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Home , Chinese Communist Party, Long March, Mao Zedong, Political commissar, Provinces of China

The

KATHRYN KOLATA Communicated by: Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh Department of History

ABSTRACT On October 16, 1934, 100,000 Chinese Communist troops set out on a 6,000 mile trek from their base in Kiangsi. This trek, later to be known as the Long March, began after Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist (the ) thwarted the fledgling Communist organization in Southeast . The Long March was an arduous journey; approximately 90,000 men and women died before it was over. However, was not eliminated in China. This paper argues that the Long March galvanized commitment to_ the communist cause and thus was the key precursor to the eventual victory of the in China in 1949. By narrowly escaping defeat and destruction through the Long March, the Communists were able to re-build support to fight the Nationalists once again - and this time they won.

THE CHINESE AND SUN YAT SEN the Manchu . Sun realized that the only way to ensure China's survival as a country was to make radical changes inside the government. Sun felt The Chinese Revolution began in 1911 with the over­ that it was imperative for China to "westernize" in throw of the Manchu government and the establish­ terms of scientific and social .2 In 1905, Sun ment of the New of China. Before the Rev­ established the T'ung-meng Hui (United Revolution­ olution, the Chinese lived mainly in competing clans ary League) that was based on his "Three Principles and were ruled by rival lords. During China's of the People." His three principles were: long history, it's people had never functioned as one cohesive unit. Because of the threat of , Great 1. : to supersede the narrow provincial Britain, and the Industrial Revolution, China needed and clan loyalties of the Chinese to become a stronger unit. The unification of China was an important development for a number of rea­ 2. : to carry into national life the self­ sons. Most important was that unification served governing processes prevalent in the villages to defend China against Japanese invasion and also set the stage for a national economy. China was ex­ 3. People's Well-Being: to improve the material tremely xenophobic, and the beauracracy did not want standards of the ordinary man's life. 3 to change. Some individuals, however, dreamed of a united Chinese nation, and it was this dream that en­ Sun Yat Sen's dream of a new republic did not come ergized the in China. to fruition until October 10, 1911.

Of these individuals, the most important was Sun Yat By 1916 Sun Yat Sen was the President of the New Sen. The "Father of Republican China," Sun was Republic of China. During his reign, Sun founded the born on November 12, 1866 in the southern of Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), which had support .1 At age thirteen Sun went to live with his from not only the Soviet Party but the Communist brother in Honolulu, Hawaii where he attended a mis­ Party in China as well. In 1924, Sun admitted the sionary school. After four years in Hawaii, Sun moved Chinese Communists into the Nationalist Party. Dur­ to Kong where he studied medicine. However, ing his career, Sun attempted to unify all of China. at age twenty-eight Sun returned to Hawaii, and left Sun Yat Sen died on March 12, 1925 with his dream the medical profession for politics. After the defeat of of unification unfulfilled. With the death of Sun Yat China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Sun re­ Sen, internal struggles plagued the Kuomintang and turned to Guangdong. During the next sixteen years, the . During these strug­ he began to develop his ideas. He at­ gles Chiang Kai-Shek emerged as chief of the National tracted many supporters, financial and otherwise, and Revolutionary . staged a number of unsuccessful attempts to overthrow 2 Dick Wilson. The Long March New York: , 1971, page 10. 1 "Sun Yat Sen." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed., page 430. 3 Ibid., page 11. 42 K. Kolata

CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE DREAM warlords in the northern part of the country. After two OF A UNIFIED CHINA years, the fighting ended when the Nationalist ~arty entered the capital, Peking. Chiang then established a new central government at N anking. Although Chi­ The dream of a unified China did not die with Sun ang was of the government he still did not Yat Sen. Chiang Kai-Shek was heavily influenced by have complete control. The warlords in the north­ him. Chiang was born October 31, 1887 in the coastal ern part of the country and the Chinese Cemmunists province of Chekiang. Unlike Sun Yat Sen, Chiang were still opposed to Chiang Kai Shek. Facing "certain was born to wealthy parents. In 1906 he began his war" with Japan in 1931, Chiang decided not to resist career in Northern China at the Paoting Mil­ the Japanese invasion until he defeated the Chinese itary Academy. After one year, he began his four year Communists.6 