & the from open warfare in Vietnam, Laos, Security Treaty .Struggle" and Thailand, to partial military 7:30 - Panel: Building the occupation in Japan and Korea; Struggle at Home from neo-colonial domination in (action in the U.S.) the Philippines to classic-colonial p*N£LS control in Micronesia. Every non-socialist nation in the Pacific Rim has been brought or beaten into economic and/or military The Pacific Rim, the nations whose treaties which the U.S. dominates.., destinies are tied to the Pacific 4P Ocean, is only just emerging as a # geopolitical unit in the popular mind. Yet it is not only the stage upon which the Vietnam War is enacted but may well be the arena in which the fate of the imperial dragon is decided. VIETNAM and the Pacific Rim Strategy

by Peter Wiley

Leviathan Vol. I No. 3 June 196°

* * *. *

For more than a hundred years the United States has been a Pacific power. But since the end of World War II and the collapse of the British, French, and Japanese empires^ the United States has become the major Pacific power. Itfhile the industrial nations remain the largest trading center for the United States and U. 3. investment is increasing in Europe twice as fast as in the Pacific, trade is increasing in the Pacific faster than in Europe. Nearly half of the United .States ' total trade in 1966 was with the Pacific where Japan is the United States' largest trading partner after Canada. But more important than present economic activity is the vast potential of the area. If the United States can get Japan to open the door and the problems of "underdevelopment" in Southeast Asia can be solved, the United otates could con­ trol a virtual mare nostrum whose economic potential far surpasses the advanced and stagnating economies of Europe. If the United States can continue to keep Japan in the position of a junior partner, while countering the threat of revolutionary nationalism, it can gain control over the Pacific and organize its markets in a way that would not be conceivable in Western Europe.

# * * •*

Japan

Although our attention is concentrated on Vietnam and Southeast Asia due to the prolonged military confrontation there, Japan is in fact the pivot of the United States' economic and military offensive in Asia. Japan, and island - 2 - bases like Okinawa, have been the most important forward staging areas in the U.S. interventions, Korea and Vietnam. Japan is industrialized, seemingly stable politically, and often a willing partner in U.S. expan­ sionist designs. Japan is the second largest market in the world after Canada for U.S. goods, the largest mar­ ket for U.S. agricultural goods, and an important target for U.S. investors and exporters who so far have been prevented from penetrating the Japanese economy like they have the European.

But Japan presents a problem and the solution to the problem is perhaps one of the most important reasons for the United States' continued presence in Southeast Asia. Japan is an island economy with a small resource bfse, a rapidly growing population, and a domestic market that is limited in relation to the rapidly expanding productive capacity of its modern economy. In order to keep up its present rate of economic growth it must have larger and larger foreign markets and supplies of raw materials. Be­ cause of the importance of Japan to the United itates in the Pacific, the United >tates, since the occupation, has assumed a great deal of responsibility for managing the expansion of the Japanese economy as well as its own. Eisenhower explained in 19S>h that the loss of Indochina "would take away that region Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss of Japan to the free world are just incalculable."

The possibility of reorientation toward China and Russia is strong if net "natural". China and Russia are Japan's logical trading partners for reasons of transporta­ tion cost and economic specialization. Prewar Japanese imperialism was based largely on the complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies. China provided a market for Japanese textiles and industrial goods and at the same time supplied important raw materials like cotton, iron ore, and coal while helping to feed the Japanese population with rice and soya. Ideology and pressures from the United States have not prevented the Japanese from trying to reestablish this trade pattern since the Cold War. Trade grew rapidly in the fifties, was slowed down by Chi­ nese political opposition in the late fifties, an«-' began to pick up again until the Cultural Revolution. The future of Sino-Japanese relations is unsure at this point although Japanese businessmen feel that trade with China this year will pick up perhaps equalling the record level of 1966. In addition Japan io involved in several joint ventures with Russia in eastern Siberia designed to develop the resources of the area. - 3 -

The United States is clearly wary lest Japan first reorient its trade policy and then follow this change with a more independent political stance in all of Asia. To prevent this reorientation the United States is encouraging Japan tr reestablish its relationship with the Southeast Asian regioi of its former East Asian Coprosperity Sphere, while directing the rest of its overseas economic activities toward the Wes4- Southeast Asia is already providing important raw materials for Japanese industry (bauxite from Thailand, oil from Indo­ nesia) and will provide more in the future as long as the Southeast Asian countries are amenable to the exploitation of their resources by new and old colonial masters. Until re­ cently, however, the region did not live up to Japan1s expec­ tations as a market for goods and investment. Japan turned instead to the United States, Canada, and Australia and began to develop new markets and sources of raw materials in Latin America. Japanese foreign investment in the "under­ developed" countries is presently shifting away from Latin America and toward Southeast Asia, particularly the United States' neo-colonial dependencies, Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand. Despite this shift, 26 percent of Japanese foreign investment in 1968 was in Latin America while only lU percent was in other Asian countries.

Significantly, the United States has provided a surrogate market for Japan in Asia which helps to keep Japan out of the Chinese or Soviet trade orbit. From 19u5 to 1962 U.S.military expenditures in Japan contributed significantly to the GNP and paid for nearly 20 percent of Japanese imports, a very impor­ tant factor in a country which until the recent boom has had chronic balance of payments problems due to the necessity to import large quantities of goods. In addition, U.S.military involvement has provided the markets that Japan needs in the "underdeveloped" countries of Asia. The Japanese economy has thrived off the export of goods to Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and other American outposts. The impact of the escalation of U.S. military involvement on the Asian mainland can be illus­ trated both by the Korean war which initiated the Japanese economic "miracle" and by the way the economy began to accel­ erate with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. In 1956-66 the GNP rose 2.7 percent, in 1966-67, in comparison, it rose by 7.5 percent reading a fantastic 10 percent in 1968.

The relationship between the tempo of Japanese economic development and U.S. military involvement is more complicated than a simple accelarating effect from U.J. military expendi­ tures in Japan .and Asia. Both the Korean and the Vietnamese interventions caused rapid upswings in the U. >. domestic economy, the largest market for Japanese goods, which in turn stittulated the Japanese economy. In general, Japanese econ­ omic health is tied in large part to U.S. military adventures. -It -

The Strategy

The corporations in the forefront of Pacific economic expansion see the development of a Pacific Rim strategy as the key to orienting Southeast Asia and Japan toward the West and integrating them into a market system under U.S. hegemony. Operating through their research arm, the Stanford Research Institute, these corporations (Kaiser, Union Oil, Bechtel, Bank of Anerica, Castle and Cook, Utah Construction and Mining, and Tenneco, to name a few) began to articulate a conscious strategy beginning in 1967 as an outgrowth of their expanded activities in the area.

At the core of the Pacific system, as they see it, are the advanced industrial nations, Japan and the United States, and the three industrializing nations, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The greater part of the flow of trade and in­ vestment is between these countries and is based on a certain degree of specialization. The United States trade with all the nations exporting a wide variety of goods, most important of which are raw materials, agricultural goods, consumer dur­ ables, and capital goods. In addition the United States has invested and will continue to invest in all the Asian coun­ tries with particular emphasis on Australia and Japan, where direct U. S. investment is presently not welcome. Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand export raw materials and agricultural goods largely to Japan. In Australia raw mate­ rials in particular are being developed for sale in Japan with Japanese and American capital. Japan produces textiles and a great variety of consumer and capital goods for the same markets as the United States while also investing wherever possible.

The United States and then Japan stand at the apex of the hierarchy of economic development. They draw resources from the next tier, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, while sell­ ing goods in these markets. These advanced countries, moreover, regard the integration of the neo-colonial countries around the Pacific Rim into their triangular and quadrilateral economic relations as essential to the future development of an inter­ national division of labor in the Pacific. First, because the neo-colonial countries are at a very low level of development, their growth could be spectacular and their potential as mar­ kets far greater than advanced countries. Second, the advanced countries view the raw materials of these countries as increas­ ingly important to their economic well-being.

*- -5 -

The greatest of all the seas and the last to be used on a large scale by civilized man bids fair to become in its turn the first in importance. The empire that shifted from the Mediterranean will, in the lifetime of those now children, bid fair to shift once more westward to the Pacific. -Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, speaking in San Francisco, May, 1903.

Despite the immense sophistication of the internatio corporation and the overwhelming strength of the American military state, the success of the Pacific Rim strategy is far from a foregone conclusion. Indeed it is subject to pressures from without and within due largely to the growth of revolutionary nationalism on the one hand and competition in the international economy on the other.

# # # *

Besides the pressures from outside, the development of the Pacific is threatened from within particularly by the complex relations between the United States and Japan. While the United States has fought in Southeast Asia in part to secure the area for Japan, Japan still remains a serious competitor. In Thailand until recently, for ex­ ample, Japan was the largest investor. Japan is pursuing new markets aggressively; the director of Pacific opera­ tions for one of the largest American firms in the area commented raaentQy that "little by little Japan is taking over the Pacific."

Japan's most serious threat is in the U.S. domestic market in steel, autos, certain consumer goods, and elec­ tronic components. The steel industry in particular is adamant about imposing measures, whether higher tariffs or quotas, which will cut down Japanese imports. Many corpor­ ations are caught in a dilemma. If the decline of the United States' competitive position is a long-term trend due to factors like inflation which cannot be controlled, they will have no choice but to restrict imports.

U.S. corporations argue that they must restrict Jap­ anese imports if Japan is not willing to reciprocate by opening the door to U.S. direct investments. Despite a recent token liberalization policy, Japan prevents Ameri­ can corporations from gaining control of Japanese firms or *v - 6 -

from setting up subsidiaries by limiting U.S. investment to joint ventures controlled by Japanese capital and to stock market investment. The United States is eager to compete equally within (read dominate) the Japanese economy by set­ ting up its own operations and purchasing Japanese firms. If the United States is allowed to Americanize the Japanese economy as it has the European, Japan, with its fantastic rate of growth, could became the major market for U.S. capital.

Faced by a variety of pressures from the United States, Japan might embark on a more independent course. Jhe is already arming herself with destroyers, subs, and American jets at the urging of the United States. Tt is forseeable that she might decide in the future that she can exist with­ out living under the United rtates' nuclear umbrella, partic­ ularly if she has more amicable relations with countries like China who will remain hostile as long as Japan serves as an outpost for U.S. military adventures. The consequences of splitting with the United States cannot be taken lightly. Besides the benefits of imperialism without militarism, Japan would lose the annual "subsidy" from U.J. military expendi­ tures outside of Japan. Japan would have to be pushed quite a ways by a strong trend toward protectionism in the United States and more adamant attempts to open the door before any fundamental change would take place. The seeds of this con­ flict do exist, however, and they are growing.

Finally there are the political liabilities of an alli­ ance with the United States. Japan is aware that subordina­ tion to the United States means inability to break out of the cycle of involvement in U.S. military adventures, a distinct problem for an Asian nation with a large, militant left. The United States and the üutual Security Treaty which allows the United States to ha-ve bases in Japan have been a target of the left for years.

Notes

This article could not have been written without the research and assistance of David Ransome who has dealt with many of these subjects particularly with relation to SRI in the Peninsula Observer.

1. U.S. concern with regional configurations of power in Asia is nothing new. A State Department memorandum of December 10, 19l0, explained that if Japan should succeed in driving the British out of the Far East, "our general diplomatic and strategic position would be considerably weakened - by our loss of Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets (and our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self- sufficient) as well as by insurmountable restrictions s - 7 -

upon our access to the rubber, tin, jute, and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions."

2. Although the statistics are somewhat inflated by in­ cluding trade with Canada as Pacific, not Atlantic trade, trade is still increasing faster in the Pacific.

