ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ISSUE 13 2008–2009
New Directions in Demographic Security Security Implications of Global Population Changes Youth Bulges and the Chances of Democracy Population and U.S. Defense Policy Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Migration and Civil Conflict in Small Island States Youth and Conflict in Africa and the Middle East
UN Environment Programme: Building Peace After Conflict
An Ethical Approach to Population and Climate Change
Navigating Peace: Water, Conflict, and Cooperation
Best of the Beat: Top Blog Posts
Reviews: New Publications Virunga National Park, 1976 and 2006 The Virunga Park area in Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic apparent. While the boundary of the parks has remained largely Republic of the Congo (DRC) is home to over half of the world’s intact since the mid-1970s, during the 1990s and early 2000s, 700 surviving mountain gorillas. Surrounding the protected areas, large numbers of people moved into the area surrounding the however, are some of the densest human populations in Africa. In parks, many of them refugees from armed conflicts in Rwanda, addition to population pressure, armed conflict in the region has Uganda, and the DRC. The decline in areas of green outside the made habitat and species protection very difficult. protected areas in the 2006 image (right) suggests that few fallow In the 1978 image (left), a line between the protected areas and fields and little natural vegetation remain. the populated agricultural areas surrounding the parks is already © 2008-2009 UNEP/GRID-Sioux Falls
Research Staff Editor Miles Brundage Geoffrey D. Dabelko Assistant Editor Alex Fischer Rachel Weisshaar Daniel Gleick Advisory Committee Managing Editor Lauren Herzer Co-Chairs Meaghan E. Parker Contributing Editors Liat Racin Thomas E. Lovejoy, The Karin Bencala Thomas Renard Heinz Center for Science, Production Editors Gib Clarke William Rogers Economics and the Lianne Hepler Sean Peoples Sonia Schmanski Environment Diana Micheli Alison Williams Karima Tawfik P.J. Simmons, Saatchi & Saatchi ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ISSUE 13 ÓäänqÓää
Environmental Change and Security Program The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars "iÊ7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ*>â>ÊUÊ£ÎääÊ*iÃÞÛ>>ÊÛiÕi]Ê 7 7>à }Ì]Ê ÊÓäää{ÎäÓÇ Tel: ÓäÓ® ÊÈ£Ê{äääÊUÊ>Ý\ÊÓäÓ®ÊÊÈ£{ää£ [email protected] www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsp www.newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM
Since 1994, the Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP) has promoted dialogue on the connections among environmental, health, and population dynamics and their links to conflict, human insecurity, and foreign policy. ECSP brings international policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to Washington, D.C., to address the public and fellow experts on four specific initiatives:
UÊ China Environment Forum: www.wilsoncenter.org/cef UÊ Environment and Security: www.wilsoncenter.org/es UÊ Population, Health, and Environment: www.wilsoncenter.org/phe UÊ Water: Navigating Peace: www.wilsoncenter.org/water
ECSP’s work is freely available on its comprehensive website, www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsp
UÊ Ê/ÜÊ>Õ>ÊÕÀ>Ã]ÊÌ iÊEnvironmental Change and Security Program Report and the China Environment Series: www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsppubs UÊ ECSP News, a monthly e-mail newsletter linking more than 4,000 subscribers to news, meeting summaries, and event invitations: www.wilsoncenter.org/ecspsubscribe UÊ ÊFocus, a series of papers on population, health, and environment: www.wilsoncenter.org/ecspfocus UÊ The New Security Beat blog, analysis and commentary on today’s news: www.newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com UÊ Õ`Ê>`ÊÛ`iÊÌiÀÛiÜÃÊÊ -*½ÃÊ9Õ/ÕLiÊV >i\Êwww.youtube.com/ecspwwc UÊ 7iLV>ÃÌÃÊ>`ÊÃÕ>ÀiÃÊvÊiÛiÀÞÊ -*ÊiÛiÌ\Êwww.wilsoncenter.org/ecspevents
-*½ÃÊVÀiÊ>VÌÛÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊ>`iÊ«ÃÃLiÊLÞÊÌ iÊ}iiÀÕÃÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê}iVÞÊvÀÊ International Development’s Office of Population and Reproductive Health. ECSP and its China Environment Forum also receive support from the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the United Nations Environment Programme, >``Ì>ÊvwViÃÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê}iVÞÊvÀÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê iÛi«iÌ]Ê7>ÌiÀÃÊ À«À>ÌÃ]Ê Western Kentucky University, and private individuals. ECSP is directed by Geoffrey D. Dabelko and is housed in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, headed by Robert S. Litwak. / iÊ7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê iÌiÀÊvÀÊ-V >ÀÃÊÃÊÌ iÊÛ}]Ê>Ì>ÊiÀ>ÊÌÊ President Wilson established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. It is a nonpartisan institution, supported by public and private funds, engaged in the study of national >`ÊÜÀ`Ê>vv>ÀðÊ/ iÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀÊiÃÌ>Là iÃÊ>`Ê>Ì>ÃÊ>ÊiÕÌÀ>ÊvÀÕÊvÀÊvÀii]Ê«i]Ê>`Ê vÀi`Ê`>}Õi°Ê/ iÊ iÌiÀÊÃÊ`ÀiVÌi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊÀ>LiÊ iiÊ°Ê>Ì]Ê>`ÊÌÃÊ >À`ÊvÊ Directors is chaired by the Honorable Joseph B. Gildenhorn. /ÊÃÕLÃVÀLiÊÀÊvÀÊÃÌÀÕVÌÃÊÀi}>À`}ÊÌ iÊÃÕLÃÃÊvÊ>ÀÌViÃ]Ê«i>ÃiÊVÌ>VÌÊ -*Ê>ÌÊ [email protected] or (202) 691-4000. iii
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM CONTENTS
Foreword
viii Environmental Security Heats Up Geoffrey D. Dabelko
New Directions in Demographic Security
2 Ê>Ã Ê*ÌÃÊ>`Ê/««}Ê*ÌÃ\Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ Implications of Global Population Changes Jack A. Goldstone
10 Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy Richard P. Cincotta
19 Population in Defense Policy Planning Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba
27 Climate Change, Demography, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal
34 Migration as the Demographic Wild Card in CivÊ vVÌ\Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê Christian Leuprecht
40 Beginning the Demographic Transition: Very Young and Youthful Age Structures Elizabeth Leahy
48 From Conflict to Peacebuilding: UNEP’s Role in Environmental Assessment and Recovery David Jensen iv
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 57 An Ethical Approach to Population and Climate Change Suzanne Petroni
Navigating Peace Initiative: Water Conflict and Cooperation
66 Water Can Be a Pathway to Peace, Not War Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko
71 The Challenges of Groundwater in Southern Africa Anthony Turton, Marian Patrick, Jude Cobbing, and Frédéric Julien
76 / iÊ iÜÊ>ViÊvÊ7>ÌiÀÊ vVÌÊ Ken Conca
80 7>ÌiÀ]Ê vVÌ]Ê>`Ê «iÀ>Ì\Ê iÃÃÃÊÀÊÌ iÊ iÊ,ÛiÀÊ >Ã Patricia Kameri-Mbote
Best of the Beat: Highlights From the First Year http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com
85 Guest Contributor Colin Kahl on Kenya’s Ethnic Land Strife Colin Kahl
86 “Bahala na”? Population Growth Brings Water Crisis to the Philippines Meaghan E. Parker
87 ,i*>Þ}pÀÊ>Ê-iÀÕÃÊ*ÕÀ«Ãi Gib Clarke
88 Discovery of Oil Destabilizing Great Lakes Region Rachel Weisshaar
89 A Word of Caution on Climate Change and “Refugees” Geoffrey D. Dabelko
Reviews of New Publications
91 Beyond Disasters: Creating Opportunities for Peace Michael Renner and Zoë Chafe Reviewed by Nichola D. Minott
v
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 93 Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, and Daene McKinney Reviewed by Annika Kramer
95 The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation Over Energy, Resources, and Pollution In-Taek Hyun and Miranda A. Schreurs (Eds.) Reviewed by Paul G. Harris
98 Escaping the Resource Curse Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Eds.) Reviewed by Kaysie Brown
100 Gaia’s Revenge: Climate Change and Humanity’s Loss Peter H. Liotta and Allan W. Shearer Reviewed by David M. Catarious, Jr., and Ronald Filadelfo
102 The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross (Eds.) Return of the Population Growth Factor: Its Impact Upon the Millennium Development Goals All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health (APPG) Population Issues in the 21st Century: The Role of the World Bank The World Bank Reviewed by Gib Clarke
105 Governance as a Trialogue: Government-Society-Science in Transition Anthony R. Turton, Hanlie J. Hattingh, Gillian A. Maree, Dirk J. Roux, Marius Claassen, Wilma F. Strydom (Eds.) Reviewed by Karin R. Bencala
108 The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Policy, National Security, and Organizational Change Robert F. Durant Reviewed by Brian Smith
110 Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict Resolution Saleem H. Ali (Ed.) Reviewed by Rolain Borel vi
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 112 People on the Move: Reducing the Impacts of Human Migration on Biodiversity Judy Oglethorpe, Jenny Ericson, Richard E. Bilsborrow, and Janet Edmond Reviewed by James D. Nations
114 Political Geography: Special Issue on Climate Change and Conflict Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch (Eds.) Reviewed by Elizabeth L. Chalecki
117 Population, Land Use, and Environment: Research Directions Barbara Entwistle and Paul C. Stern (Eds.) Reviewed by David L. Carr
120 Poverty Reduction: An Effective Means of Population Control Mohammed Sharif Reviewed by Rachel Nugent
123 The Price of Neglect: From Resource Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom Bishnu Raj Upreti Reviewed by Saleem H. Ali
125 Security By Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership Lael Brainard (Ed.) Reviewed by Sean Peoples
127 The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World Elizabeth Leahy, with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock, and Tod Preston Reviewed by John F. May
130 Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Eds.) Reviewed by Stewart Patrick
133 Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development Oli Brown, Mark Halle, Sonia Pena Moreno, and Sebastian Winkler (Eds.) Reviewed by John W. Sewell
136 The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization Thomas Homer-Dixon Reviewed by Richard Matthew
139 On the Record @ the Wilson Center vii
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ", 7",
Environmental Security Heats Up
", 9Ê °Ê DABELKO e are not your traditional pastoralists and agriculturalists as underlying environmentalists,” General explanations for the conflict in Darfur. “WÀ`Ê -ÕÛ>Ê 1-]Ê Since I began working in the environmen- ,iÌ°®]ÊvÀiÀÊ1°-°ÊÀÞÊV ivÊvÊÃÌ>vv]ÊÜÀÞÞÊ tal security field 19 years ago, climate change told reporters as he presented the Center for has never drawn this much attention from >Û>Ê>ÞÃÃ½Ê ®ÊÀi«ÀÌÊNational Security the security community. We are flooded with and the Threat of Climate ChangeÊÊ«ÀÊÓääÇÊ reports from foreign policy think tanks, mili- ÃiÜ]ÊÓääÇ®°ÊÀ}Õ}ÊvÀÊÀiÊ>}}ÀiÃÃÛiÊ tary strategists, and scientists around the world U.S. action on climate change, Sullivan said the ÊV>Ìi°Ê/ ÃÊÕ«ÀiVi`iÌi`ÊiÛiÊvÊÌiÀiÃÌÊ incomplete scientific understanding of global represents the dawning of a new era for envi- warming was no excuse for delay. Military lead- ronmental security—especially in the United ers make battlefield decisions based on partial States, where the field is emerging from the information all the time—otherwise, more lives shadows of the Bush administration’s distaste would be lost. Penned by Sullivan and 10 other for many things environmental. former U.S. generals and admirals, the launch During environmental security’s salad days vÊÌ iÊ ÊÀi«ÀÌÊÃÊLÕÌÊiÊiÛiÌÊÌ >ÌÊ>Ài`Ê in the mid-1990s, climate change was often dis- the return of environmental security to the missed as a low-priority issue. It was commonly ÜÀ`ÊÃÌ>}iÊÊÓääÇÊ>`ÊÓään° portrayed as a long-term and gradual process / iÊÃÌÊÃÊ}\Ê/ iÊ1 Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ ÕV]Ê that would not play a direct role in triggering V >Ài`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê }`ÊÊ«ÀÊÓääÇ]Ê conflicts or state failure. Climate change took devoted a session to climate change as a secu- a back seat to more immediate links between rity risk. High Representative for the Common population growth, environmental degradation, Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and and violent conflict, as in headline-dominating the European Commission (2008) delivered crises in Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the report “Climate Change and International and Somalia. -iVÕÀÌÞ»Ê ÌÊ Ì iÊ ÕÀ«i>Ê ÕV°Ê/ iÊ 1°-°Ê Reflecting its rise in larger scientific, public, National Intelligence Council conducted a gov- and policy debates, climate change is now the ernment-wide assessment of climate change secu- headline issue in the environmental security rity risks (Fingar, 2008). UN Secretary-General field. Moreover, I would argue that the powerful >Ê ÊÓääǮʫÌi`ÊÌÊV>ÌiÊV >}i]Ê images of climate’s potential security effects— viii desertification, and the increased conflict between from sea-level rise swamping cities and naval
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 bases to waves of “environmental migrants” Deforestation in Indonesia for palm oil planta- crossing borders—are partly (but certainly not tions has, for example, increased social conflict solely) responsible for the new sense of urgency around forest resources, exacerbating existing in the world’s capitals. It is sad to say, but the tensions between companies and local people thermometer ticking up one or two degrees is *>ÌiÀ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê not nearly as intuitively scary—or as motivat- ing—as the specter of millions pushed across ½ÌÊ }ÀiÊ iÝÃÌ}]Ê «ÀiÃÃ}Ê borders from the effects of climate change. problems: Our research and policy docket is So we can thank climate change for mak- already crowded with serious conflicts (as well ing environmental security “hot” again. Our as opportunities for cooperation) over resources, challenge now is to utilize this attention wisely whether they are minerals, water, timber, fish, and avoid overplaying our hand by fueling false or land. While climate change certainly poses fears. We can view climate change as an existen- a large—and potentially catastrophic—threat, tial threat to our security and trace its impacts we must not overlook the ongoing problems on local conflicts or community vulnerability. of rapid population growth, persistent poverty, 9iÌÊÜiÊÕÃÌÊ>Û`Ê>ÊÀ>}iÊvÊ«Ìv>ÃÊÌ >ÌÊVÕ`Ê lack of clean water and sanitation, and infec- undermine our progress. tious diseases that threaten lives daily. Climate change may multiply these threats, but they will Don’t oversell the links between continue to exact a high toll, whether climate climate change and violent conflict or change affects them or not. terrorism: While climate change is expected If we avoid these pitfalls, we can find to exacerbate conditions that can contribute to other approaches that could float all boats intrastate conflict, it is neither a necessary nor >ÃÊ Ì iÊ Ãi>ÃÊ ÀÃi°Ê Ê «À>VÌÛi]Ê ÕÌ`i- 7iÊÕÃÌÊ a sufficient cause of conflict. For example, sim- sional agenda could, and should, leverage the ply labeling the genocide in Darfur a “climate unprecedented attention to climate change to ÛiÀViÊÕÀÊ conflict” is both wrong and counterproductive: refocus efforts on the long-term problems of preference It ignores political and economic motivations population growth and resource consump- for the fighting—and can be perceived as a way tion. Such a diverse strategy requires broaden- for the clear to let the regime in Khartoum off the hook. ing our concept of mitigation and adaptation borders and /ÊvÕÞÊÕ`iÀÃÌ>`Ê ÜÊÌ iÊVyVÌÊLiÌÜiiÊ efforts. Policymakers and practitioners cannot Sudanese pastoralists and agriculturalists allow the increased focus on climate change to ÃÌÛi««iÃÊvÊ reached this extreme, we must not only exam- reduce attention to more “routine”—and too- Ã}iÃiVÌÀÊ ine the interplay between environmental issues often tolerated—problems. like desertification, drought, and declining agri- In addition, the all-encompassing, global approaches. cultural productivity, but also political relation- threat of climate change provides an opportu- ships, power struggles, and ethnic grievances. nity to promote new approaches that recognize Oversimplification could ultimately backfire, the links connecting issues and to create inte- lending credence to accusations that environ- grated programs that address them. We must mental security is overly deterministic. overcome our preference for the clear borders and stovepipes of single-sector approaches, Beware of knock-on effects: Policies which ignore the complex realities of an inter- designed to confront climate change can have dependent world. Embracing—not shying unanticipated effects. Promoted as a mitigation away from—this complexity is our only hope strategy, demand for biofuels has increased the for solving these problems. use of agricultural land for “growing energy”— Finally, progress requires new partner- and spurred rising food prices and riots. ships and breaking down traditional barriers ix
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM UN peacekeepers help Haitians cross a river after floods near Port-au-Prince September 7, 2008. Officials said at least 61 people had died in floods in impoverished Haiti on top of 500 killed the previous week by Tropical Storm Hanna. (@ REUTERS/ Evens Felix)
between the environment, health, develop- climate-change-is-a-threat-to-our-national-security iÌ]Ê>`ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊVÕÌiðÊÃÊiiÀ>Ê }>À]Ê/ >ðÊÓään]ÊÕiÊÓx®°ÊNational intelligence assessment on the national security implications of Gordon Sullivan said, “Many of us entered climate change to 2030. Statement to the House Ì iÊ«ÀiVÌÊ>ÃÊÜ >ÌÊÞÕÊ} ÌÊV>ÊV>ÌiÊ Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence skeptics—but we have come out united and House Select Committee on Energy around the conclusion that climate change Independence and Global Warming, U.S. House is a serious threat to our national security” vÊ,i«ÀiÃiÌ>ÌÛiðÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. `°}ÛÉÌiÃÌiÃÉÓäänäÈÓxÚÌiÃÌÞ°«`v ÃiÜ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê/ iÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ High Representative and the European Commission. field should not miss this opportunity to wel- (2008, March 14). Climate change and international come, guide, and learn from powerful new securityÊ*>«iÀÊÌÊÌ iÊ ÕÀ«i>Ê ÕV®°ÊÛ>>LiÊ partners in the fight against climate change online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ and other challenges. VÃÚ >Ì>É`VÃÉ«ÀiÃÃ`>Ì>É ÉÀi«ÀÌÃÉÎnÇ°«`v ]Ê >°ÊÓääÇ]ÊÕiʣȮ°ÊºÊV>ÌiÊVÕ«ÀÌÊÊ Darfur.” The Washington Post]Ê£x°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ References at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con- ÌiÌÉ>ÀÌViÉÓääÇÉäÈÉ£xÉ,ÓääÇäÈ£xä£nxÇ° Ì ÃiÜ]Ê/ÕViÀ°ÊÓääÇ]Ê«ÀʣȮ°Êº >ÌiÊV >}iÊ *>ÌiÀ]Ê>iðÊÓääÇ]ÊÕ}ÕÃÌÊή°Êº Ã}Ê>`ÊÌÊ«>Ê is a threat to our national security.”Terra Rossa. oil in Kalimantan.” BBC News°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ x Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.terrarossa.com/ ÌÌ«\ÉÉiÜðLLV°V°ÕÉÓÉ É>Ã>«>VwVÉÈÓÇnä°ÃÌ
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
2 Ê>Ã Ê*ÌÃÊ>`Ê/««}Ê*ÌÃ\Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ Implications of Global Population Changes Jack A. Goldstone
10 Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy Richard Cincotta
19 Population in Defense Policy Planning Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba
27 Climate Change, Demography, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal
34 Migration as the Demographic Wild Card in CivÊ vVÌ\Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê Christian Leuprecht
40 Beginning the Demographic Transition: Very Young and Youthful Age Structures Elizabeth Leahy
1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
>Ã Ê*ÌÃÊ>`Ê/««}Ê*ÌÃ\Ê Security Implications of Global Population Changes
s improving relations between Western and Î®Ê Ê- >À«ÞÊ««Ã}Ê>}iÊà vÌÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ Muslim countries crucial to fixing pension aging developed countries and youthful Iprograms in Europe and the United States? developing countries; and Can reversing the “brain drain” of medical talent (4) Increased immigration from developing migrating from developing countries to devel- to developed countries. oped ones improve the budget balance of devel- oped nations? Will economic growth in China / iÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ>`ÊVyVÌÊ«ÀLiÃÊV>ÕÃi`ÊLÞÊ and India draw investment and innovation away population growth are not mainly due to short- from the United States, Japan, and Europe? ages of resources. Rather, population distor- / iÃiʵÕiÃÌÃÊ>ÀiÊë>Ài`ÊLÞÊ«Ài`VÌi`Ê tions—in which populations grow too young, or trends in global population dynamics over the too fast, or too urbanized—make it difficult for next half century. In this article, I examine prevailing economic and administrative institu- vÕÀÊ>ÀÊÌÀi`ÃÊÌ >ÌÊ>ÀiÊiÞÊÌÊ«ÃiÊÃ}w- tions to maintain stable socialization and labor- cant security challenges to Europe, Japan, and force absorption (Goldstone, 2002; Cincotta et most other developed nations in the next two >°]ÊÓääÎÆÊ i> ÞÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÇ®° decades: 1 Big Emerging Markets and the (1) Disproportionate population growth in World Economy large and Muslim countries; (2) Shrinking population in the European ÕÌÀiÃÊ >ÀiÊ }ÀÜ}Ê Ì`>ÞÊ vÀÊ ÌÜÊ >ÀÊ Union and European former Soviet reasons: high population growth rates and JACK A. countries; demographic momentum.2 In some countries, GOLDSTONE >ÞÊÊvÀV>Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌÊ>ÃÊÜiÊ >ÃÊ>ÊviÜÊÊ >ÌÊiÀV>Ê>`Ê-ÕÌ ÊÃ>®]Ê birth rates remain much higher than mortality Jack A. Goldstone is the Virginia E. and John rates, so growth rates are more than 2.0 percent /°Ê>âiÊÀ°Ê*ÀviÃÃÀÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊiÀ}iÊ >ÃÊ per year. In these countries—which include 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ-V ÊvÊ*ÕLVÊ*VÞ°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÊ v} >ÃÌ>]ÊÌ iÊ iVÀ>ÌVÊ,i«ÕLVÊvÊÌ iÊ ÀÊV>ÕÌ ÀÊvÊiÊLÃÊ>`ÊÜiÀÊvÊ Congo, Guatemala, Iraq, Jordan, Nepal, Saudi Ì iÊ ÃÌ}Õà i`Ê-V >Àà «ÊÜ>À`ÊvÊÌ iÊ À>L>]Ê*>ÃÌ>]Ê>`Ê9iipÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ iÀV>Ê-V}V>ÊÃÃV>Ì]Ê`ÃÌiÊ still doubling every generation, or roughly every ÃÊ>Êi>`}Ê>ÕÌ ÀÌÞÊÊÀi}>ÊVvVÌÃ]Ê >ÃÊ ÃiÀÛi`ÊÊ>Ê1°-°ÊÛVi«ÀiÃ`iÌ>ÊÌ>ÃÊvÀViÊ ÎäÎxÊÞi>ÀÃÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃ]ÊÓääÇ®° ÊÃÌ>ÌiÊv>ÕÀi]Ê>`ÊÃÊ>ÊVÃÕÌ>ÌÊÌÊÌ iÊ In other countries, such as China, India, and 1°-°Ê-Ì>ÌiÊ i«>ÀÌiÌ]ÊÌ iÊi`iÀ>Ê ÕÀi>ÕÊ Indonesia, population growth rates have recent- vÊÛiÃÌ}>Ì]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê}iVÞÊvÀÊ ly dropped substantially; in percentage terms, ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê iÛi«iÌ°Ê* ÌÊLÞÊi`Ê they are growing more slowly than they have >V iÀ]Ê7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ® ÊÌ iÊ«>ÃÌÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê 2
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 However, these countries already have such ably well due to sound management and strong a large cohort of women of childbearing age economic growth (e.g., Kuwait and the United that their populations continue to add signifi- À>LÊ À>Ìiî°ÊÜiÛiÀ]ÊÊ>ÊÕLiÀÊvʺy>Ã Ê cant numbers each year. In China, for example, points,” the inability to integrate rapidly expand- although most couples have fewer than two ing populations into politics and the economy children, zero population growth is still several will lead to radical political mobilization among decades away. While current growth rates have those angry at not attaining the level of prosper- sunk to around 0.6 percent per year, China will ity reached by some of their neighbors. add nearly 80 million people during each of the Some of the extremely large countries will next two decades before its population peaks. probably manage their anticipated growth with- India, though not quite as large as China ÕÌÊVyVÌðÊ9iÌÊÌ iÊà iiÀÊÃâiÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊ today, is growing twice as fast, at 1.4 percent increases they face in coming years, combined «iÀÊÞi>À]Ê>`ÊÜÊ>``ÊÀÕ} ÞÊ£ÎxÊÊ«i- with their efforts to rapidly industrialize, means ple per decade for the next two decades. Even that many will also face a “tipping point,” when with a continued decline in their birth rates, uneven development leaves tens of millions of *«Õ>ÌÊ these two countries alone are expected to add disadvantaged people to watch other millions ÀÕ} ÞÊ{ääÊÊ«i«iÊLÞÊÓäÓxpÀiÊ Ài>«ÊÌ iÊLiiwÌÃÊvÊÀ>«`Ê}ÀÜÌ °Ê/ iÊ`ë>À- distortions— than the entire population of the United States, ties of economic fortune among classes, regions, in which the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and or ethnic groups may become so great as to Belgium today combined. spark violent protests. Or the migration of rural ««Õ>ÌÃÊ Most of the 20 largest countries in the world masses to urban and industrial centers could }ÀÜÊÌÊÞÕ}]Ê have modest growth rates but large demographic produce a social crisis. momentum, and thus will make the largest con- We cannot predict which countries will ÀÊÌÊv>ÃÌ]ÊÀÊ tributions to total world population growth in the face such crises, as they are due to failed politi- iÝÌÊÓäÊÞi>ÀðÊ/ iÊv>ÃÌiÃÌ}ÀÜ}ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊ cal leadership and administrative management ÌÊÕÀL>âi`p generally smaller, but are facing the largest bur- more than population changes per se. But we >iÊÌÊ`vvVÕÌÊ den of additional growth on a percentage basis can say that in many of the largest countries, ÃiiÊ/>LiÊ£®°ÊÀÊÌ iÊiÝÌÊÃiÛiÀ>Ê`iV>`iÃ]Ê}L>Ê governments will face exceptional challenges in vÀÊ«ÀiÛ>}Ê population growth will be concentrated in only a meeting their populations’ demands for both few regions and countries, mainly Muslim societ- strong and equitable economic growth and economic and iÃÊ>ÃÌÊÌ iÊiÌÀiÊÌ«Ê >vÊvÊ/>LiÊ£®Ê>`Ê Õ}iÊ sound political management. >`ÃÌÀ>ÌÛiÊ ÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÜÌ Ê««Õ>ÌÃÊvÊÇxÊÊÀÊÀi°Ê ÃÌÊ We can say with certainty that these trends vÊÌ iÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ`>ÌiÊ/>LiÊ£Ê>ÀiÊ>ÃÊ>}Ê «ÃiÊ>ÀÊ`i>ÃÊvÀÊÌ iÊiVVÊ«- ÃÌÌÕÌÃÊÌÊ the world’s lower income countries. By contrast, icy and development of the West, particu- maintain stable population growth rates in Europe and Japan are >ÀÞÊ ÕÀ«i°ÊÊÓääx]ÊÞÊxÊvÊÌ iÊÓxÊ>À}iÃÌÊ already low and, in some cases, negative. countries in the world were in Europe, with a socialization / iÀivÀi]Ê Ì iÊ «À«ÀÌÊ vÊ Ì iÊ ÜÀ`½ÃÊ combined population of roughly 400 million, population living in Muslim states, or in the or about one-tenth the total population of the >`Ê>LÀvÀViÊ very largest and very poorest states, will grow, remaining countries (UN Population Division, absorption. and the proportion of the world’s population ÓääÇ®°Ê ÞÊÓäÓx]ÊÕÃÌÊÌÜÊ`iV>`iÃÊ`ÃÌ>Ì]ÊÌ iÀiÊ Û}ÊÊ`iÛi«i`ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÊà À°Ê/ iÊ will be only four European countries in the top sole exception is the United States, which is Óx]ÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÌÌ>Ê««Õ>ÌÊvÊÎÎnÊ]ÊÀÊ iÝ«iVÌi`ÊÌÊ>``ÊxäÊÊ«i«iÊÊÌ iÊiÝÌÊ >LÕÌÊÃiÛiÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊx°xÊLÊ >LÌ- ÓäÊÞi>ÀÃpÃÌÞÊ`ÕiÊÌÊÀiViÌÊ>`Ê«ÀiVÌi`Ê >ÌÃÊvÊÌ iÊÌ iÀÊÓ£ÊVÕÌÀiÃ°Ê ÞÊÓäxä]ÊÌ iÀiÊ immigration of people born elsewhere. will be only three European countries in the top Some countries with extremely rapid popu- ÓxÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÌÌ>Ê««Õ>ÌÊvÊÓxnÊ]ÊÀÊ lation growth are likely to manage it reason- ÕÃÌÊvÕÀÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊÈ°ÎÊLÊÊÌ iÊÌ iÀÊ 3
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ÓÓÊVÕÌÀiÃ°Ê ÕÀ«i½ÃÊÜi} ÌÊÊÌ iÊÌ«ÊÓxÊ Óään®°ÊvÊÃ>ÊiÝVÕ`}Ê>«>®ÊV>ÊÃÕÃÌ>Ê>Ê countries is shrinking dramatically. ÛiÀ>Ê}ÀÜÌ ÊÀ>ÌiÊvÊÌÌ>Ê *ÊvÊxÊ«iÀViÌÊ / iÊ iÝ«iVÌi`Ê V >}iÃÊ Ê ÕÀ«i½ÃÊ }L>Ê per year over the next 20 years, the increase in demographic weight are even more striking. Ã>½ÃÊ *ÊÜÕ`ÊLiÊ1-fÎäÊÌÀ¸ or more Ê Óääx]Ê >Ê vÊ ÕÀ«iÊ V«ÀÃi`Ê ÇÎ£Ê - than three times the total economic growth of Ê«i«i]ÊÜ V ÊÃÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊà ÀÊÌÊ Europe. ÕÃÌÊÈÈ{ÊÊLÞÊÓäxä]ÊÜ iÊÌ iÊÀiÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊ vÊÃ>Ê *Ê`iÃÊÌÊ}ÀÜÊ>ÌÊxÊ«iÀViÌÊ ÜÀ`Ê}ÀÜÃÊvÀÊx°nÊLÊÌÊn°xÊLÊ1 Ê «iÀÊÞi>À]ÊÛ}ÊÃÌ>`>À`ÃÊÊÃ>ÊÜÊÌÊV>ÌV Ê Population Division, Óään®°Ê/ >ÌÊÃ]ÊÊ>ÊÃ}iÊ Õ«ÊÌÊÌ ÃiÊÊ ÕÀ«iÊ>`Ê>«>®°Ê9iÌÊvÊÃ>Ê generation (the next 42 years), global popula- GDP does grow at that pace, then given the size ÌÊÕÌÃ`iÊvÊ ÕÀ«iÊÜÊVÀi>ÃiÊLÞÊÓ°ÇÊL- vÊÃ>]ÊÌ iÊ«Ài«`iÀ>ViÊvÊiVVÊ}ÀÜÌ Ê lion while Europe’s population will decrease by on the Eurasian continent will be occurring >LÕÌÊÈÇÊ° outside of Europe. Greater degrees of invest- / iÊ Ã À}Ê `i}À>« VÊ Üi} ÌÊ vÊ ment and innovation are likely to move to areas European countries puts them on the horns of outside of Europe, further weakening its eco- The proportion a dilemma. If the economies of fast-growing nomic strength and leadership. In other words, developing countries do not catch up to those we are on the cusp of a global tipping point, of the world’s of the richer countries, then the standard of ÊÜ V Ê >ÃÌÊ>`Ê-ÕÌ ÊÃ>ÊViÊÌÊiV«ÃiÊ ««Õ>ÌÊ viÊiÞi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ7iÃÌÊÜÊÃiiÊÀiÊiÌiÊ ÕÀ«iÊ>`Ê>«>Ê>ÃÊ>ÀÊÃÕÀViÃÊvÊ}L>Ê and unfair than ever, fueling resentment of economic growth—a point made all the more Û}ÊÊ ÕÃÊ developing countries against the G-8. On the sharper as Europe and Japan slip into recession ÃÌ>ÌiÃ]ÊÀÊÊÌ iÊ other hand, if economic growth in those coun- at the end of 2008. tries does exceed that of the West, so that liv- / iÃiÊ`i}À>« VÊ>`ÊiVVÊV >}iÃÊ ÛiÀÞÊ>À}iÃÌÊ>`Ê ing standards in poor countries or regions starts also indicate that the military capacities of to approach those of rich countries or regions, large developing countries will increase, while ÛiÀÞÊ«ÀiÃÌÊ then the combination of shrinking popula- the ability of rich nations to put “boots on ÃÌ>ÌiÃ]ÊÜÊ tion and lagging economies will render the the ground” in conflict zones will diminish. G-8 countries more and more irrelevant to the Managing conflicts involving developing coun- }ÀÜ]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ world economy. Greater resentment or greater tries will become more difficult, and will put irrelevance: certainly a difficult choice. more of a strain on developed countries’ econo- proportion of ÕÀ«i½ÃÊ VLi`Ê *Ê Ê ÓääÇÊ Ü>ÃÊ mies, than before. the world’s 1-f£{ÊÌÀÊ`>ÀÃÊ ]ÊÓään®°ÊÃÃÕ}Ê ÃÊÌ iÊ«ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊ}L>ÊiVÞÊV- *Ê}ÀÜÌ Ê«iÀÊV>«Ì>ÊvÊÓ°xÊ«iÀViÌÊ«iÀÊÞi>ÀÊ tributed by the G-8 countries shrinks, coun- ««Õ>ÌÊ and no net population growth, Europe’s econo- ÌÀiÃÊ ÃÕV Ê >ÃÊ >]Ê `>]Ê /ÕÀiÞ]Ê À>â]Ê my would increase by US$9 trillion (excluding Indonesia, and Mexico will become global eco- Û}ÊÊ y>Ì®ÊLÞÊÓäÓx°ÊÀÊÃ>ÊiÝVÕ`}Ê>«>®]Ê VÊ«ÜiÀðÊ`ÌÌ}Ê>ÀÊÀi}>Ê«Ü- `iÛi«i`Ê ÓääÇÊ *ÊÜ>ÃÊÃ} ÌÞÊ>À}iÀ]Ê>ÌÊ1-f£nÊÌÀ- ers into international governance bodies is vital Ê`>ÀÃÊ ]ÊÓään®°Ê ÕÌÊ`ÕiÊÌÊ`iÃÌÊ if those organizations are to retain legitimacy. VÕÌÀiÃÊÜÊ growth in GDP per capita plus large population / iÊ ÛiLiÀÊ ÓäänÊ -ÕÌÊ Ê >V>Ê Ã À° increases in most countries, total GDP is grow- Markets and the World Economy expanded the ing far more rapidly in this region. Iran and “G-group” to include these big emerging demo- Pakistan achieved recent growth rates of 4 and cratic economies—a trend that must continue 6 percent per year, respectively, while India and if such efforts are truly going to grapple with China were growing by 8-10 percent per year— the global economy. and despite the global economic downturn, Naturally, these measures will provoke great both countries are expected to continue grow- opposition and controversy. However, if Europe }ÊLÞÊÈÇÊ«iÀViÌÊÊÓääÊ ]ÊÓäänÆÊ 1]Ê chooses to isolate itself from the global popula- 4
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 tion and the global economy, it will continue />LiÊ£\Ê>ÃÌiÃÌÊÀÜ}Ê ÕÌÀiÃ]Ê to shrink in relation to the world. Moreover, if ÓäääqÓääxÊÜÌ Ê>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊ£ÊÊ«i«i® Europe fails to support economic growth out- side of Europe, the rapidly increasing numbers ANNUAL GROWTH RATE, % of people in non-European and mainly Muslim United Arab EmiratesÊ {°ÇÊ countries is simply going to fuel ever-greater resentment of Europe’s position, exacerbating Sierra Leone 4.2 the problems of terrorism, smuggling, and ille- Eritrea 4.1 gal trafficking as the ways to “get ahead” and Afghanistan, KuwaitÊ Î°nÊ “get even.” In short, Europe has no choice but to support and actively engage the fast-growing Chad, Palestine (occupied)Ê Î°È countries of the world, improve relations with NigerÊ Î°x their populations, and support—and seek to ÕÀÕ`Ê Î°ÎÊ share in—their growth. Burkina Faso, i]Ê1}>`>Ê Î°Ó The Great Slowdown in Population Gambia, Guinea-BissauÊ Î°£Ê Growth in High-Income Countries Congo (Dem. Rep.), Mali, Somalia, YemenÊ Î°ä During the next several decades, the popula- }>]ÊJordan, Mauritania,Ê/}Ê Ó° tion of most European countries, including Iraq, Madagascar 2.8 Russia, Germany, Italy, Ukraine, Spain, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, SyriaÊ Ó°ÇÊ will shrink substantially, due mainly to a sharp Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, />â>>Ê Ó°È decline in the number of children per couple, Guatemala, Nigeria, Saudi ArabiaÊ Ó°x ÌÊÜiÊÕ`iÀÊÓ°äÊ>`ÊÊÃiÊV>ÃiÃÊÕ`iÀÊ£°xÊ 1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê/ ÃÊÃÜ- Note: ÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>À}iÊ ÕÃÊ««Õ>ÌÃÊÊÌ>Vð down will be accompanied by a rapid increase Source: 1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃÊÓääÇ®° in the percentage of the population in higher age brackets, as the number of young children falls further behind the number of aging baby expected to decline dramatically as a percentage LiÀÃ°Ê ÞÊÓäxä]ÊÌ iÊ«iÀViÌ>}iÊvÊ>«>½ÃÊ of global GDP. and Europe’s population over age 60 is expected / ÃÊÃÜ`ÜÊÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ Ê >ÃÊ ÌÊ`ÕLi]ÊÌÊÎxÊÌÊ{äÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌÌ>Ê««Õ>- >ÀÊ«V>ÌÃÊvÀÊÛiÀ>ÊiVVÊ}ÀÜÌ Ê tion (Jackson & Howe, 2008). LiÀÃÌ>`Ì]Ê Óä䣮°Ê/ iÊ iViÃÊ vÊ >}}Ê / ÃÊ«>ÌÌiÀÊÃÊ } ÞÊÛiÊ>`Ê>LÀ>°Ê nations will not be stimulated by growing num- Historically, population growth has stagnated LiÀÃÊvÊVÃÕiÀÃÊ>`Ê`i>`ÊvÀÊ ÕÃ}°Ê/ iÊ on occasion, or been substantially reduced by capital growth generated by larger generations >ÀÊi«`iVÃ]ÊLÕÌÊÌ iÊV>ÕÃiÊÜ>ÃÊ } ÊÀ- of young people approaching their peak earn- tality, especially among the young. Birth rates ing years and saving for retirement will cease as remained high, and when conditions were well. Even if the growth of Europe’s income per more propitious to growth, population increase capita remained constant, its overall economic resumed. In modern Europe, the United States, growth rate would be cut in half as the popula- Canada, and Japan, decreasing birth rates have ÌÊ`iViÃÊÛiÀÊÌ iÊiÝÌÊÎäxäÊÞi>Àð precipitated population decline. Women are Ê ÛiÀ>Ê }ÀÜÌ Ê À>ÌiÊ Ì ÃÊ Ã>Ê >ÜÃÊ marrying later, if at all, and having fewer chil- few margins for accumulation to invest for `Ài°Ê/ iÊÀiÃÕÌÊÃÊ>ÊÕ«ÀiVi`iÌi`Ê>}}ÊvÊ Ì iÊvÕÌÕÀi°ÊÃÊ i>ÊÀi`>ÊÓääx®Ê >ÃÊ populations (less so in the United States), at the argued, substantial growth rates allow more very same time that national economies can be groups to share to some degree in growth, and 5
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊ£\Ê}iÊ-ÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃ\Ê*iÀViÌ>}iÊvÊ*«Õ>ÌÊ1`iÀÊ}iÊ£xÊÓääx®
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provide social resources for a variety of ser- >`ÊiÌÀÞiÛiÊLÃ]ÊÞÕ}Ê«i«iÊ>ÀiÊÀÀiÃÃÌ- vices and investments. Overall growth rates ibly drawn from high-youth-density regions below 2 percent per year, by contrast, allow for to those with a lower percentage of youth; the little redistribution or investment, and tend OECD countries currently host 10 million for- to heighten social conflicts over such issues as i}LÀÊ}À>ÌÃÊ>}iÃÊ£xÓ{Ê>`ÊxxÊ- pensions, migration, and labor/employer rela- ÊLiÌÜiiÊ>}iÃÊÓxÈ{Ê" ]ÊÓään®° tions—situations we might see as the global 9iÌÊÌ ÃÊ}À>ÌpVÀi>Ã}ÞÊVÌi- economic downturn progresses. tious in the developed world—is not the only ÌÊÌ iÊÃ>iÊÌi]ÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÃÊvÊÕV ÊvÊ VÃiµÕiViÊ vÊ Ì ÃÊ L>>Vi°Ê /Ê ÃÕÃÌ>Ê the developing world will be tilted in the oppo- their elderly populations, Europe, Japan, and site direction, to a larger percentage of youth ÀÌ ÊiÀV>ÊÜÊ >ÛiÊÌÊëi`ÊÀiÊiÞÊ }°Ê£®°Ê/ iÊÞÕ}iÃÌÊVÕÌÀiÃp>ÊÊÌ iÊ on health care and pension support. Whether developing world—will have populations with active or ailing, the elderly population will need ÞÊ>LÕÌÊxÊ«iÀViÌÊ>LÛiÊ>}iÊÈä]ÊLÕÌÊÜÌ Ê intensive medical procedures and medications i>ÀÞÊxäÊ«iÀViÌÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊ£{Ê1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ necessary to sustain an active and healthy life ÛÃ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê7 iÊ ÕÀ«iÊ>`Ê>«>ÊÜÊ into older ages—at a time when the domestic approach the mid-21st century with popula- supply of new doctors and nurses will likely tions that are tilted toward the old, much of the decline. developing world will have populations that are Keeping the elderly population at work is tilted toward the young (see map). not a solution; older workers will generally not / iÊLÛÕÃÊÀiÃÕÌÊvÊÌ ÃÊL>>ViÊÃÊ>Ài>`ÞÊ welcome entry-level work at entry-level wages, taking place: a massive migration of young and ÀÊ« ÞÃV>ÞÊ`i>`}ÊÜÀ°Ê/ ÃiÊ}>«ÃÊÊ working-age populations from the developing the labor force will have to be filled by younger world to the developed world. Between 2000 workers. Moreover, while older workers excel in >`ÊÓääx]ÊÓ°ÈÊÊ}À>ÌÃÊÛi`Êi>V Ê iÝ«iÀiViÊ>`ÊÕ`}iÌ]ÊÌ iÞÊ`ÊiÃÃÊÌ }Ê year to more developed countries from less “outside the box.” Path-breaking innovations in developed regions (UN Population Division, science and technology overwhelmingly come 6 2006). Seeking new livelihood opportunities vÀÊÌ ÃiÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊ{xÆÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ ÊviÜiÀÊ
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 ÕÃÊÜiÊ>`ÊV `ÀiÊ i>Ì}ÊVÌÌÊV>`ÞÊÊ ÃÌiÀ`>Ê ÕÀÌiÃÞÊvVÀÊ ÕÃiÀÊ >ÀiÃÀi`ÆÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉ ÜÜÜ°vVÀ°VÉ« ÌÃÉ V >ÀiÃvÀi`ÉÓÇn£Î£xÈ{ÉÉ «iÕÀÕî
and fewer younger workers will likely lose an ÞÊx£xÓÊ«iÀViÌ]Ê>`ÊÌ>ÞÊ>ÌÊ{ÈÊ«iÀViÌÊ edge in innovation as well. (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). Increasing Developed nations can try to head off this Europe’s overall employment participation rates impending growth slowdown in four ways. ÌÊ ÀÌ ÊiÀV>ÊÀÊÕ««iÀÊ ÕÀ«i>ÊiÛiÃÊ First, they can improve productivity by invest- would by itself offset the decline in its working- ing in technology, education, and innovation. age population for nearly a decade. ÊVÀi>ÃiÊÊ«À`ÕVÌÛÌÞÊ«À`ÕV}Ê>ʣʫiÀ- Secondly, countries could increase immigra- cent greater gain in output per capita per year tion and seek to raise immigrants’ productivity would more than offset the change in popula- and earnings to the average level as quickly as pos- tion. Europe, in particular, should make it eas- sible. While integrating and educating immigrants ier for individuals to start companies and use can take a generation or more, the United States, capital and labor flexibly to encourage entrepre- ÕÃÌÀ>>]Ê>`Ê >>`>Ê >ÛiÊiÞi`ÊÌ iÊLiiwÌÃÊvÊ neurial enterprises—which are the most impor- making it easy for immigrants (especially skilled tant source of productivity-increasing growth ones) to start businesses, acquire education, and (Goldstone, 2006). Universities should seek move into the mainstream, such that the incomes increased support for training and research in of many immigrant groups exceeds the national the most technically important fields of biology, norm. Even lower-skilled migrants can raise the materials science, and engineering, and offer overall productivity of a society, if they work for incentives to steer more students to the techni- lower wages than had previously been paid to cal and engineering fields. non-migrants for similar work. Human capital must not be allowed to sit Unfortunately, both in Europe and recently unused. In 2006, in the United States and in the United States, debates on immigration >>`>]Ê ÀÕ} ÞÊ ÈÎÊ «iÀViÌÊ vÊ Ì iÊ ««Õ>- have exposed the fear that immigration steals ÌÊÛiÀÊ>}iÊ£ÈÊÜiÀiÊi«Þi`ÆÊÊÌ iÊ 1£x]Ê Üi>Ì ÊvÀÊÌ iÊ>ÌÛiÊ««Õ>Ì°Ê/ ÃÊ«iÀ- ÞÊxÓÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊ«i«iÊÛiÀÊ>}iÊ£ÈÊÜiÀiÊ cious view echoes the similarly mistaken idea i«Þi`°ÊÌ Õ} ÊÃiÊ ÕÀ«i>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ that protecting trade by imposing high tariffs had workforce participation rates of 60 percent or blocking foreign investment will preserve or more, France, Germany and Spain were at the prosperity of a country. Migrants tend to 7
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM self-select for entrepreneurial talent, ambition, developing countries will have young popula- and energy, and therefore produce net gains for tions, the global population as a whole will be national economies that accept them (Simon, nonetheless be heading for a relatively healthy £®°ÊÊ ÕÀ«i>ÊVÕÌÀÞÊÀÊ>«>®ÊÌ >ÌÊ >ÃÊ >}iÊ`ÃÌÀLÕÌÊvÊ««Õ>Ì°Ê/ iÊÃÌÊ}V>Ê lost much of its own demographic momentum way to overcome the population distortions in and energy can ill afford to exclude new genera- varied regions will therefore be to ease the bar- tions, even if they come from abroad. riers to movement across borders to take advan- Ê Ì À`Ê Ü>ÞÊ ÌÊ i>`Ê vvÊ Ì ÃÊ «i`}Ê tage of the overall balance. growth slowdown would be to pursue pro-natal No doubt, a combination of all four meth- The most policies that encourage larger families among ods will be required to offset the slowdown in the existing populations. However, it is not population growth in high-income countries. }V>ÊÜ>ÞÊÌÊ clear which policies would do this; demogra- 9iÌÊÜiÊà Õ`ÊÀiV}âiÊÌ >ÌÊiÊvÊÌ iÊL}}iÃÌÊ phers do not fully agree on the reasons underly- obstacles is the growing antagonism between ÛiÀViÊÌ iÊ ing a baby boom. Unless societies start placing a Ì iÊ7iÃÌÊ>`ÊÕV ÊvÊÌ iÊ ÕÃÊÜÀ`°Ê/ iÊ ««Õ>ÌÊ higher worth on larger families than on expand- way forward for the West lies in greater open- ing the consumption of consumer goods, small ness and integration, increased investment in distortions in families will continue to be preferred. In rich- growth abroad, better integration of immigrant er countries, higher fertility is mainly found communities, and reduced barriers to emigra- Û>Ài`ÊÀi}ÃÊ among more religious families, which is one of tion from fast-growing but youthful societies. will therefore the factors accounting for much higher popula- None of this is possible with the high levels tion growth in the United States than in Europe of fear, mistrust, and antagonism between the be to ease (Longman, 2006). Short of a religious revival in West and populations of many of the largest the barriers ÕÀ«i]Ê>Ê>ÀÊVÀi>ÃiÊÊviÀÌÌÞÊ>`Êv>ÞÊ and fastest growing countries of the world. We size seems the least likely solution to the conti- must reach the degree of cooperation necessary ÌÊÛiiÌÊ nent’s demographic and economic decline. to respond to the global population changes Fourth, and perhaps least discussed, encour- already in place for the next half-century. Much across borders aging a “reverse flow” of older migrants from more than terrorism, these trends will affect ÌÊÌ>iÊ developed to developing countries could create the long-term prosperity of the developed, but great benefits for both. If older migrants take stagnating and rapidly aging, populations of >`Û>Ì>}iÊ their retirement along the southern coast of the the West, and the fast-growing and extremely i`ÌiÀÀ>i>]ÊÀÊÊ >ÌÊiÀV>ÊÀÊvÀV>]ÊÌÊ youthful population of the developing and vÊÌ iÊÛiÀ>Ê can greatly reduce the costs of their retirement. Of largely Muslim nations. balance. course, developing countries will need quality resi- dential and medical facilities to make them desir- Notes >LiÊ`iÃÌ>ÌðÊ/ ÃÊivvÀÌÊVÕ`Ê>ÃÊVÕÌiÀ>VÌÊ the constant drain of medical and nursing talent £°Ê/ ÃÊ>ÀÌViÊÃÊL>Ãi`ÊÊ>Ê«>«iÀÊvÊÌ iÊÃ>iÊÌÌiÊ to rich developed countries. “Medical tourism” to forthcoming in the Mackinder Journal and presented many developing countries has already begun as to the Mackinder Forum, Minster Lovell, United }`]Ê >ÀV Ê£{£x]ÊÓääÈ°ÊÌÊÜ>ÃÊ>ÃÊ«Ài- residents of developed countries seek lower prices sented to the Conference on Population Changes and for medical procedures. Investing in facilities that L>Ê-iVÕÀÌÞ]ÊëÃÀi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊi`iÀ>ÊV>`iÞÊ will make long-term retirement attractive in cheap- vÀÊ-iVÕÀÌÞÊ-ÌÕ`iÃÊ>`ÊÌ>Ì ÀØVi]Ê iÀ]Ê er locales will reduce the pension and medical cost iÀ>Þ]Ê ÛiLiÀÊ£Î]ÊÓääÈ° burden for developed countries while channeling Ó°Ê }À>ÌÊÃÊÌÊ>Ê>ÀÊv>VÌÀÊÊÌ ÃiÊVÕ- tries experiencing substantial population growth, with LÃÊ>`ÊÛiÃÌiÌÊÌÊ`iÛi«}ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê the exception of the United States, where migration ample labor. and the high birth rates of immigrants have produced While Europe, the United States, and Japan exceptional population growth for a highly industrial- will have older populations, and many nearby ized nation. In some other highly industrialized coun- 8
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 REPORT ONLINE
Jack Goldstone and Eric Kaufman discussed “Flash Points and Tipping Points” in a Wilson Center webcast in February 2007: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_ id=1413&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=218994
The Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007: Gauging System Performance and Fragility in the Globalization Era, by Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone, plots the profound split between “Haves” (about 15 percent of the global population) and “Have-nots,” while the report’s State Fragility Index and Matrix ranks countries according to their degree of sta- bility: http://www.fpbmonitor.com/action/reader?head=scorecard&jid=FPB
Jack Goldstone and Monty Marshall presented the The Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility in a Woodrow Wilson Center webcast in March 2007: http://www.wilsoncenter. org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=225091
tries—the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Jackson, Richard, & Neil Howe, with Rebecca Strauss and the Scandinavian countries—migration is offsetting & Keisuke Nakashima. (2008). The graying of the decline or stagnation in the native-born population, but great powers: Demography and geopolitics in the 21 it is not sufficient to substantially increase the popula- century. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Ì°ÊÀÊiÝ>«i]ÊÌ iÊ«ÀiVÌi`Ê}ÀÜÌ ÊÀ>ÌiÊÊÌ iÊ International Studies. 1Ìi`Ê }`ÊÌÊÓäÓx]ÊVÕ`}Ê}À>Ì]ÊÃÊÞÊ Leahy, Elizabeth, with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb ä°ÎÓÊ«iÀViÌÊ«iÀÊ>Õ° 6}i]Ê->À> Ê>``V]ÊEÊ/`Ê*ÀiÃÌ°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊThe shape of things to come. Washington, DC: Population VÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>° }>]Ê* «°ÊÓääÈ]Ê >ÀV É«À®°Êº/ iÊÀiÌÕÀÊvÊ References patriarchy.” Foreign Policy. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and iÌÀ>ÊÌi}iViÊ}iVÞÊ ®°ÊÓään®°ÊWorld fact- Development (OECD). (2008). OECD.Stat extracts book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Q >Ì>L>ÃiR°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://stats.oecd.org/ "vwVi°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttps://www.cia.gov/ wbos/index.aspx?lang=en library/publications/the-world-factbook/ Simon, Julian L. (1999). The economic consequences of Cincotta, Richard, Robert Engelman, & Daniele immigrationÊÓ`Êi`®°ÊÊÀLÀ]Ê \Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ >ÃÌ>ðÊÓääή°ÊThe security demographic. Michigan Press. 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê*«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>° UN Population Division. (2006, March). International LiÀÃÌ>`Ì]Ê V >ðÊÓää£]Ê >ÀV É«À®°Êº/ iÊ««Õ>- migration 2006°Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê1Ìi`Ê >ÌÃ°Ê tion implosion.” Foreign Policy. Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.un.org/esa/ Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008, December 1). ««Õ>ÌÉ«ÕLV>ÌÃÉÓääÈ }À>ÌÚ >ÀÌÉ Country Forecast December 2008 Updater.ÊÛ>>LiÊ Migration2006.pdf online at www.eiu.com 1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛðÊÓääÇ®°ÊWorld population pros- Ài`>]Ê i>°ÊÓääx®°ÊThe moral consequences of pects, 2006 revision [Database]. Û>>LiÊiÊ>Ì economic growth.Ê iÜÊ9À\ÊvÀi`Ê «v° http://esa.un.org/unpp/ `ÃÌi]Ê>VÊ°ÊÓääÓ®°Êº*«Õ>ÌÊ>`ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞ\Ê UN Population Division. (2008). World urbanization How demographic change can lead to violent con- prospects: The 2007 revision population database flict.” Columbia Journal of International Affairs 56, Q >Ì>L>ÃiR°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://esa.un.org/ Ó{xÓÈΰ unup/ `ÃÌi]Ê>VÊ°ÊÓääÈ®°Êº }iiÀ}]ÊVÕÌÕÀi]Ê United States Department of Labor (DOL). (2008). innovation, and modern wealth creation.” In Irene Chartbook of international labor comparisons: The Johansson (Ed.), Innovations and entrepreneurship in Americas, Asia, Europe. Washington, DC: DOL. functional regions, Uddevalla Symposium 2005 (pp. Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°`°}ÛÉ>ëÉi`>É {xx{Ç{®°Ê/À >ÌÌ>]Ê-Üi`i\Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ7iÃÌ° Ài«ÀÌÃÉV >ÀÌLÉÓäänä£ÉV >ÀÌÓÚÈ° Ì 9
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy
s it over? Has democracy’s “third wave”— ues to mature in many of the world’s current the virtually uninterrupted uptick in the youth-bulge countries, analysts should expect Inumber of democracies since the early most of these states to ultimately attain and £ÇäÃÊ `iÃVÀLi`Ê LÞÊ ->ÕiÊ ÕÌ}ÌÊ maintain liberal democracy. Of course, there (1991)—finally spent all of its momentum? ÜÊLiÊiÝVi«ÌÃÆÊÃViÊÌ iÊi>ÀÞÊ£ÇäÃ]ÊV >À- Some analysts contend that it has, and that a ismatic authoritarian leaders and single-party reverse wave of neo-authoritarianism is already ideological elites have demonstrated a capac- on the rise (Diamond, 1996; Carothers, 2002). ity to resist democratization, persisting even as In this article, I argue that the recent leveling- their countries’ age structures matured. off in measures of global democracy is tempo- In my analysis, I compared two measures: rary, and that as youthful demographic profiles (1) the youth-bulge proportion—defined as the mature, new and more stable liberal democ- «À«ÀÌÊvÊÞÕ}Ê>`ÕÌÃÊ>}iÃÊ£xÊÌÊÓ®ÊÊÌ iÊ racies are likely to arise before 2020 in Latin ÜÀ}>}iÊ««Õ>ÌÊ>}iÃÊ£xÊÌÊÈ{®pÜ V Ê iÀV>]Ê ÀÌ ÊvÀV>]Ê>`ÊÃ>°Ê ÃÊ`iÀÛi`ÊvÀÊiÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ>`Ê«ÀiVÌÃÊ«ÕL- Why such optimism? Because my analysis of à i`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃÊÓääÇ®ÆÊ recent demographic and political trends shows and (2) liberal democracy, which is identified that countries with a large proportion of young by a rating of “Free” in Freedom House’s (2008) adults in the working-age population (referred annual evaluations of political rights and civil to as a “youth bulge”) are much less likely to LiÀÌiÃÊvÀÊ£ÇÓÊÌÊÓääÇ®°1 attain a stable liberal democracy than countries with a more mature age structure. If fertility The Youth Bulge: Constraining RICHARD P. continues to decline and age structure contin- Liberal Democracy? CINCOTTA Clues to the relationship between the youth bulge and liberal democracy can be seen in Richard P. Cincotta ÃÊÌ iÊVÃÕÌ}Ê the wake of demographic changes that swept Ê`i}À>« iÀÊÌÊÌ iÊ }Ê,>}iÊ>ÞÃÃÊ Ì ÀÕ} ÊÕV ÊvÊ >ÃÌÊÃ>Ê>`Ê >ÌÊiÀV>Ê 1ÌÊvÊÌ iÊ >Ì>ÊÌi}iViÊ ÕV°ÊÃÊ in the late 1980s and 1990s. In response to ÀiÃi>ÀV ÊvVÕÃiÃÊÊÌ iÊ«ÌV>]ÊiVV]Ê declines in women’s fertility, the proportion iÛÀiÌ>]Ê>`ÊÃV>Ê«V>ÌÃÊvÊÌ iÊ of young working-age adults in about a dozen `i}À>« VÊÌÀ>ÃÌÊ>`Ê Õ>Ê}À>Ì°Ê VÕÌÀiÃÊ`À««i`ÊÃÌii«Þ]ÊÌÊLiÌÜiiÊä°ÎÈÊ>`Ê * ÌÊLÞÊ >Û`Ê>ÜÝ ÕÀÃÌ]Ê7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ 0.42. When it did, liberal democracies evolved iÌiÀ® in most of these countries, with little of the military preemption and backsliding that pre- viously typified their regions—with the recent Ì>LiÊiÝVi«ÌÊvÊ/ >>`ÊÃiiÊ}°Ê£®°Ê 10
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 In contrast, where liberal democracy emerged before a large youth bulge declined— >ÃÊÊ L>]Ê VÕ>`À]Ê]Ê`>]Ê >>ÞÃ>]Ê *>«Õ>Ê iÜÊÕi>]Ê*iÀÕ]Ê-ÀÊ >>]Ê/ÕÀiÞ]Ê Venezuela, and numerous others—regimes failed to stabilize, retreating to less democratic ÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>Ê>À}iÊ«À«ÀÌÊvÊÞÕ}Ê practices and institutions of governance. In some cases, deliberalization occurred periodi- >`ÕÌÃÊÊÌ iÊÜÀ}>}iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÀiviÀÀi`Ê V>Þ]Ê>ÃÊÊ/ÕÀiÞÊ>`Ê`>°ÊÊÌ iÀÃ]ÊÃÕV Ê>ÃÊ ÌÊ>ÃÊ>ʺÞÕÌ ÊLÕ}i»®Ê>ÀiÊÕV ÊiÃÃÊiÞÊÌÊ >>ÞÃ>Ê>`Ê]ÊÌ iÊ«Àii«ÌÊ >ÃÊ>ÃÌi`ÊvÀÊ decades. >ÌÌ>Ê>ÊÃÌ>LiÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>VÞÊÌ >ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ ÜÌ Ê>ÊÀiÊ>ÌÕÀiÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi° The Youth Bulge and the Hobbesian Bargain
Why should a youthful age structure influence i>ÃÞ°Ê/ iÊÀiÃÕÌ}Ê«ÌVÃÊÌi`ÊÌÊLiÊvÀ>VÌÕÃÊ political regimes? Numerous studies have con- and potentially violent. In this stage, regimes cluded that countries with a large youth-bulge typically concentrate resources on preserving proportion experience a high risk of political their position by limiting dissent and maintain- ÛiViÊ>`ÊVÛÊÃÌÀviÊ i> ÞÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÇÆÊ ing order, a focus that engenders the support Urdal, 2006; Mesquida & Wiener, 1996). of commercial elites and other propertied seg- ÃÃÕ}]Ê>ÃÊ/ >ÃÊLLiÃÊ``ÊÊÌ iÊ`- ments of society. `iÊvÊÌ iÊ£ÇÌ ÊViÌÕÀÞ]ÊÌ >ÌÊVÌâiÃÊ>ÀiÊÜ}Ê States can make democratic gains during this to relinquish liberties when faced with threats stage, and are sometimes pressured into politi- to their security and property, it is not sur- cal reforms by youth-led democracy move- prising that support for authoritarian regimes iÌðÊ9iÌÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>À}iÊÞÕÌ ÊLÕ}iÃÊ should rise—especially among the commer- do not usually attain a high level of civil liber- cial elite—during a large youth bulge, when ties and political rights. When they do—when ÕV ÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊÞÕ}Ê>`ÊLiÃÃ°Ê enlightened authoritarians impose a “demo- 9ÕÌ ÊLÕ}iÃÊÌi`ÊÌÊ}ÛiÊÀÃiÊÌÊÞÕÌ ÊVÕÌÕÀiÃÊ cratic legacy” under youth-bulge conditions, that coalesce around distinctive identities and or when democratic institutions are imposed at untempered ideologies, and find expression independence or as part of a treaty—these gains through experimentation and risk-taking. Such face unfavorable odds. Countries that sustained conditions, some theorists argue, facilitate the a liberal democracy over periods of youth-bulge political mobilization and recruitment of young conditions (such as Costa Rica, India, Jamaica, adults—particularly young men—by non-state >`Ê-ÕÌ ÊvÀV>®Ê >ÛiÊà ÜÊiÝÌÀ>À`>ÀÞÊ and state-supported organizations capable of dedication to maintaining democratic insti- political or criminal violence (see Goldstone, tutions under the stresses of ethnic violence, ££ÆÊ iÀ]Ê£ÈÇÉÈn®°Ê intense criminal activity, or external threat. / iÊyÕiViÊvÊ>ÊÞÕÌ vÕÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊÊ In the second stage, the dissipation of a large regime type can be understood as a two-stage youth bulge tends to yield relative political calm process.2 Countries with a large proportion of and a “demographic dividend”: a decline in the young adults find themselves in the first stage: number of children each working adult has to / iÞÊ>ÀiÊÃ>``i`ÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÃV>ÊiÛÀiÌÊ support and a bulge in the middle-aged section where the regime’s legitimacy is strained and the of the working-age population, which relieves political mobilization of young men is relatively pressure on child health and educational ser- 11
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM al democracies grew.3ÊÛiÀ>}}Ê>ÊVÕÌÀiÃ]Ê I found that a youthfully structured country >ÃÊ>ÊxäÊ«iÀViÌÊV >ViÊvÊLi}ÊÀ>Ìi`Ê>ÊLiÀ>Ê democracy once its young-adult proportion drops to about 0.40.4 / Ãʺ >v>V >ViÊLiV >À»Ê >Ã]ÊÊÌ iÊ recent past, provided a fair indication—plus or minus a decade—of when a country will become ÊÜ>ÊÊ LiÀ>Ê `ÃÊÕ«Ê iÀÊi`Êv}iÀÊ`V>Ì}Ê a stable liberal democracy. Equipped with this à iÊÛÌi`ÊÊÌ iÊvÀÃÌÊ basic statistic, as well as population estimates democratic elections in >`Ê«ÀiVÌÃ]ÊÊ>ÀÀ>}i`Ê>ÊÌiÌ>LiÊ`iÌvÞ- LiÀ>ÊvÜ}Ê£{ÊÞi>ÀÃÊvÊ VÛÊÜ>À°ÊVVÀ`}ÊÌÊÌ iÊ ing each country’s current probability of liberal º >vÊ>ÊV >Vi»ÊLiV >À]Ê democracy and the year in which each youth- LiÀ>½ÃÊ`iVÀ>VÞÊÃÊiÊ of the most fragile. (© LÕ}iÊVÕÌÀÞÊ«>ÃÃi`]ÊÀÊÃÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊ«>ÃÃ]Ê ÓääxÊ">ÀÊ `]ÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊvÊ Ì iÊ >v>V >ViÊLiV >À°Ê/ iÊ>«Ê}°ÊÓ®Ê * Ìà >Ài®Ê highlights five categories of interest to analysts:
• Fragile liberal democracies (probability of liberal democracy is 40 to 60 percent); • / iÊÃÌÊvÀ>}iÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>ViÃÊ«ÀL- vices, stimulates savings, contributes to produc- ability less than 40 percent); tivity, and facilitates increased human capital • "Ì iÀÊÀi}iÊÌÞ«iÃÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊ >ÛiÊÀiÊ investment and, ultimately, wage growth (see Ì >ÊxäÊ«iÀViÌÊ«ÀL>LÌÞÊvÊ>ÌÌ>}Ê Bloom et al., 2002; Lee & Mason, 2006). ÃÌ>LiÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>VÞÊLivÀiÊÓäÎäÆÊ With much of society’s political volatility • "Ì iÀÊÀi}iÊÌÞ«iÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊiÃÃÊÌ >ÊxäÊ«iÀ- depleted, authoritarian executives tend to lose cent probability of attaining stable liberal the support of the commercial elite, who find `iVÀ>VÞÊLivÀiÊÓäÎäÆÊ>`Ê the regime’s grip on communication and com- • Other regimes that are demographically merce economically stifling and the privileges long overdue for liberal democracy (prob- granted to family members and cronies of the >LÌÞÊÃÊ}Ài>ÌiÀÊÌ >ÊÇäÊ«iÀViÌ®pÌ ÃÊ «ÌV>ÊiÌiÊw>V>ÞÊ`iLÌ>Ì}°ÊÃÊLÌ Ê category includes, and helps define, neo- Huntington (1991) and Schmitter (1980) have authoritarian regimes. noted, political calm and improved economic and social conditions—which usually advance Outliers: Resistant Authoritarians hand-in-hand with the maturing of age struc- and Persistent Liberal Democracies tures—provide authoritarians with opportuni- ties to make a deal for a safe exit. How well does this timetable work? It performed most accurately when forecasting liberal democ- The Probability of Liberal racy among states ruled by military “caretaker” Democracy: A Schedule regimes, weak personal dictatorships, or partial democracies. However, a close inspection of this By dividing the world into five regions and method’s failures suggests that the demographic analyzing data every five years beginning in changes (and associated social and economic £Çx]ÊÊvÕ`ÊÜÌ ÊÃÕÀ«ÀÃ}ÊVÃÃÌiVÞ®Ê changes) it tracks are too weak to undermine that as the regional average of the proportion regimes dominated by a strong and charismatic 12 of young adults declined, the number of liber- authoritarian, such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin,
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 }ÕÀiÊ£\ÊÀii`Ê-VÀiÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÊ*À«ÀÌÊvÊ9Õ}Ê`ÕÌÃÊ ÊÌ iÊ7À}}iÊ*«Õ>ÌÊ 1972-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 1972-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 0.6 1 0.6 1 Rep. of Korea Indonesia 2 2 0.5 0.5 3 3
0.4 4 0.4 4
5 5 0.3 0.3 6 6
0.2 7 0.2 7 0.6 1 0.6 1 Chile Brazil 2 2 0.5 0.5 3 3
0.4 4 0.4 4
5 5 0.3 0.3 6 6
0.2 7 0.2 7 0.6 1 0.6 1 Thailand Taiwan 2 2 0.5 0.5 3 3
0.4 4 0.4 4
5 5 0.3 0.3 6 6
0.2 7 0.2 7 0.6 1 0.6 1 Mexico Albania 2 2 0.5 0.5 3 3
0.4 4 0.4 4
5 5 0.3 0.3 6 6
0.2 7 0.2 7 1972-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 1972-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07
Young adults: average proportion of young adults (15 to 29 yrs) in the working-age Freedom score: averaged political rights and civil liberty population (15 to 64 yrs). scores. Free (1.0 to 2.5) [assumed as liberal democracy] Half-a-chance benchmark: proportion of young adults less than Free (>2.5 to 7.0 ) associated with a 50-percent probability of liberal democrac y.