At this time, he launched a number of military education in Japan. Chiang served in the in an attempt to defeat the Japanese army from 1909-1911, but when he received Communists in their base area on the Kiangsi-Fukien word of the uprisings in China, he returned home and border. The Communists, using , suc­ began to try to overthrow the Manchu government. By cessfully fought off the Kuomintang four times. But 1918, Chiang Kai-Shek was a member of the_ Kuo~­ in 1934, they finally lost their base to the Nationalists. intang. Chiang, along with Sun Yat Sen, believed m Chiang believed that when the Kuomintang captured the unification of China. the Communist base that the Communists would give While visiting the for the first time in up. Instead, they abandoned their base and began a 1923 Chiang studied not only the Soviet institutions long trek from one side of China to the other. but the Army as well. Upon returning from his visit in the Soviet Union, Chiang became a "comman­ dant of a military academy, established on the Soviet ZEDONG AND THE 4 model at Whampoa near Canton." The admission of CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang which occurred during Sun Yat Sen's presidency, later be­ came a great problem for Chiang Kai Shek. There , the eventual Chairman of the New Re­ I were tensions among the two parties that superseded public of China did not allow the Communists to dis­ l any positive factors of the alliance. The far right of the appear. This charismatic leader and poet helped en­ Kuomintang and the far left of the Chinese Commu­ sure the survival of 83 of the 100,000 troops who un­ nists rarely saw eye-to-eye. The collaboration between dertook the Long March. Mao was born on December the two parties was imperative for the overthrowing of 26 1893 in the Province of China to the warlord regime during the Northern Expedition in who had prospered by hard work. Mao was rebellious 1927 but as soon as that was over, the two parties did by nature and left his father's farm early in life to a~­ not need' one another anymore. According to Wilson: tend school. Upon graduating from normal school m I 1918, Mao went to Peking where he worked as a ­ i While the Party Central Committee respect­ brary assistant. He met two men in Peking who influ­ v ed the motion of , most enced him: Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. These men, l\ of the had only approved a demo­ "whose social criticism drew him into their orbit," cratic revolutionary and were were the founders of the Chinese Communist Party l\ quite doubtful about entering the Kuom­ in 1921.7 During the next few years, Mao held various }. intang. [The] Chinese Communist Party positions in the Chinese Communist Party until 1927. a was able to pursue its goal of organizing He began to realize that the "major force" in China v mass support under the Kuomintang um-· was discontentment of the peasants and he wrote a brella - and retained control of this organi­ " 5 report "which constituted one of his major contribu­ a zation after the united front collapsed." tions to Chinese Communism." 8 Mao believed that t: Tensions mounted between the Nationalist Party and the peasants should own their own land and not be re­ A the Chinese Communist Party until 1927 when Chiang sponsible for land that is not theirs. He thought that b finally expelled the Communists from his party. At millions of peasants would "rise like a tornado or tem­ p this time, Chiang lost the support of the Soviet Union. pest - a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that Y' 9 no power, however great, will be able to suppress it:" 11 While Chiang was struggling to deal with the Chinese Mao organized the Autumn Harvest rebellions hopmg Communist Party, he was also working to unify all of that the peasants would be particularly unhappy and p China. A large number of warlords maintained con­ angry at their government. He planned a military up­ trol over their lands and the people on them. Facing rising at , and hoped that "the Red_ Armies the imminent invasion of the Japanese, the pressure under Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and other Commumst guer- to quickly unite China into one cohesive unit was im­ mense. In 1926 Chiang began a campaign against the 6 "Chiang Kai-shek." page 479. 7"Mao Tse-Tung." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed., page 817. 4 "Chiang Kai-shek." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed., page 478. 8 Wilson, page 29. 5 Wilson, page 19. 9 Ibid. a The Long March 43

