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Home , Ai Baojun, Hu Wenming, Jiang Jiemin, Li Qingkui, Mao Weiming, Ma Guoqiang

The Historical Evolution and Governance Logic

56

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on WSP Insight at: http://www.wsp-publishing.com/Enhome/Periodical/plist/pid2/258

The Historical Evolution and Governance Logic of ’s The Historical Evolution and Cadre Personnel System：Taking the Personnel Exchange Governance Logic Between Local Governments and Central Enterprises as an Example 37 Hongming Wang School of Political Science and Public Administration，China University of Political Science and Law，，China Bo Liu School of Law，Tongji University，，China Qiufu Li School of Social Sciences，Tsinghua University，Beijing，China

Abstract Purpose－The purpose of this study is to explore the factors that influence the change of cadre and personnel and to elucidate the development of Chinese cadre personnel system. Design/methodology/approach－Based on the rich studies of China cadre personnel system，this paper focus on the change of cadre and personnel between the local government and SOEs. Findings－The examination of the three levels of mobility of local government and central enterprise cadres suggest that the growth background and career prospects of heads of central SOEs are inferior to the ones of local government officials. The narrow promotion channels，the single line of education and work experience，the less experience in multi-departmental positions，the long-term employment in a particular department，and so on all determine that the heads of central enterprises have a“ceiling”of career development when moving to a higher level. Research limitations/implications－The influence mechanism framework for the cultural and creative the Chinese cadre personnel system is finally obtained，which provides theoretical guidance and a practical operation path for the Chinese cadre personnel system. Originality/value－The purpose of this study is to explore the historical evolution and governance logic of China’s cadre and personnel system through the analysis of the communication between local government and central enterprises，so as to better promote the development of China’s cadre and personnel system and provide more practical policies. Keywords Cadre personnel system, Local government, State-owned enterprise Paper type Research Paper

1. Introduction As the two main forces for the rapid development of Chinese economy，the local government and the SOEs have been widely studied by worldwide scholars that how they increase the economic growth respectively. The history，system，and policy of the relationship between central government and local government，government and enterprise are the main focuses. The empirical research is used to study the economic relations between finance and tax. Further discussions on theories appear that whether it’s the change of inner-government relations that drives the competition between local governments finally to 100 change the Chinese reform process or it’s the mixed economy born out of the marketization that makes 2 the economic miracle of China happen . Meanwhile，the study on the communication of cadre and personnel between SOEs and the local government is very few. The current studies are mainly developed based on the above discussions，never gaining enough attention as an independent and important phenomenon. As a matter of fact，cadre personnel system not only supports the basic governance of a country，but also forms comparatively stable political ascendency and elite groups. It builds the most basic “ ， Journal of Chinese Human power relation between the power structure and each of their regulated subject. Once setting the route Resource Management ”3 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2020 cadres are the determinants . The unified power dispatched by the Communist Party of China penetrates pp. 37‑56 © World Scientific Publishing House in every power subject through systems and cadres and personnel play the role of liaisons among these 2040‑8005 DOI: 10.47297/wspchrm power subjects. The purpose of this study is to explore the historical evolution and governance logic of WSP2040‑800504.20201102 JCHRM China’s cadre and personnel system through the analysis of the communication between local 11，2 government and central enterprises，so as to better promote the development of China’s cadre and personnel system and provide more practical policies.

