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Bibliographic Note Bibliographic Note his Report draws on a wide range of World Brahmbhatt, Lilia Burunciuc, Gerard Byam, Derek Bank documents and on numerous outside Byerlee, Robert Calderisi, Anthony Cholst, Paul Col- Tsources. The following authors prepared back- lier, Nancy Cooke, Csaba Csaki, Maria Dakolias, Klaus ground papers for this Report: István Ábel, Cecile Deininger, Shanta Devarajan, Christian Delvoie, Aubert, Arup Banerji, Erik Berglöf, Lisa Bernstein, William Easterly, David Ellerman, Peter Fallon, Ger- Timothy Besley, John P. Bonin, Juan Carlos Botero, shon Feder, J. Michael Finger, Alan Gelb, Hafez Penelope Brook, Wendy Carlin, Nazmul Chaudhury, Ghanem, Daniele Giovannuci, Ian Goldin, Roger Klaus Deininger, Simeon Djankov, Cristian Pop- Grawe, Avner Greif, Christopher Hall, Peter Harrold, Eleches, David Finnegan, Heywood Fleisig, Tim Ronald Hood, Ingrid Ivins, Steven Jaffee, Cally Jordan, Hanstad, Bernard Hoekman, Karen Hudes, Timothy Satu Kahkonen, Mats Karlsson, Phil Keefer, Ali Khadr, Irwin, Roumeen Islam, Sanjay Jain, Hiau Looi Kee, Homi Kharas, Mylene Kherallah, Michael Klein, Steve Yoram Keinan, Leora Klapper, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Knack, Anjali Kumar, Victoria Kwakwa, Peter Kyle, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Rafael La Porta, Zvi Lerman, Patrick Labaste, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Donald Larson, Margaret Levenstein, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Keith Robert Liebenthal, Nora Lustig, Cheryl Martin, Ri- Maskus, Caralee McLiesh, Claudio Montenegro, Ta- cardo Martin, Keith Maskus, Bonaventure Mbida-Es- tiana Nenova, Marcelo Olarreaga, Rowena Olegario, sama, John McIntire, Oey Astra Meesook, Richard Katharina Pistor, Roy Prosterman, Raghuram G. Messick, Nicholas Minot, Paul Mitchell, Peter Moll, Rajan, Howard Rosenthal, Brian Schwarzwalder, Paul Celesin Monga, Paul Moreno-Lopez, Ijaz Nabi, Seabright, Andrei Shleifer, Warrick Smith, Charles Mustapha Kamel Nabli, John Nash, Vikram Nehru, Soludo, Valerie Suslow, Nicola Tynan, Ernst-Ludwig Benno Ndulo, Mark Nelson, Peter Nicholas, Lucas von Thadden, Alexander Volokh, Mark West, and Ojiambo, Nwanze Okidegbe, Fayez Omar, Guillermo Luigi Zingales. Perry, Guy Pfeffermann, Robert Picciotto, Vijayendra Background papers for the World Development Re- Rao, Martin Ravallion, Thomas Reardon, Dirk Rein- port are available online at http://www.worldbank.org/ ermann, Ritva Reinikka, Elliot Riordan, Richard wdr. The views expressed in these papers are not neces- Rogers, Antoinette Sayeh, Julian Schweitzer, Marcelo sarily those of the World Bank or of this Report. Selowsky, Mary Sheehan, Andrei Shleifer, Iain Shuker, Many persons, both inside and outside the World Warrick Smith, Charles Soludo, John Staatz, Roger Bank, provided advice and guidance to the team. Valu- Sullivan, Frederick Thomas Temple, Vinod Thomas, able comments and contributions were provided by: Al- Elaine Tinsley, M. Willem van Eeghen, Tara Vish- berto Agbonyitor, Sadiq Ahmed, Zafar Ahmed, Em- wanath, Erich Vogt, Michael Woolcock, Joachim von manuel Akpa, Harold Alderman, Myrna Alexander, Amsberg, Andrew Vorkink, Eliza Winters, Paolo Zac- Nagavalli Annamalai, Lystra Antoine, Ismail Arslan, chia, and Roberto Zagha. Ian