0 rilla chieftains [would] then ... march triumphantly If the enemy advances, we retreat. y on Canton to establish a new revolutionary govern­ If the enemy halts and encamps, we harass. d ment." 10 However, the victory and eventual capture If the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack. l­ of Nanchang never materialized. The peasants did not If the enemy retreats, we pursue.17 it have the interest that Mao believed they had in revolt­ l­ ing against Chiang Kai Shek. Mao was captured and Mao's discipline and organizational habits were instru­ ;s had to bribe his way out of captivity, eventually lead­ mental in the success of the Chinese Communist Party. n ing some of his troops to the mountains of Chingkang­ Over the next few years more people began to respect ;t shan on the border of Hunan and Kiangsi. Because of Mao and his beliefs. He gradually gained supporters 1e Mao's unfortunate handling of the Autumn Harvest not only in the but also in the Chinese )f Uprising he was expelled from the Politburo. Mao Communist Party. . began to lose "favour with the Communist Party lead­ n ership." 11 The intellectuals who ran the party were In 1931 Mao ordered the arrest of more than four thou­ unhappy with Mao's obsession with, "confiscating the sand men because he believed that they were involved Lt landlords' land in Hunan." 12 secretly with the Kuomintang. Mao wanted to 3. his. army of anyone that was not with him and the d In spite of the Party leaders' disillusionment with Chinese Communists one hundred percent. Liu Ti, an 'e Mao, he began to build power among the peasants in officer with the Red Army, freed these prisoners who a Chingkangshan. Mao Zedong and Chu Teh "steadily in turn killed approximately one hundred of Mao's dis­ extended the territory under their control, and the ciples. The Politburo did not look favorably on Mao's Mao-Chu group began to go by the name of the 'Real tough actions during this mutiny and he again fell out Power Faction.' " 13 In June 1930 the Central Commit­ of favor with the Politburo and was replaced by Chou tee ordered the Red Armies "to integrate themselves En-lai. under Mao's and Chu's command, to leave their rural bases and to launch attacks on a number of nearby During this time of political unrest in the Red Army, industrial cities, notably and ." 14 Chiang Kai-shek began the first of his five encirclement ~- Both Chu Teh and Mao knew that this plan was not campaigns to defeat the Chinese Communist Party. 3- best for the Party, but they were unable to reject it. The Communists won the first four of these campaigns 1- The Red Army was no match for.the Kuomintang and due to their guerrilla warfare tactics, but by the fifth 1- Mao and Chu "withdrew their troops and reorganized encirclement campaign in August 1933, Chaing Kai­ ~r at Kian in Kiangsi, determined to rebuild the rural shek was prepared. There were one million troops, ~s base from which they believed they could, over the an immense arsenal and four hundred airplanes at lS longer term, erode the power of the Kuomintang." 15 Chiang's disposal. The campaign was interrupted, t­ however, after the troops of the Nineteenth Route .n Because of the defeat of the Red Army by the Kuom­ Army became disgruntled with Chiang and his pol­ 1- intang, the leader, -san was replaced. Morale was icy of "pacifying the Chinese interior before turning to 1- very low among the peasants, which eventually led to deal with the Japanese, even though they had them­ :i, Mao's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. selves fought against the Communists in the past." 18 " This ordeal caused a great lull in the fifth encirclement ;y Mao became Political of the Fourth Red campaign and fighting did not resume until August of lS Army with Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief. This 1934. Mao and Chu Teh both agreed that the 7. army was set up in such a way that it was a paid ser­ ta vice and had rations. The army also followed Mao's Red Army should break through the ever­ a "Three Rules of Discipline (obey orders, don't take tightening Kuomintang circle, split into small 11- anything from workers or peasants, and hand in every­ units and fight guerrilla campaigns in the :i.t thing taken from local landlords and gentry) and Eight areas to the north and east of the enemy e­ Additional Rules (put back the doors you use for bed­ lines where there were no blockhouses. 19 :i. t boards, replace the straw borrowed for bedding, speak '.1- politely, pay fairly for what you buy, return everything Li Teh (also known as Otto Braun), who had the con­ :i.t you borrow, pay for anything you damage, don't bathe fidence of the world Communist leaders, rejected Mao ,9 in the sight of women, and don't search the pockets of and Chu Teh's advice and said that the base should be lg captives)." 16 The troops also had a very famous ex­ defended using trenches, positional combat and block­ td pression on the "principles of guerrilla warfare": houses. This strategy proved fatal for the Chinese p­ Communist Party. On October 16, 1934 the remain­ es ing survivors of the Kuomintang offensives began the r- lOJbid., page 20. "most extraordinary march in ." 20 11Jbid., page 29. 12 Jbid. 13Jbid., page 23. l7Jbid. 14 Jbid. 18Jbid., page 53. 15Jbid., page 24. 19Jbid., page 56. 16Jbid., page 42. 