>Ì>ÊÃÕÀViÃ\ÊÀii`ÊÕÃiÊÓään®ÆÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃÊÓääÇ®ÆÊ,i«ÕLVÊvÊ >ÊÓään®° 13
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊÓ\Ê i}À>« V>ÞÊ iÀÛi`Ê >Ìi}ÀiÃÊÓään®
Liberal Democracies
Least fragile
Fragile
Most fragile
Others / Chances of Stable Liberal Democracy Possible before 2030 Unlikely until after 2030
Long overdue
Source:Ê >Ì>ÊvÀÊÀii`ÊÕÃiÊÓään®ÆÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃÊÓääÇ®°Ê >«Ê«À`ÕVi`ÊLÞÊ ÃÌ iÀÊÌL]ÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê>ÃÃÃÌ>ÌÊ>ÌÊ*«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>° Note: / iÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃÊÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>Ài`ʺ`vvVÕÌÊÌÊ>ÃÃiÃûÊ>ÀiÊ i>ÛÞÊ«>VÌi`ÊLÞÊ6É -ÊÀÊ}À>Ì°Ê
Cuba’s Fidel Castro, or Singapore’s Lee Kwan vides some common starting points.5Ê/Ê«ÀÛiÊ 9iÜÆÊÀÊLÞÊ>ÊÕwi`Ê`i}V>ÊiÌiÊ`iii`Ê useful, the method I have outlined should pre- synonymous with the state, such as the Chinese dict, with reasonable accuracy, the proportion Communist Party. Interestingly, these regimes’ and distribution of liberal democracies among institutions and policies may have evolved, and these states, with some allowance for delays and may continue to evolve, to withstand and coun- complications due to the persistence of Soviet- ter the liberalizing side-effects of demographic era political institutions and instabilities. and socio-economic changes. Does the youth-bulge method pass this test? The dissipation / iÊiÌ `Ê>ÃÊ`iÌwiÃÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊLiV>iÊ 9iÃÆÊLÞÊÓääÇ]ÊÌ iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊÞÕ}>`ÕÌÊ«À«À- liberal democracies far ahead of schedule. Latin tion among the Eastern Bloc countries had of a large iÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ >ÛiÊÌi`i`]Ê>ÃÊ>Ê}ÀÕ«]Ê `iVi`ÊÌÊä°ÎÈ°Ê i>Ü i]ÊÌ iÊÀi}½ÃÊ«À- to embrace liberal democracy while hosting a portion of liberal democracies plodded upward ÞÕÌ ÊLÕ}iÊ large youth bulge, which may partly explain to 46 percent since the early 1990s—close, but Ìi`ÃÊÌÊÞi`Ê why 60 percent of these states have flip-flopped still short (by three liberal democracies) of the between a liberal democracy and a less demo- xÇÊ«iÀViÌÊÌ >ÌÊÜ>ÃÊ«Ài`VÌi`°Ê iÌÌiÀÊÞiÌ]ÊÌ iÊ Ài>ÌÛiÊ«ÌV>Ê VÀ>ÌVÊÀi}iÊ>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊViÊÃViÊÌ iÊi>ÀÞÊ£ÇäÃ]Ê distribution of regimes that emerged is consis- calm and a far more than any other region. tent with the method’s expectations: Liberal democracies dominate the category with the “demographic A Test: Eastern Europe and ÜiÃÌÊÞÕ}>`ÕÌÊ«À«ÀÌÃÊ}°Êή°Ê `Û`i`°» Former Soviet States Is this evidence sufficient to claim that a youthful age structure is the sole constraint / iÊÞÕÌ LÕ}iÊiÌ `ÊV>ÊLiÊÌiÃÌi`ÊLÞÊ«Ài- to greater political liberalization in the lag- dicting regime patterns among the Eastern Bloc ging Eastern Bloc states? No, not at all; the states: the former-communist states of Eastern countries that, so far, have not attained liberal Europe and their ex-Soviet neighbors. While democracy show geographic affinities and simi- these 28 states are quite different, their collec- larities in their per capita income and urbaniza- 14 tive experience as single-party autocracies pro- tion—factors that are also associated, to some
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 `ÕÊ«}ÀÃÊ«ÀÌiÃÌÊ against the local }ÛiÀiÌ°ÊVVÀ`}Ê ÌÊÌ iʺ >vÊ>ÊV >Vi»Ê LiV >À]Ê`>½ÃÊ `iVÀ>VÞÊÃÊiÊvÊÌ iÊ ÃÌÊvÀ>}i°Ê^ÊÓääÇÊ ÀÕ«Ê>`>À]ÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊvÊ * Ìà >Ài®
degree, with the pace of demographic transi- in each of these sub-regions by 2020 or before. tion. Because income measures are difficult to Other countries, which are not currently lib- predict, they do not provide a simple means to iÀ>Ê`iVÀ>ViÃ]ÊÌ >ÌÊ>ÀiÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊ«>ÃÃÊÌ iÊ «ÀiVÌÊ>ÊÌiÌ>LiÊvÀÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>VÞ°Ê half-a-chance benchmark before 2020 include L>>]ÊÀi>]ÊâiÀL>>]ÊÀ>]Ê >â> ÃÌ>]Ê Forecasting Liberal Democracy Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Myanmar, /ÕÀiÞ]Ê/ÕÀiÃÌ>]Ê>`Ê6iÌ>° If this relationship continues to hold, demo- `ÌÌi`Þ]ÊÃiÛiÀ>ÊvÊÌ iÃiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊv>ViÊ`>ÕÌ- }À>« VÊ«ÀiVÌÃÊVÕ`Ê i«Ê>>ÞÃÌÃÊ`iÌvÞÊ ing impediments to completing their demo- regions, and states within regions, that in the VÀ>ÌVÊ ÀivÀÃ°Ê ÀÊ L>]Ê }iÀ>]Ê >`Ê near and medium term are likely to experience Lebanon, further liberalization is unlikely while population age structures that are conducive non-state actors threaten lives and property, to liberal democracy—and those where liberal control territory, and operate state-like institu- democracy is at risk. Nearly all of the coun- ÌÃÊ>`ÊÌ>ðÊ9iÌÊÌ iÊ>}iÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀ>ÊVVÊ tries in two geographical sub-regions are pro- is ticking; as fertility declines and populations iVÌi`ÊÌÊ«>ÃÃÊÌ iÊ >v>V >ViÊLiV >ÀÊLÞÊ mature, recruitment will likely become more ÓäÓä\ÊÌ ÃiÊ>}ÊÌ iÊÀÌ iÀÊÀÊvÊvÀV>Ê difficult and more expensive, helping diminish ÀVV]Ê}iÀ>]Ê/ÕÃ>]Ê LÞ>]Ê>`Ê }Þ«Ì®Ê the already-dwindling field strength of insur- and along the northwestern rim of South gencies, whittling them to a small criminalized iÀV>Ê L>]Ê6iiâÕi>]Ê>`Ê VÕ>`À®°Ê core, or pressuring them to focus their resourc- iÊvÊÌ iÃiÊ ÀÌ ÊvÀV>ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ >ÃÊ«ÀiÛÕÃ- es on electoral politics (as in the evolution of ly attained liberal democracy, while Colombia, ÀÌ iÀÊÀi>`½Ãʺ/ÀÕLiû®°Ê Venezuela, and Ecuador reached these heights In several states, regimes will be able to stall i>ÀÞ]Ê >`Ê Ì iÊ ÀiÌÀi>Ìi`°Ê >ÞÃÌÃÊ Ã Õ`Ê or resist. For example, Vietnam’s communist expect one or more liberal democracies arising party and Iran’s clerical non-elected leadership 15
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊÎ\ÊÀii`Ê,>Ì}ÃÊvÊ graphic method provides little insight about ÓnÊÀiÀÊ ÕÃÌÊ >ÃÌiÀÊ governance in either of these clusters. ÕÀ«i>Ê>`ÊÃ>Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ For example, highly elevated death rates >}Ê«i«iÊÓäÊÌÊxxÊÞi>ÀÃÊ`Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ«iÀ- sistence of very youthful age structures in the 20 ÃÌÊÃiÀÕÃÞÊ ->vviVÌi`ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃpÜ iÊ 15 Free (liberal democracy) the source of great suffering among individu- Partly Free als, families, and communities—has not led Not Free 10 to the state failures that analysts once feared,
Countries 5 but instead to a confusing mélange of out- comes. Four states are rated liberal democra- 0 cies (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South _<.35 >.35–.40 >.40–.45 >.45 vÀV>®]ÊÜ iÊÌÜÊÌ iÀÃÊ>ÀiÊ>}ÊÌ iÊÃÌÊ Proportion of young adults (15–29) in the working-age population (15–64) >ÕÌVÀ>ÌVÊ -Ü>â>`Ê >`Ê <L>LÜi®°Ê Ê the oil-rich Gulf States, the composite age structure—the sum of a foreign-worker pop-
Data sources:ÊÀii`ÊÕÃiÊÓään®ÆÊ1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ulation overlaid on a much younger, socio- ÛÃÊÓääÇ®°Ê economically and ethnically separate age structure of citizens—produces misleading indications of age-structural maturity, and bear similarities to other state elites that have therefore overlooks both the political volatil- withstood the tide of age-structural change. ÌÞÊvÊÀ>LÊÞÕÌ ÊVÕÌÕÀiÊÊÌ iÊÕvÊ-Ì>ÌiÃÊ On the other hand, Venezuela’s President Hugo and grievances arising among foreign workers Chávez, having lost a constitutional referendum (Henderson, 2006). Ê ÛiLiÀÊÓääÇÊÌ >ÌÊÜÕ`Ê >ÛiÊ>Õ}iÌi`Ê ÃÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃÊ >ÛiÊ>ÌÕÀi`]ÊÌ iÊëii`Ê his constituency by lowering the voting age to vÊiÌ VÊà vÌÃÊ >ÃʵÕVii`°Ê/ iÊÃÌÊvÊÌ iÃiÊ 16, is left with only non-electoral means to dis- relative shifts is long, including: increased mantle checks on his own authority—a heavy- proportions of indigenous populations in handed tactic that, when previously applied by >ÌÊiÀV>ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÆÊ}ÀÜ}ÊÕLiÀÃÊvÊ Chávez, has alienated influential supporters. À>LÃÊ>`ÊÕÌÀ>"ÀÌ `ÝÊiÜÃÊÊÃÀ>iÆÊ>`Ê larger populations of Muslims in Western Beyond Prediction: Southern Europe. How will democracies respond to the Africa, the Gulf States, and the emergence of ethnic groups who previously Future of Europe have been political outsiders? Will the liberal democracies of European welfare states retain /ÜÊVÕÃÌiÀÃÊvÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ ÊiÝÌÀ>À`>ÀÞÊ their suite of liberties and generous social age structures were omitted from this analy- programs as they undergo dramatic ethnic ÃÃ\Ê£®ÊÌ iÊÃiÛiÊÃÌÊÃiÀÕÃÞÊ ->vviVÌi`Ê shifts? On these weighty topics the youth- countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South bulge method is unresponsive. vÀV>]Ê-Ü>â>`]Ê<>L>]Ê>`Ê<L>LÜi®]Ê where premature adult mortality buoys a high Summary proportion of young adults; and (2) the six oil- rich Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, By focusing exclusively on the institutional ->Õ`ÊÀ>L>]Ê>`Ê1Ìi`ÊÀ>LÊ À>Ìiî]ÊÜ iÀiÊ reforms and changes in political leadership that large populations of foreign workers mask more precede political liberalization, analysts have 16 ÞÕÌ vÕÊ`}iÕÃÊ««Õ>ÌðÊ/ ÃÊ`i- overlooked the influence of population age
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 structure on the timing and stability of liberal democracy. My analysis provides evidence sug- gesting that a youthful age structure—indicated by a large proportion of young adults in the working-age population—can constrain liberal `iVÀ>VÞÊ>`Ê`iÃÌ>LâiÊÌ°Ê/ ÃÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê>ÃÊ >ÌÊiÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ >ÛiÊÌi`i`]Ê>ÃÊ>Ê shows that the calculation of a country’s youth- bulge proportion can be used to assess a liberal }ÀÕ«]ÊÌÊiLÀ>ViÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>VÞÊÜ iÊ democracy’s fragility, identify uncommonly per- ÃÌ}Ê>Ê>À}iÊÞÕÌ ÊLÕ}i]ÊÜ V Ê>ÞÊ«>ÀÌÞÊ sistent authoritarian regimes, and generate rea- sonable and testable expectations for the advent iÝ«>ÊÜ ÞÊÈäÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÃiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ >ÛiÊ and stability of liberal democracy. v«v««i`ÊLiÌÜiiÊ>ÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>VÞÊ>`Ê>Ê
Notes less democratic regime at least once since the i>ÀÞÊ£ÇäÃ]Êv>ÀÊÀiÊÌ >Ê>ÞÊÌ iÀÊÀi}° £°Ê/ ÃÊ>>ÞÃÃÊVÕ`iÃÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÕÊ ÓäÓäÊ««Õ>ÌÊvÊxää]äääÊ«i«iÊ>`ÊÕÃiÃÊÀii`Ê House composite scores, which are the average of x°Ê/ iÊvÀiÀÊ >ÃÌiÀÊ VÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊL>>]Ê «ÌV>ÊÀ} ÌÃ]ʺ*,»ÊÃV>i`Ê£ÊÌÊÇ]ÊÜÌ Ê£ÊLi}ÊÌ iÊ Ài>]ÊâiÀL>>]Ê i>ÀÕÃ]Ê Ã>Ê>`ÊiÀâi}Û>]Ê maximum realization of political rights), and civil Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, LiÀÌiÃ]ʺ »ÊÃ>ÀÞÊÃV>i`Ê£ÊÌÊÇ®°Ê/ iÊV>Ìi}ÀÞÊ Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, “Free” is assigned to assessments where the average of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, *,Ê>`Ê ÊÃVÀiÃÊÀ>}iÃÊvÀÊ£°äÊÌÊÓ°x°Ê -Û>Ê,i«ÕLV]Ê-Ûi>]Ê,>>]Ê,ÕÃÃ>]Ê/>ÃÌ>]Ê Ó°Ê/ iÊÌ iÀiÌV>ÊLÀi>`ÜÊvÊÌ ÃÊ«ÀViÃÃÊÜ>ÃÊ /ÕÀiÃÌ>]Ê1À>i]Ê>`Ê1âLiÃÌ>°Ê first presented by Jack Goldstone at a seminar on democratization processes sponsored by the National Intelligence Council, March 2008. References ΰÊ/ iÊwÛiÊÀi}ÃÊ>Ài\Ê ÀÌ Ê>`Ê-ÕÌ ÊiÀV>]Ê ÕÀ«iÊVÕ`}Ê,ÕÃÃ>®]Ê ``iÊ >ÃÌ ÀÌ ÊvÀV>]Ê Bloom, David E., David Canning, & Jaypee Sevilla. ÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>]Ê>`ÊÌ iÀÊÃ>"Vi>>°Ê/ ÃÊ (2002). The demographic dividend: A new perspective analysis omits two sets of countries with irregular on the economic consequences of population change. (non-transitional) age structures: the seven countries ->Ì>Ê V>]Ê \Ê, ° ÜÌ Ê } ÊÀ>ÌiÃÊvÊ6É -Ê>`ÊÌ iÊÃÝÊÕvÊ-Ì>ÌiÃÊ >ÀÌ iÀÃ]Ê/ >ðÊÓääÓ®°Êº/ iÊi`ÊvÊÌ iÊÌÀ>ÃÌÊ with a large immigrant population. paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13£®]ÊxÓ£° {°Ê/ ÃÊ>>ÞÃÃÊi«ÞÃÊÜi} Ìi`Êi>ÃÌõÕ>ÀiÃÊ VÌÌ>]Ê,V >À`Ê*°ÊÓään]Ê >ÀV É«À®°ÊºÜÊ regression to determine regression coefficients and democracies grow up: Countries with too many intercepts for linear models generating the proportion young people may not have a fighting chance for vÊLiÀ>Ê`iVÀ>ViÃÊiÝ«iVÌi`ÊÊ>ÊÀi}Ê9®ÊvÀÊ freedom.” Foreign Policy, 165, 80-82. the average proportion of young adults (X) among Diamond, Larry J. (1996). “Is the third wave over?” countries in that region (not the regional young-adult Journal of Democracy 7ή]ÊÓäÎÇ° proportion). Seven regressions were generated, one Freedom House. (2008). Freedom in the world: Selected vÀÊi>V ÊwÛiÊÞi>ÀÃ]ÊvÀÊ£ÇxÊÌÊÓääx°Ê iÊvÊÌ iÊ data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of regression parameters from these were statistically political rights and civil liberties. Washington, DC: `vviÀiÌ°Ê/ iÊÀi}ÀiÃÃÊiµÕ>ÌÊvÀÊÌ iÃiÊV«ÃÌiÊ Freedom House. `>Ì>Ê>Ài\Ê ÊrÊä°äÎÎ9I£ä䮳£°nÎ]ÊÜ iÀiÊ ÊÃÊ `ÃÌi]Ê>VÊ°Ê££®°ÊRevolution and rebellion in the expected proportion of liberal democracies in a the early modern world°Ê iÀiiÞ]Ê \Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ Ài}>Ê}ÀÕ«}ÊvÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>`Ê9ÊÃÊÌ iÊ«À«À- California Press. ÌÊvÊÞÕ}Ê>`ÕÌÃ]Ê>}iÊ£xÊÌÊÓ]ÊÊÌ iÊÜÀ} Henderson, Simon. (2006). “High rises and low wages: >}iÊ««Õ>Ì]Ê£xÊÌÊÈ{°Ê/ ÃÊ>>ÞÃÃÊ>ÃÊ >ÃÊLiiÊ iÝ«>ÌÀ>ÌiÊ>LÀÊÊÕvÊÀ>LÊ-Ì>Ìið»ÊPolicyWatch performed using Polity IV data, assuming liberal (No. 1091). Washington, DC: Washington democracy as polity scores from +8 to +10, with very Institute for Near East Policy. similar results. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The third wave: 17
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ONLINE
Two graphics accompanying Richard Cincotta’s Foreign Policy magazine article, “How Democracies Grow Up,” are available online:
A map of “The Young World” indicates the year when each country is projected to pass the “half-a-chance” benchmark based on the proportion of young adults in the working-age population: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4199
“Where Youth and Freedom Collide” illustrates the likelihood of liberal democracy at various youth-bulge proportions: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4174
Freedom House rates countries as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” based on assessments of their political rights and civil liberties: www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls
Map of Freedom in the World, 2008 edition: www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=363&year=2008
Along with fellow Report 13 author Jack Goldstone, Cincotta assessed the evidence for “the security demographic” at the Wilson Center in June 2006: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index. cfm?topic_id=1413&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=205876
Two previous ECSP Report articles by Cincotta analyze different aspects of the links between age structure and conflict:
“Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Graphic Metric” (coauthored by Elizabeth Leahy): http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/PopAgeStructures &CivilConflict12.pdf
“Demographic Security Comes of Age”: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ ecspr10_C-cincotta.pdf
Democratization in the late twentieth century. modern world.” Comparative Studies in Society and Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. History 10ή]ÊÓÎÇÓÈä° Leahy, Elizabeth, with Robert Engelman, Carolyn G. Republic of China (ROC), Directorate of the Budget. 6}i]Ê->À> Ê>``V]ÊEÊ/`Ê*ÀiÃÌ°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊThe (2006). Statistical yearbook of the Republic of China, shape of things to come: Why age structure matters 2005.Ê/>«i\Ê ÝiVÕÌÛiÊ9Õ>]Ê," ° to a safer, more equitable world. Washington, DC: Schmitter, Philippe C. (1980). Speculations about the *«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>° prospective demise of authoritarian regimes and its ii]Ê,>`]ÊEÊ`ÀiÜÊ >ðÊÓääÈ®°Êº7 >ÌÊÃÊÌ iÊ possible consequences. Washington, DC: Woodrow demographic dividend?” Finance and Development Wilson International Center for Scholars. 43ή]ʣȣǰ 1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛðÊÓääÇ®°ÊWorld popula- Mesquida, Christian G., & Neil I. Wiener. (1996). tion prospects: The 2006 revision°Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê1 Ê ºÕ>ÊViVÌÛiÊ>}}ÀiÃÃ\ÊÊLi >ÛÀ>ÊiV- i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ VVÊ>`Ê-V>Êvv>Àð ogy perspective.” Ethology and Sociobiology 17, 1À`>]ÊiÀ°ÊÓääÈ®°ÊºÊV>à ÊvÊ}iiÀ>ÌöÊ9ÕÌ Ê Ó{ÇÓÈÓ° bulges and political violence.” International Studies iÀ]ÊiÀLiÀÌ°Ê£ÈÇÉÈn®°Êº9ÕÌ Ê>ÃÊ>ÊvÀViÊÊÌ iÊ Quarterly 50]ÊÈäÇÈÓ° 18
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
Population in Defense Policy Planning
Ê £Ç{]Ê Ì iÊ >Ì>Ê -iVÕÀÌÞÊ ÕVÊ the spread of terrorist networks. In this article, I expressed concern that population growth outline the military and intelligence communi- Iin less-developed countries would increase ties’ interests in population trends in three key competition for resources, as a result of its assess- Ài}ÃpÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌ]Ê iÌÀ>Ê Ã>]Ê >`Ê ment of “the likelihood that population growth vÀV>p>`Ê`iÃVÀLiÊÌ iÀÊÕÃiÊvÊ`i}À>« ÞÊÌÊ or imbalances will produce disruptive foreign support military planning and strategy. policies and international instability” (Kissinger, £Ç{]Ê«°Ê£®°Ê/`>Þ½ÃÊ`iviÃiÊVÕÌÞÊ >ÃÊ>Ê Four Trends for Defense broader view of the connections between demog- raphy and security, focusing less on competition Interest in population trends has recent- for resources or on population policies to stem ly increased due to the wars in Iraq and growth and more on a wider range of population v} >ÃÌ>]Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊÌ iÊ>ÕV ÊvÊÌ iÊiÜÊ issues, such as age structure and migration. But vÀV>Ê >`Ê, " ®°ÊÕÀÊ}L>Ê government interest in the influence of popu- demographic trends are particularly relevant to lation on stability and foreign policy remains U.S. defense planning in these regions: youth- high—and, since 9/11, has intensified. ful populations, changes in military personnel, /Ê «Ài«>ÀiÊ vÀÊ ÌiÀÀÀÃÌÊ >ÌÌ>VÃÊ >`Ê Ì iÀÊ international migration, and urbanization. irregular, non-state challenges, the Department of Defense (DoD) has begun to seriously exam- Youthful Populations ine the roles of demography, ethnic and national ,Ê ÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌÊ>`ÊvÀV>pÌ iÊÌÜÊv>ÃÌiÃÌÊ identity, and environmental issues in disrupt- DABBS ing state stability and instigating conflict. While }ÀÜ}ÊÀi}ÃÊÊÌ iÊÜÀ`pLiÌÜiiÊÎäÊ>`Ê SCIUBBA some in the government have long recognized the importance of these issues, the most recent Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released ÃÊ>Ê iÊ ÛÀiÌ>ÊiÜÊÊÌ iÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ in February 2006, encouraged the systematic ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê-ÌÕ`iÃÊ>ÌÊ, `iÃÊ i}i°Ê- iÊ analysis and incorporation of these factors into >ÃÊLiiÊ>ÊVÃÕÌ>ÌÊvÀÊ*VÞÊ*>}ÊÊÌ iÊ a comprehensive national security framework. "vvViÊvÊÌ iÊ-iVÀiÌ>ÀÞÊvÊ iviÃiÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê For example, the 2006 QDR directed DoD to i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ iviÃi]ÊÜ iÀiÊà iÊ`iÛi«i`Ê build partnership capacity, to shift from “con- ÃiÛiÀ>Ê«ÀiVÌÃÊ}ÊëiVvVÊ`i}À>« VÊ ducting activities ourselves to enabling partners ÌÀi`ÃÊÌÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÃÃÕiðÊ-VÕLL>ÊÀiViÛi`Ê iÀÊ to do more for themselves” (Rumsfeld, 2006, p. `VÌÀ>ÌiÊvÀÊÌ iÊÛiÀiÌÊ>`Ê*ÌVÃÊ 2). DoD recognizes that the inability of some i«>ÀÌiÌÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ >ÀÞ>`°Ê/ iÊ states to meet the needs of their growing popula- ÛiÜÃÊiÝ«ÀiÃÃi`ÊÊÌ ÃÊ>ÀÌViÊ>ÀiÊÌ ÃiÊvÊÌ iÊ tions may impede this goal; instead of increasing >ÕÌ ÀÊ>`Ê`ÊÌÊÀiviVÌÊÌ iÊvvV>Ê«VÞÊÀÊ the ability of partners to aid in achieving U.S. «ÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ iviÃiÊÀÊÌ iÊ goals, domestic strains are likely to hamper these 1°-°Ê}ÛiÀiÌ°Ê* ÌÊLÞÊ >Û`Ê>ÜÝ ÕÀÃÌ]Ê 7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ® states’ efforts to defend their borders and prevent 19
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM £x]ÊÛVÌÀÞpÊÜ >ÌiÛiÀÊvÀpÜÊÀi>Ê elusive as long as this segment of the popula- ÌÊ ÃÊ >À}>âi`Ê *, ]Ê ÓääÇ®°Ê "}}Ê programs to build schools and improve educa- tion, such as those carried out by the Combined / iÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ`iÃÊÌÊ >ÛiÊ>ÊÀLÕÃÌÊ ÌÊ/>ÃÊÀViÀÊvÊvÀV>ÊÕ`iÀÊ1°-°Ê Central Command, are a start, but more con- >`ÊV«Ài iÃÛiÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊvÀÊÌ>À}iÌ}ÊÌ iÊ centrated efforts to engage children and youth ViVÌÃÊLiÌÜiiÊÞÕÌ Ê>`ÊVvVÌ°ÊÛiÊ in positive activities would not only improve their attitudes toward U.S. soldiers, but would Ì >ÌÊ{xÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊv} >Ê««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ also empower them to contribute to rebuilding Õ`iÀÊ>}iÊ£x]ÊÛVÌÀÞpÊÜ >ÌiÛiÀÊvÀpÜÊ their societies. U.S. soldiers helping to construct some Ài>ÊiÕÃÛiÊ>ÃÊ}Ê>ÃÊÌ ÃÊÃi}iÌÊvÊÌ iÊ schools and distribute educational supplies may improve public relations, but as part of U.S. ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ>À}>âi`° ÃÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊvÀÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌÊ>`ÊvÀV>]Ê Ê should focus on training and engaging youth in more meaningful ways. Programs that focus on leadership skills and encourage peaceful con- xäÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÃÊÊÃÌÊÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ tact between youth and U.S. military personnel >ÀiÊ Õ`iÀÊ >}iÊ £xÊ *, ]Ê ÓääÇ®°Ê/ iÃiÊ Õ}iÊ ÜÕ`ÊLiÊ>ÊÃÌ>ÀÌ°Ê/ iÊ`ÃV«iÊ>`Êi>`iÀà «Ê youth cohorts—commonly known as “youth required of soldiers makes them good role mod- bulges”—can be desperate or disgruntled if they els for youth in developing states, and the more have few economic or political opportunities. meaningful interactions these youth have with Lack of employment may also prevent them soldiers, the more successful DoD will be in from getting married or participating in other encouraging stability in these volatile regions. ÌÀ>`Ì>ÊÀÌiÃÊvÊ«>ÃÃ>}i°Ê9ÕÌ ÊLÕ}iÃÊ>`Ê / iÊ>ÌÕÀiÊvÊVyVÌÊÃÊV >}}]Êi>`}ÊÌ iÊ armed conflict are strongly correlated, especially U.S. military to undertake such new and inno- in underdeveloped countries (see, e.g., Urdal, vative missions and roles. ÓääÈ®°Ê/ ÕÃ]ÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌÊ>`ÊvÀV>Ê>ÀiÊ likely to become more turbulent as the popu- Military Personnel lation grows and remains youthful, especially Ü iÀiÊÞÕ}Ê«i«iÊ>VÊLÊ««ÀÌÕÌiÃÊÀÊ Demographic trends in fertility and mortality Ì iÀÊ«ÃÌÛiÊÕÌiÌðÊÊvÀV>]ÊÌ iÊ>Ài>`Þ`ÀiÊ rates can directly affect a military’s recruiting situation is compounded by the prevalence of «°Ê Ãi>ÃiÃÊiÊ6É -]Ê>>À>]Ê>`Ê `i>`ÞÊviVÌÕÃÊ`Ãi>ÃiÃpÃÕV Ê>ÃÊ6É -]Ê ÌÕLiÀVÕÃÃÊ>ÀiÊÜi>i}ÊvÀV>ÊÌ>ÀiÃÊ malaria, and tuberculosis—that kill the most at the same time that conflict may be increas- productive segments of society. ing due to more youthful populations, strained / ÀÕ} Ê"«iÀ>ÌÃÊ `ÕÀ}ÊÀii`Ê>`Ê ÀiÃÕÀViÃ]Ê>`Ê>Ê>VÊvÊ}ÛiÀ>Vi°Ê6É -Ê Iraqi Freedom, as well as larger efforts to com- has devastated the most productive segments bat global terrorist networks, the U.S. military vÊvÀV>ÊÃViÌÞ]ÊiëiV>ÞÊÌÃÊÌ>ÀÞ>}iÊ is highly engaged in these regions. However, the ««Õ>ÌÊ *, ]Ê Óään®°Ê Ì Õ} Ê Ì iÀiÊ ÃÊ United States does not have a robust and com- little comprehensive data, UN and govern- prehensive strategy for targeting the connec- ment reports show that infection rates in many ÌÃÊLiÌÜiiÊÞÕÌ Ê>`ÊVyVÌ°ÊÛiÊÌ >ÌÊ{xÊ vÀV>ÊÌ>ÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊÃ} ÌÞÊ } iÀÊÌ >ÊÊÌ iÊ 20 «iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊv} >Ê««Õ>ÌÊÃÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊ general population, as rates are exacerbated by
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 -«V°Êà ÊiÃ]Ê>Êi`VÊvÊ Ì iÊnÓ`ÊÀLÀiÊ ÛÃ]Ê Ã«iVÌÃÊ>Êv} >ÊV `ÊvÀÊ ÃÞ«ÌÃÊvÊ«ÊiÞi]ÊÊ -i«Ì°ÊÎä]ÊÓääÓ]Ê >`> >À]Ê v} >ÃÌ>°ÊiÃÊÃÊ «>ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊ*ÃÞV }V>Ê "«iÀ>ÌÃÊ*-9"*®ÊÌi>Ã]Ê Õ>Ì>À>Ê>`Ê«>V>}iÊ Ì >ÌÊ}iÃÊÕÌÊÊ`>ÞÊ«>ÌÀÃÊ ÌÊV>ÊÛ>}iÃÊÌÊ i«Ê LÕ`Ê>Ê«ÃÌÛiÊÀ>««ÀÌÊÜÌ Ê Ì iÊV>ÊVÕÌiÃÊ>`Ê 1°-°ÊÀViðÊ* ÌÊLÞÊ-«V°Ê >Àà >Ê iÀÃÆÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊ 1°-°ÊÀÞ®
the extended time soldiers spend away from able to find legitimate employment, they will home, easier access to money for prostitutes and continue to be more susceptible to recruit- drugs, and risky behavior characteristic both of ment by anti-U.S. groups. the young in general and military culture in «>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÊ>ÀÀiÌÌ]ÊÓääx®°Ê/ iÊ1°-°ÊÌ>ÀÞÊÃÊ International Migration concerned that these diseases could have a dev- >ÃÌ>Ì}ÊivviVÌÊÊvÀV>Ê«i>Viii«}ÊvÀViÃ]Ê Large-scale movements of people can change the >ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊÊivvÀÌÃÊvÊiÀV>ÃÊ>`ÊvÀV>ÃÊ composition of a country’s population within to work together against terrorism. days or weeks—much more quickly than fertil- In many countries in the Middle East, ity and mortality trends. When people move, so growing youthful populations mean the pool do their politics; clashes of identity and interests of potential recruits is too big—and the mili- may lead to conflict or create deep social divi- tary is one of the few employment outlets for ÃðÊÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌÊ>`ÊvÀV>]Ê}À>ÌÊ ÞÕ}ÊiÊÊ>ÊÀi}ÊÜ iÀiÊLÃÊ>ÀiÊÃV>ÀVi°Ê ÃÊvÌiÊVyVÌ`ÀÛi°Ê/ iÊÃÊ`ë>Vi`Ê In Iraq under Saddam Hussein, young Sunni by troubles in Sudan and Iraq, for example, iÊi`ÊÌ iÊÌ>ÀÞ]ÊLÕÌÊÜÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊ could potentially carry their domestic political Iraqi system has been disrupted, youth are skirmishes across borders and further disrupt increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by Ì iÃiÊÀi}ðÊÀi>`Þ]ÊiÛÀiÌ>ÞÊ`ÕVi`Ê extremists. With few ways to earn a living }À>ÌÊÊ-ÕÌ ÊÃ>Ê >ÃÊV>ÕÃi`ÊVyVÌ°Ê and support their families, many young Iraqi -ViÊÌ iÊ£xäÃ]Ê£Ó£ÇÊÊ >}>`ià ÃÊ men are more willing to accept a couple of have moved to India because of floods, drought, hundred dollars—or less—to plant a roadside land scarcity, and other environmental condi- bomb or take up arms for warring factions. ÌðÊ/ ÃÊ}À>ÌÊi`ÊÌÊÛiViÊLiÌÜiiÊ Unless economic development accompanies eastern Indians and Bangladeshis in the 1980s U.S. efforts in Iraq and these young men are ,iÕÛiÞ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê 21
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 1 ,ÊÓääÇ®ÊiÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊÀiÊÌ >Ê of the U.S. military abroad, as demonstrated by two million Iraqi refugees are elsewhere in the the relief efforts following the 2004 Southeast Middle East—more than one million in Syria Ã>ÊÌÃÕ>Ê>`ÊÌ iÊÓääxÊ*>ÃÌ>Êi>ÀÌ - alone. Governments in the region have been quake. Soldiers can also increase their own cul- struggling to meet the needs of this displaced tural awareness by engaging with locals in areas ««Õ>ÌÊ>`Ê«ÀÛ`iÊÃV>ÊÃiÀÛViÃ]ÊLÃ]Ê where they otherwise would not be deployed. >`Ê ÕÃ}°Ê/iÃÃÊLiÌÜiiÊVÌâiÃÊvÊÌ iÊ Whereas urbanization in developed states receiving states and the refugees are producing offers benefits to city residents—sanitation, edu- social strife in an unstable region and overly bur- V>Ì]ÊLÃ]Ê>`ÊÌÀ>ëÀÌ>ÌpÃÕÃÊvviÀÊ dening governments that already have trouble no such services or governance. “Slumization” providing for their populations. While internal Ê ÃÕL-> >À>Ê vÀV>Ê VÀi>ÃiÃÊ Õ}ÛiÀi`Ê strife could potentially unseat regimes that are areas and the potential for internal instability, unfriendly to the United States, like Iran, there and thus provides an environment conducive to 1iÌÊ is no guarantee that the new government would terrorist recruitment and activity. Rapid urban- LiÊ>ÊÀiÊ«i>VivÕÊÀÊÃÌ>LiÊi°Ê/ iÊ1Ìi`Ê ization can increase the risk of civil conflict: iÝ«iVÌ>ÌÃÊÊ States is seeking to build the capacity of states in “During the 1990s, countries with urban pop- the Middle East to address their internal issues ulation growth rates greater than 4 percent a ÛiÀVÀÜ`i`Ê and aid in the war on terror by encouraging sta- year were twice as likely to experience civil con- cities can be ble governments that could stem sectarian vio- flict than those where urban growth was more lence, but international migration will continue «>Vi`»Ê1 //]ÊÓääÈL]Ê«°Ê£®°Ê Ì iÊV>Ì>ÞÃÌÊvÀÊ to challenge these efforts in the region. In most slums and cities in developing states, VÛÊVvVÌ° population growth is outpacing the ability of the Urbanization ÃÌ>ÌiÊÌÊVÀi>ÌiÊLÃÊvÀÊÌ iÃiÊVÌâiÃÊ>`ÊÌÊLÕ`Ê infrastructure to accommodate concomitant /ÜÊ>ÀÊ}L>ÊÕÀL>â>ÌÊÌÀi`ÃÊVÕ`Ê growth in pollution and sewage. Such unmet challenge the U.S. military to continue to expectations in overcrowded cities can be the cat- increase its global role: the growing concentra- alyst for civil conflict. Urban instability—as we tion of people in megacities and coastal areas have seen in Iraq—requires that U.S. forces be and the growth of urban slums. By 2020, all prepared for a variety of missions in urban envi- but four of the world’s megacities—those cit- ronments, and could increasingly blur the dis- ies with more than 10 million people—will be tinctions between police and military functions. Ê`iÛi«}ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ1 //]ÊÓääÈV®°Ê Ê>``Ì]ÊÇxÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊÜÀ`½ÃÊ««Õ>- Opportunities to Address These tion already lives in areas that were affected by Trends in Current Policy at least one natural disaster between 1980 and ÓäääÊ1 //]ÊÓääÈ>®°Ê i}>VÌiÃÊ>`Ê / iÊ`iviÃiÊVÕÌÞÊ >ÃÊÌ ÀiiÊ>ÀÊ««À- coastal cities in developing countries lack the tunities to address these trends and implications infrastructure to withstand most disasters and through policies aimed at the Middle East, Ì iÊV>«>VÌÞÊÌÊ`i>ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ>vÌiÀivviVÌðÊ/ iÊ vÀV>]Ê>`Ê iÌÀ>ÊÃ>°ÊÀÃÌ]ÊÌ iÊiÃÌ>Là - vulnerability of these areas will likely increase iÌÊvÊ, " Ê`iÃÌÀ>ÌiÃÊÀiV}ÌÊ demand for stability operations (military efforts that the military and intelligence communities to maintain or restore order) and humanitar- should be more anticipatory, rather than reac- >Ê>ÃÃÃÌ>Vi°Ê/ Õ} ÊÌ iÃiÊVÀi>Ãi`ÊÀiµÕÀi- tionary. In planning for the roles and missions ments may strain U.S. capabilities, conducting of this command, DoD—in partnership with stability operations or providing humanitarian the intelligence community—should develop 22 assistance could also help build a positive image ÃÌÀ>Ìi}iÃÊ ÌÊ i`>ÌiÊ ivviVÌÃÊ vÊ 6É -]Ê
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 -}Ì°ÊÀi``ÞÊ6>`iâ]Ê>ÃÃ}i`Ê ÌÊÌ iÊÓÇÌ Ê - ]Ê{Ì Ê /]Ê £ÃÌÊ >Û°Ê Û°]Ê>ÌÌi«ÌÃÊÌÊ reach a soccer ball before >ÊÀ>µÊ /,Ê-`iÀÊÜÌ Ê Ì iÊ£äÌ ÊÊ Û°]ÊV>ÊVÊÌ iÊ L>Ê>Ü>ÞÊ`ÕÀ}Ê>ÊÃVViÀÊ >ÌV Ê>ÌÊ Ì}iVÞÊ "«iÀ>ÌÃÊ >ÃiÊ``iÀÊ ÊÃÕÌ iÀÊÀ>µÊ"VÌ°ÊÓÎ]Ê Óään°Ê/ iÊVÌiÃÌÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê ivvÀÌÊÌÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊÃÌÀi}Ì iÊ Ì iÊÌÜÊÕÌýʫ>ÀÌiÀà «Ê in stabilizing Iraq. (Photo LÞÊ >°ÊiÃÃiÊi`iÀÃÆÊ VÕÀÌiÃÞÊ1°-°ÊÀÞ®
conflict-driven migration, and youthful popu- >Þâ}Ê`i}À>« VÊÃÃÕiÃÊÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ lations. For example, the military could devise >ÃÌÊ>`Ê iÌÀ>ÊÃ>ÊÃÊ>ÃÊ>ÊÀLÕÃÌÊ«iViÊvÊ programs that engage youth through leader- the strategy for winning the “long war.” ship training and through their involvement Finally, the defense and intelligence com- in building infrastructure alongside soldiers. munities must recognize their limited ability to , " Ê>ÞÊ>ÃÊvviÀÊÀiÊ««ÀÌÕ- yÕiViÊÌ iÃiÊÌÀi`ðÊVVÀ`}ÊÌÊÌ iÊÃÌ>- ÌiÃÊÌÊ«>ÀÌiÀÊÜÌ ÊvÀV>ÊÌ>ÀiÃÊÌÊ i«Ê dard division of labor within the U.S. govern- Ì iÊVL>ÌÊ6É -]ÊLÞÊiÝ«>`}Ê6É ment, the intelligence community is tasked -Êi`ÕV>ÌÊ>`Êi>`iÀà «ÊÌÀ>}pÃiÊ with providing analysis, not recommending of which can be funded under existing foreign or implementing policies that address these military training and education programs. ««Õ>ÌÊVViÀðÊ`]ÊÜ iÊÌÊÃÊÜÌ Ê Second, DoD could continue to take demo- the scope of the military’s mandate to prepare graphic issues into account when crafting for humanitarian missions and stability opera- the next iterations of policy planning docu- tions, devising education programs for youthful ments, as it did in the latest National Defense populations and even distributing aid requires -ÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊÃiiÊLÀivÊÊ«>}iÊÓÈ®°Ê/ iÊ -Ê>`Ê the help of partners in other agencies. DoD other policy reports analyze long-term trends ÜÊii`ÊÌÊ«>ÀÌiÀÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê}iVÞÊvÀÊ (like climate change, globalization, and tech- International Development and non-govern- nology) and help shape the types of programs mental organizations; many of these agencies DoD funds, the capabilities the military devel- are better suited to work with local populations ops, and priorities for intelligence collection. and can function as advisors and planners. 23
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 6Ú >Ì>Ú-iVÕÀÌÞ°«`v Gates, Robert M. (2008, June). National defense strategy. Washington, DC: Department of iviÃi°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20 defense%20strategy.pdf / iÊÌ>ÀÞÊ`iÃÊÌÊ>Ü>ÞÃÊ >ÛiÊÌ iÊÌÃÊÌÊ ÃÃ}iÀ]ÊiÀÞ°Ê£Ç{]Ê«ÀÊÓ{®°ÊNational security study memorandum 200 directive. Washington, >``ÀiÃÃÊÌ iÃiÊ««Õ>ÌÊ>`Ê`iÛi«iÌÊ \Ê >Ì>Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ ÕV°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ at ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°««Õ>ÌÃiVÕÀÌÞ°À}É££ ΰ ÃÃÕiÃ]ÊLÕÌÊLÞÊ`À>Ü}ÊÊ>ÊÜ`iÀÊVÕÌÞÊ html#1 *«Õ>ÌÊ,iviÀiViÊ ÕÀi>ÕÊ*, ®°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê2007 vÀÊÃÕ««ÀÌ]ÊÌ iÞÊiÃÃiÊÌ iÊV >ViÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÞÊ world population data sheet. Washington, DC: *, °ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.prb.org/ ÜÊ >ÛiÊÌÊ`i>ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊVÃiµÕiVið «`väÇÉäÇ7* -Ú }°«`v *, °ÊÓään®°Êº*«Õ>ÌÊ>}iÃÊ£xÓ{ÊÜÌ Ê6É -]Ê 2001 (%).” Datafinder Q`>Ì>L>ÃiR°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ While interaction among the agencies at all at ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°«ÀL°À}É >Ì>w`iÀÉ/«VÉ >À° aspx?sort=v&order=d&variable=96 personnel levels is frequent, fostering the type ,iÕÛiÞ]Ê,>v>i°ÊÓääÇ®°Êº >ÌiÊV >}i`ÕVi`Ê of large-scale collaboration necessary to address migration and violent conflict.” Political Geography demographic trends requires two key steps. 26È®]ÊÈxÈÈÇΰ First, it needs the support and encouragement Rumsfeld, Donald. (2006, February 6). Quadrennial of senior leadership, both political appointees defense review report. Washington, DC: Department vÊ iviÃi°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. and career civil servants, in all departments. `iviÃi°Éµ`ÀÉÀi«ÀÌÉ,i«ÀÌÓääÈäÓäΰ«`v Second, top-down direction from Congress and Rupiya, Martin (Ed.) (2006). The enemy within: the executive branch could help institutionalize Southern African militaries’ quarter-century battle the process. with HIV and AIDS.Ê*ÀiÌÀ>]Ê-ÕÌ ÊvÀV>\Ê ``Ì>Þ]ÊÊÌÃÊ`i>}ÃÊÜÌ Ê }ÀiÃÃ]Ê ÃÌÌÕÌiÊvÀÊ-iVÕÀÌÞÊ-ÌÕ`iðÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÕL>Ì>>°iÌÉ`VÃÉ Û>`ÉÀÕ«Þ>Ú the military can voice its support for develop- iiÞÚÜÌ ÚÌ>ÀÞÚ ÛÚäȣ䰫`v iÌÊÊÌ iÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌ]ÊvÀV>]Ê>`Ê iÌÀ>Ê UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Ã>]Ê>`ÊVÕV>ÌiÊÌ iÊViVÌÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ ÓääÇ]Ê-i«ÌiLiÀ®°ÊStatistics on displaced Iraqis demographic issues and security. DoD could also around the world. Geneva: UNHCR. Û>>LiÊ online at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ encourage congressional funding for necessary iÉ«i`V°«`v¶ÌLr-1 -/ -E`r{ÇäÎnÇvVÓ «À}À>ðÊ/ iÊÌ>ÀÞÊ`iÃÊÌÊ>Ü>ÞÃÊ >ÛiÊÌ iÊ UN Human Settlements Programme tools to address these population and develop- 1 //®°ÊÓääÈ>®°Êº/ iÊÕÀL>Ê«i>ÌÞ\Ê ment issues, but by drawing on a wider com- Conflict and natural disaster.” In State of the world’s munity for support, they lessen the chances that cities 2006/7°Ê >ÀL]Ê iÞ>\Ê1 //°Ê Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÓ°Õ >LÌ>Ì°À}Éi`>- they will have to deal with the consequences. ViÌÀiÉ`VÕiÌÃÉÃÜVÀÓääÈÉ-"7 ,¯ÓäÓΰ«`v 1 //°ÊÓääÈL®°Êº/ iÊÕÀL>Ê«i>ÌÞ\Ê iÜÊ References threats, old fears.” In State of the world’s cities 2006/7.Ê >ÀL]Ê iÞ>\Ê1 //°ÊÛ>>LiÊ iÌiÀÊvÀÊ >Û>Ê>ÞÃiÃÊ ®°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊNational online at http://ww2.unhabitat.org/mediacentre/ security and the threat of climate change.ÊiÝ>`À>]Ê documents/sowcr2006/SOWCR%2010.pdf 6\Ê/ iÊ Ê À«À>Ì°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ 1 //°ÊÓääÈV®°Êº1ÀL>â>Ì\Ê i}>ÊEÊiÌ>Ê at http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/ cities, new city states?” In State of the world’s cities National%20Security%20and%20the%20 2006/7.Ê >ÀL]Ê iÞ>\Ê1 //°ÊÛ>>LiÊ / Ài>̯Óäv¯Óä >Ìi¯Óä >}i°«`v online at http://hq.unhabitat.org/documents/ >ÀÀiÌÌ]Ê >ÕÀi°ÊÓääx®°ÊHIV and national security: i`>ÚViÌÀiÉÃÜVÀÓääÈÉ-"7 ,¯ÓäÓ°«`v Where are the links? Washington, DC: Council 1À`>]ÊiÀ°ÊÓääÈ®°ÊºÊV>à ÊvÊ}iiÀ>ÌöÊ9ÕÌ Ê ÊÀi}Ê,i>ÌðÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp:// bulges and political violence.” International Studies 24 www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ Quarterly 50ή]ÊÈäÇÈÎä°
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 REPORT ONLINE
The latest National Defense Strategy, released in June 2008 by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, recognizes the security risks posed by both population growth and deficit—due to aging, shrinking, or disease—the role of climate pressures, and the connections between population and the environment: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf
The Department of Defense’s Stability Operations Capabilities notes that “integrated military and civilian operations are the now the norm with most military operations taking place in the midst of civilian populations. U.S. military forces must be prepared to support civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts and to lead and conduct these missions when civilians cannot”: http://www. defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/stabilityOps/
LTC Shannon Beebe (USA), senior Africa analyst at the Department of the Army, wrote in the New Security Beat that “security in Africa depends heavily on non-military factors that fall outside the traditional purview of the armed forces. For AFRICOM to be successful, it must approach security as a mutually beneficial proposition, not a zero-sum game”: http://newsecurity beat.blogspot.com/2007/07/guest-contributor-shannon-beebe-on.html?showComment=122169 0660000#c9183747927274650178
-}Ì°Ê >Ì iÀiÊ"Û>ÀiâÊÃÊ ÛiÀÊ>ÊÌ``iÀÊ`ÕÀ}Ê>Ê i`V>ÊVÛÊ>VÌÊ«À}À>]Ê ÕÞÊÓ{]ÊÓään]Ê>ÌÊ>ÊÛ>}iÊ ÃV ÊÊÕLiÌÌ]Ê LÕÌ°Ê "Û>ÀiâÊÃÊ>Êi`VÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ Î{xÌ Ê ÛÊvv>ÀÃÊ À}>`iÊ ÜÀ}ÊÜÌ Ê Li`Ê ÌÊ/>ÃÊÀViÀÊvÊ vÀV>Ê/"®°Ê"Ê"VÌ°Ê £]ÊÓään]ÊÌ iÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ iviÃiÊÃÌ`ÊÕ«Ê1°-°ÊvÀV>Ê >`]ÊÀÊ, " °Ê * ÌÊLÞÊÀÊÀViÊ/iV Ê -iÀ}i>ÌÊiÀiÞÊ/°Ê VÆÊ VÕÀÌiÃÞÊ/"®
25
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Environment, Population in the 2008 National Defense Strategy
by JENNIFER The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS; cisely those risks are, as the authors never explicitly DABBS Gates, 2008), released by the U.S. Department of identify them. Instead, they emphasize flexibility in SCIUBBA Defense (DoD) in July, delivers the expected, but preparing to meet a range of possible challenges. also throws in a few surprises. The NDS reflects The environmental security language in this traditional concerns over terrorism, rogue states, NDS grew out of several years of work within Source: The New Security Beat, and the rise of China, but also gives a more promi- the Department, primarily in the Office of Policy ÌÌ«\ÉÉiÜÃiVÕÀÌÞLi>Ì°L}ḛ̈V nent role to the connections among people, their Planning under the Office of the Under Secretary environment, and national security. Both natural for Defense, to study individual trends, such as disasters and growing competition for resources population, energy, and environment, as well as a are listed alongside terrorism as some of the main series of workshops and exercises outlining possi- challenges facing the United States. ble “shocks.” For example, the NDS says “we must This NDS is groundbreaking in that it recog- take account of the implications of demographic nizes the security risks posed by both population trends, particularly population growth in much of growth and deficit—due to aging, shrinking, or the developing world and the population deficit in disease—and the role of climate pressures, and the much of the developed world.” connections between population and the environ- Finally, although the NDS mentions the goal of ment. In the wake of the Intergovernmental Panel reducing fuel demand and the need to “assist wider on Climate Change reports on climate change U.S. Government energy security and environmen- and the 2007 CNA study on climate change and tal objectives,” its main energy concern seems to security, Congress mandated that the NDS include be securing access to energy resources, perhaps language on climate change. The document is with military involvement. Is this another missed required to include guidance for military planners opportunity to bring in environmental concerns, or to assess the risks of projected climate change is it more appropriate for DoD to stick to straight on the armed forces (see Section 931 of the FY08 energy security? The NDS seems to have taken a National Defense Authorization Act). The docu- politically safe route: recognizing energy security as ment also recognizes the need to address the “root a problem and suggesting both the need for the causes of turmoil”—which could be interpreted as Department to actively protect energy resources underlying population-environment connections, (especially petroleum) while also being open to although the authors provide no specifics. One broader ways to achieve energy independence. missed opportunity in the NDS is the chance to According to the NDS, DoD should continue explicitly connect ungoverned areas in failed or studying how the trends outlined above affect weak states with population-environment issues. national security and should use trend consider- What really stands out about this NDS is how ations in decisions about equipment and capabili- the authors characterize the future security environ- ties; alliances and partnerships; and relationships ment: “Over the next twenty years physical pres- with other nations. As the foundational document sures—population, resource, energy, climatic and from which almost all other DoD guidance docu- environmental—could combine with rapid social, cul- ments and programs are derived, the NDS is highly tural, technological and geopolitical change to cre- significant. If the Obama administration continues ate greater uncertainty,” they write. The challenge, to build off of the current NDS instead of starting according to DoD, is the uncertainty of how these anew, we can expect environmental security to trends and the interactions among them will play play a more central role in national defense plan- out. DoD is concerned with environmental security ning. If not, environmental security could again issues insofar as they shift the power of states and take a back seat to other national defense issues, 26 pose risks, but it is unclear from the NDS what pre- as it has done so often in the past.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
