Reconciling with the Newer Middle East

Transcript Reconciling with the Newer Middle East Rima Khalaf Hunaidi Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 12 September 2011 This speech was delivered at the conference, The Economics of the Arab Spring. The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the speaker and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. Transcript: Reconciling with the Newer Middle East Rima Khalaf Hunaidi: Excellencies, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, Allow me to begin by saying that I’m honoured to be invited to address you here today at Chatham House, an institution that has a very long history of facilitating sincere and much-needed debate. Today, in our efforts to understand a rapidly changing world, Chatham House is more necessary than ever. I come from a part of the world that never ceases to surprise. In 1993, Shimon Peres, the Israeli elder statesman, wrote a book entitled ‘The New Middle East’. The vision he set forth in that book did not materialize. Later, Neoconservatives in Washington predicted a New Middle East reshaped by military intervention. They even perceived its birth pangs. Yet their predictions also turned out to be terribly wrong. When many countries in the region are undergoing radical transition, we need to try to come up with a new narrative that re-evaluates where the Middle East is, and where it is going. With so many ‘New Middle East’ narratives being swept away, I should like to humbly set forth my vision of what I, for want of a better term, will call the ‘Newer Middle East’. I, too, may be proved wrong. But I believe passionately that this time of great change is a turning point for Arabs, and that some things have changed for good. In my speech, I would like to address three major issues: Firstly: What are the new regional realities? Secondly: What are the short-to-medium term challenges? And lastly: How can the world help Arabs fulfil their aspirations? Ladies and Gentlemen, It has been nine months since the Arab revolt erupted. So far that revolt had led to the overthrow of three dictators and has, at the very least, shaken the thrones of almost all others. Although some observers had predicted that change was coming to the region, very few thought it would happen so quickly and on such a massive scale. But the signs were there. Almost a decade ago, UNDP published its first Arab Human Development Report. Authored by a team of distinguished Arab intellectuals, the report offered a profound insight: that Arabs would continue to lag behind other peoples until they overcame three key deficits: in www.chathamhouse.org 2 Transcript: Reconciling with the Newer Middle East freedom, in knowledge and in women’s empowerment. Its message boiled down to one simple fact: the status quo was untenable. UNDP’s third report on this topic concluded that Arabs had become disillusioned with promises of reform by Arab rulers, and with what they perceived as insincere Western initiatives. Arabs were suffering multiple injustices: domestic oppression and increasing marginalization, compounded by foreign encroachment on Arab rights. Arabs, the report concluded, were rapidly moving from a mindset of intimidation and apathy to a combustible mix of righteous indignation and anger. A threshold would inevitably be crossed, ushering in long-awaited change. This is what happened. The old Arab order is crumbling. A new order is evolving. Though its details are still unclear, this new order will be shaped by five emerging realities. Reality Number One: The theory of Arab Exceptionalism has been irrevocably shattered To the comfort of Arab autocrats, the theory of Arab Exceptionalism postulated that ethnic traditions, religious practices and linguistic characteristics rendered Arabs unsuitable for democracy. It was a convenient theory that also allowed some foreign policymakers to ignore, or at least suspend, their espoused values. Whether its proponents truly believed in it is a moot point. But propagating such ideas has left an unpleasant aftertaste. Reality Number Two: There is no going back to a pre-December 2010 world The transformations that have taken place in Arab countries are non-linear and irreversible. In such transformations, a very small and incremental change in one variable, such as an uncalculated insult to a street vendor, can lead to a breakdown of the whole system. It is like the last drop of water that causes a landslide, or the straw that breaks the camel’s back. The barriers of fear have been shattered. The Arab masses have discovered that they have a voice, and that they can make a difference. The fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali will continue to inspire others. To terrorize the masses back into submission, regimes will have to resort to something bordering on genocide. Reality Number Three: Democracy will ultimately prevail but the road will be rocky The struggle for rights, freedoms and social justice will continue. In countries that have crossed the first threshold, new mini uprisings may occur, either to www.chathamhouse.org 3 Transcript: Reconciling with the Newer Middle East correct a path or to protect the new order against the old guard. With time, the nascent forces of positive change will organize politically and gain a solid footing. Social and economic benefits of the transition will start to accrue. Regional and global powers will also find it more costly to challenge emerging democracies. It is not inconceivable that, five years from now, a vibrant democratic culture, and fully-functioning democratic institutions, will be firmly established, at least in Egypt and Tunisia. Moreover, a stable and democratic Egypt may well trigger another wave of democratization in the region. But here a word of caution: in this next round, there will be no hastily fleeing Ben Alis. Regimes will either willingly reform to pre-empt change, or they will viciously fight back to smother the first signs of protest. Reality Number Four: The West will not be able to call all the shots It is interesting to observe how Western reactions to the Arab revolutions have evolved over the past nine months. Initially the West resorted to tried and tested formulas, seeking to maintain the status quo. The French offer of military support to Ben Ali is an apt example. But that approach no longer works. Then there was a cautious resignation to change; Western States called for peaceful transitions and for presidents to step down. Ironically, and to the chagrin of friendly despots, such calls seemed to occur more rapidly the closer those despots were to Western administrations. The strong relations that the West had with powerful institutions, such as the military and the security establishment, provided the needed comfort for the disposal of a friendly ruler. Much as some would like to present the case as ideals prevailing over interests, Western Governments were often sacrificing a pawn to save a king. Lastly, the strategy shifted towards containing the change and controlling the direction of the transition. To safeguard their interests, regional powers tried to buy their way in, while global powers tried to clip the wings of revolutions. In the process, both discovered that there were new limits on their powers. Although willing, friendly interlocutors could no longer deliver reliably. Reality Number Five: The moribund peace process will finally yield peace Arab despotism, as much as superpower support, has helped sustain Israel’s occupation of Arab land, despite its violation of international law and all moral values. While paying lip service to the cause of Palestinian liberation, www.chathamhouse.org 4 Transcript: Reconciling with the Newer Middle East authoritarian rulers tended to acquiesce in Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians and the ongoing colonization of their lands. However, Arab democracy will not tolerate indefinite Israeli occupation. The Arab Revolts have revitalized Arab calls for Palestinian liberation. The new wave of support for the Palestinians now emanates from the same principles that brought millions onto the streets, namely dignity, and zero tolerance of injustice and humiliation. Its non-ideological and non-violent nature, and its solid grounding in universal human rights makes this new support for the Palestinian cause more effective and durable. Marginalized for decades, Arab public opinion will now have a decisive influence over foreign policy. Together with the prospect of a further expansion of democracy in the Arab world, this will have a major effect on the behaviour of all stakeholders in the region. Israel will find a stalemate no longer in its interest, the Palestinians, strengthened by genuine Arab support, will get a deal they can live with. And Western powers, forced to rethink their regional strategies, will, it is hoped, play a more constructive and proactive role. Now I would like to turn to the challenges the Arab world faces. The prospect of freedom, justice and good governance for Arabs, and of peace for the region and the world, has the power to keep all parties on track.

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