3. It would be incorrect to insist that U.S. policy in the Pacific is totally monolithic. There are a variety of differences in outlook among those who affect decisions. The State Department, in the short run,, might see the prob­ lem in a different light than the leading corporations. But in the long run these conflicts are not basic. Differences tend to be synthesized and different positions tend to reinforce each other, not the opposite. Liberal critics of U.S. policy in the Senate, however, are in a very different position. They cannot affect U.S. policy in any basic way in the long or short run beyond ineffectual sniping at in­ dividual programs like foreign aid. There is no reason to devote space to reiterating the arguments of C. Wright Mills (The Power Elite), William Domhoff (Who Rules America and other essays), David Eaking in a forthcoming book, and literally dozens of rnuckrakers about the complete interpén­ étration of the largest industrial and financial institutions and the U.S. government. Behind the massive U.S. military presence in ese firms have been spreading out, chiefly into the Asia, Japan is once again emerging as a major pow­ nations of the underdeveloped world. The countries er. Reconstructed zaibatsu firms like Mitsui, Mitsu­ of East Asia, for obvious historical, cultural, and bishi, and Sumitomo are rapidly moving to exploit geographical reasons, have become the prime focus the resources and markets of the Far East. Newly of Japanese business and government. expanding Japanese trade, investment, and aid are Business Week reported in 1967 that "Evidence creating neo-colonial relationships between Japan of Japan's economic presence in Asia is easy to see. and the underdeveloped countries of East Asia. This Japanese cars jam the streets of many Asian capi­ neo-colonialism will mean in the long-run only ex­ tals. Along Hong Kong's shoreline, the night is gau­ ploitation, stagnation, and continued poverty for the dy with neon signs advertising Sony radios, Canon peoples of tVip region. cameras, and Matsushita appliances. In Burma, where Japan's Hino make of buses is manufactured, The Push into Asia people run to catch the "Hino, " not the bus. Along For the better part of twenty years following the Saigon docks, Vietnamese stevedores chatter ex­ the demise of the Japanese empire in World War II, citedly when a shipload of new Honda motorcycles the Japanese concerned themselves with rebuilding arrives. Taiwanese children eagerly chew caramels the country's industrial base.l made by Japan's Morinaga Confectionary Co."5 During the last decade, the Japanese Gross The growing significance of this Japanese pene­ National Product has been growing at well over 10% tration of Asia merits a good deal of attention. each year, in real terms, and in 1968, the growth Trade --the Roots of Exploitation rate reached an astounding 14.8%. Japan is now the Japanese trade with the countries of East Asia world's third leading industrial power behind the has been growing steadily during the past decade. United States and the Soviet Union, having overtaken In 1957, Japanese imports from the region accounted West Germany last year. Japan is the world's lar­ for 14.5% of all Japan's imports. This figure rose gest producer of ships, cameras, radios, and pianos slightly to 15.4% in 1967. Similarly, Japanese ex­ and is second only to the U. S. in the production of ports to the other nations of the Far East comprised automobiles. 3 26.4'}? of all Japanese exports in 1957. This pro­ But this growth has created important problems. portion grew to 28.2% in 1967. Japan is now the As the U. S. Department of State has observed, Ja­ leading trader with Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong pan, as an island nation, "must have access to de­ Kong; second with the Philippines, South Korea, and pendable sources of raw materials at reasonable Malaysia; and third with Singapore.7 prices and have the opportunity to develop expanding Japanese imports from the countries of East and reliable markets for its exports which are essen­ Asia consist overwhelmingly of raw materials; ore, tial to economic expansion and domestic political rubber, timber, maize, etc. To these countries, stability. "^ In recent years, driven to find addi­ Japan exports manufactured consumer and capital tional sources of raw materials and markets, Japan­