Climate Change, Demography, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict
limate change is expected to alter the Climate Change (IPCC), we tested hypotheses availability of freshwater, the produc- about the expected relationships in a statistical Ctive capacity of soils, and patterns of model with global coverage. While previous human settlement. But we do not know the studies have mostly focused on national-level extent and geographical distribution of these aggregates, we used a new approach to assess changes, nor can we know how climate-related the impact of environmental change on internal environmental change may influence human armed conflict by using geo-referenced (GIS) ÃViÌiÃÊ>`Ê«ÌV>ÊÃÞÃÌiðÊ/ iÊÃÌÊ`ÀiÊ data and geographical, rather than political, predictions warn that climate change may units of analysis. greatly increase the risk of violent conflict over Obviously, climate change may bring about increasingly scarce resources, such as freshwater more severe and more abrupt forms of envi- CLIONADH and arable land. We argue that such forecasts ronmental change than we have experienced RALEIGH would be more accurate and less sensational if in the past. While this argument is frequently and they were based on the relationships between invoked to support dire claims about climate HENRIK demography, environment, and violent conflict V >}iÊ>`ÊVyVÌ]Ê>ÀÊV >}iÃÊ>ÀiÊiÞÊÌÊ URDAL found in the recent past. be the result of smaller changes compounding Land degradation, freshwater availability, ÛiÀÊ>ÊVÃ`iÀ>LiÊ«iÀ`ÊvÊÌi°ÊÃ]ÊÜ iÊ and population density and change are impor- environmental change may be more severe in tant factors that many scholars argue have both the future than the past, we are unable to assess influenced the risk of conflict in the past and the extent to which increased technological and ÜÊLiÊÃÌÀ}ÞÊyÕiVi`ÊLÞÊV>ÌiÊV >}i°ÊÃÊ institutional capacity will enhance our adapt- previous quantitative studies have found mixed ability to the effects of climate change. evidence for the resource scarcity and conflict nexus, we sought to reconcile these diverse findings by looking below national aggregates at local-level data. In our study, we found that Clionadh RaleighÊÃÊ>ÊiVÌÕÀiÀÊvÊ«ÌV>ÊÃV local-level demographic and environmental fac- iViÊ>ÌÊ/ÀÌÞÊ i}i]Ê ÕL]Ê>`Ê>Ê>ÃÃV tors do have some effect on conflict risk, but are >ÌiÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ iÌÀiÊvÀÊÌ iÊ-ÌÕ`ÞÊvÊ ÛÊ7>ÀÊ - 7®Ê>ÌÊÌ iÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê*i>ViÊ,iÃi>ÀV Ê generally outweighed by political and economic ÃÌÌÕÌi]Ê"ÃÊ*,"®°ÊiÀÊÜÀÊvVÕÃiÃÊÊ factors.1 Ì iÊ«ÌV>Ê}i}À>« ÞÊvÊVvVÌÊÊÌ iÊ Building on propositions from the litera- `iÛi«}ÊÜÀ`°ÊHenrik Urdal is a political ture on environmental security, we have iden- ÃViÌÃÌÊ>`ÊÃiÀÊÀiÃi>ÀV iÀÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ - 7]Ê tified potential links between natural resource *,"°ÊÃÊÜÀÊvVÕÃiÃÊÊÌ iÊ`i}À>« ÞÊvÊ scarcity and violent conflict. Combining these >Ài`ÊVvVÌ°Ê/«Ê« ÌÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊ >` Ê propositions with environmental change sce- ,>i} ÆÊLÌÌÊ« ÌÊLÞÊi`Ê>V iÀ]Ê narios from the Intergovernmental Panel on 7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ® 27
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM has already been a contributing factor in cur- rent conflicts such as the Darfur crisis (Byers & À>}ÛV]ÊÓää{ÆÊ ]ÊÓääÇ®° Ì Õ} ÊÌ iÞÊÜ>ÀÊ>}>ÃÌÊÛiÀÃÌ>Ì}ÊÌ iÊ relationship between climate change and armed 7 iÊ>LÀÕ«ÌÊ`ë>ViiÌÃÊ>ÞÊ >««i]ÊÜiÊ conflict, Jon Barnett (2001), as well as Nigel Purvis and Joshua Busby (2004), accept that «À>ÀÞÊiÝ«iVÌÊÌÊÃiiÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊV>ÕÃ}Ê the depletion and altered distribution of natural >Ê}À>`Õ>Ê}À>ÌÊLÞÊ«i«iÊÃi>ÀV }Ê resources likely to result from climate change could, under certain circumstances, increase the for more fertile land—or for other economic risk of some forms of violent conflict. It is not ««ÀÌÕÌiÃÊÌÊÀi«>ViÊÃÌÊÛi `ð iÞÊÌÊLiÊ>Ê>ÀÊÀÊÃÕvwViÌÊV>ÕÃiÊvÊV- flict, but may form a mounting environmental challenge that could play a contributing role À>ÕV ]ÊÓääÓÆÊ/BâiÀÊEÊ >ÀÕÃ]ÊÓääÓ®°Ê Climate change is likely to influence the Societal Consequences of Climate capacity of many areas to produce food. Some Change: Literature Review areas may experience a reduction in crop yields, but others are likely to benefit. While an increase ÃÊÌ iÊvVÕÃÊÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊVÃiµÕiViÃÊvÊ in temperature of a few degrees could generally climate change increases, greater attention has increase crop yields in temperate areas, greater been paid to climate change’s potential influ- warming may reduce agricultural output. In ence on patterns of war and peace (e.g., Renner, tropical areas, where dryland agriculture domi- 1996; Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Rahman, nates, even minimal increases in temperature 1999; Klare, 2001; Brauch, 2002; Purvis & may be detrimental to food production (IPCC, ÕÃLÞ]ÊÓää{ÆÊ ]ÊÓääÇÆÊ Õ >Õ}ÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓäänÆÊ Óä䣮°Ê`ÛiÀÃiÊV >}iÃÊÊÌi«iÀ>ÌÕÀiÊ>`Ê«Ài- Burke & Parthemore, 2008; Raleigh et al., 2008; cipitation are likely to intensify the degradation ->i Þ>]Ê Óään®°Ê/ iÊ ÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÊ Ê V>ÌiÊ of soil and water resources, although adaptive change and security focuses on two interrelated behavior could mitigate these impacts, since land processes expected to result in resource scarcity. use and management have been shown to have a First, increasing temperatures, precipitation greater impact on soil conditions than the indi- anomalies, and extreme weather are expected to rect effect of climate change. aggravate the ongoing degradation of environ- VVÀ`}ÊÌÊÌ iÊ* ÊÓä䣮]Ê£°ÇÊLÊ mental resources (Renner, 1996; Homer-Dixon people currently live in countries that are water- & Blitt, 1998; Klare, 2001; Purvis & Busby, stressed, meaning that they use more than 20 2004; Buhaug et al., 2008). «iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÀÊÀiiÜ>LiÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃÕ««Þ°Ê/ ÃÊ Second, scholars warn that rising sea levels, ÕLiÀÊÃÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊVÀi>ÃiÊ>ÃÊ««Õ>ÌÊ as well as more extreme weather conditions, will grows and industries intensify; climate change force millions of people to migrate, potentially may aggravate this trend by decreasing stream- leading to higher pressures on resources in the flow and groundwater recharge. Non-climatic destination areas and subsequently fostering com- factors may influence freshwater availability petition over resources (Renner, 1996; Rahman, and quality more than climate change, so good £ÆÊ >ÀiÌÌ]ÊÓää£ÆÊ"Ýv>]ÊÓääÇÆÊ,i>Õ`ÊiÌÊ water management may significantly reduce >°]ÊÓääÇÆÊ,>i} ÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓään®°ÊÌ Õ} ÊV>ÌiÊ vulnerability. However, in areas where vulner- change is usually viewed as a potential future ability increases and water management fails, 28 threat, some argue that global climate change increased freshwater scarcity is likely.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 />LiÊ£\Ê-Õ>ÀÞÊ,iÃÕÌÃÊvÊ «ÀV>Ê>ÞÃÃ
HIGH-INCOME LOW-INCOME ALL COUNTRIES COUNTRIES COUNTRIES
Low land degradation Not significant Higher risk Lower risk
Medium land degradation Higher risk Higher risk Not significant
Very high land degradation Higher risk Higher risk Not significant
Water scarcity Higher risk Higher risk Higher risk (weak)
Population density Higher risk Higher risk Higher risk
Population growth Higher risk Higher risk Higher risk
Population growth Higher risk Not significant Higher risk *density
Population growth Higher risk Not significant Higher risk (weak) *water scarcity
Population growth Not significant Lower risk (weak) Not significant *medium degradation
Population growth Not significant Not significant Not significant *high degradation
Instability interactions Negative or not Not significant Not significant significant
Note: ÀÊ>VÌÕ>ÊÛ>ÕiÃ]ÊÃiiÊvÕÊÀiÃÕÌÃÊÊ,>i} ÊEÊ1À`>ÊÓääÇ®°
Due to rising sea levels and increased risk of marginalization can lead to rural-to-rural migra- flooding, climate change is expected to contrib- tion, potentially causing inter-ethnic conflicts ute to migration from coastal and riverine settle- over land, and migration from rural to urban ments (IPCC, 2001). Extreme weather events >Ài>Ã]Êi>`}ÊÌÊÕÀL>ʺ ÌëÌð»Ê/ iÊÃÌ>ÌiÊv>- and flooding may cause substantial, sudden, and ure hypothesis posits that resource scarcity will acute displacement of people. However, the most weaken state institutions and provide opportuni- dramatic form of change—sea-level rise—is likely ties for potential rebels to challenge state author- to happen gradually. Improved forecasting skills ÌÞ°Ê/ iÊÃÌ>ÌiÊiÝ«Ì>ÌÊ Þ«Ì iÃÃÊÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÊ will make adaptation easier and reduce the prob- that resource scarcity may be an opportunity lem of population displacements (Chimeli et al., for weakened states to bolster their support base 2002). While abrupt displacements may happen, by mobilizing ethnic groups to capture scarce we primarily expect to see climate change caus- resources. However, quantitative studies (Esty ing a gradual migration by people searching for et al., 1998; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Urdal, more fertile land—or for other economic oppor- ÓääxÆÊ/ iÃi]ÊÓään®Ê >ÛiÊvÕ`ÊÝi`ÊiÛ`iViÊ tunities to replace lost livelihoods. for the resource scarcity and conflict nexus. Kahl (2006) identifies two distinct “state-cen- tric” causal pathways from resource scarcity to Testing the Climate Change and conflict: the “state failure” and the “state exploi- Conflict Scenario: Methodology tation” hypotheses. Both start from the premise that resource scarcity may put severe pressure In our model, we tested whether areas with on both society at large and on state institu- high levels of resource scarcity—which is likely tions. Lower agricultural wages and economic to become more prevalent as a result of climate 29
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊ£\Ê vVÌÊ<iÃÊ1«ÊÀ`Ê Results -µÕ>Àià We assessed the risk of conflict for a global sample, and then for richer and poorer states separately. Our disaggregated analysis shows that demographic and environmental variables have a very moderate effect on the risk of civil VyVÌÊÃiiÊ/>LiÊ£ÊvÀÊ>ÊÃÕ>ÀÞ®°Ê vVÌÊ<i Globally, medium to high levels of land Conflict Center degradation are related to increased conflict, as are very high levels of water scarcity, but the relative increases in risk are quite small. ,>`ÕÃÊrÊÎääÊ Increasing levels of land degradation increase the risk of conflict from a baseline of 1 percent to between 2-4 percent. Freshwater scarcity appears to exert a somewhat stronger effect, increasing the risk of conflict to 6 percent for areas with very high levels of scarcity. High population density, measured locally, change—have been more susceptible to conflict is a consistently strong predictor of armed con- in the past. We assumed that population den- flict. However, population density and conflict sity, freshwater scarcity, and environmental deg- are presumably correlated, as densely populated radation would be associated with a higher risk areas and large cities are attractive locations for L>Þ]Ê of conflict if they occurred in areas with high conflict because not only do they provide better population growth. We further assumed that opportunities for organizing and financing con- i`ÕÊÌÊ } Ê the effects of demographic and environmental flict, they also represent strategic targets (Hegre factors are stronger in poor countries than in EÊ,>i} ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê iÛiÃÊvÊ>`Ê wealthy ones, and stronger in periods of regime Based on our literature review, we expected degradation collapse and political transition. that the interactions between demand-induced For this sub-national study, we created a geo- scarcity (measured by population growth) and are related spatial dataset by dividing the globe into 100 km supply-induced scarcity (represented by land to increased by 100 km squares. Using the PRIO/Uppsala degradation, water scarcity, and population dataset, we identified the location of armed density) were likely to produce multiple stresses VvVÌ]Ê>ÃÊ conflicts from 1990-2004 (Buhaug & Gates, that could trigger resource scarcity conflicts. In >ÀiÊÛiÀÞÊ } Ê 2002; Gleditsch et al., 2002), coding all grids the global model, only the interaction between ÜÌ Ê>ÊÎääÊÀ>`ÕÃÊ>ÃÊ«>ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊVyVÌÊ population growth and water scarcity, as well as iÛiÃÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ zone (see Figure 1). We used geographical data that between population growth and density, on human-induced soil degradation from the were statistically significant. ÃV>ÀVÌÞ]ÊLÕÌÊ International Soil Reference and Information Separating the group by income confirms Ì iÊÀi>ÌÛiÊ Centre (ISRIC), data on easily available fresh- the well-established importance of wealth and Ü>ÌiÀÊvÀÊ/ ,,-//]Ê>`Ê««Õ>ÌÊ`>Ì>Ê political systems. Lower levels of GDP are the VÀi>ÃiÃÊÊÀÃÊ from the Center for International Earth Science most important predictor of armed conflict. >ÀiʵÕÌiÊÃ>° Information Network (CIESIN). We also con- States with low GDP depend more on their trolled for state-level factors like GDP per capi- environment for individual and state income ta and national regime type. than states with higher GDP, and also have 30
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 }ÕÀiÊÓ\Ê7>ÌiÀÊ-V>ÀVÌÞÊ`iÝÊvÀÊ Ìi«À>ÀÞÊ `ÌÃ
/ iÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃV>ÀVÌÞÊ`iÝÊ`iÃVÀLiÃÊÌ iÊ 7/ ,Ê- , /9Ê 8 Ài>Ìà «ÊLiÌÜiiÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ>Û>>LÌÞÊ>`ÊÌ iÊ ■ 7>ÌiÀÊ >ÀÀiÀÊÓäääÊ«i«iÉvÜÊÕÌ® ÕLiÀÊvÊ«i«iÊÌ >ÌÊV>ÊLiÊÃÕ««ÀÌi`ÊLÞÊÌ >ÌÊ ■ Ü>ÌiÀÊÃÕ««Þ°Ê/ iÊÃV>ÀVÌÞÊ`iÝÊÃÊiÝ«ÀiÃÃi`Ê 7>ÌiÀÊ-V>ÀVÌÞÉ-ÌÀiÃÃÊ ÊÌiÀÃÊvÊÌ iÊÕLiÀÊvÊ«i«iÊ«iÀÊvÜÊÕÌÊ ÈääqÓäääÊ«i«iÉvÜÊÕÌ® Ü iÀiÊ>ÊvÜÊÕÌÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃÊiµÕ>ÊÌÊ£ÊÊ ■ *«Õ>ÌÃÊ6ÕiÀ>LiÊÌÊ7>ÌiÀÊ-ÌÀiÃÃÊ VÕLVÊiÌiÀÃÊ«iÀÊÞi>À° £ääqÈääÊ«i«iÉvÜÊÕÌ® ■ Source:Ê iÛÞÊiÌÊ>°ÊÓään®°Ê `iµÕ>ÌiÊ-Õ««ÞÊ£ääÊ«i«iÉvÜÊÕÌ® ■ ÜÊ iÃÌÞÊ*«Õ>Ì a lower capacity to attenuate tensions arising Moreover, we believe a clearer link between from degradation. However, our results show the physical changes associated with environmen- that resource scarcity affects the risk of con- tal variables and the political process of rebellion flict less in low-income states than in wealth- ÕÃÌÊLiÊiÃÌ>Là i`°Ê/ iÊÕÃiÊvÊV>Êi>ÃÕÀiÃÊvÊ iÀÊÃÌ>ÌiðÊ`ÊÜ iÊ«ÌV>ÊÃÌ>LÌÞÊÃÊ>Ê income, state capacity, and ethnic relationships strong driver of internal conflict in poor states, will significantly clarify the environment-conflict it does not seem to interact with demographic nexus and help analyze the role of state policies and environmental factors to increase the risk and market fluctuations in mediating it. of conflict. Our results caution against a disproportion- ate focus on environmental factors—including Recommendations for Future climate change—in causing conflict and insta- Research bility in the developing world. By paying greater attention to how resources are distributed and Our models are more explanatory than many how political institutions create vulnerability to comparable cross-national studies, partly due to climate change, we can better assess where, and the inclusion of geo-referenced environmental under what circumstances, environmental fac- and demographic data. Since conflict often does tors contribute to or catalyze conflict. However, not occur throughout entire countries, additional as future climate changes occur with greater localized data on conflict needs to be incorporat- frequency and intensity, any assumptions about ed into future models to develop a comprehen- the future must consider that the thresholds for sive understanding of the links between conflict both environmental change and political insta- and demographic and environmental changes. bility will undoubtedly fluctuate. 31
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ONLINE
The full article on which this commentary is based, “Climate change, environmental degrada- tion and armed conflict,” was published in a special issue of Political Geography on climate change and conflict (Volume 26, Issue 6, August 2007): http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/ S0962629807000856
The Uppsala Conflict Database is a free resource on armed conflicts; currently, it includes informa- tion on 124 conflicts for the period 1989-2007: http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) is an event-based dataset based on the Uppsala Conflict Database, which records the location and date of conflict occurrences in Africa. Version 1.2 is available online: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Armed-Conflict-Location- and-Event-Data/
The World Bank’s Social Development Division convened a workshop and commissioned overview papers on the “Social Dimensions of Climate Change” on March 5, 2008: http://web.worldbank. org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:21659919~pagePK: 210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
For a balanced report on climate change and migration, see Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration, by Vikram Odedra Kolmannskog (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008): http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf
Note at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ /, /-" 6 "* /É ,iÃÕÀViÃÉ- 7À}*>«iÀÚ yVÌ°«`v £°Ê/ ÃÊ>ÀÌViÊÃÊL>Ãi`ÊÊ>ÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊ«ÕLà i`ÊÊ Burke, Sharon, & Christine Parthemore, with Josh Political GeographyÊ,>i} ÊEÊ1À`>]ÊÓääÇ®° ÕÃLÞ]Ê ÀÃÌiÊ >ÌÌ iÜÃ]ÊÞÊ ÞiÀÃÊ>vvi]ÊEÊ Jason Furman. (2008, June). A strategy for American References power: Energy, climate, and national security. 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê iÌiÀÊvÀÊ>Ê iÜÊiÀV>Ê Barnett, Jon. (2001). Security and climate change -iVÕÀÌÞÊ -®°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. 7À}Ê*>«iÀÊÇ®°Ê ÀÜV ]Ê1Ìi`Ê }`\Ê V>ðÀ}É>ÌÌ>V iÌÃÉVÌiÌ>>}iÀÃÉÓÎä{É /Þ`>Ê iÌÀiÊvÀÊ >ÌiÊ >}iÊ,iÃi>ÀV ° ÕÀiÚ iÀ}Þ >Ìi >Ì-iVÕÀÌÞÚÕiän°«`v Brauch, Hans Gunter. (2002). “Climate change, envi- ÞiÀÃ]Ê V >i]ÊEÊ VÊ À>}ÛV°ÊÓää{]Ê"VÌLiÀ®°Ê ronmental stress and conflict.” In Federal Ministry º >ÀvÕÀ\ÊÊV>ÌiÊV >}i`ÕVi`Ê Õ>Ì>À>Ê for the Environment (Ed.), Climate change and crisis?” Human Security Bulletin. conflictÊ««°Êq££Ó®°Ê iÀ\Êi`iÀ>Ê ÃÌÀÞÊvÀÊ Center for International Earth Science Information the Environment. Network (CIESIN) & Centro Internacional de Õ >Õ}]Ê>Û>À`]ÊEÊ-VÌÌÊ>ÌiðÊÓääÓ®°Êº/ iÊ}i}- }ÀVÕÌÕÀ>Ê/À«V>°ÊÓääÈ®°ÊGridded popula- raphy of civil war.” Journal of Peace Research 39(4), tion of the world version 3 (GPWv3): Population {£Çq{Îΰ density grids°Ê*>Ã>`iÃ]Ê 9\Ê-ViVVÊ >Ì>Ê Buhaug, Halvard, Nils Petter Gleditsch, & Ole >`Ê««V>ÌÃÊ iÌiÀÊ- ®]Ê ÕL>Ê >}ÕÃÊ/ iÃi°ÊÓään®°ÊImplications of cli- 1ÛiÀÃÌÞ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÃi`>V°Við mate change for armed conflict. Washington, columbia.edu/gpw \Ê7À`Ê >ÊÀÕ«°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ iÌiÀÊvÀÊ >Û>Ê>ÞÃiÃÊ ®°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊNational 32
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 security and the threat of climate change°ÊiÝ>`À>]Ê climate change impacts on U.S. national secu- 6\Ê/ iÊ Ê À«À>Ì°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ rityÊ7À}Ê*>«iÀ®°Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê iÌiÀÊvÀÊ at http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/ International Earth Science Information Network National%20Security%20and%20the%20 - ®°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.ciesin. / Ài>̯Óäv¯Óä >Ìi¯Óä >}i°«`v VÕL>°i`ÕÉ`VÕiÌÃÉ >ÌiÚ-iVÕÀÌÞÚ i]ÊÀ>ÃÌiÀÊ °]Ê >ÀÞÊ<°Ê ÕÌÌiÀ]ÊEÊ iÌÊ - ÚÕÞÚÓäänÚÛ£Úä°i`°«`v Ropelewski. (2002). “Climate fluctuations, demog- "Ýv>ÊÌiÀ>Ì>°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊUp in smoke? Asia and À>« ÞÊ>`Ê`iÛi«iÌÊqÊÀi}>ÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`ið»Ê the Pacific: The threat from climate change to human Journal of International Affairs 56£®]ÊÓ£ÎqÓÎ{° development and the environment. Oxford: Oxfam Eck, Kristine. (2004). “Collective violence in 2002 and ÌiÀ>Ì>°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. Óääΰ»ÊÊ ÌÌ>Ê>ÀLÊ `°®]ÊStates in armed con- Ýv>°À}ÉiÉwiÃÉÕ«ÚÚÃiÚ>Ã>ÚÛäÇ°«`vÉ flictÊ««°Ê£{Îq£ÈÈ®°Ê1««Ã>>]Ê-Üi`i\Ê i«>ÀÌiÌÊ download of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *ÕÀÛÃ]Ê }i]ÊEÊà Õ>Ê ÕÃLÞ°ÊÓää{®°Êº/ iÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ ÃÌÞ]Ê >iÊ °]Ê>VÊ°Ê`ÃÌi]Ê/i`Ê,°ÊÕÀÀ]Ê implications of climate change for the UN system.” Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Environmental Change and Security Project Report *>i>Ê/°Ê-ÕÀ]ÊEÊ>Ê °Ê1}iÀ°Ê£n®°ÊState 10]ÊÈÇqÇΰ failure task force report: Phase II findings. McLean, ,> >]ÊâÞÊ°Ê£®°Êº >ÌiÊV >}iÊ>`ÊÛiÌÊ 6\Ê-ViViÊ««V>ÌÃÊÌiÀ>Ì>°Ê conflicts.” In Mohamed Suliman (Ed.), Ecology, Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael politics and violent conflict (pp. 181-210). London Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, & Havard EÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
Migration as the Demographic Wild >À`ÊÊ ÛÊ vVÌ\Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê
esearch on the relationship between tative approach), I used a most-similar-systems demographic change and internecine critical case-study approach to compare differ- violence has gained some momen- ent outcomes with respect to ethnic conflict in R 1 ÌÕÊÊÀiViÌÊÞi>ÀÃÊÃii]Êi°}°]Ê >Li]ÊÓääx®°Ê Ì iÊÃ>Ã>`ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊvÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê° However, this work has mostly been confined / iÊV`ÌÃÊÊÌ iÃiÊÃ>`ÃÊ>Ài]ÊvÀÊÌ iÊÃV>Ê to examining age structure phenomena such sciences, a fair real-world approximation of as youth bulges. By contrast, the intervening controlled laboratory experiments; these small, variable of migration is strikingly absent—even (fairly) closed systems allow us to control for though migration is the third in the troika of variables in a way that is virtually impossible to core demographic variables, alongside fertil- do with complex conflicts in larger countries. ÌÞÊ>`ÊÀÌ>ÌÞ°Ê9iÌÊÌÃÊ>LÃiViÊÃÊ>ÃÊÕ`iÀ- Notwithstanding ominous predictions to the standable, because accurate and consistent data contrary, demographic trends in Mauritius have ÊVyVÌÊ>Ài>ÃÊ>ÀiÊÛiÀÞÊ`vwVÕÌÊÌÊLÌ>°ÊÃÊ actually proven to be a source of political stabil- a result, we actually know embarrassingly little ÌÞ°ÊÜiÛiÀ]ÊÌ iÊVÛiÀÃiÊ `ÃÊÌÀÕiÊvÀÊ°Ê about the bearing (if any) the demographic shifts precipitated by in- or out-migration have Comparing Mauritius and Fiji on internecine conflict. In this article, I focus on the demographic disequilibrium that results Ì Õ} ÊÌ iÞÊ>ÀiÊV>Ìi`ÊÊ`vviÀiÌÊV- from migration and its impact on ethnic rela- ÌiÌÃ]Ê>ÊV«>ÀÃÊvÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`ÊÊÃÊ tions and conflict, using the cases of Mauritius appropriate because their colonial, economic, >`Ê°Ê political, and social histories are similar. Since the paucity of data currently thwarts LÕÌÊ nxä]äääÊ «i«iÊ ÛiÊ Ê ]Ê Ü iÊ CHRISTIAN any attempt to test hypotheses that depend on Mauritius is home to about 1.2 million people. ÌÊÇÓäÊõÕ>ÀiÊiÃ]Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ >ÃÊiÃÃÊÌ >Ê LEUPRECHT a thorough statistical analysis (a large-n quanti- iÌiÌ ÊvʽÃÊ>`>ÃÃ]Ê>`ÊÃÊ>}ÊÌ iÊ most densely populated countries on the planet. Indian migrants—who originated as indentured Christian Leuprecht is an assistant profes laborers shipped in by their British colonizers ÃÀÊvÊ«ÌV>ÊÃViViÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ,Þ>Ê Ì>ÀÞÊ to work on the sugar plantations—comprise i}iÊvÊ >>`>°ÊiÊÃÊVÀÃÃ>««Ìi`ÊÌÊ a substantial proportion of the population in +Õii½ÃÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ½ÃÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ*ÌV>Ê both countries. Mauritius has a highly hetero- -ÌÕ`iÃ]Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊÌ iÊ-V ÊvÊ*VÞÊ }iiÕÃÊÃViÌÞ]ÊÜÌ Ê£xÊ}ÕÃÌVÊ}ÀÕ«ÃÊ>`Ê -ÌÕ`iÃ]ÊÜ iÀiÊ iÊÃÊ>`ÕVÌÊV >ÀÊvÊ iviViÊ vÕÀÊÜÀ`ÊÀi}ðÊÌ Õ} ÊÌ iÊ>ÊiÌ VÊ >>}iiÌÊ-ÌÕ`iÃÊ>`Ê>ÊviÜÊvÊÌ iÊ Vi>Û>}iÊÃÊLiÌÜiiÊÌ iÊ ÀiiÊÀÌÞÊÓÇÊ +Õii½ÃÊ iÌÀiÊvÀÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê,i>ÌÃÊ «iÀViÌ®Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ`>Ê>ÀÌÞÊÈnÊ«iÀViÌ®]Ê >`ÊÌ iÊÃÌÌÕÌiÊvÊÌiÀ}ÛiÀiÌ>Ê the high degree of differentiation and stratifi- ,i>ÌðÊ* ÌÊ^Ê Ê- ii >® 34 cation within Mauritian society makes ethnic
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 2 categories less powerful than expected. ÊÊ]Ê Migratory Trends about half the population is of Indian descent, while the other half is native Melanesian with a Mauritius is today the only country in the world Polynesian admixture. Ü iÀiÊÌ iÊ`>Ê`>ëÀ>ÊiÞÃÊ>ÊÌÜÌ À`ÃÊ If density, natural increase, and ethnic het- >ÀÌÞ°ÊÃÊ`i«VÌi`ÊÊ}ÕÀiÊ£]ÊÌ iÊ`>Ê erogeneity are the sole determinants of interne- population of Mauritius quickly grew from zero cine violence, then Mauritius beat the odds. On Ê£nÎ{ÊÌÊ>Ê>ÀÌÞÊÊÌ iÊ£nÈäÃÆÊÃViÊÌ i]Ê the advent of Mauritius’ independence in 1968, the proportion has remained fairly stable (Lutz Nobel Laureate James Meade, a British com- & Wils, 1994). mission, and others arrived at ominous conclu- Ê ]Ê Ì iÊ }À>ÌÊ vÊ `iÌÕÀi`Ê sions about the country’s prospects for ethnic Indian laborers occurred later; some 60,000 of harmony, economic development, and political these girmitiyasÊÜiÀiÊLÀÕ} ÌÊÌÊÊLiÌÜiiÊ ÃÌ>LÌÞÊ i>`i]ʣȣÆÊ/ÌÕÃÃÊEÊLi-Ì ]Ê £nÇÊ>`Ê££È°Ê/ iÊ`i}À>« VÊ«>VÌÊvÊ £ÈnÆÊ >«>Õ]Ê £Çή°Ê ,>«`Ê ««Õ>ÌÊ this population movement was compounded growth, the absence of economic growth, and by a subsequent wave of Indian immigration to growing population density on a small island ÊLiÌÜiiÊÌ iÊÜÀ`ÊÜ>ÀðÊÊ>LÃÕÌiÊÌiÀÃÊ with no natural resources caused some concern and relative to the native population, migration i}À>« VÊ among policymakers. Independence also flamed ÌÊÊÜ>ÃÊ`ëÀ«ÀÌ>ÌiÞÊÃ>iÀÊÌ >ÊÌÊ trends in the inter-ethnic fires, for the Franco-Mauritian >ÕÀÌÕðÊÃÊ}ÕÀiÊÓÊà ÜÃ]ÊÃViÊÌ iÊÃiÌÊ and Creole communities saw independence as a vÊ`>Ê}À>ÌÊÌÊ]ÊÌ iÊÕiÀV>Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ >ÛiÊ «ÞÊLÞÊÌ iÊ`>Ê>ÀÌÞÊÌÊ}>ÊVÌÀÊvÊ gap between Indians and native Melanesians >VÌÕ>ÞÊ«ÀÛiÊ the state apparatus. In addition, the 1960s wit- has always been much narrower than the gap nessed considerable labor and inter-communal between Indians and the “general population” ÌÊLiÊ>ÊÃÕÀViÊ unrest on Mauritius. in Mauritius. of political ÞÊVÌÀ>ÃÌ]Ê«ÀÀÊÌʽÃÊ`i«i`iViÊÊ / iÊ `vviÀiÌ>ÃÊ LiÌÜiiÊ Ì iÊ ÌÜÊ >Ê £Çä]ÊÌ iÊiÝ«iÀÌÃÊÜiÀiÊ«ÌÃÌV°Ê9iÌÊÌ iÊÕÌ- population groups on each island are largely a ÃÌ>LÌÞ°Ê ViÃÊÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`ÊÊÜiÀiÊVÌÀ>ÀÞÊÌÊ function of colonial migratory policy—that is, iÝ«iVÌ>ÌÃ°Ê ÛÊVyVÌÊÊÊÌiÃwi`]Ê colonial migratory policy had the unintended ÜiÛiÀ]ÊÌ iÊ V}ÊÌÊ>Ê i>`ÊÊ£nÇÊÜ i]ÊvÀÊÌ iÊwÀÃÌÊ VÃiµÕiViÊvÊ«À`ÕV}Ê>ÊVi>ÀÊ`>Ê>À- VÛiÀÃiÊ `ÃÊ time in its post-independence history, a party ÌÞÊÊ >ÕÀÌÕðÊÊ]ÊLÞÊVÌÀ>ÃÌ]ÊÌÊ}iiÀ- i>`i`ÊLÞÊ>Ê>ÊvÊ`>Ê>ViÃÌÀÞÊÜÊÌ iÊ ated only a sizeable Indian minority. ÌÀÕiÊvÀÊ°Ê >ÀÌÞÊ vÊ Ãi>ÌÃ°Ê Ê ÀiëÃi]Ê ÃiÊ >ÌÛiÊ >ÃÊÃÌ>}i`Ê>ÊÌ>ÀÞÊVÕ«]ÊvÜi`ÊLÞÊÃÕL- Effect on Age Structure sequent coups in 2000 and 2006. Could demographic patterns explain why In another unintended consequence of colonial >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ`iwi`Ê`ÀiÊ«Ài`VÌÃÊÜ iÊÊV- }À>ÌÀÞÊ«VÞ]ÊÌ iÊ`>ÊÀÌÞÊÊÊ tinues to struggle with civil tensions? While the inadvertently challenged native predominance. presence of an indigenous population that con- `>Ê}À>ÌÊÌÊÊ«ÃÌ`>ÌiÃÊ}À>ÌÊÌÊ Ã`iÀÃÊÊÌÃÊ>ViÃÌÀ>Ê i>`ÊÃÊ>Ê`ëÕÌ- Mauritius by several decades. Having entered able source of tension, this explanation does not the demographic transition later, the age struc- tell us why civil conflict worsens when it does. ÌÕÀiÊvÊ`>ÃÊÊÊÜ>ÃÊV«>À>ÌÛiÞÊÞÕ}- In contrast, the claims I advance about demo- iÀÊÌ >ÊÌ >ÌÊvÊ`>ÃÊÊ >ÕÀÌÕðÊ/ iÊ>}i graphics in general, and migration in particu- structure differential is partially accountable for lar, distinguish themselves from much of the the rapid population growth among Indians literature precisely because they have intrinsic ÊÊ`ÕÀ}ÊÌ iÊwÀÃÌÊ >vÊvÊÌ iÊÓäÌ ÊVi- predictive potential. tury. While immigration had virtually ceased 35
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊ£\Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃ]Ê*À«ÀÌÃÊvÊ Ì VÊÀÕ«ÃÊ£n{äq£n®
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50 Note:Ê >Ì>Ê>vÌiÀÊ£ÇÎÊ 40 are based on estimates PERCENT 30 LiV>ÕÃiÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊÃÌ««i`Ê ViVÌ}Ê`>Ì>ÊLÞÊiÌ VÊ 20 }ÀÕ«Ê>ÌÊÌ >ÌÊÌi° 10 0
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Creoles Indians
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NET MIGRATION RATE (per thousand population) RATE NET MIGRATION -25
1950–19551955–19601960–19651965–19701970–19751975–19801980–19851985–19901990–19951995–20002000–20052005–20102010–20152015–20202020–20252025–20302030–20352035–20402040–20452045–2050 Mauritius Fiji 36
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 LÞÊ£Ó£]ʽÃÊ`>Ê««Õ>ÌʵÕ>`ÀÕ«i`Ê between 1921 and 1966. If population growth remains constant, the ÌÌ>ÊviÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÊ/,®ÊÕÃÌÊLiÊ`iV}°Ê ÜiÛiÀ]ÊiÛiÊvÊ/,ÊÃÊ`iV}]ÊÌ iÊÕ- ber of women of childbearing age will continue ÌÊ}ÀÜ]Ê`ÕiÊÌÊ««Õ>ÌÊiÌÕ°ÊÃÊ>Ê Ì>ÀÞÊV iV«ÌÊ>vÌiÀÊÌ iÊ result, the crude birth rate may continue to rise, ÓääÈÊVÕ«]ÊÊ ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ « ÌLÕViÌÊÕÃiÀÊ>ë>Æ Ì ÕÃÊ«À`ÕV}Ê>ÊÃâi>LiÊÞÕÌ ÊV ÀÌ°Ê/ iÃiÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉΰ« ÌLÕViÌ° growth dynamics caused Indians to outnum- VÉ>LÕÃÉi£xÉ>ë>É v¯Óä>vÌÕÀÉV iV«ÌÚ LiÀÊ>ÌÛiÊ i>iÃ>ÃÊÊÊLÞÊÌ iÊi`ÊvÊ i>ÀÚµiL°«}® 7À`Ê7>ÀÊÊ>`Ê>««À>V Ê>Ê>LÃÕÌiÊ>À- ÌÞÊLÞÊÌ iÊ>ÌiÊ£xäÃÊ iiÀÊEÊÌ Þ]Ê£ÈnÆÊ Milne, 1981). Migrating populations tend to be fairly young, and accordingly, they reproduce at dis- proportionately high rates. Native populations may fear being “swamped” by migration. In addition, native populations may gradually end up being outnumbered by migrants due to dif- ferentials in natural increase. Neither phenom- Migration, Age Structure, and enon threatened political stability in Mauritius. Conflict Mauritius’ native population did not feel its territory was being “swamped,” and colonial Demographic change per se never had a signifi- migratory policy unintentionally preordained cant impact on conflict in Mauritius because >Ê VÌÀÛiÀÌLiÊ `>Ê >ÀÌÞ°ÊÊ ]Ê Ì iÊ`>Ê««Õ>ÌÊVÃ`>Ìi`ÊÌÃÊ>ÀÌÞÊ by contrast, the feeling of being “swamped” i>ÀÞÊ°ÊÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÕ«ÃÊÊÌ iÊÃ>`ÊÃÌ>ÌiÊ was compounded by an unintended challenge have been aging rapidly since the 1960s, and, as a ÌÊ>ÌÛiÊ«ÕÀ>ÌÞ°ÊÌ Õ} ÊÊLÌ ÊV>ÃiÃÊÌ iÊ result, no one group has the young age-structure demographic outcome of colonial migratory dynamics that may call Indian hegemony into policy was unintended, this outcome was not µÕiÃÌ°ÊÊ]Ê}À>ÌÊVÀi>Ìi`Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊÞÕ}Ê iViÃÃ>ÀÞÊÕ«Ài`VÌ>Li°Ê/ iÊ«>VÌÊvÊ}À>- Indian population that reproduced rapidly and, tion on conflict is a man-made problem; the in the process, undermined the hegemonic way migration is managed (or not) can deter- demographic position of the native population. mine its potential for mitigating or escalating However, the younger population structure a conflict. >}ʽÃÊ>ÌÛiÊ««Õ>ÌÊ>`iÊÌÊ«Ã- Both cases show evidence of significant dif- sible for Indians to consolidate their temporary viÀiÌ>ÃÊÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi°Ê/`>Þ]ÊÌ iÊiÌ VÊ plurality. Figures 1 and 2 depict inter-communal populations on Mauritius are similarly struc- ««Õ>ÌÊÌÀi`ÃÊÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê]ÊÜ iÊ ÌÕÀi`°ÊÊVÌÀ>ÃÌ]ʽÃÊÀÌÞÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ }ÕÀiÊÎÊÛÃÕ>âiÃÊÜ ÞÊ}À>Ìp«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊ ÞÕ}iÀÊÌ >ÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞÊ««Õ>Ì]ÊÜ ÃiÊ Ì iÊ«>ÃÌ]Ê«ÀiÃiÌ]Ê>`Ê«ÀiVÌi`ÊÕÌ}À>ÌÊvÊ demographic position has been undermined `>ÃpvÕVÌÃÊ>ÃÊ>ÊÃÕÀViÊvÊÃÌ>LÌÞÊ vÕÀÌ iÀÊLÞÊi}À>Ì°ÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]ÊÌ iÊÀÌÞÊ Ê°Ê Ì ÊÌ iÊÃâiÊ>`ÊÀ>ÌiÊvÊ}À>ÌÊ>`Ê ÃÊÜÊÊ>Ê«ÃÌÊÌÊV >i}iÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞ½ÃÊ subsequent emigration rapidly changed the size plurality. >`Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊvÊÌ iÊ`>Ê««Õ>Ì°Ê 37
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ONLINE
Christian Leuprecht discussed demographic shifts and civil conflict at an event at the Wilson Center on June 13, 2007: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_ id=1413&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=238429
The UN Population Division’s World Migrant Stock database provides estimates of refugees and migrants by country and region for every five years from 1960-2005: http://esa.un.org/migration/ index.asp?panel=2
The UN’s Small Island Developing States Network helps small islands face several challenges, including remoteness; poor connectivity; limited human and technological capacity; and economic and environmental vulnerability: http://www.sidsnet.org/
Ethnopolitics, the Journal of the Specialist Group on Ethnopolitics and the Association for the Study of Nationalities, is soliciting submissions for a special issue on the relationship between demographic change and ethnic politics/conflict/relations. Contact Christian Leuprecht, guest edi- tor, at [email protected] with prospective submissions or inquiries: http://www.ethnopoli- The impact tics.org/ethnopolitics/cfp.html of migration on conflict is >Ê>>`iÊ In Mauritius, by contrast, the slower initial rate attributable to migration, including demo- «ÀLiÆÊÌ iÊ of change and subsequent equilibrium in popu- graphic changes and relative differences in age Ü>ÞÊ}À>ÌÊ lation size and age structure could have contrib- structure between ethnic groups. uted to the relative stability of inter-communal / ÃÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÌ ÕÃÊVwÀÃÊÌ >ÌÊ}À>ÌÊÃÊ is managed relations on Mauritius. an intervening variable in the different out- ÀÊÌ®ÊV>Ê / ÃÊV«>ÀÃÊvÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`ÊÊÃÕ}- comes of ethnic relations in the two island gests that the most volatile situations are those states. Migration turns out to be particularly determine its Ü iÀiÊ>Ê>ÀÌÞ½ÃÊ`i}À>« VÊ`>ViÊÃÊ «ÀLi>ÌVÊÜ iÊ>Ê>ÌÛiÊ««Õ>̽ÃÊ>À- called into question, but where the same group ity (or even its plurality) is challenged tempo- potential for is eventually able to recapture a demographically rarily by migration, but the native population’s mitigating or i}iVÊ«ÃÌ°Ê/ ÃÊÀiV>«ÌÕÀiÊ>ÞÊLiÊ`ÕiÊ age structure makes it probable that it may to its younger age structure, co-ethnic immi- one day recapture a position of demographic escalating a }À>Ì]ÊÀÊi}À>ÌÊLÞÊÌ iÊÌ iÀÊ}ÀÕ«°ÊÊ `>Vi°Ê/ iÊ«À«iÃÌÞÊvÀÊÃiÀÕÃÊ«ÌV>Ê conflict. group with a younger age structure that regains instability—and possibly violence—appears to a demographically dominant position is prob- be especially high once the native population is lematic not only because the group may use its able to consolidate its hegemonic demographic numerical superiority to regain dominance and position, a finding that is echoed in a recent avenge past grievances, but also because of the µÕ>ÌÌ>ÌÛiÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊ/vÌ]ÊÓääÇ®° general link between youthful populations and / ÃÊ VVÕÃÊ ÃÊ ÌÊ ÕÃÌÊ Ã}vV>ÌÊ vÀÊ political instability. >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`Ê]ÊLÕÌÊvÀÊ>ÊÃ>ÊÃ>`Ê`iÛi- I am not arguing that demography and oping states. Many small island states are ethno- migration are deterministic or monocausal culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse. explanations for conflict. Still, some impor- ÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]ÊÌ iÃiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊÀi>â}ÊÌ >ÌÊ>>}}Ê tant conclusions follow from this compari- civil relations is a prerequisite for achieving their son. Strong differences and some similarities iVVÊ>`ÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê}>ðÊÃViÀÌ>}Ê 38 LiÌÜiiÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ>`ÊÊÜiÀi]Ê>ÌÊÌ iÀÊÀÌ]Ê demographic—and especially migratory—pat-
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 -ÌÀiiÌÊ>ÀiÌÊÊ*ÀÌÊ ÕÃ]Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃÊ ÕÀÌiÃÞÊvVÀÊ ÕÃiÀÊ>ÕÃÌiÛ>ÆÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉ ÜÜÜ°vVÀ°VÉ« ÌÃÉ >ÕÃÌiÛ>ÉÓÎÇÇäÎÎÈΣ®
terns that may prove particularly problematic for Malaysia.” Third World Quarterly 11{®]Ê£nÎx° civil relations is a significant contribution toward ÕÌâ]Ê7v}>}]ÊEÊiÊ >LiÌÌiÊ7ðʣ{®°Ê º*i«iÊÊ >ÕÀÌÕÃ\Ê£ÈÎn££°»ÊÊ7v}>}Ê attaining these goals. Lutz (Ed.), Population, development, environment: Understanding their interactions in Mauritius. Notes Berlin: Springer Verlag. Mauritius Central Statistical Office.Ê£Çή°ÊPopulation £°Ê/ ÃÊ>ÀÌViÊ`À>ÜÃÊÌÃÊiÌ `}V>ÊëÀ>ÌÊ census of Mauritius and its dependencies: Final report from Don Horowitz’s (1989) piece comparing differ- on the census enumeration made in the colony of ences in outcome in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Mauritius Mauritius and its dependencies (1861, 1871, 1891, >`ÊÊ>ÀiÊ>}ÊÎnÊ1 iLiÀÊ->ÊÃ>`Ê 1901, 1911, 1926, 1931, 1945, 1953, 1963, Developing States; another 14 small island states are 1973). Port Louis, Mauritius: H.F. Kelly. either not UN members or associate members of the Meade, James E. (1961). The economic and social struc- regional commissions. ture of Mauritius. London: Frank Cass & Co. 2. Mauritian Creoles trace their origins to iiÀ]Ê À>]ÊEÊ>iÃÊÌ Þ°Ê£Èn®°ÊFiji goes >`>}>ÃV>ÀÊ>`Ê >ÃÌÊvÀV>]ÊiëiV>ÞÊ â>LµÕi° to the polls: The crucial legislative council elections of 1963. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press. References Milne, Robert Stephen. (1981). Politics in ethnically bipolar states: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji. Vancouver: >Li]ÊivvÀiÞÊ °Ê `°®°ÊÓääx®°Êº*«Õ>ÌÊ University of British Columbia Press. and conflict: Exploring the links.” Environmental >«>Õ]Ê6°-°Ê£Çή°ÊThe overcrowded barracoon. New Change and Security Program Report 11, ÎÓn° 9À\Ê «v° Dinan, Monique. (2002). Mauritius in the mak- /ÌÕÃÃ]Ê,V >À`Ê °]ÊEÊ À>ÊLi-Ì °Ê£Èn®°Ê ing: Across the censuses 1946-2000. Port Louis, Social policies and population growth in Mauritius. Mauritius\Ê iÃÊ >`i>Ê iÌÀiÊvÀÊvÀV>Ê London: Frank Cass & Co. ÕÌÕÀi]Ê ÃÌÀÞÊvÊÀÌÃÊEÊ ÕÌÕÀi° /vÌ]Ê V>Ê ÕvvÞ°ÊÓääÇ]ÊÕÞ®°Êº*«Õ>ÌÊà vÌÃÊ ÊÃ>`ÃÊ ÕÀi>ÕÊvÊ-Ì>ÌÃÌVðÊÓääÇ®°ÊFiji census >`ÊVÛÊÜ>À\ÊÊÌiÃÌÊvÊ«ÜiÀÌÀ>ÃÌÊÌ iÀÞ°»Ê of population and housing°Ê-ÕÛ>]Ê\ÊÊÃ>`ÃÊ International Interactions 33ή]ÊÓ{ÎÓÈ° Bureau of Statistics. 1 Ê i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ VVÊ>`Ê-V>Êvv>ÀÃ]Ê Horowitz, Donald L. (1989). “Incentives and *«Õ>ÌÊ ÛðÊÓääÇ®°ÊWorld population pros- behaviour in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka and pects: The 2006 revision°Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê1Ìi`Ê >Ìð 39
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM NEW DIRECTIONS IN ",* Ê- 1,/9
Beginning the Demographic Transition: Very Young and Youthful Age Structures
n recent years, scholars, policymakers, and cal strife have been concentrated in countries at the media have paid increasing attention the opposite end of the demographic spectrum, Ito the potential challenges of aging popu- whose youthful populations continue to grow. lations in industrialized countries in Europe, *«Õ>ÌÊ VÌÊ ÌiÀ>Ì>½ÃÊ *®Ê ÀÌ ÊiÀV>]Ê>`Ê >ÃÌÊÃ>°Ê/ iÃiÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ ÓääÇÊÀi«ÀÌÊThe Shape of Things to Come: Why have crossed into the far reaches of the “demo- Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable graphic transition,” the process whereby high World defines very young and youthful age birth and death rates decline, producing smaller ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃÊ>ÃÊÌ ÃiÊÕÃÌÊLi}}ÊÌ iÊ`i- v>ÞÊÃâiÃÊ>`Ê}iÀÊviÊiÝ«iVÌ>ViðÊ/ iÊ graphic transition. In these countries, mortality average fertility rate in Japan—which, along rates have declined, and although fertility rates with Italy, has one of the world’s oldest popu- are starting to inch downward, they are still lations—has been below replacement level since v>ÀÊ>LÛiÊÀi«>ViiÌÊiÛi°Ê/ iÊÛ>ÃÌÊ>ÀÌÞÊ >««ÀÝ>ÌiÞÊ£Èx]Ê>`ÊÃÊiÝ«iVÌi`ÊÌÊÀi>Ê vÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊÞÕ}iÀÊÌ >ÊÎäÆÊÊÃiÊ below replacement level until the end of this V>ÃiÃ]ÊÌ ÃÊ«À«ÀÌÊV>ÊLiÊ>ÃÊ } Ê>ÃÊÇÇÊ«iÀ- ViÌÕÀÞÊ1 * ]ÊÓääÇ®° cent. Such countries will continue to experience Scholars and policymakers are concerned population growth for the foreseeable future. about the economic consequences of population iÌÜiiÊ£ÇäÊ>`Ê£]ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>Ê aging, including the difficulty of maintaining very young age structure were four times as pension and health care systems as the working likely as those at the end of the demograph- proportion of the population declines and the ic transition to have experienced outbreaks «À«ÀÌÊvÊi`iÀÞÊÀÃiðÊ9iÌÊÌ iÃiÊi}Ì>ÌiÊ vÊVÛÊVyVÌÊ i> ÞÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê}Ê economic concerns have not altered the fact countries with a youthful age structure, the ELIZABETH that historically, the critically serious problems ratio diminished, but they were still twice as of undemocratic governance and violent politi- likely to suffer from internal strife as those LEAHY ÜÌ Ê>Ê>ÌÕÀiÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊÊÜ V Ê>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊxxÊ «iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ`iÀÊÌ >ÊÎä®°Ê Elizabeth Leahy is a research associate at Moreover, the pattern has continued, with *«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê*®Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ six out of nine new outbreaks of civil conflict «À>ÀÞÊ>ÕÌ ÀÊvÊThe Shape of Things to between 2000 and 2006 occurring in coun- Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, tries with very young or youthful age struc- More Equitable World. *½ÃÊ/`Ê*ÀiÃÌÊ tures. Due to the complex linkages to other VÌÀLÕÌi`ÊÌÊÌ ÃÊ>ÀÌVi°Ê* ÌÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊ issues, there is no direct cause-and-effect rela- â>LiÌ Ê i> Þ® tionship between demographics, conflict, and governance. Still, the association between age structure and development is powerful, and warrants a higher priority for population and 40 reproductive health on policymakers’ agendas.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Beginning the Demographic Transition: Very Young Age Structures
