Court File No. CV-14-513961
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING
Applicants
-and-
HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
APPLICANTS' APPLICATION RECORD- VOLUME 6
SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP Barristers and Solicitors 20 Dundas Street West, Suite 1100 Toronto, ON M5G 2G8
Steven Shrybman (LSUC No. 20774B) tel: 613-858-6842 fax: 416-591-7333
Solicitors for the Applicants -2-
TO: THIS HONOURABLE COURT
ANDTO: ATTORNEYGENERALOFCANADA Suite 3400, Exchange Tower 13 0 King Street West Box 36, First Canadian Place Toronto, ON M5X 1K6
Christine Mohr tel: 416-973-0942 fax: 416-973-3004
Solicitor for the Respondents INDEX TO APPLICATION RECORD
Tab Page
VOLUME 1
1. Amended Notice of Application ...... 1 - 27
2. Notice of Constitutional Question ...... 28 - 66
3. Affidavit of Jessica McCormick swom November 26, 2014 ...... 67- 93
A Exhibit 1 Estimation of Voter Tumout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal Gender Election, April2012 ...... 94- 110
B Exhibit 2 National Y outh Survey Report, September 20, 20 Il ...... 111 - 17 5
C Exhibit 3 Who Participates? A Closer Look at the Results of the National Youth Survey, June 28, 2013 ...... 176- 206
D Exhibit 4 Generational Change: Loo king at Declining Voter Y outh Tumout over Time, November 30, 2013 ...... 207- 215
E Exhibit 5 CUSC 2013 First-Year University Student Survey, June 2013 ...... 216- 284
F Exhibit 6 CUSC 2012 Survey ofGraduating Undergraduate Students, June 2012 ...... 285- 386
VOLUME2
G Exhibit 7 Survey ofElectors Following the 41st General Election, October 2011 ...... 387- 477
H Exhibit 8 Report on the Evaluations on the 41st General Election of May 2, 2011 ...... 478- 534
I Exhibit 9 Survey of Administrators Regarding the Use of the VIC, October 2011 ...... 535- 560
J Exhibit 10 Evaluations of the 40th General Election ofOctober 14,2008 ...... 561- 602
K Exhibit Il Election Imperfection: Problems encountered by the student electorate, Dalhousie Student Union, 2008 ...... 603- 612 -2-
(Tab 3 -Affidavit of Jessica McCormick- continued)
L Exhibit 12 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 41st General Election of May 2, 2011 ...... 613- 676
M Exhibit 13 Proceedings ofthe Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, April 8, 2014 ...... 677 -707
N Exhibit 14 Excerpt from Elections Canada website September 16-23 Blog by Jessica McCormick ...... 708 -709
0 Exhibit 15 Elections Canada Strategie Plan 2008-2013 ...... 710 -729
P Exhibit 16 Office of the Chief Electoral Officer Report on Plans and Priorities 2014-15 ...... 730 -770
Q Exhibit 17 Elections Canada Service Standards for Ensuring Accessible Registration and Voting Processes for Student Electors ...... 771 -784
VOLUME3
R Exhibit 18 Elections Canada Guide for Community Relations Officers ...... 785 - 827
S Exhibit 19 Online Survey of Associations Prepared for Elections Canada, January 2009 ...... 828- 863
T Exhibit 20 Survey of electors following the 40th General Election, March 2009 ...... ·...... 864- 974
U Exhibit 21 Local Outreach in the 41st General Election Key Learnings Report, November 14, 2011 ...... 975- 992
V Exhibit 22 Transcript of Proceedings - Procedure and Bouse Affairs Committee, April 7, 2014 ...... 993- 1029
W Exhibit 23 Transcript ofProceedings- Procedure and Bouse Affairs Committee, March 6, 2014 ...... 1030- 1080
X Exhibit 24 Transcript ofProceedings- Procedure and Bouse Affairs Committee, April8, 2014 ...... 1081- 1118
Y Exhibit 25 Transcript of Proceedings - Procedure and Bouse Affairs Committee, March 25, 2014 ...... 1119 -1152 - 3-
(Tab 3 -Affidavit of Jessica McCormick- continued)
z Exhibit 26 Elections Canada Quarterly Financial Report 2014-2015 For the quarter ended June 30, 2014 ...... 1153 -1159
AA Exhibit 27 Elections Canada's Proposed Amendments to Bill C-23 as of April 8, 2014 ...... 1160- 1173
VOLUME4
4. Affidavit of Sandra McEwing swom January 7, 2015 ...... 1175- 1178
A Exhibit A Affidavit of Sandra McEwing swom April 16, 2012 Federal Court file No. T -619-12 ...... 1179- 1181
5. Affidavit of Peggy Walsh Craig swom October 29, 2014 ...... 1183 -1188
A Exhibit 1 Reasons for Judgment and Judgment released on May 23, 2013- Federal Court file Nos. T-619-12, T-620-12, T-621-12, T-633-12, T-634-12, T-635-12 ...... 1189 -1287
B Exhibit 2 Affidavit of Peggy Walsh Craig swom April14, 2012- Federal Court file No. T-633-12 ...... 1288- 1291
C Exhibit 3 Matthews Production Order dated June 8, 2011 ...... 1292- 1313
D Exhibit 4 Dickson Information to Obtain a Production Order November 2012 ...... 1314- 1345
E Exhibit 5 Chief Electoral Officer's statement dated March 15, 2012 ... .1346- 1347
F Exhibit 6 Chief Electoral Officer's Report to Standing Committee On Procedure and Bouse Affairs, March 29, 2012 ...... 1348 -1391
G Exhibit 7 Preventing Deceptive Communications with Electors C.E.O. Report issued March 26, 2013 ...... 1392 -1409
VOLUMES
6. Affidavit of Harry Neufeld swom December 30, 2014 ...... 1411- 1423
A ExhibitA Harry Neufeld Curriculum Vitae ...... 1424 -1428
B Exhibit B Compliance Review - Interim Report ...... 14 29 - 15 04 - 4-
(Tab 6 -Affidavit of Harry Neufeld- continued)
C Exhibit C Compliance Review- Final Report and Recommendations ...... 1505 -1581
D Exhibit D Transcript of Proceedings - Standing Committee on Procedure and Bouse Affairs, March 27, 2014 ...... 1582 -1592
E Exhibit E Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee Proceedings report of April8- 10, 2014 ...... 1593- 1614
7. Affidavit of Harry Neufeld swom January 8, 2015 ...... 1616- 1618
8. Affidavit of François Gélineau swom January 14, 2015 ...... 1619 -1627
A Exhibit A François Gélineau Curriculum Vitae ...... 1628 -1639
B Exhibit B Who Participates? A Closer Look at the Results ofthe National Youth Survey, June 28, 2013 ...... 1640- 1669
C Exhibit C National Youth Survey Report, September 20, 2011 ...... 1670 -1733
D ExhibitD List of Documents Reviewed ...... 1734- 1735
VOLUME6
9. Affidavit of Henry Milner swom January 9, 2015 ...... 1737- 1753
A ExhibitA Henry Milner Curriculum Vitae ...... 1754- 1762
B Exhibit B Letter from leading political scientists in Canada and Intemationally, Globe and Mail, March 19,2014 ...... 1763 -1765
C Exhibit C Youth Electoral Engagement in Canada, January 2011 ...... 1766 -1791
D Exhibit D Open Letter- statement by leading political scientists In Canada, April2014 ...... 1792- 1822
10. Affidavit ofDavid C. Eider swom January 12,2015 ...... 1824 -1849
A ExhibitA David C. Eider Curriculum Vitae ...... 1850- 1853
B Exhibit B List of Documents Consulted ...... 1854 - 1857 - 5-
11. Affidavit of Ilona Dougherty swom January 8, 2015 ...... 1859- 1876
A ExhibitA Ilona Dougherty Curriculum Vitae ...... 1877- 1882
B Exhibit B Implementation of the Identification Requirements in the Canadian North Final Report, October 7, 2008 ...... 1883- 1914
C Exhibit C Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election, May 2011 ...... 1915- 1965
D ExhibitD Final Report to Elections Canada- BC Y outh Registration Pilot Project, March 20, 2014 ...... 1966- 2019
E Exhibit E Apathy is Boring's Statement before Bouse of Commons Committee on Procedure and Bouse Affairs, April 10, 2014 ...... 2020 - 2025
VOLUME7
12. Affidavit of Mark Coffin swom January 8, 2015 ...... 2027- 2042
A ExhibitA CBC News Report dated October 14, 2008 ...... 2043- 2045
B Exhibit B Election Imperfection- Dalhousie Student Union Report, 2008 ...... 2046- 2055
C Exhibit C Springtide Collective- Nova Scotia Youth Ci vic Literacy Report ...... 2056- 2078
13. Affidavit of Lucy Draper-Chislett swom January 9, 2015 ...... 2080- 2082
A ExhibitA Request under Access to Information Act to Elections Canada from SGM, September 2014 ...... 2083- 2092
B Exhibit B Elections Canada Response to SGM Request October 24, 2014 ...... 2093- 2119
C Exhibit C Supplemental Access to Information Act Request, October 31, 2014 ...... 2120- 2121
D Exhibit D Elections Canada Response to Supplemental Request, December 30, 2014 ...... 2122- 2153 Tab 9 1737
Court File No. 14-513961
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING
Applicants
-and-
HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
AFFIDAVIT OF HENRY MILNER Ph.D (sworn January_, 2015)
QUALIFICATIONS
1. I am Senior Researcher in Political Science at l'Université de Montréal attached to the
Chair in Electoral Studies. Starting in 1999 I spent each fall tenn as a Visiting Professor
of Political Science at Umea University in Sweden. In 2004-2005 I held the Chair in
Canadian Studies at the Sorborine, and in 2005-2006, the Canada-US Fulbright Chair at
the SUNY campus at Plattsburgh. I was also a fellow at the Institute for Research in
Public Policy from 2001 to 2009, and over the years, I have been a visiting professor or
researcher at Queens, Carleton, Victoria, and Western, as well as at universities in
Finland, France, Australia and New Zealand. I have published 8 books and edited 4
others on subjects such as electoral reform, and comparativy~~litical participation, the
. :z~, =- :::::::....__ . \ (\rh ·d-o \ ~Q_\.J. 1 -2- 1738
most recent of which is The Internet Generation: Engaged Citizens or Political
Dropouts. (University Press of New England, 2010). I have contributed to numerous
journals and magazines, including Inroads, the Canadian journal of opinion and policy
(www.inroadsjoumal.ca), which I co-publish. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached
as Exhibit "A".
MANDATE
2. The Canadian Federation of Students, the Council of Canadians and three individuals
have filed an Application in the Superior Court of Ontario contesting the constitutional
validity of certain amendments that have been recently made to the Canada Elections Act
(the "Act"). That Application asserts that these amendments interfere with the right of
electors to fully participate in the electoral process and with their right to vote in violation
of s. 3 ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms because they:
(i) place unreasonable restrictions on the documentation that qualified
electors can rely on to establish their identity and place of residence in
order to obtain a ballot to vote under the Act;
(iD restri9t the authority of the Chief Electoral Officer to implement public
education .and information programs or to use any appropriate means to
provide Canadians with necessary information to allow them to participate
in the electoral process and to exercise their right to vote; and
(iii) eliminate the authority of the Chief Electoral Officer to appoint, direct,
oversee, be informed of, or report to Parliament upon enforcement and
compliance activities and measures taken under the Act by the - 3- 1739
Comr:1issioner of Canada Elections, thereby undermining public
confiô.ence in the electoral process, depriving electors of information
concerning fraudulent or corrupt practices that may have affected the
result of an election, and undermining the essentlal requirements of
electoral democracy and the. right to vote..
3. ··In this-report I addr~ss especial.ly point (ii), drawing upon my research and expertise in
.the relevant literature in the, area. of electoral participp.tion in general and among young
-~:people in particular. I refcr to a number of documents relevant to this litigation that have
·~proven useful in co;~p-l.eting this re.pô1t, ànd thes~ rire identified by footnote throughout
·.1·· this affidavit.
4. I shall not directly address (i), since I am not expert. on the specifie procedures and
documentation ref~rred to in the amend~nent both in Canada and in comparable countries
and jurisdictions. I am familiar with work by colleagues 1 (Gélineau 2013) showing that
lmowledge · about the . eiectoral process, just like politi cal knowledge generally (see
below), ~ffects the lÜœlihood of young Canadians to vot~. It is clear that an inadequate
understanding of the electoral process and of the regulations concerning the right to vote
contribute to low voter participation among yotmg Canadians. In my view, thus, here, as
in the area of public ~ducation and information discussed at length below, given the level
of electQral participation (see below) any additional restriçtions- in this case on access to
the ballot - must .b~ justified on the basis that thei:r: absence results in Clear and
meaningful benefits; Short of such . justification, to risk further reducing electoral
1 Gélineau, F. 2013. Who Partici~ates? A Clos er Look at the Results ofthe National Youth Survey, Elections Canada. -4- 1740
participation is unjustifiable. My reasoning is straightforward. Voting is, for most
citizens, their link to the democratie institutions oftheir community: a positive expression
of citizenship. Popular suppmi expressed through a satisfactory voter tumout bestows
democratie legitimacy on the institutions of government. It is of course a means to an
end, namely the selection of representatives for political office, but also a good in and of
itself. vVhile it has. been argued that democracy is served if insufficiently informed
citizens are discouraged from voting, surely the abject is to identify and institute
processes under which the less informed are able to gain access to the needed
information. My res'.:!arch looks comparatively at such efforts which, in Canada, in large
part depend on Elections Canada being able to carry out its role.
5. Insofar as (iii) is concerned, my concern is the reputation of the Chief Electoral Officer
and thus of Elections Canada. I am not an expert on compliance procedures perse. It is
the perceived effects of the applications of the provisions of the amendment that concern
me. Anything seen as undermining the authority of the C:rief Electoral Officer cannat but
lead to a weakening ·of public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process and the
institutions that allow it to function. There are too many cases in the world today, right up . to the United States presidential election of 2000, in which citizens have good reason to
be skeptical of the impartiality of the process under which an election is run and the
outcome determined, with the resulting loss of confidence in electoral democracy.
6. In this regard, the regressive nature of many of the amendments advanced by the Fair
Elections Act" (Bill C-23), as originally proposed, were the subject of critical statements
by leaciing political scientists in Canada and internationally attesting to Elections - 5- 1741
Canada' s sterling international and scholarly reputation for non-partisanship. Their letter
setting out these views is attached as Exhibit "B".
INFORMING THE VOTER
7. We can now turn to (ii). It is the position of the applicants that the proposed amendment
to the Canada ElecNons Act will restrict the authority of the Chief Electoral Officer to
implement public education and information programs or to use any appropriate means to
provide Canadians with necessary information to allow them to participate in the
electoral process and to exercise their right to vote. To me this is the crux of the issue.
Assuming agreement on the principle of seeking to encourage rather than discourage
electoral participation, certain corollaries follow. Assuming further that compulsory
voting is too controversial to be considered, let alone implemented,2 the evidence is
persuasive that a crucial path to higher tumout, or at the very least to slowing the decline
in voter tumout, is through better informing the electorate. This applies in general, but
especially to categories of citizens especially vulnerable to electoral abstention. Below I
focus on the group on which my recent research has focused, namely young citizens.
8. In this regard, apart from Elections Canada or its equivalent, severa! categories of
existing actors have a role to play.
(1) Political parties and interest groups;
(2) Educational institutions; and
2 Loewen, Peter, Henry Milner, Eruce M Hicks.20008."Does Compulsory Voting Lead to More Informed and Engaged Citizens? An experimental test." Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science 02/2008; 41(03). DOI: 10.1017/80008423 90808075X ,. 6- 1742
(3) The voluntary sector.
Each of these is limited in what it can accomplish. The parties and pressure groups, by
their very nature, provide information that suits their purposes, which, in sorne cases, are
served by at least indirectly, encouraging certain categories of voters and discouraging
others. While it codd be m:gued that these varying perspectives cancel each other out,
this is unrealistic, given differences in resources. Moreover, we know that party resources
. are concentrated on elections in marginal ridings . while party strongholds are often
ft virtually unconteste:l. To ask even. the most well-endowed politic~l parties to waste.
ifi scm·ce r-:~sources in s~ch ridings is to misunderstand the workings of our electoral system.·.·
9. We have seen a secular increase in skepticism on the part of citizens toward the political
• • J· • process,3 especially ~s to the sources and uses of campaign spending. Indirectly, here,
Elections Canada co•:ttributes to the credibility of the participation in elections by parties
and inter.est groups assuring the existence of an impçrrti.al~:ancl able arbiter to ensure that
parties cùid poli ti cal groups· ope1:a.te .vvitliin the nùes;
10. As fm· as educational institutions are concerned, .while they have a. general. mission to ~- . . . . prepare.· young peop,le .. for adulthood, they are not equippeq to pro vide the needed ·- ...... election-related information at the time required and to those most in need of such
information. The Iàw allows Elections. Ca~ada to worlc with schools·; but as currently
:· . .: . . .. phrased it unjustifiably limits the rol.e of the Chief Electoral Officer. First, given that the
schools are under ..;t~ovincial jurisdiction and thus. lacidng' any kind of institutional
; .·
3 Denernark, David, Todd Dono,;;;:1, and Richard G. Nierni. "Generatio'ns and Democratie Attitudes in Advanced Democracies ." Paper prepared fŒ~ presentation at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, 2 i July 2014.
: i.:~
·c. -7- 1743
connection to Elections Canada, the simple fact that Elections Canada is allowed to make
its services available to them is insufficient. Moreover, the amended law excludes post-
secondary institutions; yet it is in the early years of college that most young people first
have the opportunity to vote. Moreover it effectively excludes efforts to get at young
people no longer in school. As the chart below based on US turnout data shows,4 this is
precisely where eleètoral dropouts are to be found, a significant change from 50 years
ago. Parallel results can be found when we look at developments in European cotmtries 5
While we do not have parallel historical data for Canada, based on what we do know,
there is no reason to think the situation in Canada any different.
~~··~ ~·~~~ t.·~,~ t-~... ~ ~-:..~~ ''t'\," Cllli~ il.9ù Eà~~~r ., - "'·o·lFI'1-;;l H•;;:n t ~..., .J~.;:;>"~ ·'Ù~ · 0'•; H~!'l E 4 The "Forgotten Half'': Education Disparities in Youth Voter Turnout, CIRCLE: (The Center for Information & Research on Ci vic Leaming and Engagement), 2008 5 See for example: Schafer, Abendschon, and RoBteutscher, "Are tumout differences small? A closer look at Western Europe", 8th ECPR General Conference University of Glasgow, Glasgow 3-6 September 2014 - 8- 1744 11. These limitations have opened space for a third, voluntary sector that has emerged in response to declining voter turnout, especially among young people. This sector is most fully developed in the United States, where there are no public institutions mandated- or indeed sufficiently non-partisan- to take up the responsibility. There are many voluntary American organizations with a mission to encourage the engagement of young people as citizens. There is great variation in the targets of these programs, but best known and most developed are tho se forging "leaders of the future" such as madel legislatures. 12. My particular concern is with Section 7 of the Act that expressly removes from the Chief Electoral Officer the authority to implement public education and information programs beyond primary and secondary schools to make the public better informed about the electoral process. Among potentially threatened programs designed to make voting more accessible to targeted groups (youth, aboriginal Canadians, new immigrants, the homeless, and the elderly living in care facilities) are those hosting websites, providing links to resources to help engage youth, rûlmdtables, dialogue sessions, conferences and other consultative exercises and events, partnering with voluntary organizations for the purpose of increasing democratie engagement and civic education and participation, sen ding letters to new electors informing them of their right to vote and how exercise it; and hosting "Democracy Week" to engage yOtmg Canadians in meaningful discussions about politics and the workings of our democracy. 13. Moreover, Section 7 of the Act removes the discretionary authority ofthe Chief Electoral Officer to use the mass media or ether means beyond transmitting advertising messages to provide information relating to Canada's electoral process, the democratie right to vote and how to be a candidate. Combined with curtailing the authority of the Chief Electoral - 9- 1745 Officer to irnplernent public education and information prograrns, except for prirnary and secondary school students, such restrictions can only weaken if not endanger existing and needed public education and information prograrns. I am here thinking in particular of young people who gather information and cornrnunicate increasingly, indeed prirnarily, via the social media. Clearly, advertising is a minor aspect of commtmication via the social media. 14. In addition, it is false to assume that the primary and secondary schools provide sufficient · ac cess t·J th ose reacl dng voting age but unlikely to vote. As the chart above shows, today the prhTiary target r.. ;hen it co mes to voting should ·be young people weakly attached to -the eclucational syst;::m. Tl:e kind of outreach programs li::;ted ab ove: be corne especially .. impmia~t to suppleinent in-school programs - especially those making use of the social media. While cleveloping such prograrns constitutes a challenge, it is clear that reducing the authority of the only federal institution poised to address it is not approprüite. Below I draw upon my corr,parative research. to identify sorne promising potential paths. The successfi.ll cases ilb.1strate the fact that such m~asures need to be institutionalized via publicl:>; rnanclated prga.nizations like Elections Canada to be effective. In Canada, voluntary organizati.ons seeking to enhance political participàtion··have typically been poorly resourced, operating uncler conditions of uncyrtainty. They frequently depend on Elections Canada for funding, but this has been uncertain and intermittent, rnaking it 6 difficult to plan aheacl in. any coherent manner. . Clearly the voluntary sector can be cotmt~d. upon only if coordinated withi.n an institutionalized setting in which an 6 See Milner, Henr/ "Youth Ele;::toral Participation in Canada and Scandinavia" in Engaging Young People in' Civic Life. Edited by James Youniss an.d Peter Levine, Vanderbilt University Press 2009. · - 10- 1746 organization like E.bctions Canada can 10lay a lasting raie. The proposed amendment will even futther restrict Elections Canada.' s ,ability to act in this manner. This is the opposite of what is needed, namely a more direct,. systematic,. and structured involvement by Elections Ca..'lada, comparable to the role carried out in comparable organizations in se veral European co'mtries disoussed in the .last part of this report. 15. \Vhile the amendment- would not spec.ifically restrict Elections Canada's supp0rt for efforts·dn the schoo~.s, such ·efforts .could not be,1 part of the needed.long-term planned strateg~y aimed at /otmg people rig:ht up· to voting age, co.ordinated with · relevant 16. Experience elsewhere confi1ms that such an institution should, like Elections Canada, be a publi? one, at ~nns' length from the government. While, in theory, a parallel organization could p~ c:re~ted to can·y out this function, in practice it would be counter- . ~ ...... productive, sil1ce its creation could not but raise suspicions of a partisan effort to circumvent an i.ns~I~ution 'with . a 'stel;ling reputatio'n for non~partisanship. Thus, in practice, · any weak~r~ing of the capacity. of Elections Canada to carry out its role in providing infonnation and Sllpporting'efforts to encourage. electoral participation can only have n~gative consequences on the already weak ties of many young people to our electoral institution~. - . INFORMATION AND THE YOUNG CITIZEN 17. The fact that in Canadian Federal elections turnout among young people has declined significantly in the last 20 years is no secret. The paper by Blais and Loewen, attached as Exhibit "C", sets ou.t the·numbers clearly. Table 1 below from that paper is based on the -Il- 1747 reported turnout of the age groups reaching eligibility in different elections years and is especially illustrative. Compared to the generation reaching voting age before the 90s, the Internet generation v:otes significantly less at 18 and continues to do so at 35.7 TABLE 1 • Estimated Turnout by Cohort and Election • Election 1965 1968 1974 1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2008 Cohort • 1965 69 71 71 79 75 82 84 85 81 78 79 80 76 • 19687Q7180758385858279808177 • 1972 60 71 65 75 78 79 75 72 73 75 70 • 19745668627376777470727469 1979 60 54 66 70 72 68 64 66 68 63 • 1980 45 57 62 64 6157 59 62 56 • 1984 58 63 65 62 58 60 63 58 • 1988 54 57 53 50 53 56 50 • 1993534946495247 • 1997 43 40 43 47 42 • 2000 34 37 41 36 • 2004 34 38 34 • Source: Blais and Loewen 2011:13 18. With such numbers, Canada joins those democratie cotmtries where the decline in youth turnout has been most precipitous. As Table 2 shows, most, though not ali, European countries have also faced low youth turnout in recent years. (See for example the paper by Schafer et al referenced in footnote 5, above and by Sloam8 for an analysis of the UK situation: one that in many ways has paralleled that of Canada.) 7 Sorne observers claim that unconventional forms ofpolitical participation are substituting for traditional ones. But when we try to find broad evidence of this, we seldom succeed. 8 James Sloam; "Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK" Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 60 No. 4, 2007, 548-567 - 12- 1748 Table 2. European Social Survey Results. ESS estimate turnout percentage Year (eligible 18-24) Austria 2002 61.5 Belgium 1.999 87.6 Czech Rep 2002 53.7 Gem1any 2002 65.5 Denmark 2001 77.5 Spain 2000 37.7 Finland 2000 44.9 France 2002 39.9 UK 2001 31.6 Greece 2000 48.1 Hungary 2002 63.2 Ire land 2001 3ü.9 Ital y 2001 8(1.8 Netherlands 2002 65.0 Norway 2001 46.3 Po land 2001 32.4 Portugal 200~ 47~0 Sweclen 2002 71.4 Slovenia 2000 38.8 Source: Fieldhouse et al, 200i~ 19. Germany, as we can see, along especially with Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are relative exceptions and below I draw lessons from the experience in these countries. (Belgium, and to some extent Ita1y, has compulsory voting.) That experience has to do, primarily, with political knowledge. In my research I draw the link between political knowleclge and electoral participation. 10 Short of compulsory voting, as levels of political 9 Fieldhouse, Edward, Mark Trarimer, and Andrew Russell. 2007. "Something about Young People or Something about Elections? Electoral Participation of Young People in Europe: Evidence from a Multilevel Analysis of the European Social Survey." European Journal ofPolitica! Research 46 (6): 97-822. 10 The Internet Generation: Engaged Citizens or Political Dropouts. Hanover N.H: University Press of New England. 201 O. Civic Literacy: How !nformed Citizens Make Democracy Work. Hanover N.H: University Press of New England. 2002. - 13- 1749 knowledge go down over time and place, so does electoral participation. Turning to Canada, with the assistance of Eric Guntermann I have calculated average political knowledge scores as tested by the CSES 11 in Canada in the 1990s to tho se in the last decade. As we can see in the chart below, there has been an important decline, especially among young people. Canada l i . i 1 Î j 1996-1999 2005-2010 1 ·-~-~--~. ~-:--. ~J [ ~- . Correct 18-25 1Jii1111 Correct 26-65 20. Further insight into the relationship between an increasingly less politically informed younger generation and declining turnout is provided in the chmi below from a national survey of a random sample about participation in the 2011 federal election carried out for Elections Canada. 12 They: were asked three political ~owledge questions and also whether they had voted. Clea.rly, those with political knowledge participate; those who pay no attention are ~.mlikely to do so. 11 http://www .google.com.do/url ?s~,~9crct-=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd= 1&ved=OCB4QFjAA&url=http%3A %2F %2Fwww.cses.org%2F&ei=RPtÙ~VK6BMYTisQSylYCQBA&usg=AFQjCNHOopXTLFHcUIOY4qB7jPvpTBniP A 12 http://www.elections.'ca!conten:.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/part/nysr&docun:ent=p3&lang=e - 14- 1750 - What is the na me of your provincial {territorial) premi:er? Whkh party won the most .seats in the general election What JeveJ of government has primary responsibility for education: provincial -or municipal? 21. I am not suggesting that it is the job of Elections Canada to teach young people the name of their Premier. The direct mandate of Elections Canada is to educate Canadians about how to participate in the electoral process. However, a potential voter does not separate such knowledge from that enabling him or her to make an informed choice when voting. Per se, the knowledge of how to register to vote is of little value to a citizen entirely unaware of the alternatives on the ballot. To put it otherwise, it is not practically possible to isolate knowledge of the mechanics of elections from stressing the importance of voting and facilitating access to the knowledge needed to meaningfully exercise the vote. This is a key aspect of its public education and information mission, something only it can be counted upon to do in a fair, non-partisan manner. The datais clear: any effort to address declining electoral turnout, especially among those I term the Internet - 15- 175.1. Generation, 13 must focus on providing them with readily accessible relevant information. And, as my research shows, outreach must transcend those with access to the needed information througl). family, school and community, seeking out those lacking such access by whatever means are most effective. 22. It is very clear that the wording of the amended version seeks to narrow the role of Elections Canada in this area, from the general mandate to inform those needing infonnation by whatever means is most effective, to one that explicitly excludes ali but programs in the sclwols and those using direct advertising. This is exactly the wrong approach given the decline in informed political participation. 23. The April 2014 statement by leading political scientists in Canada in opposition to the original "Fair Elect[ons Act" (Bill C-23), attached as Exhibit "D", noted that "Public outreach that encourages al! citizens to vote - not just those who support one or another party- is central to the mandate of electoral commissions world-wide, such as those in Australia, India, and New Zealand." Moreover, democratie countries comparable to Canada that have proven effective at stemming or reversing the decline in youth electoral ' '. turnout ali take ~n active role in informing young people, targeting especially those with . ·. limited access to the needed information. 24. The approach needs to be wide rather than narrow. For example, Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) in Norway, like its high-turnout Scandinavian cousins, has 13 The Internet generation grew up into a world of communications in which extemally imposed order gives way to one where the content is intemaiJy selected, ordered and, potentially, created. Communicative power is no longer in institutions but in networks, not in bordered territories but "cyberspace," transcending geographical and hierarchical restrictions. Faster information gathering enhances political engagement for the digitally sophisticated but widens the digital divide between them and others. ·1, - 16- been running mock elections in the schools since 1989 for parliamentary as well as local elections. But the application goes beyond the schools, to a survey of all.young people, the results of which pro vide a context for which the results of the simulation are placed, and affect have been applied in policies to enhance electoral participation in the training of ci vi cs teachers and the lowering the voting age. 25. The Netherlands is another country where innovations in this area have flourished- and tumout remained relatively high - in particular due to the work of the IPP: The Dutch Centre, for Political Participation. Since 1994 the IPP has organized election simulations for stttdt:nts in the t1~,;o days be fore the day of the .election. But its efforts go well beyond the s:chDols. The IPJr alsù provides electronic information about the voting behaviour of members. of the na~ional and European information, and the position of the various political pmiies on issues such as health care, the economy, and education and even tests election knowledge.· In Germany, where tumout has also remained relatively solid, a useful parallel role is played by the Wahlomat, a Voter Advice Application 01 AA). Visitors to V AAs m;e asked to give their opinions on, say, about thirty propositions. The site calculates whic':J. pmiy program most conesponds to· their answers, and provides information about the positions held by the political parties. Unlike certain other V AAs, like those in Canad~, ·The. Wahlomaf. is operated by a federal agency, namely the BPB (Bundeszentrale fiir politische Bi/dung), the federal agency responsible for CIVIC education materials, ·and for whom young voters are a priority. . . 26. The IPP, BPB and parallel organizations elsewhere are public institutions independent of govel11Illent, and, more importantly, known to be indepe11dent. In the case of Canada, Elections Canada is the only federal institution Virith the capacity and credibility to ,_ - 17- coordinate, in cooperation with schools and voluntary œ:ganizations, parallel programs suited to Canadian (!Onditions. It would be most tmfortunate if it were prevented from doing S(j. 27. I make this affidavit .for the purpose ofproviding evidence in the above-noted proceeding having been apprisecl of, and understanding my obligation as an expert witness. I have signed and attached ;.1ereto a..11 acknowledgement of my duty in this respect. 'l~ HENR~IU,ŒR Ph.D l153A Court File No. CV-14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING Applicants -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF EXPERT'S DUTY 1. My name is Henry Milner. I live in the City of Montreal, in the Province of Quebec. 2. I have been engaged by or on behalf of the Lawyers for the Applicants to provide evidence in relation to the above-noted court proceeding. 3. I acknowledge that it is my duty to provide evidence in relation to this proceeding as follows: (a) to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan; (b) to pro vide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within my area of expertise; and (c) to pro vide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require, to determine a matter in issue. 4. I acknowledge that the duty referred to above prevails over any obligation which I may owe to any party by whom or on who se behalf I am engaged. January Î, 2015 Henry Milner/}9~ TABA 1754 Henry Milner CURRICULUM VITAE (abridged) ADDRESS 3777 rue Kent, Montreal, Qué. H3S1 N4 DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH April 17, 1946; Frankfurt, Germ any CITIZENSHIP Canadian LANGUAGES English, French and sorne German and Swedish TELEPHONE (514) 731-8383 E-MAIL Henry. [email protected] STUDIES COMPLETED Oct. 1976 Carleton University Ph.D. in political science May 1968 Carleton University MA. in political science May 1967 Mcgill University Honours BA. in sociology and political science ACADEMJC EXPERIENCE 2012- Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, Sodertorn University, Sweden. 2011 - Visiting Professor, Carleton University, Department of Political Science, 2011 - Visiting Professor, University of Victoria, Department of Political Science. 2006- Professeur Associé et Chercheur. Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies Département de science politique, Université de Montréal. 1998--2011 Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Umea, Sweden. 1971--2006 Professor of Political Science; Vanier College 1993--2005 Professeur Associé. Département de science politique, Université Laval. 2005-6 Canada-US Fulbright Chair SUNY (Piattsburgh) 2004-5 Chair in Canadian Studies, Université de Paris Ill (Sorbonne Nouvelle). 2002: Visiting Professor, lEP, Université de Grenoble, France. 2000: Visitor, Stockholm Instituts for Social Research (SOFI), University of Stockholm, 1998: Visiting Senior Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne. 1996: Visiting Professor, Politics Department, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. 1995-8 Visiting Professor, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University. 1995: Public Policy Chair, Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario. 1968-9 Lecturer in lnterdisciplinary Studies; University of Maryland OTHER PERTINENT EXPERIENCE 2008- Member: International Advisory Committee. DEMOCRACY: A CITIZEN PERSPECTIVE lnterdisciplinary Centre of Excellence. Abo Akadeni University Finland 2008 Organizer: International Workshop on Civic education and political participation, Université de Montréal. 2004- Visiting Research Fellow, lnstitute for Research in Public Policy, Montr~al '75~'-' 1 0 .. ;.) 1992-- Co-Publisher, lnroads, the Canadian journal of opinion and policy 2003-6 Member, Executive Committee, International Political Science Association 2003-4 President, Société Québécoise de science politique. 2002 Workshop co-chair. European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR), Turin, ltaly 1999 Section co-cordinator (Comparative-industrial), CPSA, Sherbrooke, QC 1998 Organizer: Mini-conference in honour of Gosta Rehn, Vien na, as part of the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE). 1998 Workshop co-chair. European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR), Warwick, UK, 1997 Coordinator Politics and Public Policy Program, Biennial Meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in the US (ACSUS) Minneapolis, Nov. 1997 1996- Member of the Conseil de la Langue Francaise: Advisory Board to the Quebec Government 1995: Visiting Distinguished Scholar, State University of New York (Piattsburgh) 1991--2005 Member: Centre d'analyse des politiques publiques (CAPP) Université Laval. 1991: Visiting researcher. at the Department of Political Science, University of Turku, Fin land. 1992-97 Regular commentator on CBC radio. Regular participant in Morningside Political forum 1988-92: Member of the editorial board of Quebec Studies, journal of the American Cou neil of Quebec Studies . 1985-86: .Visiting researcher at the Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm. 1984-85: Columnist with the weekly News and Chronic/e in Montreal 1983-95 Speaker on Que bec Education ta the Quebec Summer Sem in ar, organized by the lnstitute for the Study of Canada, State University of New York (Piattsburgh). 1983-85: Member of the editorial board of Politique, Revue de la Société Québécoise de science politique. MAJOR AWARDS AND GRANTS 2004-7 Research Grant, Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 1996-9 Research Grant, Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 1996-01 Research Grant, (FCAR), Government of Quebec 1997 Fellowship to study German, DAAD (German Academie Exchange) 1991-3: Research Grant, SSHRC 1988-9: Research Grant, (FCAR), 1982-3: Research Grant, SSHRC 1977-8: Post-Doctoral Fellovyship, FCAR 1970-4: Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship 1968-9 lnstitute for Policy Studies (Washington OC.), Student Fellowship PUBLICATIONS: Books: • The Internet Generation: Engaged Citizens or Political Dropouts. Hanover N.H: University Press of New England. 201 O. • Civic Education and Youth PoliticaiParticipation (Editer with Murray Print). Rotterdam, Sense Publishers,The Netherlands 2009. • (Editer) Steps toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its provinces. Peterborough: Broadview, 2004. 2 ,.,,..6. ...., . 1 " ~~ • Civic Literacy: How lnformed Citizens Make Democracy Work. Hanover N.H: University Press of New England. 2002. (Version francaise: Les Compétences Civiques; Comment les citoyens informés contribuent au bon fonctionnement de la démocratie. Québec: PUL. 2004.) • (Editer with Eskil Wadensjë) Gosta Rehn and the Swedish Mode/ at Home and Abroad. Ashgate, 2000. • (Editer) Making Every Vote Count: Reassessing Canada's Electoral System. Peterborough: Broad.view, 1999. • Social Democracy and Rational Choice, The Scandinavian Experience and Beyond. London:· Routledge 1994·; • Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. • The Long Road to Reform: Restructuring Public Education in Quebec. Montreal: McGlii-Queen's University Press, 1986. · · • La Réforme Scoiaire Au Québec. Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 1984. • Politics in the New Quebec. Toronto: McCielland and Stewart, 1978. • The Deco/onization Of Quebec' (with S. Hodgins Milner), Toronto: McCielland and Stewart, 1973. Articles: (Since 1903) œ «La rédistribution non~matérielle: L'angle mort de la lutte aux inegalités »in Misee sur l'égalité: L'argent, le pouvoir, le bien-être et la liberté. (Sous la direction d'Alain Noel et Miriam Fahmy) Montréal: Fides 2014. • «Les compétences civiques scandinaves» in Social démocratie 2.0. Le Québec comparée aux pay.Y scandinaves; (Sous la direction de Stéphane Paquin et Pier-Luc L' évesque) Montréal•: PUM 20 14i · s <( Twenty Years of Seeking to Make Inroads into Canada's two Solitudes: What have we learned?" in Where .is Québec in Canadian Studies? Compiled by Anne Trépanier and. Richai·d NimUean for Hie International Journal ojCanadian Studies. University of Toronto Press .. T..:)ronto: 20 14:.. ' • "Quelle;sorte d'engagement politique par les médias sociaux?» in L'état du Québec 2013- 2014. (Sous la directicin de Miriam Fahmy) Montréal : INM 1 Boréal20 13. • "Youth Electoral Partiéipation in Canada and Scandinavia" in Engaging Young People in Civic Life,_Edited by James Youniss and Peter Levine, Vanderbilt University Press 2009 • "The Phenomenon ofPolitical Drop-outs" in Political Culture, Socialization and Education: Interdisciplinmy and Cross National Perspectives for a New Century, Editors R Famen, D German, H Dekker, C De Lantsheer and H Suenker, Peter Lang Verlag 2008. : . • "Political Dropouts and the Internet Generation" in Elza Dunkels, Gun-Marie Franberg and Camilla Hallgren (eds), Interactive Media Use and Youth: Leaming, Knowledge ... IGI Global, 2011. • "Yolith Electoral Participation in Canada and Scandinavia" in Engaging Young People in Civic Life, Edited by James Youniss and Peter Levine, Vanderbilt University Press 2009. • "The ipformed democra_tic participation of young citizens: the challenge to civic education", in Dirk Lange and Gerhard Himmelmann (eds).Demokratiedidaktik. Impulse für die politische Bi/dung. (Democracy didactics. lmpetus for po!iticaf education). VS Verlag, 2009. • "The Phenomenon of Political Drop-outs" in Political Culture, Socialization and Education: lnterdisciplinary and Cross National Perspectives for a New Century, Editors R Farnben, D German, H Dekker, C De Lantsheer and H Suenker, Peter Lang Verlag 2008. 3 • "Compulsory Voting and lnformed Youth" Peter Loewen, Henry Milner, and Bruce M. Hicks. Canadian Journal of Politica/ Science, 41 :3. September 2008. • "The Paradox of Compulsory Voting: Participation Does Not Equal Political Knowledge?" (with Peter Loewen and Bruce Hicks). Montreal: IRPP, November 2007."Political Knowledge and Political Participation among Young Canadians and Americans." Montreal: IRPP, November 2007. (A revised version was published in May 2008 on the CIRCLE website.). • La connaissance politique et la participation politique chez les jeunes Américains, Canadiens et Québécois." ln Michel Ven ne and Miriam Fahmy (eda.) L'Annuaire de Québec, Montréal: Fides, 2007. • "The Problem of Political Dropouts: Canada in Comparative Perspective" " in Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay (eds), Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition. Broadview 2007. • "Taking part in politicallif~: Does the Nordic pattern of high and informed participation still hold?" (with Svante Ersson) in Cynthfa kite (ed.) Scandinavian Policy and Politics in Comparative Perspective (2007). • «La réforme du mode de scrutin au Québec: vers un compromis réalisable in François Pétry, Éric Bélanger, et Louis M. lmbeau, (eds.) Le Parti libéral: enquête sur les réalisations du gouvernement Charest, Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006 • "The Determinants of Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective (with Kimmo Gronlund)." Scandinavian Po/ifical Studies, 29,4. Fall, 2006. • "'YES to the Europe 1 want; NO to this one.' Sorne Reflections on France's Rejection of the EU Constitution." PS: Political Science and Politics, 39: 2: 2006. • « La Compétence civique: Le Québec et le Canada dans le contexte international» in Jean Crete (ed). Politiques Publiques : Le Québec comparé. Québec : PUL 2006. • "Can PR-Voting serve as a Shelter against Declining Turnout? Evidence from Swiss Municipal Elections" (with Andreas Ladner). International Politica/ Science Review, 27:1. 2006. • "La Participation populaire a la réforme du mode de scrutin a la Colombie Brtannique : Quelles lecons pour Québec?" in Michel Venne and Antoine Robitaille (eds.) L'Annuaire de Québec Montréal: Fides, 2006. • "Do We Need to Fix our System of Unfixed Election Dates?" Policy Matters. Montreal: IRPP, December 2005. • "The Phenomenon of Political Drop-outs: Canada in Comparative Perspective.'' Choices: IRPP 2005. • "Electoral Reform and Deliberative Democracy in British Columbia." National Civic Review. 94:1. 2005. • "A Mixed-Member Proportional System Applied to the 2004 Election." E/ectorallnsight, February 2005. • "First past the Post? Progress Report on Electoral Reform Initiatives in the Canadian Provinces.'' Po/icy Matters. Montreal: IRPP 2004. • "Compétences Civiques: Le Québec à la traîne," in Michel Venne (ed.) L'Annuaire de Québec Montréal: Fides, 2004. • "Civic Literacy in the Global Civil Society: Excluding the Majority from Democractic Participation" in Sandra Halperin and Gordon Laxer (eds), Global Civil Society and ifs Limits. Palmgrave, 2002. • "Le minorité nationale suédoise en Finlande: un exemple, mais pour qui? in Michel Seymour (ed.) Etats-Nations, multinations et organisations supranationales. Liber 2002 • "Do Canadians Care Less or Know Less: Learning form the High-Civic Literacy Scandinavian Welfare States" in Z. David Berlin and Howard Aster (eds), What's Left. Mosaic Press: 2001 • "Civic Literacy in Comparative Context: Why Canadians Should be Concerned.'' Choices. Montreal: IRPP 2001. • "Social Capital and Political Participation" in Keith Dowding, Jim Hughes and Helen Margetts (eds), Challenges to Democracy: Macmillan 2001. • "The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada" in: H. Thorburn and A. Whitehorn (eds), Party Politics in Canada: 8th Edition. Toronto Pearson Educational Publishing, 2000. 4 • "Comparative Provincial Policy Analysis: A Research Agenda" (with lmbeau, L., Landry, R and Petry F.) Canadian Journal of Po/itical Science, 2000. • "Do Voters Turn out more Under Proportional than Majoritarian Systems? The Evidence from Swiss Communal Elections" (with Andreas Ladner). Electoral Studies, 2: 1999. • "A Sustainable Welfare State for Canada." in: J Carlsen, (ed.), Canada and The Nordic Countries in Times of Reorientation: Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1998. • "Why Canada must change its Electoral system" lnroads, no. 7, 1998. • "The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada" Policy Options, November 1997. • "The Challenge of Creating the Electoral system that Canada Needs." Occasional paper#16, Center for the Study of Canada: SUNY, Plattsburgh. • "The Canadian Electoral System: A Case Study." in ACE: The International Handbook of Electoral System Design, Stockholm: IDEA, 1998. • "Electoral Systems, lntegrated Institutions, and Turnout ln Local and National Elections: Canada ln Comparative Perspective," Canadian Journal of Political Science, March, 1997. • "Institutions, Information and Values: Collective versus lndividuallnterest in the Swedish Welfare State," in Pauli Kettunen and Hanna Eskola (eds): Models, Modemity and the Myrdals. Renvall Instituts, University of Helsinki, 1997 • "Politicallnstitutions and Information: An Analysis of the first New Zealand MMP Campaign," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay and Nigel Roberts (eds): From Campaign to Coalition: The 1996 MMP Election. Wellington: Dunmore Press, 1997. • "The Welfare State as Rational Choice: Social Democracy in aPost-Socialist World," Scandinavian Political Studies, 19,2. Spring, 1996. • "Methodologicallndividualism and the U-Shaped Curve: Sorne Theoretical Guidelines for the Comparative Analysis of Public Policy," in L. M. lmbeau and R.D. McKinley (eds.) The Comparative Observation of Go vern ment Activity. London: MacMillan, 1996. • (with Frances Boylston) "Canada's Massive lnvestment in Education: ls the Return Adequate?" lnroads, no. 5, 1996. • "Prospects for Electoral Reform in Canada," in Rob Richie (Ed.) Voting and Democracy Report, 1995. Washington DC: Center for Voting and Democracy, 1995. • (with Jules-Pascal Venne) "Le sens de la continuité et du relatif," in Michel Sarra-Bournet (ed.) Douze Essais Sur L'avenir De Quebec. Montréal: Fides, 1995. • "Do O.J., Tonya and the Bobbitts Await Us Down The Electronic Highway?" lnroads, no. 4, 1995. • "The Welfare State as Rational Choice," Political Economy Research Centre, University of Sheffield Occasional Paper in Political Economy, 1995. • "Obstacles To Electoral Reform in Canada." American ReviewofCanadian Studies, Spring 1994. • "La Formation Continue en Suède et son Role dans la Performance Économique," in: Diane-G Tremblay (ed.), Concertation et Performance Économique: Vers des Nouveaux Modèles de Development? Montreal AEP, 1994. • "Education and Politics ir.i Quebec: Adapting 19th Century Structures to Face the Challenges of The 21st," in Alain Gagnon (ed.), Quebec: State and Society, (2nd Edition) Toronto: Methuen, 1993. (A revised version appeared in the French-language edition -- Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 1995). • "ln Defense of Proportional Representation; or Why Our Electoral System Builds Self-Delusion into Politics." ihroads, no. 2, Spring 1993. • "La Concertation à la Suédoise," Relations, April, 1993. • "Report From Scandinavia: Gan There Be a Middle Way Between Capitalism and Socialism if Socialism is Dead?" lnroads, no. 1, Fa111992. • (With Jules-Pascal Venna) "Breaking the Constitutional Deadlock, A Quebec Perspective." lnroads, no. 1, Fa111992. 5 • "What Canadian Social Democrats Need to Know About Sweden and Why," in: John Richards et al (eds.), Social Democracy Without Illusions. Toronto: McCielland and Stewart, 1991. "Quebec in Retrospect: Beyond Political Nostalgia," Quebec Studies, 11, Faii-Winter 1990-91. • (With Arthur Milner) "Social Democracy Versus Democratie Socialism: The Question of Public Ownership," in: S. Rosenbloom and P. Findlay, (eds.), Debates Within Canadian Social Democracy. Toronto: Lorimer, 1991. . • (with Daniel Go mez) "Marxisme, Corporatisme, et Choix Publique: Quelque Réflexions sur un Modèle des Politiques Économiques Égalitaristes," in: L. Beaudry, C. Maille, Et L. Olivier, (eds.), Les Avenues de la Science Politique: Théories, Paradigmes et Scientificité (Montreal: ACFAS, 1990) • "Scandanavian Style Social Democracy in Quebec and Canada 1970-1990," in: B. Strieffert et al, (eds.), Canada And The Nordic Countries. Lund: Lund University Press, 1988. • "The Montreal Citizens' Movement Then and Now", Quebec Studies, 6, 1988. • "Corporatism and the Microeconomie Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy", Scandinavian Pofitical Studies, 10,3, 1987. • "La réforme scolaire au Québec. Un compromis", Reperes: Essais en Education, 1986. • "The Compromise on Educational Reform in Quebec", Quebec Studies, 3, 1985. • "Who Really Won when Quebec Voted 'Nom, in: John Fry (ed.), Contradictions in Canadian Society Toronto: Wiley, 1984. • "The Constitution and the Reform of Quebec Educational Structures", in: Robert Martin (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Constitution Socialist Studies, 2, 1984 • "Quebec Educational Reform and the Protestant School Establishment", in: Alain Gagnon (ed.), Quebec: State and Society Toronto: Methuen, 1984. • "L'Avenir du Québec et la social-démocratie", Critère, printemps 1983. 6 1760 Academie Papers: (Since 1990) • Does Civic Education Beost Turnout? A Natural Experiment Paper Presented at the IPSA World Congress Santiago Chile, July 2008 • "Politicallnstftutions, Political Knowledge and the Turnout of Young Citizens: A Nordic Comparison." Presented at the 2009 Ar nuai Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3 - 6, 2009. Toronto, Ontario. • Does Proportional Representaton Boast Turnout? A Political Knowledge-based Explanation. Presented at the Comparative Stud}l of Electoral Systems. (CSES) conference, University of Toronto, September 6, 2009. • The Internet: Fri end or Foe of Youth Political Participation Presented at the 51h biennial conference of the ECPR, Potsdam Germany September 10-12, 2009. • "Civic Drop-outs? What do Young Citizens Know and Don't Know About Politics. Canada in Comparative Perspective." Presented at the 1998 Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston, September 2002. • "The Montreal Merger: How close did the City-Suburban Cleavage Converge with that over Language." Presentee! at the annual rneeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, May 2001. • "Les politiques qu( favoïiGent la compétence civique. Le Québec en comparaison internationale • Presenté 'lU colloque: "Analyse des politiques: Le Québec comparé, organisé par le Centre d'analyse des politiques publiques en collaboration avec la Société québécoise de science politique. Université Laval, mai 2002. • "The Voters' Paradox: Bringing Back the Knowledge Dimension" Presented at the 2002 conference of the Political Studies Association; University of Aberdeen, U.K., April, 2002. • "Political Participation, and the Political Knowledge of Adults and Adolescents." Presented at the workshop: Politica/ Participation and Information at the 30th ECPR Joint Session of Workshops 22nd to 28th March 1998 University of Turin. March 2002 • "The lnstitutional Context of Civic Literacy, the Missing Link between Social Capital and Political Participation." Presented to the 2001 Conference of the European Consortium on Political Research, Canterbury, UK, September 2001. • "Politicallnformation and Voter Turnout: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." Presented to the 2001 Conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August, 2001. • "Civic Literacy: How lnforined Citizens Make Democracy Work." Presented at the Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socioceonomics, (SASE), Amsterdam June, 2001. • "Civic Literacy in Comparative Context: Why Canada's #1 Rank in "Human Development" is Misleading." Presented at the an nuai meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Québec, May 2001.. · · • "Citoyenneté, 'litteracie' civique et participation politique aux élections locales." Présenté à la colloque de la société québécoise de science politique: "Pouvoir local et governance," Sherbrooke: 14 mai, 2001. • "ls Canada Really Number One? Civic Literacy and The Shaky Foundations of Canada's Welfare State." Presented at the an nuai meeting of the Canadian Political Science Associat!on, Québec, July, ~Q . • (with Andreas Ladner) "PR-Voting Boosts Turnout when Political Parties are Present to Mobilize Voters: Further Evidence from Swiss Communal Elections." Presented at the Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems Research Committee (ESRC) sessions at the August 2000 IPSA Conference, Québec, Canada. • (with Anders Mellbourn ) "The Nordic Countries and the EU at the beginning of the 21st Century. The Case of Sweden." Presented at the 2000 conference of the European Community Studies Association Canada (ECSA-C). August 2000, Québec, Canada. 7 1761 • (with Svante Ersson ) "Social Capital, Civic Engagement and lnstitutional Performance in Sweden: An Analysis of the Swedish Regions." Presented at the Joint Workshops of the ECPR, Copenhagen, April 2000. • "Civic Literacy, Social Capital and the Sustainable Welfare State." Presented at the 1998 Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston, September 1998. • "Politicization, Electoral Institutions, and Voting Turnout: the Evidence from Swiss Communal Elections in Comparative Context." Presented to the workshop on "New Urban Politics," 14th World Conference of the International Socialogy Association, Montreal, July 1998. • "Social Democracy in the 21st Century? Prospects for the Sustainable Welfare State. "Presented at the Workshop on: Social Democratie Parties and Welfare State Retrenchment, ECPR Joint Workshops, Warwick, UK, March 1998 • Participant in panel on "Public Disillusionment and Contemporary Democracy" at the 1997 Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, August, 1997. • "Knowledge, Social Capital and the Sustainable Welfare state. Report on work in Progress" Presented at the Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socioceonomics, (SASE), HEC, Montréal, July, 1997. • "Are Voters more knowledgeable under Proportional Electoral Institutions? A Preliminary Analysis of New Zealand's First MMP Election ."Presented at the Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 1997. • "Knowledge, Political Participation and Social Capital: A Comparative Analysis." Presented at the workshop on Social Capital at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR), Bern, Switzerland, February 27-March 3, 1997 • "ls There a Distinct Nordic View on European Integration? Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the IGC." Presented to the 1996 Conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 28-31, 1996. • "Electoral Systems, lntegrated Institutions, and Turnout in Local and National Elections: Canada in Comparative Perspective." Presented at the 1996 an nuai meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Brock University, St-Catherines, Ontario, June 1996. • "U-Shaped Curves, Rational Choices and the Institutions of Social-Democratie Welfare States." Presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington D.C. • "Does European Parliamentary Federalism Threaten the Scandinavian Welfare State?" Presented at the 1995 conference of the Political Studies Association; University of York, U.K., April, 1995. • "Does the raad to European Political Union lead to Canadian-style Federalism?" Presented at the workshop on political unions at the 1995 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR), Bordeaux, France. • "Rational-choice, Political Participation and lnstitutional Arrangements." Presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach Calif. March, 1995. • "Educational Deconfessionalization: Lost in the Shuffle Again?" Presented at the biennial conference of the American Council for Quebec Studies, Washington, November 19, 1994. • "Participation dans le système de santé scandinave." Presented, at the 4ième colloque du Réseau de recherche sociopolitique et organisationelle en santé. Québec, 14 Octobre, 1994 . • "Political Economy in a Post-socialist World: Toward a Theoretical Framework," Presented at the sixth Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), Paris, July, 1994. • "Rational Choice, Electoral Reform, and lnformed Political Participation," Presented at the 1994 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium on Political (ECPR), Madrid, Spain, April1994. • "Why Canada has Failed,to Change a Faulty Electoral System: Learning from Quebec's Experience." Presented at the Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS), New Orleans, La. November, 1993. 8 1762 • "Comparing the Effects of the Electoral Systems in Canada and the Nordic Countries." Presented to the 1993 conference of the Nordic Association for Canadian Studies: Turku, Fin land, August, 1993. • "ln Defense of the European Madel." Presented at the 1993 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium on Political (ECPR), Leiden, the Netherlands, April1993. • "lncentives, Values, Knowledge and the Institutions of Scandinavian Social Democracy." Presented at the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), New York, March, 1993. • "Rational Choice and the Reduction of lnequality: Toward a Theory of lnstitutional Arrangements in the Nordic Countries." Presented at the 1992 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September, 1992. • "Positive Second-Order Choice: Rational Ignorance, lnstitutional Arrangements, and Egalitarian Outcones." Presented at the Joint workshops of the European Consortium on Political Research, Limerick, lreland. April, 1992. • "The Nordic Countries and the EC." Presented at the 1992 Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, and the Association for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies in Canada, Charlottetown, PEl, May 311992. • "A Preference for Equality? Sorne Thoughts on lnstitutional Arrangements Leading to a More Egalitarian Distribution." Presented at the fourth Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), lrvine, California, March 1992. • "Rational Choice and Egnlitarian Outcomes: Towards a Social-democratie Political Economy." Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30 - Sept 2, 1990. • '"La concertation' in Quebec after Meech: from 'le Forum sur l'emploi' to a new Constitutional Stance?" Presented to the 1990 conference of the Nordic Association for Canadian Studies: Oslo, August 9-12, 1990. • "The Political Economy o'f Social Democracy: Contrasting Swedish and Canadian Approaches." Presented at a joint session of the Canadian Political Science Association and Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, May 1990. 9 TABB Horue U.Je\Vs ilComm~cu:y liBUSlDéSS llnvescmg 2Sports We believe that this Act would prove [to] be deeply damaging for electoral integrity within Canada' Letter to the Globe and Mail, March 19,2014 We, the undersigned, international scholars and political scientists, are concerned that Canada's international reputation as one of the world's guardians of democracy and human rights is threatened by passage of the proposed Fair Elections Act. We believe that this Act would prove [to] be deeply damaging for electoral integrity within Canada, as weil as providing an example which, if emulated elsewhere, may potentially harm international standards of electoral rights around the world. In particular, the governing party in Canada has proposed a set of wide-ranging changes, which if enacted, would, we believe, undermine the integrity of the Canadian electoral process, diminish the effectiveness of Elections Canada, reduce voting rights, expand the role of money in poli tics, and foster partisan bias in election administration. The bill seeks to rewrite many major laws and regulations governing elections in Canada. These major changes would reduce electoral integrity, as follows: Elections Canada: The proposed Act significantly diminishes the effectiveness of Elections Canada, a non-partisan agency, in the fair administration of elections and the investigation of electoral infractions by: • Severely limiting the ability of the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) to communicate with the public, thereby preventing the CEO from encouraging voting and·civic participation, and publishing research reports • Removing the enforcement arm of the agency, the Commissioner of Elections, from Elections Canada, and placing it in the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), a government department • Prohibiting the Commissioner from communicating with the public about the· details of any investigation • Preventing any details about the Commissioner's investigations from being included in the DPP's annual report on the Commissioner's activities- a report that the DPP provides to the Attorney General (AG), and which the AG forwards to Parliament • Failing to provide the Commissioner with the power to campel witness testimony (a significant obstacle in a recent investigation of electoral fraud) Right to Vote: The proposed Act diminishes the ability of citizens to vote in elections by: • Prohibiting the use ofvouching to establish a citizen's eligibility to vote • Prohibiting the use of Voter Information Cards to establish a citizen's identity or residency The prohibition against vouching is ostensibly to reduce voter fraud yet there is no evidence, as affirmed by the Neufeld Report on Compliance Review, that vouching results in voter fraud. These changes to the voter eligibility rules will disproportionately impact seniors, students, the economically disadvantaged, and First Nations. citizens, leading to an estimated disenfranchisement of over 120,000 citizens. Money in Politics: The proposed Act expands the role of money in elections by: • Exempting "fundraising expenses" from the spending limits for political parties, thereby creating a potentialloophole and weakening enforcement • Failing to require political parties to provide supporting documentation for their expenses, even though the parties are reimbursed over $30 million after every election • Increasing the caps on individual donations from $1200 to $1500 per calendar year • Increasing the caps on candidates' contributions to their own campaigns from $1200 to $5000 per election for candidates and $25,000 per election for leadership contestants • Creating a gap b.etween the allowable campaign contributions of ordinary citizens and the contributions of candidates to their own campaigns, and thus increasing the influence of persona! wealth in elections Partisan Bias: The proposed Act fosters partisan bias and politicization by: • Enabling the winning political party to recommend names for poli supervisors, thereby politicizing the electoral pro cess and introducing the possibility of partisan bias • By exempting "fundraising expenses" (communications with electors who have previously donated over $20 to a party) from "campaign spending," creating a bias in fa v our of parties with longer lists of don ors above this threshold - · cun·ently, the governing party · The substance of the Fair Elections Act raises significant concerns with respect to the future of electoral integdty in Canada. The process by which the proposed Act is being rushed into law in Parliament has also sparked considerable concern. The governing political party has used its majority power to eut off debate and discussion in an effort to enact the bill as soon as possible. By contrast, the conventional approach to reforming the electoral apparatus in Canada has always involved widespread consultation with Elections Canada, the opposition parties and the citizens at large, as well as with the international community. ln conclusion, we, the undersigned, ask that the proposed legislation should be revised so that contests in Canada continue to meet the highest international standards of electoral integrity. Yours sincerely, Professor Shaun Bowk·, University of California, Riverside, US Professor .Brian Costar, Swinburne University, Melbourne, Australia Professor Ivar Crewe, University College, Oxford, UK Professor .!argen Elklit, Aarhus University, Denmark Professor David Farrell, University Co/lege, Dublin, freland Professor Andrew Geddis, University ofOtago, New Zealand ProjèssorLisa Hill, University ofAdelaide, Australia Professor Ronald Inglehart, University ofMichigan, US Professor .Judith Kelley, Duke University, US Professor Alexander Keyssar, Harvard University, US Dr. Ron Levy, Australian National University, Australia Professor Richard Matland, University ofIllinois, US Professor Dan Meagher, Deakin University, Australia Dr. .Jenni Newton-Farrelly, Swinburne University, Melbourne, Australia Professor Pippa N01·ris, Harvard and Sydney Universities, US/Australia Professor Graeme Orr, University ofQueensland, Australia Professor Andrew Reynolds, University ofNorth Caro/ina at Chape! Hill, US Professor Ken Sherrill, Hunter College, City University ofNew York, US Professor Daniel Tokaji, The Ohio State University, US TABC 1766 Working Paper Series Y outh Electoral Engagement in Canada André Blais Université de Montréal and Peter Loewen University ofToronto January 2011 ' ~ < ' • • • J •• i!,.,.-:1... : ~ • ' • • .. ~. 