2. Literature Review 38 In the past dozens of years，the cadre personnel system has been one of the core topics in the study of Chinese politics. With the development of politics in China， relevant literature can be divided chronologically into four paths，totalitarianism（after 1949，the establishment of the People’s Republic of China），factional politics（1970，at the end of the Cultural Revolution），generational politics（1980，at the beginning of the opening reform），technocracy （1990，after the reform of the cadre personnel system） With the progressive rebuilding of American social science system after the war，using the pattern of the totalitarianism to reveal the overview of politics in China became a trend. Especially in the late 1950s， American scholars tended to use the framework of the totalitarianism to understand the Communist Party of China，which became the main topic of China study at that time. The China Quarterly mainly published the paper of the study of the CPC. On the one hand，the columns such as“Big Event”and “Literature Collection”accumulated abundant historical materials of the CPC. On the other hand， academic discussions on the CPC were constantly developed. Following the earlier path of the totalitarianism，through Chinese cadre personnel system，most scholars tried to understand the model of “political party-nation”since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Based on the values of the totalitarianism，the analysis of the CPC leaders’personalities and backgrounds of their growth were highlighted. Their political experiences，personalities and collective characteristics were used to analyze the reasons why the revolution led by the CPC succeeded and the distinguished features of the People’s Republic of China were hoped to be found.“The Chinese Communist Cadre：Key to Political Control”written by Walter E. Gourlay in 1952 is the first monograph of the systematic study on the CPC after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in the American academic circle. The author introduces the organizational framework of the CPC and concludes that cadres are the key for the central government to govern. He points out that cadres are the core of the organization of the CPC and the 4 education to them rely on the ideology of the Marxism-Leninism . Through the case study of one department of the central government，a county and a commune，A. Doak Barnett，describes how the grass roots of the CPC work，revealing how the political power penetrates in the all fields of grass roots 5 through cadres and bureaucracy . Lyman Van Slyke notices that the pivotal role of the united front in the development of the CPC. He believes that the united front not only connects the general public with the 6 elicit group，but also make the CPC’s leadership rightful . With the wave of“behaviorism revolution”in American political circle，the field of comparative politics began to highlight the“input”and“output”of the political system. Various structures of interest became the core issues concerned by American political scholars. The research paradigm of pluralism began to be introduced into the research of Chinese politics. Just before and after the“Cultural Revolution”，a series of“political events”created by the high-level elites in the CPC made American scholars realize that the so-called communist system was not a monolithic part under the framework of omnipotence. In fact，there were many interest groups with different subjects in it. Therefore，after the 1970s，the focus of the discussion of China’s cadre and personnel system began to shift from elites to the operation of power and process of decision-making. The so-called“factional politics”has become the political expression that influences the current understanding. For example，William W. Whitson finds that the PLA generals can be divided into different factions according to the field army they belong to. Generally speaking，it is difficult for a senior general of a certain field army to enter and develop in other 7 field forces. The cooperation among various field armies is not intimate . According to Andrew Nathan， the CPC factions are based on the“client ties”and factional politics keeps circulating according to the law 8 of“consensus-conflict-crisis”. Other scholars，by analyzing the background of political elites，such as work experience，school，family，provincial nationality，etc.，mainly believe that factional politics is an informal factor that can affect the official cadre personnel system. They pay attention to how“factional politics”will affect China’s institutional change. They believe that the pluralistic power of“factional The Historical politics”promotes the change of China’s decision-making system. Similar to the western countries at Evolution and that time，the decision-making process is controlled by different interest subjects，but the western Governance Logic decision-making process is in various fields of society. Political power is composed of multiple social interest groups， while China’s decision-making power is dispersed within the party and state organizations. 39 At the same time of the self-improvement of American social science theory，the international situation of drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe，also the end of the cold war，the above have given American scholars great confidence. In the atmosphere of“the end of history”，to test the exemplary significance of the new theory and to use the“state-society”analysis framework to find the democratization stimulus to the China’s communist system which had not yet undergone democratic transformation draw the attentions of the American scholars who studied China in 1980s. Therefore， “when will China democratize and what will lead to China’s democratization”became the core proposition of this period. With the publication of materials and the popularization of quantitative research， American scholars began to focus on the correlation statistics and analysis of the flow of the elite politics to verify whether the inheritance of supreme power was standardized and whether the intergenerational progress of Chinese elites was conducive to the“toughness”of the“authoritarian”regime. Li Cheng，a representative of elite politics，believes that since the 1980s，the party has become increasingly formalized in terms of tenure system，retirement age limit and balanced rules of regional representation，which 9 makes China’s elite politics more transparent and regularized . Bo Zhiyue also points out that compared with the pluralism paradigm，the factional model was based on the speculation and hearsay rather than the systematic information. With the deepening of reform and opening up，China has moved from factional struggle to factional balance during the Cultural Revolution. Elite politics is moving from factional competition to institutionalization，and political inheritance is no longer a zero-sum game，but a pursuit 10 of power balance among all fields . Lowell Dittmer especially emphasizes that the regularization of the political exit system and the inheritance system has narrowed the gap between formal politics and informal politics in the party. The“export”of politics is realized through retirement rather than power struggle. 11 Therefore，the power transfer gradually transforms into a game of power balance . However，in 2002，when the CPC completed the first smooth alternation of elite power in the era of “post strongman politics”，ideology also transferred from“revolutionary party to ruling party”with the times. Meanwhile，a series of research on China began to shake their beliefs，“the middle class brings democracy”，“emerging groups support democracy”，“economic development promotes civil society success”“progress brings democratization”. Just as the term“faction”was first refined 30 years ago， making American scholars transfer their views from totalism to pluralism in China’s political research， Professor Andrew Nathan，who is extremely keen on Chinese politics，once again proposed a concept of “authoritarian toughness”to describe Chinese regime. In Andrew Nathan’s opinion，it is more appropriate to use“authoritarian regime”to describe China’s system instead of democratic and totalitarian regime，while“toughness”is determined by the progressively standardized supreme power， the amendment of factional politics by selecting officials based on their performance，professional division of administrative agencies，and increasing political participation“. Then the stability of the system can be 12 maintained . Since the balance of power makes the high-level elites avoid unstable and uncertain events in the transfer of power，and further promotes the regularization of the elite political mobility system， what factors replace the previous political elite selection mechanism based on ”factions“ in the era of ”post strongman politics“？ In Andrew Nathan’s view，selecting officials based on their performance as a revision of factional politics has gradually played a decisive role in the change of high-level elites and the selection of political elites. Along with the presupposition of the positive relationship between performance and officials’ promotion， many scholars have collected a variety of data to measure economic performance. They have established different models to illustrate or disprove that there is a significant positive relationship between the quality of economic data and the promotion of local government officials，but whether it’s fiscal revenue or local taxes or land transfer fees that contributes most，they have different arguments. However， scholars believe that under the national policy of economic JCHRM development and expert governance in the reform era，the central government has successfully used the 11，2 promotion mechanism based on officials’performances to achieve the dual tasks of economic growth under the national GDP doctrine and controlling the loyalty of local government officials. Such a flow mechanism of the flow of political elites based on ”performance“ as the selection standard becomes a key to selecting political elites after the balance of high-level power，but also the essence of ”authoritarian“ 40 regime to promote economic development to realize the ”toughness“ of regime. Zhao Dingxin firmly believes that ”‘the performance-oriented’development of China’s economy has compensated the lack of legitimacy of ideology and procedure，and to a certain extent promoted the legitimacy of authoritarian 13 regime” . On the one hand，most of these studies are the most advanced but still they are in a macro aspect referred to general materials. There is a lack of in-depth analysis on the specific power subjects of China’s national governance system. More importantly， the analysis on the two main power subjects， local government and central enterprises is not enough in the reform ear when the economy rapidly develops，which failed to show the specific changes of the CPC’ s elite politics from the perspective of cadre and personnel exchanges. Although the existing studies on the cadre and personnel system of local governments， whether it is“pressure type system”，“political tournament”or“fragmented authoritarianism”or“factual behavioral federalism”，basically prove that the central government has given a lot of political and economic power to local government officials since the reform to encourage local governments to “actively”innovate the system and“boldly”do the experiment on the policies. Meanwhile，the powerful management to the cadres and personnel especially when the system of tax distribution，smuggle control and“triangle debt”touch the basic of the nation power，the central government will resort to the cadre system of the party management to penetrate its power to further crack down the local government power. But for the central SOEs，the relevant research is not too much. In fact，as the ruling foundation of ”party-state“，the effective system of party managing cadres in the governments has also been used in the central government’s governance to the SOEs. The central government still follows the system logic of ”party-state“ form and lists enterprise cadres in ”nomenklatura“ to effectively control SOEs at all levels14. However，the relationship between the governments is still limited to the scope of political power. During the revolution period of the ruling party，the party in charge of cadres has formed a ”hard“ institutional force with revolutionary nature，absolute authority and compulsion. With the change of institutional environment，the ”hard“ institutional force transformed into the institutional basis of the ruling party after the reform era. Especially in the face of market decentralization and the central SOEs（SOEs） with the goal of improving profitability，strengthening market competency and gaining market profits，how the“hard”institutional power acts positively in the “soft”market has become the adaptive challenges of the principle of the party managing cadres under the new power structure of hierarchical relationship in the reform era. Therefore，from this point of view，it is of great significance to study the flow of cadres and personnel between local governments and central enterprises. The Historical Evolution and 3. Establishment of Personnel Exchange Mechanism between Local Government and Central Governance Logic Enterprises When it comes to the exchange of cadres and personnel，first of all，we have to mention the principle of the CPC Central Committee governing cadres. The term“the principle of the party managing cadres” 41 first appeared in the official documents of the party in the“Notice of the CPC Central Committee on Strengthening Party Building”which was discussed and passed by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on July 9，1989. The notice pointed out that“we should adhere to the principle of the party managing cadres，improve the methods of cadre management，and strengthen the leadership of the party in the management of cadres. The principles and policies for cadre work will be made. Important cadres should be recommended and managed. The cadre personnel system should be guided and doing a 15 good job in macro management and supervision of cadre and personnel work is important” . The personnel management principle of the party is mainly realized through the following aspects：first，the leadership within the system will be realized mainly through the party members’direct control of political power in the local political power system and enterprise management team，and establish CPC organizations within the corresponding institutions，which relies on the decision-making mechanism based on the principle of democratic centralism；second，the leadership outside the system，that is，the so-called lever personnel management that is mainly realized through the party’s organization and personnel power over the main cadres of local governments and central enterprises，which also relies on the party’s cadre management mechanism based on the principle of democratic centralism. The leadership within the system mainly endows the cadres with national public power，and completes the governance of local governments and SOEs from the top to the bottom，so as to protect the basic demands of the public，while the leadership outside the system，that is，the use of the principle of the party managing cadres，requires that while providing the national institutional arrangements and public services，it should focus on the importance of political acceptance of the nation power to the whole elites to make the relationship between state power and elites clear. The establishment and persistence of the principle of CPC make it possible for the state power to absorb and control the social elites. By recruiting party members and government cadres，the CPC organizations absorb the majority of elites from all walks of life into the state power network and place them in strict party organizations at all levels，forming the party’s monopoly on the vast majority of social elites. That is the reason why many scholars regard the use of the principle of the party governing cadres as the core element of the Chinese model. Before the reform era，the CPC faced a basic choice，that is，whether China’s modernization model should copy the Soviet Union’s industrialization road or continue to follow the“Yan’an Road” successfully practiced in the revolution. The Soviet style industrialization road means highly relying on technical experts to carry out the central planning of the command economy，while the“Yan’an Road” emphasizes the subjectivity of the people，encouraging the“people’s pioneering spirit”. The so-called contradiction between“red”and“professional”that Mao Zedong emphasized since the 1950s is essentially related to the basic structure of Chinese society at that time. The CPC gradually formed the road of“armed separation of workers and peasants”in the revolution，and after the revolution，the vast majority of the society was occupied by migrant workers who had no culture and did not understand technology who were the objects of the political power. However，the state construction in the form of “party-state”is different from the political mobilization in the revolutionary era. How to successfully graft the experience of the party’s organization and mobilization of the“people”in the revolutionary era into the means of the state’s governance to govern the“people”in the construction period is very important for new China. Based on China’s social environment at that time，if the planned economic system of the Soviet Union was completely copied，the whole society would have to rely on a few central planning departments and a number of technical experts. As the social foundation of the Communist Party of China，farmers and workers would be placed outside the national construction of new China，and even the professional revolutionaries and soldiers in most political parties would lack the Soviet Union’s experience of governance，which would obviously bring great trouble to the national governance of new JCHRM China. This is why Mao Zedong needed to launch the Great Leap Forward. Mao Zedong asked the first 11，2 secretaries of local party committees to pay close attention to economic work，and put forward terms such as“political command of economy”，“political unified management of business”and“layman leading experts”. At the same time，the party state set up a large number of party organizations with similar functions as government departments，which，on the one hand，mobilized workers and peasants as the 42 basis and on the other hand，strengthened the party’s leadership，reflecting Mao Zedong’s strong demand that the social foundation of the CPC，the peasant and workers and party cadres become the main body of China’s industrialization. It aims to find back the direct contact between the party’s organizations at all levels and the people of the“Yan’an Road”and rediscover the experience of“party- people”as the center in the“Yan’an Road”. Through the transformation of ideology in the reform era，we find that the ruling party chose decentralization reform as the means to construct economy so that the legitimacy of ideology was more based on bureaucratic performance. However，with the expansion of power and resources，the local government no longer acts as a role of coordinating resource and distributing materials but a self- contained economic entity. The central SOEs have become direct competitors with other economic organizations to earn market resources and opportunities，relying on its ever-increasing economic scale. However，due to the fact that local governments and central SOEs occupy the decisive power of political，economic and ideological under the market conditions，the advantages of resources and power can help them earn the benefit at first hand and promote“nationalization of departmental interests”or “corporatization of national interests”，which on the one hand，it splits the central power of the ruling party，on the other hand，it erodes the development of the people’s power in the society，thus seizing a large number of social interests and making the central nature of state power and people’s nature not obvious. Interest groups are scattered in the new“block relationship”on the power network. The central committee still adopts the principle of hierarchical management to govern the local government，that is，the Central Committee of CPC only manages one level and carries out unified management on the Sub-Provincial level cadres. The personnel appointment of local cadres at the provincial levels are deliberated by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The Sub-Provincial level cadres are appointed by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. According to the principle of party managing cadres in central SOEs，48 central SOEs have been established as Bureau-Director level units and their organizations have set up party groups and general offices. Among them，two principal leaders are directly appointed by the fifth Bureau of Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee（Enterprise cadre administration bureau），and the leading members are managed by the first Bureau of SASAC. Then 48 central SOEs became the Bureau- Director level unit under the management of SASAC. The organizational structure has a party committee and an office. The principal leaders are jointly appointed by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee and the SASAC of the State Council，and the leading members are managed by the Second Bureau of enterprise cadres of SASAC of the State Council. This means that theoretically，the Party Central Committee can supervise the local government and the central SOEs through the appointment and removal of the main officials of the local party and government and the central SOEs. Their career incentives are consistent with the objectives of the Party Central Committee. Especially as the leaders of the central enterprises，they must have the identity of“manager”and“cadre”at the same time to stay in the same line with the central government. What are the similarities and differences between the application of the principle of the party in charge of cadres in local governments and central enterprises？ It is of great significance to observe the actual operation of the principle of the party to better manage cadres.