In countries with a very young age structure, roughly two-thirds or more of the population iÌÜiiÊ£ÇäÊ>`Ê£]ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊ ÃÊÕ`iÀÊÌ iÊ>}iÊvÊÎä°ÊÊÓääx]ÊÈÓÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ representing 14 percent of the world’s total ÞÕ}Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊÜiÀiÊvÕÀÊÌiÃÊ>ÃÊiÞÊ>ÃÊ population fell into this category—and all had those at the end of the demographic transition a fertility rate higher than three children per Ü>°Ê/ iÃiÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊ>}ÊÌ iÊi>ÃÌÊ ÌÊ >ÛiÊiÝ«iÀiVi`ÊÕÌLÀi>ÃÊvÊVÛÊVvVÌ° developed in the world; their average gross >Ì>ÊViÊ ®Ê«iÀÊV>«Ì>ÊÊÓääxÊÜ>ÃÊ fnÓÇÊ7À`Ê >]ÊÓääÇ®°ÊÊ>``ÌÊÌÊ>Ê While it is likely that fertility rates in coun- relatively high likelihood of civil conflict, these tries at the beginning of the demographic tran- countries have autocratic or only partially dem- sition will continue to decline over time, their ocratic governments. In the last three decades of populations will still continue to grow rapid- Ì iÊÓäÌ ÊViÌÕÀÞ]ÊÞÊ£ÎÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ ly—in some cases, even double or triple—in with a very young age structure had fully demo- the next few decades. VÀ>ÌVÊ}ÛiÀiÌÃ]ÊV«>Ài`ÊÜÌ ÊnÎÊ«iÀViÌÊ of countries with a mature age structure. Nigeria Countries with a very young age structure are While most countries have experienced great VViÌÀ>Ìi`ÊÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>]ÊÜÌ ÊÞÊ demographic change in recent decades, those a few exceptions.1 Meanwhile, only four coun- with a very young age structure have remained ÌÀiÃÊÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>p>L]Ê >ÕÀÌÕÃ]Ê largely static, and a few have actually reversed ,jÕ]Ê>`Ê-ÕÌ ÊvÀV>p >ÛiÊ«À}ÀiÃÃi`Ê their course along the demographic transition. far enough through the demographic transition to have passed beyond the very young age struc- ture category. ÌÊÌ iÊLi}}ÊvÊÌ iÊ`i}À>« VÊÌÀ>- sition, age structures follow the model of the classic “population pyramid,” with each suc- cessively younger age group comprising a larger }iÀ>ÃÊ«>ÀÌV«>ÌiÊÊ share of the total population than the previous traditional theater with >Êv>ÞÊ«>}ÊÌ iiÊ cohort. Better public health and nutrition lower Ê"}ÕÊÃÌ>Ìi°Ê^Ê *]Ê mortality rates. However, fertility rates remain VÕÀÌiÃÞÊvÊ* Ìà >Ài®Ê high, due to: • Women’s low social status and/or lack of educational attainment; • Insufficient access to an array of modern contraceptive methods; • Large desired family size for reasons of eco- nomic productivity or social status; and • Parents’ lack of confidence that most of their children will survive to adulthood. 41
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ÊÛ>}iÊ>Ê>`Ê >ÊVÕÌÞL>Ãi`Ê `ÃÌÀLÕÌÊ>}iÌÊ>ÀiÊ engaged in a spirited VÛiÀÃ>ÌÊ>LÕÌÊv>ÞÊ «>}Ê`ÕÀ}Ê>ÊÛ>}iÊ gathering near the town of Ü>ÃÃ>ÊÊViÌÀ>Ê Ì «>°Ê / iÊ>Ê >ÃÊvÕÀÊV `ÀiÊ >`ÊÜ>ÌÃÊvÕÀÊÀi]Ê>`Ê ÃÊ>}>ÃÌÊv>ÞÊ«>}°Ê ^ÊÓääxÊ6À}>Ê >«ÀiV Ì]Ê VÕÀÌiÃÞÊvÊ* Ìà >Ài®Ê
/ iÊà >ÀiÊvÊ }iÀ>½ÃÊ««Õ>ÌÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊÎäÊ management, which prevent the government ÊÓääxÊÜ>ÃÊ>VÌÕ>ÞÊ£°xÊ«iÀViÌÊgreater than in from effectively capitalizing on and fairly dis- £Çxp>ÊÀi>À>LiÊ>>ÞÊ}ÛiÊÌ >ÌÊÃÌÊ tributing income from the country’s abundant countries have made at least slight progress >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViðÊvÌiÀÊ`iV>`iÃÊvÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀÕi]Ê since then toward a more balanced population Nigeria achieved partial democracy in 1999. `ÃÌÀLÕÌÊ1 * ]ÊÓääÇ®° / iÊÓääÇÊiiVÌÃÊÜiÀiÊÌ iÊwÀÃÌÊÌÊÌÀ>ÃviÀÊ Only eight percent of Nigerian women use power among civilians. While international >Ê`iÀÊVÌÀ>Vi«ÌÛiÊiÌ `°Ê/ ÃÊÜÊÀ>Ìi]Ê observers generally condemned the elections combined with large desired family size, is pri- as blatantly manipulated, the outgoing presi- marily responsible for Nigeria’s fertility rate `i̽ÃÊ >`«Vi`ÊÃÕVViÃÃÀ]Ê1>ÀÕÊ9>À½`Õ>]Ê of nearly six children per woman (National assumed power relatively peacefully. However, Population Commission & ORC Macro, 2004). violence targeting foreign oil producers contin- One-fifth of Nigerian children die before their ues to destabilize the Niger Delta region, where fifth birthday, and 42 percent of women have ÀiLiÊÌ>iÛiÀÃÊ>`Ê`>««}ÃÊ >ÛiÊi`Ê>ÀÊ iÛiÀÊLiiÊÌÊÃV °Ê/ iÃiÊ>ÀÊÃV>Ê>`Ê multinational companies to significantly cut public health concerns are partially responsible back their production levels. for Nigeria’s stunted economic development. Ì Õ} ÊÌÊ `ÃÊÌ iÊ}Ài>ÌiÃÌÊ«iÌÀiÕÊÀiÃiÀÛiÃÊ Ethiopia ÊvÀV>Ê>`ÊÃÊÌ iÊi} Ì >À}iÃÌÊÊ«À`ÕViÀÊ Ethiopia’s progress along the demographic tran- in the world, the country’s per capita GNI was ÃÌÊÊÌ iÊ«>ÃÌÊÎäÊÞi>ÀÃÊ >ÃÊ>ÃÊLiiÊÃ} ÌÆÊ fxÈäÊÊÓääx]ÊiÛiÊÜiÀÊÌ >ÊÌ iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊvÀÊ Ì iÊà >ÀiÊvÊÌÃÊ««Õ>ÌÊÞÕ}iÀÊÌ >ÊÎäÊ >ÃÊ VÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊÞÕ}Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊ ]Ê remained virtually static. Population growth ÓääÇÆÊ7À`Ê >]ÊÓääÇ®° VÌÕiÃÊÌÊVÌÀLÕÌiÊÌÊ>Ê}ÊÌÀ>iVÌÀÞÊ Nigeria also remains hampered by political vÊ Õ>Ì>À>ÊVÀÃiÃÊÊ Ì «>°Ê/ iÊ1 Ê 42 corruption, instability, and bureaucratic mis- iÀ}iViÃÊ1ÌÊvÀÊ Ì «>ÊÓääÎ]Ê«°ÊÓ®Ê
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 found that “rapid and unhindered” popula- tion growth is a significant factor in exacerbat- ing food shortages. For more than two decades, Ethiopia has been stricken with recurring and, at times, severe food shortages. Due to wide- spread malnutrition, more than half of all chil- `ÀiÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊwÛiÊ>ÀiÊÃÌÕÌi`]ÊÜ iÊ{ÇÊ«iÀ- cent are underweight (Haile, 2004). Droughts and famine have become more fre- quent and more severe as, among other reasons, increased population density has led to erosion, the overcultivation of land, and ecological degra- dation. Most Ethiopians rely on wood and char- coal for energy, and deforestation is extensive— especially in the highlands, where more than 80 percent of the population lives. In 1900, 40 per- cent of Ethiopia was estimated to be covered by forests; today, this figure stands at less than three «iÀViÌÊ>i]ÊÓääx®°Ê Ì «>ÊÃÊiÊvÊÌ iÊ poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GNI of $160, about one-fifth the sub-Saharan vÀV>Ê>ÛiÀ>}iÊ7À`Ê >]ÊÓääÇ®° Compounding these environmental and eco- VÊ«ÀLiÃ]ÊÌ iÊÛ>ÃÌÊ>ÀÌÞÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ- lation lives in rural areas, where access to mod- ern health facilities is extremely limited. Use of modern contraceptives in rural areas, while increasing in recent years, remains very low, with a contraceptive prevalence rate of only 11 percent—compared to more than 40 percent in ÕÀL>Ê>Ài>ÃÊ iÌÀ>Ê-Ì>ÌÃÌV>Ê}iVÞÊEÊ", Ê >VÀ]ÊÓääÈ®°Ê/ÊiÀiÞÊ>Ì>ÊVÕÀÀiÌÊ«À- mary school enrollment rates—a far cry from increase in the size of each successively young- the Millennium Development Goal of achiev- er age group. However, populations in these }ÊÕÛiÀÃ>Ê«À>ÀÞÊi`ÕV>ÌÊLÞÊÓä£xpÌ iÊ countries are still growing, as women have an country would need to build an additional average of between two and four children each. 21,000 schools and train more than 280,000 / iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊ«iÀÊV>«Ì>Ê ÊÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê Ìi>V iÀÃÊ>i]ÊÓääx®° a youthful age structure is $2,429, about three times greater than that of countries with a very Continuing the Transition: Youthful ÞÕ}Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊ7À`Ê >]ÊÓääÇ®° Age Structures Countries with a youthful age structure were about half as likely to experience civil conflict / iÊ«À}ÀiÃÃÊÌ >ÌÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÞÕÌ vÕÊ>}iÊ LiÌÜiiÊ£ÇäÊ>`Ê£ÊÌ >ÊÌ ÃiÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊ structure have made along the demographic young age structure—and slightly more likely transition is evident in their population pro- to be democratic (21 percent were rated by the files, which reflect a less dramatic proportional *ÌÞÊ6Ê«ÀiVÌÊ>ÃÊvÕÊ`iVÀ>ViÃ]ÊV«>Ài`Ê 43
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM In recent decades, Pakistan has been embroiled in high-stakes geopolitical rela- Ìà «Ã]ÊLÌ ÊÌiÀ>ÞÊ>`ÊiÝÌiÀ>Þ°Ê/ iÊ divisions between Pakistan’s government and Islamic extremists reached a full-fledged con- ÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÞÕÌ vÕÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊÜiÀiÊ vÀÌ>ÌÊÊÌ iÊÃÕiÀÊvÊÓääÇ]ÊÜ iÊÌ iÊ country’s military president, Pervez Musharraf, >LÕÌÊ >vÊ>ÃÊiÞÊÌÊiÝ«iÀiViÊVÛÊVvVÌÊ ordered an attack on a mosque held by funda- LiÌÜiiÊ£ÇäÊ>`Ê£ÊÌ >ÊÌ ÃiÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊ mentalists in Islamabad, leading to the deaths vÊi>ÀÞÊÎääÊ«i«i°Ê/ iÊÃÌÕ>ÌÊVÌÕiÃÊ ÞÕ}Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀip>`ÊÃ} ÌÞÊÀiÊiÞÊ to change rapidly, following the assassination to be democratic. of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the election of a fragile coalition government, and culminating in Musharraf’s resignation in ÜÌ Ê£ÎÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊÞÕ}Ê Õ}ÕÃÌÊÓään°Ê"ÛiÀ>]Ê«ÌV>Êw} Ì}Ê >ÃÊ structure). However, countries with a youthful hindered economic progress—and distracted age structure were still significantly more prone the government from fighting terrorists and to conflict and much less democratic, on aver- Ì iÀÊÌ>ÌÃÊ/Ã]ÊÓään®° age, than those that had advanced further along / iÊÊLiÌÜiiÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊ>`Ê*>ÃÌ>½ÃÊ the demographic transition. political and social institutions is visible in the growth of the madrasa educational ÃÞÃÌi°ÊÃÊ Pakistan the country’s school-age population doubled / iÀiÊ>ÀiÊviÜiÀÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÊÞÕÌ vÕÊ>}iÊ LiÌÜiiÊ£ÇxÊ>`ÊÓäääÊ>`Ê«>ViiÌÊÊ«ÕL- structure than with a very young age structure. lic schools became more competitive, many However, the youthful group includes India, parents—particularly the poor—turned to Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which together are religious schools, or madrasas, to educate their home to more than one-fifth of the world’s ÃÃ°Ê 7Ì Ê ÀiÊ Ì >Ê £°xÊ Ê ÃÌÕ`iÌÃÊ ÌÌ>Ê ««Õ>Ì°Ê }Ê Ì iÃiÊ Ì ÀiiÊ -ÕÌ Ê in Pakistan, madrasas provide free room and Ã>ÊVÕÌÀiÃ]Ê*>ÃÌ>Ê >ÃÊÌ iÊÃÌÊÞÕÌ - board to children in need, but their education- ful age structure, as its birthrate did not begin al outlook is often limited to a strict religious declining until the 1990s, 20 years later than orthodoxy with little practical application for Bangladesh. In Pakistan, women now have an employment. Some madrasas have been linked average of four children each; in Bangladesh, ÌÊëÃÀ}ÊÌ>ÌÊ>VÌÛÌiÃÊÊv} >ÃÌ>Ê Ì iÞÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊÃ} ÌÞÊÀiÊÌ >ÊÌ Àii°ÊÌ Õ} Ê and the Kashmir province (International Crisis the two countries had the same population Group, 2002). ££ÎÊ®ÊÊ£ä]Ê*>ÃÌ>½ÃÊ««Õ>ÌÊ ÃÊ«ÀiVÌi`ÊÌÊLiÊ£xÊ«iÀViÌÊ}Ài>ÌiÀÊÌ >ÊÌÃÊ Iran i} LÀ½ÃÊ LÞÊ Óäxä°Ê Ê >}>`ià ]Ê {ÇÊ «iÀ- In the 1980s, during the prolonged war with cent of married women of reproductive age are À>µ]ÊÀ>½ÃÊviÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÊÜ>ÃÊÀiÊÌ >ÊÈ°xÊV - using a modern contraceptive method, while in dren per woman, and the annual population *>ÃÌ>]ÊÌ iÊw}ÕÀiÊÃÊÞÊÓäÊ«iÀViÌ°ÊÀÕ`Ê growth rate surpassed four percent (UNPD, the middle of the 21st century, Pakistan will ÓääÇ®°Ê ViÀi`Ê>LÕÌÊÌ iÊiVVÊVÃi- become the fourth most populous country in quences of escalating demand for public servic- the world, after India, China, and the United iÃÊ>`ÊLÃ]ÊÊÌ iÊ£äÃÊ}ÛiÀiÌÊvwV>ÃÊ -Ì>ÌiÃÊ1 * ]ÊÓääÇ®° successfully convinced key clerics of the need 44
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 for a concerted and extensive national family planning program. Ì Õ} ÊÌ iÊ«À}À>Ê`iÃÊÌÊvVÕÃÊÊ the reproductive health needs of the young and unmarried, it provides free modern contra- ceptive methods at public clinics. Prospective spouses must attend a government-sponsored class on family planning in order to receive a marriage license (Roudi-Fahimi, 2002). Indeed, the program has been even more successful at encouraging smaller families than the govern- iÌÊ >`Ê>ÌV«>Ìi`°Ê/ iÊ>Ì>ÊviÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÊ dropped to the replacement level of 2.1 chil- `ÀiÊ«iÀÊÜ>Ê1 * ]ÊÓääÇ®°ÊÃÊÀiViÌÞÊ >ÃÊ£x]ÊÀ>ÊÃÌÊ >`Ê>ÊÛiÀÞÊÞÕ}Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕV- ture, but it has now reached the later stages of Ì iÊÞÕÌ vÕÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊV>Ìi}ÀÞ°ÊVVÀ`}Ê ÌÊ1 * Ê«ÀiVÌÃÊÌ >ÌÊà ÜÊviÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÃÊ continuing to decline, Iran will achieve a transi- tional age structure by 2010. Interestingly, Iran has made this rapid demo- graphic progress under an autocratic govern- ment and with only slow economic develop- iÌ°ÊÊÜiÀ``iÊViÊVÕÌÀÞ]ÊÀ>½ÃÊ economic growth rate has averaged a little more than three percent annually over the past decade, and inflation and unemployment remain high 7À`Ê >]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê/ iÊ«ÌV>ÊiÃÌ>Là - iÌ]ÊVÌÀi`ÊLÞÊ-Õ«ÀiiÊ i>`iÀÊÞ>Ì> Ê Khamenei and other clerics, has resisted recent efforts toward political reform and openness, Ü iÊ*ÀiÃ`iÌÊ > Õ`Ê >`i>`Ê >ÃÊ economic changes it has promoted—including escalated tensions on the international stage over higher rates of women’s participation in the the country’s nuclear development program. workforce—are well-entrenched within Iranian Ê"VÌLiÀÊÓääÈ]Ê*ÀiÃ`iÌÊ >`i>`Ê society. Iran’s political and economic challenges issued a challenge to Iran’s now well-established are substantial, but the country seems well on family planning program, calling for higher fer- its way to a more balanced age structure. Iran’s tility rates in an aim to increase the country’s history suggests that economic growth and ««Õ>ÌÊLÞÊÇäÊ«iÀViÌ]ÊÌÊ£ÓäÊ°ÊiÊ democratic transformation are not prerequisites proposed achieving this drastic change by cut- for a decline in fertility. ting back women’s working hours to encourage them to have more than two children each. Policy Recommendations iëÌiÊ >`i>`½ÃÊ ivvÀÌÃ]Ê >>ÞÃÌÃÊ doubt that Iran will return to high levels of pop- Countries with very young and youthful age Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ Ê VÌÌ>]ÊÓääÈ®°Ê/ iÊ>Ì>Ê structures need interventions to encourage family planning program and the social and progress along the demographic transition, 45
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ONLINE
The complete text of The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World, by Elizabeth Leahy and colleagues, is on Population Action International’s web- site: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Shape_of_Things_to_Come/ Summary.shtml
When An earlier report from PAI, The Security Demographic, also focuses on age structure and security: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Security_Demographic/Summary. i`ÕV>Ì]Ê shtml
i>Ì ÊV>Ài]Ê>`Ê Leahy coauthored an article for World Watch magazine on “Population and Security” with ECSP’s i«ÞiÌÊ Sean Peoples: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5853 >ÀiÊ>Û>>Li]Ê ÞÕ}Ê«i«iÊ renew and which in some cases they have not even begun. must focus on the needs of and opportunities Governments and civil society should collabo- for young people. People sometime misinterpret ÀiÛÌ>âiÊ>Ê rate on reproductive health programs, which the fact that countries with youthful popula- must be long-term efforts with ongoing support tions have been more vulnerable to conflict and VÕÌÀÞ½ÃÊ from bilateral and multilateral donors. poor governance to mean that young people iVÞÊ>`Ê Progress along the demographic transition >Ài]ÊÊ>`ÊvÊÌ iÃiÛiÃ]Ê>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÌ Ài>Ì°Ê/ ÃÊ is achieved through declines in mortality and assumption could not be further from the truth. ÃÌÌÕÌÃ°Ê fertility rates, which produce a more balanced In fact, young people are an asset for any society, 1vÀÌÕ>ÌiÞ]Ê >}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊÛiÀÊÌi°Ê/ iÃiÊV >}iÃÊVVÕÀÊ and their well-being and success determine the through access to basic health care, nutrition, future of a country’s development. When edu- these >`ÊÃ>Ì>Ì°Ê/ iÊVÀi>Ãi`Ê>Û>>LÌÞÊ>`Ê cation, health care, and employment are avail- ««ÀÌÕÌiÃÊ use of modern contraceptive methods and high- able, young people renew and revitalize a coun- er levels of female educational attainment have try’s economy and institutions. Unfortunately, are not both been shown to promote smaller family these opportunities are not widespread in many sizes (Bongaarts et al., 1990). Many countries— countries that face a continually growing popu- widespread in VÕ`}Ê iÝV]Ê/ >>`]Ê>`Ê/ÕÃ>p >ÛiÊ >Ì°Ê*ÀÛ`}ÊÌ iÊÕÃÌÊLiÊ>Ê>ÀÊ«ÀÀÌÞÊ >ÞÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ successfully initiated a shift to smaller family of these countries’ development programs. sizes through state-supported voluntary family that face a planning programs that provide free or afford- Note VÌÕ>ÞÊ able contraception, counseling, and related reproductive health care. In addition, countries 1. Countries with a very young age structure outside vÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>ÊVÕ`iÊv} >ÃÌ>]Ê >L`>]Ê growing in which most girls attend secondary school Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Laos, Nicaragua, the ««Õ>Ì° have lower fertility rates and better maternal *>iÃÌ>Ê/iÀÀÌÀiÃ]Ê-ÞÀ>]Ê>`Ê9ii° >`Ê V `Ê i>Ì Ê `V>ÌÀÃÊ LÕ >`>Ê EÊ >Ãi]ÊÓää{®°Ê/ ÃÊÌÀi`Êi>LiÃÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ}i- References erations of girls to be educated, and allows more ÜiÊÌÊÊÌ iÊ>LÀÊvÀViÊ>`ÊVÀi>ÃiÊÌ iÀÊ LÕ >`>]Ê >]ÊEÊ-Ìi« iÊ >Ãi°ÊÓää{®°ÊThe economic and human development costs of missing families’ income. the Millennium Development Goal on gender equity. Finally, policies and programs in countries Washington, DC: World Bank. 46 at the beginning of the demographic transition Bongaarts, John, W. Parker Maudlin, & James F. Phillips.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 ->À>]Ê££]Ê>ÌÌi`ÃÊ>ÊvÀiiÊ >`ÕÌÊÌi>V }ÊV>ÃÃÊ>ÌÊ >Ìi >}Ê/À>}Ê iÌiÀÊÊ >Ìi >}Ê`ÃÌÀVÌ]Ê*>ÃÌ>°Ê She cannot afford school as à iÊÃÊ>ÊÀ« >°Ê^ÊÓääÈÊ >VLÊ-]ÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊvÊ * Ìà >Ài®Ê
£ä®°Êº/ iÊ`i}À>« VÊ«>VÌÊvÊv>ÞÊ«>}Ê Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.populationaction.org/ programs.” Studies in Family Planning 21È®]ÊÓÎ£ä° *ÕLV>ÌÃÉ,i«ÀÌÃÉ/ iÚ- >«iÚvÚ/ }ÃÚÌÚ iÌÀ>Ê-Ì>ÌÃÌV>Ê}iVÞÊEÊ", Ê >VÀ°ÊÓääÈ®°Ê iÉ-"/ °«`v Ethiopia demographic and health survey 2005. ``ÃÊ National Population Commission & ORC Macro. L>L>]Ê Ì «>]ÊEÊ >ÛiÀÌ]Ê \Ê iÌÀ>Ê (2004). Nigeria demographic and health survey -Ì>ÌÃÌV>Ê}iVÞÊEÊ", Ê >VÀ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ 2003. Calverton, MD: National Population at ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°i>ÃÕÀi` ðVÉ«ÕLÃÉ«`vÉ,£ÇÉ ÃÃÊEÊ", Ê >VÀ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ,£Ç°«`v ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°i>ÃÕÀi` ðVÉ«ÕLÃÉ«ÕLÚ`iÌ>ð Cincotta, Richard. (2006). Prospects for Ahmadinejad’s call Vv¶ r{x{EÃÀV /«r>`Û>Vi` for more rapid population growth in Iran. Washington, Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh. (2002). Iran’s family planning DC: Stimson Center. program: Responding to a nation’s needs. Washington, iÀ}ÞÊvÀ>ÌÊ`ÃÌÀ>ÌÊ ®°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê DC: Population Reference Bureau. International statistics. Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ /Ã]Ê > >°ÊÓään]ÊÕÞÊn®°ÊºÌÊ£ääÊ`>ÞÃ]Ê*>ÃÌ>Ê}Û- http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/ ernment in disarray.” Associated Press.ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ contents.html at ÌÌ«\ÉÉ>«°}}i°VÉ>ÀÌViÉiµ x âV} *>9- Haile, Sahlu. (2004). “Population, development, and 8i/ 6Ã+ä}<6} £*ää environment in Ethiopia.” Environmental Change and United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia Security Program Report 10]Ê{Îx£°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ 1 1 ®°ÊÓääή°ÊTargeting problems cause mal- >ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÜÃViÌiÀ°À}ÉÌ«VÃÉ«ÕLÃÉiVëÀ£äÚ nutrition: Shortage of seeds leads to next crisis°Ê``ÃÊ specialreport.pdf L>L>]Ê Ì «>\Ê1 1 °ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ >i°Ê-> Õ°ÊÓääx]Ê«À®°ÊPopulation, development, ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÀiivÜiL°ÌÉÀÜÉ,7iÃÓääΰÃvÉ and environment in Ethiopia. Presentation at the ià Þ,7 V1 i >iÉ "-È{ Woodrow Wilson Center International Center uneue-eth-28feb.pdf/$File/uneue-eth-28feb.pdf vÀÊ-V >ÀÃ]Ê7>à }Ì]Ê ]Ê«ÀÊ£{]ÊÓääx°Ê 1Ìi`Ê >ÌÃÊ*«Õ>ÌÊ ÛÃÊ1 * ®°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÜÃViÌiÀ°À}É World population prospects: The 2006 revision. New `iÝ°Vv¶Ì«VÚ`r£{£ÎEvÕÃi>VÌrÌ«Vð 9À\Ê1 * ° iÛiÌÚÃÕ>ÀÞEiÛiÌÚ`r£Ó£ä{{ University of Maryland Center for International International Crisis Group (ICG). (2002). Pakistan: iÛi«iÌÊ>`Ê yVÌÊ >>}iiÌ°ÊÓääx®°Ê Madrasas, extremism and the military. Brussels, Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and tran- Belgium: ICG. sitions, 1800-2003.ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. Leahy, Elizabeth, with Robert Engelman, Carolyn G. cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity 6}i]Ê->À> Ê>``V]ÊEÊ/`Ê*ÀiÃÌ°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊThe 7À`Ê >°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊWorld development indicators data- shape of things to come: Why age structure matters to a base. Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://genderstats.worldbank. safer, more equitable world. 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê*°Ê org/dataonline/ 47
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT
ÀÊ vVÌÊÌÊ*i>ViLÕ`}\Ê UNEP’s Role in Environmental Assessment and Recovery
e dismounted from our donkeys tle time in the village, but never in my wildest near the ancient city of Herat in dreams could I have imagined being in such a Wsearch of pistachio woodlands. situation. However, in the years that followed, /ÜiÌÞÌ ÀiiÊÞi>ÀÃÊvÊÜ>ÀÊ >`ÊV«iÌiÞÊ`iV- I was frequently struck by similar encounters mated the forests, and our team of experts from with local people trying to cope with environ- the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) had mental damage and the many ways it affects ÌÀ>Ûii`ÊÌÊÀÌ ÜiÃÌÊv} >ÃÌ>ÊÌÊ`iÌiÀiÊ their lives. how such massive deforestation was affecting -ViÊÌ >ÌÊÌÀ«ÊÌÊv} >ÃÌ>ÊÊÓääÓ]ÊÊ >ÛiÊ the lives and livelihoods of local people. investigated the environmental consequences of vÌiÀÊ ÃiÊ Ì>Ê V ÌV >ÌÊ >LÕÌÊ i>Ì ]Ê conflict in countries including Iraq, Lebanon, v>Þ]Ê>`Ê> ]ÊÊ>Ãi`ÊÌ iÊV>ÊÛ>}iÊV- Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic mander, Daolat, if he could lead us to one of Republic of the Congo (DRC) on behalf of the last remaining stands of wild pistachio in UNEP. Using state-of-the-art science and tech- the province. He countered by asking if he nology, teams of UN environmental experts could first show me his hidden weapons cache, identify direct and indirect environmental dam- including the firing tube from a Stinger missile age and assess its impact on human health, live- that he had used to destroy a Soviet helicopter lihoods, and security in conflict-affected coun- gunship. I politely declined, since we had lit- tries. Our goal is to collect scientific data about
DAVID JENSEN David JensenÊ i>`ÃÊÌ iÊ*VÞÊ>`Ê*>}Ê/i>ÊvÊÌ iÊ1 Ê ÛÀiÌÊ*À}À>i½ÃÊ*ÃÌ vVÌÊ>`Ê Ã>ÃÌiÀÊ >>}iiÌÊ À>V ÊÊiiÛ>]Ê-ÜÌâiÀ>`°Ê-ViÊÓäää]Ê iÊ >ÃÊÜÀi`ÊÊ£äÊ «ÃÌVvVÌÊ«iÀ>ÌÃÊiÌ iÀÊ>ÃÊ>ÊÌiV V>ÊiÝ«iÀÌÊÀÊ>ÃÊ>Ê«ÀiVÌÊ VÀ`>ÌÀ°ÊiÃiÊÃÊÜÊi>`}Ê1 *½ÃÊivvÀÌÃÊÌÊ«ÀÛ`iÊÌiV V>ÊiÝ«iÀÌÃiÊÊiÛÀiÌ]ÊVvVÌ]Ê>`Ê«i>ViLÕ`}ÊÌÊÌ iÊ *i>ViLÕ`}Ê ÃÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÊ1 Ê iÛi«iÌÊÀÕ«°ÊiÊ `ÃÊ>ÊL>V iÀ½ÃÊ`i}ÀiiÊvÀÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ6VÌÀ>Ê>`Ê>Ê>à ÌiÀ½ÃÊ`i}ÀiiÊvÀÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ"ÝvÀ`°Ê* ÌÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊ1 *® 48
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 the environment and present it in ways that speak to the daily concerns of local people, poli- cymakers, and the international community. If people cannot find clean water for drink- ing, wood for shelter and energy, or land for crops, what are the chances that peace will be 1 *ÊÃiiÃÊÌÊiÃÕÀiÊÌ >ÌÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÀiLÕ`}Ê successful and durable? Very slim. UNEP seeks to ensure that countries rebuilding from conflict vÀÊVvVÌÊ`iÌvÞÊÌ iÊÃÕÃÌ>>LiÊÕÃiÊvÊ identify the sustainable use of natural resources >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ>ÃÊ>ÊvÕ`>iÌ>Ê«ÀiÀiµÕÃÌiÊ as a fundamental prerequisite and guiding prin- ciple of their reconstruction and recovery. >`Ê}Õ`}Ê«ÀV«iÊvÊÌ iÀÊÀiVÃÌÀÕVÌÊ Since these specialized field operations began >`ÊÀiVÛiÀÞ° in 1999, UNEP has learned three critical lessons:
£°Ê ÊÌ Õ} ÊÌ iÊÌÞ«iÃÊ>`Ê>}ÌÕ`iÊ`vviÀ]Ê conflicts always cause environmental dam- The Birth of UNEP’s Post-Conflict age, in three primary ways: directly from Environmental Operations: The military activities, such as bombing; indi- Kosovo Conflict rectly from the coping strategies of local people; and indirectly from the breakdown UNEP’s post-conflict operations began in of institutional infrastructure, which often Kosovo in 1999. Most readers will recall the accompanies conflicts. Conflict-related ÃÌÀi>ÃÊvÊÀivÕ}iiÃÊyii}Ê ÃÛpÇxä]äääÊ environmental damage affects people in in total—but some might also remember the three ways: It threatens health; it threat- bombing of roads, public infrastructure, and ens livelihoods; and it threatens human `ÕÃÌÀ>ÊÃÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ /"ÊV>i`ʺÃÌÀ>Ìi}VÊÌ>À- security. gets.” For example, the Pancevo chemical com- plex was hit 12 separate times during the con- 2. Relief and recovery activities often rely on flict, releasing 80,000 tons of burning oil into natural resources, causing additional dam- Ì iÊiÛÀiÌÊ1 *ÊEÊ1 //]Ê age to the environment and potentially 1999). Black rain fell onto neighboring towns «À`ÕV}ÊiÜÊÃÕÀViÃÊvÊÀðÊ9iÌÊÌ iÊ and villages. In addition, a toxic soup of com- recovery process itself can be harnessed to pounds and substances leaked into the air, soil, help re-orient conflict-affected countries to and water around Pancevo—which was only more sustainable forms of development. iÊvÊÌ iÊÀiÊÌ >ÊxäÊ`ÕÃÌÀ>ÊÃÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ ÜiÀiÊ ÌÊ1 *ÊEÊ1 //]Ê£®°Ê Î°Ê Ê >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÊiÛÀiÌÊ>ÀiÊ / iÊV>ÊVÕÌiÃÊ>VÀÃÃÊ-iÀL>Ê>`Ê not only damaged by conflict, they also the region demanded to know what was hap- `ÀÛiÊ>`ÊÃÕÃÌ>ÊÌ°Ê-ViÊ£ä]Ê£ÇÊV- pening to their environment. Bulgaria and flicts have been fueled by natural resources, Romania expressed their deep concern about VÕ`}ÊiÊÊvÀV>Ê>iÊ1 *]Ê transboundary air pollution and the potentially 2008a). toxic sludge in the Danube River. Meanwhile, /"Ê>À}Õi`ÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÞÊ >`Êâi`ÊiÛ- Using case studies, this article explores each ronmental damage by using sophisticated weap- of these lessons and presents UNEP’s plans and ons and selective targeting. priorities for expanding operations in post-con- In response to the demand for accurate and flict environmental assessment and recovery. LiVÌÛiÊvÀ>Ì]Ê1 Ê-iVÀiÌ>ÀÞiiÀ>Ê 49
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM >â>Ài- >ÀvÊÃiiÊvÀÊÌ iÊ >ÀÊ ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ1 *®
wÊ>ÊÀiµÕiÃÌi`Ê1 *ÊÌ>iÊ>VÌ°Ê7iÊ Linking Natural Resources, sent teams of environmental experts to assess Livelihoods, and Peacebuilding: the environmental impacts and risks to human Afghanistan health using field samples, mobile labs, and satellite images. UNEP’s first report concluded In 2002, the transitional government of that the damage was not as serious as people v} >ÃÌ>Ê>Ãi`Ê1 *ÊÌÊV>ÀÀÞÊÕÌÊ>ÊV- wÀÃÌÊÌ Õ} ÌÊ1 *ÊEÊ1 //]Ê£®°Ê prehensive environmental assessment. However, High concentrations of chemicals were identi- since the country had virtually no heavy infra- fied at four main hotspots, but the overall situ- structure, we needed a new approach to gauge >ÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌÊ>ÊV>Ì>ÃÌÀ« i°Ê/ iÃiÊ ÌëÌÃ]Ê Ì iÊ«>VÌÊvÊÓÎÊÞi>ÀÃÊvÊVyVÌÊÊÌ iÊiÛ- however, required restoration to protect human ronment. UNEP launched five parallel teams health and the environment from further risks, of experts to assess how natural resources— and clean-up efforts were considered an urgent including land, water, forests, and wildlife— humanitarian priority. were affected by coping strategies used by local / iÊÃÌÕ>ÌÊÊ ÃÛp>Êà ÀÌ`ÕÀ>ÌÊ communities during the conflict. We also evalu- war that used sophisticated weapons in highly ated the state of water and waste infrastructure, industrialized locations—proved to be a good as well as air quality, in five of the main cities. test of UNEP’s analytical techniques and ability Our aim was to assess potential environmental to deploy multidisciplinary teams of experts to risks caused by the combined effects of urban the field. However, this approach to post-con- growth, migration, and an overall lack of invest- flict assessments—focusing on environmental ment and maintenance. contamination from bombed industrial sites— ÊÃiÊ>Ài>Ã]ÊÜiÊvÕ`ÊÌ >ÌÊÕ«ÊÌÊxÊ«iÀ- Ü>ÃÊvÕ`>iÌ>ÞÊ>ÌiÀi`ÊLÞÊÕÀÊiÝÌÊ>ÀÊ cent of the landscape had been deforested assessment. during the conflict—cut for fuel, bombed to 50
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 ÀÊÃ>«}Ê>}ÊÌ iÊ>Ê ÃÌÀiiÌÊÊ >`> >ÀÊ ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ 1 *®
ÀÊÀiÊÌ >Ê ÌÜÊ`iV>`iÃ]Ê v} >ÃÌ>½ÃÊ remove cover, or removed to grow crops and restoring them can also contribute to peace. >ÌÕÀ>Ê }À>âiÊÛiÃÌVÊ1 *]ÊÓääή°Ê >ÞÊ«i«iÊ >À}iÃV>iÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÀiVÛiÀÞÊ«ÀiVÌÃÊ were fundamentally dependent on these forests can provide immediate employment opportu- ÀiÃÕÀViÃÊÜiÀiÊ for livelihoods. Without them, and without nities and support new livelihoods, especially µÕ`>Ìi`Ê>`Ê >ÌiÀ>ÌÛiÃ]Êv} >ÃÊÜiÀiÊ}À>Ì}ÊÌÊÌ iÊVÌ- for vulnerable sectors of the population such ies or engaging in other forms of income gener- as former combatants. Ã>>}i`]Ê ation—such as poppy production for the drug Building on the recommendations contained leading to trade—in order to survive. in the post-conflict environmental assessment, v} >ÃÌ>ÊÌ>Õ} ÌÊÕÃÊÃiÌ }Ê«ÀÌ>ÌÊ 1 *ÊÃÊ i«}ÊÌ iÊv} >Ê}ÛiÀiÌÊ`iÛi«Ê widespread about the impact of conflict: Coping strategies its environmental institutions. UNEP has estab- used by local people, coupled with the break- lished a program office within the compound of >`Ê«ÀvÕ`Ê down of governance, can cause more environ- Ì iÊ >Ì>Ê ÛÀiÌ>Ê*ÀÌiVÌÊ}iVÞÊ iÛÀiÌ>Ê mental damage than the war itself. For more *®Ê>`ÊÃÊ i«}ÊÌÊLÕ`ÊÌÃÊV>«>VÌÞÊÜÌ Ê Ì >ÊÌÜÊ`iV>`iÃ]Êv} >ÃÌ>½ÃÊ>ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀV- >ÊÃiÛiÞi>ÀÊ«À}À>ÊvÀÊÓääÎÊÌÊÓä£äpÌ iÊ impacts es were liquidated and mismanaged, leading largest of its kind for UNEP. ÊvÀiÃÌÃ]Ê to widespread and profound environmental impacts on forests, aquifers, land, and wildlife. UNEP’s Latest Post-Conflict >µÕviÀÃ]Ê>`]Ê ÃÊÌ iÊÀiLÕ`}Ê«ÀViÃÃÊÕv`i`]ÊÀiÃÌÀ}Ê Environmental Assessments: and wildlife. Ì iÃiÊÀiÃÕÀViÃÊLiV>iÊ>Ê>ÀÊ}ÛiÀiÌÊ Lebanon and Sudan priority in order to restore livelihoods, reduce migration, and promote economic stability— ÕÀ}ÊÌ iÊÎ{`>ÞÊVyVÌÊLiÌÜiiÊ iL>Ê the basic prerequisites for lasting peace. and Israel in 2006, UNEP tracked environmen- v} >ÃÌ>½ÃÊ iÝ«iÀiViÊ `iÃÌÀ>ÌiÃÊ tal impacts on both sides of the Lebanon-Israel that while degraded natural resources can border. Within 24 hours of the ceasefire agree- undermine livelihoods and threaten stability, iÌ]Ê>ÊiÝ«iÀÌÊvÀÊÌ iÊÌÊ1 *" Ê 51
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM contamination levels appeared to be typical for coastal areas in that part of the Mediterranean— good news for the country’s economically important tourism and fisheries sectors (UNEP, ÓääÇ>®°Ê/ iÊÀi«ÀÌÊ>ÃÊÛiÀwi`ÊÌ >ÌÊiÊvÊ ÞÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ«i>ViÊÊ >ÀvÕÀÊÕÃÌÊv`ÊÜ>ÞÃÊÌÊ the weapons used in the conflict were made from depleted uranium or any other radioactive address the critical gap between pastoralists’ >ÌiÀ>°Ê/ iÊ>ÀÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÀÃÃÊ}iiÀ- and farmers’ demands for fertile land and water ated by the conflict were related to the disposal of debris and hazardous waste generated by the ÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÊÌi`ÊÃÕ««Þ° destruction of industrial sites and the demoli- ÌÊvÊLÕ`}ðÊ/ iÊà iiÀÊÃV>iÊvÊÌ iÊ`iLÀÃÊ Environment Unit was on the ground to assess overwhelmed municipal dump sites and waste >VÕÌiÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÀÃÃÊÌÊ Õ>Ê i>Ì °Ê/ iÊ management systems, potentially contaminat- >ÀÊVViÀÊÜ>ÃÊÌ iÊ«ÌiÌ>ÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê ing groundwater and air. UNEP made recom- damage and health risks from the bombing of mendations for addressing these risks and pre- fuel storage tanks at the Jiyeh thermal power pared to provide further technical assistance, if «>Ì]ÊÜ V Êëi`ÊÃiÊ£ä]äää£x]äääÊÌÃÊ requested. of heavy fuel oil into the sea, affecting approxi- In contrast, the assessment in Sudan was >ÌiÞÊ£xäÊÊvÊ iL>iÃiÊV>ÃÌi]Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ the largest and most complex ever undertaken >ÃÊ«>ÀÌÊvÊ-ÞÀ>½ÃÊV>ÃÌÊ1 *]ÊÓääÇ>®°Ê/ iÊ by UNEP, requiring 10 separate field missions Joint Unit worked closely with the Ministry of over 12 months, more than 12,000 km of road Environment and international actors to estab- ÌÀ>Ûi]Ê>`ÊÀiÊÌ >ÊÓ]äääÊÌiÀÛiÜðÊ/ iÊ lish an Oil Spill Operations and Coordination w>Ê>ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊÀi«ÀÌ]ÊÀii>Ãi`ÊÊÕiÊÓääÇ]Ê Centre, which coordinated equipment, mon- is the most comprehensive that UNEP has etary contributions, and staff in the spill’s after- ever produced, covering water, agriculture, for- >Ì °Ê/ iÊÌÊ1ÌÊ>ÃÊÌÀi`Ê«ÕLVÊ ests, desertification, natural disasters, wildlife, sources to gather information on other environ- the marine environment, industrial pollution, mental impacts of the conflict. the urban environment, environmental gover- /ÊV`ÕVÌÊ>ÊÜ`iÀÊ>ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊvÊÌ iÊiÛ- nance, and the role of environmental pressures ronmental damage and associated risks, UNEP Ê-Õ`>½ÃÊVyVÌðÊ/ iÊÀi«ÀÌÊvviÀÃÊnxÊÀiV- assembled a team of 12 scientists with exper- mendations and outlines a detailed government tise in solid and hazardous waste management, action plan with a total estimated national cost freshwater resources, land-based contamination, vÊf£ÓäÊÊÛiÀÊÎxÊÞi>ÀÃÊ1 *]ÊÓääÇL®Ê marine and coastal management, and military One of the report’s most critical findings is Üi>«ÀÞ°Ê/ iÊ1 *ÊÌi>ÊÛÃÌi`ÊÀiÊÌ >Ê that scarce natural resources such as land and 100 sites throughout the country and took close water are inextricably linked to the conflict in to 200 samples of soil, surface and groundwa- >ÀvÕÀ°ÊÞÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ«i>ViÊÊ >ÀvÕÀÊÕÃÌÊw`Ê ter, dust, ash, seawater, sediment, and marine ways to address the critical gap between pasto- animals. Fifteen Ministry of Environment staff ralists’ and farmers’ demands for fertile land and members and volunteers, as well as a scientist water resources and the limited supply. However, vÀÊÌ iÊ iL>iÃiÊÌVÊ iÀ}ÞÊ ÃÃ]Ê ÕÃÌÊ>ÃÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÃÌÀiÃÃÊV>Ê i«ÊÌÀ}}iÀÊ>`Ê accompanied the assessment team in the field. perpetuate conflict, the sustainable manage- / iÊw>Ê>ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊÀi«ÀÌÊVVÕ`i`ÊÌ >ÌÊ ment of natural resources can provide the basis the oil pollution to the marine environment for long-term stability, sustainable livelihoods, 52 was largely contained by the rapid response, as and development, the report concluded.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 / iÊ-> i]ÊÜ V ÊiÝÌi`ÃÊ from Senegal eastward ÌÊ-Õ`>]ÊvÀÃÊ>Ê>ÀÀÜÊ transitional band between the arid Sahara to the north >`ÊÌ iÊ Õ`ÊÃ>Û>> ÊÌÊ Ì iÊÃÕÌ °ÊÊÌÃÊ>ÌÕÀ>ÊÃÌ>Ìi]Ê the Sahel belt is characterized LÞÊL>L>LÊ>`Ê>V>V>ÊÌÀiiÃ]Ê >`Êë>ÀÃiÊ}À>ÃÃÊVÛiÀ°Ê -ViÊÌ iÊ>ÌiÊÓäÌ ÊViÌÕÀÞ]Ê ÌÊ >ÃÊLiiÊÃÕLiVÌi`ÊÌÊ desertification and soil iÀÃÊV>ÕÃi`ÊLÞÊ>ÌÕÀ>Ê V>ÌiÊV >}i]Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊ ÛiÀ}À>â}Ê>`Êv>À}°Ê/ iÊ VÕÌÀiÃÊvÊÌ iÊ-> iÊâiÊ >ÃÊÃÕvviÀi`Ê`iÛ>ÃÌ>Ì}Ê `ÀÕ} ÌÃÊ>`Êv>iÊÊÌ iÊ i>ÀÞÊ£ÇäÃ]Ê>`Ê>}>ÊÊÌ iÊ £näðʫ>ÀÌÊvÀÊ}ÌiÀÊ `ÀÕ} ÌÃ]ÊÌ iÊ-> iÊÃÊ«ÀiÊ ÌÊ } ÞÊÛ>À>LiÊÀ>v>]Ê with associated problems for ÛiÃÌVÊ>`ÊVÀ«Ài>À}°Ê ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ1 *® Building on the post-conflict environmen- Ì ÕÃÊÌ Ài>Ìi}Ê«i>Vi°Ê/ iÊi`>ÌiÊ>- tal assessment, UNEP has developed a Sudan agement of these resources is fundamental to «À}À>ÊÜÌ Ê>Ê««iiÊvÊ«ÀiVÌÃ]ÊVÕ`}Ê building peace and stability. UNEP is launch- building capacity for the environmental min- ing a comprehensive assessment in the DRC, istries in Khartoum and Juba, and implement- seeking to determine how the country’s great }Êwi`L>Ãi`Ê«ÀiVÌÃÊÊ >ÀvÕÀÊÌ >ÌÊ«ÀÌiÊ natural resource wealth can be used in sus- reforestation and alternatives to timber use for tainable ways and contribute to—rather than iiÀ}ÞÊ>`ÊVÃÌÀÕVÌ°Ê/ iÊ«À}À>ÊÃÊ>ÃÊ hinder—the peacebulding process. conducting technical assessments of water In neighboring Rwanda, UNEP and the resources and seeking to improve governance ÛiÀiÌÊvÊ,Ü>`>ÊÜÊiL>ÀÊÊ>Ê>ÀÊ and sustainable management of groundwater. study to identify the post-conflict environmen- UNEP will also engage the international com- Ì>ÊV >i}iÃÊv>V}ÊÌ iÊVÕÌÀÞ°Ê/ iÊ«>ÀÌiÀÃÊ munity in Sudan to develop environmental will develop a forward-looking action plan out- and natural resource management as a critical lining priorities and costs for the next three to component of conflict resolution, recovery, and five years. development. The Environmental Impact of Relief Post-Conflict Assessments and Recovery in Progress: Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief and recovery operations themselves can have an environmental impact. In the DRC, In the eastern DRC, high-value natural for example, recent fighting in northern Kivu resources are fueling conflict and prolonging displaced around 60,000 people into five instability. Various militias fight with each camps near the border of Virunga National other, local communities, and the govern- Park. Virunga is one of the last two places iÌÊvÀÊVÌÀÊvÊiÀ>ÃÊ>`ÊÌLiÀ°Ê/ iÊ on Earth where mountain gorillas still live in resources themselves fund arms and armies, the wild. While relief agencies provided food, 53
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM tion process than in the conflict or disaster itself. In the rush to rebuild infrastructure and restore economies, there is little time for planning, envi- ronmental safeguards, or wise decisions on the sustainable use of resources. Political pressure ÛÀiÌ>Êii`ÃÊÕÃÌÊLiÊVÃ`iÀi`Ê dictates immediate and visible progress. ÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]ÊiÛÀiÌ>Êii`ÃÊÕÃÌÊLiÊ ÊÌ iÊ Õ>Ì>À>Ê« >ÃiÆÊvÊÜiÊÜ>ÌÊÕÌÊ considered in the humanitarian phase; if we ÀiVÛiÀÞÊÃÌ>ÀÌÃ]ÊÌÊÃÊ>Ài>`ÞÊÌÊ>Ìi° wait until recovery starts, it is already too late. / iÊ*ÃÌ yVÌÊ ii`ÃÊÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ>`Ê*ÃÌ Ã>ÃÌiÀÊ ii`ÃÊÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ>ÀiÊVÀÌV>Ê1 ÊÌÃÊ for defining early recovery needs, including environmental issues, from the outset of a cri- water, and shelter to the displaced, they failed sis. Ideally, these tools will help countries build ÌÊ«ÀÛ`iÊiiÀ}ÞÊvÀÊV}°ÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]Ê back better, reduce underlying vulnerabilities, camp inhabitants were left with no choice but and move them toward more sustainable forms to collect wood from the park itself. While of development. UNEP is working with a num- conservation needs may be less of a priority ber of partners to ensure these tools are system- than human survival, these impacts could have atically applied in post-crisis situations. been easily avoided by supplying the camp with energy-efficient stoves and sustainably Priorities, Partners, and Plans for produced wood from woodlots. UNEP in Addressing Environment In Darfur, UNEP’s post-conflict assessment and Conflict noted that some groundwater aquifers were being pumped above sustainable levels to meet UNEP is going through an exhaustive—and urgent humanitarian needs. While this may be ÛiÀ`ÕipÌiÀ>ÊÀivÀÊ«ÀViÃðÊ/ iÃiÊÀivÀÃÊ a short-term solution, the medium-term impli- will focus our work on six core areas (see box), cations for local communities that rely on the instill a results-based management approach, }ÀÕ`Ü>ÌiÀÊ>ÀiÊ}À>Ûi°Ê/ iÊÃÃÊvÊÌ ÃiÊ>µÕviÀÃÊ and strategically strengthen UNEP’s presence in could lead to another crisis or potential conflict. VÕÌÀiÃÊÜÌ Ê>ÀÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊV >i}iÃ°Ê One of the key humanitarian principles, “do UNEP is now working with member states and no harm,” should apply equally to the environ- other stakeholders to define priorities, identify ment; therefore, monitoring the extraction and partners, and explore options for expanding its recharge rates should be a basic prerequisite for work in assessing and addressing the environ- all groundwater pumping. mental causes and consequences of conflicts and / iÊÀiVÛiÀÞÊ«ÀViÃÃÊv>ViÃÊÃ>ÀÊV >i}iÃ°Ê disasters, which is one of the six core areas. In my / iÊ «ÃÌVvVÌÊ «iÀ`Ê ÜÌiÃÃiÃÊ >Ê >ÃÃÛiÊ personal vision, UNEP could consider expand- iVÌÊvÊV>«Ì>Ê>`Ê>ÊyÕÀÀÞÊvÊÀiLÕ`}Ê ing operations in the following five ways: >VÌÛÌÞ°ÊLÕÌÊÈÓäÊÌiÃÊÀiÊ>`Ê«iÀÊV>«Ì>ÊÃÊ received following a disaster or conflict than dur- Create viable early warning systems: }ʺÀ>»ÊÌiðÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]Ê>ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀV- First, UNEP should begin with prevention and iÃÊÀ>ÞÊVÃÕi`ÊÛiÀÊ>Êx£äÊÞi>ÀÊ«iÀ`Ê risk reduction. We need to start identifying, on a are consumed in a year in frenzy of post-crisis more systematic basis, countries that are vulner- “hyper-development.” While it is not yet fully able to conflicts and disasters due to poor natural quantified, I believe that more environmental resource management—particularly fragile states 54 damage actually happens during the reconstruc- where we can strengthen natural resource man-
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 agement capacity and crisis preparedness. We also need to understand which regions will be 1 *½ÃÊ i`Õ/iÀÊ-ÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊ most affected by climate change and how it will vÀÊÓä£äqÓä£ÎÊ«À«ÃiÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊ amplify conflict and disaster vulnerability. ÊÀ}>â>ÌÊvVÕÃÊÊÃÝÊVÀiÊ«ÀÀÌÞÊ >Ài>ÃÊ1 *]ÊÓäänL®\ ÕÀÌ iÀÊ`iÛi«Êi>ÀÞÊÀiëÃiÊV>«>- bilities: Second, if a conflict or disaster does • Climate change occur, UNEP should conduct its assessment in • Ã>ÃÌiÀÃÊ>`ÊVvVÌÃÊ two phases. In the first phase, UNEP and the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian • VÃÞÃÌiÊ>>}iiÌÊ vv>ÀÃÊ ÜÊ V`ÕVÌÊ >Ê À>«`Ê iÛÀiÌ>Ê • ÛÀiÌ>Ê}ÛiÀ>ViÊ assessment of critical threats to human life and • >ÀvÕÊÃÕLÃÌ>ViÃÊ>`Ê health from the release of hazardous substances. >â>À`ÕÃÊÜ>ÃÌi /Ê`ÊÌ Ã]Ê1 *ÊÜÊii`ÊÌÊÃÞÃÌi>ÌV>ÞÊ • deploy environmental experts on UN Disaster ,iÃÕÀViÊivvViVÞÊ>`Ê ÃÕÃÌ>>LiÊVÃÕ«ÌÊ>`Ê ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ>`Ê À`>ÌÊÌi>ÃÊÜÌ ÊVi>ÀÊ Ê«À`ÕVÌÊ mechanisms in place to provide emergency clean-up assistance. In the second phase, UNEP will perform more detailed environmental assessments integrated within the UN needs identify the specific environmental technolo- assessment process, which looks at environmen- gies that can be used, the key risks to be con- tal damage and risks to heath, livelihoods, and Ã`iÀi`]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊLiÃÌÊ«À>VÌViÃÊÌÊvÜ°Ê/Ê`Ê ÃiVÕÀÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ>ÃÃiÃÃiÌÃÊà Õ`Ê>ÃÊÊ> i>`Ê this, UNEP would need to maintain a trained at rebuilding better, as well as look to the past to roster of experts and deploy specialists on an understand the root causes of the event. as-needed basis.