Reprinted with permission from the Pacific Research 5 World Empire Telegram Vol. I, No. 2, September, 1969. goods, chiefly iron and steel, cement, machinery, Thai maize industry, and then proceeded to buy the chemical fertilizers, and cotton and rayon fabrics.8 maize at well below the world market price.,*8 The In overall terms, Japan is dependent on Southeast r» Asia alone for 39% of its iron ore imports, nearly Japanese imports from East Asia: all of its crude rubber purchases, and 53'i of its tim­ Ryukyu Islands—sugar, iron and steel ber. In return, Southeast Asia absorbs 40% of Ja­ scrap pan's chemical exports (mainly fertilizers), 24% of 9 South Korea— its iron and steel, and 28% of its machinery. trates Small, inefficient local industry usually cannot __ l ,, f-\ n On/H C t (l û 1 onv*0 v^ HUM dUU OLCC1 oCItip, compete with Japanese exports, and as a result, the copper and copper alloy countries of the region are forced to earn foreign Thailand maize, oil-seeds, exchange through the export of raw materials in or­ crude rubber der to buy most of the consumer goods and nearly _ ,__ , ^\i I _C/JOnO /~>1*li/~i/^ V*1 ihnA v» un been», ciuue ruuuer, all of the capital goods they need to keep their econ­ iron ore and concentrates, omies above water. The prices of these raw mater­ tin ials have been steadily falling, and there has been a ^^i Y*/"\ n Q i^rl ctûAl £2/"*Y*Q Y\ 11U11 «11U aLccl taCItip, rise in the prices of the consumer and capital goods heavy oil that the underdeveloped nations are forced to import. . _ nn 1 CDC n*intiûrl nrtttnn [juiacö. giimeu coiiun This continuous worsening in the terms of trade re­ Philippines— —wooci. jute, flax, hemp, sults in chronic balance of trade deficits for the de­ manila fibers, ramie, veloping nations. Foreign exchange is drained, and iron and copper ore and these countries become increasingly unable to im­ concentrates port the various goods they need to create a decent Indonesia —oil-seeds, crude rubber, standard of living for their people. Without light crude petroleum and heavy industry of its own, underdeveloped Asia Sabah. Sarawak. will be doomed to economic stagnation. 10 ^ ^.i\ "r\/\ri /•> »•* 11 /~1/I* r"^/~i^~v»/~\l£^ii w^ — w ouu, ci uuu [Jen oieum Foreign Investment-- Monthly Economic Statistics of Japan, May, '69 the Road to Stagnation Japan's commercial expansion in Asia has by Japanese, with a $40 million stake, are the largest no means been limited to its trade. Japanese for­ foreign investors in Thailand. ^ eign investment in the region has also been growing In the Philippines, the Overseas Mineral Re­ rapidly. At the end of 1967, Japanese direct, pri­ sources Development Corp. (OMRD), a consortium vate, foreign investment totaled $1, 076 million. The of eleven Japanese mining firms, is investing in major part of this was located in Latin American copper and iron. Japanese financing has already primary industries. Japan's Asian investments were played a major role in the opening of some of the valued at $215 million, or about 20% of the total Philippines biggest mines, including Atlas, Marin- stake abroad. Japanese investment in the Far East, duque, Philex, and other copper and iron producers. however, is now rising faster than in any other re­ Japanese firms are also investing in forestry and gion, h fishing. 20 Japanese Asian investment is concentrated In Burma, Japex, a consortium of Mitsubishi, primarily in the extractive industries—oil, mining, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Fuji, is studying seismic forestry, fishing, and agriculture. Japanese firms tests to determine the feasibility of oil exploration are stumbling over themselves in their efforts to and production. 21 exploit the region's rich natural resources. Japanese oil firms are also exploring off the In Malaysia, where Japanese firms have $9.1 2 coast of South Korea. -2 Other Japanese companies million invested,* the Sumitomo Group companies, mine copper and zinc in South Korea. 23 along with the Teikoku Oil Co., are exploring for Like Western investors, Japanese corporations oil in the waters off Sabah. Teikoku is also explor­ are especially eager to exploit Indonesia's rich re­ ing inland. 13 Several Japanese mining firms, inclu­ sources. The various tax and other incentives pro­ ding Sumitomo Metal Mining and Mitsubishi Metal vided by General Suharto's military regime have Mining, are engaged in tin smelting in Malaysia, 1-1 sweetened Indonesia's investment potential for for­ one of the world's leading tin producers. Mitsui eign firms, and as of mid-1968, approved Japanese and Mitsubishi will soon cut timber in Malaysia's investment totaled $12.9 million, with much more in forests. 15 There is a substantial amount of Japanese 6 the proposal stage. 24 Japanese oil companies are capital in the Malayan Sugar Manufacturing Co.' joining the rush to'tap Indonesia's vast reserves. Several Japanese mining companies, including Japex has one rig in operation off the coast of North the two mentioned above, are also_exploiting tin Sumatra. The consortium is also involved in a joint and tungsten deposits in Thailand.'" In the area of venture with French interests in West New Guinea, agriculture, the Japan Feed Traders Association, close to the border with Australian-controlled East including Mitsui & Co., extended financing to the New Guinea. (West New Guinea has recently been ly generate. There is also a drain on foreign ex­ the scene of sever repression by the Indonesian go­ change reserves in so far as the required capital vernment. See the last issue of PR & WET. ) Another goods must be imported with local capital. Japanese consortium, Kyushu Oil Development Corp,, 25 In addition, these factories usually produce will explore for oil off southern Borneo. Japanese clothing, assemble electrical appliances, automo­ firms will also be engaged in a great variety of other biles, and other consumer durables for members business ventures. The OMRD will engage in general of the high-income groups, who are the only ones mining activities. The Indonesia Nickel Development able to purchase these goods in countrieS»wherethe Co., a consortium of nine Japanese firms including distribution of income is extremely concentrated. Nippon Mining, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Nippon The needs of the mass of the people go unsatisfi- Yakin Kogyo and Taiheiyo, is setting up a $78 mil­ ed.30 lion nickel mining .venture on Halmahera and the There are several reasons why Japanese in­ Moluccas Islands. In the lumber industry, Mitsu­ vestors are electing to assemble their cars and air bishi Shoji Kaisha and the Kokusaku Pulp Industry conditioners locally. 31 First, (and least important Co. arÄ,each setting up $2 million logging ven­ in the case of Asia) efficient native manufacturing tures. Toyo Menka Kaisha, Toyo Bussan Kaisha, ventures have sprung up in competition with Japan­ and the Nihon Kinka Hogei Co. will fish in Indone­ ese exports, forcing the Japanese to set up domes­ sian waters, primarily for lobster, while Arafura tic operations to preserve their share of the mar­ ket. Japanese investors-often defuse whatever eco­ nomic nationalism does exist by incorporating lo­ cal capital and utilizing local managers in these enterprises. Second, in some countries, when import tar­ iffs are set up to protect whatever infant industry there is, or, as in Thailand, to attract foreign in­ vestors, foreign firms, the Japanese among them, usually set up assembly plants using imported parts not covered by tariffs. Third, countries like Thailand and Indonesia provide attractive tax and other incentives, explic­ itly to attract foreign investment. Fourth, an important factor motivating Japa­ nese and other investors to set up their assembly operations locally are the incredibly low wages paid for unskilled, assembly-line labor throughout Asia. Business Week noted dryly in 1967 that "As prosperity at home pushes wages higher, Japanese manufacturers are turning to countries where la­ bor is cheaper for making some labor-intensive products and parts. " 32 Taiwan is one of those countries where "labor is cheaper. " Take this report from Business Abroad: "'Taiwan's workers produce 15 TV sets for the wages Americans get for making one, ' ob­ served economics minister K. T. Li recently. Li Pearls Ltd. will cultivate pearl oysters. ° Indo­ wasn't exaggerating. With Taiwan industrial wage nesia's rich soil is attracting Japanese agricultu­ rates 10 1/2 £ - an - hour and absolute worker pro­ ral ventures. Sumitomo hopes to start a rice plan­ ductivity higher than in the United States, Li may tation in a Djakarta suburb. Mitsui will cultivate have understated the case. The point is obvious maize for export to Japan in Mapoeng State, Suma­ 29 that Taiwan's dexterous, literate, and highly in­ tra. dustrial 13 million Chinese are probably the While the emphasis has been on investment in world's biggest labor bargain and the raison d'etre the primary industries, Japanese corporations have not confined their overseas activities in Asia to the for an investment boom that is also one of the fast- o o extraction of raw materials. Japanese consumer ,J goods' "manufacturing" operations are prolifera­ est-paced on the globe. " ° ting throughout the Far East. These enterprises Japanese companies aren't missing out on this are almost all assembly operations, using compo­ "boom". Hitachi, Toko, and Matsushita are assem­ nent parts and materials imported from Japan. As bling electrical appliances. Nippon Electric Co. , such, there is little linkage to the local economies with a Chinese partner, has started making cross­ in which they operate except the wages they direct­ bar system telephone exchanges. The Japanese are in control of the infant automobile assembly indus- try. Yue Loong Motor Co. , the pioneer firm in the pliances, while the Belgian firm of Setron is assem­ field, and two other companies are getting into op­ bling TV sets for Mitsubishi, National, and Nivi- eration with Japanese assistance. Asahi Kasei co. 40 Industrial Co. and a Chinese partner are setting up Japanese firms have electronical appliance a $4. 6 million plant to produce acrylic fiber, and assembly and textile operations in the Philippines Teijin Ltd. recently expanded its polyester produc­ and Hong Kong, as well. 41 tion. 34 The Japanese know a good thing when they There is practically no Japanese investment in see it, and from a corporate point of view, there's heavy industry in the Far East. Japanese corpora­ nothing better than cheap labor. tions prefer not to produce capital goods in the un­ South Korea is a country that competes stron­ derdeveloped and unstable economies of Asia. These gly with Taiwan for the honor of having the cheapest goods, unlike consumer items, can usually be pro­ labor in East Asia. Footwear News, discussing duced more cheaply in Japan itself. In the steel Korean workers in 1967, noted that "they do work industry, for example, giant Japanese superships transport cheaply huge quantities of iron ore from Asia, Australia, Latin America, and Canada to "A 'greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere' steel mills in Japan located practically right on with a difference is spreading out from Japan. the water. The steel, as a result, can be produ­ The World War II cry has a new meaning. It ced extremely cheaply. The same is true of most is with aid, trade, investment that the Japan­ other capital goods. Since heavy industry requires ese build toward dominance—amid some large amounts of capital that are unavailable in sounds of alarm. " unplanned, underdeveloped capitalist economies, Japan can continue to export capital goods to the U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 19, 1967 countries of Asia with no fear of local competi­ tion. Japanese and other foreign firms come to do­ cheap. Girls start off on an assembly line at from minate the strategic sectors of the economies of the $10 to $15 a month.... Wages are estimated to be region, and the substantial profits earned from 15 to 20 percent below Taiwan, well below Hong these foreign investments and remitted to the pa­ Kong, and not even comparable to Japanese lev­ rent countries deprive the host nations of capital els. "35 Japanese investment in Korea as of May, they need so desperately in order to promote their 1969, totaled $22. 7 million, second only to the own internal development. U. S. with $69 million. 36 Firms like Hitachi and Anti-socialist military leaders like Suharto in Matsushita Electric now assemble radios, TV's, Indonesia recognize that some development is ne­ refrigerators, air conditioners, and electronic cessary to minimize social unrest. For this rea­ equipment. Other Japanese firms like Teijin Ltd. son, they eagerly invite foreign capitalists to take produce gloves, shirts and textile fabric. 37 over the economies of their countries. The mili­ Automobile assembly plants account for the tary leaders of these Asian nations use foreign in­ bulk of the Japanese manufacturing investment in vestment to "buy" stability. The development that Thailand. Nissan, Toyota, Hino, Isuyu, and Mit­ results, however, is a retarded, lopsided growth subishi operations assemble over half of the ve­ emphasizing the extractive and import-substitution hicles purchased in Thailand. As usual, Japanese consumer goods industries. Continued reliance on foreign capital will make impossible the growth of labor-intensive textile concerns are on the scene. a diversified, internally complementary economy. Toyo Rayon has two synthetic fiber plants. Osaka All the while, foreign businessmen will continue to shipbuilding and Mitsui & Co. are producing gal­ fatten themselves off the resources, markets, and vanized sheet iron. Japanese firms in Thailand al­ peoples of the rest of Asia. 42 so make automobile and truck tires. 38 In Malaysia the manufacturing pattern is the same. Last year, Toyokogyo joined with French Enter Aid interests to assemble vehicles locally. Nissan and Toyota have vehicles assembled in Malaysia under To consolidate and extend the power of Japa­ contract. In the clothing industry, Japanese inte­ nese business in Asia, the Japanese government is rests own much of the Textile Corporation of Ma­ beginning to make more extensive use of foreign laya. Yawata Iron and Steel, along with the Malay­ economic "aid". In the past, Japan has spent con­ sian government, runs big steel works. This plant siderably less than 1% of its GNP on foreign aid. is one of the few examples of Japanese investment In 1964, for example, Japanese aid expenditures in heavy industry. 39 totalled only .41% of GNP, less than any other in­ In Singapore, Nissan builds busses and com­ dustrialized nation. Most of that aid consisted of mercial vehicles. Yamaha, Suzuki, and Honda are war reparations. These were bilateral economic interested in assembling motor cycles. In elec­ agreements tied mainly to the use of Japanese ma­ tronics, Sanyo and Sharp are already producing ap­ terials, equipment, and construction firms. 43 But things are changing. Japan joined the tion of economic assistance with these countries. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund in 1964 and Business Week observed at the time that "Behind accepted at that time, as a member of the Develop­ the emphasis of Sato's bid for a more active role in ment Assistance Committee, a pledge to raise its Asia is the need to keep this huge (-Japanese-) foreign aid allocation to 1% of GNP. 44 In 1966, economic machine rolling. " 52 Japan hosted the first Southeast Asia Economic De­ A month earlier, U.S. News & World Report velopment Conference and a follow-up session devo­ had noted that "Aid like investment, is closely ted to agriculture which set up the Special Agri­ linked to trade—tailored wherever possible to Jap­ cultural Fund. 45 japan was the driving force be­ anese needs. " 53 Japanese foreign aid is, indeed, hind the Asian Development Bank which was organ­ designed primarily to benefit Japanese business in ized in 1966. Japan pledged $200 million of the various important ways. 54 planned $1 billion initial capitalization and provided First, Japanese loans and export credits are the Bank's first president, Takeshi Watana. 46 accompanied by interest rates as high as 5 3/47c55 In 1967, Japan, along with the ten other na­ The big Japanese banks that often back these loans tions of the "Amsterdam Group," agreed to help profit handsomely from this foreign aid. refinance Indonesia's $3 billion foreign debt.47 Second, Japanese aid creates immediate mar­ Last year, the Japanese proposed an International kets for Japanese exports. Stabilization loans, Fund for Reconstruction of Vietnam. The Japanese used by the recipient countries to check inflation hope the Fund will provide aid to all of Indochina— by importing badly-needed consumer goods* provide Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam, as well as an important market for Japanese products. Japan's South Vietnam. The planned initial capitalization $110 million contribution to the Amsterdam Group's is $200 million, and the Japanese have pledged to $325 million allocation to Indonesia this year in­ provide 1/3 of the total.4' At a recent meeting cluded $65 million to finance the import of raw ma­ in Bangkok of the Ministerial Conference on the terials, spare parts, and other commodities—much Development of Southeast Asia, the Japanese Fo­ of which will come from Japan. 56 reign Minister, Kiichi Aichi, announced plans for Many other Japanese loans, especially those a stepped-up foreign aid program. 49 At the Board granted through the Export-Import Bank, require of Governors meeting of the Asian Development the purchase of Japanese goods. The Bank recent­ Bank in Sydney last April, the Japanese Finance ly gave Malaysia a loan of $50 million to finance Minister, ïakeo Fukuda declared that Japanese aid the import from Japan of telecommunications equip­ ment, earthmoving equipment, and radio and tele­ to Southeast Asia would be doubled within five years, 57 reaching $1 billion by 1973. 50 At the present time, vision transmitters. Japan has alloted $40 mil­ 87% of all Japanese foreign aid goes to Asian na­ lion this year for Vietnam reconstruction, much of tions. Of that amount, 49% goes to Southeast which will be used to import Japanese building ma­ Asia. 51 terials for the construction of apartment blocs and for the improvement of the Laotian airport at Vien­ In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato took a tiane. tour of twelve Pacific nations to discuss the ques- Third, by actually increasing production, em­ Japanese Infrastructure Loans ployment and buying power to some extent, Japa­ nese aid creates larger markets for Japanese goods. A $30 million Japanese loan is being used The Far Eastern Economic Review affirmed ear­ by the Philippines to build the Japan-Philip­ lier this year that "the Japanese admit that one pines "Friendship Highway". A prospec­ purpose of their aid program is to develop markets tive $300 million loan to Taiwan will be capable of absorbing their products. " 59 used for power generation and harbour con­ Fourth, Japanese aid is often used to deve­ struction. Of the $110 million loan to Indo­ lop infrastructure— roads, bridges, ports, rail­ nesia mentioned earlier, $40 million will roads, communications networks, power stations, be used to construct dams, power stations, and communications stations. Japan has *A pernicious effect of these stabilization loans offered Cambodia an $8.4 million loan to­ should be mentioned. These loans may check in­ wards the construction of the Prek Thnot flation temporarily by enabling the recipient coun­ dam and power plant. Japanese aid has tries to import the needed consumer products. But been used in Laos to expand the Vietiane since production for export is not increased, these airport, to improve the telephone network, countries earn no additional foreign exchange. When and to build a new water system. Japan the loans come due, the repayments of the principal intends to contribute $5. 3 million toward and interest drain foreign exchange reserves still the $32 million Nam Ngum dam project further, and unleash the inflation once again. (also in Laos). The debtor nations may even have to take out new loans, not only to curb this inflation, but also to Far Eastern Economic Review, 3/20/69 pay back the original loans. This serves to dig the struggling underdeveloped nations ever deeper into subservience to their creditors. etc. These are of use to Japanese firms who need for Japanese investors to operate in. Stabilization to get their raw materials to port and their manu­ loans can cut inflation enough to remove some of factured goods to internal markets. Japanese cor­ the uncertainty for Japanese firms. The appeal of porations are unwilling to invest in this infra­ aid is often enough to "persuade" officials in the structure, as the direct financial profits from this recipient countries to enact legislation favorable to type of project are long-deferred. They prefer to Japanese investors. trap the external economies and let the Japanese More important, however, a minimal level of taxpayers pay for such investment through aid. economic growth fostered by an influx of foreign Fifth, besides providing markets for Japa­ aid may be able to "buy off" social unrest without nese exports, and roads and ports to foreign in­ significantly altering the social structure that vestors, infrastructure loans create a booming created the unrest in the first place. This token business for Japanese construction firms. The development is designed and may succeed for a Nam Ngum project in Laos (see box) will be built time in undercutting the development of national by Nippon Koe Ltd. 60 Japanese construction com­ reformist and revolutionary movements that would panies will do much of the reconstruction work in undoubtedly threaten foreign investments. Vietnam. A leading Japanese industrialist. Fumi- Japan has recognized that the United States, hiko Kono, president of Mitsubishi Heavy Indus­ worried by inflation and balance of payments prob­ tries, has stated that the impact of an end to the lems, is less anxious to provide both the military Vietnam Waf on the Japanese economy will be felt presence and the economic aid necessary to assure for only six months to a year. 61 (Japan currently stability and peace in Asia. Yoshizane Iwasa, chair­ receives about $850 million in purchases each year man of the board and president of the Fuji Bank, directly and indirectly related to the US military Japan's largest, declared earlier this year that "A s presence in Asia. 62) After that, as Foreign Japan's economic strength expands, Japan should Report has noted, "the earnings to Japan from utilize more of its resources for economic assis­ post-war rebuilding will counterbalance the los­ tance and stabilization of the Asian region. It ses caused by declining exports and the ending of should thus relieve the United States of some of the burden it has been carrying. " "•* Prime Minister various advantages which have been the by-product Sato has stated that "Japan's economy has now of the war. "63 evolved to the point where we can — and we must— Sixth, the little Japanese aid that does go to take a more active role in assisting in the develop­ develop productive enterprise is not used prima­ ment of Asia. " lU rily to foster industrial ventures which might com­ pete with Japanese exports, but is used instead tc Japan will give economic assistance to help develop agriculture and other extractive industries. stabilize Asia while providing the United States with Japanese aid has been used to develop forestry in bases in Japan (through the US-Japan Mutual Se­ Brunei, tin smelting in Malaysia, and pearl cul­ curity Pact due for extension in 1970). By provi­ ture in the Philippines. 64 ding economic counterinsurgency to the military A high proportion of Japanese aid has been dictatorships of Asia, and granting the U. S. access for agricultural development. The government to bases in Japan itself, the Japanese have become pledged an initial $100 million to the Special Agri­ partners in the defense of empire. cultural Fund in 1967, 65 and added $20 million this year. 66 charges have been made that Japan Asia UDder the Rising Sun has pushed the Asian Development Bank into an un­ Japanese corporations, with government assis­ due emphasis on agricultural as opposed to indus­ tance, are penetrating virtually every corner of trial development. () ' This pattern will continue. East ^sia in search of raw materials markets, and The Far Eastern Economic Review reported in outlets for goods and investment capital. This March of this year that in future Japanese aid pro­ Japanese trade, investment, and aid is helping to posals. "Emphasis is . .. expected to be placed on transform the countries of the Far East into full­ helping developing nations to tap their natural re­ blown neo-colonies. sources and then importing much of them. " 68 In furthering its own economic interests, Ja­ Seventh, the few Japanese loans that are pan is preventing the industralization without which granted to promote productive enterprise, as op­ the emerging nations of Asia cannot hope to develop posed to infrastructure projects, are invariably into modern, prosperous countries. While this given to private companies. This serves to streng­ decade's version of the Greater East Asia Co-Pros­ then capitalism in these nations, creating a favor­ perity Sphere is being constructed with investments able enviornment for Japanese corporations to do and loans instead of guns, the long-term effects on business in. In addition, these loans frequently go the economies and peoples of the Far East may to private Japanese firms. well prove no less oppressive. The rising sun of Finally, but by no means the least important, the resurgent Japanese empire means only economic foreign aid can be effective in promoting a suffi­ stagnation and misery for the countries and people ciently stable economic and political enviornment under its ravs.