4. Cadre flow between local government and central enterprises First of all，from the growth background of the elite groups of local governments and central enterprises，we can see that the identity of the representative of local political power，the experience of party and League organizations and leading secretaries have become the main promotion channels for the Standing Committee members of local Party committees. Ethnic identity and female gender are often the The Historical important weights for minority cadres to achieve“corner transcendence”. Among the 362 members of the Evolution and ， Secretary of Party Committees of Province from 2003 to 2012 22.6% of the Chairman had served as the Governance Logic head of the Youth League Committee at all levels. If the experience of serving as deputy or subordinate Minister of the Youth League Committee is included，there will be more such cadres. Since it is difficult for secretaries to be distinguished from the official in the low-level period and if only from the experience 43 of serving as the Secretary-General of the party committees at all levels，the number of people who have the experiences has reached 29.3%. There will be 93% of the Provincial Standing Committee members have worked in the party organization system if the party and League organization experience and secretary experience are included in the work experience of the party organization system，which means that there are few cases in which local party and government leaders can be directly promoted to the Standing Committee of the local provincial Party committee without the experience of the party and League organization system. On the other hand，the training of cadres before and after promotion in Party schools at all levels has further strengthened the ideological color of main cadres. Therefore，even in the reform era，the work of the ruling party has been put in the economic construction as the center，and the emphasis on the professionalism of local cadres does not mean the neglect of the ideological belief. The principle of the party in charge of cadres has played a role in promoting“specialization”with“red ideology”and protecting“red ideology”with“specialization”. Based on the research and observation on the political position mobility of 864 heads of central SOEs and 207 leaders of central SOEs in their full positions from 2003-2012，after the practice of“grasping the large and letting go of the small”to form mega-central SOEs，the two senior leaders of 48 central SOEs，as the representative of economic power，are now under the direct management of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and enjoy political treatment at the Sub- Ministerial level，the same with the non-regular provincial standing committee members and slightly lower than the local major party and government leaders. Unlike the local party and Government leaders who wields the local political power and have undergone multi-level and multi-departmental experience during their growth，leaders of central SOEs are entitled with extremely narrow promotion channels and in possession of absolutely single and similar career background. They have worked in the same unit or department for ages，hardly practicing the rotational program even within the enterprise. More than 60% of the leaders of central enterprises are promoted from within the system. The bare difference only lies in the fact that some are from the same enterprise group，while others are from the same walk of industry. Remarkably， the central SOEs also have the Party-people Working Department，the Youth League Committees，the General Office and other Party and Youth League organization settings. However，during 2003-2012，and the number of people who can directly enter the leadership team of central SOEs from the above three departments is only in the single digits. Obviously，in the middle level responsible for ideological working of the enterprise，political cadres are sharing far less career development advantages and opportunities compared with project managers of secondary companies or those in charge of major researching and technological projects. It’s not difficult to clarify the reason behind. After all，the essential pursuit of the central SOEs is to profit in the market competition. The marketing environment determines their requirements for their focus on the professional dimension outweigh the ideological dimension to adapt to globalization，market-oriented management idea. Thus，learning to use the knowledge and skills of the market economy，is somewhat more important than accentuating the political position. In addition，21.4% of them come from the competent departments of the State Council，such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology，the Ministry of Transport，and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SASAC），while only 10.4% have the experience in the local party and government. Especially after 2007，the proportion of central enterprise leaders with the career experience of the competent departments of the State Council and local party and government has significantly decreased，which is also in line with the requirement for specialization of corporate cadres，as leaders promoted from within the central enterprise system indeed hold mellower corporate management skills and practical experience. It can be seen that since the establishment of SASAC，specialization has become the prominent consideration for the selection of leaders of central enterprises，and the pool of talents with outstanding leadership has been JCHRM gradually established within the central enterprise system，starting to get out of the previous situation 11，2 formed during the early stage of corporate transformation that leadership talents were mostly provided by the State Council authorities. From 2012-2017，the proportion of leaders coming from within the central enterprise system has risen to 74.5% since the 18th CPC National Congress，compared to the figure of 62.3% from 2007-2012 and 55% from 2003-2007. ， 44 Besides from the perspective of the mobility of elite groups in local governments and central enterprises，there are three main flow paths of the provincial standing committees of local governments. The first one is promotion. For example，the standing committee member at the Sub-Ministerial level is promoted to the head of the local party and government at the Provincial-Ministerial level，the governor is transferred to the secretary of the provincial party committee of his own province or another province，and the secretary of the provincial party committee is promoted to the Sub-National level. Before the 18th CPC National Congress，all the local party and government heads were members of the Central Committee，the innermost of China’s political power，except for Province. Some provincial standing committees were alternate members of the Central Committee. In the Central Committee elected at the 15th，16th，17th，18th and 19th CPC National Congresses，the total number of the central committee members of local governments were respectively 61，65，65，62，while the numbers of members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee with experience as secretaries of the provincial party committee and governors are respectively 13，16，19，19 and 19. After the institutionalization of the cadre personnel system after the 1990s，local officials with experience as secretaries of the provincial party committee in two provinces are generally considered to have won the “ticket”for promotion to the Sub-National level at the next Central Plenary Session. The second one is sideways move. For instance，the Sub-Ministerial member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee is transferred to other positions of the same-level，such as the deputy minister of a central government department in Beijing or a Sub-Ministerial member of the Provincial Party Committee，including，of course，the formal leaders of the central enterprises. A governor’s transfer to a minister in Beijing or the governor of other provinces is actually the springboard to rise to the Sub-National level，as a getting-around indirect path because of the secretary of the provincial party committee. However，the move from a secretary of the provincial party committee to the minister or party secretary of a central government department is in fact an invisible demotion with rank unchanged. The third path is retirement. The Sub-Ministerial provincial standing committee member transfers to special committees of the local people’s congresses and the CPPCC（short for Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference） organizations，and the secretary of the provincial party committee or the governor transfer to the special committees of National People’s Congress and CPPCC organizations，to play their remaining role and continue to contribute. Among these three paths，cases of officials transferred from local government to central enterprises as full positions are few. Before the 18th CPC National Congress，except for and ， the senior cadres transferred from local government to central enterprises have all reached the retirement age. Perhaps lacking in political promotion possibilities，the high salary by serving in central enterprises has become an alternative compensation for these cadres’political careers under the principle of placing cadres under the party’s supervision. Zhang Guangning，the former member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee，is the most typical example. As a worker who had contributed a lot to the iron and steel industry，Zhang served only three years in the Ansteel Group to reach the retirement age of first-line leading cadres before returning to the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress as a full-time deputy director，retiring to the second line. As did Wang Zhenyou，who was formerly secretary of the Huangshi Municipal Party Committee in Province，had also worked years in the steel industry. Wang served five years in the cs to reach retirement age before returning to the Hubei Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference as a full-time vice chairman，retiring to the second line. Since the 18th CPC National Congress，there has been an obvious change in the central government’s ideas about the position transfer of local government officials to central enterprises. The central government began to select cadres in the prime of his life with rich experience serving the grassroot party and government，aiming at bringing into play the expertise of these cadres in dealing with major issues to promote the mergers and reorganizations of the central enterprises. For example，after Chen Derong， The Historical member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and secretary of the Evolution and Wenzhou Municipal Party Committee，was transferred to Baoshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation as Governance Logic chairman and general manager to shoulder multiple responsibilities，he started to promote the merger of Baoshan Steel Group and Steel Group as requested by the central government. Wang Xiangxi， who was formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee and 45 Secretary of the Politics and Law commission，was transferred to the chairman of China Energy Investment，the first issue he dealt with was to promote the merger and restructuring of China Energy Investment and Shenhua Group. Another instance ，who served in FAW（short for China First Automobile Works Group Corporation） and Provincial Committee，was transferred to Dongfeng Motor Group. After that，rumors circulated that there would be a merger of FAW，Dongfeng Motor Corporation and Changan Automobile Group. Accordingly，the restructuring of central enterprises since the 18th CPC National Congress，the central government has appointed local government officials with local governance experience to be in charge of the mergers between central enterprises，which， perhaps in the central government’s view，helps to coordinate different interests in the process on the one hand，and to better implement the central government’s guiding ideology on the other.

Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Deputy Secretary of Provincial Deputy General Manager of China 2003 Jiang Jiemin Party Committee； National Petroleum Corporation Deputy Governor of Qinghai Province 2004 Zhang Zhiyin Mayor of Lanzhou City， Province Vice President of SINOCHEM Minister of Party Committee Deputy General Manager of Sinopec 2004 Zhou Organization of Autonomous Group Region Deputy Secretary of the Party Deputy General Manager of China 2005 Xu Mingyang Committee of Tibet Autonomous General Technology（Group）Holding Region Company Deputy Mayor of Wuhan City，Hubei Deputy General Manager of China 2004 Nie Yuchun Province Electronics Corporation Deputy Minister of Organization Deputy General Manager of China 2006 Cai Zhefu Department of Provincial Datang Corporation Party Committee General Manager of China Grain 2007 Bao Kexin Deputy Governor of Province Reserves Group Company Minister of Organization Department of 2007 Su Shulin General Manager of Sinopec Group Liaoning Provincial Party Committee Member of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Party Committee； 2007 General Manager of FAW Secretary of the Jilin Municipal Party Committee 2007 He Tongxin Deputy Governor of Province President of China General Technology Secretary of the Huangshi Municipal Secretary of the Party Committee of 2008 Wang Zhenyou Party Committee，Hubei Province Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation General Manager of China South 2011 Deputy Mayor of Shanghai Industries Group Corporation member of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Party 2011 Zhang Guangning Committee； President of Ansteel Group Secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee Vice Chairman of General Manager of General Manager of 2012 Zhao Shuanglin Autonomous Region China Grain Reserves Group Company JCHRM Year Name Original Position Transferred Position ， Mayor of Chengdu City，Sichuan President of Aluminum Corporation of 11 2 2014 Ge Honglin Province China Member of the Standing Committee of President and General Manager of Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee； 2014 Chen Derong Baoshan Iron and Steel Group Secretary of the Wenzhou Municipal 46 Corporation Party Committee Deputy Secretary of Jilin Provincial President of Dongfeng Motor 2015 Zhu Yanfeng Party Committee Corporation Member of the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee； 2019 Wang Xiangxi President of China Energy Investment Secretary of the Politics and Law Commission Mayor of Dalian City，Liaoning 2019 Tan Chengxu President of Ansteel Group Province Member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee；President of China State Construction 2019 Zhou Naixiang Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Party Engineering Group Corporation Committee Member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee； 2020 Zhang Yuzhuo President of Sinopec Group Secretary of the Binhai New Area Party Committee Table 1. Member of the Standing Committee of Personnel Transferred the Provincial Party Committee； President of State Grid Corporation of 2020 from Local government Executive Deputy Governor of Jiangxi China to Central Enterprises Province