1•. ~ •••~- Elections Canaëla www.elections.ca 1767 1768 Executive Summary Youth electoral engagement in Canada is declining. Despite this, we do not know much about the causes of this decline. Using census data, this report provides a profile of youth in Canada. This demonstrates the most important differences between those under 30 years of age and those over 30. We then consider the relationship between various factors and the decision to vote among Canadian youth. Following this, we perform a cohort analysis to show how youth electoral participation has evolved over time. In these analyses, we distinguish two youth groups, those aged 18-24 and those 25-30, whom we compare to all other age groups. We finally examine the factors that seem to affect Canadian youths' decision to vote or not to vote. We briefly summarize existing research in the area, particularly in Canada but also abroad, with a view to establishing the state of knowledge, the major gaps that exist and the most promising avenues for further research. We find that Canadian youth are different from their older counterparts. They are less likely to be married, somewhat better educated and slightly less religious. They earn less income. But they are more likely to have been born in Canada. Of these socio-demographic factors, education and origin (i.e. being born in Canada) are the most powerful predictors of voting. But the most crucial determinants are interest in politics and information about politics. Our cohort analysis suggests that most of the decline in voter tumout is attributable to decline among younger generations. After reviewing the cut-rent knowledge on the causes of declining youth turnout, we suggest future studies that coulà identify solutions to address this decline. 3 1769 1. Introduction The main objective of this report is to establish what we do and do not know about the amount and causes of youth electoral engagement (and non-engagement) in Canada. To do so, we first use census data to provide a socio-demographic profile of the youth population in Canada and to show how sim il ar or different that profile is from that of the older population. We then use data from the Canadian Election Study (CES) for two distinct and complementary purposes. We first compare the profiles of youth voters and non-voters, in tenns of both socio-demographic characteristics and a range of attitudes and behaviours such as political knowledge, political interest, community engagement and media use. We then perform a cohort analysis of voter tumout since 1965 (the beginning of the CES) to show how youth electoral participation has evolved over time. In these analyses, we distinguish two youth groups, those aged 18-24 and those 25-30, whom we compare to ali other age groups. We finally examine the factors that seem to affect Canadian youths' decision to vote or not to vote. We briefly summarize existing research in the area, particularly in Canada but also abroad, with a view to establishing the state of knowledge, the major gaps that exist, and the most promising avenues for further research. 2. A descriptive profile of Canadian youth Our first task is to provide a summary picture of youth's socio-demographic characteristics. Table 1 presents the main findings. Following Statistics Canada's age group classifications in the 2006 Census, we distinguish two youth groups, aged 18-24 and 25-29, which we compare to those aged 30-64.1 We focus on those socio-economic characteristics that existing research suggests could be related to the propensity to vote or not to vote: gender, education, income, employment, marital status, place of residence (urban/rural), mobility, religion, and origin, i.e. whether individuals were born in Canada or not? Beginning with gender, we find that men and women are more or Jess equally balanced in each age group. However, men seem slightly more prevalent in those aged 18-24. Women appear slightly more prevalent in those aged 25-29 and 30-64. Looking at household income, we find little difference in the percentage of those with income less than $40,000 per annum among those aged 18-24 and 25-29 (27%). Among those aged 30-64, there is a slightly lower percentage (24%).3 Considering education, we find that Canadian youth are better educated than their older counterparts. While just over a quarter (28%) of Canadians aged 18-24 report having sorne post-secondary education, this share climbs to 54.2% among those aged 25-29.4 By contrast, under half (47%) of those aged 30-64 report having sorne post-secondary education. We assume that the eventual level of education among those aged 18-24 will look very similar to those aged 25-29. lndeed, we find evidence for this when we examine the share of Canadians who are students. W e find that more than half of th ose 4 1770 aged 18-24 (58%) are cun·ently students. This declines to 23% among those aged 25-29. Just eight percent ofthose aged 30-64 report being students. Table 1: A demographie profile ofyoung Canadians 18-24 25-29 30-65 %men 50.5 49.2 49.1 % household incarne more than $40,000 73.4 72.6 75.5 % some post-secondary education 28.0 54.2 47.2 % students 58.3 23.2 8.1 % married 4.3 26.7 61.2 %urban 69.5 72.3 67.2 % moved in Iast year "27.6 28.9 11.0 % non-religious 20.9 22.6 15.4 % born outside of Canada 16.4 20.0 25.5 Data are drawn from the 2006 Canadian Census, with the exception ofreligious attendance. Rates of marriage also differ greatly between various age groups. For those aged 18-24, just one in twenty-five reports being married. This increases to 27% ofthose aged 25-39. The percentage more than doubles to 61% among those aged 30-65. Young Canadians appear only slightly more likely to live in an urban area.5 More importantly, young Canadians are nearly three times as likely to have moved in the last year compared to their.ôlder counterparts. More than a quarter (27.6%) ofthose aged 18- 24 report moving in the last year. This share climbs to 28.9% among those aged 25-29. By contrast, among those aged 30-64, only 11.0% report having moved in the last year. This is a stark difference. We find that young Canadians are more Iikely to report no religious affiliation than older Canadians.6 Among those aged 18-24 and 25-29, one-in-five reports no religion. The ratio declines to one-in-seven among those aged 30-64. Clearly, religion appears less important to young Canadians than to older Canadians. This too could explain sorne of the decline in voter turnout, as religion or religious observance has been known to be a predictor of the decision to participate in elections. Finally, when we consider the place of birth of Canadians, we find a notable difference between oür age groups: Young Canadians are more Iikely to have been born in Canada than older Canadians. Among those aged 18-24, sorne 84% report being born in Canada. This declines slightly (80%) among those aged 25-29, and declines even farther among those aged 30-65 (74%). Having profiled young and older Canadians, we now consider the differences between voters and non-voters among Canadians aged 18-30. 5 1771 3. Contrasting young <>roters and non-voters We now focus our attention exclusively on youth and on the differences among youth voters and abstainers. For this part of the analysis we pool together the Canadian Election Studies conducted in 1:997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008.7 We need to pool these five studies in arder to geta sufficient number of both voters and non-voters within each of our two youth groups. The CES data, like ali election surveys, overestimate tumout mostly because those who arè not interested in politics (and who are less inclined to vote) are less prone to respond to election surveys (Brehm 1993). We have thus weighted the data so that self-repor~:ed turnout in the survey corresponds to the official tumout as reported by Elections Canada. In this part of the analysis, we use. the same age categories we used in an earlier version of this report, namely 18-24 and 25-30 . . ln contrasting young voters and non-voters, we first consider socio..:demographic factors. We then consider poli ti ::-a[ engagement factors. In each case, we consider simple bivariate relationships, i.e. relatl..mships between voting and one other factor. Following this, we consider multiple factor:> at the same time to determine the independent effect of each. 'ii'· As we shall see, not every factor matters much for the decision to vote (e.g., gender), and some others appear to matter differently for different age groups (e.g., man·iage). Finally, political factors seem to exert more influence than socio-demographic,factors. Socio-demographic Factors Our analysis begins with socio-demographic characteristics. Table 2 shows the estimated proportion of voters among different groups. Severa! important patterns emerge. The most apparent pattern·· is that regardless of the variable, turnout in every category increases as people gei older. For e)l:ample, consider those whose household income is less than ·$40,000 pef. annum. On average,· 34% of those agèd 18-24 vote. However, among those aged 25-30 in the same income group, 41% report voting. This increase with age can be seen across every one of our categories (we also demonstrate this general trend in t~e next sectiorr). In comparing voters and non-voters, no clear differences occur according to gender. The difference between men and women never exceeds 1.5 percentage points. By contrast, we see that h-:icome appears to exert an influence over the decision to vote or not to vote. Indeed, the gap in voter participation between those with a household income below $40,000 and those above is nearly 6 percentage points among those aged 18-24 and 11 percentage points among those aged 25-30. The effect of some postsecondary education is similar, though the s{ze of the effect is.larger. The participation gap among tho se .aged 18-24 is 9 percentage points. It grows to 17 percentage points among those aged 25-30. What of the effects of being a student? Our results suggest that being a student has the effect of increasing participation amoilg those aged 18-24 (the'gap is 9 percentage points) while there is really no difference among those aged 25-30 . . ·' 6 ... 1?72 Table 2: Turnout Rate by Socio-demographic Groups Male Fern ale 18-24 37.9 36.6 25-30 46.3 47.6 <$40,000 $40,000+ 18-24 33.7 39.3 25-30 41.0 52.3 ·No Postsecondary Sorne Postsecondary 18-24 32.0 41.1 25-30 35.2 52.5 Not a student Student 18-24 33.8 43.4 25-30 47.0 46.3 Not married Married 18-24 38.2 33.5 25-30 44.4 49.6 Urban Rural 18-24 36.1 42.8 25-30 49.9 37.9 Not religious Religious 18-24 34.4 38.4 25-30 46.4 48.0 l'lot born in Canada Born in Canada 18-24 26.9 38.8 25-30 43.5 47.9 Data are drawn from the 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies. We fi nd th at where one lives has an effect on the likelihood of voting. Among tho se aged 18-24, those who live in rural settings outvote those in urban environments by sorne 7 percentage points. However, among those aged 25-30, the pattern appears to be the reverse ;:ts the gap grows to 12 percentage points in the direction ofthose living in urban . centres. This is a puzzling pattern and we cannat determine its cause at this time. The most plausible hypothesis, however, is that this is due to differences in the rural population between two age groups attributable to mobility. There is a general migration among individuals from rural to urban settings. However, this migration is most likely to occur among those who are better educated and better off and seeking more lucrative employment or. higher education. Accordingly, those who select out of a rural environment by the time they reach our second age group are more likely to vote than those who opt to remairi in a rural setting. . Unfortunately, the CES does not include a measure of mobility, though we suspect that mobility is an important factor in Iower turnout rates among youth. It should certainly be explored further in the future. 7 1773 Marriage appears to have similarly contradictory effects. In our younger group, single individuals are more likely to vote than married citizens. Indeed, the gap is sorne 5 percentage points. However, this gap reverses in favour of the married among those aged 25-30. Again, we do not have the data at hand to decisively explain this pattern;8 however we do note that marriage does not play a role in our later multivariate analysis. Religiosity has been known to influence the decision to vote for sorne time (see, for instance, Abramson et al. 2006, 90, Table 4.4). We find support for this proposition in our data, particularly among the youngest voters. For those citizens aged 18-24, religious adherents participate more than non-adherents to the tune of 4 percentage points. This gap declines to below 2 percentage points among those aged 25-30. Finally, we find that whether citizens are born in Canada has important effects on the decision to vote or not to vote, but that this effect declines with age. For our younger citizens, those who are Canadian-born are much more likely to vote. Indeed, the gap is 12 percentage points, the Iargest observed among ali of our socio-demographic factors. ,. However, this gap declines to just 4 percentage point among voters aged 25-30. This . suggests that those who are born outside of Canada take slightly longer than their Canadian-born counterparts to come to socialize into Canadian politics. However, these results also suggest that this socialization and resulting participation do occur given time. It remains to be seen whether this influence is robust after controlling for other political factors. To anticipate our results, we do find that even after controlling for political factors, individuals born outside of Canada have a markedly lower probability of voting. This suggests that something in the experience of being an immigrant makes voting either more difficult or less attractive, even among those who are informed about and engaged in Canadian politics. Political engagement Factors In addition to socio-demographic factors, the decision of individuals to vote or not to vote is likely affected b~ their engagement in politics. We begin by considering individuals' interest in politics. Unsurprisingly, those who professa high interest in politics are more likely to vote. Indeed, among those aged 18-24 the gap is sorne 22 percentage points between those who express a medium or high general interest in politics and those who express a law interest. This gap grows further to 28 percentage points among those aged 25-30! (Table 3) A similar pattern emerges according to political information, which is either measured as a share of correct answers to a series of factual questions or is evaluated by an interviewer (see Blais et al. 2009). 10 Among those aged 18-24, those who are regarded as having medium or high political information vote at a rate 23 percentage points higher than those with low information. This gap grows to 27 percentage points among those aged 25-30. 11 As with interest in politics, information about politics plays a very important role in the decision to participate in federal elections. 8 1774 Campaign events may also play a role in motivating voters to go to the poils. Principal among these events are the leaders' debates. Watching debates can help clarify the differences between parties and give voters of ali stripes more concrete reasons to go the polis and cast a ballot. The CES data suggest that among those aged 18-24, the participation gap between those who watch a debate and those who do not is sorne 24 percentage points. This ·gap is similar (24 points) among those aged 25-30. Table 3: Turnout Rate by Political Characteristics Low interest in politics Med/high interest in politics 18-24 24.2 46.6 25-30 32.5 60.5 Low political information Med/high political information 18-24 24.8 47.5 25-30 31.4 58.5 Did not watch de bate Watched debate 18-24 33.9 58.3 25-30 43.2 67.4 No other political activity Other political activities 18-24 29.5 45.8 25-30 40.9 51.4 No use of internet for news Use of internet for news 18-24 29.2 45.6 25-30 37.3 62.8 Data are drawn fi·om the 1997, 2000,2004,2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies. Until now, we have considered factors of engagement with formai electoral politics. But what is the relationship between engagement in other social or political activities and the decision to vote in elections? For example, what is the relationship between engaging in protest or other.unconventional political action and the decision to vote. It is sometimes suggested that youth are not voting because they have found more meaningful political activities in which to er:gage. If this is the case, then we should find that turnout is at !east slightly lower among those citizens who engage in other political activities, such as signing a petition or attending a protest. In three elections (2000, 2004, and 2008), the CES asked respondents to indicate how many ofvarious political activities they have engaged in, namely signing a petition, participating in a boycott, attending a lawful demonstration, joining an illegal protest, or occupying a building or factory. As it tums out, those who participate in other political activities appear more likely to vote in federal elections than those who do not participate in other activities. Among those aged 18-24, the turnout gap betweert those who engaged in no other activity and those who did is 16 percentage points. This gap is attenuated among those aged 25-30, but it still exists at 11 percentage points. Other political activities thus appear to pull citizens into voting at a 9 1775 much younger rate. Among those who do not protest, this difference is only made up later on by other positive factors, such as age, increasing incarne, increased education, etc. Finally, we consider whether accessing information about politics over the internet is related to voting among young people. In four elections (2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008), the CES has aslœd Cana di ans if they have used the internet to ac cess information about the respective federal election. As can be seen, those who use the internet for this information acquisition are more likely to vote. Among our younger group, participation for those who access information on the internet is 16 percentage points higher. This difference increases to.26 percentage points among those aged 25-30. While causation could run in either direction, we do think it likely that access to the internet makes the information acquisition required to vote in an election easier and is thus logically associated with higher patticipation. 12 These results suggest ihat there are severa! factors which distinguish voters and non voters among Canadian youth. Sorne ofthese factors are related to an individual's station in !ife. But others are related to an individual's interest and engagement in politics. To understand which factors are most important, we perform a logistic regression that considers iirst ali socio-demographic factors and then adds in political factors. The results of this regression tell us which factors are the most important determinants of youth 13 voting anà which do not play an independent role. . Table A 1 (in the Appendix) indicates the in dependent effects of these different factors and Table 4 summarizes the impact of the most influential factors. The first set of results focuses on socio-demographic characteristics. The results show that the two most important factors are education and place of birth. The better educated have odds of voting 52% higher than those who do not have post-secondary education while those born in Canada have odds of voting over nonvoting 61% greater than those born outside the country. Then there are four ether factors, age, incarne, gender, and residence, with sorne modest effect. Indeed, we find that those with an income greater than $40,000 are more likely to vote. Similarly, those who are aged 25-30 are more likely to vote than those aged 18-24. We should note, however, that much larger age effects likely exist between those aged over 30 and those considered here. We find that women appear less likely to vote. Likewise, those in rural settings appear Jess likely to vote, on average. However, these last two effects do not persist when we control for ether political factors. When we consider socio-demographic and political factors together, we also see that the impact of education is substantially reduced, such that the result becomes statistically insignificant. This indicates that the higher turnout of those with post-secondary education is due most! y to their higher leve! of attention to political affairs. The ·findings reported in Table 4 indicate that the decision to vote or not to vote is strongly shaped by one's degree of interest and information. Those who indicate a medium or high general interest in politics (about 47% of those aged 18-24 and 61% of those aged 25-30) are most likely to vote. Indeed, the ir odds of voting are 88% higher than th ose youth who do not express a high interest in politics. Information about politics has a similarly large effect. Among those individuals who are evaluated as having a medium or high amount 10 1776 of information (48% of those aged 18-24 and 59% of those aged 25-30), the odds of voting are 89% higher than those who have a low amount of information.14 The two largest effects, then, are related to intellectual engagement in politics. In fact if we combine information and interest into an "engagement" factor, we find that the odds of voting are more than three times as high in the high engagement group (result not shown). Our findings also suggest that the lower turnout rate observed among women is similarly related to their lower ·tevel of interest. Indeed when interest and information are taken into account, there is no gender or rural/urban gap .. The situation is different, however, with respect to income and origin. In these cases, the initial relationship is maintained after the introduction of interest and information. It may weil be that those who are relatively well-off and born in Canada are more integrated into their community. This is consistent with the view that. the act of voting expresses in part one's social and psychological identification with society. Table 4: Most influential factors in the decision to vote among youth (aged 18-30) Modell -Socio-Demographic Factors Odds Ratio Effect (Without Political Factors) Canadian-born 1.61 Sorne post-secondary education 1.52 . Age 1.37 Income greater than $40,000 1.27 Woman 0.83 Rural 0.74 Model 2- With Politic.al Factors Canadian-born 1.91 Information about politics 1.89 Interest in politics 1.88 Income greater than $40,000 1.26 Data are drawn from the 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2008 Canadian Election Studies. Bach cell presents the change in probability of an individual voting given a characteristic. The estimates are drawn from the mode) repotted in Table A 1. Taking ail of this information together, we can draw a profile of the typical average youth voter and non-voter. The average youth voter is both interested in and informed about politics. The average non-voter is not. Demographically, the average voter likely lives in a wealthier household and is more likely to be born in Canada. Ail other factors do not help us distinguish voters from non-voters. 4. A cohort analysis of voter turnout in Canadian federal elections In this section we revisit and update a cohort analysis of voter turnout in Canada. We refine a methodology i~itially employed .bY Blais et al. (2004) and inspired by Johnston (1989, 1992) to sort otit Iife-cycle, generation (cohort), and period effects on turnout, and we update the analysis. 15 The basic idea is simple. We pool together all the available CES 11 1?77 data sets, covering ali federal elections 16 from 1965 to 2008 inclusively (except for 1972, when no eJection study was conducted). We have a total of 13 election studiesP We then proceed to a multivariate estimation that includes !ife-cycle, cohort, and period effects. Life cycle effects simply correspond to the impact of age. The idea is that as people grow older, as they get more involved in their social milieu and develop stronger preferences over time, their propensity to vote increases. The relationship, however, is curvilinear. At the end of the life cycle, tumout decreases slightly, most especially for health reasons. Cohorts are defined in terms ofthe first election in which people had the right to vote. For instance, th ose born between 1942 and 1944 had the right to vote for the first ti me in 1965 ( voting age was th en 21 ). We estimate a madel with 14 cohorts, each defined on the basis of the first election in which they were eligible to vote. We have also created variables for each election, which measure the impact of whatever specifie contexts of an election that made the election more or less "exciting". On the basis of the rest!lts of the multivariate madel (Table A2 in the Appendix) we are able to estimate the turnout rate of the various cohorts at each federal general election. 18 These estimations are presentee! in Table 5. A number of interesting patterns emerge. Reading.horizontally, \Ve can see the !ife-cycle effect: the turnout rate of a given cohort tends to rise over time., as people grow older. However, the rate at which it increases declines over time. This is the general trend but there are specifie "period" effects, that is, turnout is particularly low or high in sorne elections. We can observe, for instance, that turnout decreases among ali cohorts from 1979 to 1980 and increases substantially from 1980 to 1984, among ali cohorts. Generation effects can · best be appreciated by comparing the initial turnout rates of the various cohorts. In the ·1 960s, about 70% of the members of a new cohort would vote in the first election in which they were eligible to participate; by 2004 it was only slightly ovet' 30%. At !east two-thirds of new voters would cast a ballot in the 1960s; by 2004 it was about one third. As shown in previous analyses (Blais et aL 2004) this is the major reason why turnout has been going down. Turnout decline among new cohorts started in the 1970s, and has proved to be quite steaçfy. The turnout rate of new cohorts had already declined to about 50% in the 1980s and into the 40% range in the 1990s. There seems to be a persistent downward trend in the turnout rate of new cohorts. The consequence of this is that despite the fact that young voters are more likely to vote as they get older, they are beginning at su ch a low level of participation that overall turnout can only be expected to decline. 12 1778 Table 5: Estimated Tnrnout by Cohort and Election Election 1965 1968 1974 1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2008 Colzort 1965 69 71 71 79 75 82 84 .85 81 78 79 80 76 1968 70 71 80 75 83 85 85 82 79 80 81 77 1972 60 71 65 75 78 79 75 72 73 75 70 1974 56 68 62 73 76 77 74 70 72 74 69 1979 60 54 66 70 72 68 64 66 68 63 1980 45 57 62 64 61 57 59 62 56 1984 58 63 65 62 58 60 63 58 1988 54 57 53 50 53 56 50 1993 53 49 46 49 52 47 1997 43 40 43 47 42 2000 34 37 41 36 2004 34 38 34 Data are- drawn from Canadian Election Studies conducted for every election between 1965 and 2008, except 1972. Each cell presents the probability of an individual voting given their cohort and the etection. The estirnates are drawn from the model reported in Table A2. 5. Why is youth turnout so low? The final and most important question to address concerns the causes of this declining turnout among youth. We should say at the outset that we do not know a lot about these causes. This should no.t be surprising. The ttirnout decline is a long-term phenomenon; there are good reasons to think that it is a complex pattern with a combination of causes. Sorne of the data that would be needed to uncover the root causes are simply not available. Most crucia!!y, the CES does not contain a stable set of attitude questions tha:t would allow us to determine whether the most recent cohorts feel differently about politics and elections from previous cohorts, at the same age. At the same time, we know quite a few things about the phenomenon and what we know allows us at the very least to rule out certain interpretations. The first point to make is that this trend is not unique to Canada. There is clear evidence that youth are less prone to vote now than in the past and that this is the main source of overall turnout decline in other countries as wel1: the United States (Dalton 2007; Lyons and Alexander 2000; Miller and Shanks 1996; Wattenberg 2007), Britain (Clarke et al. 2004) and Finland (Wass 2007). This suggests that the causes of youth electoral disengagement are not specifie to the Canadian context. We should be looking for reasons that could apply to many other countries. : As Franklin (2004) nô-ted, turnout may increase or decrease over time, either because citizens ebange or becaJse the electoral context changes or because ofboth. A first line of inquiry is 'th us to in qui re wh ether the declining youth voter tu rn out could be related to changes in the electoral. context. 13 .·.·. 1?79 . The. most .striking chmlge in th~ Canadian eleçtoral context has been the shift from a system with two major partie~_plus a minor one (the New Dem.ocratic Part'y) to a multi party system, with novv- four parties represented in Padiament ;:\nd five parties receiving at !east 5% of the vote. It is indeed paradoxical that turnout has declined in Canada pre.cisely ~t the time v'1:1en the range of choice offered tc voters has been increasing. But ·it would be erroneous, to see ,any causal relationship between these two phenomena. · Britain ha:; witnessed the same decline in turnout while maintaining its traditional party system. Another aspect of the electoral context that, has been .sqown to affect turnout is . ~competitiveness. The moçe competitive the election is perceived to be,. the .greater the , incentive to vote and tl1e hig}iei· the turnout (Franklin 2004). This raises the question of whether elections have become Jess competitive over time in Canada (and elsewhere). J?.:he answer is negativ-e.. In fact, if.anything, the v\rinner's margin of victory has slightly .Geclined over time in rn.ost democracies (Franklin 2004, 187).-In Canada~ as·can be seen:. ,.v' ~ra Figure ;, there is nn 1:lenr trend in mm·gin ofvictory, detïneci as the vot.~ gap between ·:~..; · ..... ·the 11rst-placed party Lnd the s~cond. In fact; the mean vote margin in- the. last feur , ~· -:€h.!ctions (9.8 points) i:.:slightly lowerthan the·:average:·for.Lhc·.l'!7·elections·held from·:1: .. · .;_\:,945 to 1.997 (12.2 po;nts).· To the extentthat there· ïs. a· trend,· elections appear slightly :/.. \ -· .m01·e competitive now: · Figure-1: ·Margin of victory from 19Llr-5 to 2008 tO ,...._r.\1 2 c 'ë a. @,~ .!!! ~tO /.-,,_ êr · · ~ B .Q >ci 0 .... c: '§1 !Il Etn ~ ~ . 0 ~· 1 \ ~- ;:!• ?!!al 01 0'> . . . 0101. ,·~ ·, -'~. T"' .,... ,...,... Election Source: Data are drawn fron~ official election results. 1 ~ Still anot4-er possibility '_is that elections have bec orne less meaningful over time. Two variants of this thesis hhve been advanced. The first cçmcerns the impact of globalization. The argtiment is that aB the world economy has become more global, there is not much that national governmerits can do, and they become more or Iess irrelevant. That 14 1780 argument is difficult to evaluate rigorously and the empirical evidence of the impact of globalization is far frqm conclusive (Boix 1998). Recently, Vowles (2008) used data covering 40 countries and 72 elections to see whether the propensity to think that those in power cannot make a difference is higher in countries that are more integrated into the global eco no my, and h.e found no su ch relationship. There remains the possibility that such a relationship emerges only among youth. This would require further research. There is &Iso the possihility that elections do not matter much anymore because party differences have been· gradually waning over time. There has been much talk, for instance, of a new rap.prochement between the left and the right {see Noël and Thérien 2008, chapter 7). Yet, "systematic studies of party programs in Western democracies between the Second World War and the end of the 20th century show the remarkable stability of the left-right division over time and across. space" (Noël and Thérien 2008, 196). It is particularly difficult to believe that partisan differences have declined in Canada - given that the Canadian party system was traditionally described in the 1960s and 1970s as being based on pragmatic brokerage politics (Carty et al. 2000) and that the new parties that have emerged since, the Bloc québécois and the Reform Party in the 1990s and the Green Party more recently, could hardly be construed as "centrist". Still another possibility is that changes in the way election campaigns are run may be partly responsible for the turnout decline. Some studies have shown that traditional door to-door canvassing has a powerful impact on turnout (Carty and Eagles 2006; Green et al. 2003; Pattie et al. 1994). There is some evidence that direct candidate contact with voters bas been decreasing over time, as parties have devoted more attention to the media (Denver et al. 2003). This shift may have contributed to lower turnout, although it is not clear why this should have affected the youth more than older people. In the same vein, lower turnout may have been facilitated by the increasing negativism of election campaigning. But here again the connection is dubious. On the one hand, we are not aware of any study that has rigorously documented this more negative trend. On the other band, and most importantly, the Iink between negative campaigns and low turnout is far from obvious (for conflicting findings and conclusions, see Ansolabehere et al. 1999; Geer 2006; Lau and Pomper 2001). Finally, even ifthere is a connection, we would have to explain why negative ads seem to depress turnout o~ly among the youth. There is thus no clear evidence that the decline in youth turnout can be imputed to changes in the electoral context. The most plausible hypothesis is therefore that youth turnout is declining because of changes that have occurred among young citizens. The problem, of course, is to identify which specifie changes have produced the turnout decline. Here, as well, there are two possibilities: socio-demographic changes and attitudinal changes. The first possibility concerns changes in the life-cycle. We have known for a long time that turnout is higher a;: one grows older (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The standard interpretation is that as people get married, have kids, buy a home, and get settled into their community the propensity to vote increases. People become more integrated into 15 1781 their milieu, are more likely to be involved in groups, and they more or less naturally go to the polis when there is an election. This was the case in the 1960s and 1970s and is still the case today (see Goerres 2007). What has changed is that the gap between the young and the old has widened. One reason for this could be that the process of "maturation" talees more time than before. People get married, have kids and huy a bouse later in life, and so it takes more time for them to be engaged in their milieu. This suggests that we should not be too worried by the recent turnout decline among youth. They will eventually catch up. 19 There has been very little systematic examination of the "late maturation" hypothesis. Smets (20 10) has ascertained the validity of this interpretation in the case of Britain, where turnout has also declined substantially. Her findings suggest that part of the drop in turnout among those below age 30 can be imputed to the fact that they are Jess likely than before to be married at an early age, to own their home, and to have Iived at the same place for a long time. Smets also finds, importantly, that attendance at religious services, political interest, and the strength of partisan identification predict electoral participation. As far as we can tell, no similar study has been performed with Canadian data. This is a promising avenue for further research, particularly in studying the effects ofmobility. A second possibility is that younger cohorts have different perceptions, attitudes and values. Three specifie hypotheses have been advanced in the literature. The first is that recent cohorts are Jess prone to develop feelings of attachment to any of the parties. Because they tend not to identify with any party, they often do not have clear preferences among them, and the incentives to go to vote are therefore weaker. There is sorne evidence that partisan attachments have declined over time and particularly among younger citizens (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and that this has contributed to the turnout decline (Miller and Shanks 1996). We are not aware of any systematic study along those lines in Canada. This is clearly a question that requires further investigation. Another hypothesis is that younger generations are less likely than previous generations to construe voting as a civic duty. There is some circumstantial evidence supporting that hypothesis. Blais et al. (2004) and Wass (2007) have shown that much of the age gap in turnout can be imputed to a weaker sense of civic duty among youth. Unfortunately, however, we do not have longitudinal data that would allow us to determine whether sense of duty is indeed weaker among today's youth than among those ofyesterday. A further hypothesis is that the changing nature of political information, in both how it is communicated and how it is acquired, is resulting in a generation of citizens who are politically socialized in a manner fundamentally different than previous generations (Milner 2010). When combined with lower "civic literacy," this may lead to lower turnout in the future. Finally, Dalton (2007) has argued that the younger generation is gradually abandoning electoral · politics because it is more interested in more direct forms of political participation, such as demonstrations. There is a kernel of truth in that interpretation, as 16 1789u ..... indeed recent generations are more prone to march in the streets than their predecessors (Dalton 2007). But it is not clear that there is a causal relation between the two trends. As we noted above, those who are engaged in non-electoral political activities are also more inclined to vote (see ais~ Teorell et al. 2007; Verba et al. 1995). 6. Conclusion In many ways, younger Canadians are not very different from their older counterparts. In sorne respects, though, they are. Perhaps the most important difference is that most of them are riot married. They also tend to move more often, to be somewhat better educated and slightly less religious. Their household incarne is slightly lower. Contrary to what could be expected, they are somewhat more likely to have been born in Canada. We have .seen that, arriong demographie characteristics, education and origin (i.e. being born in Canada) are th~ most powerful predictors of voting. Political factors - notably interest .in and informr.tion about·volitics - have an even greater effect. We have also con,firmed that the reo:e~'lt turnout decline observed in Canada, ac: in many other countries, is clue,mJi.:.-çly to the·d1wp in electoral participation among recent cohorts. The turnout rate of n.';v:r· echotts (-who·t~.:re. elig.ibJe,to vote for the first time in an election) is now only siightl;y è"ver 30%, whiJ:.e it useci'to be ove-r 60%. This raises the question. ofwhy so few young electors decide to vote. We have seen that existing research does t10t allow us to provide clear answers to this question. The review of the literature suggests, however, that .this may be more the outcome of changes in youthsÇ..• socio-deinographic situation· and/or values and attitt11:les than in changes in the electoral landscape. \Vhere .do! we go from here? The first observation to be ·made is that al most ali the evidence that is marshalled on' this ·questioiJ-iïs. based on· survey data; Survey data are absolutely essential, especially if we want to understand the values and beliefs that lead many young Canadimis to abstain in elections. Y et stn-veys bave their limitations, most especia!ly: with respecho turne ut. The basic· problem Î<; that most of those who do not vote do not bother td · respond ta surveys. The consequence is a substantial under represent::don ofnon-voters in electoral surveys. ; < Bec a use ci f these · limifatioris, it is im_perative to use ath er data sources. This is wh y we strongly -encourage El étions Canada to continue its analyses of turnout rates across age groups, based on an examination of actual results. Thfs methodology provides more reliable estirhates oftui·nout thanthose that can be arrived atv"Yith surveys. On this point, it is worth; noting th at' ~~ca demie studies of tumout in com1tries lilœ the United States and Britain hf:).ve the oppot~unity to validâte electoral participation;- that is, it is possible to verify if those who say they v·oted really d!d so.- It is not ·clear to us why it is a fundamental right to protect the confidentiality of the act of voting, and/or why this right is more important in Canada than in the United States and Britain. Much more could be learned through surveys if it were possiblè to ·v ali date wh ether respondents actually voted or not. ' · · · 17 ·' 1783 In the same vein, there ls the opportunity to design experiments to test ideas about how to . increase turnout among:youth. For instance, the persona! information that is provided by Elections Canada about where and when to vote cornes by mail. It may well be that younger people pay little attention to regular mail and that they would be more . responsive if they \\'ere contacted through the Internet or through other new communication technologies. The logical way to test such an idea is torun an experiment in a local electoral district, where a random halfis contacted by mail and the other halfby Internet or another medium. There have been many such experiments conducted in the United States and they have produced sorne very interesting findings (see Gerber, et al. , 2008). No equivalent studies, however, have been undertalœn in Canada. We also need to have a much deeper understanding of variations in the propensity to vote among segments of the youth population. The CES data prov.ide sorne useful information abo~It the profile of Y')Ung voters and non-voters, but that information is necessarily Iimited by the relatively small sample of young citizens and the Jack of information about some of the socio-derr:ographic characteristics. This would cali for a .large sur.vey of young respondents that would allo\~' us, to better specify which subgroups ofthe youth population are least at1d most inclined to vote. At this stage, it is impossible to say anything about turnout among Aboriginal youth, ethno-culturid groups and youth with special neéds. There is also ample evidence that the attitudes and values of recent generations are different from those oftheir predecessors and that this change is in good part responsible for the recent turnout decline. We have a good sense of what these attitudes and values are, but it· is difficult to demonstrate without doubt that this is the case because we have little longitudinal data that would allow us to see precisely if and when these attitudes have changed over time. Thus, the need exists· to plan in the future longitudinal studies that will enable us to pin down which attitudes do and do not change and to determine how these attitude changes are correlated with the decision to ·vote or not to vote. One possibility in this regard would be for Elections Canada to link with Statistics Canada and Human Resources and Social Development Canada in their National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youtl1.. Finally, · there is the issue of new technologies." In Canada, people express their preferences on a ballot paper, which is, to say the least, an old way of doing things. Whether one should allow other forms of voting, most especially mail and/or Internet voting, is a thorn y issue th at raises fundamental. questions about the risk of fraud. Clearly, more research is needed to more rigorously ascertain the potential advantages and disadvantages of these other forms of voting. We first need to take stock of what is being done elsewhere in the world, to learn the successes and failures of experiments that are being done in many countries. But this must be completed by experiments of our own, that are sensitive to the peculiarities of the Canadian context. Again, we strongly encourage Elections Canada to conduct rigorous experiments (with randomly allocated treatment and control g:roups), perhaps in specifie electoral districts and perhaps initially 18 1784 at the time of by-elections, to determine if Canadians in general, and younger citizens in particular, would be more inclined to vote ifthey could do so from home. There i$ mu ch to do if we want to properly understand what in duces Canadian youth to engage or not to engage in elections. We need to adopt a variety of approaches, both experimental and non-experimental. We need to complement surveys with analyses based on administrative records. We need to do longitudinal research to understand how and why different cohm1s of people come to view the act of voting differently. And we need to do ali of this sooner than later. 19 Appendix Table Al: lndividual~level determinants ofvoting by young Canadians (18~30) OR S.E. P>z OR S.E. P>z Aged 25-30 1.37 0.16 0.01 1.22 0.17 0.15 Post-seconda ry 1.52 0.18 0.00 1.12 0.15 0.41 Income 1.27 0.08 0.00 1.26 0.10 0.00 Woman 0.83 0.09 0.08 1.12 0.14 0.37 Ru ml 0.74 0.10. 0.03 0.86 0.13 0.31 Student 1.24 0.19 0.14 1.20 0.21 0.30 Married 1.06 0.12 0.63 1.14 0.15 0.34 Religion 1.06 0.13 0.61 0.94 0.13 0.66 Canadian-born 1.61 .0.29 0.01 1.91 0.39 0.00 Interest in politics 1.88 0.17 0.00 InformlltÏ{'n 1.89 0.17 0.00 Watchcd Debate 1.29 0.22 0.14 1997 0.88 0.20 0.58 1.10 0.27 0.71 2000 0.77 0.16 0.20 1.11 0.25 0.65 2004 0.60 0.12 0.01 0.82 0.20 0.41 2006 0.64 0.13 0.03 0.75 0.17 0.21 N 1538 1330 Lil{elihooct Ratio 63.71 227.27 Pseudo-ID 0.03 0.12 Data are drawn from the 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies. The dependent variable is voted (1) or did not vote (0) in the election. The mode! is a logistic regression. Variables 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006 are dummy variables indicating the probability ofvoting in each ofthose elections compared to the 2008 electir;m. 20 1786 Table A2: Probability ofVoting in a Federal Election by Age, Cohort, and Election Coef. S.E. z P>z Age 0.04 0.01 8.61 0.00 Age-squared -0.00 0.00 -8.79 0.00 1965 Cohort -0.06 0.08 -0.71 0.48 1968 Cohort -0.01 0.07 -0.14 0.89 1972 Cohort -0.39 0.06 -6.86 0.00 1974 Cohort -0.42 0.08 -5.54 0.00 1979 Cohort -0.68 0.07 -10.11 0.00 1980 Cohort -0.96 0.10 ··9.33 0.00 1984 Cohoi't -0.87 0.09 -11.07 0.00 1988 Cohort -1.13 0.09 -12.73 0.00 1993 Cohort -1.20 0.09 -12.73 0.00 1997 CohoJ-t -1.35 0.11 -12.41 0.00 2000 Cohort -1.51 0.13 -11.72 0.00 2004 Coho1·t -1.51 0.13 -11.72 0.00 2006 Cohort -0.46 0.29 -1.59 0.11 2008 Cohort -2.02 0.32 -6.25 0.00 1968 Election -0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.89 1974 Election -0.12 0.07 ~1.80 0.07 1979 Election 0.26 0.07 3.73 0.00 1980 Election · -0.03 0.07 -0.39 0.70 1984 Election 0.37 0.07 ·6.73 0.00 1988 Elect'on 0.48 0.07 6.73 0.00 1993 Election 0.47 0.07 6.36 0.00 1997 Elect!on 0.24 0.08 3.12 0.00 2000 ElectRon 0.04 0.08 0.47 0.64 2004 Election 0.08 0.08 1.01 0.31 2006 Election 0.18 0.09 2.11 0.04 2008 Election -0.05 0.09 -0.61 0.54 Constant 0.13 0.14 0.92 0.36 N 36522 Lilœlihood Ratio 2707.79 Pseudo-R2 0.06 Data are drawn from the 1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000,2004, 2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies. The dependent variable is voted (1) or did not vote (0) in the election. The mode! is a logistic regression. The cohort variables indicate the election in which a respondent Wi:'.S first eligible to vote. Accordingly, those coefficients report the probabilhy ·of voting in any election given membership in a certain cohort. The election variables indicate thé probability of any individual voting in a respective election, given their coho·rt. 21 1787 References Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, and David Rohde. 2006. Change and Continuity in the 2004 and ?006 Elections. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, and Adam Simon. 1999. "Replicating Experiments Using Aggregate and Sm·vey Data: The Case ofNegative Advertising." American Political Science Review 93: 901-91 O. Bartels, Larry. 1996. "Uninformed Voters: Information Effects in Presidentia1 Elections." American Journal ofPolitical Science 40: 194-230. 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Wass, Hanna. 2007. "The Effects of Age, Generation, and Period on Turnout in Finland, 1975-2003." Electoral Studies 26: 648-659. ·,, Wattenberg, Martin P. 2o'07. Is Votingfor Young People? New York: Pearson Longman. Wolfinger, RaymondE., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven: Yale University Press. · ... ~ )• 24 1790 End n'otes 1 These two groups respecthely represent 9.2% and 6.3% ofCanadians, according to the 2006 census. 2 Throughout this study, we ~1se the 2006 Cens us whenever possible. Ali data are drawn from the 20% sample. In a previous version of this study, we·compared Canadians aged 13-24 and 25-30. We use the categories provided for the ~006 Census (i.e. 18-24 and 25-29). When yve regroup the previous data according to these new categories, we fi nd that the general differences between groups hold for each variable. AcGordingly, the percentages presented are not sensitive to the different categorizations. . 3 We make use ofhousehold incarne rather than individual incarne for two reasons. First, household incarne is the measure used ,in the Canadian Election Study. Accordingly, it affords us greater congruence between the first and second analyses to use this mensure. Second, measuring individual incarne wili tell us little about the economie class or status of individuals who are not working. Consider, for example, two high school students, one from a very poor family and the other from a wealthy family. We wou id expect that the benefits of a large h:msehold in come wou id make the second individual very different from the first, not Jeast in attaining the tools and knowledge necessary to vote. Nonetheless, ifwe measured their individual. incarnes, we wou!d see no difference between them and would be at a loss to explain the relationship between in come and electoral participation. For these two reasons, we employ a measure of household income. 4 Following the 2006 Cens us categories as defined by CANSIM, we consider those who have some postsecondmy education as having a co liege or CEGEP certificate or a university certificate, diploma or degree. Tl1is produces resulfs th at are markedly different from those in our earlier version of this report. This is due to different classification categories in 2001 a:nd 2006. Nonetheless, wh ile the quantities differ markedly, the same pattern is obtained as before, where those in the middle age category have the highest. average education. 5 We consider Canadians resident in census metropolitan areas (or CMAs) to be resident in an urban area. 6 Questions pertaining to relfgion are asked in every second census. Accordingly, we rely on the 2001 Census to provide information on religious attendance among our various age groups. 7 By pooling our datasets, \~e make the assumption that sociodemographic and political factors have the same effect in each election: Because of the small number of young respondents in each individual study, it would be difficult to conduçt election-specifie analysis. However, we have examined regressions for each year separately and we do not find significant differences between elections. Accordingly, we rest with the pooled analysis. 8 Stoker and Jennings ( 1995} show that getting married initiaiJy depresses electoral participation but that its long tetm impact is positiv~: The Canadian data are consistent with such an interpretation. 9 Interest in politics is assessed by asking individuals how interested they are in politics generally. Individuals can glve a response between 0 (not interested at ali) and 10 (very interested). Those who answer four or higher are considered to have medium or high interest. · 10 Political information is measured in two manners. In 2000, it is based on a respondents' general political knowledge, their ability to correctly identify party leaders, and their knowledge of parties' positions and promises, as weil as their ability to provide an approximation of the federal surplus. In ali other years, political knowledge was assessed by the interviewer. Bartels (1996) has argued convincingly that interviewer evaluations ofknowledge are valid indicators ofrespondents' political knowledge and information.· 11 Occasionally, the differen'ces between voters and non-voters are significantly different than in the previous version of our report. This is due to two factors. First, there was a slightly Jarger number of respondents in 2008 than in previous years, meaning that responses in 2008 are given somewhat more weight. Second, not aU measures are exact from year to year, and so wiJJ result in greater or lesser differences between voters and non-voters. Nonetheless, ali of the reported differences are in the same direction as in the previous report, suggesting consistent patterns on our key variables. This Iikewise applies to our regression results presented in the next section. 25 17.91 12 Two further factors, party membership and cynicism should be considered. However, they are beyond the scope of the CES. First, there is likely a positive relationship between party membership and voting. However, the CES only once measures party membership, so there is an inadequate amount of data to test this relationship. We should note, however, that party membership is known to be comparatively low among young Canadians (Cross 2004) and so sorne of the decline in voter turnout could be caused by less engagement with politics. However, it is equally plausible that the relationship runs in the other direction and that party membership follows from engagement in poli tics. Second, there is a common argument that youth vote less because they are more cynical about politics than their older counterparts. While the CES do es not measure cynicism in a consistent mann er year over year, we do note that Blais et al (2002, Table 3.1, pg 51) find no relationship between cynicism and voterturnout. 13 We consider only those factors that were included in every CES. Accordingly, we exclude other political activities and internet usage. 14 We note th at age is not significant in the second set of regressions, contrary to our earlier report. We note two important caveats. First, the estimated effect for age in this mode! is statistically indistinguishable from 0, but also indistinguishable from our previous estimated effect for age. Second, most of the age effect is captured by mcreases in interest and information that occur as voters age. 15 Life-cyclé' effects are thosf! th at take place as people get older, generation effects refer to differences between groups of people bnm at different times, and period effects refer to over-time changes th at affect ali individua!s. Period effect~ may point to specifie events, such as pre and post World War II, orto specifie characteristi.::s of a particula.r election. We have made two refinements to the methodology used by Blais et al. (2004). Generations are here defined in terms of the first election in which a group ofindividuals had the right to vote instead of the rather crude distinction between pre-baby-boomers, baby-boomer, born in the 60s, and bbrn in the 70s. And we create·a separate variable to tap the specifie peculiarities of each election instead of a simple contrast between elections held before and after 1990. . . . 16 The 1965 election does not appear because it is used as the reference group. We are th us measuring how more (or less) Iikely people were to vote in each election, compared to 1965, everything else being equal, that is controlling for !ife-cycle and generation effects. 17 Blais et al. (2004) examined nine elections, starting in 1968 and ending in 2000. 18 These are only estimations and they are valid only to the extent to which the assumptions that we have to make are plausible. We have to assume that the over-reporting bias is relatively constant across cohorts and age groups and also that the !ife cycle effects are relatively constant across cohorts. Our intuition is that these assumptions are not strict! y true but that the bias es are not large and that they partially cancel out. Note that wh ile we in elude variables for those who were eligible to vote for the first time in the 2006 election and the 2008 election, (see Table A2), we do not provide an estimation of the tumout rate for these voters, as the number ofvoters is too small (69 and 122 respectively). 19 They may not catch up, however, if they form the habit of not voting (Fr~nklin 2004; Plutzer 2002). 26 TABD 1792 April_, 2014 An Open Letter to Prime Minis ter Stephen Harper, Members of the House of Commons, and Senators of Canada: Last month, over 160 professors signed an open letter to express grave concems about the damage to Canadian democracy that the "Fair Elections Act" (Bill C-23) would cause. Today, we the undersigned, an even larger group ofprofessors at Canadian universities who share a deep concern over this legislation, urge the govemment to withdraw this Bill and draft truly fair election reforms based on meaningful consultations with opposition parties, non-partisan experts, Elections Canada, and the public. There is no reason to depart from this lauda ble Canadian tradition for electoral reform. Committees in bath the Ho use of Commons and the Sena te have now beard from many experts and citizens' groups. Overwhelmingly, these witnesses have criticized the legislation. Despite the government's claim that "ordinary Canadians" support the Bill, a recent poli reveals that a majority of citizens oppose it. It appears that the more citizens know about the Bill, the less they like it. Senators have raised concems about the Bill and suggested some amendments. Unfortunately, their proposed amendments cam1ot salvage an irremediably flawed Bill. Of the concerns raised in Canadian academies' first open letter, the Senators directly address only one: the "fundraising loophole" that could give the goveming party an advantage in campaign spending. The following glaring defects of Bill C-23 would remain: • Investigating electoral fraud. Bill C-23 fails to provide the Commissio11er of Elections power to · campel witness testimony in investigating systematic electoral fraud such as the 2011 "robocalls" scandai. Witnesses with knowledge offraudulent activity can- and regularly do refuse to provide infom1ation to investigators. The Bill's proposed voter contact registry will not greatly enhance the capacity to prosecute fraud, and its increased penalties for fraud do nothing if investigators cannat prove crimes. • Polling Supervision. Under Bill C-23, winning parties will appoint election poli supervisors- a further intrusion of partisanship in the electoral process, and one that creates an advantage for the incumbent party. The govermnent has not addressed objections to this measure, and there is no sound rationale for it. • Voter Tumout. With the sole exception of school programs such as Student Vote, the Senate amendments retain the gag on Elections Canada's efforts to encourage voter turnout. Senator Linda Frum bas asserted that Elections Canada is in a "conflict of interest" when it promotes tumout, claiming that heightened participation cames at the expense of electoral integrity. This position is unjustified in bath fact and logic. Public outreach that encourages all citizens to vote not just tho se who support one or another party - is central to the mandate of electoral commissions world-wide, such as those in Australia, India, and New Zealand. • The Chmter guarantee of the right to vote. By eliminating vouching and refusing voter infom1ation cards as proof of address, the Bill undermines the right to vote protected by s. 3 of the Charter, a constitutional entitlement so fundamental that it cannot be limited by the Charter's "notwithstanding" clause. Where govemments require voter ID, honouring international best practices requires that governments issue free ID to ali eligible voters. This Bill does the 1793 opposite: it takes away existing forms of cost-free ID. The Senate's proposed requirement of "letters of attestation" from First Nations, homeless shelters and eider care facilities would offload government responsibility onto under-resourced communities without resolving the underlying constitutiona1 issues. There is no doubt that the Bill's voter ID restrictions will be challenged in court for violating the constitutionally protected right to vote. By insisting on these measures, the govemment invites costly legal battles for no clear public end. • Elections Canada. As former Auditor General Sheila Fraser has argued persuasively, Bill C-23 undermines Elections Canada, an intemationally renowned non-partisan agency. The damage done by the govemment's gratuitous public attacks upon the Chief Electoral Officer and Ms. Fraser goes even deeper. By casting doubt on the non-partisanship of independent Officers of Parliament, the government unsettles the delicate balance of powers that secures our democratie system of govemment. The Senate Committee has failed to respond adequately to the many legitimate criticisms of the other features of Bill C-23. These include campaign finance rules, the Treasury Board's veto power over Elections Canada's appointment of specialized staff, and the failure to require political parties to provide receipts for electoral expenses (even though they are reimbursed over $30 million at taxpayer expense). While the Senate report recommends that Elections Canada and the Commissioner should be able to alert the public about "problems they uncover," it does not explicitly lift the gag arder imposed by the Bill or ask that the government clarify whether the Commissioner can publicly discuss investigations before charges are laid. We implore ail responsible public office-holders to heed reason, evidence, and experience. The govemment should withdraw this Bill and begin anew. We urge ali conscientious Members of Parliament to work to this end and, ifnecessary, to vote against the Bill. And failing that, Senators should keep faith with the ir role in o~ constitutional arder- the voice of sober second thought - and retum it to the Ho use of Commons for further amendmè"nt. Free and fair elections lie at the heart of our democracy. The govemment should not underestimate the commitment of Canadians to defend this fundamental princip le. Sincerely yours, Melissa Williams, Professor ofPolitical Science, University of Toronto Yasmin Dawood, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto Maxwell Cameron, Professor ofPolitical Science, University of British Columbia Monique Deveaux, Professor ofPhilosophy and Canada Research Chair in Ethics and Global Social Change, University of Guelph Genevieve Fuji J3hnson, Associate Professor ofPolitical Science, Simon Fraser University Patti Lenard, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa 1794 Further sigriatories: 1795 Melissa Williams, Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Yasmin Dawood, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Max Cameron, Professor of Political Science, Department of Poli ti cal Science University of British Columbia Monique Deveaux, Professor, Department ofPhilosophy, University of Guelph Genevieve Fuji Johnson, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, Simon Fraser University Patti Tamara Lenard, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Co-signatories: Fran ces Abele, Professor, School of Public Po licy and Administration, Carleton University Arash Abizadeh, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta Laurie Adkin, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies Programme, University of Alberta Gregory Alba, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, York University Robert Anderson, Professor, Faculty of Environment, Simon Fraser University Lesley Andres, Professor, Department of Educational Studies, University of British Columbia Caroline Andrew, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Centre on Governance, University of Ottawa Edward Andrew, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Victor Armony, Professor, Department of Sociology, Université du Québec à Montréal 1796 Barbara Arneil, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Robert Asselin, Associate Director, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Yild1z Atasoy, Professor, Department of Sociology, Simon Fraser University Chloë G. K. Atkins, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and Culture, University of Calgary Michael Atkinson, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Po licy, University of Saskatchewan · Gerald Bai er, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Joel Bakan, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Natasha Bakht, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Herman Bakvis, Professor, School of Public Administration, University ofVictoria Ryan Balot, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University ofToronto Geraldine Balzer, Assistant Professor, Co liege of Education, University of Saskatchewan Keith Banting, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, School of Po licy Studies, Queen 's University Deborah Barndt, Professor, Faculty ofEnvironmental Studies, York University Darin Barney, Associate Professor, Department of Art History and Communication Studies, McGill University Sylvia Bashevkin, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Pierre Beaudet, Replacement Professor, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa Ronald Beiner, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Toronto 1797 Daniel Béland, Professor, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Po licy, University of Saskatchewan Louise Bélanger-Hardy, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Colleen Bell, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Sas ka teh ewan Karim Benyekhlef, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal Loleen Berdhal, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Saskatchewan Philip B. Berger, Associate Professor, Department of Faniily and Community Medicine, University of Toronto Rachel Berman, Associate Professor, School of Early Childhood Studies, Ryerson University · Steven Bernstein, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Albert Berry, Professor Emeritus, Department of Economies, University of Toronto Nancy Bertoldi, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Harold Bérubé, Assist~nt Professor, Department of History, University of Sherbrooke · Davina Bhandar, Asso ciate Professor, Department of Canadian Studies, Trent University Laurence Bherer, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal Antoine Bilodeau, Asspciate Professor, Department of Political Science, Concordia University Andrew Biro, Associa te Professor, Department of Politics, Acadia University Amanda Èittner, Assodate Professor, Department of Political Science, Memorial University David Bla.ck, Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University ... 