6 Footnotes 29far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1969. 30 On these points, see Frank. Zeitlin and Petras. Baran. and John 1 P.B. Stone. Japan Surges Ahead. (New York; Frederick A. Praegei Gcrassi. The Great Fear in Latin America, (New York: Collier- 1969.) Mac Millan. 1965.) 2 Business International, June 6, 1969. 31 On these points, see Baran and Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperi­ 3 Fortune, September 1, 1968. alism. (New-York: Monthly Review. 1969.) ''Background Notes—Japan. (Washington: U.S. Department of State. 32Business Week. August 19. 1967. Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, July. 1967.) 33 Business Abroad. September. 1968. 5Business Week. August 19. 1967. 34 ibid. b Condensed Economic Statistics of Japan. (Tokyo; Fuji Bank Ltd. . 35 Footwear News, May 11. 1967. June, 1968.) 3(• Korea Trade and Investment. 7 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20. 1969. 37 ibid. H Monthly Statistics of Japan. (Tokyo; Bureau of Statistics. Office of 38 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20. 1969. the Prime Minister. May. 1969.) 39 [bid. "" ' 9 Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 1968. 40 [bid. see Andrew Günther Frank. Capitalism and Underdevelopment 41 Ibid. in Latin America. (New York; Monthly Review. 1967.) and 42 See Dobb. Baran. Frank. Zeitlin and Petras, and Gerassi. Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, eds. . Latin America: Re­ 43 Business Week. August 19. 1967. form or Revolution. (New York; Fawcett. 1968.) 44 George R. Packard III. "Living with the Real Japan," Foreign These problems are treated generally in Maurice Dobb. Economic Affairs. October. 1967. Development and Underdeveloped Countries. (New York: Merit. 45 Business Week, August 19. 1967, 1962.) and Paul Baran. The Political Economy of Growth. (New 4» Ibid. York: Monthly Review, 1957.) With respect to Latin America. 47 Ibid. see Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 4* Foreign Report. December 5. 1969. in Latin America. (New York; Monthly Review, 1967. ) and 40 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 1969. Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, eds., Latin America: jOSRI-International: The Japan California Association Report. Reform or Revolution. (New York; Fawcett, 1968.) August. 1969. 11 Business Abroad, August 21, 1967. Sllbid. ' 12 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1969. •"^Business Week. August 19. 1967. 13 Wall Street Journal. August 26, 1969. •~>3U.S. News & World Report, July 24. 1967, 14 Business Week, August 19. 1967. 54 See Magdoff. Frank. Zeitlin and Petras, Gerassl. and Gabriel 15 Stone, p. 191. Kolko. The Roots of American Foreign Policy, (Boston; Beacon, 16 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1969. 1969.) 17 Business Week, August 19, 1967. 55r.S. News & World Report, July 24, 1967. 5 18 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1969. " Far Eastern Economic Review. March 20. 1969. 19 Ibid. 5 ~ lb id. 20Ibid. •^Foreign Report. Decembers. 1968. 21 Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1969, 3->Far Eastern Economic Review. May 8. 1969. 22xew York Times, August 27, 1969. ''"Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20. 1969. 2'iKurea Trade and Investment. (Seoul: Korea Trade Promotion 61 Foreign Report. December 5. 1968. Corporation, July, 1969.) '^Far Eastern Economic Review. July 4. 1968. 24The_Investment Situation in Indonesia. (Menlo Park. Calif. ; Stan- ^'Foreign Report. Decembers. 1968. ford Research Institute, July, 1968.) ^Business Week. August 19. 1969. 25 Wall Street Journal. August 26, 1969. &> Packard - 26 i. 01-eign Investment in Indonesia. (Washington: Embassy of Indo­ M Fa r Eastern Economic Review . May 8, 1969, nesia. January, 1969.) and Far Eastern Economic Review. G'Fa Eastern Economic Review, March 13. 1969. May 15. 1969. ir Eastern Economic Review. March 20. 1969. 27 Foreign Investment in Indonesia. G »SRI-International. 28ibia. "»Business Week. August 19. 1967.

The Pacific Studies Center 1963 University Avenue East Palo Alto, California 94301 The Eye of the Beholder: Background Notes on the US-Japan Military Relationship John Dower Reprinted from the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 2, No. 1, October, 1969,