Build national and local capacity for Capitalize on the linkages between environmental governance: / À`]ÊÜ iÀiÊ environment, peacebuilding and con- key environmental risks are identified, UNEP flict prevention: Finally, UNEP should should be available to establish an in-country build greater capacity to help conflict-affected recovery program to help national environmen- countries use natural resources as platforms for tal authorities with clean-up and rehabilitation, peacebuilding through dialogue, confidence >ÃÊÜiÊ >ÛiÊ`iÊÊv} >ÃÌ>]ÊÀ>µ]Ê LiÀ>]Ê building, and cooperation. In the European Sri Lanka, and Sudan. UNEP has played a key region, UNEP has led the Environmental role in assessing their capacity, strengthening Security Initiative, which has used common their hand, and providing technical and politi- environmental threats as opportunities for cal support in the weeks, months, and years fol- transboundary collaboration and cooperation. lowing a crisis. Many member states are asking Now is the time to scale up such services to the UNEP to expand this kind of service. }L>ÊiÛi]ÊÃÌ>ÀÌ}ÊÜÌ ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÊvÀV>Ê most affected by conflict. Disseminate environmental technical /Ê«iiÌÊÌ ÃÊÛÃ]Ê1 *ÊÜÊii`Ê iÝ«iÀÌÃiÊ>`Ê>ÃÃÃÌ>Vi\ÊFourth, UNEP political, technical, governmental, and finan- should ensure that environmental technical cial partners. Some of these partnerships are assistance is available to government and UN already being forged. For example, one of our agencies struggling with environmental issues senior staff members is providing guidance on in post-crisis settings. We need to be able to natural resources and environmental manage- 55
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM REPORT ONLINE
All of UNEP’s reports on disasters and conflicts, including the assessments of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Sudan, are available online: http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications
The Sudan Environmental Database includes the data collected by UNEP experts in the field, as well as hundreds of photos, maps and satellite images, field video, bibliographic information, and technical studies: http://www.unep.org/sudan/
Scarred Lands and Wounded Lives: The Environmental Footprint of War, a documentary by Alice and Lincoln Day featuring an interview with David Jensen, was released in April 2008 at the Environmental Film Festival in the Nation’s Capital: http://www.fundforsustainabletomorrows.org/ film.htm
ment in post-conflict countries to the support References office of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Other partners—including the Earth Institute, 1 Ê ÛÀiÌÊ*À}À>iÊ1 *®°ÊÓääή°Ê Afghanistan: Post-conflict environmental assessment. Global Witness, the Environmental Law iiÛ>\Ê1 *°ÊÛ>>LiÊ>ÌÊhttp://postconflict. ÃÌÌÕÌi]Ê `i« Ê ,iÃi>ÀV ]Ê Ì iÊ 7`ÀÜÊ Õi«°V É«ÕLV>ÌÃÉ>v} >ÃÌ>«V>>Õ>ÀÞÓääΰ Wilson Center, and the International Institute pdf for Sustainable Development—are helping us 1 *°ÊÓääÇ>]Ê>Õ>ÀÞ®°ÊLebanon: Post-conflict envi- ronmental assessment. iiÛ>\Ê1 *°ÊÛ>>LiÊ>ÌÊ analyze case studies, develop tools, conduct ÌÌ«\ÉÉ«ÃÌVyVÌ°Õi«°V É«ÕLV>ÌÃÉ1 *Ú field missions, and recommend how the UN Lebanon.pdf system can help prevent resource-based con- 1 *°ÊÓääÇL]Ê>Õ>ÀÞ®°ÊSudan: Post-conflict environ- flicts and use the environment as a platform mental assessment. iiÛ>\Ê1 *°ÊÛ>>LiÊ>ÌÊhttp:// «ÃÌVyVÌ°Õi«°V É«ÕLV>ÌÃÉ1 *Ú-Õ`>°«`v for dialogue, cooperation, and confidence UNEP. (2008a). From conflict to peacebuilding: The role building. of natural resources and the environment°ÊÊ* -"Ê / iÊii`ÊvÀÊÌ ÃÊÜÀÊÃÊ>«wi`ÊLÞÊ Briefing Paper prepared in cooperation with UNEP. Û>>LiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.un.org/peace/peacebuild- the potential implications of climate change, ing/Working%20Group%20on%20Lessons%20 which is expected to change the distribution i>Ài`ÉiÛÀiÌ yVÌ* Éän°äx°Óään¯Óä of critical resources such as water and fertile WGLL%20Background%20Note.pdf land—potentially leading to new sources UNEP. (2008b). Medium-term strategy for 2010-2013: Environment for development. Nairobi, Kenya: of conflict. While the task may seem over- 1 *°ÊÛ>>LiÊ>ÌÊhttp://new.unep.org/PDF/ whelming at times, I take inspiration from > /- --8n°«`v Ì iÊv} >ÊÃ>Þ}]ʺvÊÞÕÊÜ>ÌÊÌÊ}Êv>ÃÌ]Ê}Ê UNEP & the United Nations Centre for Human alone; if you want to go far, go together.” We -iÌÌiiÌÃÊ1 //®°Ê£®°ÊThe Kosovo conflict: Consequences for the environment. Nairobi, welcome the best and brightest minds from iÞ>\Ê1 *ÊEÊ1 //°ÊÛ>>LiÊ>ÌÊhttp:// >ÀÕ`ÊÌ iÊÜÀ`ÊÌÊÊÕÃÊÊÌ ÃÊÕÀiÞ°Ê postconflict.unep.ch/publications/finalreport.pdf
56
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 SPECIAL REPORT
An Ethical Approach to Population and Climate Change
limate change has finally grabbed the ing backlashes from all sides of the issue, setting attention of the U.S. public and poli- international family planning back decades. Ccymakers, yet the role of population Ethically, we must be exceedingly conscious of has been all but overlooked until very recent- what we are asking, and why, before we hitch Þ°Ê/`>Þ]ÊÌiÀiÃÌÊÊÌ iÊÀi>Ìà «ÊLiÌÜiiÊ a ride on the climate change train. Only by global population growth and climate change is framing the connections between population growing, as demonstrated by a spate of recent and climate change in their full context can we articles (e.g., Lahart et al., 2008). Many popu- move forward in an ethical and helpful manner. lation experts see the world’s focus on climate Done well, a thoughtful and deliberative dia- change as an opportunity to make population logue around voluntary family planning’s con- relevant again (e.g., PHE Policy and Practice tribution to mitigating climate change can help Group, 2008; Smith, 2008). By getting gov- us better understand the significant role the ernments and donors to recognize that climate United States plays in the world, not only as a change might be partly alleviated by addressing consumer and polluter, but also as an important population growth, they believe they can help member of a global commons, and as a benefi- secure long-promised and sorely needed fund- cent donor. ing for international family planning. For both practical and ethical reasons, we A Brief History of Population must think very carefully before developing advocacy arguments linking global population ÀÊ/ >ÃÊ >Ì ÕÃÊÊÌ iÊ£ÇäÃÊÌÊ*>ÕÊ growth and climate change. Politically, an over- Ehrlich and Garrett Hardin in the 1960s, stated argument could invite disaster by trigger- demographers and ecologists have raised con-
Suzanne Petroni ÃÊ>ÊÃiÀÊ«À}À>ÊvvViÀÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ-ÕÌÊÕ`>ÌÊ SUZANNE PETRONI Ê7>à }Ì]Ê ° °]Ê>`ÊÃÊ>ÃÊÜÀ}ÊÊ iÀÊ* ° °ÊÊ}i`iÀÊ >`ÊÃV>Ê«VÞÊ>ÌÊ/ iÊiÀ}iÊ7>à }ÌÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ°Ê- iÊÜÀi`Ê Ê««Õ>Ì]ÊiÛÀiÌ]Ê>`ÊÃViViÊÃÃÕiÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê-Ì>ÌiÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÀÊ£ÇÓää£Ê>`ÊÃiÀÛi`Ê>ÃÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê}ÛiÀi̽ÃÊ º"vvViÀÊÊ >À}i»ÊvÀÊÌ iÊ * ³xÊ«ÀViÃÃiðÊ/ iÊÛiÜÃÊiÝ«ÀiÃÃi`Ê iÀiÊ>ÀiÊ iÀÊÜ°Ê* ÌÊVÕÀÌiÃÞÊ-ÕÌÊÕ`>Ì® 57
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM }ÕÀiÊ£\Ê*«Õ>Ì ÃÃÃÊ,i>Ìà « 3000
Note: / iÊ8>ÝÃÊ>ÀÃÊÌ iÊ}L>Ê Same population, 2500 ««Õ>ÌÊÃâiÊÊÓ£ääÊvÀÊi>V ÊvÊÌ iÊ higher emissions * ÊÃVi>ÀÃÊ£]ÊÓ]Ê £]Ê>`Ê Ó®]Ê A1 Ü iÊÌ iÊ9Ê>ÝÃÊi>ÃÕÀiÃÊÌ iÊVÕÕ>ÌÛiÊ 2000 iÃÃÃÊvÊV>ÀLÊvÀÊÓäääÓ£ää]Ê A2 which are dependent on scenarios’ iVVÊ>`ÊÌiV }V>Ê>ÃÃÕ«ÌÃ°Ê 1500 Ê}iiÀ>]Ê>Ê } iÀÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ B2 >ÃÃV>Ìi`ÊÜÌ Ê } iÀÊiÃÃÃ]ÊLÕÌÊ 1000 ÜiÀÊ««Õ>ÌÊÜÊÌÊ}Õ>À>ÌiiÊ>ÊÜÊ B1 Higher population, iÃÃÃÊÕÌViÊÊÌÃÊÜ° higher emissions Source:Ê"½ iÊÓään®° 500
Cumulative Fossil Fuel Emissions, GtC 0 5 7 9 11131517
Global Population, 2100 (billions)
cerns about the planet’s ability to sustain which to plan their families would likely choose exponentially increasing human populations. to have smaller ones, thereby leading, from the / iÃiÊ>À}ÕiÌÃÊ i«i`Ê«>ViÊ««Õ>ÌÊ>`Ê bottom up, to more sustainable development. family planning on the U.S. development agen- Donor countries agreed to provide increasing lev- `>°Ê/`>Þ]ÊÊ ÜiÛiÀ]Ê >Ì ÕÃ>Ê>>ÀÃÊ >Ã]Ê els of funding through international development for the most part, been left behind. Despite the assistance for the ICPD agenda. But today, while massive growth of the world’s population since U.S. assistance for family planning remains the £ÇnÊ>`ÊÃViÊÌ iÊ£ÈäÃ]ÊvÀÊÌ >ÌÊ>ÌÌiÀ®]Ê highest in the world, U.S. funding has declined technology and human innovation have kept significantly in real terms over the past decade famines and food shortages from causing the *«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê devastation and mass starvation that Malthus Since 1994, advocates for increased funding and Ehrlich presaged. have used many arguments and tried many ways For years, many of the programs supported to get the United States to meet its commit- by the United States and others around the iÌÃ]ÊÌÊÊ>Û>°Ê`ÊÃÊ iÀiÊViÃÊV>ÌiÊ world were geared toward achieving specific change—yet another avenue for advocacy and demographic targets, often using heavy-handed, perhaps, some hope, the grand solution to the Ì«`ÜÊÃV iiÃÊÌÊÀi`ÕViÊviÀÌÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ£{Ê funding challenge. If only policymakers accept International Conference on Population and the argument that climate change cannot be Development (ICPD) was a significant cross- resolved without stemming global population roads for the population field, turning the focus growth, government funding for international of population programs away from demograph- family assistance will be secured. ic targets and incentives and toward volunta- Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. rism and individual rights, while also launching a more comprehensive approach to reproduc- How Population Affects Climate tive health and women’s empowerment. Change Feminists and human rights activists played a key role in forging a consensus with environmen- Climate change is primarily driven by three fac- talists at the ICPD, agreeing that individuals and ÌÀÃÊ >Û`ÃÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÇ®\Ê couples who had the information and means with UÊÊGreenhouse-gas emissions; 58
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 UÊÊÊEconomic growth that fuels energy consumption; and UÊ Population growth that fosters increased greenhouse gas-emitting activities.
ÃÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃâiÊ >ÃÊVÀi>Ãi`ÊÛiÀÊÌ iÊ«>ÃÌÊ ÕÌÕÀiÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ÊÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ decades, so, too, have emissions, both in the United States and globally (O’Neill, 2008). But ÜÊ >ÛiÊ>Ê Õ}iÞÊ`ëÀ«ÀÌ>ÌiÊ«>VÌÊÊ while the trend lines run in parallel, the connec- }Àii ÕÃiÊ}>ÃÊiÃÃÃÊV«>Ài`ÊÌÊÌ iÊ tion is far from unequivocal; in fact, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the precise impacts of rest of the world. population size and dynamics on climate change. / iÊ ÌiÀ}ÛiÀiÌ>Ê *>iÊ Ê >ÌiÊ Change’s (IPCC) future scenarios vary greatly Some Ethical Concerns depending on a number of factors, including pop- ulation dynamics. For example, if high consump- Ethicist Ralph Potter wrote about U.S. popula- tion and emissions continue, the world will likely ÌÊ«VÞÊʣǣÊÌ >Ìʺ>>ViÃÊ>ÀiÊvÀi`ÊLÞÊ face significant climate change, even if popula- those who converge at any given moment in sup- ÌÊ}ÀÜÃÊ>ÌÊ>ÊÜÊÀ>Ìi°ÊÌiÀ>ÌÛiÞ]ÊÃ}wV>ÌÊ port of particular policies” (Institute of Society technological advances, such as renewable energy Ì VÃÊ >`Ê Ì iÊ viÊ -ViViÃ]Ê £Ç£®° / ÃiÊ development or carbon sequestration, could coin- hoping to place population back on the policy cide with rapid population growth to produce a agenda through the climate change discussion relatively healthy climate (see Figure 1). are attempting to create an alliance in support of / iÊ ºÃÌ>Lâ>ÌÊ Üi`}i»Ê VVi«ÌÊ «ÕÌÃÊ increasing family planning assistance to develop- vÀÜ>À`Ê>ÊÀ>}iÊvÊÃiÊ£xÊÌiÀÛiÌÃÊÀÊ ing countries. But is this effort ethical? “wedges,” seven or eight of which could work While consumption is clearly the primary together to prevent the doubling of emissions by driver of environmental degradation, including ÓäxäÊ*>V>>ÊEÊ-VÜ]ÊÓää{®°Ê ÃÌÊvÊÌ iÃiÊ climate change, it appears evident that popu- wedges require changing patterns of production lation growth is a contributing factor to some and consumption—the vast bulk of which are `i}Àii°Ê`ÊvÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ÊÃÊ«ÀÛiÊÌÊ 1 driven by the industrialized world. Speaking at be destructive to public health and the natural the Woodrow Wilson Center in March 2008, environment, then governments have an obliga- IPCC author Brian O’Neill hypothesized that tion to intervene to lessen this damage. slowing population growth might potentially But we must first recognize that, unlike cli- act as one wedge. But despite the likelihood mate change, population growth is not a con- that slowing population growth would have a sistently global phenomenon. Nearly all of the somewhat limited impact on climate change, he world’s future population growth is expected to argued the topic should be on the table, saying, take place in developing countries, which current- “We need all the wedges we can get, and some ly produce the least amount of greenhouse gases, Üi`}iÃÊ>ÀiÊ >À`iÀÊÌ >ÊÌ iÀÃÊÌÊ`°Ê`ÊvÊÌ ÃÊ but whose contribution is expected to increase as is a wedge that also has lots of individual-level their economies develop (Bongaarts & Bulatao, benefits, is a kind of win-win policy for other 2000). Ethically, those of us in the developed reasons, then it maybe should be one of the world cannot ask the people of these countries, ones that’s done first. But it’s not going to solve many of whom struggle to subsist on a dollar or the problem on its own” (O’Neill, 2008). two a day, to slow their economic development 59
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ÊÓääx]ÊÌ iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊ1°-°ÊVÌâiÊÜ>ÃÊÀië-
sible for an estimated 20 metric tons of CO2— ÃiÊÓäÎäÊÌiÃÊÌ iÊiÃÃÃÊvÊÌ iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊ `>]Ê }iÀ>]ÊÀÊÕ>Ìi>>]Ê>`ÊÇÎÊÌiÃÊ Ì >ÌÊvÊÌ iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊ >}>`iÃ Ê ]ÊÓääÇÆÊÃiiÊ Figure 2). I would argue that it is therefore not While the growing Indian appropriate for those in the United States to speak ««Õ>̽ÃÊ`i>`Ê of reducing fertility rates in Nigeria or Bangladesh vÀÊiiÀ}ÞÊÃÊ«Ài`VÌi`Ê for environmental purposes without first mention- ÌÊ`ÕLiÊÌÃÊÌÌ>Ê "Ó iÃÃÃÊLÞÊÓäÎä]ÊÌ iÊ ing the growth of their own population, whose >ÛiÀ>}iÊ1°-°ÊVÌâiÊÃÊ estimated to be responsible impact on the environment is immensely more 2 vÀÊ£ÎÊÌiÃÊ>ÃÊÕV Ê "Ó as significant. While continued economic growth in Ì iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊ`>°Ê ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ countries like India, China, and Brazil might drive vVÀÊÕÃiÀÊ >ÛiÞLÌÆÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉ ÜÜÜ°vVÀ°VÉ« ÌÃÉ their total CO2 emissions higher—according to `>ÛiÀÀÃÉÎÈxÈ£ÇÇÉ® some estimates, China has already surpassed the United States—it is highly unlikely that they will approach U.S. per capita consumption levels in Ì iÊi>ÀÊÌiÀÊÃiiÊ}ÕÀiÊή°
An Ethical Solution?
/ iÊÃÃÕiÊvÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ÊÃÊLi}}Ê for the sake of improving the global climate. So is to find its way onto the climate change table, it appropriate to ask them to slow their popula- >`pÕÃÌÊ>ÃÊÃiÊ«ÀÌiÊÃ}iÊÌiV }V>Ê tion growth to achieve the same end? solutions as quick fixes—family planning may Ã`iÀÊÌ Ã\Ê/ iÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊVÌ>ÃÊ be proposed by those seeking simple answers to four percent of the world’s population, but pro- an incredibly complex challenge. Consequently, `ÕViÃÊӣʫiÀViÌÊvÊÌÃÊ}Àii ÕÃiÊ}>ÃiÃÊ ]Ê it seems that those of us working on population ÓääÇ®°Ê ÕÕ>ÌÛiÞ]ÊÀiÃ`iÌÃÊvÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê issues must enter the climate change discussion, States have been the world’s greatest source of but we must do so with great care. greenhouse gases for the past decade, and will /ÊLiÊLÌ ÊVÀi`LiÊ>`ÊiÌ V>ÞÊ}ÀÕ`i`]Ê continue to contribute one of the world’s largest arguments must follow two essential guidelines. shares, unless consumption patterns change radi- First, we should not overstate the impact that cally. While some worry about the effects of the slowing global population growth will have on growth of countries like China, India, Nigeria, climate change, but instead acknowledge that it Pakistan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh on the ÜÕ`ÊiÞÊ«>ÞÊÞÊ>ÊÌi`ÊÀi°Ê/ iÊ>À}iÀÊ environment, few mention the U.S. population, and considerably more significant solution lies Ü V Ê}ÀiÜÊÃiÊxäÊ«iÀViÌÊÛiÀÊÌ iÊ«>ÃÌÊxäÊ in addressing the unsustainable patterns of pro- years, and is expected to increase by another 140 duction and consumption that continue to be Ê«i«iÊLÞÊÌ iÊÞi>ÀÊÓäxäÊ*>ÃÃiÊEÊ ]Ê Ì iÊ>Ê`ÀÛiÀÃÊvÊV>ÌiÊV >}i°Ê/ iÃiÊ«>Ì- 2008). While this is far fewer people than India terns must therefore dominate our discussions expects to add, it is roughly the same as Nigeria’s and our priorities as we determine and employ «ÀiVÌi`ÊVÀi>Ãi]ÊÃ} ÌÞÊÀiÊÌ >Ê*>ÃÌ>½Ã]Ê appropriate actions to mitigate climate change. and more than twice as many new people as in Second, we should affirm that population Bangladesh or Indonesia (Population Reference growth is not a uniformly “global” phenom- 60 Bureau, 2008). enon, particularly in regard to climate change.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Specifically, future population growth in the }ÕÀiÊÓ\Ê >ÀLÊ Ý`iÊ ÃÃÃÊ*iÀÊ >«Ì>]Ê United States will have a hugely disproportion- -iiVÌi`Ê ÕÌÀiÃÊiÌÀVÊÌî ate impact on greenhouse gas emissions com- «>Ài`ÊÌÊÌ iÊÀiÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊÜÀ`°Ê/ÊLiÊVÀi`LiÊ voices for slowing population growth as a means of mitigating climate change, U.S. advocates must address the challenge of their own coun- try’s growth before calling for slower growth in developing countries. Only after laying this foundation should we turn to the importance of investing in family planning specifically as an environmental issue. `ÊvÊÜiÊLi}ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ`Û`Õ>]ÊÜiÊÜÊ be on quite solid ethical ground. Indeed, the ICPD approach (and the evidence) provides an excellent basis for this position. Currently, more than 100 million women around the world want—but do not have access to—modern methods of family planning (Sedgh, ÓääÇ®°Ê/ iÊ } ÊÕLiÀÃÊvÊÕÌi`i`Ê«Ài}- Source:Ê ÊÓääÇ®°Ê >ÀÌÊLÞÊ-ÌÀiÊÀ>Þ° nancies each year, including more than three mil- lion in the United States alone, attest to this tre- i`ÕÃÊÕiÌÊii`Ê/ÀÕÃÃiÊEÊ7Þ]ÊÓään®°Ê Helping address this need is not only the right }ÕÀiÊÎ\Ê7À`Ê >ÀLÊ Ý`iÊ ÃÃÃÊ thing to do, it is also a commitment the United *iÀÊ >«Ì>]Ê£äÓäÎäÊiÌÀVÊÌî States made at the ICPD in 1994. / iÊ «>ÃÌÊ vÕÀÊ `iV>`iÃÊ >ÛiÊ Ã ÜÊ Ì >Ì]Ê given adequate information and access to ser- 15 vices, couples will tend to choose to have fewer History Projections children, thereby enabling better health and economic outcomes for their families (Schultz, 10 OECD ÓääxÆÊ i À>Ê EÊ ÜiÃ]Ê £n®°Ê / iÃiÊ choices will in turn contribute to slower popu- lation growth and, subsequently, to fewer nega- tive impacts on the environment. 5 ÃÊÌ iÊ * Ê>`ÛÃiÃ]Êv>ÞÊ«>}Ê«À- Non-OECD grams should not take place in isolation from other social programs. Efforts to improve health, advance gender equity, and expand edu- 0 cational and economic opportunities should be 1900 2000 2005 20102020 2030 pursued in their own right, as well as in coordi- nation with family planning efforts. Programs that integrate reproductive health services with Source:Ê ÊÓääÇÆÊÓään®° efforts to improve livelihoods, for example, have demonstrated greater health and environmen- tal benefits than single-sector programs (e.g., 61
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM also indirectly reduce the impacts of popula- tion growth on the environment. Let us not exploit a global threat to our survival to further a cause that should rightly stand on its own. Instead, let us think criti- ÊÌ Õ} ÌvÕÊ>`Ê`iLiÀ>ÌÛiÊ`>}ÕiÊ>ÀÕ`Ê cally and act ethically to ensure the well-being of the planet and its inhabitants, both present ÛÕÌ>ÀÞÊv>ÞÊ«>}½ÃÊVÌÀLÕÌÊÌÊ >`ÊvÕÌÕÀi°ÊÊV>ÀivÕÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊvÊÌ iÊÜ>ÞÃÊÊ Ì}>Ì}ÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊV>Ê i«ÊÕÃÊLiÌÌiÀÊ which voluntary family planning can further individual rights, community development, Õ`iÀÃÌ>`ÊÌ iÊÃ}vV>ÌÊÀiÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê and, to some extent, climate change mitiga- -Ì>ÌiÃÊ«>ÞÃÊÊÌ iÊÜÀ`° tion, could increase awareness not only of the outsized contribution of developed nations to global emissions, but also of their appropriate >ÃÌÀÊEÊ ½}iÃ]ÊÓään®]Ê>`ÊÌ}iÌ iÀ]ÊÌ iÞÊ role in the global community. If embarking all make a positive contribution to sustainable upon such a discussion leads to renewed sup- development (see brief on page 64). port and funding for family planning assistance, Perhaps most critically, family planning poli- it will achieve a great deal of good. ViÃÊÕÃÌÊ«ÀÀÌâiÊvÀii`Ê>`ÊÕÃÌVi]Ê>`Ê they must be implemented with individual Notes rights at their core, for in the end, it is indi- viduals—not abstract millions—who share our 1. Brian O’Neill (2008) cited ending deforestation, planet. Individuals must have the freedom to improving vehicle efficiency, and switching coal plants decide the number and timing of their children, to natural gas as examples of other wedges. 2. I would argue that most family planning advo- which, we must recognize, includes the freedom cates are largely unprepared to engage in the inevitable to decide to have large numbers of children. (and often anti-immigrant) discussions about immigra- Investing in meeting the unmet need for tion raised by the question of U.S. population growth. family planning, the education of girls, the empowerment of women, the promotion References of public health, the conservation of natural resources, and in other socio-economic pro- Behrman, Jere R., & James C. Knowles. (1998) grams aimed at improving the quality of life of º*«Õ>ÌÊ>`ÊÀi«À`ÕVÌÛiÊ i>Ì \ÊÊiVVÊ individuals and families around the world will framework for policy evaluation.” Population and contribute to the outcome that we all seek: Development Review 24{®]ÊÈÇÇÎÇ° }>>ÀÌÃ]Ê ]ÊEÊ,`vÊ°Ê Õ>Ì>Ê `ð®°ÊÓäää®°Ê healthy individuals living on a healthy planet Beyond six billion: Forecasting the world’s population. for generations to come. 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê >Ì>ÊV>`iÞÊ*ÀiÃð / iÃiÊ«ViÃÊV>ÌÊLiÊÃÕ««ÀÌi`ÊÃiÞÊ >ÃÌÀ]Ê>]ÊEÊ i>Ê ½}iðÊÓään]Ê«À®°ÊFishing by developing countries themselves; they for families: Reproductive health and integrated coast- require the commitment of the global commu- al management in the Philippines (FOCUS Issue £x®°Ê7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ°Ê ÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÀÊ`iÛi«i`Ê Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/ countries must understand their obligation to Ì«VÃÉ«ÕLÃÉ -*ÚVÕÃÚ«Àän >ÃÌÀ°«`v help others achieve at least a reasonable mini- >Û`Ã]Ê"°,°]Ê °Ê iÌâ]Ê*°,°Ê ÃV ]Ê,°Ê >Ûi]ÊEÊ °°Ê mum quality of life. In meeting this duty, not iÞiÀÊ `î°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊClimate change 2007: Mitigation (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth only will they contribute to improving the ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ,i«ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊÌiÀ}ÛiÀiÌ>Ê*>iÊ health and well-being of millions of women Ê >ÌiÊ >}i®°Ê >LÀ`}iÊEÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê 62 and children around the world, but they will Cambridge University Press.
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 REPORT ONLINE
A chart by Population Action International illustrates that while the level of U.S. funding for popula- tion assistance has varied since the 1970s, when adjusted for inflation, it has remained stagnant: http://www.populationaction.org/Issues/U.S._Policies_and_Funding/Trends_in_U.S._Population_ Assistance.shtml
The Guttmacher Institute provides current estimates and in-depth analyses of women’s unmet need for contraception, including the reasons why women who do not wish to become pregnant do not use contraceptives: http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2007/07/09/or37.pdf
In U.S. Population, Energy and Climate Change, the Center for Environment & Population explores how various aspects of U.S. population—including size and growth rate, density, per capita resource use, and composition—affect greenhouse gas emissions: http://www.cepnet.org/docu- ments/opulationEnergyandClimateChangeReportCEP.pdf
iÀ}ÞÊvÀ>ÌÊÃÃV>ÌÊ ®°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê À}ÉV}ÉVÌiÌÉvÕÉÎäxÉxÈnÈÉÈn¶iÞr9xn `7 “International carbon dioxide emissions and carbon MPsw&keytype=ref&siteid=sci intensity [tables].” International energy annual 2005. Passel, Jeffrey, & D’Vera Cohn. (2008, February 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê °ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. 11). U.S. population projections: 2005-2050. eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/carbondioxide.html 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê*iÜÊ,iÃi>ÀV Ê iÌiÀ°ÊÛ>>LiÊ °ÊÓään®°ÊInternational energy outlook 2008. iÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉ«iÜÀiÃi>ÀV °À}É«ÕLÃÉÇÓÉÕÌi` 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê °ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp:// ÃÌ>Ìië«Õ>Ì«ÀiVÌð www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/ PHE Policy and Practice Group. (2008, January). Institute of Society Ethics and the Life Sciences. Human population growth and greenhouse gas emissions. £Ç£®°ÊEthics, population and the American tra- Washington, DC: PHE Policy and Practice Group. dition: A study prepared for the Commission on *«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊTrends in Population Growth and the American Future ÎÊ U.S. population assistance°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ Ûð®°Ê>ÃÌ}Õ`Ã]Ê 9\Ê/ iÊÃÌÌÕÌi° ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°««Õ>Ì>VÌ°À}ÉÃÃÕiÃÉ1°-°Ú > >ÀÌ]ÊÕÃÌ]Ê*>ÌÀVÊ >ÀÌ>]ÊEÊ`ÀiÜÊ >ÌÃ°Ê *ViÃÉ/Ài`ÃÚÚ1°-°Ú*«Õ>ÌÚÃÃÃÌ>Vi° (2008, March 24). “New limits to growth revive shtml Malthusian fears: Spread of prosperity brings Population Reference Bureau. (2008). Datafinder. supply woes; Slaking China’s thirst.” Wall Street Q >Ì>ÃiÌR°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°«ÀL°À}É Journal]Ê£°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉi°Üð Datafinder.aspx VÉ>ÀÌViÉ- £ÓäȣΣÎnÎÇ£xxÇäÇ° Ì -V ÕÌâ]Ê/°Ê*>Õ°ÊÓääx®°ÊFertility and income (Center Lindahl-Kiessling, Kerstin, & Hans Landberg. (1994). ÃVÕÃÃÊ*>«iÀÊ °ÊÓx®°Ê iÜÊ>Ûi]Ê /\Ê Population, economic development, and the environ- VVÊÀÜÌ Ê iÌiÀ]Ê9>iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ° ment°Ê"ÝvÀ`ÊEÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê"ÝvÀ`Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀiÃð -i`} ]Ê`>]ÊiÌÊ>°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊWomen with an unmet O’Neill, Brian. (2008, February 20). Population need for contraception in developing countries and and climate change: Relationships, research, and their reasons for not using a method.Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê responses. Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson ÕÌÌ>V iÀÊÃÌÌÕÌi°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉ International Center for Scholars, Washington, ÜÜÜ°}ÕÌÌ>V iÀ°À}É«ÕLÃÉÓääÇÉäÇÉäÉÀÎÇ°«`v °ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.wil- -Ì ]Ê iÀÀ°ÊÓään]ÊÕi®°Êº/ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊ«ÀL- soncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events. lem.” Nature Reports Climate Change 2]ÊÇÓÊqÊÇ{°Ê iÛiÌÚÃÕ>ÀÞEiÛiÌÚ`rÎÇ{ÎÎÈ Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°>ÌÕÀi°VÉV- Pacala, Stephen, & Robert Socolow. (2004). “Stabilization mate/2008/0806/full/climate.2008.44.html Üi`}iÃ\Ê-Û}ÊÌ iÊV>ÌiÊ«ÀLiÊvÀÊÌ iÊiÝÌÊxäÊ /ÀÕÃÃi]Ê>iÃÊEÊ ° °Ê7Þ°ÊÓään®°Êº,i`ÕV}Ê years with current technologies.” Science 305xÈnÈ®]Ê unintended pregnancy in the United States.” ÈnÇÓ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÃViVi>}° ContraceptionÊÇÇ£®]Ê£x° 63
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Population and Climate Change: Enhancing Community Resilience and Adaptive Capacity
A growing number of projects around the world are Building Resilience Among integrating population programs with traditional Coastal Communities: conservation and other natural resource manage- The Philippines Example ment activities. These comprehensive community- based efforts are strengthening resilience, adap- Coastal resources and the people that depend tation, and reducing vulnerability to the effects of on them are increasingly at risk in the Philippines: climate change by: Between 1966 and 1986, the productivity of coral reefs off the coasts of the Philippines dropped by one- UÊSlowing Ê the growth of population pressure on third as the national population doubled. In response overtaxed and climate-stressed natural resourc- to these challenges, PATH Foundation Philippines, es and biodiversity; Inc. (PFPI) established the Integrated Population UÊEnabling Ê community stewardship and sustainable and Coastal Resource Management (IPOPCORM) use of forests, soils, watersheds, coastal areas, Initiative in communities in two Philippine provinces. and other climate-sensitive resources; and, IPOPCORM seeks to improve food security and overall quality of life in communities that depend on UÊ BuildingÊ local awareness of the connections ÊVÕÌÞL>Ãi`Ê aquatic resources. Its community-based approach `ÃÌÀLÕÌÊ>}iÌÊvviÀÃÊ between environmental conditions, human v>ÞÊ«>}ÊÃiÀÛViÃÊ>ÌÊ includes: health, and behavior; as well as the capacity to iÀÊVÛiiViÊà «ÊÊ plan and manage resources in the context of ÕÊÃ>`]Ê* ««iÃ°Ê UÊEducation Ê and outreach on population, environ- ÕÀÌiÃÞÊ**®° these connections at the local level. ment, and food security relationships;
UÊEnvironmentally Ê friendly livelihood development;
UÊReproductive Ê health service delivery; and,
UÊCommunity-based Ê efforts to restore coastal resources, including mangrove reforestation and coral reef protection.
By collaborating with local government and NGO partnerships, IPOPCORM is improving repro- ductive health outcomes, enhancing community- based management of coastal and marine resourc- es, and building capacity for a more sustainable future in which coastal communities will be better able to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
Source:Ê ÝViÀ«ÌÊvÀʺÕ>Ê*«Õ>ÌÊÀÜÌ Ê>`Ê Àii ÕÃiÊ>ÃÊ ÃÃÃ]»ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ*«Õ>Ìi>Ì ÛÀiÌÊ*VÞÊ>`Ê*À>VÌViÊÀÕ«ÊÓään®°Ê-iiÊ>ÃÊ ºÃ }ÊvÀÊ>iÃ\Ê,i«À`ÕVÌÛiÊi>Ì Ê>`ÊÌi}À>Ìi`Ê >ÃÌ>Ê >>}iiÌÊÊÌ iÊ* ««iÃ]»ÊLÞÊ>Ê >ÃÌÀÊ >`Ê i>Ê ½}iÃÊÓään®° 64
ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Navigating Peace Initiative Water Conflict and Cooperation: Looking Over the Horizon / iÊÀi>ÌÞÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀ½ÃÊÀiÃÊÊVyVÌÊ>`ÊV«iÀ>- ing trends in water conflict and cooperation. With tion is more complex than the political rhetoric of the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of “water wars” often implies. While the potential for iÜÊ9À]Ê>`Êi`ÊLÞÊ -*Ê ÀiVÌÀÊivvÊ >Li]Ê violent and social conflict over water is clear, the level the working group sought to: of this conflict is not so clear-cut. Exhaustive research • Understand the current mix of conflict and coop- LÞÊ>ÀÊ7vÊvÊ"Ài}Ê-Ì>ÌiÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ >ÃÊwÀÞÊ eration over water along wider continua of conflict established that international violent conflict is rare- and at more levels of analysis than have customar- ly—if ever—caused by, or focused on, water resourc- ily been considered; es. Historically, formal and informal international • political institutions managing water have adapted to ÌV«>ÌiÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ«ÃÃLÌiÃÊvÀÊÛiÌÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ increased scarcity without resorting to the expensive conflict given the negative indicators in many and inefficient means of war to secure water supplies. areas of water management; and Instead, nations cooperate to manage their shared • Formulate proactive steps for heading off conflict water resources (although equity and power differ- and encouraging cooperation. ences mean all cooperation is not the same). / ÃÊ ÃÌÀÞÊ`iÃÊÌ]Ê ÜiÛiÀ]ÊVÃiÊÌ iÊ`ÀÊÊ Ì iÊ«ÃÃLÌÞÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÜ>ÀÃ°Ê ÞÊÓäxä]Ê>ÃÊ>ÞÊ>ÃÊ Water Conflict and Cooperation ÇÊLÊ«i«ipÀiÊÌ >ÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊ>ÛiÊÊÌ iÊ Working Group Members world today—may live under conditions of water Inger Andersen, World Bank ÃV>ÀVÌÞÊ>`ÊÃÌÀiÃðÊÊ>À}iÊL`ÞÊvÊÃV >ÀÞÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê Kent Butts, 1°-°ÊÀÞÊ7>ÀÊ i}i suggests that environmental degradation may cata- lyze violent conflict within states, so the future may Ken Conca, University of Maryland not resemble the past. Geoffrey Dabelko, Woodrow Wilson However, little systematic research examines an International Center for Scholars important corollary: that environmental cooperation Kirk Emerson, 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊÀâ> may be a useful catalyst for regional peacemaking. / iÊÕµÕiʵÕ>ÌiÃÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊVÕ`Ê«ÀÛ`iÊÌ iÊVÀ- Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Strathmore University, nerstone for efforts to build confidence and peace Nairobi in regions with unsettled interstate relations. Shared Aaron Salzberg, U.S. Department of State water resources could offer avenues for trust build- Anthony Turton, /ÕV -ÌiÊ,iÃÕÀViÃÊ>`Ê ing that can in turn support predictable and more ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê7>ÌiÀÊ,iÃÕÀViÊÃÃV>ÌÊ enmeshed relations among potential adversaries. / iÊ >Û}>Ì}Ê*i>ViÊÌ>ÌÛi½ÃÊ7>ÌiÀÊ yVÌÊ Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University and Cooperation Working Group commissioned Howard Wolpe, Woodrow Wilson International four policy briefs to identify the current and emerg- Center for Scholars 65
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ALCP)''- EF%(
Navigating Peace
N8K
“Water wars are coming!” the newspaper headlines scream. It seems obvious— rivalries over water have been the source of disputes since humans settled down to cultivate food. Even our language reflects these ancient roots: “Rivalry” comes from the Latin rivalis, or “one using the same river as another.” Countries or provinces bordering the same river (known as “riparians”) are often rivals for the water they à >Ài°ÊÃÊÌ iÊÕLiÀÊvÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊ>`Ê«>VÌÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃV>ÀVÌÞ®Ê * ÌÊ^ÊÛiÀÊ6i}à ® has grown, so do the warnings that these countries will take up arms to ensure their >VViÃÃÊÌÊÜ>ÌiÀ°ÊÊ£x]ÊvÀÊiÝ>«i]Ê7À`Ê >Ê6ViÊ*ÀiÃ`iÌÊÃ>Ê-iÀ>}i`Ê claimed that “the wars of the next century will be about water.” / iÃiÊ>«V>Þ«ÌVÊÜ>À}ÃÊyÞÊÊÌ iÊv>ViÊvÊ ÃÌÀÞ\Ê Ê>ÌÃÊ >ÛiÊ}iÊÌÊ war specifically over water resources for thousands of years. International water disputes— even among fierce enemies—are resolved peacefully, even as conflicts erupt over other issues. In fact, instances of cooperation between riparian nations ÕÌÕLiÀi`ÊVyVÌÃÊLÞÊÀiÊÌ >ÊÌÜÊÌÊiÊLiÌÜiiÊ£{xÊ>`Ê£°Ê7 Þ¶Ê Because water is so important, nations cannot afford to fight over it. Instead, water vÕiÃÊ}Ài>ÌiÀÊÌiÀ`i«i`iVi°Ê ÞÊV}ÊÌ}iÌ iÀÊÌÊÌÞÊ>>}iÊÌ iÀÊà >Ài`Ê water resources, countries can build trust and prevent conflict. Water can be a nego- tiating tool, too: It can offer a communication lifeline connecting countries in the `ÃÌÊvÊVÀÃðÊ/ ÕÃ]ÊLÞÊVÀÞ}ʺÜ>ÌiÀÊÜ>ÀÃ]»Ê`Ã>ÞiÀÃÊ}ÀiÊ>Ê«ÀÃ}ÊÜ>ÞÊÌÊ help prevent war: cooperative water resources management. Of course, people compete—sometimes violently—for water. Within a nation, users—farmers, hydroelectric dams, recreational users, environmentalists—are often at odds, and the probability of a mutually acceptable solution falls as the number of ÃÌ>i `iÀÃÊÀÃiðÊ7>ÌiÀÊÃÊiÛiÀÊÌ iÊÃ}ip>`Ê >À`ÞÊiÛiÀÊÌ iÊ>ÀpV>ÕÃiÊvÊ conflict. But it can exacerbate existing tensions. History is littered with examples of violent water conflicts: Just as Californian farmers bombed pipelines moving water vÀÊ"ÜiÃÊ6>iÞÊÌÊ ÃÊ}iiÃÊÊÌ iÊi>ÀÞÊ£ääÃ]Ê iÃiÊv>ÀiÀÃÊÊ- >`}Ê clashed with police in 2000 to protest government plans to divert irrigation water to
66 NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL BASINS COUNTRIES Asi (Orontes), Awash, Cavally, Cestos, Chiloango, Dnieper, Dniester, Drin, Ebro, Essequibo, Gambia, Garonne, Gash, Geba, Har Us Nur, Hari (Harirud), Helmand, Hondo, Ili (Kunes He), Incomati, Irrawaddy, Juba-Shibeli, Kemi, Lake Prespa, Lake Titicaca-Poopo 3 System, Lempa, Maputo, Maritsa, Maroni, Moa, Neretva, Ntem, Ob, Oueme, Pasvik, Red (Song Hong), Rhone, Ruvuma, Salween, Schelde, Seine, St. John, Sulak, Torne (Tornealven), Tumen, Umbeluzi, Vardar, Volga, and Zapaleri Amur, Daugava, Elbe, Indus, Komoe, Lake Turkana, Limpopo, Lotagipi Swamp, Narva, 4 Oder (Odra), Ogooue, Okavango, Orange, Po, Pu-Lun-T’o, Senegal, and Struma 5 La Plata, Neman, and Vistula (Wista) Aral Sea, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Jordan, Kura-Araks, Mekong, Tarim, Tigris and 6 Euphrates (Shatt al Arab), and Volta 8 Amazon and Lake Chad 9 Rhine and Zambezi 10 Nile 11 Congo and Niger 17 Danube Note: From “International River Basins of the World” by Aaron T. Wolf et al., 1999, International Journal of Water Resources Development 15(4), 387-427. Adapted with permission of the author. cities and industries. But these conflicts usually break es like the breakup of the Soviet Union, as well as out within nations. International rivers are a differ- improved mapping technology. Strikingly, territory ent story. Ê£{xÊ>ÌÃÊv>ÃÊÜÌ ÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊL>ÃÃ]Ê>`Ê / iÊÜÀ`½ÃÊÓÈÎÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊVÛiÀÊ ÎÎÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊV>Ìi`Ê>ÃÌÊiÌÀiÞÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÃiÊ {x°ÎÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊ >ÀÌ ½ÃÊ>`ÊÃÕÀv>Vi]Ê ÃÌÊ>LÕÌÊ{äÊ L>ÃðÊÃÊ>ÞÊ>ÃÊ£ÇÊVÕÌÀiÃÊà >ÀiÊiÊÀÛiÀÊL>Ã]Ê percent of the world’s population, and account for the Danube. >««ÀÝ>ÌiÞÊÈäÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊ}L>ÊÀÛiÀÊyÜ°Ê`Ê Contrary to received wisdom, evidence shows this the number is growing, largely due to the “inter- interdependence does not lead to war. Researchers nationalization” of basins through political chang- at Oregon State University compiled a dataset of 67 N8KÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÃ}i`Ê>ÊÕLiÀÊvÊ tive) between two or more nations that was driven river basin agreements while the region was embroiled LÞÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÊÌ iÊ>ÃÌÊ >vÊViÌÕÀÞ°Ê/ iÞÊvÕ`ÊÌ >ÌÊ Ê>ÊÃiÀiÃÊvÊÜ>ÀÃÊÊÌ iÊ£ÇäÃÊ>`Ê£näÃ]ÊVÕ`}Ê the rate of cooperation overwhelms the incidence of Ì iʺ«i«i½ÃÊÜ>À»ÊÊ-ÕÌ ÊvÀV>Ê>`ÊVÛÊÜ>ÀÃÊÊ >VÕÌiÊVyVÌ°ÊÊÌ iÊ>ÃÌÊxäÊÞi>ÀÃ]ÊÞÊÎÇÊ`ëÕÌiÃÊ â>LµÕiÊ>`Ê}>°Ê/ iÃiÊV«iÝÊi}Ì>- ÛÛi`ÊÛiVi]Ê>`ÊÎäÊvÊÌ ÃiÊVVÕÀÀi`ÊLiÌÜiiÊ tions produced rare moments of peaceful coopera- Israel and one of its neighbors. Outside of the Middle tion. Now that most of the wars and the apartheid >ÃÌ]ÊÀiÃi>ÀV iÀÃÊvÕ`ÊÞÊxÊÛiÌÊiÛiÌÃ]ÊÜ iÊ era have ended, water management forms one of the £xÇÊÌÀi>ÌiÃÊÜiÀiÊi}Ì>Ìi`Ê>`ÊÃ}i`°Ê/ iÊÌÌ>Ê foundations for cooperation in the region, producing number of water-related events, between nations also one of the first protocols signed within the Southern v>ÛÀÃÊV«iÀ>Ì\Ê/ iÊ£]ÓÓnÊV«iÀ>ÌÛiÊiÛiÌÃÊ vÀV>Ê iÛi«iÌÊ ÕÌÞÊ- ®° `Ü>ÀvÊÌ iÊxäÇÊVyVÌÀi>Ìi`ÊiÛiÌÃ°Ê iëÌiÊÌ iÊ /`>Þ]ÊÀiÊÌ >ÊiÛiÀ]ÊÌÊÃÊÌiÊÌÊÃÌ«Ê«À«>}>Ì- fiery rhetoric of politicians—aimed more often at ing threats of “water wars” and aggressively pursue a their own constituencies than at the enemy—most water peacemaking strategy. Why? actions taken over water are mild. Of all the events, UÊ Êº7>ÌiÀÊÜ>ÀÃ»Ê Ü>À}ÃÊ vÀViÊ Ì iÊ Ì>ÀÞÊ >`Ê more than 60 percent are verbal, and more than two- other security groups to take over negotiations thirds of these were not official statements. and push out development partners, like aid agen- Simply put, water is a greater pathway to peace cies and international financial institutions. than conflict in the world’s international river basins. International cooperation around water has a long UÊ Ê7>ÌiÀÊ>>}iiÌÊvviÀÃÊ>Ê>ÛiÕiÊvÀÊ«i>VivÕÊ and successful history; some of the world’s most dialogue between nations, even when combatants vociferous enemies have negotiated water agree- are fighting over other issues. iÌðÊ/ iÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊÌ iÞÊ >ÛiÊVÀi>Ìi`Ê>ÀiÊÀiÃ- UÊ Ê7>ÌiÀÊ >>}iiÌÊ LÕ`ÃÊ LÀ`}iÃÊ LiÌÜiiÊ iÌ]ÊiÛiÊÜ iÊÀi>ÌÃÊ>ÀiÊÃÌÀ>i`°Ê/ iÊ i}Ê nations, some with little experience negotiating Committee, for example, established by Cambodia, with each other, such as the countries of the for- >Ã]Ê/ >>`]Ê>`Ê6iÌ>ÊÊ£xÇ]ÊiÝV >}i`Ê mer Soviet Union. data and information on the river basin throughout UÊ Ê7>ÌiÀÊV«iÀ>ÌÊ vÀ}iÃÊ «i«iÌ«i«iÊ ÀÊ the Vietnam War. expert-to-expert connections, as demonstrated Israel and Jordan held secret “picnic table” talks LÞÊÌ iÊÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ>`ÊÃ>Ì>ÌÊ«À- ÌÊ>>}iÊÌ iÊÀ`>Ê,ÛiÀÊÃÌ>ÀÌ}ÊÊ£xÎ]ÊiÛiÊ ects Friends of the Earth Middle East conducts in though they were officially at war from 1948 until Israel, Jordan, and Palestine. Ì iÊ£{ÊÌÀi>ÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ`ÕÃÊ,ÛiÀÊ ÃÃÊÃÕÀ- ÛÛi`ÊÌÜÊ>ÀÊÜ>ÀÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ`>Ê>`Ê*>ÃÌ>°Ê UÊ ÊÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ«i>Vi>}ÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊV>ÊVÀi>ÌiÊà >Ài`Ê `Ê>Ê£äÊ iÊL>ÃÊÀ«>À>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊ regional identities and institutionalize coopera- ÛÛi`ÊÊÃiÀÊ}ÛiÀiÌqiÛiÊi}Ì>ÌÃÊ tion on issues larger than water, as exemplified by to develop the basin cooperatively, despite the ver- Ì iÊvÀ>ÌÊvÊ- ÊÊ«ÃÌ>«>ÀÌ i`ÊÃÕÌ - bal battles conducted in the media. Riparians will iÀÊvÀV>° endure such tough, protracted negotiations to ensure Good governance—the lack of corruption—is the access to this essential resource and its economic and basic foundation for the success of any agreement. social benefits. Obviously, money is also a big challenge. But good 68 Note: / iÊ`>Ì>Ê>ÀiÊvÀʺÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÊ7>ÌiÀÃ\Ê`iÌvÞ}Ê >ÃÃÊ>ÌÊ,ûÊLÞÊ>ÀÊ7v]Ê- À>Ê9vvi]Ê>`Ê >ÀVÊ À`>]ÊÓääÎ]ÊWater Policy x£®]ÊΣÈÓ°Ê`>«Ìi`ÊÜÌ Ê«iÀÃÃÊvÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ À° governance and money are not enough. Several pol- >iÃÊÀi}ÊÃÊ>Ê`iÊÌÊiÕ>Ìi°Ê/Þ«V>Ê«À- icy initiatives could help peacemakers use water to ect cycles—often governed by shifting govern- build peace: ment administrations or political trends—are not long enough. 1. Identify and utilize more experienced facili- tators who are perceived as truly neutral°Ê/ iÊ 3. Ensure that the riparians themselves drive the World Bank’s success facilitating the Nile Basin process. Riparian nations require funders and Initiative suggests they have skills worth replicat- facilitators who do not dominate the process ing in other basins. and claim all the glory. Strengthening less pow- erful riparians’ negotiating skills can help pre- 2. Be willing to support a long process that might vent disputes, as can strengthening the capacity not produce quick or easily measurable results. of excluded, marginalized, or weaker groups to -Üi`i½ÃÊÓäÞi>ÀÊVÌiÌÊÌÊvÀV>½ÃÊÀi>ÌÊ articulate their interests. 69 N8K}iðÊÊÕ«ÀiVi`iÌi`ÊÕLiÀÊvÊ«i«iÊ>VÊ management institutions, local nongovernmental >VViÃÃÊÌÊ>ÊÃ>vi]ÊÃÌ>LiÊÃÕ««ÞÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀ°Ê/ÜÊÌÊwÛiÊ organizations, water users’ associations, and reli- million people die each year from water-related ill- gious groups. ness. Water use is shifting to less-traditional sources such as deep fossil aquifers and wastewater reclama- 5. Balance the benefits of closed-door, high-level tion. Conflict, too, is becoming less traditional, driv- negotiations with the benefits of including en increasingly by internal or local pressures or, more all stakeholders—NGOs, farmers, indigenous ÃÕLÌÞ]ÊLÞÊ«ÛiÀÌÞÊ>`ÊÃÌ>LÌÞ°Ê/ iÃiÊV >}iÃÊÃÕ}- groups—throughout the process. Preventing gest that tomorrow’s water disputes may look very severe conflicts requires informing or explicitly different from today’s. consulting all relevant stakeholders before mak- No matter what the future holds, we do not need ing management decisions. Without such exten- violent conflict to prove water is a matter of life and sive and regular public participation, stakeholders death. Water—being international, indispensable, } ÌÊÀiiVÌÊ«ÀiVÌÃÊÕÌÊvÊ >`° and emotional—can serve as a cornerstone for confi- Water management is, by definition, conflict man- dence building and a potential entry point for peace. agement. For all the 21st century wizardry—dynam- More research could help identify exactly how water ic modeling, remote sensing, geographic information best contributes to cooperation. With this, coopera- systems, desalination, biotechnology, or demand tive water resources management could be used more management—and the new-found concern with glo- effectively to head off conflict and to support sus- balization and privatization, the crux of water dis- tainable peace among nations. 9@F>I8G?@ Aaron T. Wolf is professor of geography in the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University and director of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. Annika Kramer is a project manager and Alexander Carius is director of Adelphi Research in Berlin. Geoffrey D. Dabelko is the director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. 70 K?<:?8CC ÌÊÃÊ«ÃÃLiÊÌÊÕ`iÀÃÌ>`ÊÌ iÊ`iÛi«iÌ>ÊVÃÌÀ>ÌÃÊvÊvÀV>ÊÜÌ ÕÌÊ}À>ë}ÊÌ iÊ Ã}wV>ViÊvÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÀiÃÕÀViÃ]Ê«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊ}ÀÕ`Ü>ÌiÀ°Ê-ÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>1 faces potentially severe groundwater shortages, which not only imperil the lives of those directly dependent on it, but also the continued development of the economic engines of the region—South vÀV>]Ê ÌÃÜ>>]Ê>`Ê >L>p>ÊvÊÜ V Êv>ViÊÃ}wV>ÌÊVÃÌÀ>ÌÃÊÊÌ iÀÊvÕÌÕÀiÊiV- nomic growth due to the insecurity of water supply. In addition, groundwater resources are the foundation of rural water supplies, which sustain livelihoods for the poorest of the poor (Photo © Kirk Emerson) communities. /`>Þ½ÃÊ LiÃÌÊ «À>VÌViÊ Ê ÃÕÃÌ>>LiÊ Ü>ÌiÀÊ >>}iiÌpÌi}À>Ìi`Ê7>ÌiÀÊ,iÃÕÀViÊ Management—focuses on river basins as the units of management. However, this overlooks ÌÜÊvÕ`>iÌ>ÊÀi>ÌiÃÊÊÃÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>\ 1. Groundwater aquifer systems, while being an integral part of the overall water resource, seldom correspond with the surface water management unit—the river basin; and 2. In almost all cases, groundwater systems are, by their very nature, transboundary. 7 iÊ>ÊV«iÝÊÃiÌÊvÊ>}ÀiiiÌÃÊ}ÛiÀÊÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊÊÃÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>]Ê the region lacks international groundwater treaties of similar sophistication and status, which could be a potential cause of future conflict. K_\>ifle[nXk\iGifYc\d`eJflk_\ie8]i`ZX Water resource management is almost always transboundary. Water resource management ÊvÀV>ÊÃ]ÊiÊÌ iÊVÌiÌÊÌÃiv]Ê>Ê«À`ÕVÌÊvÊÌÃÊV>Ê«>ÃÌ°Ê/ iÊV>Ê«ÜiÀÃÊ`Û`i`Ê Ì iÊVÌiÌÊÌÊÕÌÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌi`i`ÊÌÊLiÊ`iwi`ÊLÞÊÀÛiÀðÊ7Ì ÊÌ iÊxÎÊvÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃ]Ê ÈÎÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊVÀÃÃÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊLÀ`iÀðÊ/ ÕÃ]ÊÌ iÀiÊ>ÀiÊÀiÊÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊ Ì >ÊÃÛiÀi}ÊÃÌ>ÌiðÊ/ iÃiÊÀÛiÀÊL>ÃÃÊVÛiÀÊÌÜÌ À`ÃÊvÊÌ iÊVÌi̽ÃÊÃÕÀv>ViÊ>Ài>]ÊÊ which three-quarters of the human population lives, accounting collectively for a staggering £°ÊiÀi]ÊÃÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>ÊÃÊ`iwi`Ê>ÃÊÌ iÊVÌiÌ>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ>ÀiÊiLiÀÃÊvÊÌ iÊ-ÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>Ê iÛi«iÌÊ ÕÌÞÊ- ®ÆÊÃiiÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°Ã>`V°Ì 71 K?