1798 André Blais, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department ofPolitical Science, Université de Montréal Charles Bl'attberg, Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal Gregory B'lue, Associate Professor, Department ofHistory, University ofVictoria John A. Boan, Professer Emeritus, Department of Economies, University of Regina Michel Bock, Associa te Professor, .Department of History, University of Ottawa Michelle Banner, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Pierre Bosset, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université du Québec à Montréal Suzanne Boudin, Assistant Professer, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Sophie Bourgault, Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of· Ottawa . ... Susan B~~·d, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Leah Bradshaw, Professer of Poli ti cal Science, Brock University, Department of Political Science, Brock University · Susan Bràedley, Assistant Professor, School of Social Work,· Carleton University Martin Breaugh, Assof.:iate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University Gilles Breton, Professor, Gradua te School of Public and International Affairs, · University of Ottawa Janine Brodie, Profess.or, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Alberta . . : . David Brown, Postdoctoral Fellow, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Chris Brown, Associa te Professer, Department of Political Science, Carleton University Leslie Brown, Professàr, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Mount Saint Vincent University Alan Brudner, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and Faculty of Law, Uni~ersity of Toronto 1799 Pamela Bryant, Professor, School of Public Po licy and Governance, University of Toronto Penny Bryden, Professor, Department ofHistory, University ofVictoria Clint Burnham, Associate Professor, Department of English, Simon Fraser University Michael Byers, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Gillian Calder, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law University of Victoria David Cameron, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Toronto Barbara Cameron, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University Angela Cameron, Associa te Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Lara Campbell, Associate Professor, Department of Gender, Sexuality, and Women's Studies, Simon Fraser University Gail Campbell, Professor Emerita, Department ofHistory, University of New Brunswick Eduardo Cane!, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science, York University Mel Cappe, Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto Linda Cardinal, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Joseph Carens, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Toronto Paul R. Carr, Associate Professor, Departments of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Studies, Lakehead University R. Kenneth Carty, Professor Emeritus and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Julian Castro-Rea, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta Amandine Ca tala, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal 1800 Rachel Chagnon, Professeure, Département des sciences juridiques, Université du Québec à Montréal Simone Chambers, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Bruno Charbonneau, A.ssociate Professor, Department of Political Science, Laurentian University Christine Cheng, Assistant Professor, Department ofWar Studies, King's College London Ann Chinnery, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University Do rothy Chunn, Professor Emeri ta, Departmenf of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University Ryoa Chung, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Université de Montréal David Ciavatta, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University lan Clark, Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto Allyson Clay, Professai", School for the Contemporary Arts, Simon Fraser University 1 Colin Coates, Professor, Department of Cana di an Studies, York University Marjorie Griffin Cohen, Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Daniel Co~1n, Associa te Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, York University ~ Donald C. Cole, Associa te Professor, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto William Coleman, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo Stephen Collis, Associn.te Professor, Department of English, Simon Fraser University Thomas Collombat, Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Université du Québec en Outaouais Margaret Conrad, Professor Emeri ta, Department of History, University of New Brunswick 1801 }. F. Conway, Professer, Department of Sociology and Social Studies, University of Regina Eleanor Cook, Professor Emerita, Department ofEnglish, University of Toronto Ramsay Cook, Professer Emeritus, Department of History, York University David Cook, Professer, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of Toronto Michael Cottrell, Associa te Professer, Department of Educational Administration, University of Saskatchewan John Courtney, Professer and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association Department of Political Science University àf Saskatchewan Wesley Crichlow, Associate Professer, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University of Ontario lnstitute ofTechnology Julie Cruikshank, Department of Anthropology, University of British Columbia Dara Culhane, Professor, Department of Social ogy, Simon Fraser University Frank Cunningnam, P:ï'Ofessor Emeri tus, Departments of Philosophy and Political Science, University of Toronto Bruce Cu~tis, Professor, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Hugo Cyr, Professer, Department ofPolitical Science and Law, Université du Québec ·~ à Montréal · Eline de Rooij, Assista;1t Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University George Dei, Professor, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto Radhika Des ai, Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba Rita Dhamoon, Assista.nt Professer, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria . · Jordi Dfez, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph Don Dippo, Professor, Faculty of Education, York University 1802 Alexandra Dobrowolsky, Professor, Department of Political Science, Saint Mary's University Laurent Dobuzinskis, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Steve Dodge, Associa te Professor, Department of Physics, Simon Fraser University Stefan Dolgert, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Brock University Michael Donnelly, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Christopher Dornan, Associate Professor, School ofJournalism and Communication Carleton University Mathieu Doucet Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo Daniel Drache, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Political Science, York University Robert J. Drummond, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Political Science, York University Jane Dryden, Associa te Professor, Department of Philosophy, Mount Allison University Janique Dubois, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Brock University Erick Duchesne, Professor, Department of Political Science, Université Laval David Duff, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Pascale Dufour, Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, Department of Sociology, Université du Québec à Montréal Christopher Dummit, Associate Professor, Department of History, Trent University Margrit Eichler, Professor Emerita, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto Avigail Eisenberg, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University ofVictoria 180.3 Pearl Eliadis, Lawyer and Instructor, Faculty of Law, McGill University Robin Elliot, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Jason Ellis, Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Studies, University of British Columbia Lynda Erickson, Professor Emerita, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Bryan Evans, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University Dickson Eyoh, Associate Professer, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Toronto Patrick Fafard, Associa te Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ôttawa Patricia Fagan, Associate Professor, Department of Languages, Literatures, and Cultures, University ofWindsor Kath erine Fierlbeck, Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University Fred Fletcher, Professor Emeritus, Departments of Communication Studies and . Politicai, .Science York.Univ~rsity .:Craig Fo.rcese, Associa te Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa ,._~ Cristie Ford, Associate.Professor, Facult<;ofLaw, University of British Columbia Benjamin! Forest, Asso~ciate Professor, Department of Geography, Mc Gill University Lisa Form.an, Assistant"Professor, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto John Foster, Contract Instructor, Department ofPolitical Science, Carleton University Aude-Claire Fourat, Assistant Professer, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Ursula Franklin, Profes·sor Emerita, Massey College, University of Toronto 1804 Harriet Friedmann, Pr0fessor Emerita, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto ' Matthias Fritsch, Professer, Department of Philosophy, McGill University Doreen Fumia, Associ;;.te Professer, Department of Social ogy, Ryerson University Marc Furstenau, Associate Professor, School for Studies in Art and Culture, Carleton University Donald Fyson, Profes.s'.:lr, Département des sciences historiq11es, Université Laval Alain-G Gï:lgnon, Profec;sor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal Marc-André Gagnon, /,ssistânt Professor, School of Public Po licy and Administration, Carleton University. Judith A. Garber, Associ.ate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Alberta Monica Gattinger, Ass.ociate Professor, School ofPolitical Studies, University of Ottawa · · ·... · · Shelley AM. Gavigan~ IJrofessor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University Andrea Geiger, Associ.a~e Professer, Department ofHistory, Simon Fraser University • • 1 . . ~ f . • • ·:t!,,,Frallçois Gélineau, A.s~·ociate Professor, Denartment ofPolitical Science, Université ~ Lavai ' -· · . · .: · · . · · ...... : · · ~- · · · .. · ·11. As~.ociate :>~. Alexandra. . . Gheciu, . J • .: Professer,.. . .. Graduate• School• of Public and International · · Affairs, Uiiiversity of Cttawa · Roger Gibbons, Profes,sor Emeritus, and Past President Canadian Polit~cal Science Association, o'epartme:ht of Political Science, University of Calgary · Elisabeth Gidengil, Pr_qfessor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Departrrient of Politicàl Science, Mc Gill University Pablo ~i)abert, Associ?te Professor, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University Mona Gleason, Profes.sor, Department ofEducational Studies, University of British Cclumb~' . · · . · l. Qfl~ 1- (j V"<., Maya J. Golden berg, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph Luin Goldring, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, York University Cy Gonick, Professor, :Department of Political Science, University of Winnipeg Kirstin Good, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University David A. Good, Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, Associate Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen's University · Lise Gotell, Professor, Department ofWomen's and Gender Studies, University of Alberta Peter Graefe, Associate, Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University Isabel Grant, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Joyce Green, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Regina Jonathan Greene, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Trent University Marie Annik Grégoire, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal Franklyn Griffiths, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Ricardo Grinspun, Associate Professor, Department of Economies, York University Ellen Gutterman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University Rodney Haddow, Associa te Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of Toronto Blayne Haggart, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Brock University Celia Haig-Brown, Professor, Faculty of Education, York University 1806 Peter Hall, Associate Professor, Urban Studies Program, Simon Fraser University Margaret Isabel Hall, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers Universi1y Paul A. Hamel, Professor, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto Marie Hammond-Callaghan, Associa te Professor, Department of History, Mount Allison University Huamei Han, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University Antoinette Handley, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University ofToronto · Marc Hanvelt, Adj un ct Research Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University Eve Haque, Associa te Professor, Department of Languages, Literatures and Linguistics, York University Lois Harder, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta Kathryn Harrison, Prcfessor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia · . ·Matthew Hayday, Associa te Professor, Department of History, University of Guelph ! . Andrew Beard, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser Universi~/ · :; :Joseph Heath, Professnr, Departments of Philosophy and School of Public Policy and Governanée, University of Toronto Gerald K. Helleiner, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Economies, University of Toronto Susan Henders, Assoc.iate Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, York U~ve~ity · 1 • George Hoberg, Associate Member, Department ofPolitical Science, University of British Columbia Louis-Phi!lipe HodgsiJÎ1, Associa te Pro6~ssor, Department of Philosophy, York University 1807 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo Michiel Horn, Professer Emeritus, Department ofHistory, York University France Hqule, Profess;·r, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal Jula Hugh~s, Associate Professor, Fawlty of Law, University of New Brunswick Gustavo Indart, Senior Lecturer, Department of Economies, University of Toronto james Ingram, Assistant Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, McMaster University Martha Jackman, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Matthew James, Asso~:iate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Laura Janara, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of British Columbia Nancy Janovicek, Assé"ciate Professor, Department of History University of Calgary Leslie Jeffrey, Professôr, Department ofHistory and Politics, University of New Brun_swick, Saint John.. Candace Johnson, Associate Professer, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Guelph · ·:: Rebecca Johnson, ProJessor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria David Johnson, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, Çape Breton University ...... Juliet Johnson, Professor, Department of Political Science, Mc Gill University Richard Johnston, Pro:~essor, and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Departmr;>nt of Political Science, University of British Columbia Mira Johri, Professor, '.khool of Public Health, Université de Montréal Peter Jonc::s, Associate Professor, Graduate School ofPublic.and International Affairs, Universit~! of Ottawa ~ Sharalyn jordan, Assistant Professor; Faclilty of Education, Simon Fraser University 1808 Luc Juillet! Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, UniversitY of Ottawa Courtney Jung, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto David Kahane, Profes?or of Poli ti cal Science, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Alberta lian Kapo or, Professor, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University Dimitri os Karmis, Associate Professor, School of Poli ti cal Studies, University of Ottawa Gregory Kealey, Professor, Department of History, University of New Brunswick Willeen Keough, Associa te Professor, Department of History, Simon Fraser University Leslie Kern, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography and Environment, Mount Allison University Loren King, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Wilfred Laurier University · Rebecca Kingston, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Paul Kingston, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Scarborough Martin Klein, Professor Emeri tus, Department of History, University of Toronto Edward Anthony Koning, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph Jennifer Koshan, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary Konstantia Koutouki, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal Meena Krishnamurthy, Assistant Professor, Department ofPhilosophy, University of Manitoba Ed Ksenych, Professor, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, George Brown College Kathleen Lahey, Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University 1809 Lucie Lamarche, Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Law, Université du Québec à Montréal Tom Langford, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary June Larkin, Senior Lecturer, Women and Gender Studies Institute, University of Toronto Marianne A. Larsen, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Western Ontario David Laycock, Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Patrick Leblond, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Steven Lecce, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba Robert Le'ckey, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University Jean Leclair, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal André Lecours, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Larry Leduc, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Theresa Lee, Associat~ Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph Rémi Léger, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Hester Lessard, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria Helen Leung, Associate Professor, Department of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies, Simon Fraser University Leah Levac, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph Jacqueline Levitin, Associate Professor, School for the Contemporary Arts (Film)/Department of Gender, Sexuality, and Women's Studies, Simon Fraser University 1810 Brian Lewis, Professor, Department ofHistory and Classical Studies, McGill University Dominique Leydet, Professor, Department ofPhilosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal · James Lightbody, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta Mary Liston, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia David W. Livingstone, Professor Emeri tus, -Ontario Institute for Studies in Education,~ University of Toronto · Kristina Llewellyn, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Development Studies, Renison University Cc.Hege, University of Waterloo Rodney Loeppky, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, York University · Tina Loo, Professor, Department of History, University of British Columbia Catherine Lu, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Mc Gill University Willem Maas, Associa te Professor apd Jean Mon net Chair, Department of Political Science, York University Laura. MaçDonald, Professor, Poli ti cal Science, Carleton University · Audrey 1\hcklin, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto n Kym.Madaren, Assodpte Professor, Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University Colin Mac~eod, AssocL;!.te Professor, Department of Philosophy, University ofV.ictoria Jocelyn Mael ure, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Université Laval Michael MacMillan, Professor, Department of Political and Canadian Studies, Mount Saint Vincent University Laura Madokoro, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Classical Studies, McGill University · · · Terry Maley, Associate. Professor, D_epartment. ofPolitical Science, York University Ruth Mann, Associate,,Professor, Department.of Sociology, Anthropology & Crimino1ogy, University ofWÙ:tdsor · 1811 i Jean L. Manore, Professor, Department ofHistory, Bishop's University Gregory P. Marchildon, Professor, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Po licy, University of Regina Patricia Marino, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo· .Lynne Marks, ProfessO'r, Department of History, University ·of Victoria " Ruth Marshall, Associ::l:te Professor, Department of Poli ti cal SciencejStudy of Religion, University of Toronto . Marcel Martel, Profess:or, Department ofHistory, York University George M8.rtell, Assodate Professor Emeritus, Department ofEquity Studies, York University ·Geoff Martin, Part-time Professor, Department of Politics and International Relatimis, Mount Allis/.m University Michèle Martin, Profe~~or, School of}ournalism and Communication, Carleton University · Sheila Mas on, ProfessDr, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University Caris sima Mathen, As~ociate Professor,Faculty of L~w, University of Ottawa .... , Scott MaHhews; Asso.Ciate Professor, Department of Political Science, Memorial University Diane K. Mauzy, Professer Emeri ta, Department of Political Science, University of British Co'lumbia · · · Stephen McBride, Prpfessor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University Patricia McCarney, Préfessor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Liza Mc Coy, Associat~~Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary Patricia f\.1 cDerdmott, Professor, Departments of Socio-Legal Studies and Gender Studies, York University John McGarry, Professor, Department of Political Studies, Que en 's University David McGrane, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Studies, St. Thomas More Co liege, University of Saskatchewan Michael McGregor, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and International Studies, Bishop's University Lisa Mclntosh Sundstrom, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, . University of British Columbia Heath er McKeen-Edwards, Associate Professor, Department of Poli tics and. International Studies, Bishop's University Lorna R. McLean, Associa te Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa Janet McVittie, Assistant Professor, Department ofEducational Foundations, University of Saskatchewan Errol Mendes, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Robert Menzies, Professor, Department of Sociology, Simon Fraser University David Meren, Associa té Professor, Department of History, Université de Montréal 1'. Anne Mevellec, Associate Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Loralea Michaelis, Associate Professor, Department of Poli tics and Internatiol'lal Relatîons,.Mount Allisan University Hans Michelmann, Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Saskatchewan lan Milligan, Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Waterloo Lisa Mills, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University Janet Miron, Associate Professor, Department ofHistory, Trent University Shahrzad Mojab, Professor, Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education, University of Toronto Éric Montpetit, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, Université de Montréal Sourayan Mookerjea,.Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta Margaret Moore, Professor, Department ofPolitical Studies, Queen's University 1813 Esteve Morera, Associate Professor, Departments ofPhilosophy and Political Science, York University Sophie Morin, Professor Emeri ta, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal Michel Morin, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal David Morris, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University Suzanne Morton, Pro6~ssor, Department ofHistory and Classical Studies, McGill University Mary Jane Mossman, Professor, Faculty of Law, York University William Moul, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo James Muir, Associate Professor, Department ofHistory and Classics and Faculty of Law, University of Alberta Tiffany Muller Myrdahl, Assistant Professor, Department of Gender, Sexuality, and Women's Studies, Simon Fraser University Catherine Murray, Professor, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University Karen Murray, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University . Christian Nadeau, Associate Professor, Department ofPhilosophy, Université,.de Montréal James Naylor, Associa~e Professor, Department ofHistory, Brandon University Jennifer Nedelsky, Professor, Faculty of Law and Department ofPolitical Science, Universi1y of Toronto · Janice Newton, Associate Professor, Departments ofPolitical Science and School of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies, York University Winnie Ng, CAW Sam Gindin Chair in Social Justice and Democracy, Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Community Services, Ryerson University Robert Nichols, Assist3nt Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Alberta · 18:l4 Tim Nieguth, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, Laurentian UniversitY Carmen J. Nielson, Associate Professor, Department of History, Mount Royal University Naomi Norquay, Associa te Professor, Faculty of Education, York University Kim Richard Nossa!, Professor, School of Po licy Studies, Que en 's University, and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association John O'Brian, Professor, Department of Art History, Visual Art and Theory, Universit'J of British Columbia Michael O'Sullivan, Associate Professor, Department of Graduate and Undergraduate Studies, Brock University Brenda O'Neill, Associate Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science University of Calgary Nancy Olewiler, Professor, School of Public Po licy, Simon Fraser University Jasdn M. Opal, Associate ~rofessor, Department ofHistory, McGill University James Orbinski, Profes_:Sor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo · Paul Orlowski, .Assistant Professor, College of Education, University of Saskatchewan Michael Orsini, Associélte Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Clifford Owen, Profes.;or, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto' Umut Ozsu, Assistant 'Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba Dimitrios Panagos, Assistant Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, Memorial University Leo Panitch, Professa!·, Department ofPolitical Science, York University Martin Papillon, Asso~.~ate Professor, Schoo1 of Poli ti cal Studies, University of Ottawa Martin Pâquet, Professor, Department of History, Université Laval Jonathan Paquette, Associa te Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa 1815 Andrea Paras, Assista:nt Professer, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph Roland Paris, Associa-tB Professer, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Deb1~a Parkes, Associate Professer, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba Steve Patten, Associaté Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, Universlty of Alberta Justin Pauls on, Assistant Professer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University Christopher Pavsek, Associate Professor, School for the Contemporary Arts, Simon Fraser University Omid Payrow Shabar:d;·P~ofessor, Department ofPhilosophy, Guelph University Karen.. Pe~rlston, Asso~iate Professer, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick Carla L .. Peck, Associat~ 'Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta Daria Perinetti, Assocfate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal ·Martin Petitclerc, Professor, Department of History, Université du Québec à . Montréal Chiara Piazzesi, Professer, Department of Sociology, Université du Québec à , Montréal Dennis Pilon, Associate Professer, Department of Political Science, York University John Polanyi, Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Toronto ! Pablo Policzer, Assodate Professer, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary Alison Prentice, Adjunct Professor, Department ofHistory, University ofVictoria Richard Priee, Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of British Columbia W. Wesley Pue, Professer, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 1816 lan Radforth, Professor, Department ofHistory, University of Toronto Saeed Rahnema, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, York University Tracey Raney, Associate Professor, Department of Poli tics and Public Administration, Ryerson University Gillian Rans on, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary David Rayside, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of Toronto Geoff Read, Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Western Ontario Jeffrey G. Reitz, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto Philip Res nick, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Nicholas Rivers, Assis~ant Professor, Graduate School of Public and International· Affairs, University of Ottawa Kent Roach, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto D. Gordon E. Robertson, Professor Emeri tus, School of Human Kinetics, University of Ottawa . Douglas A. Ross, Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University Stephanie Ross, Assoc:ate Professor, Department of Social Science, York University Robin,Roth, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, York University Christian Rouillard, P1:ofessor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Andrea Rounce, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba· Jarrett Rudy, Associa~e Professor, Department of History, McGill University Claudia Ruitenberg, Associa te Professor, Department of Educational Studies, University of British Columbia 1817 Peter Russell, Professor Emeritus, and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto John Russ on, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph Eric W. Sager, Professor, Department of History, University of Victoria Jeff Sahadeo, Associaté Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University Stephen M. Saideman, Professor, Norman Paterson School oflnternational Affairs, Carleton University Richard Sandbrook, Professor Emeri tus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Paul Sam·ette, Associa te Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Stephen Bede Scharper, Associate Professor, School of the Environment and Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto Edward Schatz, Associate Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of Toronto, Mississauga Rebecca Schein, Assistant Professor, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University Carol Schick, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Regina.,~ David Schneiderman, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto .. Christa Scholtz, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill ..1 Universitl; Richard Schultz, Profe.ssor, Department of Political Science, McGill University Jennifer Schulz, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba Alan M. Se ars, Professor, Faculty of Education, University of New Brunswick Leslie Seidle, research director, Institute for Research on Public Policy Ozlem Sensoy, Associa te Professor, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University Michel Seymour, Profëssor, Department of Philosophy, Université de Montréal 1818 Martha Shaffer, Assodate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Byron Sheldrick, As$odate Professor, Department of Poli ti cal Science, University of Guelph Robert P. Shepherd, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University Patricia Sheridan, Associate Profess'or, Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph Nicola Short, Department ofPolitical Science, York Univer~ity .,. Lynette Shultz, Assod1-te Professer, Department ofEducational Policy Studies, University of Alberta Julie Simmons, Asso_ciate Professor, Departltlent of Political Science, University of Guelph· ' Grace Sko'gstad, Profésor and.Past President, Canadian Political Science Asspciation, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Sara Slinn, Assoi:i?_te Frofessm", Osgoode Hall Law Schooli.York University Harry Smaller, Assochte Profess~?r Emeritus, Faculty ofEducation, York University . . .· ,· .. . : . :. . . : . Miriàm Smith, Profess:Jr, and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, : ~·.-:J?epartmentofPoHtis::.:-:~ Science, YorkUniversity .dt-~ .. ,, ....'~< DavidE .. ~mith, DI~thl!:;u.ish~d Vi.s.iting P,rof~ss_or, and Past President, Canadlia.fil'; ,: · ;.. :u· · .r:· P.o.litir.al S.ciertcé A~soda'tion; Departmeii t of Politits ~1:~1d Public Administratidh ·• Ryerson r:niversity Patrick Smith, Profess;:;1r, Departin~nt of PoliticaT Scie~ce,Simon Fraser Uii.iversity Charles Smith, As,sist~nt Professer, Department of PoFtical Studies, St Thomas More College, University of,~1~skatch_ewari .. · .· · · · · E. Allyn Smith, PrqfeSf:QT, Department of ~inguistics, Université du Québec à· Montréal · · · Denis Smith, Professo~~ Emeritu~, Dep~~trhent-~fPoliticai Séience, Uni~ersity of Western Ontario Robert.Sparling, Assi~tant Profes~o"r; Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal . : . ' 1819 Mark Spooner, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Regina Susan Spronk, Associa.te Professor, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa . . Maxime St-Hilaire, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Sherbrooke Makere Stewart-Harawira, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Policy Studies, Ui1iversity of Alberta Christine Straehle, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Veronica Strong-Boag, Professor Emerita, and Past President, Canadian Historical Association, Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice/Educational Studies, University of British Columbia Richard Stubbs, Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University John Stubbs, Professor Emeritus, Department ofHistory, Simon Fraser University Sharon Sutherland, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Carleton. University Donald Swartz, Professor Emeritus, School of Public Po licy and Administration, Carleton University ; · Paul Tare, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education, Western University Christina Tarnopolsky, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University Lisa Taylor, Professor, School of Education, Bishop's University Hamish Telford, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Fraser Valley Genviève Tellier, Associa te Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Jean-François Thibault, Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Moncton Melanee Thomas, Assistant Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Calgary 1820 Neil Thomlinson, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitics and Public Administration, Ryerson University D. Gillian Thompson, Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of New Brunswick Yves Tiberghien, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Tanya Titchkosky, Associate Professor, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto Robert Tittler, Professor Emeri tus, Department of History, Concordia University Manon Tremblay, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Reeta Tremblay, Professor, and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department ofPolitical Science, University ofVictoria Linda Trimble, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta James Tully, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, University ofVictoria Allan Tupper, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Luc Turge on, Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Patrick Turmel, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Université Laval Lori Turnbull, Associa te Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University Martin Tweedale, Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta Trygve Ugland, Associate Professor, Department ofPolitics and International Studies, Bishop's University Ross Upshur, Professor, Department of Family and Community Medicine and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto Dolores van der Wey, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University 1821 Anil Varughese, Assistant Professor, School of Public Po licy and Administration, Carleton University Robert Vipond, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Srdjan Vucetic, Assodate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Keith Walden, Professor, Department of History, Trent University Jennifer \!Vallner, Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa William Walters, Professor, Department of Political ~cience, Carleton University Wesley Wark, Visiting Professor, Gr.aduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa Mark Warren, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia Lorraine E. Weinrib, P':'ofess?r, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Daniel Weiri.stock, Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University ' David Wekh, Professà, Balsillie School oflnternational Affafrs, Universi1.y.of Waterloo : . ··,.,, Steven Weldon) Assoc:ate Professor, Department of Political Science, Simo!Îl\ Fraser Universit:v J. ' · • : .r, rKer.WeHs.Assistant [Ji'Ofessor, Scbool for Con.temporary Arts, Simon Fraser •1' UniversitY Karen Wendling, Assq~:iate Professor, D~partment of Philosophy, University chf· •• Guclph · · Joel Westheimer, ProfTssor, Fac1.Jlty of Education, University of Ottawa Graham.White, Profess~r, and Past President, Canadian Politlcal Science Association, Department of Politic;;l Science~ University of Toronto ' Linda White, Associa té Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto 1S2~ Stephen White, Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, Concordia University Sandra Whitworth, Professor, Department ofPolitical Science, York University 1 . Wanda Wiegers, Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan Russell Alan Williams,Associate Professor, Departinent of Political Science, Memorial University Janice Williamson, Professor, Department of English and Film Studies, University of Alberta .David A. Wolfe, Professor, Department of Political Science,. University of Toronto Steven Wolinetz, Professor Emeritus, Department ofPolitical Science, Memorial University Lloyd L. Wang, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary Robert Yoùng, Professor and Past President, Canadian Political Science Association, Department of Politic~l Science, University of Western Ontario .. ·;,·:...... Margot Yqung, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia Anna Zalik, Associate Professor, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University , Çhri~topliZürcher,· P1:~>fessor, Gradua te School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa ·· . David Zussman, Jarislowsky Chair in Public Management, Graduate School in Public ·.: .. .Jand Inten.1atim'lal Afft1irs, University of Ottawa ~&:=:;:==:::::r--·- ~ . ~ +"' , d-o\ 5 ( , THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS et al -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS Applicants REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Court File No. CV-14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERlOR COURT OF JUSTICE Proceeding commenced at TORONTO AFFIDAVIT OF HENRY MILNER SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 20 Dundas Street West, Suite Il 00 Toronto, Ontario M5G 2G8 Steven Shrybman (LSUC No. 20774B) tel: 613-482-2456 fax: 613-235-3041 Solicitors for the Applicants .,... Q!) {':) c,.,:) Tab 10 1 Court File No. 14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING Applicants -and- RER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID C. ELDER (sworn January\'2., 2015) I, David C. Eider, of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, MAKE OATH AND SA Y as follows: 1. I am currently a consultant on public sector management and machinery of government, and an Adjunct Professor and Fellow in the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario where I teach in the Master of J:>ublic Administration program. Prior to my retirement as a member of the Public Service of Canada, I served in various senior capacities as a member of the Privy Council Office from 1993 to 2004, including as the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, M.achinery of Government, from July 1998 to October 2001. As such I have knowledge of the matters attested to below. A fuller description of my qualifications and experience is attached as Exhibit "A" to this affidavit. 2 Purpose of Affidavit 2. I have be en asked to describe the roles and responsibilities of the Chief Electoral c Officer as an Officer of Parliarnent, including in respect of the office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections and to provide my opinion concerning the consequences of the Fair Elections Act (S.C. 2014, c. 12) in respect of those roles and responsibilities ofthe Office ofthe ChiefElectoral Officer. 3. The affidavit is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer in the context of the Canada Elections Act, its establishment, its responsibilities for the "general direction and supervision over the conduct of elections" and the position of the Commissioner of Canada Elections and its responsibilities, which is also established by the Canada Elections Act. The second section analyzes the changes brought about by the Fair Elections Act as they concem the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer and its operations and particularly the effect that they have on the Commissioner of Canada Elections. A list of documents I have consulted in the drafting of this affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Section 1 - The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer 1.1 -The Establishment of the Office 4. The office of the Chief Electoral Officer was established in 1920 under the Dominion Elections Act, as an essential element in the major reform to the electoral process to which Parliarnent agreed after the difficulties with the wartime election of 1917. The Dominion Elections Act of 1920 asserted definitively the federal responsibility 1826 3 for elections and introduced a "genuinely uniform federal franchise" 1 with broad suffrager:olishing property requirements and confirming the right to vote in federal elections for all women. Importantly, it provided for a new system for voting. with standard rules enforced through the centralized administration of federal elections and their financial and logistical. operations and it defined in detail all the duties of returning officers, deputy returning officers and poU clerks, and the procedures they must follow? The Act established the office of the Chief Electoral Officer as the keystone for the new system. The new office was established as an independent authority for the conduct of elections that would ensure effective management of elections and those administering them; the office was an innovation in that it was to be an "Office of Parliament", removed from partisan political competition and from the domination and the pressures of poli ti cal parties. 5. Before the passage of the new Dominion Elections Act, the federal responsibility for elections had not been exercised. There was continued use of provincial laws prescribing the "qualifications and disqualifications" of voters and the franchise as allowed under the Constitution Act, 1867, Section 41. The preparation of the lists of èlectors moved from the provinces to the federal government and back, with the result that the franchise was not uniform across Canada. There was no clear institutional responsibility at the federallevel for administering the elections. The duty of issuing the 1 Ward, Norman. The Canadian House ofCommons: Representation, 2nd edition (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1963 ), p. 231. 2 The Minister sponsoring the legislation in the House of Commons, the acting Solicitor General, the Honourable Hugh Guthrie, described the proposed legislation as follows: "The purpose of the Bill is threefold: In the first place, to fix a uniform franchise throughout the Dominion: in the second place, to provide a uniform method for the preparation ofvoters' lists: and, in the third place, to pro vide a simple and satisfactory method for the conduct of elections. 4 writs for elections had lain with an official called the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery whose office had no legislative basis and no clearly defined statutory functions for overseeing elections or supervising the Returning Officers who were usually named by the provincial political parties. The situation was, as Professor Ward has pointed out: "As a consequence of division of authority and general inefficiency, the conduct of elections had become chaotic. "3 6. To deal with these problems, the Government sought Parliament's approval to define explicitly a locus within the federal sector for the activity of managing and administering elections, and to abolish totally the position of the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery and establish an institution that would represent a significant departure from the usual organization of government activities in Departments over which a Minister has the "management and direction"; the new institution for elections would have the independence of reporting directly to the House of Commons and the security of tenure ofajudge. 7. That intention to innovate and to guarantee in legislation the independence of the new Office was made clear in the debate in the Ho use leading to the passage of the Act on 28 June 1920, by the acting Solicitor General as the Sponsoring Minister, who pointed to the need to replace the current federal official with an Office that would have real power and authority from the mandate and independence that Parliament gave: Experience, I think, has shown, perhaps more during the course of recent elections than in earlier times, that we should have sorne person occupying almost a judicial position in this country to whom could be referred many of the difficult questions which arise periodically at every general election. It has therefore been 3 Ward, Norman, Dawson's The Government of Canada. 6th ed. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990), p. 198. 5 1828 thought that we should constitute sorne office of this Parliament who would have very large powers and control over election machine and over the retum of candidates, and that the officer so constituted should be as far as possible removed from political or partisan control of every kind. The Bill proposes that such an officer be appointed, to be called the Chief Electoral Officer, and his tenure of office be that of one of the judges of the Superior Counts of the country, so that he shall be removable from office in the same manner as ajudge might be removed.4 8. Later in the debate in the House the acting Solicitor General described the innovation that the Office was bringing about, stressing the qualifications for the position of the Chief Electoral Officer and the independence of the Office, including its security of tenure: The object of the Govemment and, I fancy, the object of the House is to appoint to the position of Chief Electoral Officer a man who is absolutely removed from political influence or control, who is at the beek or call of no body. In order to have such a man, you must make his tenure of office secure, absolutely removed from the power of the Govemment to displace the indiviélual from office. . . . In order, however, to secure a man in permanent position absolutely removed from political influence, we have agreed to give him the same tenure of office as that of a Supreme Courtjudge, with the same salary and the same retiring allowance ifhe lives to entitle himself to such. That is the object we sought to attain .... We are creating this office by Act ofParliament for the first time in Canada.5 9. The Opposition agreed to the Minister' s proposai on the need to define in legislation the independence of the Chief Electoral Officer. Ernest Lapointe, a "Laurier Liberal", immediately gave his party's approval to the position with its statutory independence that: If we accept the principle that there must be a Chief Electoral Officer, that man must be independent of the Govemment of the day, and he must be placed in such a position as to make him independent of any Govemment or party. The only way to do that is to place him in the same position as the judges of the land and, therefore, I am in perfect accord with this disposition. 6 4 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, 8 Aprill920, p. 1069. 5 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, 26 June 1920, p. 4266. 6 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, 26 June 1920, p. 4266. 6 1O. Right from its beginning the Office was meant to be unique as a form of government organization. The term "office of this Parliament" that the Minister sponsoring the legislation used was new; the term distinguished the Office from the Departments presided over by Ministers that are the usual organizations for the activities of the executive government." 11. Central to the improvement of the conduct and administration of elections was the creation of the position of Chief Electoral Officer. The intention of the Government was, through the new Dominion Elections Act, to give the Chief Electoral Officer very broad statutory duties and powers and responsibility for ali aspects of elections and the necessary independence not only from the Government and the elected executive, but also more generally from partisan politics. The new Act also imposed on the Chief Electoral Officer the obligation to report to the House of Commons.7 The institutional framework that Parliament put in place in the 1920 Dominion Elections Act is stilllargely that in which the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer now operates. 7 Section 19 of the 1920 Dominion Elections Act (R.S.C. 1920, c. 46) set out the duties and powers ofthe Chief Electoral Officer (with a remarkable continuity with the present Office), in part: (b) exercise general direction and supervision over the Du ti es and administrative conduct of elections with a view to ensuring the faimess and impartiality of ali election officers and compliance with the provisions of this Act; (c) report to the House ofCommons, through the Speaker, after an election, any matters arising in the course of the election an account ofwhich ought, in hisjudgment, to be submitted to the House ofCommons 7 1830 1.2-The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer before the Passage of the Fair Election Act (i) The Responsibilities of the Office 12. Since its establishment as an "office of Parliament" in 1920, the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer has evolved as it dealt with changes to the electoral system and the conditions that determine it including changes in the society and culture of Canada as well as technological advances. Canadian society has changed from rural to urban, from agriculture-based to industrial and now post-industrial; the population and the electorate has grown and become diverse. Technology has moved from a universe of local print, broadcast and telecommunications to global, internet interconnectedness. 13. Within these changes the Office has maintained the broad statutory responsibility given by Parliament in 1920, and now articulated in Section 16 of the Canada Elections Act, to "exercise general direction and supervision over the conduct of elections". This responsibility covers the whole cycle of elections, from policies and plans, through preparations, voter registration, operation of the polis, counting of the results, and issuing official reports, as well as informing and educating on the right to vote. lmportantly, the mandate also covers compliance with all aspects of the Act and enforcement, including investigation and eventually the possibility of prosecution. In pursuit of the broad responsibility, and as a testimony to the trust and confidence placed in it .and its competence, the Office has also received from Parliament other specifie responsibilities. For example, the Referendum Act (S.C. 1992, c. 30) gave the Chief Electoral Officer the responsibility of administering federal referendums; the Electoral Boundaries 8 Readjustment Act (R.S. 1985, c. E-3), rather than creating altemate machinery, tasked the Office with providing support to commissions established to study the readjustment of electoral boundaries. 14. The Chief Electoral Officer is also responsible, under Sections 44(1) and 366 of the Canada Elections Act, for the registration of political entities and the establishment and maintenance of an automated register of Canadians who are qualified electors, and ' has the responsibility for maintaining the registry ofpolitical parties (Section 374). 15. Parliament passed the Election Expenses Act in 1974, amending the Canada Elections Act in 1974, to set limits on candidate and political party spending and on third party spending. It also assigned to the Office the additional responsibilities of monitoring election spending by candidates and political parties and further enhanced the responsibilities, particularly following the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing ("Lortie Commission"), for examining and disclosing their financial reports and reimbursing their expenses in what is Part 18 of the Canada Elections Act. 16. In addition, up to the passage of the Fair Elections Act, the Chief Electoral Officer oversaw the work of the Commissioner of Canada Elections ("the Commissioner") who ensures that all provlSlons of the Canada Elections Act and Referendum Act are complied with and enforced. 9 ii) The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer as an "Officer of Parliament" 17. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, established by Parliament in 1920, is one of a group of Offices that together have been named "Officers of Parliament". 8 There is no statutory definition federally ofwhat constitutes an "Officer ofParliament". The Offices all have requirements to table reports in Parliament, are responsible directly to Parliament rather than to the federal government or to an individual Minister, and have statutory independence from the government ofthe day. The responsibilities of Officers ofParliament differ greatly, from investigating and adjudicating the conduct of Members of Parliament and Ministers, through auditing government accounts and expenditures, to protecting legislated rights of Canadians to access to information, protection oftheir privacy and to government services in Canada's official languages. The Office of the Chief Electoral Commissioner is in that regard unique (except perhaps for the Official Languages Commissioner) in that it is tasked with managing and giving effect to a constitutionally protected right. 18. The statutory independence given by Parliament in its legislative mandate, buttressed by the requirement to report directly to the House of Commons is particularly significant for the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer. The Chief Electoral Officer has 8 The Library ofParliament Background Paper on the Appointment ofOfficers ofParliament (PRB 09-21E), by André Bames and Élise Hurtubise-Loranger (7 December 2009; revised 24 September 2014) gives a list ofOfficers of Parliament (the dates of establishment are in brackets): Office of the Auditer General (1878); Office of the Chief Electoral Officer (1920); Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (1970); Office of the Information Commissioner (1983) Office of the Privacy Commissioner ( 1983); Office of the Conflict oflnterest and Ethics Commissioner (2007); Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (2007); Office of the Commissioner ofLobbying (2008). 10 the responsibility to manage the arrangements that Parliament wishes to have in place to guarantee the exercise of their constitutional right to vote in an election of members of the Bouse of Commons, according to a process and within a system that is (and that appears to voters to be) fair, professional and credible so that voters are convinced that their vote matters and is free from outside influence or pressure. 19. Parliament has granted to the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer a legislative mandate to direct and supervise the conduct of elections and thereby has conferred on the Office the freedom of action and the independence from the elected executive that Parliament has been deemed necessary to exercise that mandate and the obligation for the Chief Electoral Officer to report on how the Office has exercised its mandate. 20. The following sections analyze the provisions in the Canada Elections Act that structure how the Chief Electoral Officer operates to perform the legislative mandate that Parliament has granted to the Office and that guarantee its independence as an Office of Parliament. This analysis deals with the legislative provisions as they were in place before the passage of the Fair Elections Act. (a) Appointment Process: 21. The Chief Electoral Officer is appointed, according to Subsection 13 (1) of the Canada Elections Act, by a resolution ofthe Bouse ofCommons.9 9 On the appointment procedure, see O'Brien, Audrey, and Marc Bosc, House ofCommons Procedure and Practice, Second Edition (Ottawa: House of Commons, 2009), Chapter 4. 1834 11 (b) Term of Office 22. Section 13 of the Canada Elections Act, prior to the Fair Elections Act, provided for the appointment of the Chief Electoral Officer with no fixed term, a guarantee of tenure "during good behaviour", and only the obligation to retire at age 65 (Canada Elections Act, s. 13). The current Chief Electoral Officer, Marc Mayrand, was appointed on 21 February 2007; his appointment ends on 12 April 2018, when he will reach 65 years of age. (c) Removal 23. As provided in subsection 13 (1) of the Canada Election Act, the Chief Electoral Officer "holds office during good behavior" and may be "removed for cause by the Govemor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons." The term "for cause" means that the appointment is not "at pleasure" and may not be terminated arbitrarily or unilaterally but only for cause, that is a substantive reason with fault, personal or professional, on the part of the incumbent. 10 ( d) Process for determining remuneration and allowances 24. The remuneration of the Chief Electoral Officer is pegged, in subsection 15 (2) of the Canada Elections Act, to the salary of a salary of a "judge of the Federal Court, other than the Chief Justice of that Court". This means that the salary is not subject to a decision by the Govemment; it is determined through the process for the compensation of 10 There is a si mil ar provision in the Constitution Act, 1867, Section 99 (1) for the removal offederally appointed judges: "the judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be rernovable by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House ofCornmons." 12 judges appointed by the federal government, m adherence to Section 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 11 ( e) Source of Fun ding 25. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer has two budgetary authorities that fund its activities. Most of the funding cornes directly from the statutory authority that Parliament has given on an on-going basis in Section 553 ofthe Canada Elections Act, to receive payment "out of unappropriated moneys forming part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund" for specified activities related directly to the delivery of elections; no additional Parliamentary approval is necessary. This is a unique authority designed to isolate the resources needed to run an election from the possibility of extemal influence and to ensure that elections would be effective, fair and impartial, and free of government control. The ether source of funding is the annual appropriation vote, which pays for on- going activities of the Office including the salaries of permanent employees; for access to appropriations, the Office submits its request through the estimates process, with the Office submitting a Report on Plans and Priorities and a Departmental Performance Report. The funding from appropriations is subject to approval by Parliament as part of the annual main estimates process; this raises a real possibility that the Government could use the control offunding to limit the resources required for the operation of the Office. 11 In 1998, following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (3 S.C.R. 3) on the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [ 1997 ], the Judges Act was amended to provide for a Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission to be established every four years to inquire into the adequacy of judicial compensation and benefits. The Commission submits a report with its recommendations on the compensation offederally appointed to the Minister of Justice; the report is also tabled in Parliament. The Minister must respond to the report within four months after receiving it and seek the approval of the House ofCommons for the amendments to the Judges Act to set out the changes in compensation. 13 (f) Appointment of Personnel 26. The Canada Elections Act stipulates in Subsection 19(1) that the employees "shall be appointed in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act." This means that the employees are appointed on the basis of merit and without involvement of Ministers. The Chief Electoral Officer, as "deputy head" has the authority, delegated from the Public Service Commission, of the Commission's appointment and appointment-related authorities; the Chief Electoral Officer is then accountable for its proper use of the delegation to the Commission, which in turn is accountable to Parliament. (g) Relationship to Parliament: Reporting 27. The principal requirements for reporting by the Chief Electoral Officer are set out in Part 21 of the Canada Elections Act. Unlike the requirements of other Officers to file annual reports, the Chief Electoral Officer is not required to make an annual report but must prepare reports tied to general elections and to by-elections. The Chief Electoral Officer has a legislative requirement that is unique among Officers of Parliament to report on proposed legislative amendments that the Chief Electoral Officer judges "desirable for the better administration" of the Canada Elections Act (see Paragraph 33 and following, below). 28. The Chief Electoral Officer has the obligation under Section 533 of the Canada Elections Act to publish Official Voting Results, "in the case of a general election, without delay, and, in the case of a by-election, within 90 days after the return of the writ". The Chief Electoral Officer may in these reports publish any other information that the Chief Electoral Officer considers relevant. 14 1837 29. The Chief Electoral Officer also submits a "statutory report" following each general election and after by-elections in accordance with subsection 534 (1) of the Canada Elections Act; on receiving the report, the Speaker of the Ho use is required under Section 536 to submit it to the House of Commons and it is referred to the House Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. 30. The Canada Elections Act imposes the requirement to report on specifie instances of the exercise of special or exceptional powers. Notably subsection 534(1) requires the Chief Electoral Officer to report to the Ho use of Co mmons, if the Chief Electoral Officer "considers it should be brought to the attention of the House", on "any matter or event that has arisen or occurred in connection with the administration of the Chief Electoral Officer's office since the last report; and on "measures that have been taken under subsection 17(1) or (3) or sections 509 to 513 since the issue ofthe writs". 31. Subsection 17(1) gives the Chief Electoral Officer the power to adapt the working of the Act to deal with "an emergency, an unusual or unforeseen circumstance or an error", including the power to "extend the time for doing any act", and Subsection 17(3) gives to the Chief Electoral Officer the power to extend voting hours if "satisfied that, if the voting hours at the polling station are not extended, a substantial number of electors will not be able to vote". 32. The reporting allowed in Sections 509 to 513 provided the opport:ullity.for the Chief Electoral Officer to report on the activities of the Commissioner and the powers of the Commissioner to undertake inquiries on the possibility of offences by an election officer or any person. The responsibility in Section 511, previously held by the 15 Commissioner, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act, including deciding whether to initiate a prosecution was given to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, in 2006, when the position was created in the Federal Accountability Act, as was the responsibility in Section 512 for giving formai consent for prosecution for an offence under the Canada Elections Act. 33. The Chief Electoral Officer also has the obligation under Section 535 to submit to the Speaker of the Bouse of Co mm ons, "as soon as possible after a general election ... a report that sets out any amendments that, in his or her opinion, are desirable for the better administration" of the Canada Elections Act. The Chief Electoral Officer has specifie power to bring forward to Parliament proposais for amendments to the Canada Elections Act; I have not be en able to find such a power granted to any other Officer of Parliament, most of whom are required to report annually on their activities and may report on matters of special importance or on their investigations. The power allows Parliament to benefit directly from the experience that the Chief Electoral Officer has had during the previous general election in applying the law on the ground and thus to receive recommendations outside of the usual framework of public legislation presented to the Bouse by members of the Cabinet. 34. The Chief Electoral Officer has regularly used the opportunity afforded under section 535 to report to Parliament and to propose amendments to the Canacfa Elections Act, for its "better administration". Until the transfer of the Commissioner of Canada Elections by the Fair Elections Act to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Chief Electoral Officer could freely make recommendations for amendments to the Act that would improve the administration of Sections 509 to 513 of the Act which deal 16 1839 with the duty of the Commissioner to ensure compliance and enforcement. The Chief Electoral Officer used the opportunity of the report under Section 535 of the Act to make proposais to enhance the ability of the Commissioner of Canada Elections to investi gate. In the report entitled "Preventing deceptive communications with electors - Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 41st general election, 2013 ", the Chief Electoral Officer made the following recommendation for a legislative change with regard to preventive and enforcement measures that should be taken to deal with deceptive communications: In arder to make the enforcement of the Canada Elections Act more effective, it is recommended that the Commissioner of Canada Elections be given the power to apply to a judge for an arder to campel any persan to provide information that is 12 relevant to an investigation. · (iii) The Commission er of Canada Elections within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer 35. The position of Commissioner of Canada Elections was established in 1974, in the Election Expenses Act, as the Commissioner of Election Expenses, an official who had the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the Act on controls over election expenses and financing. In 1977, the position received the mandate for the enforcement of all provisions of the Canada Elections Act and the name of the position was changed to Commissioner of Canada Elections. 12 Elections Canada. "Preventing deceptive communications with electors- Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 41st general election", 2013, p. 37 1840 17 36. Prior to the coming into force of the Fair Elections Act, the Chief Electoral Officer was, as provided in Section 501 of the Canada Elections Act, responsible for appointing the Commissioner, and thus there was no involvement of the executive government in the appointment; rather the Commissioner gained legitimacy from being named by the Chief Electoral Officer who was appointed by resolution of the House of Commons. The appointment had no fixed term, and while the position was within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, the Commissioner had received from Parliament specifie authorities to act independently of the Chief Electoral Officer to carry out the responsibility of ensuring compliance with and enforcing the Canada Elections Act and the Referendum Act. Therefore, before the passage of the Fair Elections Act, the Cmmnissioner was able to act, in exercising his duties, in an independent manner. The independence of the Commissioner within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer enabled the Commissioner's Office and its staffto carry out investigations, as provided in the Canada Elections Act, in a way that was impartial and seen to be impartial. 37. The authority of the Commissioner of Canada Elections to initiate and conduct prosecutions under Section 511 of the Canada Elections Act was moved in 2006 to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, after the position was established by the Federal Accountability Act to initiate and conduct ail criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown. In consequence, this means that once the Commissioner determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed under the Canada Elections Act, the Commissioner may refer the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and it is the Director who decides whether to initiate a prosecution. 1841 18 38. Before the transfer of the Commissioner's office to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner, in carrying out his duties, had on-going contact and relations with other parts of the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer. 13 Many of the referrals on possible offences come from units within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer that receive various reports that have to be submitted to the Chief Electoral Officer, including the reports filed under the politi cal financing provisions of the Canada Elections Act; in that case the procedure was that the unit in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer notifies the Commissioner of potential offences it has identified in the audits of financial returns from parties or candidates. Section II - Changes brought about by the Fair Elections Act 39. The Fair Elections Act (An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts - 2014, c. 12, s. 2.) makes a number of changes that affect the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, particularly the transfer of the Commissioner of Canada Elections to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. (i) The Transfer of the Position of the Commissioner of Canada Elections from the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions 40. The Fair Elections Act transfers the position of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, along with the staff reporting to the Commissioner, to the Office of the 13 In Section 510, the Canada Elections Act requires the Chief Electoral Office to direct the Commissioner to make an inquiry into a possible offence by an election officer or by other persans who may have committed a serious offence, if the Chief Electoral Officer "believes on reasonable grounds" that such offences have been committed. 