In the last half century, the pivotal Conference make this obvious? Therefore steps in American-Japanese relations have critics of the military alliance appear been paced off at roughly ten-year inter­ at best naive and idealistic, at worst vals. At the Washington Conference of subversive. 1921-1922, American and other Western pres­ sure brought about cancellation of the The question rarely asked until Anglo-Japanese Alliance and forced Japan recently by Americans is whether the to rely upon uncertain international guar­ assumptions themselves are not misleading. antees for its security. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 dispelled the professed 1. Defense and Provocation hopes of the twenties, and a full decade later Pearl Harbor marked the total bank­ The problem of where defense becomes ruptcy of Japan's relationship with the provocation is ambiguous and subjective. West. At the San Francisco peace confer­ It is particularly relevant in the case ence in 1951, America led forty-eight of Japan, which is physically a great other nations in restoring Japan's sover­ deal closer to both China and Russia than eignty, and five hours after the signing it is to the United States, and historic­ of the peace treaty the U.S. summoned forth ally a reliable neighbor of neither. True shades of the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance estimates of the toll Japan extracted from by signing its own bilateral military pact a prostrate China between 1937 and 1945 with Japan. Nine years later, nationalis­ are impossible to calculate, but the tic resentment against this security ar­ Nationalist Chinese representative to the rangement of 1951 erupted in Japan, forc­ Far Eastern Commission gave some idea of ing cancellation of President Eisenhower's the numerical scale by placing his country's proposed visit. Now another decade has losses at eleven million persons killed, passed, and 1970 is clearly destined to sixty million homeless, and property mark yet another watershed in the American- damage of perhaps sixty billion dollars. *- Japanese relationship. Russian fears of Japan are persuasive when it is remembered that until the Japanese In America, discussion of the U.S.­ moved south against China from Manchuria Japan military relationship has to a large in 1937 it had been widely assumed that extent been based upon several leading they would instead launch an offensive assumptions. The military arrangement is north against the Soviet Far East. The defined as defensive, for example, and diaries of Ambassador Joseph Grew for the thus it follows that Soviet and Chinese early thirties are full of speculation as criticisms of it reveal flawed perception to if and when Japan would attack Russia, and hostile intent. The peace and security and between 1932 and 1938 it is estimated settlements of 1951 have been widely prais­ that more than five hundred armed clashes ed by American commentators as magnanimous, occurred between the two countries on one of the greatest monuments to statesman­ the ever elongating border Japan claimed ship in the entire career of John Foster between them.2 Major war scares occurred Dulles, and consequently Japanese criticism between Japan and the Soviet Union in the of this relationship represents ingratitude summers of 1937, 1938, and 1939, and in as well as short-sightedness. The resurrec­ the last of these--the famous battle at tion of Japan as a militarized, cold-war Khalkin-gol--the Japanese offensive was ally of the United States is accepted as thwarted only at an estimated cost of inevitable and essential given the hard 25,000 Japanese dead and possibly 9,000 realities of the postwar situation. Did killed on the Soviet side.3 The history not the outbreak of the Korean War a full of both Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese fifteen months before the San Francisco enmity, moreover, has.deeper roots than just these events of recent memory, for the formal decision to maintain this pres­ Japan's emergence as a world power was ence indefinitely in post-treaty Japan attained at thé turn of the century through appears to have been agreed upon by the wars against China and Russia; significant­ State Department as early as the winter ly, the Japanese offensive against Russia of 1949--over half a year before the out­ in 1904 was made possible by the protection break of the Korean War and almost two c ensured through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. years before the security pact was signed. Clearly there is more behind present-day The American decision to encourage expan­ tensions in Asia than an ideological sion of the Japanese paramilitary capabil­ cold-war confrontation. ity was made secretly by the National Security Council in November, 1948," and At war's end the Allied powers were the first positive steps toward recruit­ unanimous in their agreement that Japan, ment and training of a new Japanese Army like Germany, had to be prevented from were initiated in July 1950. In September ever again becoming a great military threat. 1951, when the peace treaty was being This was particularly clear in American signed in San Francisco, Japan already policy--in the plans approved for post- had four rough infantry divisions under­ surrender Japan by the State-War-Navy going training by American officers.7 Coordinating Committee; the double-kill of Where did it all really begin? the terror bombing; the early claim to the mandated islands, Ryukyus, and Bonins as The official record is not open, but insurance against any future Japanese the first positive gesture towards prepar­ aggression; the near total demobilization ing Japan for a possible future military of the Japanese armed forces and destruction role against the Soviet Union was taken of remaining Japanese artillery, warships, in 1945, almost immediately after the and aircraft; and in the sweeping funda­ occupation began, under Major General mental reforms of the early occupation per­ Charles Willoughby. One of MacArthur's iod, especially the no-war clause of the two most influential aides in Japan, American-drafted constitution. To a con­ Willoughby was reputedly called "my love- siderable degree, American war and peace able fascist" by the Supreme Commander, policy toward Japan in the 1940's operated and actually was to serve as an advisor in a Manichean dimension: both the Pacific to Franco after his retirement from the War and the opening stages of the occupa­ Army in the early fifties. As chief of tion which followed it were devoted to the the occupation's G-2 (Intelligence) sec­ eradication of evil. When evil was assign­ tion, Willoughby from the beginning ed new incarnations within two years of opposed a hard policy toward Japan and in the end of the war, the morality play re­ particular succeeded in freeing from the mained but Japan's role within it changed purge certain key officers of the former drastically. This metamorphosis began in Imperial Army and Navy. If Willoughby's 1947 and was transparent by 1948, and plans had carried through, these men-- both in form and timing Japan's new guise approximately fifteen in number--would bore striking parallels to the posture have become the nucleus of the general being assigned to occupied West Germany. staff of Japan's future military establish­ The shift in occupation policy toward ment. They formed several noteworthy Japan was undertaken virtually unilaterally groups. Intelligence personnel headed by by the United States; for various reasons, Lt. General Seizo Arisue, former Chief of almost all of the other wartime Allies Military Intelligence for the General were more or less opposed to the decision Staff, were incorporated into G-2's histor­ to rebuild Japan.* ical section; they were key sources of intelligence concerning Russian military The so-called "reverse course" toward dispositions in the Soviet Far East. A Japan had two faces, military and econo­ second group headed by Colonel Takushiro mic. And the military face in turn had two Hattori, Toj'o's former secretary and sides: American military presence in Chief of. the First Section of the General Japan and the spectre of a resurgent, re­ Staff's Operations Division, managed the armed Japan. It is misleading to think Demobilization Boards through which some of the military relationship between the four million Japanese servicemen were two countries as having begun with the returned to civilian life. The potential signing of the security treaty in 1951, influence of these Demobilization Board for the United States has maintained a personnel was greater than their number military presence in Japan ever since suggests, for by Virtue of their position September of 1945. More significantly, they maintained up-to-date files on the whereabouts of some 70,000 former career article by Russell Brines of Associated officers: the clerical work for demobiliza­ Press which opened with this lead para­ tion could obviously function equally well graph: for remobilization. In addition to tasks relating to their anticipated role, the Although the military phase of the favored officers also reputedly served G-2 occupation is nearly completed, Amer­ as spies, submitting influential reports ican forces may remain indefinitely on labor movements and activities on the in Japan to hold what is regarded here political left. In 1950, when the decision as the eastern anchor of a world-wide was made to rebuild a Japanese army, American line against the Soviet Union Willoughby very nearly succeeded in having and communism. Hattori made its chief of staff. The existence of these former officers within Three days later, in an address marking the actual occupation bureaucracy was known the first anniversary of the formal to the Soviets, and these men were one of Japanese surrender, MacArthur created an the groups the Russians were referring to international stir by stating that the when they stated that the purge was not Japanese islands might become "a powerful being carried out in a thoroughgoing man­ bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring­ ner—an accusation which was loudly de­ board for war." The impact of the Supreme cried at the time. ** Adam Ulam's recent Commander's remark was regarded as partic­ study of Soviet foreign policy indicates ularly significant since it coincided that the Soviet officials were indeed closely with statements by Secretary of deeply concerned about this particular State Byrnes, culminating in the famous issue: speech at Stuttgart on September 8, whict similarly suggested a reappraisal of American policy toward Germany. With fev The fact that the Americans, following exceptions, the American press regarded their occupation of Japan, did not pro­ ceed to a wholesale liquidation of the MacArthur's speech as signaling a substat Japanese general staff and the armed tial change in American policy toward forces was another source of suspicion. Japan, and writers such as Mark Gayn of Were they thinking of recreating the the Chicago Sun expressed the view that Japanese armed forces, and if so to fight MacArthur's increasingly obvious support against whom? That this was not a of the conservative wing in Japanese propaganda point is demonstrated by our politics "was an integral part of the rare glimpse into an "internal" Soviet document. On September 22, 1945, the pattern of our foreign policy. Our support high command informed the Commander-in- of conservatives here [in Japan] was no Chief Far East, Marshal Vasilevsky, different from our support of the Kuomin­ that MacArthur "repeats the same mistake tang in China or of the Dutch in the East that was committed in 1918 in relation Indies, or of the British in Greece and to Germany," i.e., leaving Japan's Iran."^2 Many newspapers which gave close leading military officers at large.' coverage to the occupation also emphasized the skill with which conservative Japanese Willoughby was not alone in his quick were actually exploiting international anticipation of a future anti-communist tensions to realize their own goals of role for Japan. Almost from the very an unrestrained and revitalized Japan. beginning of the occupation, dispatches As stated in the Christian Science Monitor. from correspondents in Tokyo reported the five days after MacArthur's speech: belief among ranking American officers there that Japan was to become the "spring­ Perhaps one of the most important aspects board for the next operation."^ in late of the Communist question in Japan December, 1945, MacArthur made clear his today is the degree to which it is being extreme displeasure at the inclusion of used by prewar politicians within the the Soviet Union in the essentially power­ present government as a bogey to win less Allied Council for Japan agreed upon support. by the Big Four at Moscow, and from the opening sessions of the Council the follow­ Similarly, the New York Herald-Tribune ing March, all statements by the Soviet indicated that certain State Department delegate were met with open hostility by officials believed that the Japanese were the American representative.H On August "playing off democracy against Communism... 30, 1946, under a headline reading "U.S. and statements like those of General Army Foreseen Staying On Indefinitely in MacArthur are extremely helpful to them." Japan," the Baltimore Sun printed an The MacArthur speech revealed a rift Misawa was reported- to be 8,500 feet long, within the State Department, attracting and thus capable of handling the largest criticism from'middle-level officials U.S. bombers. Lindsey Parrott of the but official endorsement by the Department; New York Times reported that: all parties, however, disclaimed any inten­ tion to create an American "bulwark" in Misawa is the latest in a chain of air­ Japan.1^ Military spokesmen actually fields, capable of taking the heaviest responded to the talk of an impending U.S.­ long-range bombers, that have been built Soviet clash emanating from Japan and other at key points in Japan since the occupa­ areas of international tension by offering tion began. Fighter planes have been six cogent reasons why the Soviet Union operating since last month off the did not and could not pose a real war finished section of the airstrip and threat.15 Nevertheless, the expectation according to the present program the that Japan would be retained as a pivot construction is scheduled for comple­ of American military strategy persisted tion by the end of this year.18 in the forefront of discussion from this The failure of the Marshall Mission time on. to China in early 1947 and the increasing certainty thereafter of communist victory In August 1947 Newsweek's Foreign in the Chinese civil war gave Japan added editor Harry Kern, a lobbyist for a strong significance in the eyes of American Japan, revealed a new level of considera­ strategic planners, as China joined the tion in an article entitled "The U.S. Soviet Union as the projected enemy in Answer to Russia: A Revived Japan": Asia. In the summer of 1948, Lt. General Robert Eichelberger, who had just retired It might not be beyond the realm of as commander of the Eighth Army in Japan, possibility that the United States would announced his "personal" support for the then revive Japan not only as an indus­ trial but as a military power as well. creation of a 150,000-man armed Japanese Many an American general in Japan talks constabulary.^ That fall, the National of commanding a Japanese army equipped Security Council secretly approved, to and staffed by Americans—a sort of the exact figure, the organization of such wistful thinking right now. But the a "national police force" in Japan. Act­ Japanese would probably welcome a ing to a large extent on the recommenda­ chance to fight the Russians. Recently tions of George Kennan, who had visited Kamikaze (suicide) pilots have been reporting in considerable numbers to Japan in February and March of 1948, the American airfields, ready to fly in NSC at the same time voted to strengthen the new war against the Soviets which Japan economically while easing off the they have heard has started. pressure for continued fundamental reforms. 20 Although Secretary of State Acheson and Furthermore, a Japanese army backed by others thereafter urged MacArthur to the United States could probably take begin to build up the Japanese "police" Russian Asia east of Lake Bikal. All Siberia lies within reach of American within the prescribed limits, the Supreme air forces. United States command of Commander refused to accede to these the seas would make a landing possible pressures for Japanese rearmament until almost anywhere. And Japan itself after the outbreak of the Korean War.21 is safe under the protection of super­ ior American air and sea power 16 General MacArthur's personal views On Christmas Day, 1947, the New York Herald- on the strategic role Japan was to play Tribune added its garland to the tree of in the Pacific were complex and enigmatic. speculation by reporting that the United From 1947 on, he was the leading advocate States "has designs on the Ryukyus--espe­ of an early peace treaty, and while cially on Okinawa, which reportedly is supporting a continued strong military being built up in a long-range way by posture in Okinawa, for a long time he American occupation forces now stationed appears-to have remained convinced not there." And in May of the following year only that Japanese rearmament was inad­ the American press carried stories of a visable, but also that a post-treaty thirteen-million dollar construction pro­ American military presence would be ject at the Misawa air base, "just north neither necessary nor desirable in the of Hachinoe in northern Honshu, approxi­ four main islands.22 His celebrated mately 700 miles from Vladivostok—Russia' s description of Japan as the "Switzerland major Pacific port."1? The new runway at of the East," for example, was made in 1949.23 in this respect, the General held Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized that one of the least militaristic American Japan lay within the U.S. "defense per­ positions current on Japan in the late imeter. "29 General Collins visited Japan 1940's; George Kennan held a similar view personally in October 1949 and stated concerning post-treaty U.S. military that U.S. forces would remain to guarantee presence in Japan, but he was an earlier the security of the country.30 Early the and firmer advocate of strengthening following month General Collins also Japan's military capability than was the announced that, in the words of the New General.24 At the same time, however, York Times, "Strategic plans of the Joint MacArthur had described Japan as "the Chiefs of Staff call for intermediate westernmost outpost of our defenses" as overseas* bases for the waging of any future early as 1946, and in March 1949 he offered intercontinental war.."31 At almost exact­ a more vivid (and racial) description of ly the same time, the Soviet press charg­ the Pacific sphere claimed by the United ed General Eichelberger with having made States: a provocative speech predicting a U.S.­ Japan military alliance and stating that Now the Pacific has become an Anglo- the Japanese would be such soldiers as Saxon lake and our line of defense commanders only dream about.32 runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts International pressures forced the from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu archipelago which U.S. government to announce in September includes its broad main bastion, Oki­ 1949 that it would soon begin negotiating nawa. Then it bends back through a peace settlement with Japan, but—like Japan and the Aleutian Island chain previous statements made in 1947--this to Alaska„25 proved to be largely a diplomatic char­ ade.33 xhe key international issue in considering a peace treaty at this time This was the vision that mattered, the was whether or not U.S. troops would be image that caught hold. It is academic withdrawn from the country following the but nonetheless interesting to speculate restoration of sovereignty to Japan. If how the United States would have respond­ so, then it was conceivable that an "over­ ed if a famous Russian general had all peace" could be negotiated--that is, described the Pacific as" a Sino-Soviet a treaty such as had been anticipated at Pond, or if a prominent Chinese communist war's end, involving all of Japan's former had defined China as an American Power wartime enemies including the Soviet Union since the same waves that washed America's and other communist countries. If on the shores washed his country's as well. other hand the United States decided to hinge the treaty on the indefinite main­ In February 1949, Secretary of the tenance of U.S. forces in Japan in the Army Kenneth Royall visited Tokyo and post-treaty period, it was understood that made an off-the-record comment to a this would be absolutely unacceptable to room full of journalists to the effect the Soviet Union. The best that could that the United States was considering be hoped for then would be a "separate abandoning plans for the future defense peace" involving Japan on the one side of Japan.26 Whether or not this was a and the United States and its cold-war trial balloon, it was certainly a remark supporters on the other. The decision destined neither to remain off the record lay in the hands of the United States, nor to enjoy a long and redundant exis­ and the U.S. position had become increas­ tence. It was never repeated. . Royall ingly clear during the course of 1949. himself repudiated it several days later. By the end of the year it was apparent So also did President Truman, who announced that the United States did not contemplate enigmatically that American policy toward a military withdrawal from Japan. In Japan had not changed.27 Lt. General J. Kennan's words, a general consensus had Lawton Collins, Army Vice Chief of Staff, er:erged,at least within the State Depart­ urged at the end of the same month that ment, that: American forces in Japan be increased, and related his concern specifically to communist military successes in China.28 while the treaty would not itself pro­ Over the course of the next several months vide for the retention of American bases in Japan, it would be accompanied other military spokesmen, both in Japan by a separate agreement with the Japanese and the United States and including government sanctioning such an agree­ General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the ment; and that if all this was not agree- mainland. Japan's military role in the able to the Russians, as it obviously would not be, we would not hesitate Chinese civil war was openly established to conclude both treaty and agreement on June 27, 1950, when President Truman without them.34 responded to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea by assigning the Seventh Fleet As soon became apparent, even this to the Straits of Taiwan, effectively separate-peace-with-American-hardware preventing a communist invasion of Taiwan, plan envisioned by the State Department and having the Fleet operate out of Sasebo-- was deemed too soft by the Joint Chiefs thus making Japan, in the words of one of Staff, Secretary of Defense Louis Japanese commentator, "a forward military Johnson, and others. They opposed any base for intervention in the Chinese peace settlement whatsoever in the fore­ Communist Revolution."38 seeable future, being, in the words of one scholar, "most reluctant to give up On January 12, 1950, Acheson present­ the secure base in Japan assured by the ed his now famous definition of the Amer­ American command position obtaining under ican "defensive perimeter" to the National the Occupation for the uncertainties in­ Press Club. Although tnis hewed to the volved in dealing with a once more sover­ same line MacArthur had cited ten months eign Japan, no matter how friendly to the previously—and other military spokesmen West."35 The viewpoint held by these had subsequently reiterated--Acheson's ' leading spokesmen of the military establish­ version was exhumed after the outbreak of ment was of critical importance, because the Korean War and used to attack the from the end of 1949 this group held the Truman administration on the grounds that upper hand in government councils and the exclusion of South Korea from the successfully prevented any further signif­ American defense concern had been an en­ icant activity on the part of the American ticement to aggression. The inclusion of government relating to a peace settlement Japan as an integral part of the U.S. with Japan—even a settlement contingent line of defense in Asia was not regarded upon a bilateral U.S.-Japan military pact as worthy of particular comment in the such as was eventually signed. United States by this time—despite the fact that the country was still theoretic­ ally under international occupation, and Other "defense considerations" on the despite the fact that in a less frequently part of the U.S. government contributed quoted part of his speech Acheson had come further to the uncertainty and fear in Asia closer than any previous government spokes­ concerning the future of Japan. In October man to acknowledging the American intention 1949, Congress responded to the establish­ to retain an indefinite military presence ment of the People's Republic of China by in Japan: appropriating 58 million dollars for mili­ tary construction on Okinawa, clearly revealing the projected role of this island ....the defeat and the disarmament of bastion--which initially had been placed Japan has placed upon the United States under special control by the U.S. military the necessity of. assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is on the grounds that such control was nec­ required, both in the interest of our essary to prevent any future Japanese security and in the interests of the aggression. On April 2, 1950, Assistant security of the entire Pacific area Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees con­ and, in all honor, in the interest of firmed what had long been apparent by Japanese security....1 can assure you announcing that the United States would that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses occupy the Ryukyus indefinitely.36 Prior of Japan and that whatever arrangements to the Korean War, Japan's role vis-a-vis are to be made either through permanent the Chinese revolution became further settlement or otherwise, that defense complicated by the fact that beginning must and shall be maintained.39 early in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek began releasing Japanese war criminals—including the notorious "three all" (kill all, burn To both China and the Soviet Union, on all, destroy all) General Yasuji Okamura— the other hand, this situation was a and in the latter part of the same year matter of immense concern, aS any survey the Kuomintang began attempting to recruit qftthe press of the two countries fiom former Japanese officers and pilots.37 The late 1949 reveals. "They charged that the Japanese professionals were attractive to United States planned both a prolonged the routed Kuomintang, of course, because, occupation and the rearmament of Japan; of their prior combat experience on the in November 1950, Tass made this more specific by asserting that the United Dulles desired. The first American divi­ States planned to continue the occupation sions sent to Korea were taken from the for another thirty years while tripling occupying forces in Japan, and it was the size of the paramilitary Japanese con­ soon clear that by early September no stabulary 40 These allegations as usual substantial military force at all would were dismissed as blatant propaganda, but remain in Japan. To protect both the they were in essence correct. In this bases in Japan and approximately one-quarter respect, the role of John Foster Dulles is million American dependants, the decision illuminating. was reached to expand the existing Japan­ ese police force by creating a 75,000-man Dulles was appointed advisor to the National Police Reserve (NPR). By a top- State Department in April 1950 by President secret Basic Plan dating probably from Truman in an endeavor to establish bipar­ the first week of July, it was made clear tisanship in foreign policy formulation. that the NPR was to be the nucleus of On May 18, he was assigned to negotiate a the future Japanese army.43 This violat­ settlement with Japan, and it was in part ed Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, due to his energetic endeavors toward this promulgate* in 1947» vkiek stated that goal that the opposition of the Department "land, sea, and air forées, as well as other of Defense was eventually overcome. As war potential, will never be maintained." noted above, however, by the beginning of As a result both American and Japanese 1950 the real issue within the U.S. govern­ authorities were forced to extreme contor­ ment was not whether American troops would tions to disguise the real nature of the remain in Japan, but whether they would NPR. Within che occupation bureaucracy, remain in a Japan that was sovereign or responsibility for building the new army still occupied, depending on whether State was unorthodoxly placed under a specially or Defense had its way. What mattered to the created Annex of the Civil Affairs Sec­ communists was the military dimension, and tion (CASA), while Japanese government in this respect the Tass assertion of a officials steadfastly refused to admit thirty-year occupation will be two-thirds that any more was involved than an ex­ of the way to vindication in 1970. Dulles pansion of the police. Even recruits to never considered a non-military settle­ the NPR (some 400,000 applied for the ment. first 75,000 openings) were not informed of the real nature of their new employ­ In the week prior to the outbreak of ment, and problems arose in such normally the Korean War, Dulles, General Bradley, routine areas as the preparation of and Defense Secretary Johnson all arrived training manuals for the undercover army. in Tokyo to study and discuss the issue Tanks, for example, were unpolicemanlike of Japan's future. The latter two men and consequently could not be mentioned argued heatedly against any alteration of by name; they rolled camouflaged through America's preeminent position in Japan,and the manuals as "special vehicles." Des­ in a normally routine briefing organized pite these obstacles, CASA succeeded in by occupation officials, Johnson took the training its NPR recruits in an arsenal floor to deliver a fifteen-minute harangue of increasingly diverse and large-caliber attacking "the State Department crowd." weapons. In a recent account, Frank In particular he leveled his guns, in the Kowalski, who was the American officer best tradition of Defense Department marks­ directly responsible for the creation of manship, at Dulles and his "pacifistic" the new Japanese army between 1950 and approach to world problems.41 On his own 1952, describes the status of the NPR part, Dulles was meeting for the first at the time of the San Francisco peace time with Prime Minister Yoshida and conference as follows: applying his approach by urging the rearm­ ament of Japan and raising the question of future U.S. bases in that country. In a Although the force by this time had reportedly unpleasant exchange, Yoshida undergone nothing more advanced than refused to consider' rearmament and remain­ battalion field exercises, the officers ed noncommittal on the issue of bases.42 and troops had been given extensive The incidents are particularly interesting individual and small unit training. Practically everyone in the battalions because they were prelude, not response, had actually fired carbines, M-l rifles, to the Korean War. machine guns, bazookas and mortars. As individual soldiers and members of small The Korean War altered the equation, units the NPR men could have given a although by no means to the extent that very creditable account of themselves. As battalions or infantry the NPR could, Japan, like most of the world with the in the closing months of 1951, have put exception of the United States, wavered on a whale of a fight. Beyond that the on the brink of financial chaos. One of capacity of the force for war was very limited, although in the opinion of many, the decisive factors in Japan's post-1950 the organization possessed a great recovery, in fact, was the four-billion potential for future development,^ dollars worth of "special procurements" for the Korean conflict which the U.S. pumped into the Japanese economy. While The NPR at this time was stationed in some it can hardly be denied that real domestic thirty-seven camps throughout Japan. At difficulties lay behind the decision taken approximately the same time, that is, by American policymakers to shift occupa­ between August and October 1951, previous tion priorities in Japan from structural barriers against the recruitment of former reform to economic reconstruction, it is officers of the Imperial armed services misleading to minimize the role played were dropped. In Kowalski's words: by purely cold-war considerations in this decision. Japan was to be revived as the Eventually 243 graduates of the Imperial "workshop" of Asia, just as Germany was Army and Navy Academies, the younger gradually slated to reassume a similar men initially considered, were enrolled role in Western Europe. The objectives in the first Officer Training Course were several-fold. Japan was to be for de-purgees in the latter part of strengthened to stave off internal sub­ August 1951. In October 812 former version, which it was ass'erted might Imperial captains, majors and Lt. colonels were brought into the NPR and otherwise cause its great industrial ordered to attend a two month re-orienta­ potential to fall into the hands of the tion course. The door was now open enemy. It was to be made self-sufficient for the former military to resume their to end the burden on American taxpayers. interrupted careers.45 In addition, it was to be reconstructed to perform a counterrevolutionary function as purchaser of raw materials and supplier The new Japanese military still fell of capital and technology for the falter­ far short of what Dulles envisaged, how­ ing regimes of Southeast Asia. These ever, and repeatedly from the time of his trends began to emerge in 1947, and on second visit to Japan in January 1951 he August 21 of that year the editor of the continued to urge the Japanese to create 46 Baltimore Sun followed a personal inter­ a force of 300,000 to 350,000 men. At view with MacArthur by defending the case the San Francisco conference itself, for an economically revived Japan in terms according to Kowalski, Dulles allegedly of Japan's need to "reestablish a kind of offered U.S. financial support specific­ 4 Co-Prosperity Sphere for Asia....the ally directed to this end. ' Yoshida responsibility is now that of the United continued to resist these pressures, States. It is our job to reestablish the arguing that such rapid military expansion co-prosperity sphere for her." In both was both financially and socially impos­ timing and felicity of expression, the sible in Japan at that time. In addition, Sun seemed determined to hold its own with Yoshida's aides subsequently revealed Newsweek. that the old prime minister feared that if Japan did create a force meeting Dul­ The American decision to revive Japan les' s specifications, the Japanese govern­ industrially was greeted with alarm by ment would immediately be subjected to a most of the rest of the world, and primar­ new pressure to deploy part of that force 4 ily for two reasons. First, it did indeed in Korea—and this was unthinkable. ° in raise the spectre of a new Co-Prosperity this regard, historians probably will have Sphere--possibly even a doliar-oriented to temper the popular image of Yoshida as co-prosperity sphere—and the expectation the arch conservative on the Japanese of exploitation and captured markets was political scene. Insofar as negotiation not a comforting one to countries which of the peace and security treaties is had hoped by Japan's defeat to slice the concerned, his stature may well increase Asian pie more to their own advantage. as that of Dulles declines. After 1947, boycotts of Japanese goods occurred in China, strikes by merchants The economic dimension of the reverse took place in the Philippines, and Great course in American policy toward Japan Britain and the commonwealth nations is complex and can only be mentioned in raised strong protests against this passing here. Until the Korean War, further blow to the sterling bloc. Secondly, as actually proposed by occupa­ the same provision had been included in tion authorities, the procedures by which the 1945 treaty negotiated between Stalin Japanese industrial capacity was to be and Chiang Kai-shek,or that the ANZUS and revived seemed to carry ominous military Philippine pacts were of similar purport. overtones. The reparations program was Following the signing of the security essentially terminated at a preliminary treaty in 1951 and the subsequent nego­ stage; zaibatsu dissolution was abandoned tiation of an administrative agreement, considerably short of its initially defin­ the United States gained the rights to ed goals; and ceilings hitherto placed on some 1,400 "areas and installations" in production levels in certain strategic Japan proper, including eighteen air­ industries were entirely removed. What strips, eleven airfields, and the great had been officially identified as "Japan­ naval facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo. -^ ese Industrial War Potential" in the early In addition, the United States retained stages of the occupation—especially iron control of the Ryukyus and the Bonins, and steel, light metals, metal-working and of course the former mandated islands. machinery, shipbuilding, oil refining and Over the ensuing years, technological storage, synthetic oil, and synthetic change and proliferation has constantly rubber—now passed through the rhetori­ altered the specific function of this . cians's steam room and emerged benignly American outpost. Nuclear Mace-B missiles; as "Japan's peaceful industries."4" This nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers; does not mean, however, that all occupatior B-52 bombing raids on Vietnam; gas storage reforms ceased. Diligent occupationaires and possible CBW testing; sophisticated in small offices still devoted themselves espionage laissions of a U-2, Pueblo, and to such tasks as the elimination of cant EC-121 nature; joint naval maneuvers with from school books, and worried about the Taiwan and South Korea; training grounds imprecision of Oriental languages. for guerrilla warfare--these were not parts of the equation two decades ago. Well before the actual signing of the The underlying problem of defense and U.S.-Japan security treaty, the problem provocation, however, remains essentially of a revived and remilitarized Japan had as it did then, and the comment of a thus become a major issue between the Russian admiral writing in Pravda in 1946 United States on the one hand and China is not irrelevant today. If this is and the Soviet Union on the other. Nor defense, he asked, then what is offense.^2 were the two communist countries alone Americans themselves had occasion to ask in their alarm over American policies in a similar question when they gazed across occupied Japan. The other Asian defense the Florida keys in 1962. pacts which Dulles negotiated simultan­ eously with the U.S.-Japan treaty—namely, 2. Magnanimity and Self interest ANZUS and the U.S.-Philippine treaty--were specifically and fundamentally designed to The peace treaty signed by forty- assure Australia, New Zealand, and the nine nations in San Francisco in 1951 has Philippines of American assistance against been widely acclaimed for its brevity, any future attack, not by China or Russia, clarity, and non-punitive nature. In but by a revanchist Japan. In effect, this it represented a strong contrast both Dulles found it necessary to resort to to earlier treaty drafts prepared by the these treaties as a quid pro quo for obtain­ U.S. government and to various provisions ing support of American policy toward for post-treaty control or restriction Japan.50 As the projected enemies against over Japan proposed by other countries. which a revived Japan was to function, For this reason it has been hailed as a China and the Soviet Union uad greater model of its kind and as clear evidence reason for concern and no such guarantees. of American magnanimity. Nonetheless, only the two communist countries were accused of irresponsible The bilateral security pact signed propaganda when they expressed their fears only hours after the peace treaty by the of a resurgent Japan, and the conclusion United States and Japan has been regard­ of the Sino-Soviet alliance of February ed by most Americans as a similarly 1950—with, its clause guaranteeing mutual generous arrangement, for it has obvious­ assistance in the case of aggression by ly enabled Japan to grow sleek under the Japan or its allies—was cited as an protection of the American nuclear umbrel­ obvious indication of hostile and even la. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the expansionist communist intentions in Asia. House Armed Services Committee, recently It was of little account that virtually expressed this bluntly: 10