20Jbid., page xiii. K. Kolata 44 24 THE LONG MARCH wooden litter by four carriers." It is clear, though, that this grueling journey was not a luxurious time. Every soldier on the march was "dressed and equipped On November 13, 1934 reported: the same." 25 The six-year Communist capital Juichin, in "Each man," said the chief artillery engi­ Kiangsi Province, was officially reported to­ neer afterwards, "carried five pounds of ra­ day to have been occupied yesterday by tion rice and each had a shoulder pole from government forces. Its capture was more which hung either two small boxes of am­ a result of a steady military and economic munition or hand grenades, or big kerosene blockade than of severe fighting. Dislodged cans filled with our most essential machin­ from this stronghold, the are now mak­ ery and tools. Each pack contained a blan­ ing their way westward toward the K wei­ ket or quilt, one quilted winter uniform, and chow and Szechwan provincial borders. . .. three pairs of strong cloth shoes with thick General Chiang Kai-shek is actively watch­ rope soles tipped and heeled with metal." 26 ing developments.21 On October 16, 1934, one hundred thousand troops set After three horrible months of defeats and deaths, the out on a six thousand mile trek from the southern part Chinese Communist Party finally gained the upper of China to the northern part of China. This "long hand. In early January 1935, the Chinese Commu­ march" took one year and many troops perished. It nist Party took control over Tsunyi in the Kweichow was clear to Mao and his fellow comrades that they had Province. The Communist Party decided to rest in to leave Kiangsi or face annihilation. As the remaining Tsunyi while a meeting of the Politburo of the Party one hundred thousand troops of Chinese Communist Central Committee was convened. It was in Tsunyi soldiers set out on their long journey, morale was ex­ that Mao regained his control of the Chinese Commu­ ceedingly low. Twenty thousand troops were injured nist Party, "thereafter its dominating personality ... and had to be left behind in Kiangsi. Many of the peo­ who led it into power fifteen years later." 27 This was ple who stayed behind were captured and eventually an important time not only for Mao but for his troops killed. One of those killed was Mao's brother, Mao as well. "The Tsunyi Resolutions adopted on January Tse-tan. 8, 1935 constitute[d] the most important document to be produced on the Long March." 28 This document Conditions on the march were very primitive, causing states that the leader.ship under Po Ku of the Politburo many of the troops to die of disease. There were no and Li Teh (Otto Braun) of the Military Commission medicines, hospitals or ammunition; a good number was condemnable. Po Ku's famous slogan of "Not an of the guns became useless. The troops were forced to inch of soviet territory to be lost" might have been fast for days at a time. Despite these horrible circum­ correct politically but applying that to warfare was a stances, the troops became very tough and courageous mistake.29 soldiers. The Po Ku policy of 'pure defence' had Reports in the varied as to the infor­ meant disposing the Communist forces so mation of the Nationalists' success in Kiangsi. In a that they could resist attack from all direc­ November 19, 1934 article in the New York Times, the tions, which meant not being strong enought to resist anywhere and enabling the enemy AP reported: "The Chinese Communists continued 30 their slow movement westward, engaging frequently to destroy the Red units one by one." with troops. The Communist strength is estimated This was just one of the fourteen resolutions and by t at about 50,000." 22 In a November 20, 1934 article the end of the meeting, Po Ku was "specifically named f in the New York Times Hallett Abend reported that for ... failing to admit criticism of the overwhelming s "The main Communist force, exceeding 100,000 a year majority" of the conference. Mao Zedong summed up f 23 ago, has now been reduced to about 10,000." the conference by stating: I The enlarged conference of the Politburo 1 Mao was unable to start the march with the troops on points out that the mistakes in the Party's f October 16, 1934 due to a debilitating bout of malaria. military leadership in the past were only a When Mao was able to join his troops he rode on horse­ partial mistake in the general line of the back most of the time. Other than Mao, the only other Party, which was not enough to cause pes­ person who did not walk was Li Teh (Otto Braun). Ac­ simism and despair. The Party has bravely cording to Dick Wilson's The Long March, "He would never march, and either rode a horse along the route 24Wilson, page 70. or else, if it were a long stretch, would be carried on a 25Ibid., page 67. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., page 91. 28 21 New York Times 14 November 1934: Sec. I, page 7. Ibid. 29 22 New York Times 19 November 1934: Sec. I, page 14. Ibid., page 93. 30 23 New York Times 20 November 1934: Sec. I, page 11. Ibid. The Long March 45