<:?8CC Note: Precipitation in southern Africa is unevenly distributed, with the four most economically developed coun- tries—South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe—on the “wrong” side of the global annual average of 860 mm, shown as a red line. Map courtesy of Peter Ashton. 72 Ó°Ê/ iÊ ÎÊL>Ê >ÌiÊ >}iÊ`iÊÕÃ}ÊÌ iÊ* Ê-, -ÊÓÊ-Vi>ÀÊ«Ài`VÌÃÊ>Ê ÌÌiÀÊ>`Ê`ÀiÀÊÃÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>Ê LÞÊÓäxäÆÊÃiiÊ-V iÃ]Ê,LiÀÌÊ°]ÊEÊ,°Ê }}ðÊÓää{®°ÊEcosystem services in southern Africa: A regional assessment. Pretoria, South vÀV>\Ê ÕVÊvÀÊ-ViÌwVÊ>`Ê`ÕÃÌÀ>Ê,iÃi>ÀV ° ΰÊ-iiÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÜÀ`Ü>ÌiÀVÕV°À}Éwi>`ÉÜÜVÉ7À`Ú7>ÌiÀÚÀÕÉ77{É`iV>À>ÌÃÉV>ÌiÚ iV>À>Ì°`V 73 K?<:?8CC the need to reach agreement on carbon emission almost all cases, significant resources—both surface Ì>À}iÌÃ]Ê>`ÊÜiÊV>ÊÕ«Ê- ]Ê À>â]Ê`>]Ê>`Ê >`Ê}ÀÕ`Ü>ÌiÀp>ÀiÊÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊÊ>ÌÕÀi°Ê/ iÊ China (as rapidly industrializing nations) to coop- four most economically developed countries in the erate in negotiations to this end. region are all approaching limitations on future eco- nomic growth and development due to low assurance If we are serious about poverty eradication in vÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃÕ««Þ°Ê/ iÊÀi}½ÃÊVÕÌÀiÃÊà >ÀiÊ>ÊÕLiÀÊ ÃÕÌ iÀÊvÀV>]ÊÌ iÊÜiÊÕÃÌÊLiÊ>VÕÌiÞÊ>Ü>ÀiÊvÊ of transboundary water resources and all have a vested the link between transboundary water resource man- interest in reaching agreement on their management agement and changing patterns of resource use. In in a fair, equitable, and peaceful fashion. 74 8hl`]\i \c\^\e I`gXi`Xe JkXk\ :le\e\:fXjkXc :lm\cX` :fe^f:fXjkXc :fe^f@ekiX$:iXkfe`Z >Xi`\g:fXjkXc @eZfdXk`:fXjkXc BX^\iX BXcX_Xi` BXiffJ\[`d\ekXip B\epX$KXeqXe`X :fXjkXc B`c`dXeaXif C`dgfgf>iXelc`k\$ >e\`jj9\ck EXkX$>nXX` FbXmXe^f FbXmXe^f$ 8e^fcX OOOO O 9fkjnXeX OOOOOOOO/ :fe^f ;I: OO ) C\jfk_f O DX[X^XjZXi ' DXcXn` O( DXli`k`lj ' DfqXdY`hl\ O OO O, EXd`Y`X OOOO OO - Jflk_8]i`ZX OO OO O OOO O 0 JnXq`cXe[ O ( KXeqXe`X O O, QXdY`X O O Q`dYXYn\ OOO + jkXk\jj_Xi`e^ )))*)* ( *) ( ( **+)*))))*) 9@F>I8G?@ Anthony Turton is director of TouchStone Resources and executive director of the International Water Resource Association. Marian Patrick is a researcher at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Jude Cobbing is a hydrogeologist at Water Geosciences Consulting. Frédéric Julien is a Canadian intern working for the CSIR Water Resource Governance Research Group. 75 K?<:?8CC K?<E `ÊÌ iÊÌ>ÊvÊ}ʺÜ>ÌiÀÊÜ>ÀÃ]»Ê>ÊiÃÃÊ`À>>ÌVpLÕÌÊÀiÊi`>ÌipÊ between water and violence is often ignored: the violence engendered by poor gover- nance of water resources. Policies to expand water supplies, develop hydroelectric power, alter freshwater ecosystems, or change the terms of access to water can have devastating «>VÌÃÊÊÌ iÊÛi `Ã]ÊVÕÌÕÀiÃ]Ê>`Ê Õ>ÊÀ} ÌÃÊvÊV>ÊVÕÌiðÊÃÊÌ iÃiÊ communities learn to voice their grievances, build networks across borders, and connect with human rights and environmental activists, once-local conflicts become international `ëÕÌiðÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]Ê«VÞ>iÀÃÊ>ÌÊ>ÊiÛiÃÊ>ÀiÊLi}ÊvÀVi`ÊÌÊÀiÌ ÊÜ>ÌiÀ½ÃÊÀiÊÊ `iÛi«iÌ°Ê/ÊiÃÕÀiÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÊÌ iÊÓ£ÃÌÊViÌÕÀÞ]ÊÃV>ÊVyVÌÃÊÛiÀÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÕÃÌÊ be managed in ways that accommodate the full range of people affected by water develop- iÌÊ«ÀiVÌð JfZ`Xc:feÕ`ZkjFm\iNXk\i Social conflicts over water are, to some extent, inevitable, given water’s multiple func- tions: It is a basic human need, the foundation of livelihoods, the lifeblood of critical ecosystems, a cultural symbol, and a marketable commodity. Managing social conflict is central to good water management. However, as the development of water resources and the transformation of freshwater ecosystems have intensified, so have the conflicts. Social conflicts around water are not only increasing, but also being transformed by ÌÜÊÃÕÌ>iÕÃÊ}L>ÊÀiÛÕÌðÊ/ iÊVÕV>ÌÃÊÀiÛÕÌÊ >ÃÊ«À`ÕVi`Ê>Ê explosion in global networks, access to information, and personal mobility, making it easier for affected communities and sympathetic advocacy groups to partner with those ÊÌ iÀÊVÕÌÀiðÊ/ iÊ`iVÀ>ÌVÊÀiÛÕÌÊ >ÃÊVÀi>Ãi`ÊÌ iÊ>LÌÞÊvÊ«i«iÊÊ«ÀiÛ- ously closed societies to organize and express dissent, making it easier (though not always i>ÃÞ®ÊvÀÊVÕÌiÃÊÌÊ««ÃiÊ«ÀiVÌÃÊÀÊ«ViÃÊÌ >ÌÊ >ÀÊÌ iÀÊÌiÀiÃÌÃ]ÊÛi `Ã]Ê >`ÊVÕÌÕÀiðÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌÊvÊÌ iÃiÊÌÜÊÀiÛÕÌÃ]ÊVyVÌÃÊÌ >ÌÊÜiÀiÊViÊ>À}iÞÊV>Ê matters have been dragged into international arenas. 76 77 K?<E s #REATE BETTER WAYS TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL DIS- s "ROADEN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL RIVER putes°Ê/ iÊ>VÊvÊivviVÌÛiÊiV >ÃÃÊvÀÊÀiÃÛ}Ê agreements. Internationally shared river basins are environmental disputes is perhaps the weakest link vÌiÊ Ì iÊ ÃÕLiVÌÊ vÊ ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê `«>VÞ°Ê/Ê in the chain of global environmental governance. often, however, this diplomacy is limited to dividing While useful, current mechanisms—such as the water supplies equitably between nations and reduc- *iÀ>iÌÊ ÕÀÌÊvÊÀLÌÀ>Ì]ÊÌ iÊ7À`Ê >½ÃÊ }ÊÌ iÊÊ«ÌiÌ>ÊvÀÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊVyVÌ°ÊÌ Õ} Ê Ã«iVÌÊ«>i]ÊÀÊÌ iÊ7À`Ê/À>`iÊ"À}>â>̽ÃÊ these goals are important, they do little to address dispute resolution procedures—fail to provide effec- the human security of people living in the basin. Few tive, inclusive, and dispute-transforming outcomes international river basin agreements or the institutions VÃÃÌiÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ1 ½ÃÊ} iÛiÊ*>iÊÊ-ÞÃÌi they create include robust mechanisms for incorporat- 7`iÊ iÀiViÊ Ê Ì iÊ Ài>ÃÊ vÊ iÛi«iÌ]Ê ing civil society. Without broad participation and a Õ>Ì>À>ÊÃÃÃÌ>Vi]Ê>`Ê ÛÀiÌÊÃÊVÕÀ- focus on human security, the rush to promote interna- 78 BIOGRAPHY Ken Conca is a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland and the director of the Har- rison Program on the Future Global Agenda, a research and teaching program on global issues. He focuses on the politics of water, global environmental politics, political economy, North-South issues, and peace and conflict studies. Conca’s latest book is Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institu- tion Building (MIT Press, 2006). 79 K?<E N8K Ê£Ç]Ê }Þ«Ì>Ê*ÀiÃ`iÌÊÜ>ÀÊ->`>ÌÊÃ>`\ʺ/ iÊÞÊ>ÌÌiÀÊÌ >ÌÊVÕ`ÊÌ>iÊ Egypt to war again is water.” In 1988, then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who later became the United Nations’ Secretary-General, predicted that the next war in the Middle East would be fought over the waters of the Nile, * ÌÊ^Ê}iÀÊ`iÀÃi® not politics. Rather than accept these frightening predictions, we must examine them within the context of the Nile River basin and the relationships forged among the states that share its waters. K_\E`c\I`m\i9Xj`e /iÊVÕÌÀiÃÊà >ÀiÊÌ iÊL>ÃÊvÊÌ iÊ i]Ê>À}Õ>LÞÊÌ iÊÜÀ`½ÃÊ}iÃÌÊÀÛiÀ\Ê ÕÀÕ`]Ê }Þ«Ì]Ê ÀÌÀi>]Ê Ì «>]Ê iÞ>]Ê,Ü>`>]Ê-Õ`>]Ê/>â>>]Ê1}>`>]Ê>`Ê Ì iÊ iVÀ>ÌVÊ,i«ÕLVÊvÊÌ iÊ }ÊÃiiÊ>«®°Ê/ iÊL>ýÃÊÌ ÀiiÊÊõÕ>ÀiÊ iÌiÀÃÊVÛiÀÊ>LÕÌÊ£äÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊvÀV>ÊVÌiÌ°ÊÊ««ÀÝ>ÌiÞÊ£ÈäÊ Ê«i«iÊ`i«i`ÊÊÌ iÊ iÊ,ÛiÀÊvÀÊÌ iÀÊÛi `Ã]Ê>`Ê>LÕÌÊÎääÊ- Ê«i«iÊÛiÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ£äÊL>ÃÊVÕÌÀiðÊ7Ì ÊÌ iÊiÝÌÊÓxÊÞi>ÀÃ]ÊÌ iÊÀi}½ÃÊ population is expected to double, adding to the demand for water, which is already iÝ>ViÀL>Ìi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ}ÀÜÌ ÊvÊÌ iÊÀi}½ÃÊ`ÕÃÌÀiÃÊ>`Ê>}ÀVÕÌÕÀi°Ê/ iÊVÃÌ>ÌÊ threat of droughts increases the urgency of the problem, and pollution from land- use activities affects downstream water quality. Finally, except for Kenya and Egypt, >ÊvÊÌ iÊL>ÃÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊ>}ÊÌ iÊÜÀ`½ÃÊxäÊ«ÀiÃÌÊ>ÌÃ]Ê>}ÊÌ iÀÊ populations even more vulnerable to famine and disease. Egypt and Sudan hold absolute rights to use 100 percent of the river’s water under agreements reached in 1929 between Egypt and Britain (which was then Ì iÊV>Ê«ÜiÀÊÊ iÞ>]Ê-Õ`>]Ê/>â>>]Ê>`Ê1}>`>®Ê>`ÊÊ£xÊLiÌÜiiÊ Egypt and Sudan. 80 Source\Ê*ÀÌ}]ÊÀ>« VÃÊ>`Ê >«Ê iÃ}Ê1Ì]Ê/ iÊ7À`Ê > 81 N8K :feÕ`ZkXe[:ffg\iXk`fe`ek_\E`c\ ]XZ\f]gfk\ek`XcZfeÕ`ZkXe[ I`m\i9Xj`e i\^`feXc`ejkXY`c`kp#k_\E`c\ Conflict over the Nile’s waters could fan existing YXj`eZfleki`\jZfek`el\kf conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa, making them more complex and harder to address. /iÃÃÊ j\\bZffg\iXk`m\jfclk`fej% ÊÌ iÊÀi>ÌiÀÊÀÊvÊvÀV>Ê>ÀiÊvÊ}Ài>ÌÊVViÀÊ to the international community, due to its volatility and proximity to the Middle East. Conflicts emerg- ing here might spread political, social, and economic tial conflict and regional instability, the Nile basin instability into the surrounding areas. In a river basin, countries continue to seek cooperative solutions. conflict is most likely to emerge when the downstream 4HE POLITICAL WILL TO DEVELOP A NEW LEGAL FRAME- nation is militarily stronger than nations upstream, work for managing the Nile should continue. In and the downstream nation believes its interests in the principle, the countries of the Nile River basin agree shared water resource are threatened by actions of the that the situation should change. However, they do upstream nations. In the Nile basin, the downstream not agree on how. /Ê i«ÊÀi>V Ê>ÊVÃiÃÕÃ]ÊÌ iÞÊ nation, Egypt, controls the region’s most powerful developed the high-level Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in military, and fears that its upstream neighbors will 1999. Originally designed as a way to share scientific reduce its water supply by constructing dams without information, the NBI today brings together ministers its consent. from the basin countries “to achieve sustainable socio- $ESPITE THIS GLOOMY SCENARIO INTERSTATE WAR IS economic development through equitable utilization unlikely, according to history: No nations have of, and benefit from, the common Nile basin water gone to war specifically over water resources for resources,” as stated in its shared vision.2 Ê/ iÊ Ê >ÃÊ thousands of years. Instances of cooperation between served as a catalyst for cooperation in the search for a riparian nations outnumbered conflicts by more than new legal framework for the management of the Nile. ÓÌ£ÊLiÌÜiiÊ£{xÊ>`Ê£°1 Instead of war, water However, high-level negotiations like the NBI are fuels greater interdependence. By coming together to not enough; civil society must be involved. Since the ÌÞÊ>>}iÊÌ iÀÊà >Ài`ÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÀiÃÕÀViÃ]ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ inhabitants of a river basin play critical roles in the suc- build trust and prevent conflict. In the face of poten- cess of any international agreement, interstate nego- 82 83 N8K BIOGRAPHY Patricia Kameri-Mbote is a professor of law at Strathmore University (Nairobi) and an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. She is also programme director for the International Environmental Law Research Centre. Previously, she chaired the University of Nairobi’s Department of Private Law and served as acting dean for the Faculty of Law. She was the first chair of the Kenya Nile Discourse Forum, a network of civil society organiza- tions working with other national discourse forums in the Nile River basin to influence development of projects and programs under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and other Nile-related programs. She was an Open Society Institute Africa Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 2006. 84 iÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊ i>Ì\Ê} } ÌÃÊÀÊÌ iÊÀÃÌÊ9i>À newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com he New Security Beat, ECSP’s blog, was Guest Contributor Colin Kahl on >ÕV i`ÊÊ>Õ>ÀÞÊÓääÇÊÌÊà i`Ê} ÌÊ Kenya’s Ethnic Land Strife on some of today’s broader security / By Colin Kahl, Assistant Professor, Security issues, including water scarcity, environmen- Studies Program, Georgetown University Ì>Ê`i}À>`>Ì]Ê>`Ê««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ °Ê/ iÊ School of Foreign Service posts below are selected highlights from the first year of the New Security Beat, which won January 8, 2008 >ÊÓäänÊL>Ê i`>ÊÜ>À`ÊvÀÊ ÝViiViÊ http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2008/01/ in Population Reporting in the category of guest-contributor-colin-kahl-on-kenyas.html “Best Online Commentary.” We invite you to become part of our global readership by vis- Êstory in yesterday’s New York Times describes iting us on the web at http://newsecuritybeat. an expanding campaign of ethnic cleansing blogspot.com. against the Kikuyu tribe in western Kenya. We’ve seen this story before. In my 2006 book States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, I explained how rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and his- torical land grievances collided with multi-party elections in the early 1990s to provide oppor- tunities for Kenyan elites to gain power and wealth by violently mobilizing ethnic groups >}>ÃÌÊiÊ>Ì iÀ°Ê/ iÊiÃÕ}ÊÛiViÊ«Ì- Ìi`ÊÌ iÊ >iÊ>`ÊÌ iÀÊÃ>iÀÊÌÀL>ÊV- munities engaged in pastoral activities against the Kikuyu, Luo, and other traditional farming communities in the fertile Rift Valley, leaving more than a thousand Kenyans dead and hun- dreds of thousands homeless. Sound familiar? Demographically and envi- ronmentally induced ethnic land competition— iÀ}iÌÜÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀviÃÃÀÊ Ê > Ê ÕÀÌiÃÞÊi`Ê at the heart of the 1990s conflicts—remains >V iÀ]Ê7ÃÊ iÌiÀ® 85 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM problematic today. Deep-seated grievances 7 ޶ʺ/ iÀiÊ >ÃÊLiiÊÌÊÕV ÊvVÕÃÊÊ emanating from struggles over scarce farmland developing new sources of supply rather than provide ample opportunities for elites across the on better management of existing ones,” said political spectrum to mobilize tribal supporters Department of Environment and Natural to engage in violence and ethnic land cleansing ,iÃÕÀViÃÊ-iVÀiÌ>ÀÞÊ}iÊ,iÞiÃÊ>ÌÊ>Ê>Õ>ÀÞÊ during times of electoral instability—especially ÓääÇÊVviÀiVi°ÊÃÌÊ>ÊvÊÌ iÊVÕÌÀÞ½ÃÊ in rural areas, where strong group identifica- watersheds are in critical condition, devastated ÌÊv>VÌ>ÌiÃÊÃÕV ÊLâ>Ì°Ê/ ÃÊ``½ÌÊ by logging, erosion, sedimentation, mining, happen during the last presidential election, in overgrazing, and pollution. 2002, because elites bought into the democratic Population growth is also erasing the govern- À>`V>ÃÌÊÕÀ>ÃÌÊ>`ÊL>Ê process and the elections were viewed as fair. i̽ÃÊ}>ðʺÀÊ£xÊÌÊÓääx]ÊÌ iÊ}ÛiÀ- i`>ÊÜ>À`ÜiÀÊ iV>ÀiÊ In addition, the Kenyan Electoral Commission ment has successfully provided water for an addi- ,°Ê-Þ ivÊ ÕÀÌiÃÞÊi`Ê and the international community, in an effort to Ì>ÊÓΰä{Ê°ÊÜiÛiÀ]ÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊ >V iÀ]Ê7ÃÊ iÌiÀ® «ÀiÛiÌÊ>ÊÀi«i>ÌÊvÊÌ iÊÃÌÀviÊÊ£ÓÊ>`Ê£Ç]Ê VÀi>Ãi`ÊLÞÊÓ{°xÊÊÛiÀÊÌ iÊÃ>iÊ«iÀ- closely scrutinized electoral behavior in 2002. od,” National Water Resources Board Director / ÃÊÌi]ÊÌ iÊ>««>ÀiÌÊÀ}}}ÊvÊÌ iÊiiV- ,>Ê«>>ÊÌ`Ê>Ê1 *ÊiiÌ}° tion by the Kibaki regime—which many Growing by more than 2 percent annually, minority tribes view as having used its politi- the Philippines’ population could top 90 mil- cal power to unfairly benefit its own Kikuyu lion next year. Delfin told a Wilson Center tribe—unleashed the latent grievances against audience she has met “women with eight chil- 7Ì ÕÌÊvVÕÃi`Ê Ì iÊ ÕÞÕÊÃÌÊ«ÀiÃiÌÊÊ iÞ>ÊÃViÌްʺ9ÕÊ dren who want to stop giving birth but no have to understand that these issues are much knowledge of how to do it,” and decried the ivvÀÌÃÊÌÊ«ÀÛiÊ deeper than ethnic,” Maina Kiai, chairman of “lack of natural leadership” from President degraded the Kenya National Commission on Human À>ÊÀÀÞ° Rights, told the Times°Êº/ iÞÊ>ÀiÊ«ÌV>o / iÊ* ««iÃÊÕÃiÊvÊ,i«ÀiÃiÌ>ÌÛiÃ½Ê ÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ>`Ê they go back to land.” version of the 2008 budget—currently in con- Sources: New York Times, 7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ]Ê ference—includes almost 2 billion pesos for Ài`ÕViÊ««Õ>ÌÊ *ÀViÌÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀiÃà family planning programs. “We cannot achieve }ÀÜÌ ]Ê genuine and sustainable human development if “Bahala na”? Population Growth we continue to default in addressing the popu- Ì iÊ«Ê Brings Water Crisis to the lation problem,” Representative Edsel Lagman « ë ÞÊ Philippines said in the Philippine Star. However, current Environment Secretary Lito By Meaghan Parker, ECSP º > >>Ê Ìiâ>ÊÃ>`Ê>ÌÊÌ iÊÃ>*>VwVÊ7>ÌiÀÊ-Õt January 4, 2008 that population growth should not be consid- >»pÀÕ} ÞÊ http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2008/01/ ered part of the country’s water problem. But iµÕÛ>iÌÊÌÊ bahala-na-population-growth-brings.html his opposition to family planning is well-known: `ÛV>ÌiÃÊÊÌ iÊ* ««iÃÊÀiViÌÞÊlaunched a ºµÕiÊÃiÀ>]Ê ÊreportÊLÞÊ«Ê/6ÊÕÀ>ÃÌÊMelclaire R. suit against him for removing all contraceptives ÃiÀ>»p>ÞÊiÌÊ Sy-Delfin—recent L>Ê i`>ÊÜ>Àd win- from Manila’s clinics when he was mayor. iÀÊ>`ÊÃÕLiVÌÊvÊ>ÊECSP podcast—warns “We must not leave things to fatal luck when Ì iÊÜiÃÊÀÕÊ`ÀÞ° that a water crisis could threaten the 88 million we can develop the tools to prevent harm,” said residents of the Philippines as early as 2010. *ÀiÃ`iÌÊÀÀÞÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊlaunch of the UNDP’s VVÀ`}ÊÌÊ iw]ÊÓÇÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊ«ÃÊÃÌÊ Ài«ÀÌÊÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÃV>ÀVÌÞ°Ê/ >̽ÃÊ>ÊiVÕÀ>}- lack access to drinking water, despite successful ing attitude, but without focused efforts to government programs to increase supply. improve degraded resources and reduce popu- 86 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 lation growth, the Filipino philosophy “Bahala na”—roughly equivalent to “que sera, sera”— may let the wells run dry. ,iÊ«>ÞiÀÃÊÊÌ iÊÀLÀ`Ê Sources: Ê iÜÃ]ÊPhilippine News, *«Õ>ÌÊÃÌÌÕÌi]Ê ÃÕ>ÌÊ>ÌÊÌ iʺ*«Õ>Ì]Ê 7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ]Ê - Ê iÜÃÉPhilippine Star, i>Ì ]Ê>`Ê ÛÀiÌ\Ê ÌiÀÊ*ÀiÃÃÊ-iÀÛViÊ/iÀÀ>6Û>]Ê - ]Ê"vvViÊvÊÌ iÊ*ÀiÃÃÊ Ìi}À>Ìi`Ê iÛi«iÌÊvÀÊ >ÃÌÊ -iVÀiÌ>ÀÞÊvÊÌ iÊ,i«ÕLVÊvÊÌ iÊ* ««ià vÀV>»ÊVviÀiViÊÊ``ÃÊL>L>]Ê Ì «>]Êi}Ì>ÌiÊÌi}À>Ìi`Ê ,i*>Þ}pÀÊ>Ê-iÀÕÃÊ ÃÕÌÃ°Ê ÕÀÌiÃÞÊivvÊ >Li® Purpose By Gib Clarke, ECSP December 10, 2007 http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2007/12/role- improve the economy and protect the tribes, but playingfor-serious-purpose.html more than anything else wants to prevent the con- flict between these groups from turning into an º/ iÊVÕÌÀÞÊvÊÀLÀ`ÊÃÊÊL>`Êà >«i°ÊÌÊv>ÃÊ iL>ÀÀ>ÃÃ}ÊÃViiÊÕÃÌÊÌÜÊÌ ÃÊLivÀiÊÌÊ ÃÌÃÊ in the bottom quarter of countries on the Human ÃVViÀ½ÃÊvÀV>Ê Õ«°»Ê iÛi«iÌÊ`iÝ]Ê>`ÊÕV ÊvÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞ / iÊÃÌÕ>ÌÊ>LÛiÊÜ>ÃÊ«ÀiÃiÌi`ÊÌÊ i>Ì Ê rural population lives on $1 a day. In addition, and environment practitioners, policymakers, ÀLÀ`ÊÃÊiÝ«iÀiV}ÊÀ>«`Ê««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ]Ê ÃV >ÀÃ]Ê>`ÊÕÀ>ÃÌÃÊ>ÌÊ>ÊÀiViÌÊconference in and 40 percent of the population is under the age ``ÃÊL>L>]Ê Ì «a°Ê/ iÊ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÊÊÌ iÊ vÊ£x°Ê ivÀiÃÌ>ÌÊ>`ÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê`i}À>`>- ÀLÀ`ÊÃÕ>ÌpÜÀÌÌiÊLÞÊ -*½ÃÊGeoff ÌÊVÌÕiÊÕ>L>Ìi`ÊÊÀLÀ`]Ê>ÃÊv>iÃÊ Dabelko and Gib Clarke, along with Shewaye depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, Deribe Woldeyohannes of the Ethio Wetlands and agriculture is often carried out unsustainably. >`Ê >ÌÕÀ>Ê,iÃÕÀViÃÊÃÃV>ÌpÃÜÌV i`Ê iÛiÀÌ iiÃÃ]ÊÌ iÀiÊÃÊ «iÊÌ >ÌÊÀLÀ`½ÃÊ roles for an afternoon, as they sought solutions natural beauty, impressive landscapes, and ÌÊÌ iÊ«ÀLiÃÊÊÀLÀ`°Ê7i>À}Ê`vviÀ- unique flora and fauna will translate into an ent hats—a health minister playing the part of adventure tourism market that will help turn a hotelier, for example—participants reported >ÀÕ`ÊÌ iÊVÕÌÀÞ½ÃÊiVÞ°Ê/ ÃÊÃÊ«>ÀÌVÕ- gaining new perspectives and increased under- larly true in Floriana National Park, home not standing of sustainable development challenges only to unique plants and animals, but also to and potential solutions. the indigenous Sedentaire and—for part of the / iÊ ÃÕ>ÌÊ iÝiÀVÃiÊ Ü>ÃÊ «>ÀÌÊ vÊ Ì iÊ year—Wandran tribes. “Population, Health, and Environment: Integrated / iÊvÕÌÕÀiÊvÊÀ>>ÊÃÊ>ÊÌ«VÊvÊÕV Ê`iL>ÌiÊ iÛi«iÌÊvÀÊ >ÃÌÊvÀVa” conference, attended Ê ÀLÀ`°Ê/ iÊ ÃiÀÛÞÊ Õ`>ÌÊ vÊ by more than 200 people from Rwanda, Uganda, California wants to preserve it, but demands that />â>>]Ê iÞ>]Ê Ì «>]Ê>`Ê£ÇÊÌ iÀÊVÕÌÀiÃ°Ê all people be removed and prevented from re- Participants presented real-world solutions to prob- entering. Civil society prioritizes poverty allevia- iÃÊÛiÀÞÊÃ>ÀÊÌÊÌ ÃiÊÊÀLÀ`]ÊiÝ«>}Ê tion and livelihood generation, and is also fighting how all parties can—and must—come together to for improving human health and the environment. address people’s multifaceted needs. / iÊ «ÀÛ>ÌiÊ ÃiVÌÀÊ Ü>ÌÃÊ >Ê «ÃÌÛiÊ Ài}Õ>ÌÀÞÊ I have attended more conferences than I care to environment that allows the tourism and agribusi- ÀiiLiÀ°Ê ÕÌÊÌ ÃÊVviÀiViÊÜ>ÃÊÕµÕi\Ê/ iÀiÊ ness industries access to land and water resources. was tremendous excitement about the potential of >Þ]ÊÌ iÊ }ÛiÀiÌÊ vÊ ÀLÀ`Ê Ü>ÌÃÊ ÌÊ integrated programs to address population, health, 87 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM iÛÀiÌ]Ê>`ÊÌ iÀÊV >i}iÃÊÊ >ÃÌÊvÀV>°Ê two sides resulted in the deaths of six civilians. / iÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ>ÃÊ>Ê«>«>LiÊÃiÃiÊvÊVÕÌÞ]Ê>ÃÊ / iÊ`ÃVÛiÀÞÊvÊÊÃÊV>ÕÃ}ÊÕÌÀ} ÌÊÛ- different organizations from different countries lence in the region, but it is also harming local realized that there were others like them, also seek- communities’ health and livelihoods. Rukwanzi ing to solve complicated problems with integrated Ã>`]ÊV>Ìi`ÊÊ >iÊLiÀÌÊ>`ÊV>i`ÊLÞÊ solutions. Hopefully, the lessons learned and the both countries, was partially evacuated earlier networks formed will sustain the energy that came this week by DRC authorities due to a cholera out of the conference, and lead to an increase in outbreak. Oil-related security concerns pre- the number and sophistication of integrated pro- vented health workers from treating patients }À>ÃÊÊ >ÃÌÊvÀV>° effectively, so DRC police evacuated children and the elderly—two particularly vulnerable Sources: 7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ] New Security Beat, *«Õ>ÌÊ,iviÀiViÊ ÕÀi>Õ populations. Congolese and Ugandan fishermen who Discovery of Oil Destabilizing `i«i`ÊÊ >iÊLiÀÌÊvÀÊÌ iÀÊÛi `ÃÊ Great Lakes Region >ÛiÊ LiiÊ V>Õ} ÌÊ Õ«Ê Ê Ì iÊ ÃÌÌiÃ°Ê Ê Ugandan fisherman told Reuters, “Congolese By Rachel Weisshaar, ECSP soldiers have started arresting us, saying we are November 16, 2007 in their waters. It’s not safe to fish anymore.” http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2007/11/ Congolese soldiers arrest Ugandan fisher- discovery-of-oil-destabilizing-great.html men, and Ugandan police retaliate by arresting Congolese fishermen, making fishing a danger- / iÊÕi>ÀÌ }ÊvÊÃ}wV>ÌÊÊÀiÃiÀÛiÃÊÊ ous and less-profitable enterprise. £ääiÊ}Ê >iÊLiÀÌpà >Ài`ÊLÞÊ1}>`>Ê / iÊ`ÃVÛiÀÞÊvÊp>`ÊÌ iÊ`iÃÌ>Lâ>- and the Democratic Republic of the Congo tion it can bring—could also involve other (DRC)—has already led to violence, and the Great Lakes countries. Vangold Resources Ltd. conflict could easily escalate further. /ÕÜÊ recently signed an agreement with the Rwandan Oil and Heritage Oil Corporation, which have government to conduct an extensive geophysi- drilled wells in the lake, recently estimated cal study of a portion of Rwanda’s East Kivu that it contains at least 1 billion barrels of oil. Graben basin, which, structurally, is the south- Uganda and the DRC both want the lion’s share iÀÊiÝÌiÃÊvÊÌ iÊLiÀÌiÊL>ðÊ/ iÊÃÕÀÛiÞÊ of this treasure, and their competing ambitions will be completed—and its results released— have already spurred violence in parts of the dis- within 18 months. puted Uganda-DRC border. vÀV>½ÃÊ Ài>ÌÊ >iÃÊ Ài}p«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊ Uganda and the DRC deployed troops in the DRC—has a history of natural resource- the area once the discovery of oil was report- driven conflict°Ê/À>`iÊÕÌÊvÊÌ iÊ , ÊÊ}`]Ê i`]Ê>`ÊÊÕ}ÕÃÌÊÎ]ÊÓääÇ]Ê }iÃiÊÃ`iÀÃÊ diamonds, copper, cobalt, coltan (used in cell attacked one of Heritage Oil’s exploratory oil phones), and timber has contributed to devas- barges, killing a British contractor working for tating internal violence, corruption, and pov- Ì iÊV«>Þ°Ê/ iÊ1}>`>Ê>ÀÞÊÀiÌ>>Ìi`]Ê erty, as well as conflict with other countries. We killing a Congolese soldier. Following the inci- can only hope that the discovery of oil in Lake dent, Congolese President Joseph Kabila and LiÀÌÊ`iÃÊÌÊvÜÊÌ iÊÃ>iÊ«>Ì ° 1}>`>Ê*ÀiÃ`iÌÊ9ÜiÀÊ ÕÃiÛiÊiÌÊÊ Sources: /ÕÜÊ"]ÊiÀÌ>}iÊ"Ê À«À>Ì]Ê ÕÃiÃÃÊ />â>>Ê>`Ê>}Àii`ÊÌÊ«ÕÊL>VÊÌ iÀÊÌÀ«Ã°Ê >ÞÊvÀV>]Ê, Ê iÜÃ]Ê6>}`Ê,iÃÕÀViÃÊ Ì`°]ÊÊvÀV>]Ê But later in September, an incident between the Woodrow Wilson Center 88 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 A Word of Caution on Climate Change and “Refugees” By Geoff Dabelko, ECSP July 18, 2007 http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2007/07/ / iÊiÞÊÌÊ}iÌÌ}ÊV>ÌiÊÊÌ iÊÌ>LiÊ>ÃÊ word-of-caution-on-climate-change-and.html >Ê«ÀV«>Ê`ÀÛiÀÊvÊ}À>ÌÊÃÊÌÊV>ÀivÕÞÊ Scholars, policy analysts, and even military ÌÀ>ViÊ ÜÊÌÊÌiÀ>VÌÃÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ>ÞÊÌ iÀÊ officers are breaking down climate change’s impacts into what they hope are more man- v>VÌÀÃÊÌ >ÌÊV>ÕÃiÊ«i«iÊÌÊÛi° >}i>LiÊÌ«VÃÊvÀÊiÝ>>Ì°Ê/ iÊ}À>ÌÊ that climate change could cause is one such topic. For instance, the iÌiÀÊvÀÊiÀV>Ê Progress recently posted a piece entitled academics, and governments. Governments in “Climate Refugees: Global Warming Will Spur particular have a fairly strong interest in keep- Migration°»Ê/ iÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê*i>ViÊV>`iy ing the definition narrow because of the obliga- analyzed “ >ÌiÊ >}iÊ>`Ê yVÌ\Ê/ iÊ tions they have to refugees. For this reason, the Migration Link»ÊÊ>Ê >ÞÊÓääÇÊCoping With ºiiiÀ»ÊÀi>VÌÊvÀÊÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊÜÊLiÊ Crisis working paper. Climate change-induced to resist granting refugee status to a new large migration also figured prominently in the securi- group of people. ÌÞÊ«iÀëiVÌÛiÊvviÀi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ Ê À«À>̽ÃÊ / iÊÃiV`Ê«ÀLiÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊÌÛ>ÌÃÊ Ì>ÀÞÊ`ÛÃÀÞÊ >Àd in its National Security for migration are many, and distinguishing and the Threat of Climate Change. between economic pulls and environmental In many respects, these pieces are careful in «Õà iÃÊÃÊÛiÀÞÊ`vwVÕÌ°ÊÊv>ÀiÀÊÃÕvviÀ}ÊvÀÊ their discussion of the topic. But allow me a few prolonged drought is both pushed to move words of caution on climate change and migration from his land and pulled to an urban area or to based on what we learned from a series of pro- more fertile ground by the promise of greater grams on the topic in the late 1990s here at the iVVÊ««ÀÌÕÌÞ°Ê/ ÃÊÃÊÃiviÛ`iÌ]ÊvÊ Environmental Change and Security Program. course, but when the situation is reduced to First, the use of the term “refugee” is conve- “climate migrants” versus “economic migrants,” nient but problematic. In order to achieve refu- the response from climate change skeptics will gee status, people must be fleeing persecution >Ü>ÞÃÊLi\ʺ/ iÞÊ>ÀiÊÕÃÌÊiVVÊÀivÕ}iið»Ê or violence and must cross a national border. One can easily see this classification problem Countries are then obligated by internation- with Mexican migrants coming across the bor- al law to admit them, provide shelter, and so `iÀÊÌÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊÌÊÜÀ°ÊÀiÊÌ iÞÊV- forth. Notably, then, the definition of “refugee” mate migrants because their homes have expe- is based on political boundaries and has noth- rienced prolonged drought that may have been ing to offer internally displaced persons. It also exacerbated by climate change? Or are they eco- does nothing for people who are “pulled” for VÊ}À>ÌÃÊÜ Ê>ÀiʺÕÃÌÊV}ÊvÀÊÕÀÊ economic reasons or “pushed” for environmen- Lû¶Ê/ iÊÕÌV>ÕÃ>ÌÞÊvÊÌ iÊÌÛ>ÌÃÊ tal reasons. Because not all people displaced for moving makes labeling a migrant with any by climate change will be fleeing violence or Ã}iÊ>`iVÌÛiÊ«ÌV>]ÊiVV]ÊiÛÀ- cross a national border, it is critical to avoid mental, climate, etc.) problematic. referring to them as refugees if one wants to be / iÊÌ À`Ê`vwVÕÌÞpÜ V ÊvÜÃÊvÀÊÌ iÊ taken seriously by the United Nations, lawyers, challenge of multi-causality—is that it is extraor- 89 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM dinarily difficult to develop and defend a meth- leged environmental scarcity as the explanation odology for calculating the number of climate for civil conflict were criticized, so too is the }À>ÌðÊÊ«ÀiÌÊL}ÃÌÊÜ ÊëiÊ>ÌÊ “climate refugee” argument open to critique. the Wilson Center in the mid-1990s claimed / iÊÃÌÊÕ>Vi`ÊVyVÌÊÜÀÊÜÊLi}Ê that the number of climate refugees could be done focuses on how environmental scarcity in the tens of millions. When one participant or abundance can exacerbate more proximate asked him how he determined who was in and causes of conflict such as ethnic difference or who was out of his total, his response was basi- relative deprivation. Likewise, the key to get- cally: I read a lot of reports and this is my best ting climate on the table as a principal driver guess. Naturally, the air went out of the room, of migration is to carefully trace how it inter- and we might as well have ended the meeting acts with the many other factors that cause À} ÌÊÌ i°Ê/ ÃÊÃÊÌ iÊ`>}iÀÊvÊ>ÃÃiÀÌ}ÊÌ >ÌÊ people to move. there are millions more climate migrants than Climate and migration links may prove to political refugees from war or persecution. For be effective arguments in the larger political starters, is the number of climate migrants being `ÃVÕÃÃÃÊvÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊÌ}>Ì°Ê/ >ÌÊ compared with the legal category of refugees, or ÃÊ Vi>ÀÞÊ Ì iÊ Ü>ÞÊ Ì iÊ iÌiÀÊ vÀÊ iÀV>Ê does the comparison also factor in the millions Progress article is deploying them. Raising of war-induced internally displaced persons? If migration (and its potentially negative impacts this kind of comparative analysis isn’t done care- ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞ]ÊÜ V ÊÌ iÊ ÊÀi«ÀÌÊ } } ÌÃ®Ê fully, some will believe that the climate change as an additional cost of inaction may be effec- migration numbers have been exaggerated by a tive in some political settings. But to maintain y>Üi`ÊiÌ `}Þ°Ê/ ÃÊÃÃÕiÊÜÊÌ iÊLiÊÊ a focus on improving the lives of people on danger of being unfairly marginalized. the ground, it is crucial to translate this larger I say “unfairly” because I believe climate theoretical and political argument into a variety change could have a tremendous effect on vÊëiVwVÊÌiÀÛiÌðÊ/ i]ÊÜ iÊ`ÀÃ]Ê human migration. Even though we cannot NGOs, and host governments become con- parse out a single cause, climate changes are vinced of the challenges presented by climate still critical pushes that cause people to move. and security linkages, there will be a full menu Migration—like conflict and other social phe- of responses to offer and implement. nomena—is by definition multi-causal. Just as Sources: iÌiÀÊvÀÊiÀV>Ê*À}ÀiÃÃ]ÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê*i>ViÊ “environmental conflict” theories that privi- V>`iÞ]Ê Ê À«À>Ì]Ê7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ 90 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 NEW PUBLICATIONS Beyond Disasters: Creating Opportunities for Peace By Michael Renner and Zoë Chafe Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 2007. 56 pages. Reviewed by NICHOLA D. MINOTT Beyond Disasters: Creating Opportunities for Nichola Minott is a doctoral candidate at Peace examines the impact of natural disas- Ì iÊiÌV iÀÊ-V ÊvÊ >ÜÊ>`Ê «>VÞÊ ters on conflicts by analyzing the 2004 Indian >ÌÊ/ÕvÌÃÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ°Ê- iÊÃÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊÜÀ "Vi>ÊÌÃÕ>Ê>`ÊÌ iÊÓääxÊi>ÀÌ µÕ>iÊÊ }ÊÊÃÃÕiÃÊ«iÀÌ>}ÊÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê >à À°Ê >ÕÌ ÀÃÊ V >iÊ,iiÀÊ>`Ê<lÊ iÛÀiÌÊ>`ÊÀiÃÕÀViÊ«VÞÊÃÌÕ`iÃ]Ê Chafe focus on two main themes: the impact ÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÃÌÕ`iÃ]Ê>`ÊVvVÌÊ of disasters on ongoing conflicts, and how the ÀiÃÕÌÊ>`Êi}Ì>ÌðÊ- iÊ `ÃÊ>Ê >ÃÌiÀÊvÊÀÌÃÊÊ >ÜÊ>`Ê «>VÞÊvÀÊ responses to disasters can change the dynamics Ì iÊiÌV iÀÊ-V ° vÊÌ iÃiÊVyVÌðÊ/ iÃiÊÃ}wV>ÌÊ>`ÊÌiÞÊ questions can help us understand how post- disaster interventions could contribute to con- flict resolution and facilitate cooperation among Ài̻ʫ°ÊÇ®°Ê,iiÀÊ>`Ê >viÊLÃiÀÛiÊ warring factions by helping address the deeper that the severity of disasters is increasing as socio-economic and political barriers within the growing socio-economic inequalities push conflict itself. development and settlements into vulnerable / iÊ Ài«ÀÌÊ >>ÞâiÃÊ Ì ÀiiÊ V>ÃiÃ\Ê Vi Ê areas, exposing more people to the full impact `iÃ>®]Ê-ÀÊ >>]Ê>`Ê >à À°ÊÊÌ ÀiiÊ of these events. From the melting ice caps to regions were plagued by civil unrest and con- Hurricane Katrina to the 2004 tsunami, the flict, and all suffered a sudden and devastating world has borne witness to the destructive environmental disaster that, for a time, pacified power of environmental disasters. the conflicts. However, the post-disaster out- Renner and Chafe describe how human comes varied, ranging from a peace agreement population growth is forcing more people ÌÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊÛiViÊ>`ÊL`à i`°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ into fragile and vulnerable ecosystems, thus provide important lessons and policy recom- increasing the number of people likely to be mendations, demonstrating how governments, affected by disasters. By 2008, “for the first the military, disaster relief agencies, and civil time ever, more people will live in cities than society can play positive (and negative) roles in rural areas” (p. 10). Despite advanced early conflict resolution. warning systems—which have decreased / iÊwÀÃÌÊ«>ÀÌÊvÊBeyond Disasters presents fatalities—the number of people affected by a general overview of natural disasters as they disasters has risen 10 percent over the past relate to “human impacts on the natural envi- two decades (p. 9). 91 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Environmental degradation is contribut- it brought international attention to the con- ing to the severity of the damage; for instance, flict. While unofficial peace talks were already short-sighted economic policies led Louisiana in progress prior to the disaster, the post-tsu- to lose more than a quarter of its wetlands, elim- nami involvement of the international com- inating a natural buffer zone that could have munity—specifically, the European Union-led minimized the devastation. In addition, the Vi Ê ÌÀ}Ê ÃÃp i«i`ÊVÀi>ÃiÊÌ iÊ authors cite studies by the Intergovernmental VÌiÌÊÌÊ«i>Vi°Ê9iÌÊVi ½ÃÊ«ÃÌÌÃÕ>Ê Panel on Climate Change indicating that peace could be easily endangered by continued Earth’s temperature has increased over the past inequalities in resource distribution and aid. ÊÊ`Ã>ÃÌiÀÊ century, along with the severity of storms and 1iÊ Vi ]Ê «ÃÌÌÃÕ>Ê -ÀÊ >>Ê other undesirable climate-related phenomena. `iÃVi`i`ÊÌÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊÛiVi°Ê/ iÊÕiµÕ>Ê V>ÊÜi>iÊ 9iÌÊÜ >ÌÊÕÌ>ÌiÞÊ>ÌÌiÀÃÊÃÊÌ iÊÌi- distribution of post-disaster aid helped ness and adequacy of relief programs and the increase tensions between government forces >Ài>ÃÊ>Ài>`ÞÊ ability of the affected society to absorb the >`ÊÌ iÊ/>ÊÀiLiðÊ"Ì iÀÊv>VÌÀÃÊVÌÀL- ÊVvVÌ]Ê Ã VÊ>`ÊÀiLÕ`°Ê/Þ«V>Þ]ÊÌ iÊ«ÀÊ>`Ê uted to this particular outcome, including the disenfranchised bear the brunt of the disas- Sinhala nationalists, who viewed any type of vÕÀÌ iÀÊ ter. For instance, the U.S. federal response to negotiated settlement as a ploy for a separate depleting Hurricane Katrina was clearly lacking, and the state. Peace was not politically expedient for poor of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast are the Sinhala-led government; studies showed Ì iÊVÕÌÀÞ½ÃÊ still suffering the results years later. Ì >ÌÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞ- >>Ê««Õ>ÌÊ``ÊÌÊ Post-disaster relief and economic aid can be Ü>ÌÊÌÊi`ÊÌ iÊVvVÌ°Ê`ÊÌ iÊÌiÀ>Ì- economic ÕÃi`Ê>ÃÊ>Ê«ÌV>ÊÌ\Ê`ÊÌÊÌ iÊÛVÌÃÊvÊ al community sided with the government by ÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ disasters can distort the economy by increasing >Li}ÊÌ iÊ/>ÃʺÌiÀÀÀÃÌð» inflation, the cost of living, and competition for 1iÊ Ì iÊ VÛÊ Ü>ÀÃÊ Ê Vi Ê >`Ê -ÀÊ >`Ê>}Ê LÃ]Ê>`ÊLÞÊi>`}ÊÌÊÕiµÕ>ÊV«iÃ>ÌÊ Lanka, the third case study focuses on an it more >`ÊVvVÌÃÊÛiÀÊÀiÃiÌÌiiÌ°ÊÊ`Ã>ÃÌiÀÊV>Ê ÌiÀÃÌ>ÌiÊVvVÌ°ÊvÌiÀÊ>Ê>ÃÃÛiÊi>ÀÌ µÕ>iÊ weaken areas already in conflict, further deplet- Ê "VÌLiÀÊ n]Ê Óääx]Ê `>Ê >`Ê *>ÃÌ>Ê `vvVÕÌÊÌÊ ing the country’s economic resources and mak- took tentative steps toward thawing rela- ing it more difficult to recover from violence. tions, allowing some travel across the “Line of ÀiVÛiÀÊvÀÊ For example, Pakistan’s slow response to the Control,” which demarcates their respective ÛiVi°Ê £ÇäÊv`ÃÊÊ«ÀiÃiÌ`>ÞÊ >}>`ià ÊiÛiÌÕ- geographical claims in the disputed territory of ally led to the region to push for independence >à À°Ê/ iÊÌÜÊ}ÛiÀiÌÃÊ>ÃÊ>}Àii`ÊÌÊ Ê iViLiÀʣǣ°Ê iÜÃi]Ê V>À>}Õ>Ê`V- v>VÌ>ÌiÊVÀÃÃLÀ`iÀÊÀiivÊivvÀÌðÊ/iÃÃÊ Ì>ÌÀÊ>ÃÌ>ÃÊ-â>½ÃÊivvViÌÊÀiëÃiÊÌÊ decreased and trade increased; however, both Ì iÊ`iÛ>ÃÌ>Ì}Ê£ÇÓÊi>ÀÌ µÕ>iÊ>`ÊiLiââi- sides remained cautious. While the earthquake ment of international reconstruction aid weak- mobilized civil society, biased aid distribution ened his support base and eventually led to his ÃÌÀÀi`Ê`ÃVÌiÌÊ>`ÊVvVÌ°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ ÛiÀÌ ÀÜÊ«°Ê£Ç®° conclude that the nations missed an opportu- Renner and Chafe delve deeper into the cases nity to build peace; neither side seemed ready vÊVi ]Ê-ÀÊ >>]Ê>`Ê >à À°Ê7 iÊÌ iÊ to make the necessary commitments to truly ÌÃÕ>Ê ÌÊÌ iÊ`iÃ>Ê«ÀÛViÊvÊVi Ê engage in dialogue. on December 26, 2004, the province had been In the final chapter, “Creating Future under martial law since the failure of official Opportunities for Peace,” the authors provide «i>ViÊÌ>ÃÊÊ >ÞÊÓääΰÊ/ iÊÌÃÕ>ÊvÀVi`Ê >ÊiÝViiÌÊÃÞÌ iÃÃÊvÊÌ iÊÌ ÀiiÊV>ÃiðÊ/ iÀÊ the parties involved to shift their focus from clear and concise summary of the key aspects fighting to working together to distribute relief of post-disaster engagement in each case pro- 92 to the population in need. Most importantly, vides steps the international community can ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 take to help further peacebuilding in these munity, and powerful elites to make the sacri- vÀ>}iÊiÛÀiÌðÊ/ iÞÊ>À}ÕiÊÌ >ÌÊ`ÀÊ fices necessary to mitigate inequalities that are nations should leverage aid to build peace; further exacerbated by natural disasters. How humanitarian groups should be more sensi- does one create incentives for powerful groups tive to the realities of politics and conflict; and to implement the policies needed to minimize other actors responding to natural disasters Ì iÊ«>VÌÊvÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ`Ã>ÃÌiÀöÊ/ ÃÊëiVvVÊ should make a concerted effort to restore the recommendation is lacking—which is what environment (p. 42). the policy realm most needs. / Õ} Ê Ì iÊ >>ÞÃÃÊ ÃÊ V«i}]Ê Ì iÊ Overall, I found the report a fascinating report’s main weakness lies in its vague pol- examination of how three regions addressed icy recommendations. It is hardly news that the devastating impact of a natural disaster and environmental restoration will minimize the their divergent outcomes on conflict. Renner damage caused by disasters, or that “building and Chafe conclude that the tsunami and trust and reconciliation” is pivotal to increas- earthquake created opportunities and chal- ing cooperation among disputants. Most of lenges that warrant further study to determine the recommendations are aspirational and do why the effects on the conflicts were so varied. not address the hard realities on the ground. Beyond Disasters is a timely call for more in- / iÊÀi>ÊÃÃÕiÊÃÊÌ iÊ>VÊvÊ«ÌV>ÊÜÊÊÌ iÊ depth research on disaster relief and its links to part of governments, the international com- conflict mitigation. Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation By Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, and Daene McKinney Singapore: World Scientific, 2007. 468 pages. Reviewed by ANNIKA KRAMER /ÜÊÀ«>À>ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃ]ÊÊ>`Ê ]Êà >ÀiÊiÊÌÀ>Ã- Annika Kramer is a research fellow with LÕ`>ÀÞÊ>µÕviÀ°Ê/ iÊVÕÌÀiýÊiViÃÊ>ÀiÊ `i« Ê,iÃi>ÀV ÊÊ iÀ]ÊiÀ>Þ°Ê- iÊÃÊ L>Ãi`ÊÞÊÊÌ iÊ>µÕviÀ½ÃÊÜ>ÌiÀ\Ê/ iÞÊ«Õ«Ê Ì iÊV>ÕÌ ÀÊvʺ >>}}Ê7>ÌiÀÊ vVÌÊ water to sell it on the international market as >`Ê «iÀ>Ì»ÊÊ7À`Ü>ÌV ½ÃÊState of LÌÌi`ÊÜ>ÌiÀ°ÊÃÃÕi]ÊvÀÊëVÌÞ½ÃÊÃ>i]ÊÌ >ÌÊ the World 2005. the capacity of the international market to con- sume water is limited, and the price per unit of water is a decreasing function of the quantity. high market prices for water and realize the 1vÀÌÕ>ÌiÞ]ÊÊ>`Ê Ê`iV`iÊ ÜÊÕV ÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ } iÃÌÊÌÊ«>Þvv°Ê to pump without consulting the other. Each With this transboundary groundwater ver- country then pumps as much water as possible sion of the famous “prisoner’s dilemma,” the and sells it on the market; however, this floods authors of Bridges Over Water: Understanding the international market and lowers the price Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and for water. If the two countries instead commu- Cooperation demonstrate how a transbound- ary water situation could be expressed using nicated and cooperated, they could maintain 93 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM game theory. Game theory is only one of the the environmental, social, and political proc- approaches employed by this textbook, which esses taking place in river basins. Instead, it is seeks to introduce the multidisciplinary facets not mentioned until later in the book, and its of freshwater management by considering its principles, including participatory approaches political, economic, legal, environmental, and and institutional aspects, are under-represented hydrological aspects. Representing a cross- in the following chapters. ÃiVÌÊ vÊ `ÃV«iÃ]Ê >ÕÌ ÀÃÊ ÀiÊ >À]Ê Bridges Over Water continues with an over- Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, and Daene view of the literature on conflict, negotiation, McKinney seek to fill the void by producing a and cooperation over shared waters. While this single textbook that covers all aspects of nego- chapter concisely summarizes the literature tiations over transboundary water, an ever- from various fields of research—which is very iÝ«>`}Êwi`ÊvÊÃÌÕ`Þ°ÊÃÊÃÕV ]ÊÌ ÃÊLÊÃÊ>Ê useful for anyone doing research in the field—it very valuable undertaking. will probably not be easy for a new student to Bridges Over Water is aimed at graduate stu- understand due to its brevity and the multitude dents in economics, engineering, water law, and of concepts it introduces. international relations, as well as practitioners / iÊ Ì À`Ê >`Ê vÕÀÌ Ê V >«ÌiÀÃÊ ÌÀ`ÕViÊ of water resource management, international the main principles of international water law Ü>ÌiÀÊ>Ü]Ê>`ÊÜ>ÌiÀÊ«ViðÊ/ iÊLÊ«ÀÛ`iÃÊ and cooperation, providing examples of their a theoretical background on water resources application in transboundary basins around and international water law, as well as quanti- Ì iÊÜÀ`°Ê/ iÊ«ÀÃiÀ½ÃÊ`i>Ê«ÀiÃiÌi`Ê tative approaches to analyzing transboundary above sets the stage for two chapters on coop- water problems, such as river basin modeling erative game theory and how it can be used to >`Ê}>iÊÌ iÀÞ°Ê/ iÊ>iÝÊvviÀÃÊ`iÌ>i`ÊV>ÃiÊ analyze the cooperative or competitive behavior studies of particular transboundary river basins, vÊÀ«>À>ÃÊÊÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊL>ÃðÊÊwVÌÛiÊ lakes, and aquifers, together with the treaties example of a basin shared by three riparians }ÛiÀ}ÊV«iÀ>Ì°ÊÊ ," Ê>VV- is interesting to read in spite of the many for- panying the book includes modeling software, mulas that might scare away those less familiar which can be used to model the fictive Lara ÜÌ ÊiVVðÊ/}iÌ iÀÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊÜi`}iÊ River basin or other basins. }>i`ÊÊÌ iÊV >«ÌiÀÊʺ/ iÊ1ÃiÊvÊ,ÛiÀÊ / iÊ LÊ ÃÌ>ÀÌÃÊ ÜÌ Ê >Ê ÌÀ`ÕVÌÊ ÌÊ >ÃÊ `i}Ê>ÃÊ>Ê/ÊÌÊÃÃiÃÃÊ yVÌÊ>`Ê global water issues, sectoral use patterns, and Potential Cooperation,” game theory is used to Ü>ÌiÀÊÃV>ÀVÌÞÊVVi«ÌðÊvÌiÀÊÌ>}ÊÃÌVÊvÊÌ iÊ analyze the hypothetical but illustrative exam- world’s transboundary river basins, the first chap- ple of the Lara River basin in the book’s annex. ter points out that conflict is not the prevailing / iÊ`i}ÊÃvÌÜ>ÀiÊ«ÀÛ`i`ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊLÊ outcome of riparian states’ divergent interests. allows students to track cooperation’s likely However, it does not provide a clear overview of effects on the basin. common conflicts of interests in transboundary / iÊÃiÛiÌ ÊV >«ÌiÀÊ`ÃVÕÃÃiÃÊVyVÌÊ>`Ê water basins, such as issues of water quality, quan- cooperation over water from the perspective of tity, and flow timing, or divergent water manage- international relations and negotiations, includ- ment priorities such as hydropower, flood con- ing examples illustrating how the relative power ÌÀ]ÊÀÊÜiÌ>`Ê«ÀÌiVÌ°Ê/ ÃÊÛiÀÛiÜÊÜÕ`Ê and geography of riparians—as well as conflict have provided readers with a clear understanding history, domestic policy, and external actors— vÊÌ iÊÃÌÊVÊ«ÀLiðÊÃ]ÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ can influence the balance between conflict and should have devoted some time to introducing V«iÀ>Ì°Ê/ ÃÊV >«ÌiÀÊVÀi>ÌiÃÊ>ÊÀiÊÀi>- the concept of integrated water resources man- istic picture of the various social and political agement as the recognized approach to water factors that may sidetrack economically rational 94 management and as a basis for understanding Li >ÛÀ°Ê/ iÊvÜ}ÊV >«ÌiÀÃ]ʺ"ÛiÀÛiÜÊvÊ ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 -iiVÌi`ÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê7>ÌiÀÊ/Ài>ÌiÃÊÊ/ iÀÊ Ì>ÊiÝ«>>ÌÃÊ>`Ê>`ÕÃÌÊÌ iÊVÌiÌÃÊ Geographic and Political Contexts” and “Global ÌÊÌ iÊÃÌÕ`iÌýÊiÛi°Ê/ iÊLÊÜÕ`Ê >ÛiÊ >ÞÃÃÊvÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê7>ÌiÀÊ}ÀiiiÌÃ]»Ê benefited from a clearer introduction to the provide a comprehensive overview of how >ÀÊ«ÀLiÃÊ>`ÊÃÃÕiÃÊvÊ`ëÕÌiÆÊÀi- international freshwater agreements can help over, more attention could have been devoted settle water disputes, including a useful set of to the actual problems water managers face on questions for analyzing freshwater agreements. the ground—especially in developing coun- /}iÌ iÀÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊL>ÃÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÌi«>ÌiÊÊ tries, where many of the transboundary rivers iÝÊÓ]ÊÌ iÃiʵÕiÃÌÃÊÜÊ «ivÕÞÊV- of the world are located—such as the lack of tribute to an increasing pool of comparable case data, the difficulty of enforcing agreements, study analyses. and limited institutional capacities to main- Preparing a textbook on such an interdis- tain river basin organizations. Overall, how- ciplinary topic and targeting graduate stu- ever, Bridges Over Water is a valuable contribu- dents from multiple disciplines is ambitious. tion that helps fill the need for comprehensive Bridges Over Water must be complemented by textbooks on transboundary water conflict, a knowledgeable teacher who can give addi- negotiation, and cooperation. The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation Over Energy, Resources, and Pollution Edited by In-Taek Hyun and Miranda A. Schreurs Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 362 pages. Reviewed by PAUL G. HARRIS The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Paul G. Harris is the director of the Conflict and Cooperation Over Energy, Resources, ÛÀiÌ>Ê-ÌÕ`iÃÊ*À}À>Ê>`Ê>Ê«À and Pollution describes and analyzes connections viÃÃÀÊÊÌ iÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ*ÌV>Ê-ViViÊ among resources, the environment, and security >ÌÊ }>Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞ]Ê}Ê }°ÊÃÊÃÌÊ Ê ÀÌ i>ÃÌÊÃ>°Ê iëÌiÊÌÃÊÌÌi]ÊÌ ÃÊLÊÃÊ ÀiViÌÊLÊÃÊEurope and Global Climate ÌÊ>LÕÌÊ>ÊvÊÃ>]ÊLÕÌÊÃÌi>`ÊvVÕÃiÃÊÊÌÃÊ Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional eastern, and particularly its northeastern, states CooperationÊ `Ü>À`Ê }>À]ÊÓääÇ®° and regions. Given the number of people living in this part of the world, its prodigious pollu- tion, its unprecedented economic