19 Director of Public Prosecutions. It also changes the appointment process for the Commissioner of Canada Elections; under the new Subsection 509(1) of the Canada Elections Act, the Director of Public Prosecutions appoints the Commissioner for a seven-year term, subject to removal for cause. 41. Before the Fair Elections Act, the Chief Electoral Officer appointed the Commissioner of Canada Elections; there was no term for the appointment, but the fact that appointment of the Commissioner was made by an independent officer of Parliament who was appointed, as indicated above, by resolution of the Bouse of Commons, provided distance from possible poli ti cal pressures. The Director of Public Prosecutions, on the other hand, is appointed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Attorney General, albeit after a selection process, provided for in Section 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, that has a committee recommend candidates; the Attorney General will select one of them as "most suitable for the office of Director" and refer to a Parliamentary committee for approval before submitting the appointment to the Governor in Council. 42. The Director of Public Prosecutions works "under and on behalf of the Attorney General" and exercises the authorities of the Attorney General for prosecutions on behalf of the Crown, as set out in Subsection 3(3) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. The Attorney General is also the Minister of Justice; and, according to the Department of Justice Act (Section 4), The Minister (of Justice) is the official legal ad viser of the Governor General and the legal member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. 20 184.3 This means that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General is a member of the Cabinet and belongs to the elected executive and participates in discussions in Cabinet; the Minister is also an elected Member of Parliament, sitting in the Ho use of Commons. The Director of Public Prosecutions is accountable to the Attorney General for the activities of the office and for how the resolirces of that office are used. The situation, therefore, is that the Director of Public Prosecutions who appoints the Commissioner of Canada Elections and to whom the Commissioner now reports, works "under and behalf of' a Minister who is a Member of Parliament elected in accordance with the Canada Elections Act. An investigation under the Canada Elections Act by the Canada Elections Commissioner could focus on the conduct of the Minister or the Minister' s colleagues in Cabinet, or his fellow Members in the House. 43. The Director of Public Prosecutions Act states, in Subsection 3(8), 14 that the Director of Public Prosecutions "initiates and conducts prosecutions on behalf of the Crown with respect to offences und er the Canada Elections Act". Administratively, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, as part of its "directives", affirms that the Director of Public Prosecutions "does not brief the Attorney General on Canada Elections Act matters". 15 However~ in my view, the independence of the Commissioner's function within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer is a much better guarantee that any prosecutions will be and will appear to be undertaken in full impartiality and freedom from involvement of either the legislative or the executive branches or of political actors. 14 Section 2 of the Direct or ofPublic Prosecutions Act also contains an exception from the definition of"prosecution" for Canada Elections Act matters. 15 Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, p. 8 1844 21 44. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act provide that the Commissioner and staff will be a separate part of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. From the perspective of the location of the function of the Commissioner within the public administration, the Commissioner and his staff moved from being a unit in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, integrated into the duties and functions of that Office, and under the purview of an independent "officer of Parliament", into the core public service, reporting to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is part of the executive branch of government. 45. The Commissioner will be "deputy head" for the purposes of the Financial Administration Act and the Public Service Employment Act. The Commissioner will be administratively responsible for that "portion of the federal public administration" that reports to the Commissioner and will now have to make appointments in the office. In addition, as a separate unit, the Commissioner's office will have to seek its own funding and resources by preparing and submitting to Treasury Board its own estimates, subject to the review by the Board and adding to the management load on the Commissioner. 46. Removing the functions of the Canada Elections Commissioner from the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer will also have negative operational consequences, which may undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of the enforcement regime of the Act and public confidence in it. While the Commissioner had separate authorities and responsibilities, they were part of the overall responsibility of the Chief Electoral Office for the "general direction and supervision over the conduct of elections". The change means that compliance and enforcement are moved away from the Office's 1R4~ 22 ._, .c.o. ·..1 responsibilities for all elements of the election cycle. There had been easy exchange of views between what had been units in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer. Particularly, the work done by the officiais in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer who receive reports on election spending and who audit returns provided a source of information for the Commissioner in reviewing and deciding on investigating. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer has also been the locus for complaints about the election process which were another potential source of information for the Commissioner in deciding on investigations. Because of the establishment of the Commissioner's office as a separate unit, the new subsection 16(5) had to be added to the Canada Elections Act to allow the Chief Electoral Officer to disclose information obtained under the Canada Election Act to the Commissioner,' when the Chief Electoral Officer considers that it would be useful to the Corrimissioner, as well as allowing the Commissioner to require the disclosure of information from the Chief Electoral Officer. 4 7. The intention to maintain a strict separation of the work of the Commissioner of Canada Elections from that of the Chief Electoral Officer is clear from the provision introduced to the Canada Elections Act (Subsection 509(2)) which states that the "Director of Public Prosecutions shall not consult the Chief Electoral Officer with respect to the appointrnent of the Commissioner." 48. The Fair Elections Act also changes the arrangements for reporting on the activities of the Commissioner. Rather than including in the statutory report prepared under Section 534 of the Canada Elections Act reporting on the enfo'rcement and compliance actions of the Commissioner of Canada Elections or having the Commissioner of Canada Elections issue an annual report (as the Commissioner did for 1 p. ;1 ç - •.) "Jt ~) 23 2012-13), the Commissioner's report will now be a section in the annual report of the Director of Public Prosecutions required in Subsection 16(1) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. In the section provided by the Commissioner under Subsection 16 (1.1), the Commissioner will report on "activities under the Canada Elections Act". 49. Even more importantly, the transfer of the Commissioner of Canada Elections from the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer will deprive the Commissioner of Canada Elections from proposing, as part of the Chief Electoral Officer's report under Section 535 of the Canada Elections Act, recommendations for legislative reform as he is now directed to do. 50. Under the changes in Subsection 509(1) of the Canada Elections Act, the term of the Commissioner is limited to seven years. The term of seven years for the Commissioner is problematic. While it may be the same term as, for example, the Information Commissioner or the Privacy Commissioner, it would cover only a little more than one election cycle, and it would not allow the incumbent to develop the necessary understanding of the operations of elections and the complex requirements of the Canada Elections Act. (ii) Changes to the Term of the Chief Electoral Officer 51. The amended Canada Elections Act limits the term of the Chief Electoral Officer to ten years. The term of ten years will co ver at least two elections and may be seen as a reasonable limitation, being the same term as the Auditor General. However, the fact that the five last Chief Electoral Officers have actually served an average of twenty years 24 seems strong evidence that the complexity of the powers and duties under the Canada Elections Act require a longer term than ten years. Concluding Comments 52. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada was created in 1920 by Parliament through the Dominion Elections Act. The House of Commons on both sides was determined to create a new institution, an "office of this Parliament", to which it entrusted the "general direction and supervision over the Duties and administrative conduct of elections". The Members of Parliament wished to achieve a "faimess and impartiality of all election officers" and, therefore, sought to distance from the governinent of the day the management of elections and the supervision of the vothig that brought them to their seats in the House. The innovation of the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer as independent, fair and impartial is one that has withstood the test of time and brought to Canada a history of fair and free federal elections. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer has evolved with new authorities to manage and oversee the full election cycle, both in the Canada Elections Act and the Referendum Act. The Fair Elections Act diminishes the institutional independence of the Office by transferring to an office of the executive govemment, as part of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Canada Elections, the ·official "whose duty is to ensure that the (Canada Elections) Act is complied with and enforced." By removing from t}_le Office of the Chief Electoral Officer the official who is responsible for compliance with and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act, the ability of the Chief Electoral Officer to "exercise general direction and supervision over the conduct of elections", which is still the primary duty of the Office, is significantly compromised. In my view, the transfer 1848 25 affects the independence of the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer and reduces the credibility of the institution and its "faimess and impartiality". Any lessening of the effectiveness and credibility of the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer also diminishes the legitimacy of tho se whom the elections it oversees elects. 53. I swear this affidavit for the purpose of providing evidence in the above noted proceeding having been apprised of, and understanding my obligation as an expert witness. I have signed and attached hereto an acknowledgment of my duty in this respect. SWORN before me at the City of Ottawa In the Province of Ontario, on January 1~ 2015. DAVID C. ELDER Lucy Joan Draper-Ghislett, a Commfssloner; etc., Province of Ontario, wh lie a Student-at -law Expires August 22, 20Ù. Court File No. 14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING Applicants -and- RER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF EXPERT'S DUTY 1. My name is David C. Eider. I live at the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario. 2. I have been engaged by or on behalf of the Lawyers for the Applicants to provide evidence in relation to the above-noted court proceeding. 3. I acknowledge that it is my duty to provide evidence in relation to this proceeding as follows: (a) to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan; (b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within my area of expertise; and (c) to provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require, to determine a matter in issue. 4. I acknowledge that the duty referred to above prevails over any obligation which I may owe to any party by whom or on whose behalfl am engaged. January 12, 2015 TABA This is Exhibit A referred to in the affidavit of David C. Eider, sworn before me this 12th day of January, 2015 Lucy Joan Draper·Ghislett, a Gommissioner, etc., Province of Ontario, wh ile a Student-at -Law. Expires August 22, 2017. Exhibit "A" QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE I served in the Privy Council Office for more than ten years, principally in the Machinery of Government Secretariat, and was Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government, from July 1998 ta October 2001. From 1996 to 1998, I was Director of Operations in the Machinery of Government Secretariat, and from 1993 to 1996, Director of Operations in the Security and Intelligence Secretariat in the Privy Council Office. The Privy Council Office is the public service department that supports the Prime Minister as head of government and serves as the secretariat to the Cabinet. The Machinery of Government Secretariat provides advice and analysis ta the Prime Minister and the Clerk of the Privy Council on the practical workings of the constitutional arrangements for providing effective Cabinet and ministerial government. The role of the Machinery of Government Secretariat derives from the requirement that the Prime Minister exercise systematically and consistently, on the basis of precedent and convention as well as law, the Prime Minister' s duties and responsibilities for the orderly establishment and conduct of govemment and the Prime Minister's prerogative for the organization of government. As Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government, I was responsible for providing support ta the Prime Minister in regulating the overall conduct of govemment, within the conventions and practices of responsible government. This included providing advice and operational support on the organization of the ministry, the cabinet decision-making proèess, preparations for the transition to new governments and cabinet shuffles, the responsibilities of Ministers and their accountability, the establishing of new organizations, the resolution of jurisdictional and other disputes between ministers, the establishment of public inquiries, and the briefing of ministers and their offices on responsible cabinet govemment and the Prime Minister's rules for ministerial conduct including their duties in respect of the cabinet and the collective responsibility its discussions engender, the mandates of ministers, and on ministers' relationships with their deputy ministers and departments, and their relationships with other agencies within their portfolios. Among my responsibilities was providing advice on the relationship of -2- Ministers to Parliament and maintaining an overview of the offices of the officers of Parliament. In the Machinery of Government Secretariat, 1 drafted or oversaw the drafting of official documents dealing with responsibility and accountability in govemment, the renewal of the public service, the role and responsibilities of the Privy Council Office, a guide for Heads of Agencies, and the Guide for Deputy Ministers, as well as drafts of the Prime Minister's guidance for Ministers (which is now published, in a new edition, by the Privy Council Office as Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State - 2011. 1 joined the Public Service of Canada in 1973, with the Department of External Affairs, now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Among my assignments in the Department's headquarters in Ottawa, 1 served as the Department's Senior Assistant to the Minister and as Director of International Economie Relations in the Economie Policy Bureau. From 1989 to 1993, 1 was the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the Organization for Economie Cooperation and Development in Paris. 1 have also served abroad in the Canadian Embassy in Dakar, Sénégal, and the Canadian High Commission in Harare, Zimbabwe. The assignments with Foreign Affairs gave me an opportunity to compare the organizational structures and the processes of Canada with those of other countries. On retiring from the federal Public Service in April 2004, 1 have been serving as a consultant to the Canadian Govemment and foreign govemments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector on matters related to the structures of govemment, the operation and the effectiveness of public institutions, including central agencies and policy units supporting the formulation of policy and the making of decisions. 1 have provided advice and briefings to senior govemment officiais from Nepal, Libya, Ukraine, Georgia, Bénin, and the People's Republic of China, Ukraine, and Georgia. 1 was also for 10 years a Senior Advisor in the Canada School of Public Service, especially within the Canada-Russia Public Administration Reform program. In these international cooperation activities, 1 have prepared analyses and recommendations on improving institutions and processes, based on my experience in the operations of the Government of Canada and in the functioning of the relationship of the Govemment to Parliament and its accountability to the House of Commons. 1 teach in the Master of Public Administration program in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University, giving courses on approaches to policy analysis, public sector organization and reform, and -3- management in the public sector. I received a B.A. (Honours) in French and German from McMaster University in 1964, and a M.A. in French from the University of Toronto in 1965. I undertook further graduate studies at the University of Toronto from 1965 to 1970, and the Université de Paris from 1968 to 1970 . I taught in the Department of French at the University of Toronto from 1965 to 1968, and the University of British Columbia from 1970 to 1973. TABB This is Exhibit 8 referred to in the affidavit of David C. Eider, sworn 1 before me this 12 h day of January, 2015 AC Lucy Joan Draper-Ghlslett, a Commlssloner, etc., Province of Ontario, wh ile a Student·at -Law. Expires August 22, 2017. List of Documents Consulted Legislation Access to Information Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1) Auditor General Act (R.S.C. ,1985, c. A-17) Canada Elections Act, (S.C. 2000, c. 9) Constitution Act, 1867 Constitution Act, 1867 Department ofJustice Act (RS.C., 1985, c. J-2) Director ofPublic Prosecutions Act (S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 121) Dominion Elections Act (R.S.C. 1920, c. 46) Fair Elections Act (S.C. 2014, c. 12) Federal Accountability Act (S.C. 2006, c. 9) Financial Administration Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11) Judges Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1) Privacy Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21) Public Service Employment Act (S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) Government Documents Canada. Elections Canada, "Preventing deceptive communications with electors - Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 41st general election", 2013. Canada. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Commissioner of Canada Elections- Annual Report 2012- 2013. Canada. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Special Investigators' Manual prepared by the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections. 2000. Canada. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, "Performance Report 2013-14", 2014 Canada. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer: "20 14-2015 -Report on Plans and Priorities", 2014 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Annotated Standing Orders of the House of Commons, 2005. -2- Canada, Parliament. Bouse of Commons, Standing Orders of the Bouse of Commons, including the Conflict oflnterest Code for Members, January 2014. Canada. Parliament. Parliamentary Information and Research Service. Legislative Summary of Bill C-23: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, 2014 Canada. Parliament. Parliamentary Information and Research Service. Legislative Summary of Bill C-2: The Federal Accountability Act, 2006 Canada. Parliament. Library of Parliament Background Paper on the Appointment of Officers of Parliament (PRB 09-21E), by André Barnes and Élise Burtubise-Loranger (7 December 2009; revised 24 September 2014) Canada, Privy Council Office, A Guide Book for Beads of Agencies: Operations, Structures and Responsibilities in the Federal Government (August, 1999). Canada. Public Prosecution Service of Canada. Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, 2014 United Kingdom, Bouse of Commons. Library, "Officers of Parliament: recent developments", SN/PC/04720 (London: Bouse ofCommons Library, 2008). Secondary Material: Books and Monographs Bell, Jeffrey Graham. Agents ofParliament: The Emergence of a New Branch and Constitutional Consequences for Canada (Ottawa: The Institute On Governance, 2006). Gay, Oonagh and Barry K Winetrobe. Officers ofParliament: Transforming the role (London: The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, UCL, 2003). Mallory, J. R., The Structure of Canadian Government (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), Mari eau, Robert, and Montpetit, ed. Bouse of Commons Procedure and Practice, First Edition (Bouse of Commons, 2000). O'Brien, Audrey, and Marc Bosc, ed. Bouse of Commons Procedure and Practice, Second Edition (Bouse of Commons, 2009). Smith, David E. The People's Bouse ofCommons: Theories ofDemocracy in Contention. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Ward, Norman. The Canadian Bouse of Commons: Representation, 2nd edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) Ward; Norman, Dawson's The Government of Canada. 6th edition (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990). -3- Secondary Material: Articles Bosc, Marc, "The role of officers ofParliament", Communication, Meeting of Association of Secretaries General ofParliaments, Bangkok, March/April2010 (accessed at: http://www.asgp.co/node/30100). Courtney, J.C. Canada's Chief Electoral Officer: Responsibilities and fudependence, Canadian Parliamentru:y Review, Vol. 30 (2007), pp. 32-37. Davidson, Jean-Pierre, "Enforcing Campaign Finance Laws: What Others Can Learn from Canada", Election Law Journal, Volume 3, Number 3, 2004, pp. 537-544. Kingsley, Jean-Pierre "fudependence and Accountability Mechanisms in Federal Election Legislation." Conference on "fudependence and Responsibility: Canada's Officers of Parliament." University of Saskatchewan, November 2-3, 2001. Kingsley, Jean-Pierre, "The Administration of Canada's fudependent, Non-Partisan Approach", Election Law Journal, Volume 3, Number 3, 2004, pp. 406-411. Massicotte, Louis, "The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada" Canadian Parliamentacy Review.Vol. 26 (2003), pp. 19-26. Smith, David E. "A Question of Trust: Parliamentary Democracy and Canadian Society." Canadian Parliamentacy Review. Vol. 24 (2004), pp. 24-29. Thomas, Paul G. "The past, present and future of officers of Parliament." Canadian Public Administration 46.3 (2003), pp. 287-314. Secondary Materials: Theses Furi, Megan Michelle. Officers of Parliament: A Study in Govemment Adaptation. M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: 2002). Chaplin, M. Ann, Officers ofParliament: Accountability, Virtue and the Constitution, LL.M. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Ottawa: 2009). THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS et al -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS Applicants REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Court File No. CV-14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE Proceeding commenced at TORONTO AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID C. ELDER, SWORN JANUARY 12, 2015 SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 20 Dundas Street West, Suite 1100 Toronto, Ontario M5G 2G8 Steven Shrybman (LSUC No. 20774B) tel: 613-482-2456 fax: 613-235-3041 Solicitors for the Applicants ,.... ~-·:~ ·:·,n C.'O Tab 11 Court File No.14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, THE CANADIAN FEDERATION OF STUDENTS, JESSICA McCORMICK, PEGGY WALSH CRAIG, and SANDRA McEWING Applicants -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent AFFIDAVIT OF ILONA DOUGHERTY (sworn January , 2015) I, ILONA Dougherty, ofthe City ofMontreal, in the Province ofQuebec, MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows: 1. I am the President and Co-Founder of Apathy is Boring which is a national youth-led non-partisan charitable organization that has been working to educate Canadian youth about" democracy since 2004. As a result of my work in this position, I have persona! knowledge and experience in relation to the matters set out below which reflect my own persona! knowledge and opinions and not necessarily tho se of Apathy is Boring. 1860 2 Background 2. In January 2004, I co-founded Apathy is Boring (www.apathyisboring.com), a national non-partisan charitable organization that uses art and technology to educate youth about democracy and encourages them to vote. In my position as the Executive Director of Apathy is Boring from 2004-2013, I accompanied the Govemor General of Canada on the 2009 State Visit to the Ukraine and Norway, I was featured by the national media (I am a regular commentator on CTV News Channel and CTV Montreal News), and I participated in research initiatives related to youth voter turnout and civic engagement. As Apathy is Boring' s current President, I regularly speak intemationally about young people and youth issues in relation to civic engagement and democracy. I recently completed a Graduate Diploma in Social Innovation at the University of Waterloo. I am a recipient of the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal and was named a BMW Foundation Young Leader in 2012. In 2009 I received an Ashoka Fellowship (for social entrepreneurs) and a Yukon Women's Award in 1999. A copy of my CV is attached hereto as ExhibitA. The Context: Canadian Youth and the Democratie Process: 3. Canadian youth are not opting into the democratie process. In the 2011 Federal Election, only 38.8% of Canadians aged 18-24 voted, continuing a long-term downward trend. Voting- or not voting- is a habit. If a young person doesn't vote in the frrst two elections when they are eligible, they are less likely to vote throughout the rest oftheir lives. If this issue is not addressed, in a generation we will have a country where the majority of citizens don't vote. An engaged citizenry is key to the strength of, and public confidence in our democracy. Ifwe don't engage young people now, we are setting ourselves up for the dangerous reality of a disengaged generation and fragile democracy. 3 About Apathy is Boring 4. Apathy is Boring's vision is a Canada where every young Canadian is an active and creative citizen, and youth are meaningfully engaged in all aspects of the democratie process. 5. Apathy is Boring's mission, as a non-partisan charitable organization, is to use art and technology to educate youth about democracy, with the aim of increasing youth voter tumout, increasing youth engagement in the democratie process, and building a sustainable dialogue between youth and elected officiais. 6. Apathy is Boring accomplishes its mission through three core programs: • Voting: W e increase youth voter tumout through mobilization campaigns during federal, provincial, and municipal elections that inform and research projects focused on improving youth mobilization tactics. • Getting Involved: We encourage youth to get involved in the democratie process and create opportunities for dialogue with their elected officiais through ApathyisBoring.com and CitizenFactory.com online, and workshops, street teams, and live events offline. • Y outh Friendly: We give civil society and govemment the concrete tools they need to engage youth in decision-making through workshops, organizational audits, and other 'Youth Friendly' services and resources. 4 7. Apathy is Boring's Philosophy is as follows: • Youth as Decision-Makers: We believe that creating spaces for dialogue and decision-making opportunities for youth are critical to youth engagement in democracy. • Impact: We believe in solving the problem of declining youth engagement in democracy, not just raising awareness aboutit. We make sure our work has impact. • Reaching the Unengaged: We believe in doing the hard work to reach and activate unengaged youth. • Intergenerational Partnerships: We believe rn the importance and value of intergenerational partnerships. • Low risk entry points: We believe in implementing outreach strategies by going to locations young people often frequent and not expecting young people to come to us. We believe that sometimes taking the fust step towards civic engagement is the most important one. • Provide information and choices: We believe in providing information in an accessible way to educate and inform young people. We don't believe in preaching. 5 8. Apathy is Boring is a non-partisan organization. Our goal is to educate ail Canadian youth about democracy. Apathy is Boring doesn't support or oppose any given party, candidate, campaign, or po licy. Our content and prograrnming are balanced and impartial which means that we stick to the facts. Apathy is Boring does not seek to increase youth democratie participation by appealing to particular youth-focused topics (ex. tuition rates), as these discussions can easily become partisan in nature. Rather, increased youth participation in the democratie process is the goal in and of itself and thus the focus of Apathy is Boring' s messaging is on the benefits and importance of democratie participation generally. 9. Being non-partisan does not mean that Apathy is Boring avoids contact with parties or politicians. All Canadians have an interest in engaging youth in the democratie process. Apathy is Boring is happy to cooperate with anyone who wants to engage youth. However, Apathy is Boring ensures we stick to our principles: our work will always remain neutral, and we proactively disclose any dealings we have with partisan groups or individuals. Apathy is Boring takes our commitment to non-partisanship seriously. We want all young Canadians to be active citizens, whatever their beliefs or affiliations. 6 Relevant Studies and Reports Work 10. Implementation of the Identification Requirements in the Canadian North Final Report - October 7, 2008: In 2008, as representatives of Apathy is Boring myself and one colleague conducted over 70 interviews (both in persan and over the phone) with a variety of identified stakeholders in the three Territories- Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories - and in the electoral district of Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River (Saskatchewan), as well as with Members of Parliament whose ridings are directly above or below the 60 parallel. These interviews were guided by a questionnaire, developed in collaboration with Elections Canada, in orderto: • Identify any barriers ansmg from the implementation of the new identification requirements; • Determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and determine if there are additions or changes that could be made to the list to reduce barriers; and • Determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges. 11. A copy of the report summarizing the results of these interviews and Apathy is Boring' s recommendations is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 7 12. Participants mainly agreed that voting in federal elections in the North is currently fraught with challenges. Obstacles that were identified ranged specifically from accessing, understanding, and then satisfying the new voter ID requirements to the larger issues of awareness of and education about the federal electoral system (as opposed to territorial and/or band elections), in addition to the motivation and desire to opt into the federal system. The importance of the cultural and physical realities of northem communities (inclement weather, limited infrastructure, and high costs associated with procuring necessary documents) pervaded most interviews, and many participants expressed frustrations with a system they felt was not adapted to their particular reality. 13. As a result ofthese interviews, Apathy is Boring believes that the key issues that should be considered by Elections Canada are the following: • Increase clarity, communication and streamlining of current practices to ensure that ali northem Canadians have the same opportunity to cast a ballot as their southem neighbors. • Adapt ali processes - from advertising elections-related information to running community relations officers programs and polling stations - to take into account the specificities of northem communities' contexts. 14. Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election: May 2011: This report, attached hereto as Exhibit C, presents the fmdings of a mixed-methods research project undertaken by Apathy is Boring during the 2010 Toronto municipal election. The report focuses on the electoral engagement patterns of youth in Toronto, as weil as the nature and impact of youth mobilization initiatives. The key fmdings of the report include the following: 8 • There are substantive differences in engagement among youth that are linked to residential and lifestyle factors, such as living with a parent or living in the city centre. • Most youth do not recall receiving a voter information card, which implies they are either not registered or inaccurately registered as voters. The likelihood of receiving these cards is tied to residential patterns, so that certain groups are more likely to be missed. • Commuters in the amalgamated suburbs face significant barriers to voting because of opening hours ofpolling stations for municipal elections. • There is a relationship between unsolicited mobilization activity- specifically, being contacted by a candidate - and voting in the election. Y outh who are contacted by a candidate during the writ period are more likely to vote, and young people due to residential patterns are less likely to be contacted by a candidate than other demographie groups. • Organizations invest a significant amount of effort into organizing election debates, yet these do not appear to be particularly effective at reaching or mobilizing unengaged youth. • Organizations seeking to mobilize youth are modifying resources from elections agencies to better suit their needs. There is also a clear need for outreach resources with information about candidates and their platforms. 9 • The non-partisanship policies of government agencies appear to cause concem among partner organizations and may contribute to limiting mobilization activity. Non-profit organizations are unclear about what being non-partisan means, and are concemed that their funding might be affected or they might face other challenges should they inadvertently cross any lines while engaging in a non-partisan get out the youth vote campaign. • Community and non-profit organizations responded positively to Toronto Elections' youth initiative and want to see more comprehensive youth mobilization in future elections. Pursuant to these fmdings, the report includes a series of research and outreach recommendations that all stakeholders - including community organizations, outreach workers, candidates and election agencies - can use to better engage young voters. 15. BC Youth Registration Pilot Project- March 2014: During the May 2013 British Columbia provincial election, Apathy is Boring teamed up with "Get Y our Vote On" to conduct voter registration drives targeting youth in severa! cities. Together, the two organizations formed "Street Teams" to engage youth at conceqs and other events to encourage them to register to vote. In total, the Street Teams reached over 10,500 youth. The project drew upon a "quasi- experimental" methodology to determine the impact of the youth voter registration activities. The report discusses many usefullessons for organizations involved in registration and get-out- the-vote campaigns. Key fmdings of the report include: 1868 10 • Those who registered through the Street Teams were more likely to vote. Voter tumout for youth registered by the Street Teams was 13 points higher than the average voting rate for 18-24 year olds who were registered to vote in the election (however, because the sample was not randomly selected, no causal claims can be made). • Street Team outreach at concerts, theatres, and bars tended to be more successful than outreach using "tabling techniques" at university campuses and on busy streets. • The majority ofindividuals contacted by the Street Teams reported they were already registered. N onetheless, these individuals were provided with other voting materials that may have had a positive impact. Other barriers to completing registrations included timing, location, privacy concems and low attendance at sorne events. 16. The project was undertaken with the support ofElections BC. Elections Canada provided support to the research component. The fmal report for this project is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 1869 11 Strategies of Addressing Low Y ou th Voter Turnout The problem 17. Y outh voter participation is not a partisan issue. It is in the interest of Canadian society as a whole to inculcate democratie values in every new cohort of young adults so that our democracy thrives from one generation to the next. Y outh must not be viewed as a voting black that will sway as a who le in one direction or another, as this in fact has been proven to ~not be the case. In fact, there is pro of to the contrary. The Student Vote pro gram has shawn that high school mock election results roughly mirror the actual electoral results. 1 A major influencing factor that determines whether or not youth decide to vote is their discussions and interactions with their parents/ which explains why their values and choices in the end are not far off from those of older generations. 1 Available at: htto://www.studentvote.ca/2011/results/index.php?id=l 2 Mclntosh, Hart & Youniss, The Influence ofFamily Political Discussion on Youth Civic Development: Which Parent Qualities Matter? Political Science and Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 495-499 1870 12 18. Voter participation in Canada has declined significantly in the past four decades, but it. has not done so uniformly across ali age groups. Canadians over the age of 55 are currently voting at rates in the 70%-75% range, similar to their voting rates in early adulthood.3 Meanwhile, young people toda y vote at almost half the rate of youth in the 1960s. During the 4 2011 federal elections, 18-24 year-olds voted at only 38.8% , continuing a long-term downward trend in the number of new voters opting into the electoral process, a trend which we see throughout the Western world. 19. If young people vote in the frrst two elections in which they are eligible, they tend to continue voting for the rest of their lives. However, those who do not vote early in life are less )ikely to begin doing so later on. 5 Therefore low-voter turnout among youth can have a significant and lasting effect on voter participation in the future. 20. The key factor that determines voter participation is motivation to vote.6 However, in surveys of adolescents, youth actually self-report that they have a high degree of motivation to vote and the ir "intention" to vote has been measured at 80%.7 This intention however, do es not translate directly into an equally high voter turnout. While motivation is a key factor, we must also considera second important factor: voting accessibility. 3 Elections Canada, "Estimation ofVoter Tumout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General Election." Available at: http://www .elections.ca!res/rec/part!estim/estimation41 e.pdf 4 Elections Canada, "Estimation of Voter Tumout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Fëderal General Election." Available at: htto://www .elections.ca/res/rec/part/estim/estimation41 e.pdf 5 Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics ofElectoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 6 JoshuaHarder and JonA. Krosnick, Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Tumout, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 525-549. 7 Dietlind Stolle, Department ofPolitical Science, McGill University http://bridgingdifferences.mcgill.ca/en!English_school_participants.pdf 13 Addressing the problem 21. The key factor that determines voter participation is motivation to vote. 8 As such, Apathy is Boring's work focuses on providing young Canadians not only with the tools they need so that they know how, where, and when to vote, but we also running campaigns designed by youth for youth, around the equally important question, "why vote?" 22. Strategies that focus on motivational factors have been shown in numerous research reports to be highly effective. For example, peer-to-peer in-person motivation and information campaigns, like many of the campaigns Apathy is Boring organizes, have been shown to increase voter tumout by 8 to 10 percentage points.9 Motivation is a factor in deciding whether or not to vote, and it can be used, and indeed has been used successfully, as a lever to increase voter tumout. 23. Apathy is Boring recognizes that elected officiais and politi cal parties have an important role to play in engaging with voters and motivating and informing them about how to vote. That being said, it is equally important, in our experience, that non-partisan actors contribute to civic and democratie education, precisely because they do not have a stake in the outcome of any given election, and these stakeholders are focl.).sed on the democratie process generally rather than the ends of any particular election. 8 Joshua Harder and JonA. K.rosnick, Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Tumout, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 525-549. 9 Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, Get Out The Vote! How to Increase VoterTumout. Brookings Institute, 2008. 14 24. In our experience, political parties most often do not reach out to individuals who they consider to be unlikely to vote. Instead, political parties often choose to speak to their base and undecided voters, both of whom are composed of current voters. In contrast, non-partisan actors such as Apathy is Boring, Student Vote, and Elections Canada amongst others, aim to encourage and enable non-voters to become voters, thus increasing the size of the voting pool. This outreach is essential to renewing and enhancing the health of our democracy. 25. Elections Canada's is the largest and most important and influential organization with the independence and institutional and financial resources required to engage in promoting and enabling voter participation. As stated above, political parties do not have the incentives to fulfill this role. Also, small non-for profit organizations like Apathy is Boring simply do not have the resources or capacity to conduct campaigns to the scale that could be accomplished by an institution like Elections Canada. Given the important public benefit that derives from an engaged citizenry, it is vital that Elections Canada maintains its discretion to use the most effective means available to encourage and enable voter participation, especially with regards to target groups who have been identified as having difficulty accessing their right to vote. 26. Apathy is Boring has a history of measuring and quantifying the impact of its activities/initiatives and building an evidence-base culture that ensures that what we do has an impact that is both measurable and cost-effective. To do this, we require the support of experts and electoral agencies. To date, partnerships and support from Elections Canada has been vital in pursuing and measuring the impact of outreach initiatives. 15 27. Elections Canada is recognized intemationally for its expertise in ensuring citizens are able to exercise their democratie right to vote. Elections Canada' s sponsors international initiatives such as the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (http://aceproject.org) which has entrenched its reputation as an organization whose professionalism, innovation, independence, and use of best practices in the field makes it a leader in amongst electoral agencies internationally. This reputation and the importance of Elections Canada's work internationally should not be minimized. 28. As citizens' attitudes and demographie makeup change so do their concepts of civic duty and citizenship. Thus, it is key that electoral agencies themselves should be transparent, forward looking, and able to adapt to these societal trends. Elections Canada's research programs and its focus on the importance of ongoing data gathering and leaming has been an important factor in establishing Elections Canada's reputation as a leader in the field. 29. From April to October 2014 Elections Canada hosted events under it's "Inspire Democracy" banner with the aim of: "To better inform youth aged 18-24 on where, when and how to vote in the upcoming 2015 federal elections, Elections Canada is hosting a series of civic engagement workshops across the country. The workshops will. be held in 10 cities from April to October 2014 and make use of "training the trainers" techniques. Representatives from youth-serving organizations and youth leaders willlearn more about the latest research on voting and civic engagement and be given tools and information to mobilize young voters and prepare them to exercise the ir right to vote."10 30. A non-partisan actor such as Elections Canada is in a unique position to act as a convener and facilitator bringing together other actors in the field, such as was done in the Inspire Democracy workshops. 10 Available at: http://inspirerlademocratie-inspiredemocracy.ca/evt/index-eng.asp 16 Statement on Bill C-23, The Fair Elections Act 31. On April 10, 2014, then Executive Director Youri Cormier appeared as a witness on behalf of Apathy is Boring before the House of Cornmons Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to highlight the potential implications of the Bill C-23 ("Fair Elections Act") reforms on Canadian democracy, especially with regard to youth. Apathy is Boring' s full statement on the Fair Elections Act is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 32. In keeping with our strict non-partisanship policy, Apathy is Boring does not advocate on matters of public policy, and this includes not taking a public stance for or against the Fair Elections Act. As such, the goal of the statement was to provide an accurate, impartial, and balanced analysis of the youth electoral context in Canada in relation to the Fair Elections Act, with the hope that this would provide a valuable addition to the debate. As such, Apathy is Boring suggested three key questions that should be considered as part of the Fair Elections Act debate: 1) If Elections Canada is no longer empowered to invest in and conduct outreach campaigns that promote voting, then who will actively reach out to non-voting citizens and youth who are deciding whether or ~ot to vote for the frrst time? 2) If tighter ID requirements are implemented, it will indeed be crucial to ask the question: what means will be put in place to counter the potentially challenging impacts of tighter voter identification rules on young eligible voters who are not registered to vote? . 1875 17 3) In attempting to safeguard democracy from administrative risks, how can we also ensure we do not expose our democracy to another important risk given the current youth electoral context: the immediate and continued decline of youth voter turnout, and the impact this may have on long term voting habits? Experience Since Bill C-23 was Passed 33. Since the Fair Elections Act was passed it is my understanding that Elections Canada no longer has authority to implement public education and information programs to any populations other than primary and secondary school children. Now, Elections Canada has been limited to communicating with Canadians via advertising and its important role of educating and working with youth organizations through its Inspire Democracy pro gram has been somewhat limited as a result of the Bill. 34. The role Elections Canada plays in engaging in outreach to communities/groups who serve populations that face particular challenges in exercising their right to vote is incredibly important because Elections Canada is a key influencer for electoral agencies at the provincial and municipal leve!. Also, Elections Canada has the capacity to reach a broad cross section of groups across the country who are able to carry out peer-to-p~er interaction which in my experience has been proven time and again to be the most effective way of motivating citizens to vote. Limiting Elections Canada's mandate will no doubt have an impact on the innovative and forward looking practices of electoral agencies in regions across Canada as well as the capacity of the community organizations reached through programs such as Inspire Democracy 18 35. The changes to s. 18 ofthe Canada Elections Actmeans that Apathy is Boring is now the on1y national non-partisan actor in the Canadian context with the mandate and ability to use education and information programs to motivate and educate youth about voting. Apathy is Boring functions with very limited resources and the passage of Bill C-23 has increased both the pressure on our organization to expand our reach and effectiveness, as well as the urgency to do so. 36. I swear this affidavit in support of this Application because of my experience in field of democratie youth engagement. I swear this affidavit for no other or improper purpose. SWORN before me at the City of Montreal In the Province of Quebec, on January'f , 2015. TABA 1877 This is Exhibit A referred to in the affidavit of Ilona Dougherty, sworn before me this _9_,_ ___ day of January, 2015 •. Ilona Dougherty Phone: (514) 951-1831 Email: [email protected] Address: 3526A Coloniale • Montreal, Quebec • h2x 2y4 WORK EXPERIENCE 2013- present The Apathy is Boring Project National Co-founder & President National non-partisan charitable organization uses art and technology to educate youth about democracy and encourage them to vote. Board of Directors, spokesperson, and organizational mentor. www.apathyisboring.com 2004- present CTV News Channel, CJAD, The Montreal Gazette, CTV Montreal National Commentator On behalf of Apathy is Boring provided regular commentary on Canadian public policy, politics, and youth issues. 2004- 2013 The Apathy is Boring Project National Co-founder & Executive Director National non-partisan charitable organization uses art and technology to educate youth about democracy and encourage them to vote. Media coverage on (Canada AM, CTV Newsnet, Globe and Mail, CPAC, Toronto Star, CBC, The New York Times, The Ottawa Citizen). Raised over $2.5 million. www.apathyisboring.com 2003-2004 MASC: Artists for Schools and Communities Ottawa Communication and Development /ntern Wrote the second edition of The Youth Friendly Guide and Youth and Cultural Sensitivity policies and implementation plans. Assisted with fundraising and general community outreach. 2003 Old Crow Health and Fitness Project Yukon Project Coordinator Developed, fundraised for, and managed program to promote leadership through physical fitness in a small first nations community north of the Arctic Circle for youth 7 - 11. 2002 (Fall) United Nations Assac. in Canada Montreal Facilita tor Facilitated a weeklong retreat for 15 youth, ages 18-30, preparing to attend the Earth Summit in Johannesburg South Africa. 2002 (summer) Yukon Youth Conservation Corps Yukon Project Coordinator/ Facilitator Coordinated environmental education camps in rural communities in the Northern Yukon including Old Crow, Carmacks, Pelly Crossing, Beaver Creek, and Haines Junction. 2001 -2002 Youth Environmental Network Ottawa Project Coordinator/ Facilitator Coordinated organizational logistics and facilitated a weeklong retreat for youth leaders from around Canada. Gathered input from participants and created a long-term vision and strategie plan for the organization. 1998 - 1999 Canadian Environmental Network Ottawa National Caucus Coordinator Coordinated seven issue-based caucuses; work included fundraising, proposai writing, media relations, publicity & communications, conference organizing, and administrative duties. VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE 2011 -present Volunteer Canada National Chair- Board of Directors Ta provide leadership in strengthening citizen engagement and ta serve as a catalyst for voluntary action. www.volunteer.ca 2012- present Michaelle Jean Foundation National Honorary Member www.fmjf.ca 2007 - present Studio 303 Montreal President- Board of Directors Studio 303 exists ta promote the evolution of live artistic practices. www.studio303.ca 2009-2012 Michaelle Jean Foundation National Founding Member- Board of Directors www.fmjf.ca 2001 - 2004 Sierra Club of Canada National Board of Directors National environmental organization whose mandate is ta develop a diverse, well-trained grassroots network working ta protect the integrity of our global ecosystems. 1998-2001 Sierra Youth Coalition National Executive Committee Oversaw national staff and executive committee, facilitated retreats, wrote annual and strategie plans, worked on visioning and general 1880 organizational management. 1994- 1998 Canadian Environmental Network Youth Caucus National Chair Oversaw national and regional staff, facilitated retreats, wrote annual plans, worked on visioning and general organizational management. 1994 Students Aware of Our World Yukon Co-founder Lead activities of Local social justice and environmental student group, now known as Bringing Youth Towards Equality. LANGUAGES English - Fluent spoken & written French - Fluent spoken & basic written AWARDS & APPOINTMENTS 2012 Queen Elizabeth Il Diamond Jubilee Medal Recipient 2011 Chantier sur la démocratie, City of Montreal 2011 Youth Advisory Council, Manning Centre for Democracy Conference 2011 2009 Ashoka Fellow 2009 Canadian Delegate- State Visit to the Ukraine and Norway Appointed by the Governor General of Canada 2007 Canadian Dimensions Magazine nominated as one of five "Women Changing The World". 2005 Montreal Mirror Noisemaker- Person to watch in 2005. 2003 Vince Sirois Prize - Most outstanding graduating student in Concordia University's School of Community and Public Affairs. 1999 Yukon Women's A ward -A Young Women Leader. 1997 Member of Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. 1997 Youth Round Table on the Environment-Appointed by Minister of the Environ ment EDUCATION 2013 - present University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario Graduate Dipolma • Sociallnnovation 1999-2003 Concordia University Montreal, Quebec Bache/or of Arts with Distinction • Major in Community, Public Affairs & Policy Studies • Major Contemporary Dance • Member of School of Community and Public Affairs WRITING CREDITS & SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS 2012 Bastedo, H., Dougherty 1., LeDuc L. Rudny, B., Sommers, T. (2012) Youth, Democracy and Civic Engagement: The 'Apathy is Boring' Surveys 2011 Dougherty, 1. Engaging Youth in Decision-Making: Moving from Volunteerism to Active Citizenship. The Philanthropist, Vol 24, No 2 (2011) 2010 Rudny, B., Dougherty, 1., Blais, A., Dumitrescu D., Loewen P., Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election. Commissioned by Elections Canada. 2010 Clarke, A., & Dougherty, 1. Youth-Led Social Entrepreneurship: Enabling Social Change. The International Review of Entrepreneurship- special issue on Social Entrepreneurship. 2008 Dougherty, 1. & Smith, A. Implementation of the Identification Requirements in the Canadian North. Consultations with northern Canadians were conducted by Apathy is Boring for Elections Canada. 2007 Chapter by: Dougherty, 1. etc. Edited by: Aldana Cohen, D., Cullis- Suzuki, S., Frederickson K., Kayssi A., MacKenzie C., Notes from Canada's Young Activists: A Generation Stands Up for Change. Greystone Books. 1997 Segger, M., Clarke, A., Dougherty, 1., Alexander, K., Marcolongo, M., and Duplisea, B. "The Youth-Friendly Guide--The Youth Guidebook to Policy Change for lnter-generational Partnerships", Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Recent Blogs & Opinion Pieces: 2012 Opinion: Voter turnout among youth can't be ta ken for granted The Montreal Gazette 2011 lncreasing Youth Voter Turnout: Easier Said Than Done. The Huffington Post Canada 2011 Stop Blaming Young Voters The Huffington Post Canada Recent Speaking Engagements: Association of Municipalities Ontario- Keynote (Ottawa, Ontario) New Frontiers School Board- Keynote (Saint Adele, Quebec), Vitalize 2012 & 2013 {Alberta), National Association of Friendship Centers (Whitehorse, Yukon), Canada's Democracy Week 2012 & 2013 (Fredericton, Ottawa, Halifax), Imagine Canada National Sector Summit (Ottawa), The Next 10 Forum (Toronto), University of Toronto, and McGill University. TABB This is Exhibit B referred to in the affidavit of Ilona Dougherty, sworn before me this _...L.Cj___ day of January, 2015 Implementation of the Identification Requirements in the Canadian North Final Report October 7, 2008 1884 Presented by: Ilona Dougherty and Adrienne Smith, Apathy is Boring Presented to: Elections Canada Implementation of the Identification Requirements in the Canadian North Apathy is Boring ::L'Apathie C'est Plate 514.844.Ais8 (2472) :: 1.877.744.2472 10 Pins W. #412 ::Montreal, QC :: H2W 1P9 www.apathyisboring.com 1 www.lapathiecestplate.com Montreal, Quebec, Canada 2008 Ç) 8· ,...... -Ut..'J1 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Introduction 3. The Research Framework A. Objectives B. Methodology 4. Attitudes Towards Voter Identification at the Polis 5. Vouching 6. Letters of Attestation 7. Communicating with Electors A. Voter Information Gard (VIC) and Householder B. Advertising Campaign/Outreach Initiatives 8. Voting Issues in the North - Experience at the Polis 9. Recommendations A. Voter ID requirements (1-6) B. Communications and Outreach (7-15) C. Voting Process (16-19) 1 O. Appendices 1. List of interviewees (date, location, name and title) 2. Interview Guide 3. Letters from Elections Canada 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1886 1. Executive Summary This report addresses the challenges and opportunities surrounding implementation of the new election identification requirements in the Canadian North and more generally, obstacles and challenges to voter participation specifie to the realities of the North. Apathy is Boring conducted over 70 interviews (bath in persan and over the phone) with a variety of identified stakeholders in the three territories- Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories and in the electoral district of Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River (Saskatchewan), as weil as with members of Parliament whose ridings are directly above or below the 60 parallel. These interviews were guided by a questionnaire, developed in collaboration with Elections Canada, in arder to: identify any barri ers arising from the implementation of the new identification requirements determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and determine if there are additions or changes th at cou Id be made to the list to reduce barriers determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges Participants mainly agreed that voting in federal elections in the North is currently fraught with challenges. Obstacles identified obstacles ranged specifically from accessing, understanding, and then satisfying the new voter ID requirements to the larger issues of awareness of and education about the federal electoral system (as opposed to territorial and/or band elections), in addition to the motivation and desire to apt in to the federal system. The importance of the cultural and physical realities of northern communities (inclement weather, limited infrastructure, and high costs associated with procuring necessary documents) pervaded most interviews, and many participants expressed frustrations with a system they felt was not adapted to their particular reality. The consistencies noted in our consultations informed the recommendations that follow, and wherever exceptions did occur, they are noted in the report.Apart from particular changes to the list of authorized pieces of identification and sorne operational aspects (see section "Recommendations"), based on ourwork, Apathy is Boring believes th at the key aspects th at should be given consideration are the following: lncrease clarity, communication and streamlining of current practices to ensure that ali northern Canadians have the same opportunity to cast a ballot as their southern neighbors. Ad apt ali processes- from advertising elections-related information to running community relations officers programs and po !ling stations - to take into account the specificities of northern communities' contexts. Apathy is Boring believes that Elections Canada can capitalize on the changes to ID requirements to increase the accessibility of elections to northern Canadians in an innovative and proactive mann er. A critical aspect of this project will be the follow-up, which will help ensure that participants feel included in the process and have a clear sense of resulting action steps. Particulars of the follow-up are still to be determined in consultation with Elections Canada. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1887 2. Introduction Upon the request of Elections Canada, Apathy is Boring conducted a series of interviews to seek an understanding of the potential challenges that people in the North could face at the polis with the changes brought by the Canada Elections Act concerning identification requirements. ln arder to vote in a federal election, electors must now satisfy the identification requirements laid out in the following options: Option 1 Provide one original piece of identification issued by a government or government agency containing your photo, name and address. Option 2 Provide two original pieces of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Bath pieces must contain your name, and one must also contain your address. Option 3 An elector can be vouched for by an elector whose name appears on the list of electors in the same polling division and who has an acceptable piece or pieces of identification. Bath are required to make a sworn statement. An elector cannat vouch for more than one persan, and the persan who has been vouched for cannat vouch for another elector. Drawing on the authors' own contacts in the communities visited as weil as th ose of Elections Canada, Apathy is Boring interviews were conducted in persan and by phone with community members who had a wide range of experience with the electoral process and the realities of the North. Interviews were conducted in various communities in Yukon, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and in Desnethé Missinippl-Churchill River (Saskatchewan) as weil as with members of Parliament whose ridings are directly above or below the 60th parallel. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1888 3. The Research Framework A. Objectives B. Methodology The purpose of this research was to identify potential The methodology used in the development of this report was challenges for northern Canadians to meet identification based on securing qualitative research. Using aquestionnaire and address requirements arising from the new voter developed in partnership with Elections Canada, in addition identification requirements when voting during a federal to an informai and personalized interview format, we election event. lts particular objectives were to: discussed the new voter identification requirements and 1. determine the impact of the list of identification authorized experiences with voting and elections in general with ali by the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) interviewees. Expia nations of the new ID requirements and 2. identify any barriers arising from the implementation of prompting were used to clarify questions for those who had the new voter identification requirements not previously heard of the ID requirements. 3. determine which, if any, additions are required to the list of identification authorized by the CEO Interviews were conducted in a careful, lengthy and very 4. note existing challenges regarding the accessibility of "human" process underpinned by an understanding of the the electoral process that are unique to the North. nature of relationships in northern communities. The time was taken to ensure that community members were comfortable with the process, and that a diversity of members of any given community were able to participate. Over 70 in-depth interviews ranging from 1 hour to 1.5 hours in length-with members of Parliament among others-were conducted in Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Northern Saskatchewan. Because severa! participants requested anonymity, names have not been assigned to the quotes outlined in this report. Cities and occupation (where relevant) are listed. Selection of provinces and territories, cities and communities The communities were selected for this interview process based on the following criteria: They ensured appropriate coverage of the North. They offered a sample representation of other communities in the North. The interviewers had already established contacts the re, or Elections Canada had provided them with contacts the re. The established target groups were represented (youth, isolated residents, fly in communities, Aboriginal communities, transient members of northern communities). The following communities were part of the study: Yukon Whitehorse (population 24,473) Dawson City (population 2,022) Old Crow (population 282) NWT lnuvik (population 3296) 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1889 Nunavut community relations officers (CROs- Elections Canada) lqaluit (population 7,250) territorial chief electoral officers (CEOs) lgloolik (population 1 ,538) religious leaders (Church bishop, pastor, minister) Saskatchewan Members of Parliament (MPs) were selected based on the Spruce Home (population 3,429) - 20 kilometres north geographie location of their electoral district. Any member of Prince Albert of Parliament whose electoral district is located on the 60th La Ronge (population 3,500) 1 La Ronge Reserve parallel was contacted for an interview. (population 2,000) Prince Albert (population 34, 138) Period of interviews Saskatoon (population 208,300) Interviews were conducted during the following time Selection of interviewees periods in 2008: Yukon/NWT April 18 - May 2 Participants were selected based on the following three Nunavut May 11- May 18 categories, within which the aim was to provide as diverse Saskatchewan June 22 -June 28 and representative a selection as possible: Member of Parliament Interviews 1Additionallnterviews by Phone June 10 -August 29 Target Groups: Representatives of the following targeted groups were interviewed: youth isolated residents (trappers, hunters, those living more than 2 hours from the closest town) fly-in communities Aboriginal communities transient members of northern communities Demographies: The following demographies were taken into account: age gender education level degree of community involvement geographie location (rural/urban, isolated/community oriented, on /off reserve) language considerations Occupation: The following community members were targeted given their high level of interaction with community members and/or understanding of the identified issues: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers health care providers (nurse, etc.) representative from each federal registered political party (in that electoral district) Aboriginal government leaders (band leader, chief, head of band cou neil) community workers (social workers, youth workers, etc.) government employees (postal workers, etc.) field liaison officers (FLOs - Elections Canada; Saskatchewan only) returning officers (ROs- Elections Canada) 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1890 4. Attitudes Towards Voter Identification at the Polis Throughout the interviews, participants expressed the consensus that the requirement to produce ID at the polis is not seen as necessary in the Canadian North, especially in small isolated communities. "Everyone knows everyone else" was a phrase repeated in almost every interview conducted. Producing ID is seen as a strange and redundant process, especially wh en it is likely a family member or friend who will be staffing the polis. As expressed by participants, this issue is compounded because it is not general practice for northerners, especially First Nations, to carry ID because they don't often use it in day-to-day life: "People won't have their ID in their wallet." Simply put, participants felt that this legislation "will create difficulty" in the North, and many people will "fall through the cracks". There was an overall concern expressed in Nunavut and the Nwr that even wh en locals do have ID there will be many issues with inaccuracy including misspelljngs, incorrect information, or information that does not match or is inconsistant across multiple pieces of ID. For example, participants referred to the recent admission by the Government of the Northwest Territories that there are more health cards in circulation than the re are people living in the Nwr. lt was pointed out that birth dates of many Eiders are unclear, or not known, and many First Nations people have names that have been changed or adapted throughout their lifetime. Debit cards are often stolen in lnuvik and employee cards and firearm acquisition cards (FACs) are often inaccurate. Given this, it was made clear by participants th at identification in the North is not a fail-safe way to ensure that the most accurate and necessary information about voters will be obtained. Participants identified youth, Eiders, First Nations, and middle-aged women as those who will have particular trouble proving their residential address because their names generally_ do not appear on many of the documents accepted by Elections Canada for use at the polis. The re is a Iso confusion among familias around who exactly needs to prove their identify. Specifie Challenges Identification lt was explained that in the North physically obtaining a piece of ID is a challenge due to a Jack of resources necessary to create ID in both urban and rural areas. For example, participants reported that there are only two ID machines that produce ID cards that are sent out to communities in the Yukon. Only Dawson City, Watson Lake, and Whitehorse have permanent machines (one in each of these communities) to produce ID cards. Furthermore, participants said that there are ongoing issues with breakdowns, and also with the quality of ID cards that are produced. "There was an instance recounted where a husband and wife came to the polis and itwas assumed th at because the husband had ID the wife didn't need her own form of identification in arder to vote." 