X will tell you one thing, just get it Japan to agree to conditions of inferior­ in your head right now: if there is ity unmatched in any of the other forty- any country getting by without paying plus security treaties negotiated between their share, it is Japan.53 the United States and other nations in the'1950's. In the 1960 Congressional The magnanimity concept, however, hearings on the revised treaty, Secretary obscures both the strong American self- of State Christian Herter acknowledged interest which underlies support of the that: alliance, as well as the many negative features of the relationship which have ....there were a number of provisions given rise to legitimate resentment and in the 1951-1952 Security Treaty that fear among many Japanese. It is obvious were pretty extreme from the point of from his own statements that Dulles urged view of an agreement between two sovereign nations.54 a generous peace treaty because he was convinced that it was eminently pragmatic to do so. Throughout the period when he Exactly what these provisions were was was responsible for arranging the treaty, subsequently outlined by J. Graham Par­ he constantly referred to the lesson of sons, Assistant Secretary of State for Versailles: punitive peace settlements Far Eastern Affairs: do not work. To this extent, the Dulles accomplishment appears wise and statesman­ like. At the same time, the end result The United States is permitted to use bases without consulting the Japanese of Dulles's accomplishment in 1951 was Goveinirant for actions in other parts essentially a peace for Asia without of the Far East that might involve Asians. The three major countries of Japan in a war irrespective of Japan's continental Asia—China, Russia and India- interests. did not sign the treaty at San Francisco, nor did Burma or North Korea. Australia, Second, the Unite: States could bring New Zealand, and the Philippines signed into Japan whatever weapons she chose only with misgivings. And if the peace regardless of the wishes of the Japan­ treaty by itself was admirably brief and ese with regard to their own territory. non-punitive, it nevertheless had no Third, it provided for the intervention separate existence of its own, but rather of U.S. forces in large-scale internal was contingent upon Japan's agreeing to a disturbances in Japan incompatible with military alliance with America: magna­ the sovereign status of Japan. nimity under lock and key. Moreover, the agreement to give American forces virtual­ Fourth, there was no specific commitment ly free rein in post-treaty Japan was not by the United States to defend Japan in case of attack; the treaty provided she the only price the Japanese paid for their may defend Japan if she chooses. sovereignty. As mentioned above, they were also expected to rearm and constant­ Fifth, it provided for a United States ly pressured to do so at a rapid rate. veto over any arrangements for the Furthermore, they were forced to abandon entry of the forces of a third power hopes to restore natural economic ties into Japan. with Asia; most strikingly, Japan was not permitted to normalize relations with Finally, there were no provisions for a the People's Republic of China. termination of the treaty except by mutual consent.