exposed its own mistakes. It has educated banks' remittance rates have fallen decid­ itself through them and learnt how to lead edly following the bolstering of public con­ the revolutionary war more efficiently to­ fidence and the subsiding of the fears of a wards victory. After the exposure of mis­ Communist incursion. 36 takes, the Party, instead of being weakened, 31 After five weeks of attempting to cross the , actually becomes stronger. the Red Army retreated and recaptured the Luoshan During the Red Army's resting period and conference Pass and Tsunyi on February 27, 1935, which they in Tsunyi, Chiang Kai-shek was trying to take back had lost several weeks prior to that. In a poem Mao the towns that the Red Army had occupied. Ac­ Zedong expressed his feelings about the Luoshan Pass: cording to a January 7, 1935 report in the New York Cold blows the west wind Times, "Serious pressure of outlaw troops of the im­ Far off in the frosty air portant city of K weiyang, in Kweichow Province of The wild geese call Southwestern China, was reported relieved today by In the morning moonlight the arrival of government troop reinforcements rapidly 32 In the morning moonlight thrust in from Hunan and Kwangsi ." As Horses' hoofs ring out sharply reported in the New York Times on January 26, 1935 And the bugle's note "A motley horde of Chinese peasants, the curiously Is muted armed 'Chinese ,' streamed into Chungking to­ Do not say that the pass is defended with iron day to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's Nation­ This very day alist armies defend Szechwan Province against Com­ At one step munists." 33 There was increasing hostility and fear We shall cross over it among the people in the Kweichow Province of China We shall cross over it that was reduced when the Kuomintang arrived to The hills are blue like the sea take back the towns. And the dying sun is like blood37 s After the Tsunyi Conference, Mao was named Chair­ After a few bitter defeats of Mao's Fourth Front Army y man of the Revolutionary Military Council and the by the Kuomintang in Szechuan, the First Front Army ) entire Council was reorganized. It has been written, crossed the Wu River and entered K weiyang, the capi­ t in retrospect, that Tsunyi tal of Kweichow in April 1935. After Mao's troops ar­ 0 rived at K weiyang, Chiang sent his Kuomintang troops is the point at which the mass flight of the there. Unexpectedly, Mao pulled his army out and n Red Armies was stemmed and the Long n headed to . Mao was a strategist; and he di­ March began: when Chu Teh's superb gen­ vided his troops on the way to Yunnan, causing a n eralship and Mao Tse-tung's political acu­ a 34 diversion. Chiang was confident that he could fin­ men united to turn defeat into victory. ish off the Red Army on the banks of the Yangtze, After Tsunyi, Mao was ready to strike. He set up a but he underestimated Mao. The Red Army captured new base in Szechuan with the Fourth Front Army seven enemy ferry boats, "crossed the Chinsha River which was already established there. In this new loca­ at the Chiaoche Ferry in nine days and nine nights" tion the Communists would be out of the direct con­ and "extricated itself from the several hundred thou­ sand Kuomintang troops hot on its heels or trying to trol of the Kuomintang. Szechuan was an area rich 38 in "both foodstuffs and minerals." 35 Chiang Kai-shek intercept and encircle it." was determined to defeat the Red Army and gain con­ Articles in the New York Times reported over the )y trol over the southwestern provinces. Chiang joined period of twelve days said, "As predicted, the Com­ ~d forces with the local warlords to try to establish a munists in Northern Kweichow Province are prov­ 1g stranglehold on the Chinese Communists. In order ing a grave menace, and it is evident that recent lp for the Red Army to gain entry into Szechuan, they Nanking assertions about their elimination are not jus­ needed to cross the Yangtze River. Reported in the tified."39 Another April 3rd article stated that "Com­ New York Times on February 8, 1935, a special cable munists in Kweichow Province who broke through from Nanking relayed: provincial troops captured today the city of Chihshui, With the receipt of abundant financial aid swept south and occupied Tungtze and Tsunyi and ap­ the government troops sent to Chungking proached within forty miles of K weiyang, capital of the as the vanguard of a large-scale movement province. Although it was believed K weiyang was in against Communists in Szechwan Province no immediate danger, the populace was highly excited finally are on the move . . . The Chinese when reports were received that Communists, number­ ing about 10,000, were again swinging southwest into 31 Ibid., page 96. 32 New York Times 7 January 1935: Sec. I, page 11. 36 New York Times 8 February 1935: Sec. I, page 5. 33 New York Times 26 January 1935: Sec. I, page 10. 37Wilson, page 115. 34Wilson, page 109. 38 Ibid., page 120. 35Ibid., page 111. 39 New York Times 4 April 1935: Sec. I, page 12. 46 K. Kolata