growth—and prominent environmental and resource issues. the dominant “growth-first, clean-up-pollution- / iÊ£ÓÊVÃÃÌiÌÞÊvÀ>ÌÛiÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊVÕ`iÊ >ÌiÀÊ`iÊvÊ`iÛi«i̻ʫ°ÊÓx{®p>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊ three devoted to defining environmental security the region’s growing appetite for natural resourc- and identifying regional institutions that address es, anyone interested in environmental security environmental and resource problems; three should be concerned about the issues addressed focused on energy security, including one dedi- in this book. cated to radioactive waste; two on the marine Broadly speaking, the book examines the environment and water security; and chapters practice of and prospects for regional environ- on food security, Korea, and NGOs. mental cooperation, and provides readers with Most chapters are very detailed, well-written, detailed descriptions and analyses of several and freestanding, allowing readers to easily skip 95 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM to those chapters of greatest interest. Like several discussion of the global security implications of other chapters, Mika Mervio’s chapter on water China’s escalating greenhouse gas emissions. >`Ê Õ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÊ ÀÌ i>ÃÌÊÃ>Ê««°Ê£{Î Regular readers of the ECSP Report most 164) is one of the best available analyses of the likely agree that there are important connections topic; it is worth the price of the book by itself. between environmental change and security, but ->ÀÞ]Ê9Õ}>Ê >i½ÃÊV >«ÌiÀÊÃÊiÊvÊÌ iÊ may disagree on the exact definition of environ- best English-language summaries of radioactive iÌ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞ°Ê/ iÊi`ÌÀÃÊvÊThe Environmental Ü>ÃÌiÊ>>}iiÌÊÊ >ÃÌÊÃ>Ê««°ÊÈÎnn®° Dimension of Asian Security define “environment” The Environmental Dimension of Asian and “environmental security” very broadly, which Security is very useful for its detailed—and helps explain the heavy emphasis on energy secu- sobering—discussion of the poor prospects ÀÌÞ]ÊÜ V ÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê>ÀÊÌ«VÊvÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÜiÊLivÀiÊ for establishing robust and effective regional environmental security gained prominence in regimes to address environmental changes and the lexicon of international affairs. ÀiÃÕÀViÊÃV>ÀVÌiðÊÊ«ÀviÀ>ÌÊvÊÜi>Ê>`Ê ÃÊ À>`>Ê-V ÀiÕÀÃÊÌiÃÊÊ iÀÊwiÊV >«- overlapping environmental regimes have had ter on regional cooperation to protect marine little beneficial impact on environmental prob- environments, “Environmental security has lems. Despite the region’s profound environ- been defined in different and, at times, compet- mental challenges, longstanding animosities }ÊÜ>Þûʫ°Ê££®°Ê/ ÃÊLÊÃÊÊiÝVi«Ì]Ê and mistrust prevent effective cooperation on but the contributors at least move us closer to environmental and non-environmental threats finding a common definition. In the introduc- >i°ÊÃÊiÕÊ iiÊ>À}ÕiÃ]ʺLÀ>`iÀÊ`iÌÌÞÊ ÌÊLÞÊ/>iÊÞÕÊ>`Ê-Õ} >Ê ]ÊiÛ- relations among the countries in Northeast ronmental security is defined “in terms of the Ã>Ê>ÀiÊ«iÀ >«ÃÊÌ iÊÃÌÊ«ÀÌ>ÌÊv>VÌÀÃÊ source of environmental problems, the scope affecting the formation of environmental secu- and impacts of those problems, and the level of rity complexes,” alongside “legacies of past threat perceived by states or nations in relation colonial history and rivalries between Japan to the problems” (p. 9). In other words, if envi- >`Ê >»Ê«°ÊÎn®Ê>`ÊÜ >ÌÊ À>`>Ê-V ÀiÕÀÃÊ ronmental change is not perceived at all, it is not appropriately refers to as “still considerable a threat to security—or at least it is unlikely to mutual suspicion and tension in the region” lead to interstate conflict. However, I wonder «°ÊÓxÈ®°Ê>Ã]ÊÌ iÊLÊ`iÃÊÌÊ`iÌ>Ê ÜÊÌÊ about the dangers of unperceived environmental surmount these obstacles; we need additional changes; this definition would exclude climate work devoted to overcoming historical suspi- change until the perception of its threat spread cions as a prelude to ensuring environmental beyond a few scientists. Hyun and Kim propose security in the region. one way around this problem: Empower “the Some issues are largely absent or given mini- community of experts working on the envi- mal attention. For example, climate change ronment” (p. 14). When this community has garners very little attention, despite possibly sufficiently stimulated people’s perceptions of posing the greatest threat to environmental environmental risk, “preventive” regional coop- security—and even territorial integrity (due, for eration to avert environmental conflict becomes example, to sea-level rise)—across much of East «ÃÃLiÊ««°Ê£Î£{®° Ã>°ÊÌ Õ} Ê>Ê ÀiÌÌiÊ`iÛÌiÃÊwÛiÊ«>}iÃÊ I question whether all of the issues in this book (pp. 104-109) of her very informative chapter fall under the rubric of environmental security. on energy security to climate change, it could ÀÊiÝ>«i]Ê ÃÊ9]Ê-iÕ} Ü>Ê ii]Ê>`Ê have been featured much more prominently Fengshi Wu’s excellent chapter on environmental throughout the book. I would have liked a NGOs and their growing (but still constrained) chapter devoted to climate change and its secu- impact on environmental policy refers to environ- 96 ÀÌÞÊ«V>ÌÃÊvÀÊ >ÃÌÊÃ>]ÊÀÊ>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊÀiÊ mental security at the outset, but then assumes ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 that all environmental issues are problems of argue that environmental problems are near- environmental security. Some chapters refer to ly always dealt with through ordinary policy the usual environmental security concerns, such means, which would leave most of the issues as transboundary pollution and competition for examined in the book beyond the scope of envi- natural resources, while others are dedicated to ronmental security. In short, most of the time issues that are not necessarily primarily environ- “environment” and “environmental security” mental, such as energy and food security. If states are interchangeable in this book, which explores seeking energy security adopt energy sources the environmental dimensions of Northeast i°}°]ÊV>]ÊÕVi>ÀÊ«ÜiÀ®ÊÌ >ÌÊV>Ê >ÛiÊ>ÀÊ Ã>ÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÀi>ÌÃÊ>`Ê`iÃÌVÊ«- environmental impacts, energy becomes a matter ÌVÃÊÕÃÌÊ>ÃÊÕV Ê>ÃÊÀÊÀiÊÌ >]ÊÊÌ iÊV>ÃiÊvÊ of environmental security, according to Elizabeth some chapters) security. Economy, who addresses energy security in her / iÊLÊ >ÃÊ>ÊviÜÊÀÃiÊV >À>VÌiÀÃÌVÃ\Ê superb chapter on the reality of and potential for / iÊÃi>`}ÊÌÌiÊÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊLÊÃÊ a regional “environmental security complex” (see >LÕÌÊ>ÊvÊÃ>Ê>`ÊÌÊÕÃÌÊ >ÃÌÊ>`ÊiëiV>ÞÊ iëÌiÊÌ iÊ pp. 242-246). But if conflicts over energy arise ÀÌ i>ÃÌ®ÊÃ>°Ê-iV`Þ]Ê>ÊvÊÌ iÊÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊ>ÌÊ region’s due to greater demand for it—as Sangsun Shim the end of the book, but there are no headers to and Miranda Schreurs discuss in their chapters indicate the chapters and page numbers, making «ÀvÕ`Ê Ê`i«i`iViÊÊ ``iÊ >ÃÌiÀÊ]ÊÌ iÊ£ÇäÃÊ reading the notes extraordinarily annoying and oil shocks, and the nuclear crisis on the Korean ÌiÊVÃÕ}°ÊÌÊwÀÃÌÊ}>Vi]ÊÌ iÊiÝÌÀiiÞÊ iÛÀiÌ>Ê Peninsula—this seems to stretch the term “envi- detailed index—40 pages of small type—is a V >i}iÃ]Ê ronmental security” far enough to include every- godsend for those who might use the book for thing somehow related to the environment. reference. However, it is not reasonably orga- longstanding Similarly, if food shortages arise not from envi- nized; entries for North Korea alone take up two animosities and ronmental change but from incompetent govern- and one-half pages of the index—but not one of ment economic policies—as is arguably the case these is for “security.” In fact, the general index ÃÌÀÕÃÌÊ«ÀiÛiÌÊ in North Korea, which gets much attention in this entry for “security” refers to only three pages of LÊi°}°]Ê««°Ê£Èx£n{®pÌÊV>ÊÌ iÊiÛÀ- the entire book. Some of the material is out of ivviVÌÛiÊ mental security issues again stretches the defini- date, and much of the recent literature on envi- cooperation on tion. Just as energy security is not always environ- ronmental politics and diplomacy in Northeast mental security (hence references in the book to Ã>ÊÃÊÌÊVÌi`°Ê iÛiÀÌ iiÃÃ]ÊÌ iÊL½ÃÊÃiiVÌi`Ê iÛÀiÌ>Ê “environmental and energy security”), food secu- but extensive bibliography, which provides a >`Ê rity is not always environmental security. substantial sampling of publications on environ- ÃÊiÕÊ iiÊ«ÌÃÊÕÌ]Ê`iwÌÃÊvÊiÛ- mental policy in the region up to a few years ago, iÛÀiÌ>Ê ronmental security proliferate, and “[a]ttempts is still of great benefit. to conceptualize [it] have created considerable Despite the omissions, The Environmental Ì Ài>ÌÃÊ>i°Ê VVi«ÌÕ>Ê>`Ê«VÞÊVvÕûʫ°ÊÓή°Ê iiÊ Dimension of Asian Security is an excellent book defines environmental security as “the state’s that should be part of any institutional or per- protection of the people from environmental sonal library on environmental change. Readers threats and threats of an environmental origin” will not find better descriptions of some of the «°ÊÓx®]Ê>`ÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊÀiwiÃÊÌÊLÞÊiÝ«>}ÊÌ >ÌÊ most important environmental challenges facing “[e]nvironmental problems become security ÀÌ i>ÃÌÊÃ>]ÊiëiV>ÞÊÌ ÃiÊÌiÀiÃÌi`ÊÊiiÀ- issues when the state is forced to respond with gy, the marine environment, water, food, the role iÝÌÀ>À`>ÀÞÊi>ÃÕÀiûʫ°ÊÓx®°Ê/ ÃÊ`iw- of NGOs, and regional environmental coopera- tion seems to exclude preventive cooperation tion. However, readers hoping to find a handy, all- described in other chapters, and suggests that encompassing definition of environmental securi- something is not a threat to security until the ty will be disappointed—though that is a problem problem becomes quite severe. One might that most of the literature has yet to solve. 97 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Escaping the Resource Curse Edited by Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 408 pages. Reviewed by KAYSIE BROWN Kaysie BrownÊÃÊ>Ê`i«ÕÌÞÊ`ÀiVÌÀÊvÊÌ iÊ be less developed than similar states lacking *À}À>ÊÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊ>`Ê such resources. Jeffrey D. Sachs, in his fore- L>ÊÛiÀ>ViÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ ÕVÊÊÀi}Ê word, attributes the curse to three overlapping ,i>ÌðÊ- iÊ >ÃÊÜÀÌÌiÊÊÌ«VÃÊÃÕV Ê>ÃÊ phenomena: so-called “Dutch disease,” where Ì iÊi}>ViÃÊvÊÜ>ÀÊiViÃÊÊ«ÃÌVvVÌÊ resource-related capital inflows inflate currency «i>ViLÕ`}ÆÊLÕÃiÃÃÊ>`ÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê values and crowd out unrelated industries like VÀiÃÆÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ>`Ê`iÛi«iÌÊÊÌ iÊ -ÕÌ Ê*>VvVÆÊ>`ÊÌ iÊÀÕiÊvÊ>ÜÊÊ«i>ViÊ manufacturing and agriculture; the volatility of «iÀ>ÌðÊiÀÊÀiViÌÊ«ÕLV>ÌÃÊVÕ`i\Ê commodity prices; and the negative effects of Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing resource abundance on fragile political institu- “Whole of Government” Approaches to tions, which Sachs identifies as a consequence Fragile States ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê*i>ViÊÃÌÌÕÌi]Ê of states’ ability to raise funds without taxation. ÓääÇ®, and The Pentagon and Global Indeed, below-ground wealth in the develop- Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s ing world is found in countries such as Nigeria, Expanding Role ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê À>µ]Ê>`Ê}>pÜÊÀiÊvÀÊVÀÀÕ«Ì]Ê conflict, human rights abuses, and authoritar- With oil prices becoming increasingly volatile, ian rule than for good governance or successful demand for energy rising in China and India, poverty-reduction programs. and instability affecting key oil producers in the VVÀ`}ÊÌÊ->V Ã]ʺÌÊ >ÃÊÜÊLiiÊÀiV}- Middle East, Escaping the Resource Curse surfs nized that transparency and accountability are the wave of interest in new oil-producing coun- the remedies” for overcoming the curse. While tries. Unfortunately, these producers—such as this sentiment may overstate the extent to -Õ`>Ê>`ÊÃiÛiÀ>Ê7iÃÌÊvÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃp>ÀiÊ which a cure has been found, transparency and often better known for poverty, civil conflict, accountability are undoubtedly key ingredients, and political instability than for sound resource and the editors emphasize them throughout management policies. For these countries, the analysis and policy recommendations that absorbing substantial new capital inflows with- make up the book. In keeping with their focus out succumbing to civil disorder or corruption on solutions, Escaping the Resource Curse aims to poses quite a challenge—one made even more offer countries that are potentially affected by difficult by the set of economic and political the curse a framework for effectively managing distortions collectively known as the “resource their oil and gas reserves. VÕÀÃi°»Ê/ ÃÊi`Ìi`ÊÛÕi]ÊÊÜ V Êi>`}Ê / iÊi`ÌÀýÊ>LÌÊÃÊÕ`i>Li\ÊÊÌ iÀÊ academics, practitioners, and policymakers attempt to present a workable solution to one focus on overcoming the problems faced by of the more bedeviling economic challenges of states endowed with large oil and gas reserves, recent years, they marry theory and practice could not have come at a better time. while addressing the curse’s socio-economic / iÊ ÀiÃÕÀViÊ VÕÀÃiÊ ÃÊ VÞÊ `ivi`Ê >`Ê«ÌV>ÊivviVÌðÊÀÀ>}i`ÊiÊ>Ê >`LÊ as the tendency of states with large reserves of for policymakers in oil-rich states, the volume 98 natural resources, such as oil or diamonds, to is divided into three sections. Part I comprises ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 particularly interesting (but somewhat cum- agriculture and manufacturing to “nontradable bersome) chapters discussing ways for govern- sectors” such as services (no doubt easier said ments to improve their negotiations with oil than done). His chapter ends with a balanced, corporations, since greater understanding of thought-provoking, and cautionary discussion these processes—from deciding how and when of the promises and pitfalls of decentralization to privatize, to evaluating the economic condi- as a method of countering regional inequality. tions of an oil contract, to selecting a skilled / iÊVVÕÃ]ÊV>ÕÌ Ài`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊi`ÌÀÃ]Ê negotiator—can create more transparency in attempts to bring all of the pieces of the resource the oil industry itself. «ÕââiÊÌ}iÌ iÀÊLÞÊ>}Ê£ÎÊÀiVi`>- / iÊiÝÌÊÌÜÊÃiVÌÃÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊÌ iÊÜ>ÞÃÊÊ tions that span its economic, political, techni- which natural resource management plays a cal, and theoretical aspects. Roughly two-thirds key role in resource-rich countries once the of these recommendations target ways oil-rich taps have been turned on and oil revenue has governments themselves—and by extension started to pour into a country. Part II focuses on their citizens—could reap greater rewards from the technical aspects of managing the macro- Ì iÀÊÀiÃÕÀViÊÜi>Ì °Ê/ iÊÀi>}ÊvÕÀÊÀiV- economy. It includes a chapter written by Sachs ommendations concentrate on how the interna- that unpacks how and when oil wealth can tional community could generate greater trans- have deleterious effects on other economic sec- parency and accountability in the oil industry. tors, and recommends specific ways to reverse / iÃiÊ«À«Ã>ÃÊVÕ`iÊÃiÌÌ}ÊÃÌÀVÌiÀÊÃÌ>- this powerful trend. Macartan Humphreys and dards for multinational corporations and creat- Martin Sandbu contribute an engaging and ing a worldwide public information office on well-written chapter on using natural resource oil and gas revenues that would build on the funds to push for better management of petro- VÕÀÀiÌʺ*ÕLà Ê7 >ÌÊ9ÕÊ*>Þ»ÊÌ>ÌÛi°Ê"iÊ iÕÊÀiÛiÕiÃÊÊÌ iÊ`iÛi«}ÊÜÀ`°Ê/ iÃiÊ the more interesting recommendations propos- funds, which often employ escrow accounts, es creating a global clearinghouse for all natural typically limit governments’ discretion to spend resource revenue funds. oil money, attempting to conserve and direct While most of the chapters reflect the latest the proceeds either by stabilizing oil revenues or thinking on the resource curse, and a few move LÞÊÃ>Û}Ê>Ê«ÀÌÊvÀÊvÕÌÕÀiÊÕÃi°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ that debate forward significantly, the volume conclude that such funds will be sustainable as a whole is a mixed bag. Escaping the Resource only if they are accompanied by incentives for Curse does not live up to its ambitious goal of political change. bringing together many different streams of Part III picks up on this theme by focusing Ì Õ} ÌÆÊÃÌi>`]ÊÌÊÃÊ>ÊÀ>Ì iÀÊ`ÃÌi`ÊV- on the legal and political dimensions of creating lection of discussions about economics, the responsible revenue management policies and macro-economy, and political and legal issues. practices. In one of the only chapters to focus / iÊÀi>ÊV >i}ip>`ÊÌ iÊÀi>Êii`pÃÊÌÊ on minerals (as opposed to oil), Michael Ross figure out to the ways in which these issues packs a lot of punch into his examination of the ÌiÀÃiVÌ°ÊÃ]ÊÌ iÊLÊÃiÌiÃÊv>ÃÊÌÊ effects of resource wealth distribution. While it move beyond well-established debates on the is popularly believed that mineral wealth cre- resource curse or to make certain very tech- ates wider gaps between the rich and poor than nical ideas accessible to a more general audi- other forms of wealth, he concludes that the ence—a definite flaw for a volume targeted at evidence is not yet strong enough to confirm policymakers. this. Given the lack of data, Ross calls on states Most importantly, the book seems to give to focus on creating policies that enable work- short shrift to some of the most intractable ers to transition from “tradable” sectors such as aspects of the resource curse. For example, 99 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM the authors do not explain how to convince growing influence, which has transformed an oil-rich governmental elite to initiate the reform landscape, as well as oil-industry reform—a necessary prerequisite to negotiat- nationalization, which has recast the balance ing with oil companies and establishing revenue of power between oil companies and produc- Ê>>}iiÌÊÃÞÃÌiðÊÊÌÊvÌi]ÊÌ iÞÊëÞÊ ing states. While these omissions leave room assume that the political elite will be virtuous, for further study, Escaping the Resource Curse is and thus do not explain how to achieve buy- still an important contribution to a topic that is °Ê/ iÊLÊ>ÃÊv>ÃÊÌÊ>VVÕÌÊvÀÊ >½ÃÊ unlikely to go out of style anytime soon. Gaia’s Revenge: Climate Change and Humanity’s Loss By Peter H. Liotta and Allan W. Shearer Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007. 194 pages. Reviewed by DAVID M. CATARIOUS, JR., and RONALD FILADELFO David M. Catarious, Jr.]Ê>`ÊRonald Liotta and Shearer make it clear that this book FiladelfoÊÜÀÊ>ÃÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê>>ÞÃÌÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ is not a history of or primer on climate science. iÌiÀÊvÀÊ >Û>Ê>ÞÃÃÊ ®]ÊÜ iÀiÊÌ iÞÊ In fact, the third paragraph lists everything the ÜiÀiÊiLiÀÃÊvÊÌ iÊÌi>ÊÌ >ÌÊ«À`ÕVi`Ê book is not supposed to be, concluding that Ì iÊ«ÀÊÓääÇÊÀi«ÀÌÊNational Security and “instead, this book is about the challenges that the Threat of Climate Change. confront us and finding ways to envision the most effective actions that may best taken” (p. In Gaia’s Revenge: Climate Change and 2). Õ>ÌÞ½ÃÊ ÃÃ]Ê*iÌiÀÊ ÌÌ>Ê>`Ê>Ê- i>ÀiÀÊ / iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÀiÛiÜÊÌ iÊV >}}Ê`iwÌÊ argue that scenario analysis can be a useful of security; discuss the impact of different lev- tool for policymakers searching for the proper els of uncertainty on the mindset of decision- response to the impending challenges presented makers; and offer a framework for developing by climate change. Over the course of seven and considering climate change-focused sce- chapters, the authors move from presenting the narios. In describing why these scenarios are of theoretical underpinnings of scenario develop- such importance, they state: “We must create ment to discussing and critiquing an example representations that allow us to come to terms of a climate change-focused scenario developed with [climate change]”. Gaia’s Revenge con- for the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, cludes with a chapter on the current state of Ì iÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊÃ]Ê>ÌÊÌiÃ]Ê`ÃÌi`Ê>`ÊÌÊ the climate change debate in the United States, fully developed. Despite these drawbacks, Gaia’s the difficulty of finding workable solutions, the Revenge provides an interesting change of per- >ÀÊÃÃÕiÃÊÌ Ài>Ìi}Ê Õ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÊÌ iÊ spective for members of either the environmen- coming century, and the need for action at lev- tal or security communities. els other than that of the nation-state. By looking only at the title, readers may mis- / iÊL½ÃÊÃÌÀi}Ì ÊÃÊÌÃÊ>LÌÞÊÌÊ«ÀÛiÊ takenly expect to read about the past and future discussion among policy- and decision-makers effects of climate change on the planet and on opposite sides of the divide between the human beings in particular. Early in the text, traditional security community and the newer 100 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 players in the security realm (e.g., the envi- ronmental community). By discussing climate change through a security lens, Gaia’s Revenge could help the traditional security community find a place for environmental issues in its pol- icy portfolio. Conversely, the book can aid the Since climate change and other “creeping nontraditional security community by provid- ing them with a methodology and framework ÛÕiÀ>LÌiûÊ`vviÀÊvÀÊ`ÀiVÌÊÌ Ài>ÌÃoÜiÊ for considering familiar issues from a new and ÜÊÌÊ`i>ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÃiÊ«ÀLiÃÊivviVÌÛiÞÊ useful perspective. / iÊÌ À`ÊV >«ÌiÀ]ʺ<LiÊ Vi«ÌÃÊ>`Ê vÊÜiÊVÌÕiÊÌÊ>««À>V ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊVViÀÃÊ the Boomerang Effect,” will be of most interest vÀÊ>ÊÌ>ÀÞViÌÀVÊ«iÀëiVÌÛi° to both the national security and environmental communities. In it, Liotta and Shearer review human and environmental security and argue that we must broaden the parameters that define too early; it would have better for the authors to >Ì>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÌÊVÕ`iÊÌ i°Ê/ iÞÊÃÌ>ÌiÊÌ >ÌÊ discuss the possible frameworks for construct- since climate change and other “creeping vulner- ing scenarios and then describe the techniques abilities” differ from direct threats (such as those ÕÃi`ÊÊÌ iÊÓääÎÊÃVi>À°ÊÃÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊÀ}>- posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War), nized, the second chapter seems to distract from we will not deal with these problems effectively if the book’s main purpose, and stands noticeably we continue to approach security concerns from apart from the rest of the book. a military-centric perspective. Because creeping More problematically, Gaia’s Revenge reads vulnerabilities do not have a clear culprit or poli- like a collection of separate essays sewn together cy solution, they often fall prey to the “do-noth- under one cover (as one could ascertain from ing” response. Reconsidering the cliché, “If all the copyright acknowledgements). For example, you have is a hammer, then every problem begins the relevance of the material in the fifth chapter to look like a nail,” Liotta and Shearer comment, (which covers different types of uncertainty) to the “It might be more apt to say that when one only ÀiÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊÌiÝÌÊÃÊÕVi>À°Ê/ iÊVVÕ`}ÊV >«ÌiÀÊ has a hammer, the problems that do not look like contains content useful to students of the debate >ÃÊ>ÀiÊ}Ài`»Ê«°Êx®°Ê surrounding climate change, but does not serve as While we believe that the material covered a logical conclusion to the chapters that precede by Gaia’s Revenge is valuable, several aspects of Ì°Ê/ iÊÀ}>â>Ì>Ê«ÀLiÃ]ÊVV>Ã>ÊÀi«iÌ- the book could use improvement. First, the tion, and dense content help make the text dis- book is mistitled; it has very little to do with Ìi`Ê>`ÊVvÕÃ}ÊÊ«>ViðÊ1«ÊÀiÛiÜ}Ê the Gaia hypothesis, mentioning it only in pass- the book as a whole, the connections between the }°Ê/ iÊÌÌiÊ«iÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊLÊÜÊvVÕÃÊ sections become clearer, but Gaia’s Revenge would on the impacts of climate change, but the text have delivered a better experience had the authors vVÕÃiÃÊÊVÃÌÀÕVÌ}ÊÃVi>ÀðÊÊÀiÊwÌ- taken more time to excise extraneous material and ting title would help the book find an appropri- keep the text more tightly focused. ate audience. While it is not for the casual reader and suf- Second, the book’s arrangement is awkward. fers from some organizational problems, Liotta / iÊÃiV`ÊV >«ÌiÀÊVÀ̵ÕiÃÊÌ iÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊ and Shearer’s Gaia’s Revenge: Climate Change and scenario commissioned by the Department of Humanity’s Loss is a valuable contribution to poli- iviÃiÊÊÓääÎÊÜ V ÊÃÊVÕ`i`Ê>ÃÊ>Ê>««i- cymakers and researchers working at the nexus of dix to the text). However, this discussion comes national, environmental, and human security. 101 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs Edited by Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007. 470 pages Available online from http://www.worldbank.org Return of the Population Growth Factor: Its Impact Upon the Millennium Development Goals By the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health (APPG) London: APPG, January 2007. 69 pages. Available online from http://www.appg-popdevrh.org.uk Population Issues in the 21st Century: The Role of the World Bank By the World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007. 70 pages. Available online from http://www.worldbank.org Reviewed by GIB CLARKE Gib ClarkeÊÃiÀÛiÃÊ>ÃÊÃiÀÊ«À}À>Ê>ÃÃV Þi>ÀÃÊvÊÃÕVViÃÃiÃ]Êv>ÕÀiÃ]Ê>`Ê>`ÕÃÌiÌÃ°Ê >ÌiÊvÀÊ««Õ>Ì]Ê i>Ì ]Ê>`ÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê `ÌÀÃÊ7>ÀÀiÊ °Ê,LÃÊ>`Ê Ê°Ê,ÃÃÊ ÃÃÕiÃÊvÀÊÌ iÊ ÛÀiÌ>Ê >}iÊ>`Ê boldly claim that these case studies—all writ- -iVÕÀÌÞÊ*À}À>Ê>`Ê>ÃÊVÀ`>ÌÀÊvÊÌ iÊ ten by key program personnel—comprise a 7ÃÊ iÌiÀ½ÃÊL>Êi>Ì ÊÌ>ÌÛi°Ê history lesson for the next generation of family «>}Ê«À>VÌÌiÀðÊ/ iÊV>ÃiÃÊiÌVÕÕÃÞÊ detail each program’s socio-economic, cultural, ÊÌÀÊvÊÀi«ÀÌÃÊÀii>Ãi`ÊÊÓääÇpÌÜÊvÀÊ and political context, and include a full chron- the World Bank, one from the UK Parliament— }ÞÊvÊiÛiÌðÊ/ iÊÀi>`iÀÊÃÊ`ii`ÊivÌÊÜÌ Ê examine the past, present, and future of family a profound understanding of the family plan- «>}Ê«À}À>ðÊÊÌ ÀiiÊÛÕiÃÊ } } ÌÊ ning movement’s birth, struggle to grow, and successes and failures; elucidate best practices ultimate success. and lessons learned; and offer recommenda- / iÊÀV Ê ÃÌÀÞÊÊÌ iÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊÃÊÃÕ«- tions for next steps. plemented by a powerful introduction from The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Steven Sinding, former director general of the Decades of Population Policies and Programs International Planned Parenthood Federation. vviÀÃÊÓÎÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊvÊi>ÀÞÊ>Ì>Êv>ÞÊ Sinding provides a global context, present- planning programs, tracing their progress from ing the key debates (such as the importance 102 `i>ÊÌÊV«iÌÊ>`ÊVÛiÀ}Ê>ÃÊ>ÞÊ>ÃÊÎäÊ of family planning and the best methods for ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 implementing national programs), critical Upon the Millennium Development Goals°Ê/ ÃÊ events and conferences, and influential organi- exclusion is potentially crippling to the family zations and individuals that helped shape fam- planning movement, as many funding decisions ily planning programs. and programmatic priorities are based on the In case after case, I was struck by the fact needs identified in the MDGs. Indeed, as the that these programs were truly pioneering, authors note, despite evidence that the unmet developed with little to no precedent, no mod- ii`ÊvÀÊv>ÞÊ«>}ÊÃÊ } ÊÓÇÊ«iÀViÌÊ els to emulate, and no literature to consult. Due of women of reproductive age in sub-Saharan to the lack of precedent, the programs show vÀV>Ê>`Ê£ÈÊ«iÀViÌÊÊ-ÕÌ i>ÃÌÊÃ>®Ê>`Ê incredible variation in planning and execution. rising, funding for family planning has not kept Some programs were executed with support or «>ViÊ«°Ê£x®°Ê,>Ì iÀÊÌ >Ê`iVÀÞÊ««Õ>̽ÃÊ direction from the government, while others absence and argue for its inclusion as the so- stayed below the political radar. Some programs called “Ninth MDG,” the authors instead point worked principally through their health minis- to evidence—collected in UK parliamentary try, while others relied on population commis- hearings and submitted briefs—that attaining sions to coordinate the work of several agencies. the MDGs is not possible without addressing Finally, some programs stressed condoms, oth- population growth. ers promoted intrauterine devices (IUDs), and / ÃÊ>VViÃÃLiÊ>`ÊVi>ÀÞÊÜÀÌÌiÊÀi«ÀÌÊ some changed commodities over time. is to be praised for its straightforward argu- Despite their differences, most of the pro- iÌÃÊ>`Êi>ÃÞÌvÜÊV >ÀÌðÊ``ÀiÃÃ}Ê grams were successful, with contraceptive prev- each MDG in turn, it identifies why contin- alence rates (CPR) increasing and total fertility ued population growth will make reaching the À>ÌiÃÊ/,®Ê`iV}°Ê/ iÊiÛiÊvÊÃÕVViÃÃÊÜ>ÃÊ identified targets more difficult for developing influenced by the particular methods of imple- VÕÌÀiðÊ/ iÊÀi«ÀÌÊVVÕ`iÃÊÜÌ ÊÃÝÊëiÊ mentation, but also seems to be a function of recommendations to donors and the family higher socio-economic status, education levels, planning community alike, focusing on remov- and the status of women in the country. ing financial, social, and technical barriers to / Õ} Ê ÕV Ê V>Ê LiÊ i>Ài`Ê vÀÊ Ì iÊ family planning. cases presented in The Global Family Planning For the most part, the arguments are sound. Revolution, it falls short in a few areas. First, Reaching the second MDG, achieving universal Ü iÊÌ iÊÛiÀÜ i}Ê>ÀÌÞÊvÊÌ iÊÜÀ`½ÃÊ primary education, will be difficult under any } ÊviÀÌÌÞÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>]Ê VÀVÕÃÌ>ViðÊ``}ÊÊ««Õ>ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ]ÊÌ iÊ the book includes only two cases from that con- authors claim, means that some countries will be tinent. Second, the authors acknowledge that “running to stand still”; for example, countries coercion existed, but downplay its significance with high population growth need to add two ÌÊÕV ÆÊÌ iÊ/ÕÃ>ÊV >«ÌiÀ]ÊvÀÊiÝ>«i]Ê million teachers per year to sustain a teacher- dismisses coercion as “not generalized” (p. 62). to-student ratio of 40, an already strained edu- For the family planning revolution to be reborn, cational environment (pp. 21, 29). Success on it must fully own up to its early mistakes. the third MDG, gender equality and women’s Whereas The Global Family Planning empowerment, is not possible until women have Revolution looks at largely successful programs the knowledge and means to control their own ÊÌ iÊ«>ÃÌ]ÊÌ iÊ*>ÀÌÞÊ*>À>iÌ>ÀÞÊÀÕ«Ê fertility. Short birth intervals, a frequent com- on Population, Development and Reproductive ponent of high birth rates, often contribute to Health focuses on family planning’s total exclu- children’s poor nutrition, thus making the fourth sion from the United Nations’ Millennium MDG (reducing childhood mortality) more dif- Development Goals (MDGs) in its report, ficult to achieve. Lack of birth spacing, high-risk Return of the Population Growth Factor: Its Impact pregnancies, and complications from unsafe 103 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM abortion can all decrease maternal health, which cation, economic status, or living situation— ÃÊÌ iÊwvÌ Ê °Ê/ iÊÜÀ`ÊÃÊ>Ài>`ÞÊv>V}Ê usually limit access to information and services. difficulties with the seventh MDG, ensuring Members of disadvantaged groups are often not environmental sustainability, and population empowered to negotiate sex or make decisions growth—especially in areas where growing num- about their contraceptive use. bers of people are dependent upon limited stores Despite the World Bank’s confidence in its of forests, fish, or other natural resources—makes multi-sectoral approach, the authors are clear it harder still. about the challenges the Bank faces. First, On the other hand, the claim that popula- they point to severe under-funding of popula- tion growth—particularly urbanization—has a tion initiatives by donors, developing-country i}>ÌÛiÊ«>VÌÊÊivvÀÌÃÊÌÊw} ÌÊ6É -Ê governments, and international organizations and malaria (the sixth MDG) is less convincing. (including the Bank itself). Second, devel- Some experts argue that urbanization instead oping countries are not prioritizing popula- «ÀÛiÃÊ>VViÃÃÊÌÊ i>Ì ÊÃiÀÛViÃÊ1 *]Ê tion—perhaps taking the signal from funders ÓääÇ®°Ê / iÊ Ài>Ìà «Ê LiÌÜiiÊ ««Õ>- and the MDGs. World Bank strategic plans tion growth and poverty (the first MDG) is ÃÕV Ê>ÃÊ ÕÌÀÞÊÃÃÃÌ>ViÊ-ÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊ,iÛiÜÃÊ Ì iÊÃÕLiVÌÊvÊÕV ÊVÌÀÛiÀÃÞ°ÊReturn of the and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers address Population Growth Factor uses several instances population only occasionally, and when they of correlation between rising populations and do, the policies they include are usually not worsening poverty to make the case for family ivviVÌÛi°Ê>Þ]ÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ>ÃÊÜ ÞÊvÀV>Ê planning. Other studies are neither as conclu- has yet to share in the global success of fam- sive nor as optimistic; and some point out that ily planning programs. Why is the demand for the causal chain works both ways: Poverty can V `ÀiÊÃÊÕV Ê } iÀÊÊvÀV>ÊÌ >Ê>Þ- lead to higher fertility, as well (Kelley, 1998; where else in the world, despite declines in National Research Council, 1986; Pritchett, child mortality? Unlike most other developing £ÇÆÊ-]Ê£n£®° VÕÌÀiÃ]Ê«i«iÊÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞÊvÊvÀV>Ê Population Issues in the 21st Century: The countries list opposition to family planning Role of the World Bank picks up where Return and health concerns (in addition to wanting of the Population Growth Factor leaves off, with more children) as the principal reasons for not an assessment of the importance and relevance using contraception; relatively few women of population issues and recommendations for VÌiÊ>VÊvÊ>VViÃÃ]ÊvÕ`Ã]ÊÀÊÜi`}i°Ê/ iÊ future priorities for the field and for the World authors recommend researching what makes >ÊÊ«>ÀÌVÕ>À°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ«ÌÊÕÌÊÌ >ÌÊ vÀV>Ê`vviÀiÌÊÊÌ iÃiÊÀiëiVÌÃ]Ê>`Ê ÜÊ«À- while family planning programs have been tre- grams can be tailored to address these factors. i`ÕÃÞÊÃÕVViÃÃvÕ]ÊÎxÊVÕÌÀiÃÊΣÊvÊÜ V Ê The Role of the World Bank should be taken >ÀiÊÊvÀV>®ÊÃÌÊ >ÛiÊ/,ÃÊvÊwÛiÊÀÊ } iÀ°Ê with a grain of salt, as the introduction states In some of these countries, the population will that its results are “preliminary and unpol- `ÕLiÊÀÊÌÀ«iÊLÞÊÓäxäÊÕiÃÃÊ`À>>ÌVÊÃÌi«ÃÊ Ã i`oÌÊiVÕÀ>}iÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊ>`Ê`iL>Ìi»Ê«°Ê are taken. ii). No financial or programmatic commitments Population and development are intricately are attached to this report. Even so, it is a step linked, and this report identifies synergies at the in the right direction. World Bank, including those within the office />iÊÌ}iÌ iÀ]ÊÌ iÃiÊÌ ÀiiÊÀi«ÀÌÃÊ`iÃVÀLiÊ of Health, Nutrition and Population, which the family planning movement, providing a is well-positioned to tackle the multi-faceted useful history of the factors that have made ÃÃÕiÊvÊ««Õ>Ì°Ê/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊvVÕÃÊÊiµÕ- Ì iÃiÊ«À}À>ÃÊÃÕVViÃÃvÕ°Ê/ iÞÊ>ÃÊ`iÃVÀLiÊ>Ê ty, both between and within countries, since movement in crisis as it grapples with its new 104 inequities—whether due to age, ethnicity, edu- status and lower levels of funding. Now that it ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 is no longer the darling of donors such as the in The Global Family Planning Revolution show, 7À`Ê >]Ê1- ]Ê>`Ê«ÀÛ>ÌiÊvÕ`>ÌÃ]Ê ÃÕVViÃÃÊ``ÊÌÊViʵÕVÞÊÀÊi>ÃÞ°Ê/ iÊÃ>iÊ is family planning content to reposition itself kind of patience and creativity demonstrated by and to play the “enabling” role in development these programs may well be required if family that the Parliamentarians describe? Or will planning is to achieve a comeback. it prove its worth once again as a stand-alone intervention? References The Role of the World Bank offers welcome signs that the negative tide that started at the iiÞ]ÊiÊ °Ê£n®°ÊThe impacts of rapid population 1984 Mexico City population conference may growth on poverty, food production, and the environ- be beginning to turn. Return of the Population mentÊ ÕiÊ VVÃÊ7À}Ê*>«iÀÊ °Ên£Î®°Ê Growth Factor cites the inclusion of universal Durham, NC: Duke University. access to reproductive health as a target under National Research Council. (1986). Population growth and economic development: Policy questions. the MDG on maternal health as a symbol of 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê >Ì>ÊV>`iÞÊ*ÀiÃð progress. But old debates about family plan- *ÀÌV iÌÌ]Ê >Ì°Ê£Ç]Ê >ÀV ®°ÊQ,iÛiÜÊvÊÌ iÊLÊ ning’s relevance and tactics are still evident. The ends of the earth]. Finance and Development /ÊÀiÃÛiÊÌ i]ÊÌ iÊv>ÞÊ«>}ÊVÕ- 34(1), x£° nity should continue to document their positive Simon, Julian L. (1981). Population: The ultimate resource. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. results on social and economic indicators, and 1 Ê*«Õ>ÌÊÕ`Ê1 *®°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊState of the to loudly and consistently emphasize the volun- world’s population 2007: Unleashing the potential of Ì>ÀÞÊ>ÌÕÀiÊvÊÌ iÀÊ«À}À>ðÊÃÊÌ iÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊ urban growth°Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê1 *° Governance as a Trialogue: Government-Society-Science in Transition Edited by Anthony R. Turton, Hanlie J. Hattingh, Gillian A. Maree, Dirk J. Roux, Marius Claassen, Wilma F. Strydom New York: Springer, 2007. 354 pages. Reviewed by KARIN R. BENCALA For many years, the field of water management Karin R. BencalaÊÃÊ>ÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÀiÃÕÀViÃÊ«> was dominated by large dam construction and ner at the Interstate Commission on the the belief that large-scale technological advanc- *Ì>VÊ,ÛiÀÊ >ðÊ*ÀiÛÕÃÞ]Êà iÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê es could solve the world’s water challenges. «À}À>Ê>ÃÃÃÌ>ÌÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ ÛÀiÌ>Ê /`>Þ]ÊÌi}À>Ìi`ÊÜ>ÌiÀÊÀiÃÕÀViÊ>>}iiÌÊ >}iÊ>`Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ*À}À>°Ê- iÊ >ÃÊ>Ê (IWRM) is the preferred (though not perfect) >ÃÌiÀ½ÃÊ`i}ÀiiÊÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÃViViÊ >`Ê>>}iiÌÊÜÌ Ê>ÊvVÕÃÊÊ«ÌV>Ê model; while it has existed in various forms iVÞÊvÊÌ iÊiÛÀiÌÊ>`ÊvÀià Ü>ÌiÀÊ for decades, only within the past decade has >>}iiÌÊvÀÊÌ iÊ ÀiÊ-V Ê>ÌÊÌ iÊ it emerged as the new paradigm for managing 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ >vÀ>]Ê->Ì>Ê >ÀL>À>° water and other resources to ensure a sustain- able supply of good-quality water for both peo- ple and the environment. Many water managers and implementing IWRM plans that must now grapple with the challenge of developing address the many disparate interests involved. 105 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM are the arenas in which information is trans- ferred between experts and other actors, personal relationships are built, and decisions are made. Each interface is briefly described in an introduc- tory chapter and referred to in a subsequent case 7>ÌiÀÊ>>}iiÌÊÃÊÌÀÕÞÊ>ÊÃÃÕiÊvÀÊ study—although the government-society inter- face receives more attention than the interfaces ÊiÛiÀÞi]ÊÜ iÌ iÀÊÞÕÊÛiÊÊ>Ê`iÛi«}Ê ÜÌ ÊÃViVi°ÊÃÊ V >iÊ °Ê >«>>]ÊÞÃÃ>Ê ÀÊ`iÛi«i`ÊVÕÌÀÞ]ÊÀÊÊ>ÊÜ>ÌiÀÀV ÊÀÊ °Ê iÀ]Ê>`ÊivvÀiÞÊ/°Ê ÃiÊ«ÌÊÕÌÊÊÌ iÀÊ V >«ÌiÀÊÊ ÀÌ ÊiÀV>]Ê>ÊÌ ÀiiÊ}ÀÕ«ÃÊ`Ê Ü>ÌiÀÃV>ÀViÊÀi}° not always have the same amount of influence on the process or the end result. Given the impor- tance of these interfaces, it is unfortunate that Governing water resources is clearly not a the editors did not make more of an attempt to simple challenge with a single answer; success- map the dynamics of each interface between the ful IWRM requires a detailed understanding of three main actor-clusters. a region’s water and other natural resources, the *>ÀÌÊ£]ʺÊ"ÛiÀÛiÜÊvÊÛiÀ>Vi]»ÊiÝ«ÀiÃÊ ability to make trade-offs between competing ecosystem governance, offering those with lim- human and environmental uses for the water, ited knowledge a basis from which to assess functioning institutions, and a legitimate gov- the trialogue model. Malin Falkenmark’s chap- ernment that can see the plans to fruition. In ter, “Good Ecosystem Governance: Balancing Governance as a Trialogue: Government-Society- Ecosystems and Social Needs,” steps back to Science in Transition]ÊÌ ÞÊ/ÕÀÌÊ>`Ê ÃÊ explore how the nature of ecosystems determines co-editors take a hard look at the elements of which resources can be governed and the way governance, examining a “trialogue” model that in which they should be governed. It succinctly comprises the set of actors and their interactions describes water’s role in all ecosystems and the required to achieve management goals. While essential function it plays in allowing humans to this book does not prove the model’s effective- provide for themselves. While the five chapters in ness, its investigation will be beneficial to those this section repeat the definition of some terms attempting to flesh out the requirements for and explanations of conceptual topics, they cover good water governance. important ground: what governance is, what /ÕÀÌ]Ê>iÊ°Ê>ÌÌ} ]Ê >ÀÕÃÊ >>ÃÃi]Ê makes for good governance, and how the process ÀÊ°Ê,ÕÝ]Ê>`Ê*iÌiÀÊ°Êà ÌÊÃÌ>ÀÌÊLÞÊvviÀ- plays out at varying scales. }Ê>ÊiÜÊ`iwÌÊvÊ}ÛiÀ>Vi\ʺ/ iÊ«À- *>ÀÌÊÓ]ʺÌiÀÀ}>ÌÊvÊÌ iÊ/À>}ÕiÊ `i]»Ê cess of informed decision-making that enables applies the model to ecosystems, but not always trade-offs between competing users of a given ëiVwV>ÞÊÌÊÜ>ÌiÀ°Ê/ iÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊÊÌ ÃÊÃiV- resource so as to balance protection with ben- tion each illustrate at least one of the model’s eficial use in such a way as to mitigate conflict, interfaces. However, there is nothing tying the enhance equity, ensure sustainability and hold articles together to guide the reader through their officials accountable” (p. 12). With this defi- iÛ>Õ>ÌÃÊvÊÌ iÊ`i°Ê/ ÃÊÃiV̽ÃÊ>>ÞÃÃÊ nition in mind, the authors have developed a could be improved by a set of graphics that iden- working model of governance as a trialogue.1 tifies the interface being investigated and how /ÕÀÌÊ>`Ê ÃÊVi>}ÕiÃÊVVÕ`iÊÌ >ÌÊÌ ÀiiÊ the arguments either support or challenge the different actor-clusters in the governance pro- validity of the model. cess—government, society, and science—interact In her chapter, “Lessons from Changes in 106 ÜÌ Êi>V ÊÌ iÀÊʺÌiÀv>Við»Ê/ iÃiÊÌiÀv>ViÃÊ ÛiÀ>ViÊvÊÀiÊ >>}iiÌ\Ê/ iÊ1ÕÛÕ>Ê ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Operation Firestop Campaign,” Sandra Fowkes } ÞÊV«iÝÊ«ÀViÃÃiÃÊ>ÌÊÜÀ°Ê/ÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊÌ iÊ shares lessons from a cooperative fire manage- understanding of governance as a process and as iÌÊ«ÀiVÌÊ>`Ê«ÌÃÊÕÌÊ>ÊviÜÊvÊÌ iÊÌÀ>- a product, they propose to begin describing and logue model’s oversights. First, she observes that cataloguing the forms of the different interfaces. each actor-cluster’s influence is not necessarily / ÃÊivvÀÌÊÜÕ`ÊLÃÌiÀÊÌ iÊ`iÊ>`Ê i«Ê equal and can change depending on the situation. others interested in water governance apply these Furthermore, she questions whether or not sci- principles to their own situations. ence should be its own cluster, instead suggesting Governance as a Trialogue lacks discussion on that it should be viewed as a tool that the other leadership and power, two key aspects of gover- groups use in decision-making. She critiques the nance. While their influence is difficult to quan- model’s grouping of everything outside of gov- tify and varies drastically between situations, it is ernment or science into one large society cluster, difficult to ignore their importance. Leaders are arguing that combining such disparate groups essential for moving processes forward and for with varying interests and value systems simpli- helping factions reach consensus. Power dynam- fies the true nature of civil society. ics within a region or control over a specific body / iÊ Ì À`Ê ÃiVÌÊ vÊ Ì iÊ L]Ê º ÀÃà of water—especially the roles of upstream and cutting Governance Requirements,” digs into downstream users—must be explored if we are to the mechanics of the interfaces between the understand how decisions are made. >VÌÀVÕÃÌiÀðÊ/ iÊ V >«ÌiÀÃÊ VÛiÀÊ Ì iÊ ii`Ê Good governance is now recognized as for a proper learning environment to educate a way to tackle the world’s water challeng- managers and decision-makers; communica- es. Water management is truly an issue for tion’s essential role; and the missing dimension everyone, whether you live in a developing or of time. One of the most valuable in the book, developed country, or in a water-rich or water- this section provides perspectives on the actual scarce region. Many technological fixes exist, process of the interactions that make up gov- and others are continually being developed ernance. Linda Godfrey’s chapter, “Ecosystem and improved, but we have lacked innovative ÛiÀ>ViÊ >`Ê Ì iÊ /À>}ÕiÊ iL>Ìi\Ê Ê strategies for implementation. Governance as "ÛiÀÛiÜÊvÊÌ iÊ/À>}ÕiÊ,i>Ìà «Ê >`Ê a Trialogue reflects the growing attention to Ì iÊ }>}iiÌÊ}ÊÌiÀv>ViÃ]»Ê`iÛiÃÊÌÊ the problem of inadequate governance that the role of science in the trialogue model and hinders the larger goal of sustainable develop- explains how governance is affected by both the iÌ°Ê/ iÊÌÀ>}ÕiÊ`iÊ i«ÃÊÌ iÊwi`ÊvVÕÃÊ strength of engagement and the rate at which its attention on specific relationships between this engagement plays out between the three actors and the actions they take. Whether or }ÀիðÊ/ iÃiÊÀ>ÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊÌ iÃiÛiÃÊ>vviVÌi`ÊLÞÊ not this iteration is comprehensive does not the environment in which these interactions are matter as much as the fact that it furthers the taking place. discussion on the only sustainable solution to / iÊw>ÊV >«ÌiÀÊvÊÌ iÊLÊÀiÛÃÌÃÊÌ iÊiÊ the water crisis. hypotheses initially proposed in the introduc- tion, reflects on the chapters’ case studies, and Note «À«ÃiÃÊ >Ê iÜÊ ÀiÃi>ÀV Ê >}i`>°Ê/ÕÀÌÊ >`Ê Hattingh find support for all of the hypotheses, £°Ê/ÕÀÌÊiÌÊ>°ÊVÌiÊ >Ê>i>ÀÊ>ÃÊÌ iÊwÀÃÌÊ person to use the term “trialogue” to describe the inter- but determine that a few need to be analyzed fur- action between the three actor-clusters, “during a con- Ì iÀ°Ê/ iÞÊLÃiÀÛiÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊ>iÃÊvÊÌ iÊ>VÌÀ versation with one of the authors in Stockholm during clusters are too simplistic and do not reflect the the 2004 Stockholm Water Symposium” (p. 12). 107 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM The Greening of the U.S. Military Environmental Policy, National Security, and Organizational Change By Robert F. Durant Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007. 