Few persons now deny that the original I might add that we have often seen the U.S.-Japan security pact was an unequal view expressed by the Japanese that this first treaty of 1951 was not one treaty in the fullest sense of that old which was entered into by Japan volun­ Western legal tradition for dealing with tarily.55 Asian countries. It was of course nego­ tiated with Japan when that country was still under occupation and without sover­ In addition to the above sources of ten­ eign rights. It violated the no-war sion, it should be noted that the really provision (Article 9) of the Japanese operative part of the pact, the so-called constitution by stating in its preamble administrative agreement, was not nego­ that Japan was expected to "increasingly tiated until February 1952 and was never assume responsibility for its own defense subject to Diet or Senate approval. More­ against direct and indirect aggression." over, the final decision of the number and More than this, however, the treaty forced location of facilities to be used by the 11 U.S. military in Japan was not settled un­ real self-interest. til June 1952.56 Thus even in September 1951, neither the Japanese people nor the In studying Japanese attitudes in the Japanese government itself were entirely period leading up to the peace treaty and clear as to exactly what they were getting security pact, it is striking that Yoshida into--being ignorant of details such as and his aides appear to have been primar­ the fact that sovereign Japan was to play ily concerned not so much with any project­ host to 100,000 American troops, and that ed Soviet or Chinese threat to Japan but within a few years America would attempt rather with the nature and direction of to introduce nuclear-capable Honest John U.S. cold-war attitudes. One of the pieces missiles to the main islands (a move of advice Yoshida later claimed to have thwarted only by a strong outcry from the found most useful in guiding Japan once Japanese populace in 1955).57 On the again to sovereignty was that given him American side, major responsibility for by former premier Suzuki Kantaro in 1946. negotiating the administrative agreement Lie still like a carp on the carving fell to special ambassador Dean Rusk. Thus board, the old admiral told him, and the two foremost architects of the American although Yoshida did more than this, he hard-line in Asia—Dulles and Rusk—were did not fuss when it was useless 60' Be­ both intimately involved in the initial fore the first occupation troops had even formulation of America's Asian containment landed in Japan, experienced Japanese policy before assuming the responsibilities diplomats such as Yoshizawa Kenkichi had of Secretary of State. openly predicted the emergence of Soviet- American tensions and advised that this Some of the more blatant inequities would be tne key to Japan's rise again to of the 1951 agreement were amended in a place in the sun."^ Yoshida accepted 1960,^8 but very fundamental differences this analysis, and as prime minister during of outlook have remained. One of these most of the occupation he never lost an concerns China. The statements of key opportunity to turn American cold-war Japanese officials such as Yoshida reveal apprehensions to Japan's advantage. That that up to the time of the San Francisco the Yoshida government acquiesced in Amer­ conference, and for a short while there­ ican designs for Asia does not mean that after, the Japanese intended to normalize it necessarily subscribed to the analysis relations with the People's Republic of which underlay those designs. Even after China once they were in a position to do the outbreak of the Korean War and the so--that is, when the occupation was formal­ Chinese entry into that conflict, Yoshida ly ended through ratification of the San reportedly rejected the view that the Francisco treaty by, most importantly, the Soviet Union was contemplating, or even U.S. Senate. Yoshida abandoned these plans capable of, invading Japan, and he private­ only after it was made clear to him that ly supported neither the military contain­ Congress, at the peak of its indignation ment nor economic isolation of China.62 over the "loss of China," would refuse to To a staunch patriot, however, endorsement ratify the peace treaty unless Yoshida gave of such views was a tolerable temporary prior guarantee that Japan would recognize price to pay for the restoration of Japan­ only the Kuomintang regime. Dulles visi­ ese dignity. Increasingly over the past ted Tokyo in December, 1951 with Senators two decades that price has come to seem John Sparkran and Alex Smith, Democrat and both less tolerable and less necessary to Republican representatives respectively many Japanese. of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, primarily to impress this fact upon Yos­ The corollary to the view that, mili­ hida. The success of their mission was tary alliance with the United States has revealed the following month with the distorted a more natural role for Japan publication of the "Yoshida letter," in in Asia is that by being forced into a which the Japanese prime minister signed his rigid anti-communist role, Japan may have name to the American line on China.59 That increased rather than decreased its vul­ so virulent an anti-communist as Yoshida nerability. To retain the Pentagon's had to be pressured into taking this posi­ meteorological imagery, many Japanese fear tion indicates how widely divergent the two that the American arsenal in Japan, includ­ countries were, and still are, in their ing Okinawa, may be not an umbrella but a evaluation of the situation in Asia. With lightning rod. In any holocaust between regards to China, American "magnanimity" the superpowers, Japan will have to be has forced Japan into a posture which many taken out quickly. This fear of being an Japanese believe to be inimical to their unwitting victim of retaliation has been 12 reinforced in recent years by the clear strategic calculations, since Japan's demonstration of American aggression and proximity to the alleged enemy is no ineptitude in Asia, particularly since longer of such great importance in an era both bombing missions against Vietnam and of intercontinental ballistic missiles. espionage missions against China, North More zealous chess players, however, argue Korea, and the Soviet Far East originate that the reverse is true. The F-1Ö5 in large part in Japan. Like many of the fighter-bombers now based in Japan remain major issues which mar the U.S.-Japan of tactical importance, in this view, relationship today, however, this too has particularly since they are adaptable to its roots in the occupation period. The small nuclear weapons. Japan's great grim gamesmen of the American military naval facilities at Sasebo and Yokosuka establishment themselves implicitly took must continue to service the wide-ranging Japan's role as an expendable buffer into Seventh Fleet. Okinawa, it is held, account in their projections at least as should assume an even greater nuclear role early as 1947, when the function of forward than that which it now plays as nuclear bases in U.S. strategic planning was as depot and site of the Mace-B missiles follows: (which allegedly were specially designed for use against China). In the new What is necessary to reach the target is projection, Okinawa can also serve as a, a launching base relatively near the base for Polaris and Poseiden submarine target—to put it literally, within five fleets and as a possible ABM site against hundred miles...Under the conditions of the Chinese ICBM's.64 Thus the issues of war in which atomic bombs are available nuclear deployment, Okinawa's return to to a possible enemy, the importance of depriving the enemy of bases near one's Japan, and the nature of the future rela­ own shore and preferably of acquiring tionship between Japan and the United and maintaining bases close to his States are intricately interwoven, while territory remains as great as before. the present "security" relationship breeds The logic supporting this proposition an increasing sense of insecurity among derives from the characteristics of much of the populace of Japan. atomic bomb carriers presently known or conceivable....The outlying base, if properly placed, is also a tremendous Even without a doomsday dimension, advantage to the defense as a further however, king-pawn relationships are measure of protection against long- predictably unhappy. Since 1951 Japan has range bombing aircraft. For such bases been kept from true sovereignty by the provide means of advance protection and very nature of its relationship with the interception which greatly augments the obstacles to penetration of vital terri­ United States. It has been urged to "do tories by attacking bombers. These bases more," but always with the understanding may themselves be vulnerable to atomic that the boundaries of behavior must bomb attack, but so long as they are conform to overall American policy. The there, they are.not likely to be by­ Dullesian-Ruskian vision of Asia must be passed. In this respect the advanced accepted as just that: vision and not base may be likened to the pawns in halluoination. Japan has been the shrewd front of the king on a chessboard; meager though their power may be individually, but decidedly junior partner in the rela­ so long as they exist and the king stays tionship, and this wound to pride -- the 63 legacy of defeat and occupation -- is both severely behind them, he is safe immeasurable and increasingly untenable. Since the closing years of the occupation, With such projections as this, the question Japanese critics of the U.S.-Japan rela­ of who is being magnanimous to whom becomes tionship have warned against becoming an somewhat more ambiguous than Chairman Rivers American satellite. Over the years this would choose to have it. The Japanese peace slogan has gained rather than lost support, movement which emerged in the 1949-1950 and present-day nationalistic sentiment period was based partly on the belief that may well constitute the greatest single such a role for Japan would be both provoc­ factor underlying Japanese opposition to a ative and possibly suicidal. continuing forced ideological alliance with the United States. Technological advances and nuclear proliferation since the immediate postwar 3. Facts of Life and Facts of Death years have increased the sheer terror of the game. Some have argued that in fact One of the most fashionable and the new weaponry should diminish the asinine concepts in the current discussion importance of Japan's role in American of Japan's future role in Asia is that of a 13