Yunnan Province." 40 On April 5th, 8th and 10th it to sick or wounded men to ride. 42 was reported that the Red Army's advance has been "checked." By April 15th, the New York Times re­ The troops were exhausted, but they needed to reach the other side in order to connect with the Fourth ported that the Red Army had occupied the towns of a' Front Army. The troops would march late in the Tingfan, Changchai, Pingchai and . Mao Ze­ l evening so as to avoid enemy bombing. The rain, snow dong and the Chinese Communist Party were viewed t and fierce wind caused more men to die of exhaus­ as a group of miscreants who terrified not only the a tion and cold. After days of severe weather the Red Chinese but other countries as well. v Army finally reached the sunny summit. Later Mao a In May 1935 the Red Army faced its most challenging recalled some of his memories of climbing the Great obstacle in the entirety of the Long March: the Tatu Snow Mountain in a poem: River. Towering aloft The current is too rapid for navigation, and Above the earth ferrying across is extremely risky. The wa­ Great Kunlun ter roars like thunder and throws up rain­ You have witnessed all that was fairest bow mists as it crashes against the cliffs. In the human world Where the main roads cross the Tatu there As they fly across the sky, the three million are usually bridges made of iron chains or dragons ropes.41 Of white jade Freeze you with piercing cold If the Red Army did not cross successfully, the Long In the days of summer March would be over. From May 26th to 28th, 1935 Your melting torrents the Red Army ferried their troops across. On the third Fill streams and rivers till they overflow day the troops were slowed down and the Kuomintang Changing men began to bomb the Red Army from above. At Luting, Into fish and turtles with the Kuomintang waiting for them on the other What man can pass judgment side, the Red Army began to cross the iron chain sus­ On all the good and evil pension bridge. All of the planks had been removed, You have done yet miraculously the Red Army was able to cross it; These thousand autumns? only seventeen people perished. But today I say to you, Kunlun After crossing the Tatu River the Red Army was now You don't need your great height less than a hundred miles from their Fourth Front A You don't need all that snow! Army in northeastern Szechuan. On the way to the If I could lean on the sky " Kansu province, the Red Army had to traverse seven a I would draw my sword T ranges of high mountains. One of these was the Great And cut you in three pieces b Snow Mountain (Chiachinshan). Before the troops One I would send to Europe tl made their ascent, they ran into Tibetan warriors One to America S< where some fighting occurred. The Red Army troops And one we would keep in China. ei disarmed and took the Tibetan's clothing in order Thus would a great d to stay warm during their ascent of the Great Snow Reign through the world Mountain. Mao, who was sick with malaria again, had li' For all the world would share our warmth to rest after ascending sixteen thousand feet, while Lin z and cold43 Piao, the official historian of the Long March, had both P· of his legs amputated due to frostbite. After the Long Ill After the Red Army arrived safely in Moukung and ir March one survivor said of the Great Snow Mountain: reunited with the Fourth Front Army, there were feel­ n Chiachinshan is blanketed in eternal snow. ings of uncertainty. During all of the fighting with the V< There are great glaciers in its chasms and Kuomintang there was some infighting between the 01 everything is white and silent. We were First Front Army led by Mao Zedong and the Fourth h~ heavily burdened because each man had Front Army led by Zhang Guotao. st to carry enough food and fuel to last ten a1 days. Our food was anything we could buy Between Zhang and Mao there were also fe separated yet aligned interests: their in­ - chiefly corn, though we had a little buck­ a~ wheat and some peppers. We carried our dividual political interests, the interests of al food in long cloth pouches over our shoul­ the armed forces to which they belonged, cc ders. General Chu carried his food like ev­ and the interests of the Communist Party and Red Army in the face of their general eryone else. He had a horse but he gave it ni

40Ibid. 42Ibid., page 177. 41 Wilson, page 151. 43Ibid., pages 182-83. The Long March 47

Nationalist enemy.44 Zhang Guotao obtained the de facto con­ Zhang believed that his army was the strongest, most trol of the Army leadership . . . The Front viable army and deserved to be shown the appropri­ Headquarters was in charge of combat op­ ate amount of respect. On June 25, 1935 the Polit­ erations; its commander and political com­ buro held a conference in Lianghekou trying to plan missar were both from the Fourth Front the tasks (i.e. military maneuvers) of the Communists Army. after the conference. After the Lianghekou conference As for Mao, his membership in the Three­ was over there were five resolutions, three of which are Man-Group was automatically dropped, his as follows: assistantship to Zhou in military affairs was 1. After the union of the First and Fourth Red Front even more out of the question, and his for­ Armies, our strategic policy is to apply our main mer position as Political Commissar of the forces to attack at the north, to destroy the en­ Front Headquarters was given to Ghang­ emy