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 9 1u v0.1 -1.. During the interviews, participants indicated that there has often ask the executive director to cash their cheques for been a recent push in the North to encourage community them as they do not have bank accounts themselves. members to acquire passports, especially in fly-in communities where airtravel is a necessity su ch as Old Crow, Wh en discussing experiences at the polis in the context of the Yukon. They said that this process has been challenging, new ID requirements, participants reported overwhelmingly as acquiring the necessary supporting documents to get ID that those people turned away for not having adequate ID is difficult for many, particularly Eiders. An example given would Ieave and not return. ln these instances, frustration, in La Ronge, Saskatchewan, by the local librarian was that embarrassment, and even a sense that a person's reaction when people come to the library to get library cards, they could be dangerous to those around them were sentiments sometimes don't even know their address, making even this commonly expressed throughout the interviews. Taking into simple process complicated. The RCMP in Inuvik (NWT) account the long distances northerners may travel in arder said that it is common practice, bath in lnuvik and in severa( to reach their polling station, participants repeated that if ether communities where community members have no ID someone was turned away from the polis and had to drive 2 at ali, for them to provide affidavits for community members or 3 hours to get different ID or a utility bill, they justwouldn't so that these persans can prove their identity. doit. Interviewees repeatedly said that ID costs money and Concern was expressed that the new ID requirements within takes time to acquire. Given the large distances between the voting process would be especially confusing for Eiders communities, slow and unreliable postal service, a Jack of who don't know what to do when they get to the polling perceived need for producing ID, challenges in obtaining station. Eiders "don't like to look stupid" (Oid Crow, Yukon) supporting documents and rare access to the necessary in front of their communities and th us their reaction to being equipment to produce ID cards, the northerners interviewed turned away might be "But you know me" or "This is my land". suggested that they are at a significant disadvantage when This would be considerably more embarrassing for those in it cames to being able to acquire the identification required sm ali communities, participants explained, because they will for options 1 and 2. likely know the persan turning them away. As such it will be an issue "they will talk about ali year" (Dawson City, Yukon). While we did not specifically ask respondents about their views on having a voter ID, sorne participants asked Although there was no evidence of this in the recent by "Why don't we have an 'elections card'?" (La Ronge and election in northern Saskatchewan, there was a sense Whitehorse); ethers expressed concerns that such a card among sorne interviewees that these new requirements would only complicate matters rather than improving the would encourage poli clerks in small towns to bend the ru les situation. In La Ronge and Spruce Home, Saskatchewan, around ID requirements so that community members could participants said that producing such a card is much too avoid embarrassment. reminiscent of a "national ID card" and would ra ise additional concerns about privacy. Residential address and privacy Interviewees repeatedly suggested that the status card Many participants identified the residential address should be adequate proof of ID to vote in federal elections, requirement as an obstacle to voting in federal elections especially when a band or reserve is Iisted on the card. lt for many in the North. Transient workers (many of whom was also suggested that the cards produced by individual have no ID at ali), such as those in Dawson City, Yukon, First Nations such as the Métis card or the Gwich'in Tribal are often also squatters. They live in tents surrounding the Council card be included as viable options in option 2. community and therefore Jack any type of address. Severa( local service providers in Dawson City estimated that there lt was articulated that the North is still very much a cash are severa( hu nd red transient workers per year without any society, so debit cards (known as bank cards) and credit ID in Dawson City alone. cards that are so common in the South do not exist in similar numbers in the North. Participants mentioned that general Many interviewees stated that the term "residential address" stores (NorthMart in Inuvik, Robertson's in La Ronge) cash was not clear, especially considering the often arbitrary cheques for locals who don't have their own bank accounts; systems used to assign addresses (bath street names and furthermore, employees of the youth centre in Inuvik will numbers) in northern communities. Small communities 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 129.2 have house numbers that are not listed on ID but are used ln small communities privacy was also raised as a concern. commonly for band elections. The house numbers currently According to participants, everyone knows everyone and used to identify houses for the purpose of water and sewage their business. Items listed in option 2, such as a bank services are seen in many communities as potentially useful statement, property assessment, government statement, or in beth the revision process and a Iso the general identification a SIN number are of concern in small isolated communities process. lt was suggested by severa! interviewees that where this information cou Id be used to invade the privacy of house numbers, which are different from civic addresses, a voter. Many people stated that they were not comfortable should be taken into account when attempting to find ways using these items to vote. to accommodate northerners. Du ring the interviews, we heard that due to the housing crisis in northern Canada, many electors in these communities live in multiple family or government housing and therefore have more difficulty producing the required ID to vote. Participants said that there are often many families in one home, especially on reserves, and frequently people move from house to house and may not have any fixed address within the community. lt was stated in many interviews that sometimes there are up to 15 people "residing" at one address. ln cases like these, it was explained, many items on the option 2 list will only be in one family member's name (often an older male or "head of the household") and will not be accessible and/or available to the remaining people living there for use as ID (for example, utility bills). Another obstacle mentioned is that many people in the North don't pay federal income tax or contribute to a Canada Pension Plan. For example, many NWT communities surrounding Jnuvik are not tax based, so property tax assessments are irrelevant. The same is true below the 60th parallel on reserves. Furthermore, participants reported that there is a significant amount of government and subsidized housing in the North. Many Eiders and ethers living in this housing do not pay their own bills and th us do not have access to bills in their names. They also noted that many youth in small communities, especially fly-in communities, may Jack ID and bills in their nam es. Another concern raised by participants is that there is confusion around which polling station a person should be going to. "ls it the polling station where your street address is located or where your box is?" La Ronge, Saskatchewan election official. One specifie example in Saskatchewan is the Mistawasis Reserve where everyone lives in the Desnethé riding but has addresses in Leask (which is outside of the riding). The member of Parliament for this area said th at this caused confusion during the last by-election. lt was also made clear that which polling station to go to is confusing for those who use their local band office as their mailing address, but live in a different part of the community. These community members may not receive a voter information card, and they may be confused asto where to vote, close to the band office or close to their home. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1894 5. Vouching Many participants said they were not aware that vouching From the perspective of service providers or ethers in a .was an option for identification. position to vouch for electors, the "first come first served" approach was seen as difficult; they mentioned that it would The vouching process, presented as option 3 in the list of be hard to avoid playing favorites, as they would not want to acceptable identification, was considered problematic by tu rn people away or further disenfranchise potential electors. the northern communities interviewed. While a general indifference among those unfamiliar with the process was Moreover, many expressed confusion as to why multiple expressed insofar as no one thought it could hurt to have vouching cou Id not be an option. Concerns about security and it, the caveats and restrictions surrounding the vouching fraud were seen as extremely minimal in these communities. process (you may only vouch for one person, who in turn cannat vouch for anyone else) were met with concern. ln communities where most people showing up to vote will know those administering the elections, many thought that Those in more isolated communities identified vouching as needing to be formally vouched for was a redundant and theoretically useful given that these communities have less unnecessary process. Severa! participants suggested that access to government offices that issue ID. ln reality, the only th ose unknown in the community should need someone vouching process is contingent on having an adequate ratio to vouch for them, and that "common sense" would ensure of th ose with acceptable 1D and those who need someone to that people showing up at the polis could vote despite not vouch for them and this ratio, participants expressed, could having adequate ID. Issues concerning compromised not be met in many of these small communities. Ultimately, security and voting fraud were mentioned mainly by those it appears that the places where vouching in its current form involved in the administering of elections; many participants could be used were also the places that had less of a need in the communities found the idea of someone bothering for it. to vote multiple times unlikely and unfeasible given the resources needed to travel ta more than one polling station Specifie challenges du ring the course of election day. Lack of information/misinformation Overall, participants felt that the vouching process was not adequately promoted or communicated as an option. Many participants interviewed either had no knowledge or incorrect knowledge of how it was supposed to work. Th ose who were "Vouching could be very familiar with the vouching process cited its complexity and problematic in very small the consequent difficulties in communicating that complexity as major obstacles to its implementation. Specifie issues communities." identified included not understanding who could vouch for whom within a polling division or at a polling station, Nunavut or why those already known to elections officiais should need to formally vouch at ali. For example, in La Ronge, Saskatchewan, seme electors during the last by-electiqn found themselves at the same polling station but were told they were in different polling divisions and therefore ineligible to vouch for one another. "One to one is useless; Multiple vouching not enough." Allowing someone with acceptable identification to vouch for only one ether persan was seen by many participants as Nunavut problematic in ensuring accessibility to northern electors. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North i on~ C:J ~J ···' 1896 6. Letters of Attestation 7. Communicationg With Electors "There was no direct contact with individual band A. Voter Information Card (VIC}/Householder administrators/village councils to ens ure someone During the interviews, ali participants (excepting interviews was in place to sign attestation forms. A faxed out conducted by phone) were shawn copies of the VIC and form is insufficient. Follow-up calls need to be householder produced by Elections Canada for the fall made and individuals identified on election day." 2007 and spring 2008 by-elections describing the new voter identification requirements. For the majority of participants, Desnethé Riding, Saskatchewan the complexity of the documents' messaging and laya ut was seen as a barrier to comprehension. Participants noted that, as with vouching, there are several issues concerning letters of attestation that impede their The comment received most often was that many people utility. First of ali, having letters of attestation as part of who receive the VIC and the householder in the mail would option 2 was not viewed as helpful because many people simply throw them away without looking at them. When didn't even notice it in the long list of ID options. Once this showing participants bath materials, the overall sentiment was clarified, most participants could think of one or two was that bath were too confusing, wordy, and generally not instances in which it would be useful (hospitals, shelters); useful. however, many people did not think it applied at ali. ft was suggested by sorne participants that a possible solution to lmportantly, many people thought that the VIC was an increasing the efficacy of letters of attestation is to expand acceptable form of identification because it seemed to the list of th ose in a position of authority to provide one. contain ali the information listed as acceptable on the householder. These participants wondered why it could not Specifie challenges be used as ID to vote. Too dependent on the whims of individuals Specifie challenges Concerns were expressed by participants, especially those in the Desnethé riding, that the letter of attestation was Complexity of messaging not always accessible to electors due to the difficulties in actually procuring one from a recognized authority. This When written materials are used, many participants in ali problem with implementation is expressed in several regions reiterated they should be written at a Grade 6 level examples communicated in interviews throughout the North. of literacy (maximum) and be simple and to the point in arder For instance, having a housing authority or band chief sign to communicate to a wide cross-section of the population. a letter of attestation cou Id be difficult as it means relying on someone who may or may not be willing to sign the form, The amou nt of information on bath the VIC and householder, participants explained. Manipulation and coercion in the combined with small print, was viewed as "too much". case of authorities who may withhold a letter of attestation Although thorough, it was mentioned that these materials from members who do not align with certain partisan views over-inform and consequently are regarded as not worth the was also expressed as a concern by interviewees. ln these effort to read and understand. One participant who works situations, participants suggested that there is tao much with at-risk youth said she "would never send a document anus on the individual to procure a letter of attestation. (like the householder and the VIC) to the parents she works with" (Whitehorse, Yukon), highlighting the numerous Lack of awareness and advance notice misinterpretations that could be caused by the level of complexity on bath materials. As with the vouching process, many interviewees were unaware that letters of attestation were acceptable forms of The divisions between the three options on the householder ID. Many people said that they had .not heard of them at were another source of confusion to many participants, as ali, and in the Desnethé riding participants mentioned that the three boxes at the top and two lists (options 1 and 2) the candidates had not talked about them during outreach were again seen as simply too much information. efforts. Several election officiais and candidates interviewed in Desnethé said that they had tried to publicize this option, but found it very difficult to get in touch with authorities who could provide letters of attestation, such as band chiefs, managers, and membership coordinators. Throughout the North it was expressed that letters of attestation would take tao much effort to organize before an election. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North Look and feel Languages identified by participants as useful (in addition to English and French) were: Participants stated that the VIC looked like advertising Cree and Dene (beth verbal and written) and that it ends up in "piles of garbage at the post office". lnuktitut 1 a dialect of lnuktitut called lnuinnaqtun, which Because written materials are seen as secondary to verbal is pronounced like lnuktitut but uses the alphabet communication, a suggestion of one participant to ensure instead of lnuktitut symbols (beth verbal and written, that the VIC and householder are not thrown away was to Nunavut) reinforce their importance through radio announcements Michif (Metis Language) (Verbal) indicating that electors will be receiving information in Dogrib (beth verbal and written) the mail about new voter ID requirements, and that these Inuit (beth verbal and written) documents are important. Several official languages in NWT (verbal) Gwich'in and lnuvialuktun (beth verbal and written) Misleading message German (Yukon) (written) Participants perceived the VIC as misleading in that the phrase "This is not identification" is not prominently featured. B. Advertising Campaign/Outreach Initiatives Because the VIC has ali needed persona! information on By far the most successful forms of advertising, promotion, it (name, address, polling station, etc.) sorne participants and outreach identified by participants surrounding the new thought that by virtue of receiving one you didn't have to identification requirements were those that involved verbal bring any ether identification to the polis. communication. Whether a radio PSA or a community member talking to electors about the changes, persona! While the householder's intent is to inform electors of what outreach that involves a conversation, listening to a radio type of ID they can bring, again its length "gave people a program, or ward of mouth was seen as critical, as opposed false sense of security" (La Ronge, Saskatchewan). Many to passively receiving information in the mail and being participants suggested that while viewing the long list, expected to (1) actually read the materials and (2) take an community members would assume they had sorne form of action based on one's interpretation of them. acceptable ID without making the effort to confirm. Specifie challenges Languages used Lack of awareness - new ID requirements The overall needs regarding language echoed throughout the communities surveyed breaks down into two parts: As one participant stated, "there was no mainstream news 1. having written materials available in many languages interest (until) after the fact when there was an issue, besides English and French; but not during the election" (media expert - Saskatoon, 2. having verbal service provided in First Nations Saskatchewan). People expressed frustration that the languages. education and awareness campaigns undertaken by candidates, MPs, political parties and Elections Canada According to participants, due to strong oral traditions in were inconsistent, unclear, and did not start weil enough in many First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities, verbal advance. translations (for Eiders and those with low or no literacy) are more useful to have than are written translations. For Participants noted that simply having written materials like instance, it was reported that local First Nations languages the VIC and Householder sent by mail during a campaign is may not always be codified and therefore although the entire not effective outreach because too much onus is put on the community may speak it, it's unlikely that many will be able individual to read, comprehend, and th en take action. Without to read it. However, print materials were still deemed useful an accompanying verbal explanation or push (whether it be by participants, and it was suggested that it may be helpful hearing ali your neighbors tai king about getting new ID to vote to send materials in First Nations languages to returning or listening to a radio interview about the new requirements), officers, a practice that used to be commonplace (according participants suggested that most people would not take to one elections official in Saskatchewan). action to ensure their ID is acceptable to vote. Interviewees explained that more effective outreach strategies would be ln addition to the 27 languages found on Elections Canada's radio campaigns, PSAs, TV commercial$, word of mouth Web site, many people expressed the need to be served by and door-to-door advertising when used in tandem with Elections Canada officiais in the ir own language, orto easily written promotions such as posters. access someone to translate. For example, participants in Nunavut said that if someone calls to revise their information on the list of electors, they need to have the option of being served in lnuktitut. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North Lack of awareness - election event ensued. ln the Desnethé riding one interviewee said that an Elections Canada official was turning people away if they "ln the case of the by-election, sorne didn't even know didn't have ID without telling them that they could go home there was a by-election until after the fact" (La Ronge, to find an alternative piece of ID or be vouched for. Another Saskatchewan). example from Desnethé was that when election time came around "sorne elections workers had only worked for two Severa! specifie issues expressed by participants across ali days and they were answering the phones but didn't have a regions included the need for informational sessions and clue (about what was going on)" (La Ronge, Saskatchewan). workshops, as weil as ether education initiatives in general, and a concerted media buy in ali languages prier to the Participants in Saskatchewan noted that a better election. Also, participants, especially service providers, understanding of local realities must be integrated into viewed the first few days after the writ is dropped as crucial the structure of this program for it to be successful: "The in getting the ward out. community needs to be more involved in this process." Community involvement is seen as critical to ensure that lt was stated by many participants that using local resources the program is actually reaching those it intends to reach in to assist in outreach is very important; suggestions included the most effective and accessible manner possible. Having informing community service providers about the changes an "in" with the local community is critical in effectively and asking them to pass on the information, setting up communicating a message to a diversity of community general information tables in frequented public venues, or members. lt was repeated consistently thatthe CRO program having incarne tax professionals let people know that they "could be great" but currently isn't reaching its mandated can update their information wh en they file the ir taxes. goals or potential. Interviewees stated that CROs should have the budget and time to travel to remote communities. Elections Canada's Web site Sorne local election officiais suggested that CROs could also act as liaison between the RO and local communities, supporting the RO in finding local poli clerks for example. "The Elections Canada Web site should be made less complicated. lt's very hard to Many participants noted that in the North it is extremely find what information you're looking for." difficult to fill these positions with qualified people. There is a Jack of staffing at the polis and also in elections offices. Nunavut Even once someone is offered a position it is "hard to find people who will show up". (election official, La Ronge, For example, one participant in Nunavut mentioned that he Saskatchewan). The wage differentiai (working territorial had gene to the Web site to look for information but after a elections pays more than working federal cnes - NWT) is few minutes of not being able to find what he was looking such that it is even harder to hire workers people to staff for, gave up. the polis, according to severa! participants. They explained that it is not only a matter of pay scales but also that these Election officers' involvement positions are short term and have to compete with higher paying longer term options. There was a general consensus among participants that programs such as the Community Relations Officer (CRO) lt was said by severa! people involved in the Desnethé by Program and the Aboriginal Eider and Youth Program are election that the returning officer and field liaison officer did good in theory but are not currently meeting the objectives a good job, and did the best they could with the resources or needs of the community, particularly in terms of available to them. Many noted that they had no interaction communicating these new requirements. with community relations officers during the by-election, and sorne didn't know that the program existed at ali. Election officers who were interviewed indicated that the training for election workers was deemed insufficient, the According to community members and election officiais, manuals were seen as confusing and often changed at the workers at the polis in Desnethé were frustrated and last minute, and there was confusion as to the goals and many of them didn't agree with the ·ID requirements. This objectives that the CRO and Aboriginal Eider and Youth influenced their presentation of the options to electors; as programs are trying to achieve. stated by an elections official, "Everyone just bucked it'' (La Ronge, Saskatchewan). lt was also stated in Desnethé During the recent by-election in Desnethé, participants in La that "Elections Canada will need to overcome the fact that Ronge stated that elections officiais in Ottawa and in the there was wrong information out du ring the last election" (La local riding were not giving out consistent information about Ronge, Saskatchewan). the new ID requirements and thus confusion and frustration 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1900 8. Voting Issues in the North Experience at the polis lt was noted that people will make the effort to vote once and if it is a bad experience it will "shake the ability to engage Dramatic distances, ice roads, or no roads at ali, and often a them in the future" (La Ronge, Saskatchewan). Some people severe Jack of infrastructure, were ali identified by participants may even be angry and vocal; it was suggested that they as challenges faced by Canadians who live in the far North. would say things like "The government messed up" (Oid A concrete example given by one participant occurred in Crow, Yukon). 2004 when severe weather in Northern Saskatchewan meant that people just didn't show up ta vote. Freeze-up and Distances in the North were another reoccurring theme breakup as weil as hunting and fishing seasons were also during interviews, especially wh en it came to advanced polis described as unavoidable hindrances by interviewees. As and ether voting options that require travelling. Interviewees a northern Saskatchewan journalist explains "This obstacle explained that participating in an election is far more costly cames dawn to the different contexts in which elections and difficult for many voters in the North th an it is for someone are taking place and how they are understood. Elections living in downtown Vancouver or Halifax. One participant Canada needs to be aware of the differences in the North" said, "What is needed in Toronto doesn't work in small (La Ronge, Saskatchewan). communities. These regulations are a step backwards." Participants indicated that in the North it is not unusual at ali "Ottawa and Toronto don't know what is going on here." for a poli not to open because the deputy returning officer is out hunting caribou (Desnethé riding during by-election) ft was repeated often (especially in the Desnethé riding) or for an advance poli not to happen because it coïncides that people have "election fatigue" and that it is important with hunting season for the community (Uranium City, to recognize that a federal election is only one of many Saskatchewan, recent election). Participants emphasized elections in First Nations communities; band, municipal, that those in Ottawa or in the larger cities who service the provincial/territorial elections ali compete for a voter's North need to be more sensitive to this cultural reality. attention. Participants stated that education around what a federal election actually means is critical in ensuring that "Ottawa doesn't understand our communities." northerners understand why elections are important. For example, many voters in Nunavut expressed confusion as At the same time, participants talked about resilience and to how federal elections are run and how the prime minister an ability to cape with external circumstances as particular is elected through representatives versus the territorial non to the North; one election worker in La Ronge explained that partisan system. during the fast federal election she had worked at a polling station during a blackout, and despite everything "everyone just kept going" (librarian and election worker, La Ronge, Saskatchewan). There was an ove rail consensus among th ose we interviewed th at working to clarify and simplify the voting process, as weil as adapting it to the realities of living in the North, are critical and would greatly enhance the experience of northerners at the polis. According to participants, voting in the North requires a commitment that should not be underestimated. Participants noted that the myriad realities surrounding voting in the North, whether physical (walking across town, driving three hours, or taking a boat or plane to the polling station) or persona! (voting happens in a community setting and the act of voting [or Jack thereof] will be witnessed by your neighbors, friends, and family) must be taken into account. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1 1)(11 -. • ... • · ..• •rl,. Specifie challenges Voting methods Time constraints Bath the mail-in ballot and advance polling days were overwhelmingly seen as useful tools. The mail-in ballot As mentioned previously, participants felt that there was not however, was deemed more useful in larger communitie~ enough time to procure adequate ID between the time the where the postal service is more reliable, as it was repeatedly writ is dropped and the election. mentioned th at mail in the North in general can be too slow to ensure that people will be able to mail their votes in on time. Revision Participants (predominantly those in Nunavut) explained that sometimes it is too much trouble for people to actually lt was repeatedly stated that revision is useful for outreach go and mail a ballot, due to factors including remoteness and is a great way to "spread good information." Participants and isolation. said that information about ID requirements should be communicated during the revision process. There was a concern among participants that advance polis only exist in sorne communities; for example, in the Interviewees stated th at an updating of the· voters list is Desnethé riding advance polis were only in larger areas urgently required in the Canadian North, especially in First like Prince Albert. "Moving advance polis around to different Nations communities because of the "fluid occupation" in communities would be positive, to give as many people these communities. About 45 percent of the population is as possible a chance to vote in these polis" (La Ronge, under the age of 23 and many of these young people are Saskatchewan). not on the voters list, according to many participants. lt was recommended that a large part of the revision process be "Advance polis work! Elections in the North have been carried out by individuals who know the communities and decided on advance polis" (Nunavut). understand the cultural context. lt was repeated numerous times that the voters list is currently perceived as inaccurate. Although not currently options, registering and voting on-line Tools such as the Métis communities' own enumeration were both identified by a few participants as tools th at would process, water and tax bills, as weil as provinciallists, were potentially increase voting accessibility in the North. For seen as important in ensuring that the list is kept up ta date. example, the Yukon has the highest rate per capita of people lt is also seen as critical ta communicate with First Nations on-line. There were, however, mixed reactions to the use of leadership in arder to facilitate this process. technology in the electoral process and not ali respondents supportedtheidea. Elections officers mentioned that it is hard to find staff ta carry out revision. Mobile polis or sorne sort of special ballot were seen as extremely useful in work camps. This was another area Also, many were under the perception that "revision" is where frequent revision of the polling list was seen as useful actually enumeration; among interviewees, there was a lot of given the transient population. confusion about what the revision process actually entailed. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1902 9. Recommandations Northern Canada, while a geographically vast part of the country, contains a small and often overlooked segment of the population. The amendments made to the Canada Elections Act in 2007 concerning the voter identification requirements, can have significant and unexpected effects on those living in small, rural communities across the Canadian North. At present, electors in Pond ln let do not have the sa me resources, information, and tools at the ir disposai to vote as electors in Toronto, nor are there adequate accommodations being made to ensure that the particular reality and challenges faced by northern electors are taken into consideration in the voting options available to them. The recommendations below encourage increased clarity, communication and streamlining of current practices to ensure that ali northern Canadians have the same opportunity to cast a ballot as their southern neighbors. The recommendations aim to find a balance between the need for accessibility and the need for security when it cames ta voting in federal elections. We encourage Elections Canada to work with its existing tools and programs to both clarify and improve them so as to better meet the needs of northern Canadians. Major legislative change is not recommended. Rather, we focus on the challenges of communicating these new ID re quirements to northerners and ensuring that ali Elections Canada officiais, especially those who are not based in northern Canada, work to become more aware and sensitive to the unique realities of the North. The new ID requirements are an opportunity for Elections Canada to work to develop innovative practices in creating an accessible process so that ali electors have an equal opportunity to cast a ballot. With voter turnout already law in these small, rural, often First Nations communities, the perception of a problem with the voting process, has, in our opinion, just as much potential to dissuade voters as does whether or not the ID requirement can actually be met. These recommendations address beth the perceptions of northern voters and the effectiveness of the electoral system itself for voters in the North. A. Voter Identification Requirements Recommendation 1: The following should be considered for addition to the list of authorized pieces of identification: • baptismal certificates • band enrollment number documentation - "enrollment card" • band membership cards (for example, Gwich'in Tribal Council card, Métis card) • NTI card • land claims documents/beneficiary card Notes: • Status cards only have pictures if they have been renewed recently. • Debit (commonly know as bank cards in the North) cards in NWT are generic (don't have names on them). • SIN card: those who are married may have a different name on their SIN card. · • Locals, especially First Nations, don't have hunting and fishing licences. Seme interviewees suggested that hunting and fishing licences should be taken off the list. But in Fort Smith, which has a 90 percent voter tu rn out, they have been useful. Recommendation 2: Further examine in collaboration with the federal government the current reality that no federal piece of ID meets option 1 criteria, and that obtaining ID in the North remains a significant challenge; Recommendation 3: Consider allowing letters of attestation to be provided by a community authority (mayor or equivalent) or elections official for ali residents in any community with less than 1 000 members, especially th ose th at are particularly isolated (e.g. fly-in communities). 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 1903 Recommendation 3; Consider allowing letters of attestation to be provided by a community authority (mayor or equivalent) or elections official for ali residents in any community with less than 1 000 members, especially th ose th at are particularly isolated (e.g. fly-in communities). Recommendation 4: Clarify and expand the letter of attestation option. Allow application to a broader cross-section of institutions/situations. Recommendation 5: Remove letter of attestation from option 2 and have it be a category unto itself. Recommendation 6: House numbers (which are different from civic addresses) should be taken into account when attempting to fi nd ways to accommodate northerner voters. B. Communications and Outreach Recommendation 7: Redesign the voter information card and householder to ensure clarity, especially for those with low literacy levels. Notes: Suggestions by participants include: • Use shorter and simpler language (maximum Grade 6 leve! of literacy). • Have important words and phrases in bold capitals, such as "VOTER REMINDER CARO", "THIS IS NOT ID", "IMPORTANT- BRING THIS CARO AND IDENTIFIC}\TION TO VOTE". • Use brighter and more "user-friendly" design incorporating pictures and more colors. • Focus on two to three main messages as opposed to including ALL options and details. • Both the voter information card and the householder need to make it clear that (1) there are NEW AND DIFFERENT ru les regarding identification and (2) these ru les are important and you need to understand them and take action to make sure you can abide by them. Recommendation 8: Ensure that materials in ali available languages offered by Elections Canada are accessible from the front page of the Elections Canada Web site, and that every effort is made to provide verbal translation by Elections Canada when possible, especially in lnuktitut and related languages. Recommendation 9: ln collaboration with local communities continue to support voting education initiatives that directly target the North and First Nations communities in between elections. Recommendation 10: Begin education about new ID requirements before the writ is dropped for the next election. Recommendation 11: The Community Relations Officer Program is a èritical program that is not currently achieving its program goals. Revisit this program to ensure: • Accessibility of training materials • Clarity of job description and goals Recommendation 12: Review the Community Relations Officer Program and determine whether or not this program should be administered solely by Elections Canada or wh ether it may be more effective to partner with external groups su ch First Nations and youth organizations to administer this program. Recommendation 13: Ensure clarity of messaging regarding ID requirements so that consistent information is provided by ali Elections Canada staff. 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North 10!l1 - ~ '<...1 :l Recommendation 14: lmplement mandatory cultural sensitivity training of ali Elections Canada officiais who may work with First Nations or northern communities, especially those not based in the North. Recommendation 15: Continue the Aboriginal Eider and Youth Program, but work with local communities' members to ensure that this program is meeting its goals. Notes: As additional support for Eiders at the polis was a consistent theme, sorne suggestions include: • Translators and hel pers for Eiders (helpers currently read out voting options for Eiders who can't read or write) • Eiders need to be encouraged to ask for help • Provide pictures of each candidate's/political party's symbols for those who can't read C. Voting Process Recommendation 16: Expand targeted revision in the North, with a specifie focus on First Nations communities. Ensure that outreach materials and messaging surrounding the new ID requirements are communicated as part of the revision process. Note: There is still the perception that "revision" is actually enumeration. There was a lot of confusion about what the revision pro cess actually entailed and this must be clarified, especially among th ose who are part of the electoral process. Recommendation 17: Clarify and expand the use of mobile polis. Allow application to a broader number of situations (e.g. work camps). Note: Mobile polis or sorne sort of special ballot were seen as extremely useful in work camps. This was another area where frequent revision of the polling list was seen as useful given the transient population. This is an area of significant con cern that needs particular attention. Recommendation 18: Hold advance polis in more communities or move advanced polis around to different communities, to ensure as many people as possible have access. Recommendation 19: Work to implement the use of on-line methods to enable extremely rural voters to participate in the electoral process. 1O. Appendices 1. List of interviewees (date, location, name and title) 2. Interview Guide 3. Letters from Elections Camada APATI-IVISBORING 2008 Implementation of the Identification requirements in the Canadian North .f.lamê~~ o&cüi>atto~~~*~~~i~~~--w~ •Tà"ri:ietïGroûlliiSîîolioitêarëriP.artïën~ .Cit\tibrmïwii~ F!r~t\WFera~'Fer'iit~stattls~~~~ Esau Schafer Vun!ut Gwi!chin First Nation - Depu!v Chief Flv in communi!ies 1 Ars! Nations OldCrow Yukon ln!erviewed Aoril 2008 JoeTe!lichi Vun!ut Gwi!chin First Na!lon -Justice Coordina!or Flv in communi!ies 1 Ars! Nations O!dCrow Yukon ln!erviewed Aoril 2008 Meqan Williams Vun!u! Gwilchin Arst Nalion - Herilaae Manaaer Fiv in communi!les O!d Crow Yukon ln!erviewed Aoril 2008 Marion Schafer Vun!u! Gwi!chin First Nation- Communi!v Heal!h Reoresen!ative FlY in communi!ies 1 First Nations Old Crow Yukon ln!erviewed Aoril 2008 Kimberiv Blake Vun!u! Gwilchin First Nation- Heal!h and Social Services- Office Assistant Flv in communities 1 First Nations OldCrow Yukon ln!erviewed April 2008 Tracv Kaouschak Vun!u! Gwi!chin First Nation- Home and Communitv Gare Coordinator Fiv in communities 1 First Nations OldCrow Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 Tracv Ri soin Vuntut Gwi!chin Arst Nation- Education Director Fiv in communi!ies 1 Arst Nations Old Crow Yukon !nterviewed April 2008 idaTizva Oid Crow Communitv Member Fiv in communlties 1 First Nations OldCrow Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 Robert Bruce Oid Crow Communitv Member F!v ln communilies 1 First Nations Old Crow Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 Constable Shannon Steller RCMP Officer Dawson Citv Service Provider Dawson Ci!y Yukon interviewed April 2008 Susan Titterinaton Anclican Minlster Service Provider Dawson Citv Yukon interviewed April 2008 Lee Titterino!on Anolican Minister Service Provider Dawson City_ Yukon !nterviewed Aori! 2008 WalkerThomas Graham Head Nurse in Charce Service Provider Dawson City Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 K_yia Popadvnec Dawson Citv Communitv Member Communi!v Member Dawson Cl!v Yukon lnterviewed APril 2008 Courtney Cratty Tr'ondek Hwech"ln- Suooort Centre Ars! Nations Dawson Citv Yukon lnterviewed Aori! 2008 Father Mouchet Old Crow Health & Fi!ness Prooram Fiv in communities 1 Seniors Whilehorse Yukon lnterviewed Aoril 2008 Gavle Gruben !nuvialuit Reoional Corporation - Office Manacer inuit lnuvik NWT !nterviewed April 2008 Debbie Dillon !nuvia!uit Recional Corporation - Executive Secretarv Inuit lnuvik NWT lnterviewed April 2008 Derek Lindsav Mavor- Town of inuvik Service Provider inuvik NWT lnterviewed April 2008 ChE!ryi Wright Gwich'in Tribal Counci!- Office Manaoer First Nations inuvik NWT interviewed APril 2008 Lawrence Norbert Gwich'in Tribal Council- Communications Advisor First Nations lnuvik NWT interviewed Aorii 2008 Liz Hansen lnuvik Native Band - Councilor First Nations inuvik NWT interviewed Aoril 2008 W.M. Bill Eubank S/Sgt. !nuvik RCMP Officer Service Provider inuvik NWT lnterviewed Aori! 2008 Lindsay Wood lnuvik Youth Center Prooram Coordinator Youth lnuvik NWT lnterviewed Aoril 2008 Ms. Jo-Ann Wauah Yukon Territorial CEO Election Official Whitehorse Yukon interviewed April 2008 Larrv Bacnell Member of Pariiament- Yukon Member of Parliament Whitehorse Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 Susan Edelman Yukon Returninc Officer IROs - Elections Canada! Elections Canada Whilehorse Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 David Prodan Whi!ehorse Bovs and Girls Club - Executive Director Youth Whltehorse Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 Louise HardY Social Worker 1 Former Member of Pariiament Transient Members Whi!ehorse Yukon tnterviewed April 2008 1 Carole Kroenina Whitehorse Communitv Member 1 Peliv Crossina Resident lsolated Resident Whitehorse Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 · ! Todd HardY Yukon Territorial -Leader of the OooosiUon Etected Offical Whitehorse Yukon lnterviewed April 2008 )> Rob Clarke Member of Parliament- Desnethé Member of Parliament Ottawa Saskatchewan tnterviewed June 2008 "'C Joan Beatty Liberal Candidate - Desnethé Candidate Deschambauit Lake Saskatchewan tnterviewed June 2008 "'C Brian Morin NDP Candidate - Desnethé Candidate Buffalo Narrows Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 CD Jennifer Brown Metis Youth Activist MetlsYouth Prince Albert Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 ::::s Roger Francis Recional Media Advisor Media Saskatoon Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 o. Jim Mattern CJWW- Saskatoon - Journalist Media Saskatoon Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 )(' PE)ggyWoods Field Llason Officer E!ec!lons Canada Saskatoon Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 Mariene Wolkoskv Returnina Officer - La Ronce Elec!lons Canada La Ronqe Saskatchewan tnterviewed June 2008 ...:.. Robin-Orr Green Partv Candidate Candidate La Ronae Saskatchewan tnterviewed June 2008 Valerie Bames-Conneli La Ronqe Northemer Media La Ronce Saskatchewan !nterviewed June 2008 Rosemarv Loeffle~ MUS Town of La Ronae Service Provider: Former Elections Canada La Ronce Saskatchewan lnterviewed June 2008 Meo Shatilia Spruce Home Communitv Member Rural Residents Soruce Home Saskatchewan tnterviewed June 2008 Clifford l_quaa Innova Municipal Liaison Officer Service Provider· ohotoaraoher for General ioloolik Nunavut lnterviewed May 14 2008 Wendy Pickneii Constable RCMP RCMP klaluit Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 11 2008 Vlnnie Karetak Director of Communicatinos Qikiotani Inuit Association Service Provider: QIA toalui! Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 12 2008 Sidonie Unoalaq Communitv Liaison Officer loloolik Service Provider: QINIQ lnlooiik Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 14 2008 Sandv Kosuaak Chief Electoral Office~ Nunavut Elections Canada lolooiik Nunavut lnterviewed May 16 2008 Mike Gardner Reverend toalui! CommunitVService Provider Tclaluit Nunavut lnterviewed May 16 2008 James Barlow Reverend St. Jude's Anoiican Church faaluit Communii\1Service Provider Tclatuit Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 13 2008 Rai Downe Sous-ministre ad" ointe resoonsible des oroorammes et des norms Ministere de la Sante et des Services socia laalui! Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 12 2008 Michael Seidemann Constable RCMP 1 looiik Detachment RCMP lalooiik Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 14 2008 Mike lmmaroitok Land Administra!or loloolik Service Provider: Hamlet Office in lnlooiik lnloolik Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 14 2008 Leah Otak ManaQe~ IQ and Oral Hlstorv Research Nunavut Research lnstitute Communitv Researcher lnlooiik Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 14 2008 Beverley Browne Senior Jud!le Justice Deoartment lnaluit lnaluit Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 16 2008 Jimmv Akavak RCMP Communi!v & Inuit Poiiclna Section RCMP lnalui!· Inuit Communitv Service Pro Ina luit Nunavut lnterviewed Mav 12 2008 Ed Picco MLA lqaluil East Minls!e~ Govemment of Nunavut !nalult Nunavut !nterviewed Mav 12 2008 Charlie Anaus Member of Pariiament Member of Pariiament Kirk!and Lake Ontario lnterviewed Auaust 11 2008 Brian Jean Member of Pariiament Member of Pariiament Fort McMurrav Alberta lnterviewed June 2008 JayHill Member of Pariiament Member of Pariiament FortS!. John BC lnterviewed June 2008 Louise Chemetz Winnipeq: North East Winnioeo Justice and Peace Field Sun nort Officer Nunavut lnterviewed Auoust 11 2008 Elizabeth Wvman Retumina Officer Western Arc!lc Elections Canada NWT !ntervlewed Auqust 12 2008 Kelly Provost News Dlrector at Mlsslniol Broadcastina Corooration Media La Ronqe Saskatchewan lnterviewed Auoust 7 2008 ~ Denise Yuhas MLA Constituencv Assistant MLA Camoaion Manaoer Elected Offical Fort Smith NWT lnterviewed Auqust 7 2008 Nathan Culien Member of Pariiament Member of Pariiament Smi!hers BC lnterviewed Auoust 29 2008 ç_.~ Sue Heron-Herbert Aboriainal Communitv Relations Officer Elec!lons Canada Yellowknife NWT !nterviewed Auqust 22 2008 0 Nancy Karetak-Lindeil Member of Pariiament Member of Pariiament loaluit Nunavut lnterviewed June 2008 Roger Valley Member of Pariiament Member of Parliament Kenora Ontario lntervlewed June 2008 ë.-'"r Appendix 2 ~ Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements Ëlections CanaCia at Federal Elections - Interview Guide The Canada Elections Act, which govems the administration of federal elections in Canada, was amended in June 2007 to require electors to prove their identity and residential address when voting. · Following a detailed analysis by Elections Canada, it was determined that large numbers of electors geographically concentrated in rural and northem communities do not have a complete civic address or do not have identification documents with a civic address. It was also noted that electors residing in the same polling division would not be able to vouch for other electors since most electors in the polling division would likely have no document to prove their residential address. Parliament passed legislation in December 2007 to provide that if an elector or voucher provides a piece of identification, he or she is considered to have proved their address if the address on the piece(s) of identification used is consistent with the information on the federal list of electors. (See Annex A for more information on the new identification requirements and implementation.) Objectives Elections Canada is undertaking consultations with various groups and within specifie regions that are more likely to experience problems with the new voter identification requirements when voting at federal elections. The objectives of this consultation are: • To identify any barriers arising from the implementation of the new identification requirements; To determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and to determine if there are additions or changes that could be made to the list to reduce barriers; and To determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges. (See Annex B for information about the authorised pieces of identification.) Elections Canada commissioned Apathy is Boring to conduct initial consultations in the Canadian North to get fu.rther insights into the existing challenges and potential solutions that are unique to electors regarding the accessibility of the electoral process. (See Annex C for more information onApathy is Boring.) The results of these consultations will be made available once completed. 1907 Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements ~Ele--c=t:"::"ion=s~c=--a-n-aëla at Federal Elections - Interview Guide AnnexA- New identification requirements and implementation The Canada Elections Act provides three options for an elector to proofhis or her identity and residence: Option 1 Provide one original piece of identification issued by a Canadian government, whether federal, provincial, territorial or local, or an ageney of that government, that contains a photograph of the elector and his or her name and address; or Option 2 Provide two original pieces of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada each of which establishes the elector' s name and at least one of which establishes the elector's address (see Annex B). The Chief Electoral Officer may authorize as a piece of identification for Option 2 any document, regardless of who has issued it; or Option 3 Be vouched for by an elector whose name appears on the list of electors in the same polling division and who has an acceptable piece or pieces of identification (as indicated in Option 1 or Option 2). If an elector uses this option, both will be required to make a swom statement. In addition, an elector cannot vouch for more than one person, and the person who has been vouched for cannot vouch for another elector. The new voter identification requirements were first implemented during the September 17, 2007, by-elections held in Outremont (Québec), Roberval-Lac-Saint-Jean (Québec) and Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagat (Québec), and subsequently during the March 17, 2008, by-elections held in Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River (Saskatchewan), Toronto Centre (Ontario), Vancouver Quadra (British Columbia) and Willowdale (Ontario). Elections Canada's communications and outreach activ.ities were re-worked, including its advertising campaign, to incorporate key messages about the new voter identification requirements. In particular, the Voter Information Card was revised to include specifie messages about the new requirements and a new householder was created. The householder included the three options to prove identity at the polis as well as the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. The householder was translated into 27 heritage languages and made available on Elections Canada's Web site. As well, a poster coiltaining the three options for voter identification was created for display at polling stations and other locations. Elections Canada also developed an information backgrounder specifie to the new identification rules as well as two new sections on its Web site. In addition, as an Attestation of Residence is authorized under Option 2, community relations officers obtained signatures from administrators of homeless shelters, soup ? 1.908 Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements ~El ....ec=t~ion=s"""""!::c:-a-n-aëla at Federal Elections - Interview Guide kitchens, senior residences, student residences and Aboriginal bands and delivered them to deputy retuming officers on election day to validate the attestations. Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements ~Ël;...;;ec~t:;;:ion=s~c:;;;;a;;;;;;n=aaa at Federal Elections - Interview Guide Annex 8 - Option 2 Provide two original pieces of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Bath pieces must contain the elector's name, and one must also contain the elector's address. Identity Cards Original documents (containing name and address) D Health Card D Social Insurance Number Card D Credit Card Statement D Birth Certificate D Bank Statement D Driver's Licence D Utility Bill (residential telephone, cable D Canadian Passport TV, public utilities commission, hydra, gas D Certificate of Indian Status or water) D Certificate of Canadian Citizenship or D Attestation of Residence issued by the Citizenship Card responsible authority of an Indian band or D Credit/Debit Card with elector name reserve D Canadian Forces Identity Card D Local Property Tax Assessment D Veterans Affairs Canada Health Card D School, College or University Report Card D Employee Card issued by employer or Transcript D Old Age Security Identification Card D Residential Lease, Residential Mortgage D Public Transportation Card Statement or Agreement D Student ID Card D Canada Child Tax Benefit Statement D Library Card D Incarne Tax Assessment Notice D Liquor Identification Card D Insurance Policy D Canadian Blood Services/Héma-Québec D Government Cheque or Government Ca rd Cheque Stub with elector name D Hospital Card D Statement of Employment Insurance D Fishing Licence Benefits Paid {T4E) D Wildlife Identification Card D Canada Pension Plan Statement of D Hunting Licence Contributions/Quebec Pension Plan D Firearm Acquisition Card/Firearm Statement of Participation Possession Card D Statement of Old Age Security {T4A) or D Outdoors Card and Licences Statement of Canada Pension Plan D Provincial/Territorial Identification Card Benefits (T4AP) D Local Community Service Centre Card D Statement of Benefits from provincial {CLSC) workplace safety or insurance board D Statement of Direct Deposit for provincial works or provincial disability support program D Vehicle Ownership D Vehicle Insurance D Attestation of Residence issued by the responsible authorities (shelters, soup kitchens, student/senior residences, long term care facilities) D Letter from public curator Note: A document bearing an address may be used as proof of the elector's address if this address was written by the issuer of the document and is the same as or consistent with the address on the list of electors. No document other than those included on this list may be accepted to establish the name and address of an elector. 4 Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements ~el-ec;;;;;;:t:;;:;ion=s~c:;-a-n=aaa at Federal Elections - Interview Guide Annex C - Apathy is Boring tm APATI-IYISBOI=liNG Tired of seeing their peers feel disconnected from the democratie system, three young Canadians founded Apathy is Boring in January 2004. After an extremely well-received 'get out the vote' campaign in the 2004 federal election and another in 2006, Apathy is Boring has continued its work on democracy projects that create dialogue between youth and community leaders. Using a Web site, digital media technology, concerts, and a media outreach campaign, Apathy is Boring has established itself as a respected voice on issues relating to youth and Canadian democracy, and has been recognized and supported nationally by a diversity of NGO, corporate, and celebrity partners, not to mention continuai recognition by the Canadian media. At Apathy is Boring our goal is to reach as many youth as possible who are not being reached by traditional channels, give them basic information about issues, and then show them in clear easy steps how they can get involved, influence policy makers, and become influential policy makers themselves. The three key pillars of our innovative approach are: - Art: capturing the attention of youth and providing role mo dels - Technology: being where young people are - Intergenerational Partnerships: meeting youth halfway Interviewer biographies llona Dougherty The project will be led by Ilona Dougherty, Executive Director of Apathy is Boring. Ms. Dougherty grew up in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan and Whitehorse, Yukon. Having grown up in a family that encouraged community involvement, Ilona became a concemed citizen at a surprisingly young age. Drawing from her studies and interests, in January 2004 Ilona founded Apathy is Boring. She was recently named one of five women changing the world by Canadian Dimensions Magazine, and was also featured in Severn Suzuki's new book ''Notes from Canada's Young Activists". Her recent speaking engagements include University of Toronto, McGill University, Ottawa University, Yukon Volunteer Bureau, Volunteer Bureau of Montreal, and Performance Creation Canada Conference. Adrienne Smith Adrienne Smith is currently the Development Director at Apathy is Boring. Trained in anthropology and women's studies at McGill University, Ms. Smith has extensive experience working with diverse interest groups. Having worked with a number ofNGOs and non-profits conducting research at both the national and intemationallevels, she has produced several articles for publication. Adrienne has a long history of community 1911 Consultation on Voter Identification Requirements at Federal Elections - Interview Guide volunteerism. Deeply committed to women's rights, she focused her activism during university on the Women's Studies Student Association, academically as an executive and artistically as creative director for their literary publication. She currently chairs the fundraising committee for RECLAIM, a Montreal literacy organization that caters to English speaking adults. Appendix 3 ln June 2007, Parliament passed Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Public Service Employment Act (S.e. 2007, C.21). Among the new provisions, electors are now required to prove their identity and address when voting. For this reason, we are undertaking interviews with various groups that may experience challenges in meeting the new voter identification requirements. Elections Canada recently commissioned Apathy is Boring, a national non-partisan organization, to conduct initial interviews with individuals and organizations in northern Canada to seek a better understanding of the challenges associated with implementing these changes. Ms. Ilona Dougherty, Executive Director, and Ms. Adrienne Smith, Development Director, were mandated to conduct interviews with individuals and organizations representing northern communities, including members of Parliament for electoral districts on or close to the 60th para li el. These interviews began in April and will continue over the next few weeks. Upon completion, the results will be shared with participants and other interested stakeholders. The study has three objectives: • To identify any barriers arising from the implementation of the new identification requirements; • To determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and whether additions or changes could be made to the list to reduce barriers; and • To determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges. Ms. Dougherty should be in touch with your office shortly to organize a telephone interview that should not last longer than an hour. Y our feedback would provide further insight into how Elections Canada can continue to meet the needs of electors in northern Canada. Y ours truly, Marc Mayrand Chief Electoral Ofticer April 18, 2008 Dear participant: The Canada Elections Act was recently amended to require electors to prove their identity and address when voting. Elections Canada is seeking a better understanding of the challenges associated with implementing these changes. For this reason, we are undertaking consultations with various groups that may experience challenges in meeting the new voter identification requirements. The consultations will begin in northern Canada and take place during April and May 2008. The study will have three objectives: • to identify any barriers arising from the implementation of the new identification requirements; • to determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and whether additions or changes could be made to the list to reduce barriers; • to determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges. Elections Canada has commissioned Apathy is Boring, a national non partisan organization, to conduct initial consultations in northern Canada. Ms. Ilona Dougherty, Executive Director, and Ms. Adrienne Smith, Development Director, will be contacting and interviewing individuals from a number of target groups. The interviews should take between 1 and 1.5 hours. Elections Canada developed the enclosed interview guide in arder to familiarize interviewees with the new identification requirements and their implementation. Information about Apathy is Boring is also provided. Upon completion, the results of the consultations will be made available to participants and other stakeholders. Thank you for your willingness to participate in an interview. We anticipate that your feedback will provide further insight into how Elections Canada can continue to meet the needs of electors in northern Canada. Y ours truly, Belaineh Deguefé Director General Outreach, Communications and Research June 17, 2008 Dear participant: The Canada Elections Act was recently amended to require electors to prove their identity and address when voting. Elections Canada is seeking a better understanding of the challenges associated with implementing these changes. For this reason, we are undertaking consultations with various groups that may experience challenges in meeting the new voter identification requirements. The consultations began in northern Canada are taking place from April to June 2008. The study will have three objectives: • to identify any barriers arising from the implementation of the new identification requirements; • to determine the effectiveness of the list of identification authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and whether additions or changes could be made to the list to reduce barriers; • to determine how Elections Canada can best provide information on the new voter identification requirements to targeted groups that are likely to experience challenges. Elections Canada has commissioned Apathy is Boring, a national non partisan organization, to conduct initial consultations in northern Canada. Ms. Ilona Dougherty, Executive Director, and Ms. Adrienne Smith, Development Director, will be contacting and interviewing individuals from a number of target groups. The interviews should take between 1 and 1.5 hours. Elections Canada developed the enclosed interview guide in arder to familiarize interviewees with the new identification requirements and their implementation. Information about Apathy is Boring is also provided. Upon completion, the results of the consultations will be made available to participants and other stakeholders. Thank you for your willingness to participate in an interview. We anticipate that your feedback will provide further insight into how Elections Canada can continue to meet the needs of electors in northern Canada. Y ours truly, Belaineh Deguefé Director General Outreach, Communications and Research TABC This is Exhibit C referred to in the affidavit of Ilona Dougherty, sworn before me this __1-'------day of January, 2015 Y outh Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election i -~-~-:~·il:· ' ~-,·' ...... 