Among the two Sub-Ministerial-level leaders of central SOEs，there are also three main career development paths. The first one is to directly enter the constituent departments of the central government. From 2003 to 2020，a total of 26 heads of central SOEs were transferred to central institutions，of which only 7 were promoted from the Sub-Ministerial level to the Provincial- 16 Ministerial level at the same time . The long-term work in the front line，the lack of administrative experience，the relatively old age of more than 55 when the position moving，and the relatively short time in the Sub-Ministerial position of only an average of 2.7 years together have led to the powerless performance for those cadres coming from the central SOEs. Basically，they just retire when it’s time. The second is to transfer to the local government. Except for who has been directly promoted to the governor of Province，most of leaders of the central SOEs have transferred to the local vice provincial officials，while some have directly transferred to the standing committee and some the vice governor. However，unlike the heads of central SOEs who entered the central government organizations，in these seventeen years，officials transferred to the local governments are generally very young with an average age of 49. Though there were only 12 of them，they’d already had 4.5 years of experience in Sub-Ministerial positions. The elites move to the local，quickly become the core force and gain access to the central committee，indicating that the purpose of selecting young cadres to enrich the cadre of the provincial government lies in cultivating these political talents，enhance their working experience between the central and local and between the government and enterprises，and prepare them for further promotion and reappointment in the next step. Therefore，the transfer of key officials of central enterprises to local governments is more beneficial for the cadres to remove the last obstacle to the central committee than the reverse path. Compared with the cadres transferred from local governments to central enterprises，who are generally older with little room for political promotion，officials transferred from central enterprises to local governments are relatively younger and more robust. Most of them are rising stars in the field，appointed by the central government to the local to accumulate experience，and then entrusted with important responsibilities. Under the principle of the party controlling，the promotion from Sub-Ministerial level Provincial- The Historical Ministerial level and eventually to the central committee relies particularly on those senior cadres’ Evolution and personal qualifications and experience. The transfer to local government can precisely make up for the lack Governance Logic of weak experience under the single channel of promotion of senior cadres in central enterprises. For this reason，most senior officials who have been transferred from central enterprises to local government positions have generally been promoted. 47 It’s also because the transfer of central enterprises to local governments bring a broader platform， people in charge of central enterprises can grab more the opportunities to utilize their economic power in exchange for political power. Among them，the heads of representatives of monopolistic interest groups in the market such as central enterprises of electric power，petroleum and aerospace are often more able to stand out and be transferred to key positions in local governments，due to their monopolistic nature or the relative stagnation of power in the central sector during the period of economic transition.

Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position General Manager and Secretory of the Party Secretary of Hainan Provincial Organization of China Governor of Hainan Party Committee； 2003 Wei Liucheng National Offshore Oil Province Member of the 17th Central Corporation； Committee Alternate Member of the 16th Central Committee

Secretary of the Party Committee of Deputy Secretary of Autonomous Region；Minister General Manager and the Provincial Party of The Ministry of Public Secretory of the Party Committee of Guangxi Security； Organization of Aluminum 2004 Guo Shengkun Autonomous Region； Secretary of the Political and Corporation of China； Alternate Member of Law Commission； Alternate Member of the the 17th Central Member of the 18th and 19th 16th Central Committee Committee Central Committee； Member of the 19th Central Political Bureau

Member of the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Party Minister of Ministry of General Manager and Committee； Industry and Information Secretary of the Party 2005 Miao Yu Secretary of the Technology； Organization of Dongfeng Wuhan Municipal Member of the 18th and 19th Motor Corporation Party Committee； Central Committee Alternate Member of the 17th Central Committee

Minister of the Deputy General Manager of Ministry of Governor of Province 2006 Su Shulin China National Petroleum Organization of （investigated）；Member of the Corporation Liaoning Provincial 18th Central Committee Party Committee Member of the Standing Secretary of the Party Committee of the Jilin Organization and President Deputy Governor of 2007 Chen Weigen Provincial Party Committee； of China General Jilin Province Deputy Director of the Technology Provincial People’s Congress JCHRM Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position 11，2 Member of the Standing Committee of Hunan General Manager of China Deputy Governor of Provincial Party Committee； 2007 Chen Zhaoxiong Electronics Corporation Hunan Province Deputy Minister of the 48 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

Member of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial President and General Party Committee； President of Dongfeng Motor Manager of FAW； Deputy Secretary of Corporation； 2007 Zhu Yanfeng Alternate Member of the the Jilin Provincial Alternate Member of the 18th 16th Central Committee Party Committee； Central Committee Alternate Member of the 17th Central Committee

Additionally as Member of the Vice Chairman of General Manager of Harbin Standing Committee 2007 Zhao Kefei Provincial Political Electric Corporation of the Heilongjiang Consultative Conference Provincial Party Committee

Deputy General Manager of Deputy Mayor of 2007 Baoshan Iron and Steel Investigated Shanghai Group Corporation

Member of the Governor of Province； Standing Committee Minister of Transport； General Manager of China of Shanxi Provincial Alternate Member of the 18th 2008 Huaneng Group Corporation Party Committee； Central Committee； Deputy Governor of Member of the 19th Central Shanxi Province Committee

Deputy Governor of Heilongjiang Minister of the Ministry of Province； Emergency Management； 2009 Wang Yupu President of Daqing Oilfield Alternate Member of Member of the 18th and 19th the 17th Central Central Committees Committee

Deputy Secretary of General Manager of Fujian Provincial Governor of Fujian Province Sinopec Group； Party Committee； 2011 Su Shulin （investigated）；Member of the Alternate member of the Alternate member of 18th Central Committee 16th Central Committee the 17th Central Committee

President and Secretory of Governor of the Party Organization of Secretary of Heilongjiang Province； the Commercial Aircraft Provincial Party Committee； 2011 Member of the 17th， Corporation of China； Member of the 19th Central 18th Central Member of the 16th Central Committee Committees Committee Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position The Historical Member of the Evolution and Standing Committee Governance Logic Governor of Zhejiang General Manager of China of Provincial 201 Province； Aerospace Science and Committee； 2 Member of the 19th Central Technology Corporation Alternate Member of Committee 49 the 17th Central Committee

Member of the Standing Committee of Liaoning Provincial Committee； General Manager of China Executive Deputy Governor of 201 Deputy Governor of Tan Zuojun State Shipbuilding Liaoning Province； 2 Liaoning Province Corporation Secretary of Dalian Municipal Committee；Alternate Member of the 19th Central Committee

General Manager of China Deputy Secretary of North Industries Group Municipal Mayor of Tianjin； 2013 Corporation； Committee； Member of the 19th Central Alternate Member of the Member of the 18th Committee 17th Central Committee Central Committee

Vice Chairman of Secretary of the Party Hubei Provincial committee of the Wuhan Committee of the 2013 Wang Zhenyou Retired Iron and Steel Group People’s Political Corporation Consultative Conference

President of China Three Gorges Corporation； Deputy Governor of 2013 Cao Guangjing Current Alternate Member of the Hubei Province 18th Central Committee

Vice Chairman of the Heilongjiang President of General Provincial Committee 2015 Gong Jingkun Manager of Harbin Electric Current of the People’s Corporation Political Consultative Conference

Deputy Director of Zhang 2017 President of Ansteel Group Guangdong Provincial Retired Guangning People’s Congress

Deputy Secretary of President of Baoshan Iron Hubei Provincial 2018 Guoqiang and Steel Group Committee； Exempted Table 2. Corporation Secretary of Wuhan Municipal Committee Personnel Transferred from Central General Manager of China Deputy Governor of Enterprises to Local 2019 Ling Wen Current Energy Investment Province government JCHRM 11，2 ebro the of Member Central for Commission Discipline Inspection 1 1 2 50 1 16 Alternate the of Member Central Committee 3 2 5 2 1 1 1 th 19 The the of Member Central Committee 0 ebro the of Member Central for Commission Discipline Inspection 2 1 2 1 6 Alternate the of Member Central Committee 1 1 1 2 1 2 8 th 18 The the of Member Central Committee 1 1 2 4 ebro the of Member Central for Commission Discipline Inspection 1 1 1 3 Alternate the of Member Central Committee 4 1 3 4 4 1 1 18 th 17 Table 3. The the of Member Central Committee 1 1 Central Committee and Central

Commission for ， ， Discipline Inspection ，

Personnel of Different Aluminum Categories of Central ， Enterprises Petroleum Power Electric Communication Machinery Shipbuilding Mobile Aerospace Steel Grain Industry Electronic Transport Architecture Sum The third path is to transfer to other central SOEs or simply retire. Unlike local officials transfer for the The Historical purpose of accumulating political experience and getting the“ticket”to Sub-National level in the next Evolution and term，apparently the transfer between the heads of central SOEs fails to yield the same effect. From 2003 Governance Logic to 2020，the average age of the 47 heads who were transferred within the central SOEs was as high as 53，most of whom didn’t have previous experience in other units. They’ve developed，worked and managed in the enterprise. It’s rare for the local government officials to successively serve three 51 provinces’party and government. The only one exception is ，who has served as secretary in Qinghai，Gansu and Guizhou provincial party committees. However，the central enterprises have witnessed Ning Gaoning，Xu Ping，，etc. transferred to three different corporations. As analyzed in the previous data，due to the relatively narrow channels of transfer to central departments and local governments，most heads of central SOEs often have to go through the one-way street of retirement or transfer to other central SOEs，the purpose of which is to avoid the formation of nativism and nepotism by solidified management in the same central SOE for a long time，or to promote the merger of central enterprises in the same field. Basically，the leaders of the central enterprises mainly transfer among different enterprises within the industry，such as among China Unicom，China Mobile and China Telecom，the three giants of the telecommunications industry and the five major power generation enterprises. But after the transfer，they mostly retire at age without any promotion. Thus，the purpose of the reappointment of these cadres doesn’t lie in broadening promotion channels，accumulating richer political qualifications. To avoid breeding large-scale corruption，promote the competition within the industry of central enterprises，and even prevent their utilization of the economic power to softly resist central power may be the more important reason. Therefore，the political prospect of internal transfer of the leaders of central enterprises is inferior to that of transferring to local governments，which also highlights the importance of central enterprise leaders’desire to use their economic power to seek political power in local governments.

Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position President of China National Ning General Manager of China 2004 Cereals，Oils and President of SINOCHEM Gaoning Resources Corporation Foodstuffs Corporation General Manager of China President of Dongfang 2004 Wang Ji Retired First Heavy Industries Electric Corporation General Manager of China President of China Mobile Wang United Network 2004 Communications Group Retired Jianzhou Communication Group Corporation Corporation President of China President of China 2005 Xiong Qunli Electronics Technology Current Electronics Corporation Group Corporation President of State Nuclear Power Technology Wang General Manager of State 2007 Company（Later merged Retired Binghua Power Investment into State Power Investment） Secretary of the Party President of China President of China Huadian 2008 Li Qingkui Organization of State Grid Southern Power Grid Corporation Corporation of China Company（investigated） President and General Manager of China Huaneng General Manager of China Group Corporation； 2008 Cao Peixi Current Huadian Corporation Member of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection JCHRM Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position ， Liu General Manager of China President of China Eastern 11 2 2008 Current Shaoyong Southern Airlines Airlines

Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and General Manager of China 52 Secretary of the Part Information Technology； United Network 2008 Shang Bing Organization of China Deputy Director of the Communication Group Telecom Office of the Central Corporation Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs

President and General Manager of Aluminum Chairman of the General Manager of China Xiong Corporation of China； Supervisory Board for Key 2009 Tourism Group（Hong Weiping Member of the 18th Central Large State-Owned Kong） Commission for Discipline Enterprises Inspection

Secretary of the Party Secretary of the Party Organization of China State Organization of China Shipbuilding Corporation； 2010 Retired North Industries Group Member of the 18th Central Corporation Commission for Discipline Inspection

General Manager of China General Manager of China 2010 Li Jianhong Ocean Shipping Group Retired Resources Corporation Company

President of China Changan Automobile Group； President of China South 2011 Xu Bin Member of the 17th Central Industries Group Retired Commission for Discipline Corporation Inspection

General Manager of China 2011 Fu Chengyu National Offshore Oil President of Sinopec Group Retired Corporation General Manager of China President of China 2011 Ma Zehua Ocean Shipping（Group） Retired Shipping Group Company Company General Manager of Secretary of the Party President of China 2014 He Wenbo Baoshan Iron and Steel Committee of China Iron Minmetals Corporation Group Corporation and Steel Association

President of China United President of China Network Communication Wang Telecom； 2015 Group Corporation； Current Xiaochu Alternate Member of the Alternate Member of the 17th Central committee 18th Central committee

President of China United Chang 2015 Network Communication President of China Telecom Investigated Xiaobing Group Corporation President of China South President of Dongfeng 2015 Xu Ping President of FAW Industries Group Motor Corporation Corporation Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position The Historical President of China National Evolution and Petroleum Corporation； President of China National Governance Logic 2015 Wang Yilin Member of the 18th Central Retired Offshore Oil Corporation Commission for Discipline Inspection 53 President of China National Ning 2016 Cereals，Oils and President of SINOCHEM Current Gaoning Foodstuffs Corporation President of China President of China Huadian 2016 Li Qingkui Southern Power Grid Investigated Corporation Company President of China President of China Huadian 2016 Zhao Jianguo Southern Power Grid Retired Corporation Company President of Aero Engine President of China Corporation of China； 2016 Cao Jianguo Aerospace Science and Current Alternate Member of the Industry Corporation 19th Central committee General Manager of China General Manager of China 2016 Chen Feihu Current Guodian Corporation Datang Corporation President of General President of Dongfang 2016 Zou Lei Manager of Harbin Electric Current Electric Corporation Corporation General Manager of President of General 2016 Si Zefu Dongfang Electric Manager of Harbin Electric Current Corporation Corporation President of China General 2016 Xu Xianping General Manager of FAW Current Technology Qiao President of China Guodian President of China Energy 2017 Retired Baoping Corporation Investment General Manager of State General Manager of China 2017 Yu Jianfeng Development and National Nuclear Current Investment Corporation Corporation President of China Changan 2017 Xu Liuping President of FAW Current Automobile Grou President of China South 2017 Xu Ping President of FAW Industries Group Current Corporation President of China 2018 Tang Fuping President of Ansteel Group Current Minmetals Corporation President of China State President of China Shipbuilding Corporation； 2018 Lei Fanpei Aerospace Science and Current Alternate Member of the Technology Corporation 19th Central committee President of General President of China National 2018 Lv Jun Manager of China Grain Cereals，Oils and Current Reserves Group Company Foodstuffs Corporation President of China National President of State Power Nuclear Corporation； Investment； 2018 Qian Zhimin Current Alternate Member of the Alternate Member of the 18th Central committee 19th Central committee JCHRM Year Name Original Position Transferred Position Latter Position ， General Manager of President of China National 11 2 Zhang 2018 Dongfang Electric Machinery Industry Current Xiaolun Corporation Corporation General Manager of China United Network General Manager of China 54 2018 Lu Yimin Current Communication Group General Technology Corporation General Manager of China President of National General Manager of 2018 Zhang Wei National Petroleum Petroleum and Natural Gas SINOCHEM Corporation Pipe Network Group President of China Meng General Manager of State 2018 Southern Power Grid Current Zhenping Power Investment Company President of China Shu President of State Grid 2018 Huaneng Group Current Yingbiao Corporation of China Corporation President of China Mobile 2019 Yang Jie President of China Telecom Communications Group Current Corporation President of Aluminum 2019 Yao Lin President of Ansteel Group Current Corporation of China President of China Energy General Manager of China Conservation and 2019 Liu Dashan South Industries Group Current Environmental Protection Corporation Group President of China National General Manager of 2019 Yang Hua Current Offshore Oil Corporation SINOCHEM General Manager of China President of National 2019 Zhang Wei National Petroleum Petroleum and Natural Gas Current Corporation Pipe Network Group President of State Grid General Manager of China 2020 Kou Wei Current Table 4. Corporation of China Datang Corporation Formal Leaders President of Sinopec Transferred From Group； President of China National 2020 Dai Houliang Current Within the Central Alternate Member of the Petroleum Corporation Enterprises 19th Central committee