in large numbers in mobile warfare, to take hao. In other words, Mao lost all his titles over southern first and then to create the and power in the Red Army.48 --Gansu Soviet Base. Thus, we Mao was extremely uncomfortable with his loss of po­ will put the Chinese Soviet movement on a firmer sition in the Red Army, but he was still very influential and broader base foundation or foothold in order in the Party Center and was considered the spokesman to strive for victory in the northwestern provinces for the First Front Army. Zhang was unhappy with and eventually in all China. this because he could not assert control over the First 2. To realize this strategic policy, tactically, we must Front Army with Mao still as influential as he was. concentrate our main forces to destroy Hu Zong­ Zhang and his men also had designs on positions in nan's troops, to capture Songpan and control the the Party Center, so another conference was called to region north of Songpan in order to achieve a suc­ discuss these issues. cessful march to southern Gansu. On August 5th and 6th, 1935 a Politburo conference 3. One part of the Red Army - a minor part of the convened at Shawo. This meeting has been considered Red Army - should be dispatched to the Yao and the "most important event in the reunion of the First Rivers to control this region so that we can and Fourth Front Armies." 49 The conference at Shawo back on the vast area of Gansu, , was the first conference since Tsunyi to seriously deal and provinces, which would be to the with political issues. A part of the final Resolution of 45 benefit of development toward the east. the Shawo Conference reads as follows: After all the discussions, the conference concluded The fraternal solidarity of the First and with no decisive resolution. Mao asked Zhang, "How Fourth Front Armies is a necessary condi­ about leaving the matter for further consideration?" 46 tion for fulfilling our historical mission of This did not placate Zhang for long, though. It has creating the Sichuan- Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet been shown that at the time of the union between and establishing the Chinese Soviet Repub­ these two armies that there were ten to fifteen thou­ lic. All those tendencies, intentional or un­ sand troops in the First Front Army and sixty to sev­ intentional, toward breaking the solidarity enty thousand in the Fourth Front Army. Zhang was of the First and Fourth Front Armies can displeased with the conference in June because he be­ only be harmful to the Red Army and ben­ lieved that it favored the Central Red Army and Mao eficial to the enemy. Zedong. A battle plan called "Operation of the Song­ pan Battle" stated that the Red Army in its entirety It should be made clear to each individ­ needed to march north to capture the city of Songpan ual that both the First and Fourth in order to pass to Gansu.47 Zhang was extremely Front Armies are constituents of the Chi­ reluctant to follow these orders because he had not nese Worker and Red Army, and voted for these plans and did not wish to sacrifice his both were under the leadership of the Cen­ own men. Mao's troops rushed to Songpan but, as tral Committee of the Chinese Communist he did not want to fight the battle alone, he had to Party. There are only class love and aid be­ stop and renegotiate with Zhang. In mid July, Zhang tween us, not divergence and contradiction. and Mao met in Luhua where there was another con­ Only in this way can the union of the First ference. This conference was more about who could and Fourth Front Armies be firm and last­ assert the most power rather than about finding a vi­ ing, can we combine into one unit to defeat able solution to their problem. The result of the Luhua our class enemy. 50 conference was as follows: While all of this infighting was going on, Chiang Kai­ 44 Benjamin . From Revolution to Politics; Chinese Commu- shek was slowly encircling the Red Army to prevent it nists on the Long March Boulder:Westview Press, 1990, page 143. 45 Ibid., page 145. 48 Ibid., page 149. 46 Ibid. 49 Ibid., page 151. 47Ibid., page 148. 50 Ibid., page 152. 48 K. Kolata from re-entering eastern Sichuan. The Red Army was When Mao Tse-tung and his threadbare surrounded on every side, except to the west due to band arrived in the loesslands of Shensi, limiting terrain, and the Kuomintang patiently waited. they represented a force, which, even on an Mao took the "First and Third Army Groups of the optimistic estimate, was only a marginal el­ First Front Army and the Fourth and Thirtieth Armies ement in Chinese political life viewed on a of the Fourth Front Army" on the eastern route, while national basis. Sustained principally by dis­ Zhang took the "Ninth and Thirty-first Armies of the cipline, hope and political formulae, Mao's Fourth Army and the Fifth and Ninth Army Groups group had, however, fortuitously garnered of the First Front Army" on the western route.51 This several hidden assets which were later to began the historic crossing of the Grasslands of Ching­ prove of major significance. 56 hai.