Bannon, Kaushik Basu, Abhijit Banerjee, Luca Bar- The team wishes to thank individuals who partici- bone, Maria Benito-Spinetto, Tim Besley, Deepak pated in the following events during the planning and Bhattasali, Vinay Bhargava, Dominique Bichara, Milan drafting stages of this Report: Berlin Workshop on the Institutional Foundations of a Market Economy fred Ogbamey, Dapo Olorunyomi, Manuel Orozco, (held February 23–25, 2000 in Berlin, Germany): Anil Padmanabhan, Rob Paul, Sharmini Peries, Guy Masahiko Aoki, Christopher Mark Armstrong, Bhuban Pfeffermann, Reuben Phiri, Nikolina Sajn, Danny Bajra Bajracharya, Pranab Bardhan, Jean-Christophe Schechter, Petko Shishkov, Andrei Shleifer, Frank Bas, Robert H. Bates, Andreas Beckermann, Erik Smyth, Rick Stapenhurst, Nicholas Stern, Leonard Berglöf, Timothy J. Besley, Hans-Gert Braun, Heinz Sussman, Guennadi Tchernov, Fissehaye Tesfaindrias, Bühler, Paul Collier, Dieter Duwendag, Thomas El- Rich Thomas, Ricardo Trotti, K. Viswanath, Frank haut, Julian Franks, Thomas F. Hellman, Martin Hell- Vogl, Erich Vogt, Ruth Walden, Ting Wang, Matthew wig, Michael Hofmann, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kauf- White, and Ivan Zassoursky; Consultative Meeting on mann, Ioannis Kessides, Gudrun Kochendörfer-Lucius, Judicial Systems (held May 18, 2001 in Washington, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Rolf J. Langhammer, Colin P. D.C.): Elizabeth Adu, Nagavalli Annamalai, Ferid Bel- Mayer, Claus Offe, Christoph G. Paulus, Katharina haj, Sandra Bloemenkamp, Juan Botero, Chas Cadwell, Pistor, Jean Philippe Platteau, Boris Pleskovic, Rudolf Maria Dakolias, Alfredo Dammert, David Finnegan, Richter, Jozef M. Ritzen, Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Wolf- Xavier Forneris, Bohdan Futey, Heike Gramckow, gang Schmitt, Kenneth Sokoloff, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Cheryl Gray, Linn Hammergren, Irina Kichigina, Bert Thierry Verdier, Robert Wade, Ralf Wegener, Jennifer Kritzer, Alfredo Larrea-Falcony, Gail M. Lecce, Floren- Widner, William Witherell, Thomas Wollenzien, Luigi cio Lopez-de-Silanes, Waleed Malik, Richard Messick, G. Zingales, and Michaela Zintl; Summer Research Peter Messitte, Isabelle Mouysset, Peter Murrell, Joe Workshop (held July 17–19, 2000 in Washington, Onek, Brian Ostrom, Friedrich Peloschek, Randi Ry- D.C.): Jean-Paul Azam, Timothy J. Besley, Gerard terman, Andrei Shleifer, Nan Shuker, Visu Sinnadurai, Caprio, Nicholas R. Crafts, David Dollar, William Stefka Slavova, Loren Smith, Donna Stienstra, Melissa Easterly, Marcel Fafchamps, Alan Gelb, Cheryl Gray, Thomas, Ko-Yung Tung, Donna Valdez, Russ Wheeler, Jose Luis Guasch, John Haltiwanger, Daniel Kauf- and Steven Williams. mann, Tarun Khanna, Homi Kharas, Jan Kleinheis- In addition to these events, the team held consulta- terkamp, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Janet T. Landa, Rafael tive videoconferences with audiences in Bangladesh, La Porta, Ross Levine, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Keith E. Maskus, Ugo Mattei, John McMillan, Curtis and Thailand. They wish to thank the following indi- J. Milhaupt, Paul Miranti, Pradeep Mitra, Roger Noll, viduals: in Bangladesh: Abu Abdullah, Abu Ahmed, Rowena Olegario, Santos Pastor, Guy Pfeffermann, Fakhrul Ahsan, Debapriya