1 ~~:n~dîf~~~,~t~~r»~j~. André Blais and Delia Dümitrescu·~ ·.~-;~·.: ;f., • :· .- ( '~· fil'•;:·""'·:·:,;:.::;,--:;.. ,_ ~ •.!A··:- -.~;.:,.·~·- .'l_; Université de Montréal · '.,r.,,.:>.~> ~.·;: · Peter Loewen . "'-.. UniversitY of Toronto -~;. .:· ...·- .·:;; ... :···• n May 2011 ~. ·..:· ·._-· · •.• ':. .. ••• j . . . · ·.·• \~~~}~(i:';ê;~~I,-; <... . . ·.... '. ,,. :~----:. ,;__ · ... ·)., ;·.··.:;.-\': ~ :{ -~- . ~-,. 1, :;·!,".;_; '·. , i' ., . ï!;·. · ...... ;~·: :: : ' ' ( ; ,; · .. 1916 Table of Contents Figures and Tables ...... 5 Executive Summary ...... 7 Acknowledgements ...... 9 About Apathy is Boring ...... 11 Introduction ...... 13 1. Research Design and Methodology ...... 15 1.1 Survey of Y outh in Toronto ...... 16 1.2 Interviews and Mobilization Assessment ...... 18 2. Survey Findings ...... 21 2.1 Profile ofRespondents ...... 21 2.2 Engagement Indicators ...... 22 2.3 Election Indicators ...... 23 2.4 Contact Indicators ...... 24 3. Multivariate Analysis ...... 26 3.1 Receiving a Voter Information Card ...... 26 3.2 Campaign Contact ...... 27 3.3 Civic Engagement ...... 28 3.4 Tumout ...... 29 4. Youth Mobilization Assessment ...... 33 4.1 Summary ofMobilization Activity ...... 33 5. Interview Findings ...... 35 5.1 Organizations and Interview Participants ...... 35 5.2 Toronto Elections' Youth Outreach Initiative ...... 36 5.3 Non-Partisanship Policies ...... 38 5.4 Election Information and Resources ...... 40 5.5 Regional and Demographie Patterns ...... 41 5.6 Characteristics of Successful Organizations ...... 42 6. Recommendations ...... 45 6.1 Research Recommendations ...... 45 6.2 Electoral Epgagement Recommendations ...... 4 7 References ...... ~ ...... 53 Appendix A- Quasi-Experimental Analysis ...... ;...... 55 Appendix B-Post-Election Interview Questions ...... 57 Appendix C- Candidate and Organization Contact Rates ...... 59 Appendix D -Multiple Regression Explained ...... 61 Appendix E- Sample Letter of Attestation ...... 63 Appendix F-Field Experiment Protocols ...... 65 Table of Contents 3 1917 Figures and Tables Figure 1: Estimated number of eligible voters reached by contact type ...... 33 Figure 2: Interview participants by organization type ...... 35 Figure 3: Interview participants by organization location ...... 3 6 Figure 4: Organizational activities outside ofthe 2010 Toronto municipal election ...... 37 Table 1: Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents ...... 12 Table 2: Engagement indicators for survey respondents ...... 22 Table 3: Election indicators for survey respondents ...... 15 Table 4: Campaign contact for survey respondents ...... 25 Table 5: Determinants ofreceiving a voter information card ...... 18 Table 6: Determinants ofbeing contacted by a campaign ...... 19 Table 7: Determinants of civic engagement ...... 19 Table 8: Determinants ofturnout ...... 29 Table 9: Determinants oftumout including candidate contact ...... 30 Table 10: Contact rates for survey respondents by type ...... 59 Figures and Tables 5 Executive Summary This report presents the findings of a mixed-methods research project undertaken by Apathy is Boring during the 2010 Toronto municipal election. The report focuses on the electoral engagement patterns ofyouth in Toronto, as weil as the nature and impact ofyouth mobilization initiatives. The key findings include the following: • There are substantive differences in engagement among youth that are linked to residential and lifestyle factors, such as living with a parent or living in the city centre. • Most youth do not recall receiving a voter information card, which implies they are either not registered or inaccurately registered as voters. The likelihood of receiving these cards is tied to residential patterns, so that certain groups are more likely to be missed. • Commuters in the amalgamated suburbs face significant barri ers to voting because of· opening hours of polling stations for municipal elections. • There is a relationship between unsolicited mobilization activity- specifically, being contacted by a candidate - and voting in the election. • Organizations invest a significant amount of effort into organizing election debates, yet these do not appear to be particularly effective at reaching or mobilizing unengaged youth. • Organizations seeking to mobilize youth are modifying resources from elections agencies to better suit their needs. There is also a clear need for outreach resources with information about candidates and their platforms. • The non-partisanship policies of government agencies appear to cause concern among partner organizations and may contribute to limiting mobilization activity. • Community and non-profit organizations responded positively to Toronto Elections' youth initiative and want to see more comprehensive youth mobilization in future elections. Pursuant to these findings, the report includes a series of research and outreach recommendations that ali stakeholders- including community organizations, outreach workers, candidates and election agencies - can use to better engage young voters. Executive Summary 7 Acknowledgements Apathy is Boring would like to express our appreciation to Elections Canada for supporting research into youth electoral engagement in Canada, including this project. Apathy is Boring would also like to thank the City of Toronto for its partnership in this project. The city made a significant commitment to reach youth during the 2010 municipal election. Toronto Elections brought together a network of partner organizations seeking to engage youth, connected us with those organizations for interviews and helped promote our survey to youth across Toronto. This research would not have been possible without their cooperation and support. Apathy is Boring also wishes to specifically express our appreciation to Monika Matel-Sousa and Carole Boughannam for their assistance. Apathy is Boring would also like to thank André Blais, Delia Dumitrescu and Peter Loewen for contributing their time and expertise to this project. And finally, we would like to thank ali of the organizations that participated in and helped support this project, including: Arts Vote Centennial Co liege Student Association Malvern Action for Neighbourhood Change Mal vern Family Resource Centre Malvern Votes Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants Operation Black Vote Ryerson Students' Union Scadding Court Community Centre Scarborough Campus Students' Union Scarborough Centre for Healthy Communities Scarborough Civic Action Network Schools Without Borders Seneca College Student Association of George Brown Co liege Toronto Community Housing Toronto Public Library Toronto Y outh Priority Symposium University of Toronto Centre for Community Partnerships University of Toronto, HartHouse University ofToronto Office ofGovernment, Institutional and Community Relations University of Toronto Students' Union Youth Action Network Ackitowledgements 9 1D20 About Apathy is Boring Apathy is Boring is a national charitable organization that uses art and technology to educate youth about democracy. Apathy is Boring accomplishes its work through four program areas: • Concerts and events that create an opportunity for dialogue between community leaders and youth on issues of concem to young people; • A Youth Friendly program comprised ofworkshops, tools and resources to engage youth in decision-making and educate decision-makers about how to engage youth; • Web sites (www.apathyisboring.com and www.citizenfactory.com) that provide youth with information on how to get involved; • Election campaigns that reach out to youth and give them the information they need to cast an informed vote. Apathy is Boring aims to reach Canadians aged 18-35 who are currently unengaged in the democratie process. The work Apathy is Boring does is critical and noteworthy because it is the only youth-led, non-partisan, year-round, Canadian charitable organization that offers educational resources and programming tailored to young people about how they can become active citizens. Apathy is Boring has distinguished itself as a leader by reaching hundreds of thousands of young Canadians since 2004. About Apathy is Boring 11 Introduction The goal of this report is to provide a more detailed picture ofyouth mobilization initiatives and youth engagement during a Canadian municipal election. Using survey data collected during the 2010 Toronto municipal election, it compares the levels of engagement and campaign contact among youth across the city. The report also summarizes the findings from a series of interviews with representatives of organizations involved in youth mobilization during this election. The nature ofthis report is more practical than academie: it seeks to provide information that ali stakeholders - including community organizations, outreach workers, candidates and election agencies - can use to better engage young voters. The data were collected immediately before and after the 2010 Toronto municipal election. This was a salient and competitive election: there was no mayoral incumbent running and overall tumout was 51%, up from 39% in the 2006 municipal election. The City of Toronto also launched a new youth electoral outreach initiative for 2010, including the creation of a network of partner organizations seeking to engage youth. 1 First, this report presents an overview ofresponses from our survey ofyouth in Toronto. This includes a discussion of engagement and activity patterns, with a particular focus on life-cycle effects. This is followed by a multivariate analysis of factors that influence four key dependent variables: tumout, civic engagement, campaign contact and receiving a voter information card. The independent variables considered include age, being a student, being an immigrant, living with a parent, residential mobility, and where one lives in the city. Second, this report presents an overview of the data colle·cted from organizations involved in youth mobilization initiatives, along with a basic assessment oftheir impact. This is followed by the findings from a series of qualitative interviews conducted with representatives from Toronto Elections' partner organizations. These findings include descriptions of the partners and their activities, as weil as their feedback for election agencies. Finally, this report ineludes a series of recommendations for election stakeholders. The first set of recommendations addresses both needs and opportunities for further research into youth electoral engagement. The second set of recommendations includes practical advice for improving youth mobilization initiatives and increasing youth participation in future elections. 1 Municipalities in Ontario do not collect age-segmented tumout data, so only overall tumout rates are available. Introduction 13 1922 1. Research Design and Methodology Turnout in Canadian elections has been declining for decades, and this decline is being driven by youth. As they become eligible to vote, fewer and fewer young Canadians are choosing to cast a ballot (Blais et al. 2004). Similar declines have been observed in most industrialized democracies over the last half-century (Ibid.). In spite ofthis, information on the nature and causes oflow youth turnout is relatively scarce. In Canada, the premier dataset for research into voting behaviour is the Canadian Election Study (CES), a national survey fielded for every federal election since 1965. However, even the CES gathers limited information about youth. For example, of the 4,495 Canadians who responded to the CES campaign-period survey in 2008, only 213 were aged 18-24 (Canadian Election Study 2008). Even when respondents from multiple surveys are pooled to create a larger sample, making useful comparisons between youth sub-populations ( e.g. rural, urban and suburban) can be difficult. Even less information is available about youth participation in Canadian municipal elections. Most municipal authorities do not collect age-segmented turnout data, which precludes the most basic form for analysis. The minimal data available suggest that youth turnout is low. For example, Ward 27 in downtown Toronto contains much ofRyerson University and the University ofToronto's campuses. Overall turnout in the ward was 56% for the 2010 municipal election, while turnout in the four subdivisions covering the university campuses was 35% (City ofToronto 2010).2 Over the last decade, research into voter mobilization and Get Out The Vote (GOTV) initiatives has'burgeoned in the United States, largely thanks to the adoption of field experiments to study turnout. The most consistent finding of these experiments is that face-to-face contact with a potential voter is the most effective way to mobilize them (Green and Gerber 2008). When they are contacted, young voters are equally responsive to these appeals (Nickerson 2006). In short, the evidence shows that youth mobilization matters. For anyone seeking to engage youth during Canadian elections, the shortage of information about youth can be a challenge. Faced with limited resources, organizations wishing to mobilize youth during elections benefit from information about how· and where to target the ir efforts. This translates into two basic research questions: How does electoral engagement differ among youth sub-populations? And what is the impact of existing youth mobilization initiatives? The 2010 Toronto municipal election provided an opportunity to begin answering these questions. The City of Toronto decided to launch a new outreach initiative for 2010,including a focus on youth. As part of this initiative, Toronto Elections brought together a network ofpartner organizations from across the city seeking to engage youth, including community groups, NGOs, youth-serving organizations, and post-secondary institutions. 2 The four subdivisions and their respective individual turnout rates are: Subdivision 16 (41%), Subdivision 29 (37%), Subdivision 52 (43%), and Subdivision 67 (28%). Research Design and Methodology 15 Apathy is Boring took this opportunity to conduct a survey ofyouth in Toronto, as well as a study of Toronto Elections' partner organizations. This mixed methodology approaches the research questions from two directions: an organizational analysis of real-world youth mobilization initiatives, as weil as a quantitative analysis ofwhat is happening on the ground. 1.1 Survey of Youth in Toronto Sample and Distribution The Toronto Y outh Election Survey was conducted on-line both before and after the 2010 Toronto municipal election. The final sample for the survey was 796 eligible voters in the city of Toronto between the ages of 18 and 35. The survey sample was not randomly selected. Rather, the survey was promoted to the public and respondents chose to participate. Random selection from a population is the preferred approach for any survey. However, when the population in question is youth, traditional survey methodologies typically involve high costs or significant shortcomings. For example, most telephone surveys only reach Canadians with landlines. However, the most recent Residential Telephone Service Survey by Statistics Canada, conducted in 2008, found that "34.4% ofhouseholds comprised solely ofadults aged between 18 and 34 rel[ied] exclusively on cell phones. Among all other households the rate was 4.5%" (Statistics Canada 2008). Although it is possible to construct a sample that includes both cell-only and landline households, this adds to the already prohibitive cost oftrying to reach youth with telephone surveys. Given these shortcomings and the focus of this research, an on-line survey was used. The survey questionnaire was available to the public, with respondents screened for eligibility before they could begin the questionnaire. To encourage participation, Apathy is Boring promoted the survey in conjunction with Toronto Elections and their partner organizations. Links to the survey were distributed through e-mail newsletters, social media, partner Web sites, and posters. To increase the survey's appeal to youth at large, it was incentivized with a contest to win one of several free iPods. This incentive was featured prominently in promotional materials. As the respondents chose to participate, the survey sample exhibits a self-selection bias. Youth participating in the survey are more likely to be engaged than their peers, which limits external validity. The value provided by this survey cornes from making relative comparisons within a sample ofyouth from a specifie city, with respondents who tend to be more engaged than average. Two-wave Design The survey used a two-wave design with both waves administered on-line. The first questionnaire was available to the public from October 4 to 22 (one day before the election). The day after the election, participants received a follow-up questionnaire by e-mail. The direct e-mail system matched respondents' pre- and post-election responses, thus treating both questionnaires as a single survey case. Of the 796 first-wave respondents, 443 (56%) completed the follow-up questionnaire. 16 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 1924 A two-wave design was chosen to schedule the initial distribution during the municipal election campaign. Respondents are more likely to complete surveys that they perceive as timely and relevant to current events (Cook, Heath and Thompson 2000). The two-wave design involved distributing the first questionnaire at the height of the election campaign, when it was most timely, while also collecting post-election information such as turnout. The two-wave design was also chosen to potentially allow for a quasi-experimental analysis in conjunction with the other information collected, although this analysis was not ultimately conducted for this report.3 Survey Questionnaires The survey questionnaires were developed in conjunction with Elections Canada and Toronto Elections. Along with standard socio-demographic indicators, the survey included questions that spoke to both of our research questions. The questionnaire included measures of civic duty, community activity, political knowledge and political interest, to assess respondents' patterns of engagement. It also included indicators to assess election outreach and mobilization programs, ranging from contact with an election campaign to receiving a voter information card in the mail. Election surveys face a number of limitations, the most notable being that they consistent! y overestimate turnout (Karp and Brockington 2005). This occurs for two main reasons. First, there is a selection bias: respondents who are willing to participate in a survey are also more likely to vote than non-responders. Second, there is a social desirability bias: sorne respondents will falsely report voting on surveys because of positive social norms surrounding voting (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjay 2001). Misreported turnout is particularly problematic for surveys because it has been associated with other respondent traits. For example, respondents who falsely report voting also report higher levels of education, civic duty and political attentiveness than honest non-voters (Presser and Traugott 1992; Karp and Brockington 2005).4 To compensate for misreporting, the survey uses an adaptation of the American National Election Studies' turnout question, which offers respondents severa! socially acceptable reasons for not voting. This question wording has been shawn to attenuate turnout over-reporting (Duff et al. 2007). However, like most election surveys, this one has an inflated turnout rate. Overall tumout in the 2010 Toronto municipal election was 51%, whereas 71% ofsurvey respondents reported voting. Election surveys are also limited by the ir use of self-reporting to measure exposure with campaigns. Survey respondents may be unable to remember contact, or falsely remember contact where there was none. To compensate for these limitations, the questionnaire included a battery of 14 different campaign contact indicators, which collect information on the relative rates of different contact methods. 3 See Appendix A for an explanation of the quasi-experimental analysis and why it was not conducted. 4 Karp and Brockington also found a weak relationship between age and false reporting, but it did not appear to have a significant impact on the results of regression analysis using self-reported tumout versus actual tumout. Research Design and Methodology 17 1.2 Interviews and Mobilization Assessment Setting and Sample Toronto Elections assembled a network of more than 40 partner organizations seeking to engage youth directly during the 2010 municipal election.5 This network included youth-serving organizations, community organizations, post-secondary institutions, student unions and other non-profit organizations. Representatives from each organization first came together at City Hall on July 22, 2010, to discuss their plans and opportunities for collaboration around the election. Representatives from 43 of the partner organizations were invited to participate in post-election interviews and a mobilization assessment pro gram. Twenty-two representatives did not participate, with nine of them declining because their organizations ultimately were not active during the election. The final sample of 22 interview participants is therefore skewed towards the more active organizations in the network. 6 Post-election Interviews Bach participant was contacted by an Apathy is Boring staff member for an interview after the election. The goal ofthese interviews was to secure qualitative feedback from each organization about their work during the election. Fifteen interviews were conducted in-persan in mid-November and the remaining seven were conducted by phone in the following month. Many of the participants represent organizations that rely on funding from government agencies and departments. To encourage honest responses, the interviews were conducted on a semi-anonymous basis: by default, no comments were attributed to specifie organizations or individuals. Participants also had the option to make any of their comments fully anonymous. Bach interview included a consistent set of 14 questions to secure information about each organization' s election mobilization activities, as well as to solicit feedback and best practices/ Given that the sample included sorne of the most active organizations in terms ofyouth mobilization, we wanted to identify common characteristics and patterns. Along with information on the planning and deployment ofyouth mobilization initiatives, the interviewer asked for background information about each organization. Participants were explicitly asked to identify any challenges they faced and to make suggestions for consideration by election agencies. 5 These organizations were also part of Toronto Elections' network of 121 communication partners. 6 Arts Vote Toronto, an organization from outside of Toronto Elections' partner network, was included as the 22nd participant because a number of survey respondents reported contact with their campaign. 7 See Appendix B for the full list of interview questions. 18 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 1D26 Mobilization Assessment Representatives were asked to record their organization' s mobilization activity during the election in a standardized format. Each activity was recorded individually, along with its time, date, location and estimated reach.8 For example, sorne organizations reported organizing election debates, while others reported canvassing specifie streets or hosting workshops. For the final mobilization assessment, only activities tied to specifie geographie locations were included in the analysis. Although sorne information was collected on printed materials and on-line outreach, it was impossible to reliably assess their dissemination, and they were therefore excluded from the analysis.9 8 This information was originally supposed to be tracked by ali participants with a standardized tracking spreadsheet. However, few participants complied with the full protocol. As a result, most of the data was compiled after the election through persona! follow-ups and organizational records. 9 The printed materials were distributed passively (e.g. on newsstands) throughout the city, so the only reliable information available was the number of copies printed. Similarly, few organizations had reliable or consistent metrics for their on-line outreach. Research Design and Methodology 19 1D27 2. Survey Findings 2.1 Profile of Respondents Table 1 presents a summary of survey respondents' socio-demographic characteristics. Previous work in both international and Canadian contexts has linked the life cycle - including transitions such as moving out and entering the workforce- to youth electoral participation (Howe 2007; Blais and Loewen 2009). We divide respondents into two subsamples, aged 18-21 (n = 425) and 22-35 (n = 363). By the age of22, most respondents have been out ofhigh schoollong enough · to complete a four-year college or university degree. This scheme therefore serves as a convenient way to examine the transition to adulthood and independent living. 10 Table 1: Socio-demogra hic rofile of survey respondents 18-21 22-35 Male 35.4% 39.3% Born in Canada 75.3% 75.6% Sorne post-secondary education 51.1% 94.2% Completed co liege or university degree 5.0% 64.8% Student 87.0% 41.9% Employed full-time 2.1% 47.4% Moved in the last year 36.8% 43.3% Live in city centre 27.1% 46.9% Live with a parent 65.9% 40.5% The sample as a whole is disproportionately female (61 %), with men being even less prevalent in the 18-21 age group. Immigrants are consistently represented throughout the sample; about one quarter of aU respondents were born outside of Canada, with similar proportions in both age groups. These age groups exhibit major differences in terms education and employment. The overwhelming majority (94%) or respondents aged 22-35 have completed sorne level of post-secondary education, and almost two-thirds (64%) have either a college or university degree. Among respondents aged 18-21, about half (51%) have completed at least one year of post-secondary education, and very few (5%) hold any kind ofpost-secondary degree. We attribute these differences to the life cycle, as a larger proportion of older respondents have completed the ir education and entered the workforce. Y ounger respondents are much more likely to currently be enrolled at a post-secondary institution (87%) than working full-time· (2%), whereas older respondents are more evenly divided between students (42%) and full-time employees (47%). 1°Conducting the analysis with 23 as the dividing age yields similar results, with the 18-23 subsample living independently and scoring slightly higher on indicators of engagement. This reinforces the imputation ofthe differences between these subsamples to !ife-cycle effects. Survey Findings 21 1D28 Older respondents also have more independent lifestyles. Those aged 22-35 are less likely to live with a parent (41%) and more likely to have moved in the past year (43%) than their younger counterparts (66% and 37% respectively). Similarly, respondents aged 22-35 are much more likely to live in Central Toronto (47%) than those aged 18-21 (27%). These findings paint a portrait oftwo relatively distinct groups, which we refer to as "recent adults" and "young independents." Recent adults are youth who have graduated from high school within the last four years. Most of them are pursuing sorne type ofpost-secondary education, and they are more likely to stilllive with a parent. Young independents, by comparison, are more likely to have entered the workforce and moved away from home, often to the city centre. Of the young independents who are students, almost half (45%) already have sorne type of post-secondary degree. 2.2 Engagement lndicators The differences between recent adults and young independents extend beyond socio demographic factors. Table 2 compares the two groups based on a series of civic and political engagement indicators. 11 Older respondents score higher on the majority of these indicators, regardless of whether they are related directly to electoral engagement. Table 2: Engagement indicators for survey respondants 18-21 22-35 Voted in 2010 municipal election 62.9% 79.4% High interest in politics 25.4% 45.6% High interest in municipal election 31.1% 46.5% Believe voting is a duty 51.8% 61.3% Satisfied with democracy 72.2% 59.8% Follow news and current events daily 27.6% 47.5% Correctly answered ali four knowledge questions 43.7% 56.3% Contacted a politician or govemment official 19.0% 39.0% Volunteered for a campaign 12.9% 19.6% Made ethical or political purchases 50.2% 61.3% Attended a public demonstration 28.2% 37.4% Volunteered in their community 68.6% 66.7% Respondents aged 18-21 are less interested in politics. They are less likely to express high levels ofinterest in politics generally (25%) and in the 2010 municipal election (31 %) than those aged 22-35 (46% and 47% respectively). Similarly, younger respondents are much less likely to follow the news and current events on a daily basis (28%) than their older counterparts (48%). 11 Bath questionnaires included civic duty and political interest indicators. Where possible, we present responses from the pre-election questionnaire, which had a larger sample (n = 796). There were no significant pre-to-post differences among respondents who completed bath questionnaires. 22 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election Given their higher levels of interest, it cornes as no surprise that older respondents also perform better on a test of general political knowledge: 56% ofthose aged 22-35 answered all of four of the survey's knowledge-testing questions correctly, compared to 44% ofthose aged 18-21. In terms oftumout, respondents in the older group are significantly more likely to report having voted (79%) than those in the younger group (63%). Respondents aged 22-35 are also more likely to believe that voting is a duty (61%) than those aged 18-21 (52%). In spite ofthis, younger respondents appear to be more satisfied with the democratie process itself. When asked how they feel about the way democracy works in Canada, 72% ofthose aged 18-21 described themselves as "very" or "fairly'' satisfied. Only 60% ofthose aged 22-35 responded similarly. The gap between these groups narrows for other forms of engagement. The survey asked respondents about their involvement in five activities during the last year, ranging from contacting a politician to volunteering in the community. Respondents aged 22-35 are more likely to contact a politician (39%) or attend a demonstration (37%) than those aged 18-21 (19% and 28% respectively). However, respondents from both groups are unlikely to volunteer for a political campaign, and they volunteer in their communities at similar rates: 69% for those aged 18-21 and 67% for those aged 22-35. Young independents are cl early more engaged on the who le, particularly in politics and elections. The gap between them and recent adults is largest for traditional political engagement: contacting politicians, following the news daily, and general interest in the political system. For civic or alternative political activities such as volunteering or public demonstrations, the gap is smaller. As for the puzzling fin ding that tho se who tend to participate less in the democratie process (i.e. younger respondents) express more satisfaction with it, we have no clear explanation. Perhaps, as Aesop said, familiarity breeds contempt. The relationship between political attitudes and the life cycle certainly deserves further study, as discussed in the Recommendations section. 2.3 Election lndicators The differences between the two groups are smaller for election-specifie indicators, as summarized in Table 3. Young independents still score higher than recent adults in terms of seeking out information about the election, but this is hardly surprising, given their higher levels of politi cal interest. In early October, the City of Toronto sent a voter information card (VIC) to ali registered voters in the city. Roughly half of ali respondents recalled receiving a VIC in the mail prior to the election, and the likelihood of receiving a card does not differ significantly between the two age groups (47% versus 48%). · Survey Findings 23 1D30 Table 3: Election indicators for survey respondents 18-21 22-35 Received a voter infonnation card 47.1% 47.9% Remember Toronto Elections youth slogan 36.4% 29.3% Called 311 hotline about election 14.6% 14.4% Read election brochure or flyer 61.6% 66.5% Visited Toronto Elections Web site 69.2% 79.4% Encouraged to vote by family 58.9% 50.7% Encouraged to vote by friends 49.8% 61.7% Y ounger respondents are somewhat more likely to remember seeing the slogan for Toronto Elections' youth outreach campaign (36% versus 29%). The slogan- "Your vote is y our voice. Speak up 10/25/10."- was chosen through a public contest for Torontonians aged 14-24, which likely accounts for this finding. On the ether hand, respondents aged 22-35 are more likely to get information from election brochures (67%) or the Toronto Elections Web site (79%) than those aged 18-21 (62% and 69% respectively). On the whole, these distinctions are less pronounced than the socio-demographic and engagement gaps discussed earlier. In a similar vein, respondents aged 18-21 are more likely to be encouraged to vote by their family (59%) than by their friends (50%). The reverse is true ofthose aged 22-35, who are more likely to be encouraged by friends (62%) than family (51%). This difference can be attributed to residential patterns, as younger respondents are more likely to live and socialize with their parents. 2.4 Contact lndicators The post-election questionnaire included a battery of 14 contact indicators: the survey asked respondents whether or not they had been encouraged to vote by either a candidate or an organization during the election, as weil as how they had been contacted. The results are summarized in Table 4.12 12 Because the questionnaire recorded contact by candidates and other organizations separately, ali of the indicators in this table are dichotomous composites (i.e. respondents contacted "by phone" include those who received a phone cali from a candidate, from an organization, or from both). Table 10 (in Appendix C) provides a summary of candidate and organization contact rates. 24 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election ..t 0 ~1· 1 'J .:.:J' Table 4: Campaign contact for survey respondents 18-21 22-35 In person 45.8% 57.2% At an event 21.7% 29.7% By phone 45.3% 38.3% By mail 50.0% 65.3% Bye-mail 26.3% 38.1% By text message 1.5% 3.9% Through social media 37.6% 53.8% By a candidate 70.7% 80.9% By an organization 59.7% 62.2% On the whole, respondents aged 22-35 are more likely to be contacted by almost every method. The sole exception was 'contact by phone, with those aged 18-21 being more likely to receive a phone call (45%) than those aged 22-35 (38%). Contact rates by text message are extremely low for both age groups, with only 3% of the entire sample receiving any ele~tion-related text messages. A trend emerges when we consolidate the indicators based on the source of the contact. 76% of all respondents recall being contacted by a candidate, while 61% recall being contacted by another organization. Y ounger and older respondents are equally likely to be contacted by other organizations prior to the election (62% and 60% respectively). However, respondents aged 22-35 are more likely to be contacted by a candidate (81 %) than those aged 18-21 (71 %). The predictors of campaign contact, as well as the impact of contact on tumout, are discussed further in the next section of this report. The discussion includes an examination of the different contact methods and their impact on respondents. Survey Findings 25 3. Multivariate Analysis Comparing recent adults to young independents is a helpful way to show the links between the life cycle and electoral engagement, as age is a convenient proxy for life-cycle changes. However, to make recommendations for future youth mobilization initiatives or research, more information is needed about the specifie factors that influence youth engagement. To that end, we conducted a multivariate analysis using logistic regression.13 Five socio-demographic factors, aU ofwhich are relevant when identifying youth sub-populations for outreach and mobilization, were identified as key independent variables: being a student, being an immigrant, living with a parent, residential mobility, and where one lives in the city. This section includes regression analyses of four dependent variables: receiving a VIC, being contacted by a campaign, civic engagement, and tumout. The first two variables are indicators of how effectively the City of Toronto and other election stakeholders are reaching youth. The latter two are indicators of which youth are most engaged. 14 3.1 Receiving a Voter Information Card The first dependent variable is whether or not respondents received a VIC in the mail. This variable is a proxy for registration: only registered voters with up-to-date addresses receive a card. 15 The VIC also serves as a basic source of information about polling times and locations for voters. Given that less than half of survey respondents (48%) remember receiving a VIC, the distribution of these cards is worth examining. The results in Table 5 show bo-th positive and negative predictors of receiving a VIC. Respondents who live with a parent are much more likely to receive a card, whereas those who live in Central Toronto are less likely to receive one. There is also a slight positive relationship between age and receiving a VIC. 13 See Appendix D for a brief explanation of multiple regression analysis. 14 Ail of the dependent and independent variables were coded as dichotomous durnrny variables, with the exception of age in years. Respondents were also divided into four residential regions (Central Toronto, Etobicoke, Scarborough, and York), with Etobicoke as the excluded category for the regressions. Sam pie sizes for the regressions vary based on the number of complete responses for the variables in question. 15 The City of Toronto compiles a list of registered voters in collaboration with the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, a non-profit corporation created by the Govemment of Ontario. The VIC is sent to ali voters on this list in early October. The survey questionnaire prompted post-election respondents with an image of a VIC as a rnemory eue, and asked if they remernbered receiving one. 26 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election The association between moving in the last year and receiving a VIC does not immediately appear to be significant, which is counterintuitive. However, this is due to the negative relationship in our sample between residential mobility and living with a parent.16 Ifwe conduct a similar regression, but omit living with a parent as a factor, the negative relationship between residential mobility and receiving a VIC becomes significant (B = -0.3219, p < 0.05). The overall finding is clear: youth who move away from home are significantly less Iikely to receive a VIC. Table 5: Determinants of receiving a voter information card B S.E. p Age 0.0768* 0.03 0.03 Student -0.0829 0.27 0.76 Immigrant -0.1488 0.28 0.60 Lives with a parent 1.1871** 0.27 0.00 Moved in last year -0.0793 0.17 0.64 Central Toronto -0.7947* 0.39 0.04 Scarborough . -0.2341 0.42 0.58 York -0.6008 0.41 0.15 Constant 0.6611 1.11 0.21 N 374 Pseudo R2 0.0479 Log likelihood -237.20183 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.0 l 3.2 Campaign Contact The second dependent variable is contact with an election campaign. The post-election questionnaire included a battery of 14 contact indicators. Factor analysis shows a relatively high degree of internai consistency among these indicators (Cronbach's a.= 0.73). We therefore reduce them to a single dependent variable for the pur-poses of this analysis, to see which respondents receive the most contact overall.17 None of the socio-demographic indicators in Table 6 are significantly related to composite campaign contact. There is a positive association between being a student and being contacted by a campaign, although it does not reach the traditional threshold of significance (p > 0.05). Given this lack of a clear relationship, campaign contact is examined in more detail as an independent variable related to tumout later in this analysis. 16 This is not surprising, as parents tend to move less than youth. There is a clear negative correlation between living with a parent and moving in the last year (r = -0.396, p < 0.01). 17 In this case, we created the composite variable by taking the average number ofmethods by which a respondent was contacted. This provides us with a continuous measure, which is more suitable for examining the overall distribution of campaign activity. Survey Findings 27 Table 6: Determinants ofbeing contacted by a campaign B S.E. p Student 0.0609 0.03 0.06 Immigrant -0.0211 0.04 0.58 Lives with a parent -0.0466 0.04 0.20 Moved in last year -0.0065 0.02 0.79 Central Toronto 0.0080 0.05 0.88 Scarborough -0.0900 0.06 0.11 York 0.0329 0.06 0.55 Constant 0.7086 0.08 0.00 N 406 AdjustedR2 0.0203 p > 0.05 for ali factors 3.3 Civic Engagement The third dependent variable is a composite measure of civic engagement. The first survey questionnaire included five indicators ofrespondents' civic and political activity during the past year (see Table 2). Due to their relatively high degree ofintemal consistency (Cronbach's a= 0.61), we take the mean ofthese five indicators to create a single variable for analysis. Table 7: Determinants of civic engagement B S.E. p Student -0.0482* 0.02 0.04 Immigrant -0.0080 0.03 0.75 Lives with a parent -0.0253 0.02 0.31 Moved in last year 0.0128 0.02 0.44 Central Toronto 0.0853* 0.04 0.02 Scarborough 0.0389 0.04 0.32 York 0.0326 0.04 0.39 Constant 0.3999 0.05 0.00 N 714 AdjustedR2 0.0193 *p Table 7 shows the independent effects of socio-demographic factors on civic engagement. Being a student has a slight negative association with civic engagement, whereas living in Central Toronto has a stronger positive association. No other factors appear to significantly influence civic engagement. In terms of civic activity and engagement, there appears to be a gap between Toronto's urban core and the amalgamated suburbs. 28 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 3.4 Turnout The final dependent variable is tumout, as reported on the post-election questionnaire. This regression includes two additional independent variables: age and campaign contact. Age is a well-established predictor oftumout (Blais et al. 2004), and we include it to compensate for the strong relationship between age and being a student in our sample.18 There is also a well-established positive relationship between campaign contact and tumout in elections (Green and Gerber 2008), which we consider here. Table 8: Determinants of turnout B S.E. p Age 0.1236* 0.04 0.00 Student -0.1295 0.32 0.68 Immigrant -0.5297 0.29 0.07 Lives with a parent 0.9891* 0.31 0.00 Moved in Iast year 0.1979 0.20 0.32 Central Toronto 1.0125* 0.39 0.01 Scarborough 0.2222 0.41 0.58 York 0.5919 0.41 0.14 Campaign contact -0.5874 0.43 0.16 Constant -1.8856 1.30 0.14 N 400 Pseudo R2 0.0864 Log Iikelihood -210.36109 *J.l :S 0.01 Table 8 shows the results of our first tumout regression. Age, living with a parent, and living in the city centre are all positively related to voting, all with high levels of significance. Being an immigrant also has a negative association with tumout, but it does not attain conventionallevels of significance (p > 0.05). The contact indicator has a negative but insignificant association with tumout, which runs contrary to expectations. However, this is due to our use of a composite indicator. Although the individual contact indicators can be scaled together for sorne analytical purposes, the distinctions between them are meaningful when examining tumout. When we conduct bivariate analyses of all 14 contact indicators, we find a number of positive correlations between contact and tumout but only for contact that was initiated by candidates. 18 When age is excluded from the regression, being a student appears to have a strong negative relationship to tumout. However, this is an artifact of the sample's age distribution, which showed a strong negative association between age and student status (r = -0.495, p < 0.01). Survey Findings 29 The low impact of organizational contact can be attributed to two factors. The first is self-selection: many respondents were directed to the survey questionnaire by non-profit and community organizations. Therefore, they are more likely to already be in contact with these organizations. Campaign contact with these respondents should therefore have less of an impact on turnout, as they are already more likely to vote and be engaged. Second, most non-profit and community organizations in Toronto do not have election-specifie mandates. As a result, much oftheir work during the election was not explicitly focused on voter mobilization. 19 We would expect this contact to have less of an impact than candidates' GOTV efforts, particularly in a municipal election with a highly competitive mayoral race. Table 9: Determinants ofturnout, including candidate contact B S.E. p Age 0.1131* 0.05 0.02 Student -0.1921 0.34 0.57 Immigrant -0.2113 0.31 0.49 Lives with parent 0.6733* 0.33 0.04 Moved in last year 0.2971 0.29 0.31 Central Toronto 0.9310** 0.34 0.01 Etobicoke -0.0702 0.43 0.87 Scarborough 0.0107 0.36 0.98 Contacted in person 0.3628 0.31 0.25 Contacted by phone 1.0767** 0.32 0.00 Contacted by mail 0.0584 0.27 0.83 Contacted by e-mail -0.0234 0.47 0.96 Contacted at an event 0.0927 0.46 0.84 Contacted through social media 0.5003 0.33 0.13 Constant -2.7726 1.24 0.03 N 370 Pseudo R2 0.125 Log likelihood -196.25914 *p < O.OS;**p :S 0.01 19 See Interview Findings. The organizational indicators appear to be recording contact that is not explicit voter mobilization. For example, when asked to name the organizations that contacted them, seven respondents identified Apathy is Boring, whose involvement in the election was Iimited to fielding this survey. 20 Note that York was the excluded residential region for this regression. 30 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election This analysis therefore focuses on candidate contact. As described earlier, this is a self-selected sample: youth who volunteer to complete an election survey will obviously tend to be more engaged in the election. That means there is less potential for campaign contact to increase turnout. It also affects the contact rates for severa! indicators, as respondents will be more likely to self-select into a campaign mailing list, Facebook group, or event. However, the impact of self-selection effect should vary between contact methods. For example, respondents are unlikely to receive campaign e-mails unless they signed up for a mailing list. On the other hand, traditional GOTV tactics - such as canvassing, phone calls and direct mail- are typically unsolicited. We therefore conduct another analysis with the individual candidate contact indicators.21 The results in Table 9 show a strong positive relationship between receiving a phone cali and turnout. There is also slight positive association between face-to-face contact and turnout. Ifwe conduct another regression but omit the self-selected contact indicators (e-mail, events and social media), this relationship cornes close to significance (B = 0.4835, p = 0.11). These findings should be interpreted with caution, but they suggest that unsolicited campaign contact is effective at mobilizing youth to vote. They also recall past findings that stranger-to-stranger contact is more effective at boosting turnout than peer-to-peer contact (Nickerson 2007). The relatively low impact offace-to-face contact versus phone calls is surprising, given that other studies have typically found more persona! forms of contact to be more effective (Green and Gerber 2008). However, this may be a limitation of the survey contact indicator, which does not distinguish between different types offace-to-face contact ( e.g. solicited or unsolicited). 21 Candidate text messages are omitted from the analy sis due to the extremely low contact rate (< 1% ). Survey Findings 31 4. Y outh Mobilization Assessment This section includes a brief quantitative analysis of the overall contact rates for on-the-ground youth mobilization activity. The characteristics of organizations that were successful at mobilizing youth are also discussed later in this report (see Interview Findings). 4.1 Summary of Mobilization Activity The partner organizations that participated in this research provided us with information about their mobilization activity leading up to the election. This information was collected in a standardized format, including the location and estimated reach of different activities (see interview design and methodology for details). The large majority of recorded activity took place in late September or October. This analysis considers only on-the-ground mobilization activities such as election events or canvassing. Although sorne information was collected about print and on-Iine activity, it is excluded from this analysis because there was no consistent way to assess their reach. Interview participants provided us with contact estimates for on-the-ground activities, based on either event attendance or the number of people approached. Figure 1: Estimated number of eligible voters reached by contact type BElection debate Iii Workshop or otherevent ~ Unsolicited contact Youth Mobilization Assessment 33 C~·<)o 1 ;_; -:_1 v Altogether, these on-the-ground activities reached an estimated 6,140 voting-age Torontonians.22 Figure 1 shows this mobilization separated into three categories: election debates, workshops or other events, and unsolicited contact. The first two categories are self-explanatory. Unsolicited contact is defined as any public activity that does not have a self-selected audience, such as canvassing a neighbourhood or speaking to a classroom of college students. The distribution of this contact is somewhat surprising, as the number of people contacted does not correspond to the amount of effort put into each type of activity. Of the 17 different organizations active in these areas, 12 held workshops or events, nine were involved in organizing debates, and four engaged in unsolicited personal campaigning. By their nature, workshops tend to be smaller, more personal and more resource-intensive than debates. Their attendance is therefore likely to be relatively low. However, attendance for debates varied significantly, ranging from 30 to 350 in most cases.23 The mean attendance for debates was 184 but the median was 90. The three largest debates account for more than half of all attendees, with most debates drawing relatively few people. Far fewer organizations were involved in unsolicited personal campaigning, y et they reached a comparable number of people. There are many reasons to host an election debate, such as encouraging dialogue and ensuring that certain issues or community interests are part of the agenda during an election. However, these findings show that most debates draw small crowds. Given that organizing a debate requires a relatively large amount oftime and resources, and that those who attend are already likely to be engaged, debates should be approached with caution when used as a mobilization tool. 22 Sorne organizations also provided us with information about their outreach to school-aged youth, which we excluded for the purposes of this analysis. 23 The sole outlier was the ArtsVote debate hosted at the Art Gallery of Ontario, which drew a total of approximately 1,250 people (though not exclusively youth). 34 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 5. Interview Findings Representatives from 22 different organizations involved in youth mobilization participated in the interview process.24 This section begins by providing a profile of the organizations represented and then presents the findings from the interviews. Along with collecting feedback from the participants, the interviewer asked them to describe the planning and execution oftheir mobilization work during the election. The interview findings are presented as they relate to six topics: Toronto Elections' youth outreach network; non-partisanship; election information and resources; regional and demographie patterns; and the characteristics of successful organizations during the election. 5.1 Organizations and Interview Participants Twelve of the 22 organizations have youth-specific mandates or represent typically young communities (e.g. student unions). The other 10 organizations have broader mandates, but were involved in youth mobilization during the election. Figure 2 shows the distribution of different organizations based on their mandates. Non-profit organizations with general mandates are distinguished from those that focus either on electoral engagement or on specifie geographie communities. Figure 2: Interview participants by organization type • Youth-serving organization lil Community organization 11@Non-~~t orgaruzatxon .Student union Post-secondary Dinstitution .Electi?n. orgamzation N=22 24 Two of the participants represented different community organizations that worked together for the 2010 municipal election as part of the Malvem Votes campaign. Interview Findings 35 The participants also represent organizations from across Toronto, as summarized in Figure 3. Six of the organizations are located in Central Toronto, eight are located in amalgamated suburbs, and another eight have city-wide or provincial mandates. Figure 3: Interview participants by organization location .Central fiSuburban ~ City-wide or great er N=22 The organizations' activities outside ofthe 2010 municipal election are also varied. Ofthe 22 organizations represented, only eight had previously been directly involved in electoral mobilization. As shown in Figure 4, seven of the organizations are involved in lobbying and policy advocacy, whereas a third provide civic education programming to their communities. 5.2 Toronto Elections' Youth Outreach Initiative The response to Toronto Elections' youth outreach initiative and the creation of a network of partner organizations was overwhelmingly positive. Participants were particularly enthusiastic about connecting with ether organizations at the meetings held by Toronto Elections. "I am so grateful," said one participant. "Because ofthat [meeting ofpartner networks], I am doing so many things that I am passionate about, and they're coming to fruition because ofthiit." In terms of improvements, participants generally said that Toronto Elections could have been more proactive. The two most common recommendations are described below: approaching partners earlier in the year and developing a more extensive mobilization campaign. 36 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election Figure 4: Organizational activities outside of the 2010 Toronto municipal election Time and Planning Constraints Severa! participants complained that Toronto Elections approached them too late in the year. Of the 21 participants from the youth partner network, five specifically identified this as an area for improvement. Sorne organizations had either already made their plans before meeting with Toronto Elections, while others did not have enough time to develop plans between the first meeting on July 22, 2010, and the election. "[Toronto Elections] needs to articulate what they're going to do earlier on in the process," said one participant. This feedback came from each type of organization. "Get into the universities early," said one university representative. "Sometimes it's hard to figure out who the right person to speak with is, but there will be a person who is keen to develop that programming. It' s just a question of finding them." Similarly, student union and community organization representatives identified spring or early summer (approximately six months before the election) as a better time to start planning for a fall election. Mobilization Activity and Capacity When asked to suggest improvements, 10 of the 22 participants said that election agencies should be more involved in directly contacting and mobilizing youth. Interview Findings 37 r..L''l'·• ., 1 v..:..~.... Participants' intuitions in this area often echoed the existing research around GOTV and personal contact. "I felt the one-on-ones I had with people were really the strongest," said one student union representative. "They actually come back to you and say 'I voted."' Another participant said that the Toronto Elections youth campaign relied too heavily on print media: "A flyer? That's not really enough. Especially when you're dealing with youth, that's not enough to make a youth go out and fill out a ballot." Five participants emphasized the need for more outreach by Toronto Elections through social media, and for adopting a flexible approach to these media. "These things have to be clone on the fly, it has to be responsive," said one participant. "Tomorrow there could be another version of Twitter or Facebook, and you need to embrace that." Several participants also suggested that the city engage in capacity-building for youth mobilization initiatives. One participant recommended that Toronto Elections "actually send out representatives to different schools, to different organizations, to coach the youth workers themselves - on different approaches, different methods, different strategies to talk to youth about elections." Another proposed that Toronto Elections create "a youth action team that might be able to go around the city and deliver workshops for young people, by young people." 5.3 Non-partisanship Policies Although none of the organizations selected for interview had partisan affiliations, five participants expressed concems with the non-partisanship policies of the City of Toronto and ether levels of govemment. Relationships with Government and Funders Most of the organizations represented in our sample, as well as most of the organizations in Toronto Elections' partner network, rely to sorne extent on govemment funding for their operations. Many of them also receive funding from foundations and organizations that are non-partisan and hold charitable status. Three interview participants explicitly identified these relationships, and the perceptions of partisanship surrounding election mobilization, as an obstacle to the ir work during the 2010 municipal election. One participant described an incident from the 2006 municipal election, where a candidate filed a formai complaint against a local non-profit organization. Although the organization was cleared of any wrongdoing, they were forced to devote a significant amount of resources to dealing with the cornplaint. The participant reported hearing similar concems expressed by other local organizations, which make them reluctant to engage in elections: "There's this culture of fear that has been created around election time, where organizations say 'You know ·what? It' s not even worth it for us. We don't want to engage our participants on any level at ali when it cornes to elections."' 38 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 1944 Two other participants described a non-partisan organization whose application for funding was rejected by a federal ministry, as their focus on visible minority voters was considered overly poli ti cal. "Because they' re trying to get a certain ethnie group- a certain population-to vote," one participant said, "the understanding [within the government] is 'If [that population does] vote, they're not going to vote for us, so why should we support this group?' There's that element. And you might find that controversial ... but definitely that's an issue." These concerns can be summarized as two different challenges. The first is that sorne non-political organizations who engage in youth mobilization believe their mandates are perceived as implicitly political. As one participant put it, "It's really interesting: when you say that '1 want to support youth,' you become partisan, because the right automatically assumes that you are now assisting the left." The second challenge is a lack of clarity around non-partisanship policies and regulations. Participants received mixed signais about what activities were considered non-partisan depending on which officiais they spoke with. As one respondent put it, "1 think there needs to be more of a dialogue with public funders- with the municipal, provincial, federallevel- [and] the organizations they fund, tolet them know this is what is allowed and this is what isn't allowed. There's a lot ofmiscommunication." These concerns also reveal a blind spot in this anal y sis: by virtue of how the interview sample was selected, it only includes organizations that were active during the election. There is no way to estimate how many other organizations avoided election mobilization altogether because of similar concerns involving partisanship and funding. The topic warrants further attention. City Non-partisanship Policies Severa! participants described Toronto Elections' non-partisanship policy as limiting their effectiveness at youth mobilization. One repeated criticism was that Toronto Elections staff would not attend events where candidates were present. As one participant explained, "because [Toronto Elections] has to be so, so non-partisan, they had a policy about not coming to events where there were going to be any candidates. And 1 feel that's very limiting.... For events where ali of the candidates are being invited and the event itself is non-partisan, l'rn not sure why the city can't have a presence." Another participant expressed frustration with the support Toronto Elections could provide for organizers trying to mobilize youth. When the participant asked for help planning issue-specifie youth mobilization activities, city officiais responded that providing that advice feil outside of their mandate. "Sometimes 1 feel that limits [Toronto Elections] in the way they can actually help organizations," said a participant. "They've clone weil in their very neutra! stance, but they can do a lot more in aggressively trying to help people connect to issues and connect to things." Interview Findings 39 fol /~ ~J 1 u :;t ~· Practical concerns with non-partisanship extend beyond Toronto Elections. Another participant who organized severa! election events and debates had difficulty securing space from the Toronto District School Board. Although the board provides free space to non-profit organizations through the Priority Schools Initiative, applications to use this space for youth workshops and debates were rejected because these activities were election-related. 5.4 Election Information and Resources Providing information to voters is a central part of Toronto Elections' mandate. During the 2010 municipal election, the city ran a traditional media campaign, maintained a social media presence, distributed print materials and provided information on the city' s Web site. Along with these resources, flyers, posters and other promotional materials were also created specifically for the Toronto Elections youth outreach campaign. On the whole, interview participants responded positively to these resources: of the 22 participants, 16 reported using the city' s print materials in the ir work. Participants also gave specifie feedback on election information that was needed for their work. The interview questions did not explicitly solicit this feedback, which suggests that respondents were identifying a significant gap in the election resources currently available. Candidate and Platform Information The single most-requested resource during the interviews was more information about candidates and their platforms. Specifically, participants identified a need for resources that present and compare candidates and their platforms in a consistent manner.25 Participants from community and student organizations identified this as a barrier to their work. Two representatives from student unions explained that students would frequently ask about where candidates stood on specifie issues, and the representatives were unable to provide a response or direct them elsewhere. Other participants identified this as a general shortcoming of the Toronto Elections Web site. As one participant put it, "You can find out who's registered to run in each ward and for mayor, but it's just a name and it doesn't mean anything to anybody." Perhaps the most telling were the three organizations that developed candidate information sheets or report cards of the ir own. This suggests that information about candidates and the ir platforms is an appreciable need for organizations seeking to mobilize youth. 25 This finding is consistent with Apathy is Boring's internai Web analytics. For the 2008 federal election, ApathyisBoring.com provided information about civic engagement, how to vote, and platform summaries for ali of the political parties. During the month prier to the election, platform summaries were by far the most popular form of content, accounting for 43.7% of ali pages viewed on the Web site. Similarly, ofyouth who opened an election-day e-mail with links to this content, the majority (51.1%) navigated to the party platforms, compared with much smaller proportions who chose general election information (12.2%) or information about how to vote (6.3%). 40 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election Il ~'":\ ,..., ~ ..ü..V'::!l:G Accessing Candidate Contact Information A lack of accessible information about candidates was also an obstacle for sorne organizations. The Toronto Elections Web site does not consistently provide contact information for candidates. Because of this, participants had to travel to city offices and pay for photocopies of candidate lists in order to organize election debates. "We're in an age where there's really no excuse for not having this stuff on the Internet," said one participant who was involved in organizing debates. "Ifyou don't have an e-mail address, you probably shouldn't be running for city councillor. Get an e-mail address, put it on-Iine and make sure you're accessible. That's part ofthe democratie process." Adaptation of Election Resources During the interviews, 11 of the 22 of the participants reported adapting resources from Toronto Elections. The most common approach was for participants to copy information from the city's Web site, revise it for their target community and then integrate it into their organization's outreach materials. This behaviour pattern was remarkably common and consistent, and its implications are discussed in the Recommendations section of this report. One participant aptly summarized the consensus from the interviews: "Resources are great, but you have to take these resources and make them your own." 5.5 Regional and Demographie Patterns As in the case of survey respondents, several interview findings pertain to specifie regions or demographie groups. In particular, suburban residents, immigrants, and students in residence faced unique accessibility issues during the election. Polling Station Opening Hours Y outh in the amalgamated suburbs face different barri ers to voting than those living in the city centre. Participants from the colleges and universities with suburban campuses consistently identified commuter culture as a general barrier to engagement, as students were o:ften less engaged in campus activities. Commuter culture was also a challenge for community organizations working in the suburbs. Three participants explicitly identified the opening hours of polling stations as a barrier to participation. Polling stations in Toronto were open from 10:00 a.m. until8:00 p.m. on election day, which leaves only a narrow window in the evening for commuters with traditional schedules to vote. One participant identified this as the "number-one complaint" from residents in their community. Interview Findings 41 Citizenship and Immigrant Communities Two participants identified a separate category of challenges surrounding citizenship and immigration. These participants work with communities that have large immigrant populations. In the course oftheir election outreach, one participant discovered that the majority ofyouth their organization was targeting had immigrated to Canada as young children, but never applied for citizenship. The interaction between immigration issues and youth engagement is beyond the scope of this report, but it certain! y warrants further attention. Students in Campus Residences During the 2010 municipal election, the City Clerk's Office cooperated with severa! post-secondary institutions and student unions to pro vide Ietters of attestation for students living in campus residences, as many Iack any other proof of address.26 Ali of the student union and administration representatives involved in this program responded positively to it. Two student union representatives we interviewed also identified the distribution of these Ietters as an opportunity for persona! contact with students, although in one case they were prevented from doing so because of a university po licy preventing canvassing in residences. The relationship between post-secondary institutions' policies and campus mobilization warrants further attention from stakeholders. 