Japanese "nuclear allergy"--as if fear of pattern for approaches to Asia. the bomb were an illness, a symptom of unsound and unbalanced development. This Third, and related to the above, was is the rhetoric of "realism" which has been the assumption of a bipolar world--the used to defend the U.S.-Japan military twentieth century's contribution to yin- relationship since the time of Dulles. It yang cosmology. Neutralism was not only is the language of the hard-fact men. Yet unworkable but immoral (another dimension it is possible to argue that many of the in itself). International guarantees were "facts" upon which the relationship was a chimera. The consequences of this premised, and which remain little question­ assumption for Japan were immeasurable, for ed today, are actually assumptions which they meant that Japan could not attempt to have not withstood the test of time notice­ become a bridge between East and West, but ably well. rather was forced to become a bastion against most of the rest of Asia. To de­ Several core assumptions dominate fend this position, it was necessary to Dulles's pronouncements and memoranda place greater emphasis upon materialistic concerning the situation in Asia at the considerations (that Japan's obvious tech­ time the military relationship with Japan nological capability would make the country was being created. One of these, and more comfortably Western than Eastern) than perhaps the fundamental one, is the mono­ upon racial, cultural, or geographic consid­ lithic-communism assumption -- the belief erations that might naturally be expected in a minutely planned program of expansion to motivate the Japanese toward an Asian which posed an external threat to Japan. policy based upon conciliation rather than The corollary of this assumption was confrontation. (Dulles was naturally cog­ to dismiss any consideration of the nizant of the racial dimension of the possibility of nationalistic aspiration problem, but chose to interpret it to or real fear on the part of the communists, suit his own purpose. In a secret memor­ and to distort not only the intentions of andum written several weeks after he had the Chinese and Russian governments, but been assigned responsibility for the peace also their relationship and actual capabil­ treaty, Dulles, in the words of Frederick ities. In the case of the People's Repub­ Dunn, noted the need "to capitalize on the lic of China, American policy makers pur­ Japanese feeling of racial and social sued what might be called the have-your- superiority to the Chinese, Koreans, and China-and-dismiss-it-too school of policy­ Russians, and to convince them that as making, whereby it was argued on the one part of the free world they would be in hand that the communist regime would shortly equal fellowship with a group which is fold of its own accord since (a priori for superior to members of the Communist communists) it lacked popular support- world.") J The bipolar-world approach while on the other hand Mao's success posed also led America to postulate that Asia's a serious threat to Japan and good reason future and Asia's well-being lay with the for summoning forth again the Rising Sun. Rhee's and Chiang's and Bao Dai's and Quirino's of the Far East, and that Japan's A second assumption was the European- proper role was to aid in the support of analogy syndrome--the notion that Asia such regimes. Conversely, the stability is the counterpart of Europe, only, some­ of Asia required that Mao's China remain what like the writing system, facing the weak and that Japan remain hostile to opposite direction and a bit inscrutible. China rather than attempt to create region­ This was clearly reflected in the rhetoric al security by establishing political and of the late forties and fifties. Japan economic ties with the mainland regime. and Germany were an inevitable forensic From the very moment he assumed responsi­ couple, the strategic "workshops" of Asia bility for the peace settlement, in fact, and Europe, and policy changes first one of Dulles's cardinal tenets was to initiated in occupied Germany often were prevent Japan from becoming economically introduced several months later to Japan. tied to the communist countries.°° Korea was understood to be the Greece of Asia. Defense plans focusing on Japan A fourth assumption, also entangled were identified as a "little NATO" for with the preceding, is revealed in the the Pacific. The decision to reconstruct disproportionate emphasis given to military the economics of Japan and Southeast Asia considerations in the solution of political was a "little Marshall Plan" for the Orient. problems. In this respect, Dulles's Most importantly, policies such as contain­ approach to Japan and the U.S.-Japan rela­ ment deemed viable for Europe became the tionship need not be contrasted to the 14 views of the left. It can be contrasted weaponry; more tolerance of nuclear to establishment figures such as George "realities"; more contribution to U.S.- Kennan and Yoshida Shigeru. Kennan, formulated regional security in Asia), who recognized China's weakness and found it may be well to ask whether this is any­ no evidence of Soviet plans for a military thing other than more sabre rattling which thrust against Japan, strongly opposed the in the long run will heighten tension and decision to maintain a huge American insecurity in Asia, impede more natural military presence in post-treaty Japan. regional alignments, cause increasing To the view that the Korean War revealed frictions between the United States and both the wisdom and absolute necessity of Japan by perpetuating the king-pawn rela­ this decision, Kennan has offered the tionship, and exacerbate already serious serious countersuggestion that the trend schisms within the Japanese body politic of American occupation policies in Japan itself. may in fact have been a major contributing factor to the outbreak of that conflict. Certainly if future calculations con­ Yoshida also gave military considerations tinue to be based on a "realism" as far less weight than did Dulles in looking dubious as that of the past, the facts of ahead to Japan's future. As mentioned life in Asia will be that much closer to above, he stubbornly and successfully being the facts of death.69 opposed U.S. pressures to recreate a Japanese military establishment at a rapid rate. In some of the earlier projections Footnotes he ordered made concerning Japan's post- treaty role, serious consideration was 1. U.S. Department of State, The Far given not only to a neutral role for Japan, Eastern Commission: A Study in Inter­ but also to a guarantee of Japan's military national Cooperation, 1945-1952, Publica­ security by U.S. forces stationed outside tion 5138, Far Eastern Series 60, Washing­ the main Japanese islands themselves."7 ton, 1953, p. 145. See also Chang Hsin- Dulles, however, appears never to have hai, "The Treaty with Japan: A Chinese given serious consideration to any settle­ View," Foreign Affairs XXVI:3 (April ment for Japan which did not involve 1948), p. 506. either a heavily rearmed Japan, U.S. bases in Japan, or both; and future students may 2. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the conclude that for all his technical law­ Far East, Yale, 1948, p. 24-25. yer's competance, his negotiation of the settlement with Japan was a rigid and rou­ 3. Larry W. Moses, "Soviet-Japanese tine accomplishment. It is interesting Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The to note that the predominant military Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol," Journal cast to America's Japan policy was initiat­ of Asian History 1:1 (1967), p. 64-85. ed with the firm support of the Department of State. Robert Murphy, America's first 4. The Far Eastern Commission, p. 228. post-occupation ambassador to Japan, for This is an excellent source throughout for example, had no background whatsoever in gaining an insight into the (generally Far Eastern affairs and was assigned to negative) attitude of other countries this post primarily, in his own words, concerning American initiatives in occu­ because of "my long association with pied Japan. military officers."68 5. George F. Kennan, Memoirs (1925- Obviously the U.S.-Japan military 1950), Bantam paperback edition, 1969, treaty was premised upon the assumption p. 416. Compare Frederick S. Dunn, that it would increase security in Asia, Peace-Making and the Settlement with cement the relationship between the United Japan, Princeton, 1963, pp. 77ff. States and Japan, and ensure domestic stability within Japan by providing forces 6. Dunn, 77. capable of suppressing insurrection. These are assumptions which require serious re­ 7. Frank Kowalski, Nihon saigumbi, examination, since the relationship is now (The Rearmament of Japan), Simul Press, at a turning point where the potential for Tokyo, 1969, ch. 9. This is a judicious death and destruction is greater than account of the remilitarization of occu­ ever before. Before following the easy pied Japan under American auspices in the line of more of the same (more GNP to period between the Korean War and Japan's defense outlays; more sophisticated assumption of sovereignty upon the coming 16

33. See Van Aduard's discussions of 49. Far Eastern Commission, p. 70-71. the treaty proposals of both 1947 and 1949. 50. Sebald, p. 259, 260, 282. Compare 34. Kennan, p. 416. John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs XXX:2 (January 35. Burton Sapin, "The Role of the 1952), p. 182. Military in Formulating the Japanese Peace Treaty," in Gordon B. Turner,(ed.) A 51. Packard, p. 8. History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century, 52. Pravda, September 12, 1946. 1953, p. 760. For an interesting discus­ Translated in Soviet Press Translations sion of the split between State and 1:5, p. 4-7. Defense see William J. Sebald, With MacAr­ thur in Japan: £ Personal History of the 53. Washington Post, August 10, 1969. Occupation, Norton, 1965, pp. 247ff. Se­ bald was the State Department representa­ 54. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee tive to Japan during the occupation. On Foreign Relations, Hearings, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with 36. Shinobu Seizaburo, "The Korean Japan, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, War as an Epoch of Contemporary History," (1960), p. 10. The Developing Economies IV:4 (December 1966), p. 26-27. 55 Ibid., p. 30-31.

37. New York Times, January 30, 1949 56 Packard, p. 6-8. and February 6, 1949. Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1949. On Okamura, 57 Weinstein, p. llOff. see Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford, 1962, 58 See Packard. p. 55. 59. Sebald, p. 284-87. 38. Shinobu, p. 33. 60. Kosaka Masataka, Saishö Yoshida 39. Quoted in Dunn, p. 80-81. Shigeru (Chüö Köron-sha, 1968,)p. 26.

40. Cited in George R. Packard III, 61. Toyama Shigeki, Showa shi, (Iwan- Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty ami Shincho, 1955, 1967), p. 254. Crisis of 1960, Princeton, 1966, p. 10. 62. Kowalski, ch. 5; Weinstein, p. 41. Sebald, p. 252-53. 67-8, 83, 94.

42. Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida 63. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Memoirs, Houghton Mifflin, 1962, p. 192, (July 1947) on Navy Department strategic 249, 265; Dunn, p. 98ff; Sebald, p. 257. thinking; quoted in P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, The interview with Yoshida in the Dulles War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Oral History Project at Princeton Univer­ Consequences of Atomic Energy, McGraw- sity focuses on this issue, but Yoshida Hill, 1948, p. 83-84. was very old at che time the interview was made, and his recollections are not 64. Newsletter of Japan Congress reliable. Against A-&H-Bombs, July 20, 1969.

43. Kowalski, ch. 3. Compare The 65. Dunn, p. 100. Yoshida Memoirs, p. 182ff. 66. Ibid. 44. Kowalski, ch. 9. 67". Kennan, Memoirs, p. 525. See also 45. Ibid. his "Japanese Security and American Policy," Foreign Affairs XLII (October 1964). 46. Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Post­ war Defense Policy, Columbia University 68. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Ph.D. thesis, 1969, p. 81ff. Warriors. Doubleday, 1964, p. 339.

47. Kowalski, ch. 12. 69. The phrase is from Dr. George 48. Ibid. Wald's speech at MIT, March 4, 1969. A FEW READING SUGGESTIONS Qj3BASIA C BOOKS ON JAPAN Japanese History: New Dimensions of Approach and Under s tanding, John Whitney Hall, MacMillan, 63 pp. 75^. Modern Japan: A Brief History, Arthur Tiedeman, Van Nostrand Press, 193 PP., ?l71+57" Asian Dilemma: U.S., Japan and China, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, P.O. Box UX)68, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103 $2.25. Japan and the United States in Asia, Robert E. Osgood, George R. Packard, III, and John H. Badgley. Johns Hopkins Press, I968 .

Literature: two grove press paperback anthologies: Earliest Era to the Mid-Ninteeth Century Modern Japanese Literature to the Present Day "Concerned Theatre Japan", a quarterly at $2.50 per issue. Hikari-cho 2-13-25, Kokubunji-shi, Tokyo 185, Japan

JAPANESE FEATURE FILMS Wt&'figTF0*' Rashomon The Island Ugetsu The Magnificent Seven available from Cinema Guild, 10 Fiske Place, Mount Vernon, N.Y.

ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF NEWS fW^eT^ffiBusBea monthly, October to May, for students; social concerns, world affairs, the arts and poetry, %h per year. P.O. Box 871, Nashville, Tennessee 37202. I.F. Stone Weekly, penetrating commentary on current foreign and domestic affairs. Best of its kind. $5 annually, from M+20 29th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20008. Leviathan, a monthly "movement" newspaper with excellent articles on international issues (see Peter Wiley article in this packet). $5 (500 for single issues), from 330 Grove Street, San Francisco, California 9^102. The Guardian, a weekly newspaper offering an excellent regular alternative news source; $10, or $5 for students; 197 East 4th, New York, New York. Liberation News Service, news items for stud nt or underground newspapers. l60 Claremont Avenue, New York, New York 10027

AMPO - see copy enclosed in packet

IUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND JAPANESE STUDENT MOVEMENTS Altbach, Philip G.: "A New Left in Japan", Christian Century, No. 83, 1966. "Crisis in Japan's University System", Christian Century, December k, I968. Bix, Herbert, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military Industrial Complex", Bulletin, Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (see Action Guide), January, 1970 , Vol.2, No.2. Lifton, Robert J., "Youth and History, Individual Change in Postwar Japan", Daedulus, Vol 91 No. 1 Winter I962, Also in Erik Erikson, The Challenge of Youth, Anchor, I965, pb. Packard, George III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis, Princeton University Press, 1966. Best treatment of i960 crisis. Very relevant. Passin, Herbert, ed. The United States and Japan, Prentice Hall Inc. 1964. Brief exploration of issues and projection Reischauer, Edwin 0. Beyond Vietnam: United States and Asia, 1967> Alfred Knopf, pb. Shimbori, Michiya, "The Sociology of a Student Movement A Japanese Case Study", Daedulus, Winter, 1968. Excellent descriptive article. See his other references listed in the article. Scalapino, Robert, The Japan Communist Movement, 192O-1966, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967. Should be read with the Stockwin critique of Scalapino's projection. Stockwin, J.A.A., "Is Japan a Post Marxist Society?", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (summer 1968). Excellent analysis. from the Bungei Shinjuu, December I968, a colloquim on the University crisis translated and available from the Japan Society, 250 Park Avenue, New York, New York.

The Japan Times, The Asahi Evening News, the Yomiuri, and Japanese daily newspapers are available at the Library of the East Asia Institute, Columbia University, .The Japan Society, Consulates in major U.S. cities, and in other colleges and universities with an Asian emphasis.

See bibliographical notes with articles in this packet, and the ACTION GUIDE to supplement this list of suggested source materials.