North Alabama Historical Review Volume 2 North Alabama Historical Review, Volume 2, 2012 Article 7 2012 Politics, Persistence, and Power: The Strategy That Won the French Wars Jackson Prather University of North Alabama Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.una.edu/nahr Part of the European History Commons, and the Public History Commons Recommended Citation Prather, J. (2012). Politics, Persistence, and Power: The Strategy That Won the French Wars. North Alabama Historical Review, 2 (1). Retrieved from https://ir.una.edu/nahr/vol2/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNA Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Alabama Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNA Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Articles 85 Politics, Persistence, and Power: The Strategy That Won the French Wars Jackson Prather In the year 1815, as the dust settled on the battlefield of Waterloo and the ink dried on the various agreements signed at the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain emerged as the undisputed hegemon of Europe. She commanded the seas and vanquished Napoleon. The Industrial Revolution powered the dynamic, robust British economy, and the Empire extended from the Caribbean to Southeast Asia and from the British Isles to the southern tip of Africa. Great Britain seemed invincible and the greatest power the world had yet known. However, the previous twenty- two years were among the most difficult and perilous in British history. For those two decades Great Britain was at near constant war with her age-old rival: France. Ultimately, Great Britain won the French Wars because of strategy. The French Wars, as they were known in Britain, lasted from 1793-1815, with a brief ceasefire in 1802-1803 called the Peace of Amiens. The hostilities in Europe actually began in 1792 with the Coalition of Kings – an alliance between Prussia and Austria – that was created to end the French Revolution and reinstate the Bourbon monarchy. The combat expanded and soon embroiled Europe in the most destructive war it had yet seen. The first period of the war, lasting from 1792-1802, is known as the French Revolutionary War. By the time the war resumed in 1803, French General Napoleon Bonaparte had become the leader of France, and as such started the second phase of the war, the Napoleonic War 86 Articles (1803-1815). The wars were fought as a series of seven Coalitions against France, and these alliances were made up primarily of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Coalitions were named in order of their formation, from the First Coalition (1793-1797) to the Seventh Coalition (1815). Great Britain was the most persistent and steadfast opponent of France, refusing to accept French dominance in Europe and remaining totally dedicated to the destruction of the French Empire. Although Britain would emerge with a complete victory over France, such a victory seemed unlikely if not impossible for the majority of the French Wars. France was a military juggernaut, and on numerous occasions Britain’s allies were forced to surrender and left the British as the only power left opposing France’s quest to conquer all of Europe. Great Britain’s strategy was to proceed with caution and pragmatism throughout the wars. Victory was a byproduct of Britain’s ability to overcome and persevere when the odds were against her. The British political system encouraged dissent yet managed to consistently find solutions. Great Britain had far fewer soldiers than France but was much better at forging alliances. Britain’s willingness to adapt when plans failed allowed her to develop a comprehensive strategy that would eventually lead to victory. I. Overcoming Difficulties Britain’s victory in the French Wars is all the more impressive when the difficulties she overcame are considered: internal political dissent and upheaval, a constant shortage of manpower, and recurring chaos in the Coalitions. Much of the domestic dissent was caused by the epic events unfolding across the English Channel. The British watched everything the Articles 87 French did very closely, and this was no exception. When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, the reaction in Britain was altogether confused. The previous century had seen the most intense stage of the Anglo-French rivalry, often referred to as the Second Hundred Years’ War.1 Hatred for the French was as fervent as ever in Britain, and the sour taste left by the French intervention in the War of American Independence still lingered. The British, always conscious of economic competition, saw the French Revolution as an opportunity to reassert their naval power globally and once and for all become the world’s commercial titan.2 The French Revolution was more than a mere regime change and, much like the American Revolution, produced strong ideology that challenged the status quo that existed in Europe. Many in Britain sympathized with this new political philosophy, including powerful men in Parliament, like Charles James Fox and William Pitt the Younger.3 The British considered themselves to be a free people and the French to be subjects of a despotic government. Fox was a proponent of Britain welcoming the Revolution with open arms and embracing the revolutionary spirit that was sweeping the world. Fox’s ideological rival, Edmund Burke, almost instantly recognized the threat that the French Revolution posed to both France and the whole of Europe. Burke went so far as to call the events in France an “irreparable calamity to mankind,” and predicted that the Revolution would soon be taken over by some charismatic general that would lead France into perpetual war.4 The rivalry between Fox and Burke would be played out not only in 1 Clive Emsley, Britain and the French Revolution (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 3. 2 Michael Duffy, “British Diplomacy and the French Wars 1789-1815,” In Britain and the French Revolution (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1989), 127. 3 Trevor Lloyd, Empire: The History of the British Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 2001), 63; William Pitt, Orations on the French War (London: London, 1906), 18. 4 Emsley, 10; Lloyd, 64. 88 Articles Parliament, but also throughout the British public. Many were appalled at the behavior of the French, while others thought the Revolution wonderful and a sign of possible political reform in Britain as well. Opinion began to sway in favor of the conservative opponents of the French Revolution in 1792. Tension between France and her two primary continental rivals, Prussia and Austria, reached a breaking point on 20 April 1792 when France declared war. Prussia and Austria were longtime rivals, having just fought a war in the late 1770s.5 The events in France terrified the two nations enough to force an alliance of convenience, and they prepared for an invasion of France.6 This alliance, known as the Coalition of Kings, was expected to crush the disorganized French armies and restore the Bourbon monarchy. Regardless of how confident many were of victory, the people of Britain had no interest in waging yet another war against France. British finances were still in poor order following the loss of the American colonies, and war against France did not provide any advantages for Britain. Therefore, Britain remained neutral. It was not until the surprising French victory over invading Austro-Prussian forces and the subsequent French invasion of the Low Countries7 that Britain became concerned with France’s behavior. Britain had always feared French expansionism, and in November 1792 France conquered and occupied present-day Belgium at the Battle of Jemappes.8 The situation escalated in January 1793 with the execution of France’s King Louis XVI. This action horrified the British people because they remembered what chaos and bloodshed resulted from the execution of a monarch in their own civil war during the 17th century. Then, on 1 5 War of Austrian Succession 6 Stephen Pope, The Cassell Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. (London: Cassell, 1999), 10-16. 7 Present-day Belgium and the Netherlands 8 Pope, 17, 529. Articles 89 February, France declared war on Great Britain. Although the British government had positioned itself to oppose France long before this declaration, the fact that France appeared the aggressor united many in Parliament and the public.9 Political and public dissent would continue for the course of the war. George III was involved in strategic planning, and his opinion was widely respected in Parliament. He supported prosecuting the war against France and finding European allies to fight alongside Britain.10 William Pitt the Younger, George’s hand-chosen Prime Minister, honored the King’s wishes and sought peace only when it appeared favorable for Britain - as it did in 1802.11 George III’s involvement prevented any type of broadly supported coalition from forming within Parliament and alienated many factions, such as the Foxites. Fox strongly supported peace in 1796 as the First Coalition appeared to be on the brink of collapse, but George III insisted that no peace negotiations be held until after the completion of British expeditions to the East and West Indies.12 Popular dissent was also a problem for Britain throughout the war. Riots raged constantly and grew increasingly violent as the war affected more and more Britons. The Burdett riots in April 1810 and the food price riots that resulted from the poor harvest of 1811 epitomized this trend. Compounded by the ever-present fear of Irish insurrection, Britain was forced to tie down over forty thousand infantrymen and five regiments of cavalry for the purpose of maintaining domestic security.13 9 Emsley, 23. 10 Christopher Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-1815 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 56.