5.6 Characteristics of Successful Organizations As described in the Youth Mobilization Assessment section, the size and scope of organizations' mobilization activity varied considerably. The extent to which organizations met their own goals for voter mobilization also varied significantly. Based on the survey, mobilization, and interview data collected, we identified three highly successful organizations participating in this research. In this case, we defined successful organizations as those that were generally able to meet their own goals and that were also described as having the Iargest impact by ether interview participants. We identified similarities in the mobilization plans and activities ofthese organizations, which may be Iinked to their success. Starting Early The three organizations we identified started planning early, from four months to a full year before the election. Almost ali oftheir mobilization activities still took place in September and October, but they developed specifie plans wellin advance ofimplementing them. For example, one organization was forced to postpone their activities with high school students uritil after the summer vacation. Given that the organization started their planning in March, they were able to cope with a three-month delay. 26 See Appendix E for a sample letter of attestation. 42 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election q il Q 1 v :;;:0 Leveraging Existing Relationships All three organizations collaborated with ether groups, which was representative ofthe sample as a whole. However, most ofthese collaborations appear to have originated from persona! connections. All of the participants relied primarily on existing connections within their communities, rather than approaching new partners. Two of these three organizations also secured fun ding ( albeit in limited amounts) for the ir election work, again through existing relationships. When asked to recommend best practices, one of the participants aptly summarized a pattern: "Start early and find as many allies as you possibly can." Another interview participant echoed this comment, emphasizing the value of partnerships to bypass obstacles and reach new communities. "Collaborate as muchas possible, because the more you collaborate, the less work you have to do yourself," said the participant. "Ifyou don't really know the community [you are trying to reach], don't try to get to know the community. Just go in and allow the people who actually know the community to do that part of the work. Collaborate with them." Defining Narrow Strategies All three organizations also developed relatively "narrow" strategies prier to the election, in terms of choosing to restrict the scope of their goals and activities. Each organization started by identifying limited goals for the election, such as increasing participation in a specifie neighbourhood or raising awareness around a specifie issue. The organizations then developed plans specifically to meet these goals and excluded ether activities from their plans. This stands in contrast to ether participants who described more complex and original plans for the election, many of which did not come to fruition. Interview Findings 43 6. Recommendations This section in eludes two sets of recommendations: suggestions for further research in the field ofyouth electoral engagement, as weil as best practices for youth mobilization initiatives. Although these recommendations are framed in the context of youth electoral engagement, many of them can be applied to voters of ali ages. Conducting field experiments, collecting turnout data, providing election information and increasing accessibility are relevant to the electoral engagement ali Canadians, particularly in an era of continually declining turnout. 6.1 Research Recommendations 1. Election agencies should commission field experiments that use actual turnout records to study youth mobilization. There is a need for field experiments that use actual turnout records to directly measure and compare the effectiveness of different youth mobilization strategies. Additional survey research into youth engagement is also needed, particularly in Canada (see next recommendation). However, when the dependent variable is direct participation in an election, there is no substitute for real-world turnout data.27 With proper implementation and data collection, there are a limitless number ofturnout field experiments that can be conducted. Appendix F describes three experimental protocols that could serve as starting points for a turnout research pro gram in Canada: • Testing different methods of delivering letters of attestation to students living in campus residences • Holding festivals at polling stations on election day • Variations of traditional door-to-door canvassing for young voters II. Election agencies should commission and conduct additional research into the lifestyles and attitudes Canadian youth. The survey results presented in this report show the significant impact of life-cycle effects and residential patterns on engagement. Other studies have shawn the large impacts of the transition to adulthood on turnout, sometimes on the arder of20 percentage points (Bhatti and Hansen 2010). These effects warrant further attention, particularly because the first few years of eligibility may be a critical period in the formation ofvoting behaviours (Johnston, Matthews and Bittner 2007). 27 Researchers in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and United Kingdom, are also able to use validated voting records in their experimental research. Because these records report tumout at the individual leve!, they make it much easier to study the behaviour of specifie groups such as young voters. Similar datais not currently available in Canada. Recommendations 45 ILl Conduct research with large, randomly-selected samples ofyouth. Many of the findings described above could not have been identified using smaller samples or less detailed indicators. Large, representative samples allow for finer distinctions between subsamples based on age, place of residence, etc., while securing results that accurately represent the population as a who le. IL2 Gather longitudinal data about attitudes among youth. Studies such as this one use age as a proxy, comparing younger respondents to older ones to assess the impact of !ife-cycle changes. However, by observing the same group of respondents over time, researchers can more precisely link changes in attitude to changes in behaviour. IL3 Gather more information about the whereabouts ofyouth. Severa! key findings in this report involve the residential patterns ofyouth in Toronto. In arder to better target youth during elections, be it for mobilization campaigns or the distribution of VICs, more information is needed about where young Canadians live and spend the ir time. Residential patterns differ from city to city, as weil as between urban and rural communities. Understanding these patterns is crucial for any initiative that seeks to reach and mobilize youth. 11.4 Gather more information about immigrant communities. Two interview participants described issues surrounding citizenship as barriers to youth participation. More information about these communities is needed in arder to properly assess these barriers and determine how they can be addressed. m. Election agencies should collect consistent, age-segmented turnout data for ali Canadian elections. This research could have had a broader scope and more robust findings - without any substantial change in the budget or labour required - if consistent, age-segmented turnout data had been available. Patterns ofyouth engagement in different areas of the city, as weil as the impact of mobilization activities and campaigns, could be analyzed in far greater detail with real-world turnout information. Canada has an abundance of elections. In 20 Il, there will be six provincial or territorial elections, dozens of municipal ·elections in another three provinces, and Band Council elections across the country. Unfortunately, most provincial and municipal election authorities do not record turnout by age. What little data they do collect often lacks detail and cannat be compared to other jurisdictions due to methodological inconsistencies. Consistently collecting turnout data has severa! advantages. One unintended consequence of a federal system is that it creates natural experiments: election agencies across Canada operate in a variety of contexts and under a variety of regulations. Consistent turnout data would open the door to countless comparative analyses. Researchers could analyze the influence of many factors on youth turnout, including registration systems, ID requirements, polling dates, ballot types, on-Iine voting, electoral competitiveness and more. 46 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election Elections Canada has already developed a secure and reliable procedure for gathering age-segmented turnout data during Canadian federal elections (Elections Canada 2010) The implementation of similar procedures for other elections would be a boon to the study of turnout in Canada and provide an invaluable source oflongitudinal data about young voters. 6.2 Electoral Engagement Recommendations IV. Election agencies should plan and publicize their youth strategies earlier. The youth mobilization conducted during the 2010 Toronto municipal election was a remarkable achievement. In the space of about three months, Toronto Elections brought together a network ofyouth partners from across the city, including many organizations that had never before been involved in electoral mobilization. Given the overwhelmingly positive response from interview participants, election agencies should continue this approach. However, interview participants repeatedly said that their organizations could have been more active if they had been given more time to prepare. Election agencies should ensure that other stakeholders are aware oftheir youth strategies and have sufficient time to coordinate with them. V. Stakeholders should adopt mobilization strategies that target unengaged youth. The survey findings in this report suggest than unsolicited forms of persona! contact mobilize youth to vote. This reflects similar findings in GOTV research, as weil as the qualitative input of the interview participants. These findings suggest that organizations seeking to engage youth in elections should reconsider their mobilization strategies. V.l Election debates are not a highly effective mobilization tool. They may further other po licy or educational goals, but the people who attend debates are also more likely to already be engaged. Debates also draw relatively small crowds given the relative commitment oftime and resources. V.2 For organizations seeking to mobilize youth, traditional activities such as canvassing may be more effective. For those still wishing to host events, integrating the election into an event that appeàls to unengaged youth (e.g. a music event or community festival) may be a more promising approach. V.3 Narrower mobilization strategies appear to be more effective. Our survey findings show significant differences between recent adults and young independents in terms of Iifestyle; engagement, and residential patterns. Furthermore, youth who either live with a parent or have moved to the city centre report higher levels of civic and electoral engagement. · A one-size-fits-all approach to youth mobilization is unlikely to be effective at contacting these diverse groups. Y outh who live independently in the city centre, for example, will have different needs and Iifestyles than those living independently in the amalgamated suburbs (with the latter group being less engaged on the who le). Furthermore, the organizations that were most effective at mobilization in the 2010 municipal election focused on specifie communities. Y outh Recommendations 47 mobilization initiatives that are less ambitious and tailored for specifie sub-populations may prove to be better investments. These findings are relevant to ali election stakeholders; the targeted strategies described above can just as easily be integrated into partisan campaigns as non-partisan ones, and they are also relevant when mobilizing groups other than youth. VI. Election agencies should support non-partisan youth mobilization networks that convene, coordinate, and educate stakeholders. When asked to pro vide feedback for election agencies, 10 interview participants recommended more on-the-ground mobilization. Others asked for more guidance and leadership from Toronto Elections. Given that most ofthese organizations do not have election-specifie mandates, it is unreasonable to expect them to spontaneously develop large and highly effective electoral mobilization campaigns. They need an outside source of expertise, coordination and support. The activities election agencies are willing to undertake are limited. As described in the interview findings, these limitations had a negative impact on Toronto Elections' ability to mobilize youth in the 2010 municipal election. If election agencies are sincere in the ir commitment to increase youth tumout in Canada, they need to collaborate with other youth stakeholders and support more effective mobilization initiatives. Below, we recommend steps to be taken in order to provide the necessary expertise, coordination and support through a non-partisan youth mobilization network. This plan builds on Toronto Elections' recent youth initiative by creating a more structured network that is better able to meet the needs ofyouth and community organizations. Election agencies should support the creation of one ofthese networks in an upcoming election to serve as a test and proof of concept. VI.l Help youth and community organizations implement effective youth mobilization strategies. When asked for a subjective evaluation of the impact oftheir work during the 2010 municipal election, most interview participants vacillated. They described it as unknown or impossible to assess. This uncertainty suggests a generallack of confidence among organizations in their youth mobilization plans. The primary role of a youth mobilization network would be to help organizations develop and deploy effective mobilization campaigns. Political operatives and social scientists may think extensively about tumout, but youth and community organizations do not. They are unlikely to be familiar with the research into voter mobilization strategies and their effectiveness. A youth mobilization network can share this specialized knowledge with organizations and help them ~~~ . VI.2 Coordinate the work ofyouth and community organizations. Interview participants repeatedly cited collaboration as a best practice in their work, and a lack of preparation time as a barrier to being more active during the election. These organizational challenges affected the Toronto Elections partner network even though the date ofthe 2010 municipal election was fixed years in advance. They can only be aggravated for elections that occur on short notice. 48 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election f1l l'• 1 v;) •'3 A youth mobilization network is a long-term initiative. lt would build trust and maintain links with partner organizations before and after the election campaign, rather than repeating the process of outreach, relationship-building and coordination each time an election is held. lt falls outside the traditional mandate of election agencies, but a stable network is a more effective way to engage stakeholders from the community and non-profit sectors. The coordination of non-partisan mobilization through a network has additional benefits. First, it helps to reduce duplication of effort among the members of the network. Organizations can share resources they have developed, collaborate, or find partners to host events and plan activities. This is precisely the type ofbehaviour that occurred within the Toronto Elections network, and it should be supported. Convening a network also provides a way for member organizations to give feedback to and start a dialogue with election agencies. Many of the findings and comments contained in this report could have been secured through a conversation between election agencies and interview participants. However, for this type of conversation to happen, there must be a relationship with mutual trust. VI.3 Expand knowledge ofyouth mobilization among ali stakeholders. As identified in the research recommendations, there is a need for more real-world data about how to engage youth in elections. Y outh mobilization networks should gather this information and disseminate it to other electoral stakeholders. For example, a coordinated network could easily implement any of the experimental designs discussed in Appendix F. There are limits to the systemic impact of non-partisan mobilization initiatives. Elections are ultimately about partisan competition. Political parties and candidates will always be the primary source of mobilization in elections. Unfortunately, partisan organizers are not al ways far-sighted: their priority is to gain a relative advantage over opponents in the current election. Although youth are the largest untapped group ofvoters in Canada today, the conventional wisdom is that campaigns should focus on persuading known voters rather than reaching out to new ones. However, the self-interest of parties and candidates can also be hamessed to mobilize non-voters. By testing and refining cast-effective youth mobilization strategies, other stakeholders can impact the system as a who le. As Green and Gerber (2008) have articulated, political campaigns have an interest in this type of information: Our perspective on how to raise voter tumout is rather different. Examine a range of GOTV tactics and figure out which ones are effective and cost-efficient. By demonstrating what works (and what does not), this investigative approach provides an important signal to those engaged in electoral competition. If the market for campaign services leams from a reliable source that a particular GOTV tactic is a more cost-effective way of gamering votes, we eventually will see campaigns allocate more resources to this tactic. Recommendations 49 Even with the limitations of our survey dataset, this research found that certain forms of contact from a candidate made youth more likely to vote. Supporting the creation of a pilot youth mobilization network will produce more comprehensive and robust research. VII. Election agencies should improve youth coverage in the voters' list. Youth are less likely to receive a Voter Information Card (VIC). An Ipsos Reid survey commissioned by the City of Toronto for the 201 0 election found that 65% of Torontonians recalled receiving a VIC at their current address, whereas 26% responded that they did not receive a card (Ipsos Reid 2010). That compares with 48% and 47%, respectively, in our sample. Given that these cards serve as a basic source of information about the election for voters, this relatively low coverage ofyouth is troubling. Our findings show that youth who live independently, reside in the city centre, or changed addresses recent! y are less likely to receive a VIC. To supplement the existing process for municipal elections, targeted enumeration could be conducted in communities that have younger and more mobile populations. The success of any efforts to engage or inform potential voters hinges on a reliable knowledge ofthat population. VIII. Non-partisan stakeholders should clearly define non-partisanship policies and their implications. The interview process revealed a significant amount of confusion and concem surrounding non-partisanship policies during elections. Further attention to this tapie is certainly warranted, as it was never part of this project's research design and its impact may be underplayed. VIILJ Stakeholders in elections should clarify their definitions ofnon-partisanship. For example, what makes an election event non-partisan? Do ali candidates have to be present? Or should no candidates be present? Clearly, there is no litmus test for non-partisanship. However, organizations that rely on govemment support would benefit from clearer guidelines and articulations of po licy in this area, particularly when concems surrounding fun ding are at play. Discussion: Managing risks related to non-partisanship Severa! participants identified potential negative consequences associated with the perceptions of youth mobilization. As this report includes a number ofrecommendations conceming youth mobilization, a discussion ofhow to mitigate these risks is appropriate. These risks are to sorne extent inevitable. By nature, every election produces both winners and lasers. Commentators and interested parties attribute these results to a variety of causes: the weather on election day, the tone of media coverage, etc. Initiatives that mobilize youth, and particularly those that prove effective, are not exempt from this type of commentary and speculation. The simplest way for any youth mobilization initiative to mitigate negative perceptions is to be both non-partisan and transparent. For example, the youth mobilization network proposed earlier 50 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election 1 Df;5 should not be linked to any partisan stakeholders, be it through membership, funding, or other affiliations. It should operate independently, with member organizations formally committing to non-partisanship in their electoral activity. Similarly, any organization involved in non-partisan youth mobilization should publicly and proactively disclose their membership, strategy, and plans for the election. This provides ethers with the opportunity to raise any concems before activities take place. These steps can help to address perceptions of partisanship or impropriety wh en mobilizing youth. Beyond that, any negative response is tied to youth engagement itself. However, if any election stakeholders genuinely disagree with the notion that more young Canadians should vote, surely the onus is on them to show why election agencies and ether organizations should share thatview. IX. Election agencies should provide adaptable and redistributable election information. Fully half of the interview participants described taking on-line resources from Toronto Elections and modifying them to suit their organizations and campaigns. Election agencies should encourage this adaptation of resources by election stakeholders. There are two immediate steps that can be taken in this direction. IX.l Public information about elections should be provided with a Creative Gommons or comparable license. This would encourage ethers to adapt the information without fear of infringing on any copyrights, while still requiring them to properly attribute the source of the information. Given that the practice is already widespread, this would serve primarily as a symbolic gesture. IX.2 Public information about elections should be provided in open and editable formats. This eases the actual process of adaptation and sharing by removing the inconvenience of extracting information from a "closed" resource.28 Similarly, public election information should be provided on-line whenever possible - a problem that was identified by debate organizers in the 2010 Toronto municipal election. There is a perceived risk in using open formats, as the information provided may be reproduced inaccurately. However, the practice ofthird-party adaptation and dissemination is already widespread with closed formats. It is also unpreventable: in the Internet era, election agencies cannet monopolize information about voting. By responding to this practice, rather than ignoring it, election agencies can engage with those who are adapting information and secure their cooperation in reproducing it accurately and attributing it properly. X. Stakeholders should provide information about candidates and their platforms. · Ifunsolicited feedback indicates a clear need, then this recommendation deserves special attention. Interview participants repeatedly identified a need for more information about 28 A useful rule ofthumb is to never provide a public resource as a PDF. If the goal is to share and diffuse the information in a document, it should be provided in an editable format. Recommendations 51 1956 candidates and their platforms. They also identified this as a challenge oftheir work, as they were often unable to answer questions about candidates in the election. Information about candidates, parties and platforms should be compiled and distributed as a public service. This information should come from a reputable, non-partisan source. Political parties and candidates, for obvious reasons, tend to provide skewed descriptions oftheir platforms. Y et in order for this information to be trusted by th ose involved in non-partisan mobilization, it must be compiled by an organization with no interest in the outcome of the election. Unfortunately, providing this information is Iikely to be deemed too risky by election agencies. However, a number of organizations, including Apathy is Boring, already develop platform summaries on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, on-Iine voting compass projects ask voters to identify their priorities and, based on information compiled by experts in the field, provide analyses of how an individual's opinions relate to the positions of different candidates. These non-partisan initiatives already exist, but they require consistent extemal support to expand the scope and improve the quality of this work. XI. Election agencies and other stakeholders should increase voting accessibility. XLI Polling stations should be open longer during municipal elections. Interview participants from the amalgamated suburbs raised concems with polling station hours for the 2010 Toronto municipal election. This was a significant issue in their communities, as most residents commute to work or school, leaving only a narrow (and therefore crowded) window in the evening for them to vote. XI.2 Students living in campus residences should receive letters ofattestation. During the 2010 municipal election, the City Clerk' s Office cooperated with severa! university administrations and student unions to provide these letters, as many students in university residences lacked .another pro of of address. Interview participants responded positively to this program, and we recommend that it be continued in future elections. Distributing these letters also provides an opportunity to mobilize students, which requires further discussion and coordination between all stakeholders, including college or university administrations and student unions. 52 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election References Addonizio, Elizabeth M., Donald P. Green and James M. Glaser. 2007. "Putting the Party Back into Politics: An Experiment Testing Whether Election Day Festivals Increase Voter Turnout." PS: Political Science and Politics 40, 4: 721-727. Bennion, Elizabeth A. 2005. "Caught in the Ground Wars: Mobilizing Voters During a Competitive Congressional Campaign." The ANNALS ofthe American Acade my ofPolitical and Social Science 601, 1 : 123-141. Bernstein, Robert, Anita Chadha and Robert Montjoy. 2001. "Overreporting Voting." Public Opinion Quarterly 65, 1: 22-44. Bhatti, Yosef, and Kasper M. Hansen. 2010. "Leaving the Nest and the Social Act ofVoting Revisiting the Relationship Between Age and Turnout among First-time Voters." Unpublished manuscript. University of Copenhagen. Blais, André, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. 2004. "Where Does Turnout Decline Come From?" European Journal ofPolitical Research 43, 2: 221-236. Blais, André, and Peter Loewen. 2009. Youth Electoral Engagement in Canada. Working Paper Series on Electoral Participation and Outreach Practices. Ottawa: Elections Canada. Canadian Election Study. Canadian Election Study, 2008 Campaign Period Survey, Respondent's Year ofBirth (table). Canadian Opinion Research Archive (database). http://130.15.161.127:82/webview/?v=2&study=http%3A//130.15.161.127%3A82/obj/fStu dy/CES08&mode=documentation&submode=ddi&node=O&top=yes (accessed February 14, 2011). City ofToronto. 2010 Municipal Election Voter Statistics. City ofToronto. http://www. toronto.ca/elections/results/pdf/20 10-voter-turnout-statistics.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011). Cook, Coleen, Fred Heath and RusselL. Thompson. 2000. "A Meta-Analysis ofResponse Rates in Web- or Internet-Based Surveys." Educational and Psychological Measurement 60, 6 (December): 821-836. Duff, Brian, et al. 2007. "Good Excuses: Understanding Who Votes with an Improved Turnout Question." Public Opinion Quarter/y 71, 1: 67-90. Elections Canada. 2010. Estimation of Voter Turnout by Age Group at the 2008 Federal General Election. Working Paper Series on Electoral Participation and Outreach Practices. Ottawa: Elections Canada. Gerber, Alan S., and Todd Rogers. 2009. "Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation to Vote: Everybody's Voting and So Should You." The Journal ofPolitics 71, 1: 178. Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2001. Getting Out the Youth Vote: Resultsfrom Randomized Field Experiments. 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"Social Desirability and Response Validity: A Comparative Analysis of Overreporting Voter Turnout in Five Countries." The Journal of Politics 67, 3: 825-40. Michelson, Melissa R. 2005. "Meeting the Challenge ofLatino Voter Mobilization." The ANNALS ofthe American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 601, 1: 85-101. Nickerson, David W., and Todd Rogers. 2010. "Do You Have a Voting Plan? Implementation Intentions, Voter Turnout, and Organic Plan Making." Psychological Science 21,2 (February): 194-9. Nickerson, David W. 2006. "Hunting the Elusive Young Voter." Journal ofPolitical Marketing 5, 3:47-69. ---.2007. Friends Don 't Make Friends Vote: Selection and Reputation in Voter Mobilization. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 30-September 2. Presser, Stanley, and Michael Traugott. 1992. "Little White Lies and Social Science Models: Correlated Response Errors in a Panel Study ofVoting." Public Opinion Quarter/y 56, 1: 77-86. Statistics Canada. Residential Telephone Service Survey. Statistics Canada. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/090615/dq090615c-eng.htm, (accessed February 14, 2011). 54 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election or.::o 1 i,J ..,; :,y Appendix A - Quasi-experimental Analys~s Apathy is Boring' s original intention, as described in the Research Design and Methodology section of this report, was to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis using data collected from both the survey and Toronto Elections' partner organizations. In a true experiment, researchers assign subjects to treatment and control groups, typically through random assignment. In a quasi-experiment, researchers are observing an existing phenomenon. Groups are identified as "treatment" or "control" based on their exposure to the phenomenon in question. In both cases, the analysis is then conducted by comparing results from the treatment and control groups. The initial survey questionnaire collected postal codes from respondents. Our goal was to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis by combining this with the mobilization data, using respondents' proximity to mobilization activities as a proxy for exposure. However, as explained below, this form of analysis was not possible for youth mobilization in the 2010 municipal election. The report therefore presents a simpler analysis of the data. Limited Scale of Mobilization Activity Due to the scale ofyouth mobilization during the election, it is impossible to develop a treatment scheme for a quasi-experimental analysis. This problem is best explained with a specifie example: consider Ward 42 in the city of Toronto. This ward had the largest amount ofrecorded mobilization activity before the election. In total, approximately 1,952 voting-age residents of the ward- though not exclusively youth- were approached by volunteers or attended election-related events·organized by partner organizations. A back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates the analytical challenge. In 2010, there were 44,136 registered voters in Ward 42 (City ofToronto 2010). For argument's sake, let us make two generous assumptions about the mobilization activity being analyzed: that there was no duplication of contact, and that everyone persan contacted was a registered voter. Given these assumptions, 4.4% ofregistered voters in Ward 42 either attended an event or encountered a volunteer. Thè survey sample includes 27 respondents from the ward, 18 ofwhom completed the follow-up questionnaire. This creates the challenge ofusing a sample with fewer than 20 respondents to assess the impact of a campaign that contacted less than one twentieth of the population from which they are drawn.29 This issue occurs despite the tremendous amount of activity in Ward 42, where almost a third of ali recorded contact in our dataset took place. Whatever the effectiveness ofyouth mobilization in the 2010 Toronto municipal election, its overall scale is too small for a quasi-experimental analysis. 29 Changing the unit of analysis does not resolve this issue. Sorne neighbourhoods have higher contact rates than the wards in which they are located, but they also have fewer survey respondents. Appendix A- Quasi-Experimental Analysis 55 Appendix B -Post-election Interview Questions The questions below were used for the qualitative interviews with representatives from Toronto Election's network ofyouth outreach partners. Where appropriate, the interviewer prompted participants to provide further details 1. Can you briefly tell me a bit about your organization, and the role you play in it? What kind ofwork does the organization do? 2. Has your organization been involved in voter outreach or mobilization during previous elections? 3. Has your organization been involved in other civic or political engagement projects? 4. What was your organization's plan for the 2010 municipal election? Can you tell me when and how was it developed? 5. W ere there any factors that made y our organization alter its original plans for the 201 0 municipal election? 6. Can you give me a briefsummary ofthe outreach and mobilization activities your organization conducted during the election? 7. Can you tell me about the impact, as you saw it, ofthese activities? 8. Can you tell me about the impact, as you experienced it, of the activities other organizations conducted during the election? 9. Did you collaborate with any other organizations during the election? 1O. Did you get election-related information o-r resource.s from any other organizations? 11. As you saw it, can you describe the involvement ofyour organization's members or community in the 2010 municipal election? How were they engaged? What obstacles to engagement did they face? 12. What was the greatest challenge your organization faced in your work during the 2010 municipal election? 13. In-terms ofbest practices, did you leam anything from your experiences during the election that you would like to share? 14. Do you have any feedback for Toronto Elections or other election authorities to consider in future elections? Appendix B-Post-Election Interview Questions 57 Appendix C - Candidate and Organization Contact Rates This table summarizes contact rates by method and type as reported by survey respondents. Table 10: Contact rates for survey respondants by type Candidate contact Organization contact In person 35.3% 34.1% At an event 16.8% 19.2% By phone 38.2% 18.0% By mail 52.9% 23.5% Bye-mail 17.3% 23.4% By text message 0.8% 1.8% Through social media 31.0% 33.3% Appendix C-Candidate and Organization Contact Rates 59 Appendix D -Multiple Regression Explained Multiple regression is a statistical technique that examines the relationship between a dependent variable (e.g. height) and a number of independent variables (e.g. parents' height, di et, exercise and gender). Rather than comparing the relationship between height and aU ofits possible causes separately, multiple regression considers aU these causes at the same time and determines the in dependent effect of each. The estimated effect of each factor is represented by a regression coefficient. Coefficients tell us how strongly an independent variable is related to the dependent variable. Coefficients are accompanied by a p-value that tells us how sure we can be that the relationship between the two variables is not due to chance. The larger the regression coefficient, the more important its effect. The smaller the p-value, the surer we can be that the relationship is real and not due to chance. We say that a relationship that is not due to chance is statistically significant. Retuming to the example of the determinants ofheight, imagine ifwe found that the only statistically significant predictors ofheight were parents' height and gender. This would tell us· that diet and exercise do not matter after we control for parents' height and gender. It would also tell us that parents' height and gender matter individually, such that a brother and sister could expect to be of different heights (because despite sharing the same parents, they are of different genders). Likewise, two women with different parents could expect to be of different heights, provided the ir parents were not of the same height. Appendix D- Multiple Regression Explained 61 Appendix E - Sample Letter of Attestation This is an example of the letters of attestation issued to students living in residence by the University of Toronto for the 2010 municipal election. Data Student Na me Residence .Addrass Toronto, OniBrlo Postal Coda Oear student: The next Toronto municipal election will ba held an Manday, Oclober 25, 2010. Your residence Jocated at The MunlcJpal EJections Act states that a "persan may have residences ln two local munieipalitias at the same tima if the person nves in one of the local munieipalities in order tc attend an educational institution, but not with the intsntion of àlanging his or her pennanent lodging place•. Therefore sludanls may vola bath in the municipality where. they live io aflsnd school and the munlclpallty where thalr permanent hama Js localsd. ln ortier 1o vols, you must: 1) be a Canadien citizen 2) be at !aast 1a years old 3) live in 1ha City of Toronto or own or rent pmperty in Toronto or be the epciJ.llla of a psrson wha owns ar rents property ir Toronto 4) not be prohlblted from vot hg under any law Eligible votera must show acceptable identification at the voling location in arder to receive a ballot. Present silher one piace of ID shawing your name, Toronto address and signature. or two pieces of ID, 1ha firat Bhcwing your nama and signature and the second &hO'!Ning your name and Toronto address. For the full list af acceptable JdenllflcaUon, vlsH htlp"}/www:loronto,eafelectlonslycters/8ccep!Jlble-ldenUfication.hlm This latter can be used as proof ofyour name and Toronto address for tho purposes of the Toronto 2010 Election. Yourvoting location is: tf you have any questions about this process or want more Jnfonnatlon about the sleciion, contact Toronto ElacHons. durlng ragular business hours at 416-338-1111, vlslt www,toronto,caleJections, follow Toronto Votes on Faœbook or @loronlovote on Twiller. If you require nY BEirvice, caii416-33B-0889. Sincarely, Yournarne Yourtitle Your resldence/College YCIUR CITY. YOUR VDTE. Appendix E-Sample Letter of Attestation 63 Appendix F - Field Experiment Proto cols The three protocols described below were ali identified as promising ways to study youth electoral engagement in the Canadian context with tumout field experiments. Campus Residence Letter Delivery Election agencies and university administrations already work together to produce letters of attestation for students living in campus residences, as they lack another proof of address. During the partner organization interviews, student union representatives identified the delivery ofthese letters as an opportunity for outreach. lt also provides an opportunity for a field experiment. Students in residences can be randomly assigned into two groups: a treatment group whose letters are delivered personally by a volunteer encouraging them to vote, and a control group whose letters are delivered impersonally. When students go to vote, they present their letters of attestation as proof of address. This experimental protocol relies on creating a slight cosmetic difference between the letters delivered to the treatment and control groups, which allows researchers to count how many of each letter is presented. By comparing the rates of use for the two letters, we can analyze the impact ofpersonal or impersonal delivery on tumout. This protocol is a variant oftraditional canvassing (discussed below) and is similarly flexible in terms oftesting different tactics and messages. Polling Station Festivals Holding a public festival adjacent to a polling station on election day has been found to be an effective (and cast-effective) way to increase voter tumout (Addonizio, Green and Glaser 2007). By tuming the polling station into a place where people can socialize and have fun, these events provide a social incentive that is absent when voting is a solitary act. This protocol has several features to recommend it. The first is that the character and scale of events can easily be adapted and modified. To target young voters, a festival can include musical performances that appeal to youth. Similarly, festivals can be held in neighbourhoods to target specifie populations, or on college and university campuses. A field experiment in this area can serve as a model for future community-organized election festivals. This experimental protocol has also been proven: non-partisan election festivals can be organized successfully, and it is possible to measure their impact on tumout. Of course, there are legal restrictions on the types of activity that can occur near polling stations. However, these can be taken into account when planning the events. Given that election officiais in nine different US states have sanctioned these types of events, there is no reason to believe the same cannot be done in Canada. Appendix F-Field Experiment Protocols 65 Canvassing Many mobilization experiments simply involve knocking on someone' s do or and encouraging them to vote. Door-to-door canvassing is a traditional approach that has been proven effective in a variety of contexts, including elections where the outcome is predictable (Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2008). This type of contact is also effective at mobilizing young voters, although traditional political campaigns may have difficulty targeting them (Green and Gerber 2001; Nickerson 2006). Canvassing is a very flexible protocol for field experiments. It can be conducted on large or smali scales, and the treatment can be randomized at different units of analysis, ranging from individual addresses to electoral districts. Similarly, experimenters can test the effectiveness of different tactics and messages within the same canvassing campaign. Testing tactics and messages is particularly useful because there are many open questions concerning the relationship between persona! contact and youth mobilization. For example, Bennion (2005) found that the impact of a non-partisan, student-led mobilization campaign was greatest for voters under the age of30. This echoes the finding that Latino canvassers are more effective at mobilizing Latino voters (Michelson 2005). Groups with traditionally low turnout may be more receptive to appeals from canvassers with whom they have certain characteristics in common. Similarly, the content of interactions with potential voters may also be important. Asking potential voters to verbaliy des cri be the ir plans on election day ( e.g. when they will vote and how they will get to the polling station) appears to dramaticaliy increase turnout, but only in single voter households (Nickerson and Rogers 2010). Mobilization messages that emphasize high turnout may also be more effective than messages that emphasize low turnout (Gerber and Rogers 2009). Ali ofthese findings have potentialiy significant implications for youth mobilization initiatives. They also come from research conducted in the United States, which raises questions asto how they apply to the Canadian context. These research questions can ali be asked- and answered with experimental protocols. 66 Youth Engagement and Mobilization in the 2010 Toronto Municipal Election TABD This is Exhibit D referred to in the affidavit of Ilona Dougherty, sworn Final Report to Elections Canada BC Youth Registration Pilot Project before me this --=-Cj'---- day of March 20, 2014 January, 2015 Judith Handfield, Sasha Caldera, Ilona Dougherty, and Youri Cormier Apathy is Boring CONTENTS Tables & and Figures 5 Executive Summary 6 Acknowledgements 8 About Apathy is Boring 8 Introduction 9 Background 9 Project Objectives 10 Report Objectives 10 Research Design & Methodology 11 Group Turnout Comparison 11 Interviews with Local Organizations 12 Street Team Activities & Registration Drive Findings (February - April 2013) 13 Street Team Strategies Analysis 15 Statistical Results & Analysis - Registration Drive 23 Comparison with the Control Group 27 ~~s ~ NGO Workshop Series and Survey/lnterview Results 29 Overview- Reaching Young (Non-) Voters Workshop (February 18, 2013) 29 Overview - Securing Participation in the Workshop 30 Overview - Participant Feedback 30 Analysis 31 NGO Impact 35 Survey Analysis 36 Post-election Interviews with Local organizations 38 Interview Findings 38 Conclusion 42 Lessons Learned and Outcomes of the Project 42 Future Objectives & Recommendations 43 1369 APPENDICES Appendix A 200A Form with Apathy is Boring Side Panel 45 Appendix B Motivation Questions from "BC Workshop Evaluation" and "BC Interviewee Survey" 46 Appendix C List of Events Attended 48 Appendix D Interview Questionnaire 51 Appendix E Additional Interview Responses 53 TABLES & FIGURES Table 1 Outreach at concerts, theatres, and bars Table 2 Outreach using tabling techniques Table 3 Street outreach Table 4 Treatment group Table 5 Transaction types by age group Table 6 Treatment group voter turnout by age group Table 7 Treatment group voter turnout by transaction type Table 8 Control group Table 9 Treatment group voter turnout by age group (formatted for comparison to control group) Table 10 Self-reported NGO youth outreach SURVEY FIGURES Figure 1 Will your organization be actively encouraging youth to register or vote in the 2013 BC General Election? Figure 2 What is your organization planning to do for the 2013 BC General Election? Figure 3 Has your organization actively encouraged youth to register or vote in past elections? Figure 4 For which types of elections was your organization active in the past? INTERVIEW FIGURES Figures· What activities did your organization undertake during the past election (choose ali that apply)? Figure 6 Actions taken by NGOs during this election (methods) Figure 7 Actions taken by NGOs during this election (activities) Figure 8 Actions taken by NGOs during previous election Figure 9 How long before the election was your plan developed? Figure 10 Has your organization actively encouraged youth to register or vote in past elections? Figure 11 For which types of elections was your organization active in the past? 1 5 '10'11 -- -:...,.• .!: ..i. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report provides an assessment of Apathy is Boring's youth electoral engagement activities carried out during the 2013 British Columbia provincial election. The objective of the project was to evaluate the effectiveness of the outreach strategies used by Apathy is Boring, Elections BC, Get Your Vote On (GVYO), and possibly other organizations in terms of their impact on youth voter registration and turnout. The purpose of this report is to: 1. Provide an overview of activities carried out, tactics, and strategies used 2. Analyze the project's successes and challenges 3. Analyze the data from surveys and interviews with the BC organizations that conducted youth electoral outreach in one way or another 4. Provide a statistical analysis to show the impact of the registration drive on voting To gain local support and context, Apathy is Boring contracted Get Your Vote On (GYVO), a BC youth voter outreach organization, to carry out the ground logistics, involve local organizations, and work as the lead coordinators of the Street Teams component of the project. On February 18, 2013, Apathy is Boring was contracted by Elections BC to organize a workshop for BC organizations, "Reaching (Non-) Voters," about youth electoral outreach with presentations by Elections BC, Apathy is Boring, and guest panellists. Twenty-one participants representing a cross-section of organizations attended and feedback was generally positive. Participants believed that the sessions would help their organizations design better voter outreach strategies. The results from the questionnaires sent to bath workshop participants and 183 organizations throughout BC showed that the majority of 1 6 respondents planned to engage approximately 100 youth du ring the election primarily through social media, emails and leveraging existing informational materials from election management bodies. From March 8 to April 19, Apathy is Boring was contracted by Elections BC to carry out Street Team activities across BC, with the goal of registering young voters. The Street Teams attended 51 events, registered 572 voters using paper 200A forms, and had 10,511 interactions with youth, encouraging them to register to vote. A majority of the 10,511 individu ais whom Apathy is Ba ring encountered turned dawn the offer of registration because they were confident of their correct status. There were also a few barriers to successfully registering the remaining group of individuals who knew that they were not registered or who were unsure whether they were registered. These included: timing and location (it was ineffective to ask someone walking somewhere or in the vicinity of public transit routes); people who appreciated the invitation but preferred doing the task on their own ti me (in which case the Apathy is Boring reminder may have contributed to unmeasured registrations); people who were not comfortable sharing their information with either the government or with strangers; and people who were critical of the political system itself and 1 or who intended not to vote. Among the 572 completed 200A forms, only 494 were kept for the analytical part of the research project'because they were in the age group for which we were testing (18-34). The 18-24 year olds who registered through the Apathy is Boring initiative voted at a rate of 60.8%, compared to the average voting rate of 47.9% for youth in this age group who were registered to vote. The 25-34 year olds who registered through Apathy is Boring voted at a rate of 58.5%, compared to the average voting rate of 39.8% for youth in this age group who were registered to vote. The overall participation rate of youth that Apathy is Boring registered (59.9%) was higher than the provincial average for this age group (42.4%) and was also above the electoral participation rate for ali registered BC voters (57.1 %). 1 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Apathy is Boring would like to thank Elections Canada for supporting them in spearheading this exciting research initiative. They would also like to thank Elections BC for their support of these innovative activities to encourage youth voter registration. Finally, they would like to thank GYVO for carrying out voter outreach activities in British Columbia throughout the testing phase of this research project. ABOUT APATHY IS BORING Apathy is Boring is a non-partisan charitable organization that uses art and technology to educate youth about democracy, with the aim of increasing youth voter turnout, increasing youth engagement in the democratie process, and building a sustainable dialogue between youth and elected officiais. 1 8 INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND A growing body of international research has revealed that outreach strategies can impact voter registration and turnout. Building on this research, Apathy is Boring and Elections BC carried out a pilot project to facilitate registration and participation by youth aged 18-35 in the May 14, 2013, provincial election. They sent youth-led volunteer Street Teams to concerts and events, where these young volunteers encouraged their peers to register for the upcoming election. Elections BC also conducted its own activities to increase registration rates and voter turnout. ln addition, Elections BC contracted Apathy is Boring to host a workshop on February 18, 2013, titled "Reaching Young (Non-) Voters Workshop" to educate organizations about how to reach out to youth and mobilize them to vote. Apathy is Boring sent an online qualitative questionnaire to these organizations and others who were considered likely to engage youth during the BC provincial elections to find out more about their outreach activities, with follow-up interviews in the summer and fall of 2013. Elections Canada contracted Apathy is Boring to evaluate the effectiveness of key tactics using quasi-experimental methods and qualitative interviewing. The project consisted of two main components: 1) conducting a quasi-experiment to test the effectiveness of registration drives by Street Teams at concerts and events in March and April 2013; and 2) conducting a series of qualitative interviews with organizations that would engage or mobilize youth during the 2013 BC provincial election .. For Component 1, youth who registered as a result of Apathy is Boring's efforts constituted the treatment group. The control group consisted of youth who were not reached by this initiative. Note that the activities of the Street Teams themselves were funded by Elections BC. 1 9 The scope of this project was limited to the integration of quasi-experimental protocols into the Street Teams' activities, data collection, and data analysis. Similarly, for Component 2, Apathy is Boring integrated the interviewing process into the framework of a workshop on youth electoral outreach planned with the support of Elections BC. PROJECT OBJECTIVES The objective of the project was to evaluate the effectiveness of the outreach strategies being used by Apathy is Boring, Elections BC, Get Your Vote On (GVYO), and possibly other organizations in terms of their impact on youth voter registration and turnout. REPORT OBJECTIVES 1. Provide an overview of activities carried out, tactics, and strategies used 2. Analyze the project's successes and challenges 3. Analyze the data from surveys and interviews with the organizations in BC that conducted youth electoral outreach in one way or another 4. Provide a statistical analysis to show the impact of the registration drive on voting 1 10 1976 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY GROUP TURNOUT COMPARISON Apathy is Boring's Street Teams attended concerts and events in March and April 2013 ta encourage youth ta register ta vote. A quasi-experiment was conducted ta test the effectiveness of the registration drives. At these events, young volunteers encouraged their peers ta register for the upcoming election and facilitated the registration process by providing paper registration forms and then collected the forms ta process them. Through the Street Teams initiative, Apathy is Boring compiled the number of interactions with youth, the number of events attended, the number of hours spent at each event, the number of registration forms collected, and the number of information packages handed out. Elections BC provided the total number of youth who reported being reached by the Street Teams initiative who registered ta vote online or via telephone. Voters in British Columbia can register online, over the phone, or by filling out a paper 200A form. ln ali three cases, it was possible ta identify voters who were reached by the initiative. When registering online or over the phone, voters were prompted about what motivated them ta register. Apathy is Boring was among a short list of response prompts offered. The paper 200A forms distributed by the Street Teams were also identified with the Apathy is Ba ring si de panel. Voters reached by the initiative were therefore identified directly on the voters list. Note The phone prompts and online survey could not be used in the data analysis because of a flaw in the question/answer. lndividua/s were asked why they had registered and given the choice of "Apathy is Boring. 11 Understanding this as a statement, rather than the name of an organization, the number of individuals who chose this answer was not proportional ta the actua/ scope of the outreach. ln any future attempt ta determine these results by phone interview, it would be crucial ta spe/1 out the answer as ·~n organization ca/led Apathy is Ba ring registe red me or convinced me ta register. 11 1 11 1 !<3 'ï 17 1. u fJ Il The Elections BC data included turnout rates broken dawn by age and electoral district for the treatment and control groups. Ta ensure voter privacy, ali data provided by Elections BC for analysis were anonymous. INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS Through Survey Monkey, Apathy is Boring distributed two qualitative questionnaires designed ta determine the outreach activities planned by organizations ta engage or mobilize youth during the 2013 BC provincial election. The first questionnaire, entitled "BC Workshop Evaluation" was only sent ta participants who attended the "Reaching Young (Non-) Voters Workshop" on February 18, 2013, along with an evaluation form for the workshop itself. The second, entitled "BC Interviewee Survey," was a seven-question survey sent ta 183 organizations in British Columbia that Apathy is Boring and GYVO deemed would have an interest in responding. Of the 183 requests, 24 organizations responded, 8 of which had participated in the workshop. Representatives from the organizations that answered the survey were also asked ta take part in structured qualitative interviews after the election ta evaluate their organizations' experience in the youth electoral engagement activities carried out during the election campaign. These interviews were conducted over the phone and structured with a consistent questionnaire and protocol ta ensure the data collected were bath reliable and comparable. Interview responses were coded during the analysis phase to provide quantitative indicators where appropriate. 1 12 STREET TEAMS ACTIVITIES AND REGISTRATION DRIVE FINDINGS (FEBRUARY -APRIL 2013) OVERVIEW Between March 8 and April 19, 2013, Apathy is Boring and GYVO organized Street Teams ta attend 51 events in British Columbia. Street Teams attended a variety of events in different locations, including:1 19 Concerts/Live Entertainment 17 Street- Sidewalks/Public Places 1 0 On-Campus ~ 2 Movie Nights 3 Festivals The philosophy behind this approach is that the Street Teams are able ta go ta where youth are and leverage the benefits of peer-ta-peer outreach in arder ta encourage youth ta register ta vote. The Street Teams were also proactive, engaging actively with the public rather than standing behind a table, thus reaching youth who might be unengaged or who might not typically search out opportunities ta register ta vote. Street Teams also provided youth with ali the information they needed ta register and vote in the BC provincial èlection. As a volunteer opportunity, the Street Teams garnered significant interest from 18-35 year olds who wanted ta encourage their peers ta register and vote. Apathy is Boring and GYVO aimed ta have 50-60 volunteers participate in the Street Teams. The opportunity was 1 See Appendix C for full list of events attended. 1 13 1979 promoted on both Apathy is Boring and GYVO's Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, sent to their existing volunteer lists, and sent to the organizations that attended the February workshop to be promoted through their mailing lists and social media as weil. ln the end, 79 individuals signed up for the opportunity and 33 actively participated in multiple Street Team events. To prepare for the outreach activities, a Street Team Manu al was developed that outlined the entire process for each Street Team event for ali parties involved, including GYVO coordinators and volunteers. Street Team volunteers also participated in one of two training sessions led by Apathy is Boring, Elections BC, and GYVO. The first session was held on March 7, 2013; 22 volunteers attended, both via Skype and in persan, as weil as Elections BC staff and the Chief Electoral Officer. The second training was held on March 10, 2013; 12 volunteers attended, both via Skype and in persan, as weil as with Apathy is Boring and GYVO staff. Volunteers who could not attend these training days attended individual in persan or virtual trainings with a GYVO Coordinator. At these training sessions, volunteers met with organizers and were given information about the project and the BC election. Volunteers were trained on the processes for receiving 200A forms and how to handle confidential information. They also received specifie training from an outreach professional on how to approach the public in this type of project.2 Humour and informai presentation styles were used to get the key messages across to the young volunteers. GYVO coordinators were in charge of arranging for the Street Teams to attend the events. District Returning Officers were not consulted in choosing venues. They had initially been considered as a resource, but due to capacity issues with both Elections BC and Apathy is Boring, this resource was not used. The coordinators would contact the following persans in this order, until they had approval to send Street Teams to an event: the musicians 2 The organization was Public Outreach (http://www.publicoutreachgroup.com/ca-en). 1 14 1980 themselves, the musicians' manager, the event promoter, and the venue manager. If coordinators failed to reach any of these, they would reach out to the musicians via social media. Some events such as festivals, had a slightly different set up in terms of who was contacted, but a similar tiered approach was used. At each Street Team event, one paid GYVO coordinator was present and responsible for volunteer coordination and supervision, and on the spot coaching. GYVO coordinators provided necessary materials (e.g., t-shirts, handouts, and clickers) to volunteers to use at each event and collected these materials at the end of each event. Each Street Team had two to five volunteers, depending on the size of the event attended, and was led by one of three GYVO coordinators. The Street Teams' outreach and registration activities lasted on average three hours and were carried out in severa! cities in British Columbia, including Vancouver, Victoria, and Kelowna. At each Street Team event, volunteers would approach youth to ask if they were registered to vote, and if not, whether they wanted to register on the spot. They were instructed to approach youth in a friendly/casual manner and encouraged to start a conversation with them. If people chose to register on the spot they would be given a "BC Has More Ways to Vote" package which instructed them about next steps they could take to vote. If they declined to register on the spot, they would be offered a "Register to Vote" package that listed information about additional ways to register at a later ti me, including registering by phone or online. Those who registered were also given a swag item called a Digiclean-a screen cleaner with the Elections BC logo intended for mobile phones, which can be attached to the back of the deviee. Street Teains activities were captured in photos, which can be fou nd on Apathy is Boring's Flickr: http ://www. flickr.com/photos/apathyisboring/sets/72157633094970145/ STREET TEAM STRATEGIES ANALYSIS Comments from Street Team volunteers reported that while small events with lower attendance (i.e. The Rio Theatre, < 500) lent themselves better to engaging in deep conversations with 1 15 000;1 1 -::..) .21. youth, such conversations were also possible at larger events. More importantly, the volunteers noted that larger events (i.e. The Commodore Ballroom with capacity > 1,000) increased the scope and effectiveness of their efforts through economies of scale. Venues featuring evening performances with substantial intermission times between showings, acts, and sets were the most successful. Volunteers commented that the public felt encouraged by the physical presence of Street Teams asking whether they are registered voters. Additionally, Street Teams volunteers reported that soliciting registrations at busy intersections and on sidewalks was not effective. lt should be noted that many organizations already solicit membership sign-ups and donations this way. Therefore, there is a possibility that the public could associate Street Teams with those organizations and with "asking for money." lt is important to note that for the street outreach activities in gathering spaces, such as festivals, parks, and campus parties, Street Teams reported a higher success rate, most likely because youth were not in a rush and could take time to engage in a conversation. Finally, it is necessary to keep in mind that other factors could have influenced the number of people who completed a registration form in each type of outreach, such as weather, attendance, time spent doing the outreach, and nature of the crowd (already politically engaged, non-English speakers, aider than targeted population, etc.). Analysis One organizer described the importance of finding venues where people had time and were "curious," rather than in a hurry. Concert venues, bars, movie theatres, and festivals should be prioritized in the future over talking to passers-by on the street. More ti me 1 16 no'l 1 JOt..J and possibly sorne funding should be allotted ta effectively ensure appropriate venues are secured for Street Teams. Peer-ta-Peer Outreach & Active Engagement with the Public The goal of the Street Teams was ta reach beyond the youth who are typically engaged in their communities-such as students, or young leaders. This project tested innovative ways ta reach unengaged youth and encourage them ta register using peer-ta-peer outreach. Eye-catching banners, t-shirts, swag items and prize incentives were tactics that Street Teams were able ta adapt-in varying degrees-ta each event, and the volunteers appreciated this because it facilitated the ir approach as they interacted with strangers. These tools were effective in breaking the ice. Street Team volunteers were approachable, which led ta a high number of interactions per event, and a reportedly high interest from the public ta stop, talk, and ask questions about the provincial election. Despite an interest in tai king ta the volunteers and a willingness ta learn vital information about voting and registering, on the-spot registrations were more difficult ta secure. Analysis Continue ta build on successes of peer-ta-peer outreach ta develop active and creative ways of engaging with the public. Street Teams, being youth-driven, have a natural advantage in understanding the daily lives of youth and are flexible in tailoring outreach activities ta fit outside typical work hours and in locations where youth are most present. Expand on creative strategies used during this pilot phase ta increase the number of registrations collected on the spot, including the use of technology such as tablets ta collect registrations. Timing Previous Street Teams campaigns ran by Apathy is Boring and GYVO showed that a key challenge is timing. If Street Teams occur tao far in advance of elections, there seems ta be a lack of interest ta talk about elections and voter registration. However, if Street Teams are active tao close ta election time, this poses organizational challenges, such as needing ta 1 17 run a large volume of events at once, and/or difficulty for the involved Electoral Agency to dedicate efforts to the initiative during busy electoral periods. Analysis A lack of desire to talk about elections could potentially be addressed by increasing the Street Teams' brand recognition. Volunteers noticed youth were more willing to engage in conversation when volunteers were clearly linked to an organization. GYVO also noted this in their 2004 campaign. GYVO increased brand recognition by simply being at enough events that they began running into the same young people more than once. They indicated that young people who saw them at severa! events might not approach them at first, but wou Id come up to them the second or third time they came across GYVO. Comments such as "1 have seen you guys at events before, what is this ali about?" were reported as common in 2004. ldeally, a campaign should be organized six months in advance, but this is not necessarily feasible, especially in the context of minority governments. a lack of interest to talk about elections and voter registration. However, if Street Teams are active tao close to election time, this poses organizational challenges, such as needing to run a large volume of events at once, and/or difficulty for the involved Electoral Agency to dedicate efforts to the initiative du ring busy electoral periods. Street Teams Manual & Volunteer Training Apathy is Boring has carefully documented !essons learned from seven years of nonelection Street Teams along with best practices in youth engagement tactics into a Street Teams Manual. This manual was the basis for volunteer training and acted as a comprehensive guide offering practical tips for ali Street Team volunteers and GYVO coordinators. This manu al received high marks from ali involved in the project. The volunteer training was successful, although comments from GYVO expressed that the second volunteer training, which was more interactive, more effectively engaged the young volunteers. Analysis The Street Teams Manual should continue to be used and updated with additional best practices and !essons learned. GYVO suggested that future volunteer trainings should 1 18 ""0 .