5. Conclusion The examination of the three levels of mobility of local government and central enterprise cadres suggest that the growth background and career prospects of heads of central SOEs are inferior to the ones of local government officials. The narrow promotion channels，the single line of education and work experience，the less experience in multi-departmental positions，the long-term employment in a particular department，and so on all determine that the heads of central enterprises have a“ceiling”of career development when moving to a higher level. What’s more noteworthy is that there is little communication between the elite groups of central SOEs and local governments. These two sections vertical-horizontal structural governance subjects，political power of local governments and economic power of central SOEs，operate separately and independently under the strong control of the central government’s party-control-cadres principle，which also effectively avoids the“complicity and cooperation”between the two at the dimension of institutional absorption and avoids to the greatest extent the weakening and fragmentating of the central power in the vertical-horizontal relationship. Thus， under the central party-control-cadres principle，the centralization is reflected in the departmental power structure in the cadres’personnel appointments and dismissals“vertically”and“horizontally” from the dimension of the institutional absorption. The Historical At the level of party supervision，the central government has adopted a more stringent approach of Evolution and corruption control to local officials. Numerous descriptive phrases such as “collapse-like”， Governance Logic “hilltopism”，“political interest groups”，“political gangs”have appeared in many cases of corruption among local officials. Except for“petroleum gang”（those grabbing shameful interests in petroleum industry），the heads of central SOEs are mostly investigated and punished for the charge of some 55 economic terms like“hedonism”，“individualism”or“the three official consumptions”. It’s obvious that the central government has profounder political considerations for the governance of corruption in local governments. But once the collusion of power and interests between central SOEs and local governments is exposed，the central government will relentlessly curb it with the help of centralized party discipline and inspection principles，a case in point being the complicity between the“petroleum gang”and Sichuan province. It’s not difficult to understand the situation. Under the new“vertical-horizontal”power structure of the reform era，the local government is still the first major force with political power outside the central government. Although the central SOEs tend to use their economic power to move closer to political power and begin to form economic interest groups to encroach on political interest groups，what remains unchanged is the fundamental role of political power in the“party-state”form as a result of the interaction of economic，military and ideological power. Then possessing more political power becomes an important factor for elites to be selected and promoted under the party-control-cadres principle. On the other hand，the elite group of central SOEs，as a weighty force with economic power，continues to play an important role in the institutional absorption of the“party-state”form in the market economy. The balance and contradiction between the local government’s“vertical management”and the central enterprise’s“horizontal management”under the central authority’s party-control-cadres principle， remains to be observed and examined in the ongoing development of Chinese politics.

The 17th The 18th The 19th Alternate Alternate Alternate Member of Member of Member of Member of Member of Member of the Central the Central the Central the the the Committee Committee Committee committee committee committee

Central 15 3 20 1 22 5 Committee State Council 51 13 49 18 52 8 Military System 36 19 41 18 42 24 Local 63 86 64 103 66 95 Government Table 5. Central 1 23 7 19 0 22 Changes in the Origin Enterprises17 Organization of Central Others18 39 22 24 11 22 20 Committees（in last 3 ） Sum 204 167 205 171 204 174 years

Member of the Alternate Member of Member of the Central Commission Party Representative the Central Sum Central Committee for Discipline Table 6. Committee Inspection Number of Party Representatives and The 17th 107 1 18 3 22 “Three Comms” The 18th 145 4 8 7 19 Elected by Central The 19th 117 0 16 2 18 SOEs JCHRM References ，“ ： 11，2 Barry Naughton and Yang Dali Holding China Together Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era”，New York：Cambridge University Press，2004，p.9. Zheng Yongnian and Huang Yanjie，“Market in State：The Political Economy of Domination in China”，Cambridge： Cambridge University Press，2018. Mao Zedong，“The Role of the in the National War”，Beijing：People’s Publishing Huse， 56 1999，p526. Walter E. Gourlay，“The Chinese Communist Cadre：Key to Political Control”，Cambridge：Harvard University Press，1952. A. Doak Barnett，“Cadres，Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China”，New York：Columbia University Press，1967. Lyman Van Slyke，“Enemies and Friends：The United Front in Chinese Communist History”，Stanford：Stanford University Press，1967. William W. Whitson，“The Chinese High Command：A History of Communist Military Politics，1927-1971”， New York：Praeger，1973，pp.498-517. Andrew J. Nathan，“A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics”，The China Quarterly，Issue 53，Jan 1973， pp.34-66. Li Cheng and Lynn White，“The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party：Hu Gets What”， Asian Survey，Vol.43（4），2003，pp. 553-597. Bo Zhiyue，“China’s Elite Politics：Political Transition and Power Balancing”，Hackensack，NJ：World Scientific， 2007. Lowell Dittmer，“Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development”，The China Quarterly，No. 176，Dec 2003，pp.912. Andrew J. Nathan，“China’s Changing of the Guard：Authoritarian Resilience”，Journal of Democracy，Vol.14（1）， 2003，pp.14-15. Zhao Dingxin，“The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China”， American Behavioral Scientist，Vol.53（3），Nov 2009，pp.416-433. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard，“Politics and Business Group Formation in China：The Party in Control？”，The China Quarterly，Vol.211，2012，pp.624-648. Cui yan，Liu Daofu，Li Donglai，“Treasure Book of Party Constructio”，Beijing：Hongqi Press，1996，pp.346 The cadres promoted upon their transfer to central agencies were：Li Yizhong，promoted from General Manager and Chairman of CNPC to Secretary of the Party Committee and Deputy Director of SASAC（short for State- owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission）；Zhang Qingwei，transferred from General Manager of CASC（short for China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation）to Director and Secretary of the Party Group of COSTIND（short for Commission of Science，Technology，and Industry for National Defense）；Li Jiaxiang，transferred from General Manager of Air China to Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the CAAC（short for Civil Aviation Administration of China）；，transferred from General Manager of CETC（short for China Electronics Technology Group Corporation）to Secretary of the Party Group and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology；Jiang Jiemin，transferred from Chairman of CNPC to Director of SASAC；，transferred from General Manager of CASC to Vice Minister of MIIT（short for Ministry of Industry and Information Technology）and Director of CNSA（short for China National Space Administration）（at Provincial-Ministerial level）；，transferred from Chairman of CASC to Vice Minister of MIIT and Director of CNSA（at Provincial-Ministerial level）. Including central enterprises in the banking and financial systems. Including the National People’s Congress，the CPPCC，the public inspection law system，the higher education system，people’s organizations etc.

Corresponding author： Hongming Wang can be contacted at：[email protected].

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