The land known as the Grasslands of Chinghai is a THE IMPACT OF THE LONG MARCH part of the Songpan plateau. It is between six and nine thousand feet above sea-level, but it is not moun­ The commitment and sheer determination that en­ tainous. In the summer months "green grass grows abled the remaining troops to survive the Long March everywhere and makes excellent pasture for the Ti­ helped the Chinese Communists establish themselves betans' yaks and horses. But it rains for eight or nine as the future leaders of China. Had the Long March months in the year, and the drainage is poor." 52 Be­ never occurred, it is quite possible that China would cause of the excessive amounts of rain, the land be­ be today under Japanese rule. comes marshy. August was the worst month in the Grasslands for rain and mosquitoes and because the Mao Zedong's strategic genius helped establish the Red Army's medical supplies were low and basically Chinese Communist Party as indestructible. Because non-existent, many succumbed to "black malaria." 53 of his guerrilla warfare tactics during the encirclement The Red Army had great difficulty procuring food dur­ campaigns and his innate ability to know what the ing this part of the Long March. Because the land was Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek were going to do, so marshy, the troops were unable to make fire, making he brought a sense of mystery and power to his Party. it impossible to cook what provisions they did have. The troops ate grain and vegetables raw, causing some When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, Chiang men to become violently ill. "On emerging from the Kai-shek realized that he needed the assistance of the Grasslands the depleted Red Army encountered the Soviet Union in order to survive. In order to gain Nineteenth of Hu Tsung-nan at Paotso, but the assistance of the Soviet Union, Chiang needed to was able to scatter it without too much difficulty." 54 amend the tense, combative situation with the Chinese Chiang Kai-shek had only one more opportunity to Communist Party. Mao had wanted to unify China for defeat his enemies before they landed in the northern years and he looked upon this opportunity as a way . to "break the ice in their relations with the KMT as a whole." 57 On February 10, 1937 the Chinese Com­ The Kuomintang constructed trenches and bunkers munist Party sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek with and installed its guns at the Latzu Pass, between five conditions that needed to be met in order for the the waters of the Pailung and Min Rivers. The only alliance to occur. Chiang and the Kuomintang needed way the Red Army could cross the Latzu Pass was to: to climb the single-plank bridge over the river, which 1. Stop the and unite all forces to fight the the Kuomintang controlled. The Red Army sent three Japanese companies of climbers to scale the right bank, and they made it possible for the Communist force to capture 2. Grant freedom to the people and release all po­ the bridge and defeat the Kuomintang. litical prisoners At the end of October 1935, the troops that survived 3. Hold a national conference of all parties and cir­ the Long March arrived in the town of Wuchichen in cles the northern Shensi soviet area. After the troops set­ tled down, Mao "led a party over to Hsiashihwan, the 4. Prepare for an anti-Japanese war seat of government of the soviet area and headquar­ 5. Improve the people's .58 ters of the Shesni-Kansu Provincial Party Committee. Membership totalled less than forty thousand upon en­ If these conditions were met the Chinese Communist tering Shensi in October 1935." 55 Professor Howard Party would fulfill four promises. It would: L. Boorman sums up the Long March best by stating: 1. Abolish the CCP rebellious policies against the 51 Wilson, pages 201-02. KMT government 5 2 Ibid., page 204. 53Ibid., page 206. 56Ibid., pages 234-35. 54 Ibid., page 222. 57Yang, page 239. 55 Ibid., page 233. 58Ibid. ':I, The Long March 49

2. Change the Soviet into a special region of the Re­ power until 1949, it is clear that the Long March gal­ public and Red Army as a part of the Nationalist vanized commitment to the Communist cause and was Army thus the precursor to the eventual victory of the Com­ munist Party in China. Mao's ability to negotiate 3. Realize a democratic government of the people in and make decisions enabled him to take over China in a general election 1949. Mao knew that in order for the Chinese Commu­ 4. Abandon the land distribution policy59 nist Party to survive he needed to "stress three magic wands: Party organization, military struggle, and the After making amendments to these requests the· two united front." 62 Mao's determination during the Long parties came to an agreement for unification on Septem­ March solidified his eventual position as Chairman of ber 15, 1937. This collaboration "proved to be a great the New Republic of China. success for the CCP as a and for Mao as an individual person." 60 REFERENCES l- The Sino-Japanese War took place from 1937 until h 1945. During these years, the Chinese Communist "Chiang Kai-shek." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed. Party honed its ability to persevere. The Red Army ~s "Mao Tse-Tung." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed. h was extremely disciplined and organized, allowing it to d strengthen its influence during this time. Had the two New York Times 14, 19, 20 November 1934. parties not been aligned with one another, it is doubt­ New York Times 7, 26 January; 8 February; 4 April ful that the invasion of Japan could have been ended. 1935. .e Mao Zedong and his troops were underestimated not "Sun Yat Sen." Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1967 ed. :e only by the Nationalists but also by the Japanese. The Lt Japanese never "expected that the Communist guer­ Wilson, Dick. The Long March. New York: Viking 1e rillas could become their most potent enemy and that Press, 1971. ), all the territory they took over from the hostile Na­ Yang, Benjamin. From Revolution to Politics; Chinese y. tionalists in would become the kingdom Communists on the Long March. Boulder: West­ of the even more hostile Communists." 61 Although view Press, 1990. 1g the Communists and Mao Zedong did not come into Le n ;o ;e KATHRYN KOLATA will graduate in May 2001 and is currently a junior majoring in Elementary Education. ff wrote this paper for HlOl, The World in the 20th Century. She chose this topic because "I had not 'Y previously known much about the Long March or China. Through this research, I have learned a great ts deal about twentieth century China. The events that I cover in my paper led to the eventual communist 1- ;h takeover of China in 1949." Kathryn presented this paper at the IUSB Undergraduate Research Conference Le in March 1999. ~d ie

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59Ibid. 60 Ibid., page 242. 61 Ibid., page 251. 62Jbid., page 257.