~ 1 "lo be more interactive and less focused on electoral procedures. Apathy is Boring proposes a compromise: Offering a less thorough overview of electoral procedure may increase the sessions' user-friendliness, but if Street Teams are not fully equipped to answer specifie questions about procedure, they should at least know how this information is accessed, so that no question is left completely unanswered; it can be redirected to the experts orto the electoral agency's website. Venues - Go Where Youth Are Securing ideal venues was imperative to the Street Teams' success. Wh ile it is a challenge to create buy-in among musicians, managers, promoters, and venues, especially when the artists are not from the area, it is nonetheless an important resource that should be cultivated. A mere acknowledgment from the band can facilitate the work and increase the impact of the Street Team operating at the venue. Ap·athy is Boring Street Teams were able to experiment with a variety of different locations and creative ideas for capturing young people's attention. Unlike other enumerators who go door to door, the Street Teams sought out and found strategie hang-out places where they wou Id find youth, regardless of their address. Also, the type of venue is very important to the Street Teams' success. For example, outreach tactics became challenging in scenarios where teams were registering voters outdoors, or if the venue was extremely busy. Likewise, selecting an event where unengaged youth are expected to be is not an exact science. Luckily, Apathy is Boring had examples of past best practices, cou pied with local insight from the volunteers in arder to steer them in the right direction and minimize the risks which are endemie to outreach aimed at unengaged youth. As Street Team activities progressed, teams were increasingly able to better predict which settings (and what types of events) were worth investing time and human resources. 1 19 The outreach activities used by volunteers can be divided into three groups: 1) outreach conducted at events such as concerts, theatres, and thematic nights in bars;s 2) outreach conducted on university campuses and in libraries, using tabling techniques; and 3) talking ta passers-by on the street. Volunteers reported more success engaging people during the first two types of activities and this is reflected by the aggregated Street Teams data. Out of the 51 outreach events, 26 were held at concerts, theatres, and bars, 7 used tabling techniques on campuses and in libraries, and 18 were done by talking ta passers-by on the street. As shawn in Table 1, outreach in the first group (26 occurrences) totalled 4,846 interactions and 335 completed forms. This translates into 1 completed form for every 14 people. Table 2 indicates that outreach conducted using tabling techniques (7 occurrences) totalled 324 interactions and 52 completed forms, with 1 completed form for every 6 people. Finally, outreach conducted on the street (18 occurrences), as shawn in Table 3, totalled 5,341 interactions and 185 completed forms. This suggests 1 completed form for every 29 people. For comparison, other registration drives held by Elections SC averaged 9 completed forms perevent.4 3 Volunteers who conducted outreach at concerts, theatres, and bars combined tabling techniques and walking around to engage conversations. These events could not be grouped with the ones conducted at libraries and campuses since volunteers did not mainly use tables; when they were used, the method was combined with engaging conversations by walking around during the same events. 4 http://www.elections.bc.ca/docs/rpt/2013-Enumeration-Report.pdf 1 20 Table 1 Number of interactions and completed forms: Concerts. Theatres & Bars Concerts, theatres, bars Interactions Completed Forms (26 occurrences) Total 4,846 335 Average per event 186 13 1 completed form for every 14.5 people Table 2 Number of interactions and completed forms: Tabling Tabling Interactions Completed Forms (7 occurrences) Total 324 52 Average per event 46 7 1 completed form for every 6 people Table 3 Number of interactions and completed forms: Street Street Interactions Completed Forms (26 occurrences) Total 5341 185 - Average per event 297 10 1 completed form for every 29 people Using the available information for the Street Teams' activities from March 8 to April19, 2013, the following figures give a general picture of reach: 51 events attended (the target was 40 events); 1 21 11 completed 200A forms on average per event, 572 completed 200A paper forms total (the target was 200 forms per event, or a total of 8,000 200A); 206 interactions on average per event recorded on clickers, 10,511 total interactions recorded on clickers (the target was 350 interactions per event, or a total of 14,000 interactions); 390 "Register ta Vote" packages given out total (the target was 150 per event or 2,040 in total, i.e., the number of people expected not ta complete a form out of the 350 targeted interactions per event); 511 "BC Has More Ways ta Vote" packages handed out total (the target was 200 per event, i.e., the same people who filled out the 200A forms); 20 youth signed up ta receive emails from Apathy is Boring as part of the side bar panel of the 200A form. Considering the proportion of interactions and completed forms, it is evident that street outreach was the !east successful method. Outreach conducted at concerts, theatres, and bars was significantly more effective than street outreach. Tabling techniques seem ta be the most successful method. However, it should be noted that the number of occurrences for tabling techniques was quite small and significantly lower than for the other two methods. Although it would be premature ta draw conclusions, the comparative success of tabling techniques suggests the potential of this method and the importance of conducting further experimental research. Materials Street Teams used Apathy is Boring and GYVO's youth-friendly designed and branded materials and Elections BC's more traditionally-designed materials. GYVO reported that volunteers gave away more youth-friendly designed materials than Elections BC materials. lndeed, young people were more apt ta take material that was more visuÇllly attractive and on which election information -web link ta fi nd the nearest polling station and election date - was clearly indicated. 1 22 F)OQ 1 vUU STATISTICAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS REGISTRATION DRIVE Below is the voter turnout of youth that were registered by the Street Teams (treatment group), according to age and transaction type, as weil as relative to the overall population (control group). Data were collected in 74 of the 85 electoral districts in BC. Table 4 shows the number of registrations broken dawn by age group (18-24, 25-29, 30- 34). The total number of registrations was 494. The initiative reached people in aider age groups; however, those numbers were not included in the data, since the project involved people under 35. Volunteers registered 306 youths in the 18-24 age group, which was more than twice as many for the 25-29 age group (145). Registration forms were also collected for 43 people between the ages of 30-34. Table 4 Treatment aroup Number of Completed Age Group 200A Forms 18-24 306 25-29 145 30-34 43 Total .../ 494 The original target for registrations was set at 8,000 out of 10,000 interactions. However, the number was unrealistic and should have been much lower from the beginning. The target was based on Apathy is Boring's experience organizing Street Teams and asking youth to 1 23 complete surveys. The number of surveys collected by Apathy is Boring is considerable reaching 90% participation rates in sorne cases. The registration target was set with the assumption that people would register for an election at the same rate that they would complete a survey. One major point that was not considered was that the majority of people we interacted with responded that they either knew or believed they were already registered on the electoral list. Furthermore, 390 people chose not to register on the spot and were given the "Register to Vote" package that listed information about additional ways to register at a later time, including registering by phone or online. People who registered later by themselves were not included in this registration data, because the phone and online "Apathy is Boring" survey prompt was ineffective. The total number of volunteer hours for Street Teams was 248. By dividing the number of completed registration forms (572) by this number, we obtain a result of 2.3 registrations per volunteer hour. Literature on the number of people reached during similar registration drives is almost non-existent. However, evidence from the experiments conducted by Green, Gerber and Nickerson,5 which relate canvassing to voter turnout, confirm that the Apathy is Boring Street Teams' results were reasonably similar in effectiveness. lndeed, in the aforementioned experiments, by going door-to-door, teams of canvassers were able to reach 8 people per hour when they travelled in pairs but knocked on different doors and 5 people per hour when they travelled and talked to people in pairs. As mentioned above, the number of registrations that were collected per event was similar to those of other enumerating teams du ring the BC elections. s Donald P. Green, Alan S. Gerber and David W. Nickerson (2003). Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments. The Journal of Politics, 65, p. 1094. 1 24 1090 Once the registration forms were collected, the number or registrations were divided into three types of transactions, as outlined in Table 5: 1. Create: people who were registering ta vote for the first ti me 2. Confirm: people who were already on the voters list and did not have ta alter their persona! information 3. Update: people who modified their persona! information on the voters list (e.g.: their address) Table 5 Transaction types by age group Create Confirm Update Total 18-24 164 40 102 306 25-29 36 18 91 145 30-34 8 13 22 43 Total 208 71 215 494 The majority of people who completed the 200A form were already on the voters list (57.9%). However, 42.1% were being registered for the first time, of which 78.8% were between the ages of 18 and 24. Among the aider segments of the treatment group, the portion of individuals already on the voter list was higher: 75.2% for the 25-29 age group and 81.4% for the 30-34 age group. The number of updates accounts for more than half the total number of transactions recorded in these two aider age groups (respectively 62.8% and 51.2%). The number of updates represented one third (33.3%) of transactions for the 18-24 year olds, wh ile in the same age range the number of confirms only accounts for 13.1 %. 1 25 Table 6 shows the treatment group voter turnout by age group. Table 7 shows the treatment group voter turnout by transaction (create, confirmand update). Table 6 Treatment group voter turnout by age group Treatment group % of treatment group Treatment group voter turnout voter turnout 18-24 306 186 60.8% 25-29 145 76 52.4% 30-34 43 34 79% Total 494 296 59.9% Table 7 Treatment group voter turnout by transaction .. Create Confirm Update Total Did not Did not Did not Did not Voted Voted Voted Voted vote vote vote vote 18-24 90 74 28 12 68 34 186 120 25-29 13 23 13 5 50 41 76 69 30-34 5 3 9 4 20 2 34 9 Total 108 100 50 21 138 77 296 198 1 26 1992 COMPARISON WITH THE CONTROL GROUP (PROVINCIAL NUMBERS) The numbers in Table 8 were provided by Elections BC and show the total number of registered electors and the registered electors in the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups (control) who voted. Table 9 shows these values for the treatment group. Table 8 Control group voter turnout by age Registered electors % of registered Registered electors whovoted electors who voted 18-24 235,563 112,851 47.9% 25-34 505,356 200,990 39.8% Total 740,919 313,841 42.4% Table 9 Treatment group voter turnout by age (formatted for comparison to control group) Registered electors % of registered Registered electors whovoted electors who voted 18-24 306 186 60.8% 25-34 188 110 58.5% Total 494 296 59.9% The treatment group voted at 59.9%, which was higher than the overall voter turnout of registered voters du ring the BC election (57.1 %). The voting rate for the treatment group is 1 27 significantly higher than the voting rate for the control group: youth voter turnout among registered voters was 42.4%. The chi-squared test for significance confirms that the difference between the treatment group and the control group is highly significant (Chi2=62.04; p<.0001). lt is important to clarify that since the treatment group was not randomly selected (i.e. because only people who were interested in registering would have chosen to do so and the people who were offered registration were not randomly selected), it is impossible to draw any causal inferences from these data. ANALYSIS Many factors could help explain why the proportion of youth belonging to the treatment group who voted is higher than the overall youth voter turnout. The two most likely explanations are as follows: 1. There is an inevitable sampling bias at play, in that people who chose to engage with the Street Teams may have been more politically engaged and/or motivated to vote to begin with, thus explaining why they agreed to complete the 200A form. 2. Literature shows the effectiveness of face-ta-face voter mobilization,s and the peer ta-peer interactions may have acted as a reminder and an inducement to vote. For each transaction type (create, update, confirm) except one, the number of people who voted is higher than the number of people who did not vote. For the create transaction in the 25-29 age group, the number of people who did not vote is higher than the number of people who voted. Also, the create category is the one where the proportion of people who voted and did not vote is closest (voted: 51.9%, did not vote: 48.1 %), compared with confirm (voted s Donald P. Green, Alan S. Gerber and David W. Nickerson (2003). Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments. The Journal of Politics, 65, pp. 1 083-1 096. 1 28 70.4%, did not vote: 29.6%) and update (voted: 64.2%, did not vote: 35.8%). This could be explained in part by the !ife-cycle effect: it has been observed that people who become eligible ta vote for the first ti me have lower rates of turnout but they gradually increase the ir probability of voting and become habituai voters.7 NGO WORKSHOP SERIES AND SURVEY /INTERVIEW RESULTS Overview- Reaching Young {Non-) Voters Workshop {February 18, 2013) This eight-hour workshop took place at the Delta Vancouver Airport Hotel and was coorganized by Elections SC, Apathy is Boring, and Get Your Vote On (GYVO). Dr. Keith Archer, CEO of Elections BC, gave the welcome speech. Following this, Bernard Rudny, Apathy is Boring's Election and Program Strategy Coordinator presented "What Makes Someone Vote?", a summary of Apathy is Boring's previous research findings. A video summary of the presentation can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=lzsL4VzA21 O&list=UUOnmBJQcCcjH3Dxx6qNwiLQ&index=3 Anton Boegman and Tim Strocel of Elections BC gave a presentation titled "Registration and Voting in British Columbia." Shortly thereafter, Adia Kapoor of Elections BC and Anton Boegman, with facilitation from Bernard Rudny, presented "Seing Non-Partisan," a video summary of which can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=arNMOrihGwo&list=UUOnmBJQcCcjH3Dxx6qNwiLQ&index=2 The presentation was followed by a 25-minute plenary group activity facilitated by Apathy is Boring and Elections SC, discussing common situations or scenarios involving non-partisanship. ln the afternoon, a panel session moderated by Ilona Dougherty, Executive.Director of Apathy is Boring, was convened featuring young leaders from the local community: Ajay Puri, 'SC Patient 7 Plutzer, E. 2002.""Becoming a Habituai Voter: lnertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood." American Politica/ Science Review, 96(1) :41 56. 1 29 Safety and Quality Council; Julianna Torjek, City of Vancouver Social Policy Division; Kevin Huang, Shark Truth; and Lyndsay Poaps, Get Your Vote On. The panellists led a discussion highlighting best practices in youth engagement. Afterward, a presentation and group activity was presented by Apathy is Boring and GYVO focusing on key ideas about how participants can introduce a youth voter outreach campaign into their organizations. Each table of 8-10 participants was asked to brainstorm opportunities in creatively engaging youth during the election. An open-floor session followed where organizations had the chance to offer remarks, and Dr. Keith Archer delivered a thank-you address to close the conference. A video summary of the day can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=4JmdDOoWa6w&list=UUOnmBJQcCcjH3Dxx6qNwiLQ&index=1 Overview - Securing Participation in the Workshop ln arder to secure participation in the workshop, Apathy is Boring reached out to over 250 BC organizations that work directly with youth. Those who could not attend were sent an email with the video links of the workshop content after the tact. ln addition, the survey was sent to 183 organizations. ln total, 24 organizations answered the survey (16 from the group of 183 organizations that did not attend the workshop and 8 organizations that did attend the workshop). Overview- Participant Feedback Twenty-one participants representing organizations specializing in youth engagement attended this workshop. Moreover, there was a broad range of individual participants from · non-profits, post-secondary education bodies, and the private sector.a . a The following organizations attended: Samara, Metis Nation of British Columbia, SFU Public Square, Cinevolution Media Arts Society, Parkgate Community Services Society, The Urban Native Youth Association, Ambleside Youth Center, PartyX, Simon Fraser Student Society, Gel Your Vote On, Canadian Federation of Students-BC, North Shore Neighbourhood House, GreenJobs for BC, Transformation Projects, Powershift and KPMG. 1 30 According to the workshop evaluation questionnaire, the vast majority of participants found the different sessions very or somewhat useful in improving their understanding of issues such as the registration and voting processes or how to engage youth. Many participants made positive comments on the "Seing Non-Partisan" workshop, stating it was interactive and thought provoking. However, many comments were made about the need to include more networking activities and space for dialogue between participants in arder to foster creativity and generate ideas. Analysis Apathy is Boring has combined the results of two questionnaires that were distributed through Survey Monkey. The first questionnaire, entitled "BC Workshop Evaluation," was sent only to participants who attended the workshop on February 18 and included a workshop evaluation, which is referenced above in the overview of participant feedback. The second survey, entitled "BC Interviewee Survey," was a seven-question survey sent to 183 organizations in BC that Apathy is Boring and GYVO deemed would be interested in responding. ln interpreting the results, only the responses for questions relevant to this research project were used,9 not the workshop evaluation. Figure 1 (n=24) NGO intentions to actively encourage vouth registration Q Will your organization be actively encouraging youth to register or vote in the 2013 BC General Election? e Yes ê No @1 1 don't know- our organization hasn't made plans a Key motivation questions are listed in Appendix B. 1 31 1997 Figure 1 shows that of ali the organizations that offered feedback for the first question (n=24), the majority of respondents {58.3%) had a strategy ta encourage youth ta register during the upcoming provincial election, while only 12.5% reported not having such a strategy. Approximately a third, or 29.2%, of respondents did not know at that moment whether they wou Id actively encourage youth ta register or vote. Of those who attended the workshop, there was a higher portion (6 organizations) that were planning ta engage their organization in youth mobilization activities (n=8). Figure 2 (n=11) Activities planned by NGOs 02 What is your organization planning to do for the 2013 BC General Election? (Choose ali that apply) 80.0% .,...------70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Sharing Producing Face-ta-face Organizing Sending Social Other information and sharing outreach or election- emails media or materials yourown canvassing related from information events electoral and agencies materials Expanding on the first question, the second question, shawn in Figure 2 (n=11 ), considers what strategies organizations were seeking ta carry out in engaging youth during the provincial election period. Sharing information from election management bodies and organizing election-related events were the most popular, with over 60% of participants indicating that they would be using these tactics. Participants also intended on leveraging social media, email lists, and face-ta-face outreach tactics. Producing inhouse materials was the !east popular 1 32 1098 tactic, with Jess than 30% of participants indicating they would do so. For other tactics, one particular organization (Samara) intended on carrying out a series of citizen engagement events in British Columbia called "Democracy Tafks." There were no substantial differences in responses between the workshop participant surveys and the combined results. Using existing information sources from electoral management bodies remains the clear strategy for aff organizations carrying out youth voter outreach campaigns. The organizations also planned to promote this information by organizing events and through social media. The survey asked how many youth each organization was hoping to reach through these activities. The responses (n=11) varied greatly. However, in general, organizations that attended the workshop were planning to reach out to an average of 100 youth, where university student societies were anticipating reaching 1,000 youth.1o "YouthPolitk," an organization under the City of Vancouver's Social Policy Division, was aiming for 5,000 youth. 11 Figure 3 below indicates th at for the fourth question (n=21 ), the majority of organizations responded that they did not know whether they engaged in youth outreach activities in past elections, while equal numbers of organizations either have, or have never launched an elections campaign. The large number of organizations that were unsure may be attributed to high-turnover rates within the non-profit sector, or a Jack of organizational memory for past campaigns. 1o Simon Fraser Student Society (SFSS) was hoping to reach this target. 11 The website of YouthPolitik can be accessed here: http://www.vancouveryouth.ca/ 1 33 Figure 3 (n=21) NGO actively encouraging youth ta register or vote in past elections Q Has your organization actively encouraged youth ta register or vote in past elections? e Yes ~ No G 1don't know The majority of those organizations were active during federal and municipal elections, as can be seen in Figure 4 (n=5). Figure 4 (n=S) NGO activity by election type 5 4 3 2 0 Municipal Provincial Federal With regard to the types of activities undertaken in previous elections, the use of digital technology (e.g., social media and email) was quite common, followed by traditional outreach tactics and organizing events as Figure 5 shows. 1 34 Figure 5 (n-5) What activities did your organization undertake du ring the past election? (Choose ali that apply). 5 4 3 2 0 Sharing Producing Face-ta-face Organizing Sending Social Other information and sharing outreach or election- emails media or materials your own canvassing related from information events electoral and agencies materials NGOIMPACT The survey allowed us ta tabulate the impact the organizations reported having by tracking the number of interactions with youth during the election. 1 35 nr.; •'"' n'""~' ' fo.ù \...• "- ..:l. Table 10 Self-reported NGO youth outreach Action Type Rea ch Candidates election forum or workshops 21712 Face-ta-face outreach Î ,69913 Voter registration or vote pledge 724 Total 2,640 SURVEY ANALYSIS Survey results and anecdotal suggestions from workshop organizers and participants have contributed to the following suggestions: Network building Leading up to future workshops, allowing for six months to one year of lead time to develop a network of youth organizations interested in mounting youth mobilization campaigns may contribute to interest from a wider group of organizations. Workshop length and timing Workshop organizers may want to condense workshops into a three-hour black offered in the evenings, in various locations through the province to facilitate wider participation. Video Future projects should prioritize a video component and promoting this content via social media for a longer period of time. Recording activities of local groups There remains a significant knowledge gap among local groups and a lack of institutional memory about what youth electoral 12 Two organizations cou id not provide either their number of attendees or an estimation of the number of youth present at the ir ali-candidates forum. Therefore, this number accounts for events of two organizations only. 13 Most of these face-ta-face outreach activities were targeting youth but reached people from ali age groups. This is especialiy true for one event that was a door-to-door campaign. 1 36 2002 mobilization activities they may have participated in previously. lt is important ta continue documenting these activities ta build on best practices and !essons learned and develop institutional memory. Knowledge sharing There is an ongoing need ta connect organizations that are experienced in youth voter outreach with interested organizations that do not have an electoral engagement background, or organizations that cannat recall previous campaigns. Many groups don't know why they should, or how they can participate in or run youth mobilization campaigns during elections. Workshops like the one offered on February 18, 2013, should continue ta be prioritized, as weil as developing networks of organizations who work together on youth mobilization activities leading up ta provincial, municipal, and federal elections. Lack of resources As many organizations face a lack of resources when carrying out youth mobilization activities, ways ta remedy this should be explored further. For example, activities organized by Apathy is Boring for the Toronto municipal election (201 0) were augmented thanks ta volunteer participation from local community organizations. Such partnerships should be further developed for outreach in ali types of elections. Also, in 2013, a project organized by the City of Grande Prairie and Apathy is Boring was funded by the city and a portion of the budget was slotted for hiring local youth ta lead Street Teams. This is a great opportunity for communities ta contribute ta youth employment and civic engagement, while also allowing local leaders ta receive training in communications, outreach and community organizing. 1 37 POST-ELECTION INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS Representatives of 65 organizations were invited ta participate in post-elections interviews. Apathy is Boring contacted representatives from organizations that work with youth and were deemed ta have carried out youth voter outreach activities related ta the fast BC provincial elections. Among these 65 organizations, the 24 organizations that answered the survey distributed through Survey Monkey were contacted. Of these, 4 agreed ta participate in the interview follow up. Of the 65 organizations contacted, 9 people agreed ta participate in interviews, 6 declined because they were not interested and the rest either never replied or mentioned not being involved in voter outreach activities. Each participant was contacted by an Apathy is Boring staff member for an interview after the election. The goal of these interviews was ta secure qualitative feedback from each organization about their work during the election. An Apathy is Boring staff member conducted interviews through Skype or phone during the summer of 2013. Interviews consisted in a set of 20 questions ta collect information about the organizations' election related activities and their reach, as weil as solicit feedback and best practices. Representatives from eight organizations and one from a group of high school students who organized an outreach activity agreed ta be interviewed. Of these organizations, six have youth-specific mandates (e.g., student unions), while three have a broader mandate (e,g., community centres). INTERVIEW FINDINGS Sorne organizations' strategies were based on one activity, while others organized more than one. Figure 6 (n=9) shows which methods were used by the organizations that were interviewed. 1 38 Figure 6 Actions taken by NGOs in this election 6 5 4 3 2 0 Face-ta-face Registering Ali-candidates outreach people to election forum vote or or workshops organizing a about voting, vote pledge politics or democracy Figures 7 and 8 below (n=9) list the type of activity by organization during this election and the previous one. Overall, organizations were more active during this election than the previous election, and engaged in a wider range of activities. ft is also worth noting that the most dramatic change is the increase in face-ta-face outreach this time around. Also, from the previous election to this one, there was a growing interest in this group ta share information from the electoral agency (Elections BC). lt could be of interest ta explore among these NGOs and others whether sharing information from an electoral agency is a lever worth Using in arder ta amplify the communication strategies of other electoral agencies (municipal and federal). 1 39 Figure 7 Actions taken by NGOs during this election îO 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 0 Sharing Producing Face-ta-face Organizing Sending Social Other information and sharing outreach or election- emails media or materials your own canvassing related from electoral information events e Yes agencies and materials ~ No Figure 8 Actions taken by NGOs during previous election îO 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Sharing Producing Face-ta-face Organizing Sending Social Other information or and sharing outreach or election- emails media mate rials your own canvassing related from electoral information events e Yes agencies and materials ® No 1 40 {'{\1"> • ,: ~ j !)-; 2 ~J v ·v Figure 9 (n=9) confirms that the bulk of the organizations in our sample made plans for upcoming elections within a 1-4 month period of planning. Figure 9 (n-9): How long before the election was your plan developed? Q How long before the election was your plan developed? • 1-2 weeks • 1-2 months @ 3-4 months ® 7-8 months When asked about the main challenges that organizations faced du ring their planning, the issues raised by the interviewees included: not having enough time the project was tao ambitious and it needed ta be scaled dawn there was voter apathy and a lack of interest or excitement the process of registering as a third-party advertiser created an administrative burden for the organization finding a balance between staying non-partisan and advocating for students These challenges confirm that organizations need support ta effectively conduct youth electoral engagement outreach. They need training seminars on strategies ta properly tailor their project ta the scope of their capacity ta implement it. They need support in tackling the problem of voter apathy and disengagement. They need proper non-partisanship training. If these immediate barriers are addressed, their potential impact will increase and their successes may encourage them ta be more ambitious the next time around. They may also be more likely ta convince other groups ta take on the challenge tao. 1 41 CONCLUSION LESSONS LEARNED AND OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT The most important outcomes from this project have been as follows: 1. Voter turnout of individuals who registered ta vote du ring the Apathy is Boring registration drive was higher than the average voter turnout for registered voters for this age group and far above the voter turnout among ali eligible voters in this age group. However, because the sample was not randomly selected, no causal claims can be made. 2. We created a "how ta" guide for enhancing the impact of Street Teams leading up ta our plans for a major 2015 federal elections campaign. This includes sitting out tactics that are less effective such as shows and events without intermissions, or public places where individuals are in transit and therefore unavailable ta engage (i.e. train station or sidewalks). Economies of scale are also possible based on the fact that events with over 1 ,000 people were quite manageable for Street Teams. These lessons will decrease costs of future outreach initiatives while increasing their impact. 3. We gained evaluation insight from the fact that most individuals approached responded that they were already correctly on the electoral list. Providing these individuals with alternative materials such as "why ta vote" and "how ta vote" infographies were an aspect of this project that had unmeasured impacts on youth voter engagement. 4. We provided an overview of the NGO landscape, including the type of actions taken by groups interested in engaging youth ta vote. The results of the interviews also suggested that if electoral management bodies develop · materials and platforms communicating information about voting logistics or· campaigns ta encourage voting, their impact will be amplified by NGOs that are increasingly more active in youth electoral engagement. 1 42 2008 FUTURE OBJECTIVES & RECOMMENDATIONS If such a project were to be organized again, Apathy is Boring would set its objectives differently and make use of technology to increase its impact. î. Use wireless networks and electronic tablets to increase the effectiveness of data gathering as weil as to segment the audience according to their willingness to engage (i.e. receive voting information, pledging to vote, registering to vote, etc.) a. Generate greater security and privacy by using encryption technology that allows private data to travel without paper and sealed envelopes (this would require approval from the electoral agency and/or the legalization/ implementation of online registration). Some individuals who turned dawn our offer to register on the electoral list mentioned that they did not want to jot dawn this type of private information and hand it off to a stranger. This could mean: i. Register voters using a direct online portal to the electoral management website, if electronic registration is permitted. ii. Register voters using electronic form - with tactile screen & pen for signature, if possible. b. Share electronic materials (i.e. voting information and campaigns) from electoral management bodies via text message and email. c. Join 1 Follow options for social media. d. "Piedge to vote" by clicking a tab after entering your information for one of the above items. e. Ali participants will get a "Go vote" reminder from Apathy is Boring the day before polis open. 2. Aim to achieve a î 0% reg istrati on rate among participants and/or a ratio of five registrations per volunteer hour. This may be achieved sim ply by eliminating venues and public spaces that were not effective and increasing our presence at events that work best: large events and shows with intermissions, parent/child centres, public libraries, etc. 1 43 3. Continue to distribute information leaflets for those who are not carrying a smartphone. 4. lnclude a smart tag (OR code) on ali posters and materials to link to online information such as interactive how-to-vote infographies or online forums, blogs, and social media. 5. Get youth involved at ali points in the development of promotional materials, slogans, and outreach strategies. The objective will be to use materials that are designed by and for youth and that are catchy and engaging with very clear and simplified information. 6. Encourage additional partnerships with community groups, especially with groups that are in more remote areas, to increase potential outreach to underprivileged youth and marginalized youth. 7. lncrease interactions between electoral management bodies, community groups with access to youth and organizations specializing in youth electoral engagement so that best practices and knowledge can be shared and messaging amplified. 1 44 2010 APPENDIXA 200A FORM WITH APATHY IS BORING SIDE PANEL APPLICATION TC REGISTER OR UPDATE A 200A #YOUTHVOTEBC PROVINCIAL VOTER REGISTRATION AiB (12/09) PersonallnformaUon collected on !his torm will be used to reglstervoters orto update voltr ~ lnfonnaUon :as authorl:&d und er the EJM:tionActand the Ftudom oflnlorm•llon 1nd Pro/Klion of ELECTIONS• SC Privar:yAel. Ivry unauthortzed use of this ln/ormaUon ba via taUon ofSec:tlon 275 of the E1eclfon A-.--OII'qtiV.OI...... A cl and ls punlshable by a lino ofup !0 $20,000, or lmprisonmentfor up Jo two ye;u,, orboth. By submltllng this form, you are conRnnlng thal you mut the followlng n~qulrements: • YouareaCIInadianeiUun • You have boen a resident of B.C. for the past six monlhs • You me 18 years of ago orolderor, tr an election ls CLIITllnlly ln progress ln youroteetoral district. APATI-IYISBORING you wiU be tumlng 18 years of ago on orbe fore General Vollng Day • Vou are nol dlsqualilled from voUng ~APATI-IIEC'ESTPLATE You may only apply foryoursalf -yeu may not apply for someona aise WARNING: 11 la an off•ncelo mako a false statoment und er the EJ•cdon Act. PLEASë PRINT IN Bt..OCK LETTERS 1 1 1 lï'iiy 1 1 IFIRSTIW.Iel' I"'IOa.ENAME(S) .. 0 ILASTIOitJITSOI'SIH IIICCRrVER'SUCENCS: YYYY 1 MM 1 DO ~ ~0 M 0 1 XXX HOME AOORESS * lsYèiur mail del!vered lo lhls address? . 0 YES 0 NO · .;.;~ ~ .... ~ :;:•.!'<"~.· ·... :,: ·,_..~.i-~·~··:t·.• ·~-;tt•HI'·:~v~: ·;-.:.,J·t, ':: '4.,.~:.,•:t-·~-~-,:-.:.\.. ·~ ~,~::'b~ • IEIULDINOM.IMBER: .ISTREETNAAIE ICITYITO'.'M IPOSTALCOOE PREVIOUS NAME · · >·'l(lfyou'are ehangingyour name on yourvoterrecord) ,. ·i:!··'·!•·.. •,.t,..•~,,~•.... :ioi:•;,;H,.J,;.!f'.:.~t.i•f.:,..>!Jf:lt'.\.i;.f*S'Tn-J~;:;;;,;,.,.,y;.,~.H:oi~.;~-::r.;-:t;J; LASTNAAIEI' IFIRSTNAMEI' INJ0a.E~$J PREVJOUS HOMEADDRESS f~J(IfYot.i have 'movtld from ttie~addresS'ôn~ycïurvoter1eCèfd) ,· ..• .; ·,· ... ,,;..:~;t~~-:!.• ..;. :-...,;ii'.,,.~ ••. tl· ,,. ·.r:;;.'.'J..\v.., u-:<~. '.-!:$.;l;l l8Uit.OINGNUMBER: (STREETHAME l<:m'IJ'O'M.I .. IPOSTALCOOE Pie an submlt your r-.glstratlon application tc Elections BC: lfyou hav. questions about rtgitttring to vota or about privacy and MaU!ngAddreu: PO Box 9275 Stn Prnv Govt, Vldoria, Be V8W 9J6 protec!lon ofvoterlnformallon, pleasa caD EJoctlons BC Voter SeMees Fax: 250-387-3578/Toll-frea Fax: 1-866-466-0iiSS ai1S0-387·5305ortoiJ..freeat 1-81)().661-8683. Email: [email protected] Aceasa to th a vot1rallst ls rntrlct1d und•r th• Efecdon Act W&b$1ta: .,..._,elecl!ons.bc.ca to protscl th• prlv.acy rlghts of lndlvfduals, 1 45 APPENDIX 8 MOTIVATION QUESTIONS FROM "BC WORKSHOP EVALUATION" AND "BC INTERVIEWEE SURVEY" 1. Will your organization be actively encouraging youth to register or vote in the 2013 BC General Election? a. Yes. b. No. c. 1 don't know-our organization hasn't made plans yet. 2. What is your organization planning to do for the 2013 BC General Election? (Choose ali that apply): a. Sharing information or materials from election agencies. b. Producing and sharing your own information or materials. c. Face-ta-face outreach or canvassing. d. Organizing election-related events. e. Sending emails. f. Social media. g. Other (please specify) 3. Approximately how many youth are you hoping ta reach through these activities? 4. Has your organization actively encouraged youth ta register or vote in past elections? a. Yes. b. No. c. 1 don't know. 5. For which types of electionswas your organization active in the past? (Choose ali that apply): a. Federal Elections. b. Provincial Elections. c. Municipal Elections. 1 46 6. What activities did your organization undertake during past elections? (Choose ali that apply): c. Sharing information or materials from election agencies. d. Producing and sharing your own information or materials. e. Face-ta-face outreach or canvassing. f. Organizing election-related events. g. Sending emails. h. Social media. i. Other (please specify) 7. Wou Id a representative of your organization be willing ta participate in a follow-up interview after the election? c. Yes. d. No. 1 47 APPENDIX C LIST OF EVENTS ATTENDED Concerts 1 Live Entertainment (19): Real Mckenzies- March 8, 2013 - Lucky Bar Roska feat. Combine- March 8, 2013 - Electric Owl Martha Wainright- March 9, 2013- The Rio Theatre Powder Rocket Concert Series- March 21, 2013 - Electric Owl 90s Saturday Morning at Night- March 22, 2013- Roxy Cabaret Hayden - March 23, 2013- The Rio Theatre The Critical Hit: Live Dungeons & Dragons Comedy Experience- March 27, 2013- The Rio Theatre Wintermitts Video Release- March 28, 2013 -The Media Club Stars- April 3, 2013 - Kelowna Community Theatre Stars and Said The Wh ale in Victoria- April 5, 2013- Alix Goolden Hall Stars (afternoon) -April 6, 2013 -Commodore Ballroom Stars (evening) -April6, 2013- Commodore Ballroom ~ Van Siam Finals Night (ft. Truth ls) -April 8, 2013 -The Rio Theatre ~ EastVanlove vol. 8: Journey ta Now- April 11, 2013 - SFU Woodward's Canadian lndividual Siam Poetry Finals -April 12, 2013 -The Rio Theatre Swollen Members- April18, 2013- Commodore Ballroom Miami deviee -April 18, 2013 -The Rickshaw The Zolas and The Du des-April19, 2013 -The Vogue La Chinga with No Sinner- April 19, 2013- The Rickshaw 1 48 Street Outreach (17) Street Outreach- March 15-17, 2013- Commercial Dr, Main St, Gastown ~ Street Outreach - March 23, 2013 - Commercial Drive Street Outreach - March 24, 2013- English Bay Street Outreach (Gastown) - March 26, 2013 - Gastown Street Outreach - March 28, 2013- Vancouver Public Library (Central) Street Outreach- March 29, 2013- Main St. Street Outreach - March 30, 2013- Hastings-Sunrise Street Outreach - March 31, 2013- Davie St Street Outreach- April 5, 2013- Vancouver Public Library (Central) Street Outreach -April 6, 2013 - Outside Art Gallery Street Outreach - April12, 2013- Vancouver Public Library (Central) Vancouver Kingsway Votes- Street Outreach -April 13, 2013 Street Outreach -April 14, 2013 - Davie St Vancouver Kingsway Votes- Street Outreach -April 16, 2013 - Outdoors Street Outreach -Vancouver Public Library- April 17, 2013 -Vancouver Public Library (Central) Street Outreach- April18, 2013 -Vancouver Public Library Street Outreach- April 19, 2013- Vancouver Public On-Campus Outreach (1 0) ~ Speed Dating/Wings Night- March 13, 2013 ·- Highland Pub @ SFU Wings Night- March 20, 2013- Highland Pub @ SFU Campus Outreach - March 22, 2013- @ SFU - Burnaby Campus ~ Wings Night- March 27, 2013....:. Highland Pub@ SFU ~ Wings Night- April 3, 2013 - Highland Pub @ SFU Campus Outreach -April4, 2013- Langara College SFU Public Square City Conversations: Vote lt or Lose lt-April 4- SFU Harbor Centre 1 49 UBC AMS Black Party- April 5, 2013- UBC Campus (outdoor) Wings Night- April1 0, 2013- Highland Pub @ SFU SFU Public Square: Next Generation Transportation Ali Candidates Forum -April18, 2013- SFU Harbour Centre Movie Nights (2) Rocky Harrar Picture Show - March 15, 2013 -The Rio Theatre Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles midnight movie- March 29, 2013- The Rio Theatre Festivals (3) CelticFest and Parade- March 17, 2013 - Downtown Vancouver Persian New Year- March 19, 2013-Ambleside Park Vaisahki Day Parade- April 13, 2012- Main Street (South) 1 50 APPENDIX D INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Gan you briefly tell me a bit about your organization and the raie you play in it? What kind of work does the organization do? 2. Was your organization involved in voter outreach activities during the 2013 SC General Election? 3. What was your organization's plan for the 2013 SC General Election? a. Underline ali that apply: share information or materials from election agencies, produce and share your own information or materials, face-ta face outreach or canvassing, organizing election-related events, send emails, social media. b. Did you plan other activities not previously mentioned? 4. How long before the election was your plan developed and how was it developed? 5. Approximately how many youth were you hoping ta reach through these activities? 6. Do you know how many youth you actually were able ta reach? If sa, how many? 7. Did your organization have ta alter its original plans for the 2013 SC General Election? If sa, what were the reasons for these changes? 8. Gan you tell me about the impact, as you saw it, of the activities your organization conducted? 9. Did you collaborate with any other organizations during the 2013 SC General Election? If sa, who were they? 1 O. Did yôu receive any election-related information or resources from: a. Apathy is Soring b. Elections SC c. Elections Canada d. Other 1 51 11. Did you use any of this information mentioned in Question 10? 12. What was the greatest challenge your organization faced in your work du ring the 2013 BC General Election? 13. Was your organization involved in voter outreach activities du ring previous elections? If so, which ones? 14. What activities did your organization undertake during past elections? a. Underline ali that apply: share information or materials from election agencies, produce and share your own information or materials, face-ta face outreach or canvassing, organizing election-related events, send emails, social media. b. Did you plan other activities not previously mentioned? 15. Did you learn anything from your experience du ring the 2013 BC General Election that you would like to share- positive or negative? 16. Do you have any feedback for Elections BC or other election authorities to consider in future elections? 17. Where do you look for research or information about youth voter participation in Canada? (i.e., who or what are your main sources of research or information?) 18. Are there any questions or issues related to youth civic engagement where you would like to see more research? What are they? 19. ln your opinion, what do you think would be the best way for Elections Canada, Elections BC or Apathy is Boring to encourage stakeholders to increase youth civic engagement? 20. Outside of an election, would you like to receive research or information on youth engagement? If so, what would be the bestway to send research findings and other information to you, so that you and your staff can receive, read and use them? 1 52 APPENDIX E ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW RESPONSES Figure 10 (n=9) Has your organization actively encouraged youth to register or vote in past elections? Q Has your organization actively encouraged youth to register or vote in past elections? e Yes Cil No 4l\l 1don't know Figure 11 (n-9) For which types of elections was your organization active in the past? Q For which types of elections was your organization active in the past? e Federal e Provincial ® Municipal 1 53 TABE This is Exhibit E referred to in the affidavit of Ilona Dougherty, sworn before me this _9...!._ ___ day of January, 2015 CitizenFactory.com (http://citizenfactory.com/) lntrod~Jction Apathy is Boring is a national youth-led non-partisan charitable organization thal has been working to educate Canadian youth about democracy since 2004. In keeping with our strict non-partisanship policy, we do not advocate on matters of public pollcy, and this includes not taking a public stance for or against the Fair Elections Act. Our goal with this statement is to provide an accurate, impartial, and balanced analysis of the youth electoral context in Canada in relation to the Fair Elections Act, with the hope thal this will be a valuable addition to the current debate. As such, we have suggested three key questions thal should be considered: 1. If Elections Canada is no longer empowered to invest in and conduct outreach campaigns thal promote voting, then who will actively reach out to non voting citizens and youth who are deciding whether or not to vote for the first lime? 2. If tighter ID requirements are implemented, it will indeed be crucial to ask the question: what means will be put in place to counter the potentially challenging impacts of tighter voter identification rules on young eligible voters who ~re not registered to vote? 3. ln attempting to safeguard democracy from administrative risks, how can we also ensure we do not expose our democracy to another important risk given the current youth electoral context: the immediate and continued decline of youth voter turnout, and the impact this may have on long term voting habits? Youth Voter Participation Context Youth voter participation is not a partisan issue. lt is in the interest of Canadian society as a whole to inculcate democratie values in every new cohort of adults so thal our democracy th rives from one generation ta the next. Youth must not be viewed as a voting black thal will sway as a whole in one direction or another, as this in fa ct has be en proven ta not be the case. ln fa ct the reis proof ta the contrary, the Student Vote program has shawn th at high school mock election results roughly mirror the actual electoral results.1 Also, a recent poli found thal 18-24 year olds support the political parties in proportions thal are similar to other age groups, and even the issues they prioritize are roughly the same as those of other generations, even people over the age of 60.2 A major influencing factor thal determines whether or not youth decide ta vote is their discussions and interactions with their parents,3which explains wh y the ir values and choices in the end are not far off from th ose of aider generations. Voter participation in Canada has declined significantly in the past four decades, but it has not done so uniformly across ali age groups. Canadians over the age of 55 are currently voting at rates in the 70o/.-75% range, similar to their voting rates in early adulthood.4 Meanwhile, young people today vote at al most half the rate of youth in the 1960s. Du ring the 2011 federal elections, 18-24 year-olds voted at only 38.8%5, continuing a long-term downward trend in the number of new voters opting into the electoral process, a trend which we see throughout the western world. If young people vote in the first two elections in which they are eligible, they tend to continue voting for the rest of their lives. However, those who do not vote early in !ife are less likely to begin doing so later on.6 Therefore low-voter turnout among youth can have a significant and lasting effect on voter participation in the future. 1. If Elections Canada is no longer empowered to invest in and conduct outreach campaigns that promote voting, then who will actively reach out to non voting citizens and youth who are deciding whether or not to vote for the first time? 2. If tighter ID requlrements are implemented, it will indeed be crucial to ask the question: what means will be put in place to counter the potentially challenging impacts of tighter voter identification rules on young eligible voters who are not registered to vote? 3. ln attempting to safeguard democracy from administrative risks, how can we also ensure we do not expose our democracy to another important risk given the eurre nt youth electoral context: the immediate and continued decline of youth voter turnout, and the impact this may have on long term voting habits? Promotion of Democracy (This section re fers to proposed changes to Section 18 of the Canada Elections Act) The key factor that determines voter participation is motivation to vote.7 As such, Apathy is Boring's work focuses on providing young Canadians not only with the tools they need so that they know how, where, and when to vote, but we also running campaigns designed by youth for youth, around the equally important question, "why vote?" Strategies that focus on motivational factors have been shown in numerous research reports to be highly effective. For example, peer-to-peer in-person motivation campaigns, like many of the campaigns Apathy is Boring organizes, have been shown to in crea se voter tu rn out by 8 to 10 percentage points.8 The impact on voter turnout was not only significant, it could be measured in increments, depending on the messaging used.9 Motivation is a factor in deciding whether or not to vote, and it can be used, and indeed has been used successfully, as a lever to increase voter turnoul We recognize that elected officiais and political parties have an important role to play in engaging with voters and motivating them to vote. That being said, it is equally important, in our experience, that non-partisan actors contribute to civic and democratie education, precisely because they do not have a stake in the outcome of any given election, and these stakeholders can speak for the democratie process and its values rather than its ends. Wh ile political parties may choose to speak to their base and undecided voters, beth ofwhom are composed of current voters, non-partisan actors such as Apathy is Boring, Samara, Student Vote, and Elections Canada aim to encourage non-voters to become voters, thus increasing the size of the voting pool. This ls essential to renewing and enhancing the health of our democracy. Apathy is Boring has a history of measuring and quantifying its impact, but to do this we require beth the support of experts and a commitment by partners and institutions to building an evidence-base culture th at ens ures th at what we do, has an impact th at is beth measurable and cast-effective. Study after study has shown that as youth voter turnout declines throughout the western world, motivation is much more of a significant factor in why young people don't vote th an accessibility of the electoral pro cess. 10 This is a critical factor to consider wh en aiming to address the decline in youth voter turnout, and a factor that we suggest should be considered in the debate surrounding Bill C- 23. If Elections Canada is no longer empowered to invest in and conduct outreach campaigns that promote voting, then who will actively reach out to non- voting citizens and youth who are deciding whether or not to vote for the first time? Will there be new opportunities for ali democratie stakeholders, not only political parties to develop and share best practices in the area of engaging non- voters, especially youth? Will Elections Canada be able to continue to invest in research projects that aim to understand the trend of low youth voter turnout and identify which strategies might be cast-effective in turning the trend around? Voter participation in Canada has declined signiticantly in the past four decades, but it has not done so uniformly across ali age groups. Cànadians over the age of 55 are currently voting at rates in the 70°/o-75% range, similar to their voting rates in early adulthood.4 Meanwhile, young people today vote at almost half the rate of youth in the 1960s. During the 2011 federal elections, 18-24 year-olds voted at only 38.8%5, continuing a long-term downward trend in the number of new voters opting into the electoral process, a trend which we see throughout the western world. If young people vote in the first two elections in which they are eligible, they tend to continue voting for the rest of their lives. However, those who do not vote early in !ife are less likely to begin doing so later on.6 Therefore low-voter turnout among youth can have a significant and lasting effect on voter participation in the future. 1. If Elections Canada is no longer empowered tc invest in and conduct outreach campaigns !hat promote voting, then who will actively reach out tc non voting citizens and youth who are deciding whether or not tc vote for the tirs! lime? 2. If tighter ID requirements are implemented, il will indeed be crucial tc ask the question: wh at means will be put in place tc counter the potentially challenging impacts of tighter voter identification rules on young eligible voters who are not registered tc vote? 3. ln attempting tc safeguard democracy from administrative risks, how can we aise ensure we do not expose our democracy tc another important risk given the current youth electoral context: the immediate and continued decline of youth voter turnout, and the impact this may have on long term voting habits? Vouching and Voter Information Cards (This section re fers to proposed changes to Section 143 of the Canada Elections Act) Vlfny do young Canadians vote less !han their eider peers? We know !hat it is not because they believe less in democracy. ln surveys of adolescents, their "intention" tc vote has been measured at 80%.11This, however, does not translate directly into an equally high voter turnout. Vlfnile motivation is a key factor, we must aise considera second important factor: voting accessibility. Youth have a high level of mobility. They move away from home, go off tc college, and then they move again tc find work. As a result, young adults are less likely tc be on the electoral list, and if they happen tc be on it, there is a higher likelihood thal the information will be Incorrect. The impact is thal they will not receive reminders tc vote, or information on when, how, and where tc vote. The accuracy of youth registrations on electorallists is problematic be cause of the ir high mobility. For example, wh ile Apathy is Be ring was working si de by side with Elections BC in 2013, we learned !hat whereas 91.3% of people over the age of 60 have correct information on the electoral list, this number falls tc 72.9% for people under the age of 30.12 However, this number only includes people who are in fact registered tc begin with. ln BC, the electoral list includes only 62.5% of the 18-29 population. Vlfnat this actually means is thal there are likely1 3 more young people in BC who are not on the list or incorrectly on the list (54.5%) !han there are people of this age group who are correctly on the list (45.5%). Tc faciiitate voting among population groups with greater accessibility issues, namely the elderly, youth, and aboriginal people, Elections Canada piloted the use of Voter Information Cards (VIC) as partial identification du ring the 2011 federal election (a photo ID was aise required). This trial run was limited tc certain aboriginal communities, nursing homes, and colleges, and pending its outcomes, could have been expanded nationaliy. A research project conducted by Apathy is Boring in 2008 found through surveys !hat participants from the Canadian north, primarily aboriginal respondents, agreed thal voting in federal elections in the North is currently fraught with challenges. Obstacles identified ranged specifically from accessing, understanding, and th en satisfying voter ID requirements tc the larger issues of awareness of and education about the federal electoral system (as opposed tc territorial and/or band elections). At !hat lime Apathy is Boring recommended thal Elections Canada could "capitalize on changes tc ID requirements tc increase the accessibiTity of elections tc northern Canadians in an innovative and proactive way."sup>14 VIC were a logical choice, especially since even before the Elections Canada pilot proje ct, our research fou nd !hat "many people thought !hat the VIC was an acceptable form of identification because it seemed tc contain ali the information listed as acceptable on the householder."15 ln a survey conducted by Ekos, 72% of respondents answered th at being allowed tc use the VIC as a proof of identification made voting either easier or much easier.16 With regard tc vouching, in the 2011 federal elections, it was estimated by Elections Canada !hat 120,000 voters were allowed tc vote thanks tc this form of of attestation.17 This method is particularly relevant tc urban youth who do not have proper identification, but willlikely have friends and family who do. Though we appreciate the fa ct !hat voters have 39 alternative forms of authorized ID tc prove their identity and residence, 18 the problem re mains th at despite the variety· of identification methods, this do es not facilitate youth registra!ion or youth voting unless youth do indeed have Identification with the address where they in fact reside. If high mobility means !hat the proof of address is incorrect on the required identification cards, then this invalidation applies not to one single form of ID, but the ethers as weil. 8oth vouching and voter information ca rd identification are important factors tc consider wh en addressing the decline in youth voter turne ut, and the refere should be considered in the debate surrounding Bill C-23. ln the event !hat vouching and VIC identification are beth stricken from electoral procedure, it will be important to address the new difficulty this might impose on young voters. This should include developing new programs and strategies !hat will faciiitate the process of registering tc vote in a way !hat is adapted tc their high levels of mobiiity. At Apathy is Boring, for example, we encourage the implementation of youth-led, mobile registration drives !hat can access youth where they are and help them through the process. If tighter ID requirements are lmplemented, it will indeed be crucial to ask the question: what means will be put in place to counter the potentially challenging impacts of tighter voter identification rules on young eligible voters who are not correctly on the voters list? Conclusion Vlfnile Apathy is Boring recogniies !hat ali forms of electoral fraud have the potential to shake the confidence and trust !hat Canadians, especially youth, have in their democracy, it is important to stress !hat democratie life is a fine balance between security and accessibility. We encourage an Parliamentarians who will have the occasion tc debate Bill C-23 to ask themselves, in attempting tc safeguard democracy from administrative risks, how can we also ensure we do not expose our democracy to another important risk given the current youth electoral context: the immediate and continued decline of youth voter turnout, and the impact this may have on long lerm voting habits? A democracy may be very weil administered and free of irregularities, but what worth would il have if this "regularity" came at the expense of citizens opting out of the democratie process? Young Canadians deserve to be a part of the democratie process and we need them to be active citizens. An engaged citizenry is key to the strength of our democracy. If we don'! engage young people now, we are setting ourselves up for the dangerous reality of a fragile democracy and a disengaged generation. Apathy is Boring hopes that engaging youth as voters will be an important part of the debate around the Bill C-23. We continue to be committed to our non- partisan charitable mission of educating Canadian youth about democracy, and look forward to continuing our important work with the many stakeholders who are critical to addressing this issue. Endorsement of this Statement This Apathy is Boring Statement on the Fair Elections Act has been endorsed by Apathy is Boring's Board of Directors (http://apathyisboring.com/team/) and the following members of the Council on Youth Electoral Engagement (http://apathyisboring.com/cyee/): Jean-Pierre Kingsley- Founding Chair Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (1990-2007) The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy President and Vice-Chancellor, University of Winnipeg Dr. André Blais Director, Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies, Université de Montréal Penny Collenette Adjunct Professer, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law Ilona Dougherty - Vice-Chair President & Co-Founder, Apathy is Boring Mackenzie Duncan- Vice-Chair Chair of the Board of Directors & Co-Founder, Apathy is Boring Dr. Youri Cormier- Vice-Chair Executive Director, Apathy is Boring Dr. Elisabeth Gidengil Hiram Mills Professer, Centre for the Study of Democratie Citizenship, Department of Political Science, McGill University Frank Graves President, EKOS Research Associates Dr. Richard Johnston Canada Research Chair in Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation, University of British Columbia Tasha Kheiriddin Writer, Broadcaster, and Political Commentator The Right Honourable Paul Martin Prime Minister of Canada (2003-2006) Anne McGrath Campaign Advisor, New Democratie Party of Canada The Honourable Audrey McLaughlin Leader of the New Democratie Party of Canada (1989-1995) Peter G. White Former Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and lifelong political activist References 1 http://vMw.studentvota.ca/2011frosults/index.php?fd=1 2http://www.nanosresoareh.com'nbrary/poUs/POLNAT·W14-TS99.pdf 3Mclntosh, Hart & Youniss, The Influence of Farrily PoUtlcal Discussion on Youth Clvlc Oevelopment: W'lich Parent Qualitles Matter? Politlcal Sc:lenc:e and Politlcs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (JuJ., 2007), pp, 495-499 4EJectlons Canada, Voter tumout statistlc:s slnce 1945 SEJectlons Canada, •Estimation of Voter Tumout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General EJection.· I!Mark N. Franklin, Voter Tumout and the l>jnarrics of Electoral Corrpctltlon ln Establlshed Democracles Since 1945, Carrbridge, Carrbridge University Press, 2004. 1Joshua Harder and JonA. Krosnlck, W:ly Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysls of the Causes of Voter Tumout, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 52S.549. 11 0onald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, Get Out The Vote! How to lncrease Voter Tumout. Brooklngs Instituts, 2008. SIOonald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, Get Out lhe Vote! How to lncrease Voter Tumout. Brooklngs lnstltute, 2008, 10A revlaw of the literature can be found ln: Joshua Harder and JonA. Krosnlck, Wly Do People Vote? A Psycholog!cal Analysls of the Causes of VoterTumout, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 525--549. 11[let1Jnd StoDe, Department of Potitlcal Science, McGiU University http:/lbtfdgingdifferences.m::g!U.ca/en/Eng6sh_school_partlcipants.pdf 122011 Volers Ust Quality Measurement, Elections BC, October 2011 tl Tho nurrberwould re quirc a sDght dovmward modification to account for youth Yotlo are landed lrmigrants but v.ilo have not obtalnad thelr canadlan cltizenshlp y eL 141fona Oougherty and Adrienne Srrith (Apathy ls Borfng), Report presenled to Elections canada: lfl1llementatlon of the Identification Requlrements ln the Canadian North, October 7, 2008 151Jona Oougherty and Adrienne Srrith (Apathy ls Borfng), Report presented to Elections Canada: lfl1llamentatlon of the Identification Requlrements ln the Canadian North, October 7, 2008 Hl Elections Canada, Survey of Adrrinlstrators Regardlng the Use of the Voter lnfonnatlon Cardas Proof of Address, 2011. t7http://YmN.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince·edvr.lrd-l'sland/falr.electlons·act.could.deny.J.Jote-to-thousands·council·1.2536884 tehttp:J/WNW.democratlcrefonn.gc.ca/englcontentlbackgrounder·falr.electlons·act.cracklng..do'Ml.J.Joter..fraud, THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS et al -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS Applicants REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Court File No. CV-14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE Proceeding commenced at TORONTO AFFIDAVIT OF ILONA DOUGHERTY, SWORN JANUARY __, 2015 SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 20 Dundas Street West, Suite 1100 Toronto, Ontario M5G 2G8 Steven Shrybman (LSUC No. 20774B) tel: 613-482-2456 fax: 613-235-3041 Solicitors for the Applicants ['.:) .,::> (.,:) ·.,_;J THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS et al -and- HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS Applicants REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Court File No. CV-14-513961 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE Proceeding commenced at TORONTO APPLICANTS' APPLICATION RECORD VOLUME6 SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP 20 Dundas Street West, Suite 1100 Toronto, Ontario M5G 2G8 Steven Shrybman (LSUC No. 20774B) tel: 613-482-2456 fax: 613-235-3041 Solicitors for the Applicants