Bhattacharya, Abul Bayes, Richard H. Pildes, Boris Pleskovic, Jozef M. Ritzen, Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury, Shamsul Haque, Yussuf Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Jennifer Prah Ruger, Friedrich Abdullah Harun, Akmal Husain, Khushi Kabir, Zakir Schneider, Nemat Shafik, Andrei Shleifer, Timothy Ahmed Khan, Akbar Ali Khan, J.A. Maas, Sattar Man- Sinclair, Warrick Smith, Kenneth Sokoloff, Charles dal, Wahiuddin Mahmud, John Moore, Hossain Zilllur Soludo, Pablo Spiller, Nicholas Stern, Joseph Stiglitz, Rahman, Latifur Rahman, Masihur Rahman, Rokia A. Richard Sylla, Shang-Jin Wei, and Jennifer Widner; Rahman, Syed Abdus Samad, Phiphit Suphaphiphat, Consultative Meeting on the Role of the Media in and Irene Wilson; in Brazil: Murillo de Aragão, Regi- Development (held April 12, 2001 in Washington, naldo Oscar de Castro, David Fleischer, Paulo Springer D.C.): Mahfuz Anam, Stuart Auerbach, Ana Elisa Luna de Freitas, Amaro Luiz de Oliveira Gomes, Katherine Barros, Kenneth Best, David Black, Robin Burgess, Hennings, Roberto Shoj Ogasavara, Adriano Pereira Tim Carrington, M.G. Chandrasekhar, Luckson Rubin Silva, Sergei Soares, and Silvia Valadares; in Chipare, Kavi Chongkittavorn, Diana Daniels, Sunil Egypt: Moataz El-Alfy Rashed, Hanaa Kheir El Din, Dasgupta, Araceli De Leon-Herlihy, Stephen Fidler, Reda El Edel, Nagui El Fayoumi, Nadir El Fregany, Kristen Guida, Gary Hansen, Chris Haws, Nancy Hussein El Gammal, Laila El-Khawaga, Alia El Mahdy, Hedin, Gracia Hillman, Craig Hobbs, Ann Hudock, Faika El-Rifaei, Hala El Said, Ganat El Samalouty, Mats Karlsson, Hisham Kassem, Aristides Kattopo, Nabil El Shamy, Amin El Sharkawy, Nermine El Daniel Kaufmann, Tim Kenny, Reinhard Keune, Ta- Sheimy, Mahmoud Aboul Eyoun, Ahmed Ezz, Mah- tiana Khaborova, Mark Koenig, Ronald Koven, Dale moud Abdel Fadil, Samiha Fawzi, Laila Gad, Ah- Lautenbach, Georges Leclere, Jesus Meza Lueza, Rod med Galal, Nemat Genena, Amina Ghaniem, Heba Macdonell, Sokol Mici, Tahir Mirza, Gumisai Mu- Handoussa, Aziza Helmy, Tarek Kamel, Sara Louza, tume, Rebeccah Nelems, Jenny Ng, Pippa Norris, Al- Ibrahim Moharam, Mahmoud Mohieldin, Heba Nas- sar, Osman Osman, Mohamed Ragab, Hoda Rashad, Endnotes Darren Schemmer, Kamel Ahmed Sed-Ahmed, and Magda Tantawy; in Japan: Koji Fujimoto, Yukiko Chapter 1 Fukagawa, Tetsuya Fukunaga, Yujiro Hayami, Kaoru 1. North 1994; Coase 1937, 1959; Williamson 1985. Hayashi, Kenichi Ishida, Shigeru Ishikawa, Masahiro 2. Scholars have differed in the definitions of institutions. The most widely used one is “Institutions . consist of Kawai, Fukunari Kimura, Naonobu Minato, Morio formal rules, informal constraints—norms of behavior, con- Miyazaki, Megumi Muto, Takakyuki Nakaya, Naoya ventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct—and their en- Ochi, Tosió Ogata, Kenichi Ohno, Kan Sato, Hiroko forcement characteristics (North 1991). Nabli and Nugent Shimizu, Toyomitsu Tamao, Ippei Yamazawa, and Toru (1989) apply the principles of the New Institutional Eco- Yanagihara; in Mexico: Ismael Díaz Aguilera, Santiago nomics literature to developing countries, in particular look- Levy Algazi, Everardo Elizondo Almaguer, Jonathan ing at the case of Tunisia. In their definition they discuss how institutions may vary in
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