283 pages. Reviewed by BRIAN SMITH Brian D. SmithÊÃÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊÜÌ Ê>Ê>ÀÊV ÊÀ}>â>Ì>ÊV >}i°ÊÃÊ>ÊÀ}>â>Ì>Ê ÃÕÌ}ÊvÀÊ>`Ê >ÃÊÃiÀÛi`Ê>ÃÊ>ÊVÌÀ>VÌÀÊÌÊ change textbook built around a well-vetted set Ì iÊ1°-°Ê i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ iviÃi]ÊÃÕ««ÀÌ}Ê of historical cases, the book—which is well- iÛÀiÌ>ÊÃÃÕiÃ]ÊvÀÊÀiÊÌ >Ê£äÊÞi>ÀÃ°Ê written and easy to follow—succeeds admirably. iÊ«ÀÛ`i`ÊÌiV V>ÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÌÊ>ÊÕLiÀÊvÊ However, based largely on my experiences and >VÌÛÌiÃÊëÃÀi`ÊLÞÊÃiÛiÀ>ÊvÊÌ iÊvvViÃÊ the experiences of my colleagues as contractors Õ`iÀÊÌ iÊi>`iÀà «ÊvÊ`Û`Õ>ÃÊÀiviÀÀi`ÊÌÊ working on this process, I found a few impor- in The Greening of the U.S. Military. tant areas where I thought the book was lacking or inaccurate. The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Durant provides a generally accurate descrip- Policy, National Security, and Organizational ÌÊvÊ>ÀÊiÛiÌÃÊ>`ÊÃ}wV>ÌÊÛiiÌÃ]Ê Change is a carefully constructed and well-orga- including the Republican victory in the 1994 nized account of the regulation of environmen- congressional elections and the subsequent tal issues within the Department of Defense retrenchment by the Clinton administration— ®Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ>Ài`ÊÃiÀÛViðÊÕÌ ÀÊ,LiÀÌÊ°Ê probably one of the most important reasons Durant recounts and analyzes the organizational for the halting progress made during that time. changes that took place as the defense establish- Efforts by the Clinton administration to reap ment moved to comply with significant parts of the post-Cold War “peace dividend” by reduc- the environmental regulatory framework that ing military budgets—and the pressure from }ÛiÀÃÊVÛÊiÌiÀ«ÀÃiðÊ/ Õ} ÊÌÊÃÊ>ÃÊv>ÀÊ Congress and local interests to quickly deal with L>VÊ>ÃÊÌ iÊ/ÀÕ>Ê>`ÃÌÀ>Ì]ÊÌ iÊLÊ facilities targeted for realignment and closure— focuses on the administrations of George H. W. were key drivers toward realizing the benefits of Bush and Bill Clinton, as well as the early parts a more environmentally friendly approach to the of the George W. Bush presidency. management of military facilities and the acqui- / iÊLÊÃÊÀ}>âi`Ê>ÀÕ`Ê>ÊviÜÊLÀ>`Ê sition of future systems. However, these drivers themes that are carefully threaded through a were also serious impediments to significant and series of issue-based case studies in self-con- systematic changes in defense culture and the tained chapters. Each of the chapters examines attitudes both within DoD and the armed ser- a particular issue—such as base cleanup or the vices toward remediation and restoration efforts. Military Munitions Response Program—using Durant’s description lacks a discussion of chang- authoritative secondary sources and official es to the force structure itself and the cultural documentation; explains the issue’s histori- behavior of the military in the face of heightened cal context and relationship to other issues; regulatory pressure and reduced budgets. and then discusses how that issue exemplifies a Durant suggests that reduced military bud- number of important concepts in the literature gets beginning in the early Clinton administra- 108 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 tion led to reductions in the emissions of regu- regulatory regime, based in evolving case law, lated pollutants and toxic materials; however, and transparently, rationally, and quickly apply he misses some key factors. When the budgets the law to their specific cases. In many cases, were reduced, existing forces—including active such as the munitions rule, the military and the ÀÞÊ`ÛÃÃ]Ê >ÛÞÊV>ÀÀiÀÊL>ÌÌiÊ}ÀÕ«Ã]Ê>`Ê regulatory agencies (notably the Environmental ÀÊÀViÊÜ}ÃpÜiÀiÊ>ÃÊÀi`ÕVi`]ÊÊÀ`iÀÊÌÊ *ÀÌiVÌÊ}iVÞ®ÊvÕ`ÊÌ iÃiÛiÃÊÊÌ iÊ pay for the research, development, and procure- uncharted territory of managing significant risk ment of the next generation of weapons sys- to future operations. ÌiðÊ/ iÊÌ>ÀÞÊV ÃiÊÌÊÀiÌ>Ê>`Ê>Ì>Ê Ài>`ÞÊ>ÊVÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊÀ}>â>Ì]ÊÜ iÊ its newer systems and retire older systems that confronted with the possibility (real or per- had been in service since Vietnam. While some ceived) of having its operations curtailed, the older systems were preserved, the overall reduc- military should be granted some leeway for mov- tions resulted in a younger—and in many cases, }ÊÃÜÞÊ>`ÊV>ÕÌÕÃÞ°Ê/ iÊÕÃiÌÌi`Ê}L>Ê less polluting—inventory of systems than those strategic environment put enormous pressure ÕÃi`ÊÊ iÃiÀÌÊ- i`Ê>`Ê iÃiÀÌÊ-ÌÀ°Ê/ iÊ on the defense establishment to be prepared to military’s response to the reduced budget was as deal with the unexpected, and thus maximize its >Vi`ÊÜÌ Ê important to the reductions in effluents as the options. While such slow and cautious move- dealing with budget reduction itself. If, instead, the military ment could be interpreted as obstructionist, I had decided to take the cuts across the board believe that it instead reflects the great difficulty >ÊÕLiÀÊvÊ or largely out of research and development, the faced by the DoD and the armed services in significant budget reduction might have led to increased >`ÕÃÌ}ÊÌ iÀÊ«iÀ>Ì>ÊVÕÌÕÀiÃÊÊ>ÊVÃÃ- emissions, given the increase in operational tent and uniform fashion. changes in a Ìi«Ê`ÕÀ}ÊÌ ÃÊÌi°Ê/ iÊÀi`ÕVÌÊÌi`- While Durant correctly identifies senior short period ed to preserve the older, pre-compliance ethic civil servants as key to successful organiza- toward regulation of the military’s environ- tional transformation, he does not address the «iÀ`ÊvÊÌi]Ê mental performance. Faced with dealing with a expanded role of contractors and their impact Ì iÊÌ>ÀÞÊ number of significant changes in a short period ÊÀ}>â>Ì>ÊV >}i°Ê/ ÃÊÀiÊ`iÃiÀÛiÃÊ period of time, the military culture was only ÀiÊ`i«Ì Ê`ÃVÕÃÃ]Ê>ÃÊÌÊÃÊ>Ê>ÀÊvi>- VÕÌÕÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ >LiÊÌÊÌiÀ>âiÊÃÊ>Þ°ÊÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊvÊÌ >ÌÊ ture of current day-to-day operations in the trade-off and decision process is largely missing defense establishment. He briefly addresses the ÞÊ>LiÊÌÊ from The Greening of the U.S. Military. firms that develop, build, and support the sys- internalize so Durant appears to suggest that the military tems in the defense inventory (“metal benders”). conspired to systematically obstruct the applica- However, the service contractors’ role in trans- >Þ° tion of federal environmental regulations to its formation has greatly increased since the early facilities and operations. He does not adequately 1990s, as more technical, analytical, and sup- address an alternative hypothesis: that the DoD port work has moved from the government to and the armed services were not adequately private industry. Contractors have evolved from prepared to assimilate and operationalize these providing systems and system-specific support regulations. Much of his analysis is focused on to providing general staff support and special- a “post-compliance ethic” as the benchmark for ized technical and analytical support. In many performance, when in reality, reaching a “com- cases, contractors become the organization’s pliance ethic” would have been a more appro- institutional knowledge in times of change priate threshold. He assumes that the defense among the senior leadership. establishment, acting as a nearly monolithic Finally, I found it curious that despite his whole, should have been prepared to accept the extensive research, Durant did not interview 109 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM many of the key decision-makers referred to in views with them; notably, he did not speak to the book. While making extensive use of sec- Sherri Goodman and Gary Vest, whose insights ondary materials and official documents, he reg- I believe would be central to understanding the ularly attributes strategies, beliefs, and actions opportunities for and impediments to greening to individuals without having conducted inter- the U.S. military. Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict Resolution Edited by Saleem H. Ali Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 377 pages. Reviewed by ROLAIN BOREL butions are too long and burdened by unneces- Rolain BorelÊ i>`ÃÊÌ iÊ i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ ÛÀiÌ]Ê*i>Vi]Ê>`Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ Ã>ÀÞÊ`}ÀiÃÃðÊÌ Õ} ÊÌ iÊ>ÀÌÞÊvÊÌ iÊ 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÀÊ*i>ViÊÊ ÃÌ>Ê,V>]ÊÜ iÀiÊ ÃÊ authors are from the United States, and only >ÊÌiÀiÃÌÃÊ>`ÊÌi>V }Ê`ÕÌiÃÊiÊÊÌ iÊ seven are from the Global South, the cases cover vi`ÊvÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊVvVÌÊÀiÃÕÌ° a wide geographical range. /ÜÊ>Êv>VÌÀÃÊiÝ«>ÊÌ iÊ}ÀÜ}ÊÌiÀ- iÃÌÊÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê«i>ViÊ«>ÀðÊiÊ>Ê and Charles Besançon claim it reflects on the In Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict growing commitment to bioregionalism and Resolution—brilliantly conceived and edited by the need to increase the geographic scale of ->iiÊ°ÊpΣÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊiÝ«ÀiÊÌ iÊÕÌ- conservation areas beyond national borders. ple ways in which environmental conservation On the other hand, Rosaleen Duffy argues zones can facilitate the resolution of territorial that peace parks are being promoted as a form VyVÌðÊÊVVÕ`iÃÊÜÌ Êº>ÊÃiÃiÊvÊ«Ì- of global environmental governance, reflect- mism” because the concept of international ing the wider shifts in global politics from peace parks (sometimes known as transbound- state governance to networks of international ary protected areas or trans-frontier conserva- À}>â>ÌðÊVVÀ`}ÊÌÊ ÕvvÞ]ÊÌ ÃÊ}ÛiÀ- ÌÊ>Ài>îÊÃÊiÝ«>`}ÊÀ>«`ÞÊ«°ÊÎ{£®°Ê/ iÊ nance model is also related to the “extension of £ÇÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊ}>Ì iÀi`ÊÊÌ ÃÊÛÕiÊà ÜÊ neoliberal market-oriented forms of economic that ecological factors have the potential to management”—i.e., revenues generated by eco- become instrumental in peacebuilding; how- ÌÕÀÃÊ«°ÊxÇ®°Ê ever, much of the evidence is not fully conclu- Several of the articles address territorial issues: sive, and the role of peace parks in international ,>ÕÊ i>ÊÃÌÀiÃÃiÃÊÌ >ÌʺÌiÀÀÌÀ>ÌÞÊ >ÃÊLiiÊ affairs remains in the realm of the possible, not the subtext for violent conflict” and that it is of the certain. “ironic that territory is now being turned on Peace Parks is both broad and deep: Part I its head as an instrument of peace” (p. 41). In provides a historical overview and methodolog- Ì iÀÊÀiëiVÌÛiÊV >«ÌiÀÃ]Ê]Ê V iiÊ-ÌiÛiÃ]Ê ical and theoretical perspectives; Part II presents and Ke Chong Kim point out that interna- cases of bioregional management and economic tional peace parks can act as physical buf- development in existing peace parks; and Part fers (e.g., the Sierra del Condor between Peru III offers several visions of future peace parks. and Ecuador; the demilitarized zone between 110 While most chapters are engaging, some contri- North and South Korea) or as sites of collab- ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 orative exchange (e.g., “the informal exchange of ing their impacts and attempting to separate information on elephant poaching and security Ì iÀÊivviVÌÃÊvÀÊÌ iÀÊyÕiViðÊÃÊ >>Ê >ÌÌiÀûÊLiÌÜiiÊ/>â>>Ê>`Ê â>LµÕi]Ê ,>ÕÌÃ`i>Ê>`ÊÊ«ÌÊÕÌ]ÊÌ iʺ«i>Vi»ÊÊ `iÃVÀLi`ÊLÞÊ,vÊ >`ÕÃÊiÌÊ>°ÊÊ«°Ê£Óx®° peace parks is not automatic, because it implies a / iÊ V>ÃiÊ vÊ Ì iÊ ÕÀÊ Ã>`Ã]Ê Ü V Ê iÊ purpose and an impact that are not always pres- between Japan and Russia, illustrates that ter- iÌ°ÊVVÀ`}ÊÌÊ>Ê>`Ê iÃ>X]ÊÃViÊ ritorial problems are unlikely to be “solved by peace parks represent the “confluence of several piling up historical arguments based on interna- mutually reinforcing interests, namely those tional law,” argues Jason Lambacher, who asserts of biodiversity conservation, economic devel- that a “new approach needs to unsettle nation- opment, cultural integrity, and regional peace alist thinking, and defuse historical grievances” and security,” integral assessment tools—such as well as offer a “form of political compromise >ÃÊÌ iÊ*i>ViÊ>`Ê yVÌÊ«>VÌÊÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ over the sovereignty issue” (p. 269). In fact, it * ®pVÕ`ÊLiÊ >ÀiÃÃi`ÊÌÊi>ÃÕÀiÊ«À}- would be irrelevant which country is formally ÀiÃÃÊÌÜ>À`ÊÃÕV ÊLÀ>`ÊLiVÌÛiÃÊ«°ÊÓx®°Ê/ iÊ `iÃ}>Ìi`ÊÌ iʺÜiÀ»ÊvÊÌ iÊÃ>`Ã]Ê>ÃÊÌÊ iÝ«iÀiViÊvÊÌ iÊÀi>ÌÊ ««Ê/À>ÃvÀÌiÀÊ environmental stewardship will require the oth- *>ÀÊ Ê ÃÕÌ iÀÊ vÀV>]Ê `ÃVÕÃÃi`Ê LÞÊ >Ê er’s cooperation. Spenceley and Michael Schoon, illustrates the For international peace parks to be effective, difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of such ViÀÌ>ÊV`ÌÃÊÕÃÌÊLiÊiÌ°Ê/ÜÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊ complex initiatives in economic, environmental, conclude that post-9/11 “security” measures and equity terms. pose, for example, a definite threat to interna- Chapter authors attribute many positive tional peace parks straddling the borders between impacts to existing peace parks, including: the United States and Canada or Mexico, in spite of a long history of cooperation between U Improving the effectiveness of biodiversity the countries. In less favorable situations, such conservation in protected areas; >ÃÊÌ iÊ«À«Ãi`Ê«i>ViÊ«>ÀÊÊv} >ÃÌ>½ÃÊ borders discussed by Stephan Fuller, the critical UÊ ÊSymbolizing ongoing cooperation (which, I security situation poses an almost insurmount- >À}Õi]ÊVÕ`Ê>ÃÊLiÊ>ÌÌÀLÕÌi`ÊÌÊÌÊivvÀÌÃÊ able obstacle. on many other issues, such as transportation, Border areas have their own peculiarities, a mail, or the electric grid); life of their own independent from the policies UÊ Changing the symbolic meaning of a border of the respective countries. In their chapter on (see chapter by Ramutsindela); and LiÀ>]ÊÀÌ ÕÀÊ Õ`iÊ>`Ê/ÞiÀÊ ÀÃÌiÊ point out that people on either side are often UÊ Ê,i`ÕV}Ê`«>ÌVÊÌiÃÃÊÌ ÀÕ} ÊÌÊ linked by kinship and marriage, as well as by ÌÀ}]ÊV>LÀ>ÌÛiÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê«ÀiVÌÃ]Ê local trade and culture. Relationships between ÀÊÌÊvÕ`}Ê«À«Ã>ÃÊÃiiÊV >«ÌiÀÊLÞÊ actors in the immediate vicinity of the bor- 9}ÞÕÌÊ/ÀÃÕÀ>ÌÊÊ`V >®° der are usually very fluid. In their report on the Selous-Niassa elephant corridor in East Several of the authors also identify negative vÀV>]Ê,vÊ >`ÕÃÊ>`Ê ÃÊV>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÃÌ>ÌiÊ «>VÌÃ°Ê Ê «ÌÃÊ ÕÌÊ Ì >ÌÊ ÕÃÌÊ >ÃÊ >Ì>Ê that border inhabitants more frequently share conservation efforts can create conflicts, so can common underdevelopment conditions than international peace parks. In addition to exacer- VyVÌðÊ/ iÀivÀi]ÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê«i>ViÊ«>ÀÃÊ bating political inequalities between local com- must not impose externally designed processes munities and state actors, international peace on local stakeholders. parks can emphasize disparities between coun- / iÊÃiV`ÊÃiVÌÊvÊPeace Parks assesses ÌÀiÃ]Ê ÌiÊ >Ê >`Ê iÃ>X°Ê ÃÃiÌÕÊ existing international peace parks by identify- À>j9>ÞjÊ>`Ê iÀÊV>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ`VÕiÌÊÌ iÊ 111 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM security threat posed by criminals who find the authors argue. However, Duffy contends that º7»Ê*i>ViÊ*>ÀÊÊ7iÃÌÊvÀV>Ê>ÊÃ>viÊ >ÛiÊvÀÊ efforts to decentralize and link up with local their activities. VÕÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊÕÃÌÊÜ`Ü`ÀiÃÃ}ÊvÀÊÌ« / iÊ V >«ÌiÀÃÊ Ê Ì iÊ L½ÃÊ Ì À`Ê ÃiVÌÊ down, market-oriented interventions by inter- identify proposed peace parks and their possible national bureaucracies. benefits. While all the proposals demonstrate ÃÊiÌi`Êi>ÀiÀ]Ê`ÀÃÊw`ÊÌ iÊÌiÀ- potential, the feasibility of several is question- national peace parks model attractive and may able—not due to lack of resources (as donor help galvanize the establishment of shared interest is high), but because of lack of politi- management between border communities, for V>ÊÌiÀiÃÌ°Ê/ ÃÊÃiVÌ]ÊÜ iÊëÀ}]ÊÃÊ which state governments are not well-equipped. weaker than the first two, because the feasibility For example, Blundell and Christie call on of implementing the proposed parks depends international partners to provide the funds heavily on external factors. for a proposed international peace park along ÊÕLiÀÊvÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÊÌ iÊ`vviÀiÌÊ Liberia’s borders in order to promote dialogue processes that have been and could be used LiÌÜiiÊ7iÃÌÊvÀV>ÊVÕÌÀið when creating an international peace park. ÊVVÕ`iÃÊÌ >ÌʺiÛÀiÌ>ÊV«iÀ>- Some level of decentralization is inherent— tion is both a result of conflict mitigation and and in itself problematic in most developing leading to conflict reduction itself, in a dialecti- VÕÌÀiÃ]Ê«ÌÃÊÕÌÊ À>j9>ÞjÊiÌÊ>°Ê/ iÊ cal process of a non-linear and complex series decision-making capacity of communities and of feedback loops in the conflict de-escalation a cooperation model driven by bottom-up process” (p. 6). Peace Parks is a must-read for technical and situational demands are critically anyone interested in transboundary conserva- important to the success of such efforts, some tion areas. People on the Move: Reducing the Impacts of Human Migration on Biodiversity By Judy Oglethorpe, Jenny Ericson, Richard E. Bilsborrow, and Janet Edmond Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund & Conservation International Foundation, 2007. 93 pages. Available online from http://www.panda.org Reviewed by JAMES D. NATIONS James D. Nations heads the Center for prompted and stymied by factors such as politi- -Ì>ÌiÊvÊÌ iÊ*>ÀÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ >Ì>Ê*>ÀÃÊ cal boundaries, population growth, and envi- ÃiÀÛ>ÌÊÃÃV>ÌÊÊ7>à }Ì]Ê °Ê ÀiÌ>Ê`>>}i°ÊÃÊÌ iÞÊÜÀÊÌÊ«ÀÌiVÌÊ iÊÃÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÊvÊThe Maya Tropical Forest: Earth’s biological diversity, conservation plan- People, Parks, and Ancient Cities 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ ners and practitioners must increasingly con- vÊ/iÝ>ÃÊ*ÀiÃÃ]ÊÓääÈ®°Ê sider the effects of human migration. In People on the Move: Reducing the Impacts of People have been migrating from one place to Human Migration on Biodiversity, co-authors Judy another since the first humans walked out of Oglethorpe, Jenny Ericson, Richard Bilsborrow, vÀV>ÊÌÊ>ÊÕViÀÌ>ÊvÕÌÕÀi°Ê"ÛiÀÊÌ iÊ- and Janet Edmond point out that “responding lennia, our movement has become increasingly to migration is a relatively new concept for the 112 complicated. Human migration today is both VÃiÀÛ>ÌÊÃiVÌÀ»Ê«°ÊÛ®°Ê/Ê i«ÊvVÕÃÊÌ ÃÊ ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 response, this book provides conservation plan- rural, and rural-to-rural migration, pointing out ners and protected area managers with an excel- that studies of rural-to-rural migration are less lent overview of contemporary human migra- prominent in the literature than the other types, tion, emphasizing its impacts on biodiversity. despite the fact that it can have the most serious / iÞÊÃÌÀiÃÃ]Ê ÜiÛiÀ]ÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÞʺÃiiÊÃÕÌÃÊ consequences for natural ecosystems. that work for people as well as the environment: In a chapter titled “Deciding Whether and for both local residents and, where possible, the How to Intervene,” the authors write that no single migrants themselves” (p. viii). blueprint can be applied “to prevent migration or People on the Move offers a clear, concise dis- >Û`ÊÌÃÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê«>VÌûʫ°ÊÓx®°Ê,>Ì iÀ]Ê cussion of the movement of human populations interventions must be carefully selected for each across landscapes and across international bor- ÃÌÕ>Ì°Ê/ ÃÊÜiVÃÌÀÕVÌi`ÊV >«ÌiÀÊÀiÛiÜÃÊ `iÀðÊÃÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ«ÌÊÕÌ]Ê>««ÀÝ>ÌiÞÊ interventions that may help conservation planners three million people migrate across interna- and protected area managers prevent migration, tional borders each year, and the number of influence its course, or reduce its adverse impacts internal migrants may be 100 times as large. ÊL}V>Ê`ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ>`ÊV>Ê««Õ>ÌðÊ/ iÊ / iÊL½ÃÊÃÕÀÛiÞÊVÛiÀÃÊ}ÀiV}âi`Êv>V- text is complemented by a detailed matrix of pos- tors in migration, such as growing populations sible migration interventions—from local to glob- and increasing natural disasters, but it also dis- al scales—that considers such factors as areas of cusses emerging issues, such as globalization, origin, areas of destination, armed conflict, poli- climate change, and the increasing number cies, and the parties involved. of civil wars in the last century. Most impor- ÃÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊ«ÌÊÕÌ]ÊPeople on the Move tantly, the authors provide documented case reviews “what’s in the tool kit” for confront- studies, maps, and graphs, as well as an action ing human migration in biodiversity-rich areas plan to improve our understanding of migra- «°ÊÓ®°Ê/ iÞÊ>VÜi`}iÊÌ >ÌʺÌÊÃÊÌÊi>ÀÞÊ tion and create effective approaches to mitigat- to draw conclusions about the most effective ing its impacts on the biological foundations interventions, because there are few docu- vÊ Õ>ÊviÊÊ >ÀÌ °ÊÃÊÌ iÞÊ`V>Ìi]ÊÌ iÀÊ mented examples and little monitoring of out- goal is to prompt “the development of practi- Viûʫ°Êxx®°ÊÜiÛiÀ]ÊÌ iÀÊ>VÌÊ«>ÊÃÊ cal tools and new approaches for conservation designed to remedy these gaps and help coun- practitioners in the future” (p. viii). ter the ecological problems human migration vÌiÀÊ`iv}Ê}À>ÌÊ>`ÊÕÌ}ÊÌÃÊ can cause. potential impacts, the authors dedicate the In sum, these nine brief chapters of well-writ- LÕÊvÊÌ iÊL½ÃÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊÌÊ£ÎÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊÊ ten text present a state-of-the-art guide to human } «ÀÀÌÞÊ>ÌÕÀ>Ê>Ài>ÃÊÊvÀV>]ÊÃ>]Ê>`Ê migration for conservation researchers, planners, >ÌÊiÀV>°Ê >V ÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊ«ÀiÃiÌÃÊÌ iÊv>V- >`Ê«À>VÌÌiÀðÊ/ iÊLÊVVÕ`iÃÊÜÌ Ê>Ê tors that prompted the migration, the resulting illustrated and annotated list of published and impacts on ecosystems and human populations, online resources in this too-long neglected field. and what, if any, attempts were made to alter the ÃÊ ««Õ>ÌÊ }ÀÜÌ ]Ê V>ÌiÊ V >}i]Ê >`Ê ÕÌVi°Ê/iÊvÊÌ iÃiÊV>ÃiÃÊÛÛi`ÊÃiÊvÀÊ civil unrest continue, People on the Move will of intervention that altered migratory patterns in help guide our search for viable solutions to the high-biodiversity environments or mitigated the environmental impacts of human migration. impact on natural ecosystems and local people. / iÊLÊÜÊLiÊÕÃivÕÊÌÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}VÊ«>iÀÃÊ /}iÌ iÀ]ÊÌ iÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊ«ÀÛ`iÊ>ÊiÝViiÌÊ and on-the-ground practitioners of biodiversity overview of the complex “push” and “pull” fac- conservation throughout the world, as well as tors that prompt individuals, families, and com- to researchers seeking to understand the causes munities to move from one location to another. and consequences of the increasing movement of / iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÊ>ÌÊÀÕÀ>ÌÕÀL>]ÊÕÀL>Ì human populations in the 21st century. 113 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Political Geography: Special Issue on Climate Change and Conflict Edited by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch Volume 26, Issue 6, August 2007. Reviewed by ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI Elizabeth L. ChaleckiÊÃÊ>Ê>`ÕVÌÊ«Àvià ÀÊÜ>ÃÊÌÊÌi`i`ÊÌÊLi°Ê/ iÊÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ ÃÀÊÊÌ iÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê-ÌÕ`iÃÊ«À}À>ÊvÊ V>ÌiÊV >}iÊ>`ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ>ÀiÊÕÃÌÊiiÀ}}Ê ÃÌÊ i}i°Ê- iÊÀiViÛi`Ê iÀÊ`VÌÀ as fertile ground for both security practitioners >ÌiÊvÀÊÌ iÊiÌV iÀÊ-V ÊvÊ >ÜÊ>`Ê and social scientists. Now, however, with world «>VÞÊ>ÌÊ/ÕvÌÃÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ]ÊvÀÊ iÀÊ`ÃÃiÀ policy attention focused on climate, they rightly Ì>Ì]ʺ/ iÊ " Ê7ÊÜ>ÞÃÊiÌÊ/ ÀÕ} \Ê Ó point out that these connections cannot be left >Ì>Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ>`Ê >ÌiÊ >}i°»Ê to tenuous connections in white papers. Nordås and Gleditsch recommend that future studies of the climate-conflict link should Given that the Nobel Committee awarded its better combine climate models and conflict ÓääÇÊ*i>ViÊ*ÀâiÊÌÊvÀiÀÊ1°-°Ê6ViÊ*ÀiÃ`iÌÊ models, and point out an inconvenient truth ÊÀiÊ>`ÊÌ iÊÌiÀ}ÛiÀiÌ>Ê*>iÊÊ >LÕÌÊÌ iÊ* ÊÀi«ÀÌÃ\Ê/ iÞÊÞÊ«iÀ« iÀ>ÞÊ Climate Change (IPCC), and that greenhouse address the implications of climate change for gas emissions continue to increase around the security and conflict. Nordås and Gleditsch also globe, practitioners of peace and security will maintain that further research on climate and have to familiarize themselves with climatic conflict should: `ÀÛiÀÃÊ vÊ VvVÌ°Ê/ÊÌ >ÌÊ i`]Ê Ì iÊ ÕÀ>Ê Political Geography has devoted an entire issue UÊ ÊDifferentiate between types of violence driv- to exploring the links between climate change en by climate change, including non-state and violent conflict. violence; In the issue’s opening article, “Climate UÊ ÊRecognize the capacity of humans to adapt Change and Conflict,” Ragnhild Nordås and to the positive and negative effects of cli- Nils Petter Gleditsch lament the lack of first- mate change; hand, peer-reviewed research on climate and UÊ />iÊÀi}>ÊÛ>À>ÌÃÊÌÊ>VVÕÌÆÊ>`Ê conflict, noting that “statements about secu- UÊ ÊFocus more on climate change’s security rity implications have so far largely been based implications for the world’s poor. on speculation and questionable sources” (p. ÈÓn®°Ê/ iÞÊVÌiÊÃiÊvÊÌ iÊÀiViÌÊ`VÕiÌÃÊ vÌiÀÊ Ì iÃiÊ VÃiÃiÊ ÀiVi`>- addressing this linkage, including the paper tions, Nordås and Gleditsch veer off course for the Department of Defense’s Office of Net with their assumption that the world is becom- ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊ-V Ü>ÀÌâÊEÊ,>`>]ÊÓääή]ÊÌ iÊ ing more peaceful and that the climate-conflict iÌiÀÊvÀÊ >Û>Ê>ÞÃýÊÓääÇÊÀi«ÀÌÊÜÀÌ- ViVÌÊ ÃÊ ºÃiv`iÞ}»Ê «°Ê ÈÎx®°Ê/ iÞÊ ten by retired military officers, two German point out that conflict models assume that reports (German Ministry of Environment, the future will look like the past, and they also ÓääÓÆÊ 7 1]Ê ÓääÇ®]Ê >`Ê Ì iÊ ÀiViÌÊ 1 Ê note that the “current trend toward a more -iVÕÀÌÞÊ ÕVÊ`iL>ÌiÊ1 ]ÊÓääÇ®]Ê>}Ê peaceful world” (a trend measured only since others. Nordås and Gleditsch are correct: Much the end of World War II) will not be reversed. 114 of this literature has not been peer-reviewed, However, the climate models, which have been ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 extensively developed and reviewed, predict the on migration, he adapts the standard migration iÝ>VÌÊ««ÃÌi\Ê/ iÊvÕÌÕÀiÊÜÊÌÊÊiÊÌ iÊ literature to the problem of environmental refu- past. If, as the authors recommend, climate and gees, and argues that populations can respond conflict models should be more tightly coupled, to environmental changes in one of three ways: then the climate models must lead the way. by staying and doing nothing; by staying and / iÊÃiV`Ê>ÀÌVi]ʺ >ÌiÊ >}i]ÊÕ>Ê mitigating the effects; or by leaving the area. Security, and Violent Conflict,” by Jon Barnett ,iÕÛiÞÊiÝ>iÃÊÎnÊV>ÃiÃÊÊÜ V ÊiÛ- >`Ê7°Ê iÊ`}iÀ]ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊ ronmental factors played a role in migration, poses risks to human security because “the more vÀÊ Ì iÊ ÕÃÌÊ ÜÊ Ê Ì iÊ £ÎäÃÊ 1Ìi`Ê people are dependent on climate-sensitive forms States to modern-day Bangladesh and Brazil. vÊ>ÌÕÀ>ÊV>«Ì>oÌ iÊÀiÊ>ÌÊÀÃÊÌ iÞÊ>ÀiÊvÀÊ Since less developed countries are more reliant climate change” (p. 641). However, this sensi- on the natural environment for their liveli- tivity is mitigated by social and political adap- hoods, they are more vulnerable to the effects tive capacity, which varies by region and era. In of climate change. Environmental factors that one of their most interesting observations, the “push” people to migrate include degrada- authors point out that climate change-driven tion of arable land, droughts, deforestation, v]Ê>ÃÊÌ iÊ stresses can have a cascading effect, with failure in water scarcity, floods, storms, and famines, all >ÕÌ ÀÃÊ one primary production sector causing a down- of which are predicted to intensify as the cli- stream industry to slow down, thus leading to a mate changes. Reuveny recognizes that envi- ÀiVi`]Ê market failure, etc. While intervening variables ronmental factors do not work in isolation, climate and are rightly identified, this cascade theory is still but argues that they nevertheless contribute particularly noteworthy because the independent significantly to migration episodes. However, conflict models variable of climate change is the primary driver. “climate refugees” alone do not engender con- à Õ`ÊLiÊÀiÊ >ÀiÌÌÊ>`Ê`}iÀ½ÃÊ>Êw`}ÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊV- flict; instead, conflict arises when migrants of a mate change will undermine human security different nationality or ethnicity move quickly Ì} ÌÞÊVÕ«i`]Ê in two key ways: by reducing the opportunities or in large numbers into countries that are people have to provide for themselves and thus themselves suffering from limited resources. then the constricting their livelihoods; and by eroding "vÊÌ iÊÎnÊ}À>ÌÊV>ÃiÃÊ,iÕÛiÞÊÃÌÕ`i`]Ê£Ê climate models state capacity to provide the services that sus- resulted in conflict. Ì>ÊÛi `ÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÀivÀiÊ«i>Vi°Ê/ iÞÊÀiV- Reuveny concludes that it will cost more ÕÃÌÊi>`ÊÌ iÊ ommend three paths for future research, which in the long term to do nothing about climate I believe would all help conceptually strengthen change-induced migration than it would to for- Ü>Þ° the climate-conflict link: mulate a policy for addressing the issue. Citing two examples of public policy interventions in UÊ ÊÃÃiÃÃÊÌ iÊÀi>ÌÛiÊÛÕiÀ>LÌÞÊvÊ«i«i½ÃÊ >ÀÊ}À>ÌÃ]Ê iÊVVÕ`iÃÊÌ >ÌÊ}ÛiÀ- livelihoods to climate change (by region); ment policy could help mitigate the effects of UÊ ÊConnect reduced livelihoods with violent climate change on conflict. However, he has no conflict (e.g., why do individuals choose specific policy recommendations for developed violence?); and countries, and warns of high costs without any UÊ ÊExamine how climate threatens state citations to back up his claims. Despite petering capacity. out at the end, Reuveny’s article is one of the more straightforward examinations of the links Rafael Reuveny, in “Climate Change-Induced between climate and conflict in the volume. Migration and Violent Conflict,” notes that In “Climate Change, Environmental climate-induced migration appears in many cli- i}À>`>Ì]Ê>`ÊÀi`Ê yVÌ]»Ê >` Ê >ÌiÊV >}iÌÛiViÊÃVi>ÀðÊvÌiÀÊÃÌÕ`Þ- Raleigh and Henrik Urdal report on their sta- ing the effects of other environmental problems tistical analysis of three climate change effects: 115 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM cropland degradation, freshwater scarcity, and vÀV>]»Ê ÕiÊi`ÀÝÊ>`Ê->À> Ê>ÃiÀÊ>À}ÕiÊ ««Õ>ÌÊ`ë>ViiÌ°Ê/ iÞÊ>««i`Ê`>Ì>Ê Ì >ÌÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>ÊÃÊiëiV>ÞÊÛÕiÀ>LiÊÌÊ on these variables over grid squares of 100 km the conflict-provoking effects of climate change, x 100 km across the Earth’s surface, and then due to existing inequalities in resource access and overlaid intervening variables, including eco- distribution. However, Hendrix and Glaser find nomic and political factors like GDP and pol- no significant correlation between rainfall and ity scores. Raleigh and Urdal stress that more the onset of civil war, though they do recognize information can be gained by looking at sub- that the country-wide spatial scales they used national regions than from national averages, could mask local hotspots. since not all of a country’s territory is usually In “Environmental Influences on Pastoral under conflict at once, nor do environmental yVÌÊÊÌ iÊÀÊvÊvÀV>]»Ê*>ÌÀVÊ iiÀ]Ê stressors fall neatly within national boundar- Doug Bond, and Joe Bond cross-reference con- ies. Hence, local resource scarcity may be a flict data gathered from on-the-ground observ- better predictor of conflict than national-lev- ers in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda el scarcity. Most of their findings underscore with environmental indicators such as veg- the conventional wisdom that environmental etation, precipitation, and forage (pasture for stressors are indirect drivers of conflict, but grazing) in an attempt to determine whether they do find, surprisingly, that “degradation the latter might serve as possible harbingers of and scarcity variables are uniformly positively «>ÃÌÀ>ÊVyVÌ°Ê/ iÞÊw`ÊÌ >ÌÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê and significantly related to conflict” in higher- drivers are significantly correlated with the inci- income countries and less so in lower-income dence of organized pastoral raids, but not with states (pp. 688, 691). the number of human deaths or the amount of / iÊV>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÀiV}âiÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÀÊ>>Þ- livestock lost. sis suffers from one of the key weaknesses of ÊÌ iÃiÊ>ÀÌViÃÊVVÕ`iÊÌ >ÌÊVyVÌÊÃÊ>Ê ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>ÞL>Ãi`ÊViVÌÕÀiÃÊ>LÕÌÊÀi>ÊÜÀ`Ê complex dependent variable, and that envi- iÛiÌÃ\Ê/ iÊÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>Êi>ÊvÌiÊ `iÃÊÃÕLÃÌ>- ronmental measures of climate change do not tial regional or temporal variations. Conversely, provide sufficient explanatory power without the exclusion of information about one coun- taking into account intervening political and try or region can make an otherwise significant economic variables. In addition, most authors result statistically insignificant. For example, lament the incompleteness of the available data Raleigh and Urdal determine that omitting sets, which is only to be expected; many coun- data about Russia from one model negates the tries do not have the inclination or the where- connection between land degradation, water withal to gather and compile sub-national data scarcity, and conflict. Similarly, omitting data sets on environmental variables, and interna- about Niger from another model renders the tional agencies usually gather data only at the interaction between water scarcity and popula- national level. ÌÊ}ÀÜÌ ÊÃ}wV>Ì°Ê9iÌÊÌÊÃÊÌÊ`vwVÕÌÊ I have two main concerns with this issue. to imagine that, on a very local scale, these driv- First, the authors overuse the principle of cet- ers would be compelling. Just because a large- erus paribus—all other things being equal. But N study does not find a statistically significant when are all other things ever equal? Such a relationship between two variables across an relationship is a statistical convenience and does entire sample does not mean that the relation- ÌÊÀiyiVÌÊÌ iÊÀi>ÊÜÀ`°ÊÌÌ>V }ÊÌÊÕV Ê ship might prove different if examined on a weight to the existence of a statistical relation- case-by-case basis. ship can shut down profitable avenues of inqui- / iÊ>ÃÌÊÌÜÊ>ÀÌViÃÊÊÌ iÊÃÃÕiÊvVÕÃÊÊ ry into particular problems, especially if they do vÀV>°Êʺ/Ài`ÃÊ>`Ê/À}}iÀÃ\Ê >Ìi]Ê >ÌiÊ not occur on a macro level. If statistical correla- 116 Change, and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan tion is what Nordås and Gleditsch mean when ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 they look for “more rigorous analysis,” then References they could miss the forest for the trees. Second, these articles generally appear iÌiÀÊvÀÊ >Û>Ê>ÞÃÃÊ ®°ÊÓääÇ®°ÊNational secu- to conflate the ideas of conflict and security, rity and the threat of climate change. iÝ>`À>]Ê6\Ê Ê À«À>Ì°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://secu- assuming that if a region or nation is free from rityandclimate.cna.org conflict, then by definition it must be secure. German Ministry of Environment. (2002). Climate / ÃÊ>ÃÃÕ«ÌÊÃÊv>ÕÌÞ]Ê>ÃÊ>Ê>ÌÊ`iÃÊÌÊ change and conflict: Environmental policy. Bonn, have to engage in conflict in order to be inse- Germany: Federal Ministry for the Environment, VÕÀi°Ê/ iÊÀiViÌÊ>`ÊÃÌ>ÀÌ}Ê`>Ì>ÊÊÀVÌVÊViÊ >ÌÕÀiÊ ÃiÀÛ>Ì]Ê ÕVi>ÀÊ->viÌÞ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ at www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ melt provides a sterling example of an emerg- climges.pdf ing area of insecurity for many circumpolar -V Ü>ÀÌâ]Ê*iÌiÀ]ÊEÊ Õ}Ê,>`>°ÊÓääή°ÊAn abrupt nations that has not (yet) devolved into con- climate change scenario and its implications for flict, whereas the pastoral conflict that Meier, United States National Security. Washington, DC: Bond, and Bond examine does not rise to the ÛÀiÌ>Ê i`>Ê-iÀÛViðÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÜÜÜ°iðÀ}ÉV>ÌiÉ«iÌ>}ÚV>ÌiÚV >}i° level of a national security threat (though they html#report do not claim that it does). 1Ìi`Ê >ÌðÊÓääÇ®°ÊSecurity Council holds first-ever What the scholarly literature on climate and debate on impact of climate change, 5663rd meeting. conflict needs now is not more theory or more iÜÊ9À\Ê1Ìi`Ê >ÌÃ]Ê i«>ÀÌiÌÊvÊ*ÕLVÊ attempts at statistical correlation, but opportu- Information. 7 1°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê7iÌÊÊ7>`iÊiÊ-V iÀ iÌÃÀÃÊ nities to test out the existing theories on a sub- Klimawandel [World in transition and climate change >Ì>ÊÃV>i°Ê/ ÃÊÃÃÕiÊvÊPolitical Geography >ÃÊ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÀÃR°Ê iÀ]ÊiÀ>Þ\ÊiÀ>Ê`ÛÃÀÞÊ has opened the door to an upcoming and ÕVÊÊL>Ê >}i°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp:// important field of research. ÜÜÜ°ÜL}Õ°`iÉÜL}ÕÚ}ÓääÇÚi}°«df Population, Land Use, and Environment: Research Directions Edited by Barbara Entwistle and Paul C. Stern Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005. 321 pages. Reviewed by DAVID L. CARR ÃÊÃiiÊvÀÊë>Vi]Ê>`ÊVÛiÀÊV >}iÊÃÊv>ÀÊ>`Ê David CarrÊvÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ >vÀ>]Ê away the signature imprint of human habita- ->Ì>Ê >ÀL>À>]Ê >ÃÊÃiÀÛi`Ê>ÃÊ«ÀV«>ÊÛià tion on the surface of the Earth. What is driv- Ì}>ÌÀÊÊ}À>ÌÃÊvÀÊ -]ÊÌ iÊ >Ì>Ê ing changes in land use and the environment? ÃÌÌÕÌiÃÊvÊi>Ì ]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ >Ì>Ê-ViViÊ What is the role of population? In addressing Õ`>Ì]Ê>`Ê >ÃÊ>ÕÌ Ài`ÊÀiÊÌ >ÊxäÊ these questions, Population, Land Use, and «ÕLV>ÌÃÊÊ>`ÊÕÃiÉVÛiÀÊV >}i]Ê«À Environment presents the goals and research ÌiVÌi`Ê>Ài>Ã]Ê}À>Ì]ÊviÀÌÌÞ]Ê>`Ê i>Ì Ê directions of the National Research Council’s in the tropics. (NRC) Panel on New Research on Population and the Environment along with state-of-the- >ÀÌÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iðÊ/ iÊÌ ÀiiÊÃiVÌÃÊvÊÌ ÃÊÛ- Stern, focus on land use or land cover change ume, edited by Barbara Entwistle and Paul C. where population is a prominent driving force. 117 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM / iÊwÀÃÌÊÃiVÌÊÀiÛiÜÃÊÌ iÊÃÌ>ÌiÊvÊÜi`}iÊ UÊ Ê/ iÊ`iÌwV>ÌÊvÊ } ÞÊivviVÌÛiÊiV >- in the field; the second recommends research nisms to facilitate interdisciplinary research. directions; and the third features 10 papers rep- resenting current research trends. How to increase coordination is hotly debated / iÊi`ÌÀÃÊvÊPopulation, Land Use, and among human-environment scholars, but such Environment observe that recent investigations controversy aside, coordination is crucial to have expanded our understanding of the influ- >V iÛ}Ê ÃÌVÊ«ViðÊ/ iÊÃiV`ÊÀiV- ence of human population on the environment mendation may understate the role of other fac- to a host of factors beyond mere population tors, particularly economics. Exploring cross-scale growth, including migration, population densi- ÌiÀ>VÌÃÊÀi>ÃÊ>Ê>ÀÊV >i}i]ÊÜ V ÊÃÊ ÌÞ]Ê>`Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi°Ê/ iÞÊÕ`iÀÃÌ>Ìi]Ê«iÀ >«Ã]Ê admirably if incompletely addressed in many of the fact that population variables by themselves the research papers included in the volume. rarely emerge as overwhelmingly predominant Developing linked datasets is a key step in forces driving land-use change; much more moving beyond disaggregated local case stud- commonly, they operate in tandem with socio- ies and large-scale regional and global efforts economic, political, and ecological processes. informed by unreliable or inconsistent data. More than a decade of research on popula- For example, we could leverage the compara- tion-environment interactions has produced tive advantage of existing large-scale surveys studies tracking population, land use, and that cover areas of dynamic human-envi- environment dynamics over several (or more) ÀiÌÊ ÌiÀ>VÌÃÊ ÃÕV Ê >ÃÊ Ì iÊ 1- Þi>ÀÃÊ Ê `ÛiÀÃiÊ }i}À>« VÊ Ài}Ã°Ê / iÃiÊ sponsored Demographic and Health Surveys ÀiÃi>ÀV Ê «ÀiVÌÃÊ ÜiÀiÊ V>Ì>Þâi`Ê LÞÊ Ì>À}iÌi`Ê -®°Ê`Û>ViÃÊÊÛiÊÌiV µÕiÃÊÃÕV Ê>ÃÊ land use/cover change funding mechanisms agent-based modeling, spatial and hierarchical and the emergence of international research statistical approaches, and the integration of networks, including the international Land methods from the physical and social sciences 1ÃiÉ >`Ê ÛiÀÊ >}iÊ*ÀiVÌÊ>`ÊÌÃÊÃÕV- have furthered efforts to model causal rela- ViÃÃÀ]ÊÌ iÊL>Ê >`Ê*ÀiVÌ]Ê ÃÌi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ Ìà «Ã°Ê``Ì>ÊÃÞiÀ}ÞÊÃÊ«ÀÃi`ÊLÞÊ International Human Dimensions Programme funding mechanisms of the National Science on Global Environmental Change (IHDP) Foundation and the National Institute of Child and the International Geosphere-Biosphere Health and Human Development, which pro- Program. Importantly, such research has also mote cross-disciplinary research and integrated been enhanced by technological innovations VÕÀÀVÕ>°Ê / iÊ iiÀ}iViÊ vÊ ÃV >ÀÞÊ iÌ- in remote sensing from space. Population, Land works and institutions such as IHDP and the Use, and Environment offers seven recommen- Population-Environment Research Network dations for researchers in the field, including: (PERN) has also facilitated such interdisci- «>ÀÞÊÜÀ°ÊÃÊÀiÊÀiÃi>ÀV ÊvÕ`}ÊÛiÃÊ UÊ ÊIncreased coordination; toward climate change mitigation and adapt- UÊ Ê/ iÊ iÝ>>ÌÊ vÊ V>ÕÃ>Ê Ài>Ìà «ÃÊ ability, funders should be reminded that land- among specific component factors of popu- use change is intimately associated with climate lation, land use, and environment; outcomes and their impact on human and nat- UÊ Ê/ iÊVL}ÊvÊ««Õ>Ì]Ê>`ÊÕÃi]Ê>`Ê ural systems. environmental variables; / iÊ Ì À`Ê >`Ê v>Ê ÃiVÌÊ vÊ Population, UÊ Ê/ iÊiÝ«À>ÌÊvÊVÀÃÃÃV>iÊÌiÀ>VÌÃÆÊ Land Use, and Environment presents 10 research UÊ Ê/ iÊ`iÛi«iÌÊvÊi`Ê`>Ì>ÃiÌÃÆÊ papers that exemplify recent population and UÊ ÊIncreased efforts to model and quantify >`ÕÃiÊÀiÃi>ÀV °Ê/ÜÊ«>«iÀÃÊvVÕÃÊÊ>}ÀVÕ- causal relationships among population, land tural frontiers with dramatic population and for- 118 use, and environment; and est cover change. “Population and Environment ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Ê >â>\Ê >`ÃV>«iÊ >`Ê ÕÃi `Ê was enabled by agricultural intensification and Dynamics” by Emilio F. Moran, Eduardo S. attendant enhancement of agricultural yields. Brondizio, and Leah K. VanWey challenges “Global and Case-Based Modeling of Population the orthodoxy of a linear relationship between and Land Use Change” by Gunther Fischer and population size and deforestation. Survey and Brian C. O’Neill asks the important question of land-cover data from multiple years demonstrate how case study research can best inform global non-linear relationships between demographic analyses, concluding that spatially explicit analy- variables, land use, and primary and secondary ses at a large regional scale are most suitable. vÀiÃÌÃÊ Ê Ì iÊ À>â>Ê >â°Ê º*«Õ>ÌÊ “Beyond Population Size: Examining >}iÊ>`Ê >`ÃV>«iÊ Þ>VÃ\Ê/ iÊ >}Ê ÌÀV>ÌiÊ ÌiÀ>VÌÃÊ }Ê *«Õ>ÌÊ ,}]Ê/ >>`]Ê-ÌÕ`iûÊLÞÊ-Ìi« iÊ°Ê7>à ÊiÌÊ Structure, Land Use, and Environment in al. integrates time-series data of remote images Wolong Nature Reserve, China” by Jianguo Liu with socio-economic and demographic surveys. et al. addresses a socio-political conundrum fac- Similarly pioneering methods are employed ing protected areas throughout the world: How in “Economies, Societies, and Landscapes in can policies mitigate human impacts on eco- /À>ÃÌ\Ê Ý>«iÃÊ vÀÊ Ì iÊ *i>ÀÊ ,ÛiÀÊ }V>ÊÃÞÃÌiöÊ/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÃÕ}}iÃÌÊÌ >ÌÊÀi- / iÊVÛiÀÃÊ Delta, China, and the Red River Delta, cating young people out of the Wolong Nature Vietnam” by Karen C. Seto, which investi- Reserve is more socially acceptable than relocat- of forests to gates economic and political policies that could ing other groups, while also being more ecologi- >}ÀVÕÌÕÀiÊLÞÊ «>VÌÊ>`ÕÃiÊV >}iÊ>`ÊÕÀL>â>Ì°Ê/ÜÊ cally effective and economically efficient. other studies investigate urban land-use change. “People, Land Use, and Environment in ÀÕÀ>Ê«i«iÊ º/ iÊ1ÀL>Ê V}ÞÊvÊ iÌÀ«Ì>Ê* iÝ\Ê Ì iÊ9>µÕÊ6>iÞ]Ê-À>]Ê iÝV»ÊLÞÊ*>i>Ê ÃÌÊi>ÛiÃÊÌ iÊ Ê >LÀ>ÌÀÞÊvÀÊÌiÀ`ÃV«>ÀÞÊ-ÌÕ`Þ»ÊLÞÊ Matson et al. presents cross-disciplinary work Charles L. Redman highlights historical, demo- incorporating land-use and management deci- >À}iÃÌÊ Õ>Ê graphic, and socio-economic factors in urban- sions from the bio-geochemical cycle to farm- footprint on ization and its effects on agricultural land, iÀÃ½Ê `iVÃ>}Ê «ÀViÃÃiðÊ/ iÊ «ÀiVÌÊ biodiversity, and human-environment nutrient pioneers the combination of various scales the Earth’s flows, demonstrating the importance of inte- and data sources within a vulnerability and grating multiple scales in studies of human and ÀiÃiViÊvÀ>iÜÀ°ÊÌ iÀÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÊv>À- ÃÕÀv>Vi]ÊÜÌ Ê natural systems. “Patterns of Urban Land Use ing systems, “Population and Environment in VÃiµÕiViÃÊ >ÃÊÃÃiÃÃi`ÊLÞÊ->ÌiÌiÊ>}iÀÞ\ÊÊ««V>ÌÊ the U.S. Great Plains” by Myron P. Gutmann to Cairo, Egypt” by John R. Weeks, Dennis et al. uses county-level data to investigate rural LÌ ÊÕÀÕÃÊ P. Larson, and Debbie L. Fugate develops an population change, cropland expansion, and “urban index” through the use of remote sensing soil chemistry changes across the U.S. farm belt >`ÊLiiÛiÌ°Ê to pick up signals that can be used to estimate during the past century. the percent of land surface that is impervious to While each study incorporates elements of water (e.g., pavement and buildings). the panel’s research agenda, they incompletely /ÜÊ«>«iÀÃÊ iÝ>iÊ ««Õ>Ì>`Ê ÕÃiÊ integrate social and natural sciences across tem- Ài>ÌÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ>Ì>ÊiÛiÊÊÃ>°ÊºÊ,iÛiÜÊ «À>Ê>`Êë>Ì>ÊÃV>iðÊ/ iÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊ>ÀiÊ>ÊÃÃ- vÊ£äÊ9i>ÀÃÊvÊ7ÀÊÊ VVÊÀÜÌ Ê>`Ê ing a Meso-scale link between local and region- *«Õ>ÌÊ >}iÊÊ,ÕÀ>Ê`>»ÊLÞÊ`ÀiÜÊ al, economic and political land-use policies, Foster matches survey data from several thou- proving that the field remains in its infancy. Ã>`Ê ÕÃi `ÃÊ>VÀÃÃÊ`>ÊLiÌÜiiʣǣÊ>`Ê Nevertheless, the editors and researchers dem- 1999 with concomitant satellite data. Research onstrate the previous decade’s remarkable prog- suggests that continued high fertility, popula- ress and fruitful avenues for further growth. tion growth, and increased road access accom- Challenges facing future research include link- panied modest but notable reforestation, which ing social and environmental data, collecting 119 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM data at the appropriate levels of resolution, rural population change and urban consump- comparing data across sites and time, and mov- tion on rural systems remain the primary driv- ing from descriptive studies to those that can iÀÃÊvÊ>`ÕÃiÊV >}i°ÊÃÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê>}i`>ÃÊà vÌÊ reasonably find causality. Moreover, even in towards climate change, human vulnerability, light of recent strides, interdisciplinary collabo- urbanization, and aging, the conversion of forests ration remains a challenge. to agriculture by rural people still leaves the larg- Climate change has emerged as the topic du est human footprint on the Earth’s surface, with jour, and human population and land-use inter- VÃiµÕiViÃÊLÌ ÊÕÀÕÃÊ>`ÊLiiÛiÌ°Ê >VÌÃÊ>ÀiÊLÌ Ê>ÀÊV>ÕÃiÃÊvÊ}Àii ÕÃiÊ}>ÃiÃÊ / iÊ«ÀÛi`ÊÕ`iÀÃÌ>`}ÊvÊÌ iÊViVÌÊ >`ÊÛ>LiÊ>ÛiÕiÃÊvÀÊÌ iÀÊÀi`ÕVÌ°ÊÌÊ>ÊÌiÊ between human activity and environmental con- when urbanization and aging have replaced rural cerns demonstrated in Population, Land Use, and population growth and youthful population the Environment, which synthesizes more than a structures as the most-discussed demographic decade of population-land use research, is both trends of the new millennium, the demands of exciting and daunting. Poverty Reduction: An Effective Means of Population Control By Mohammed Sharif London: Ashgate, 2007. 184 pages. Reviewed by RACHEL NUGENT Rachel NugentÊÃÊ`i«ÕÌÞÊ`ÀiVÌÀÊvÊÌ iÊ topic to the sidelines of most of the important iÌiÀÊvÀÊL>Ê iÛi«i̽ÃÊL>Ê development discussions of our day. i>Ì Ê*À}À>ðÊ- iÊ >ÃÊÓxÊÞi>ÀÃÊvÊiÝ«iÀ Fertility decisions are driven by a compli- iViÊ>ÃÊ>Ê`iÛi«iÌÊiVÃÌÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊ cated set of social, economic, cultural, and *«Õ>ÌÊ,iviÀiViÊ ÕÀi>Õ]ÊÌ iÊ}>ÀÌÞÊ technological conditions that are difficult to ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê iÌiÀÊvÊÌ iÊ1°-°Ê >Ì>Ê sort out. Government policy may be a minor ÃÌÌÕÌiÃÊvÊi>Ì ]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊ1 Ê`Ê>`Ê influence on the fertility component of popula- }ÀVÕÌÕÀiÊ"À}>â>Ì]Ê>}ÊÌ iÀð tion growth, but in some places and times it can be an important agent of change, even simply by changing decisions at the margin. However, Population policy in developing countries it is not easy to measure the impact of govern- has long been a controversial topic, not least ment policy—or any other factors—on fertility. because the vast amount of research devoted to / iÀivÀi]ÊÀiÃi>ÀV Ê >ÃÊLiiÊÃiÌiÃÊVÌÀ>- understanding the key determinants of fertility dictory, sometimes inconclusive, and the stron- behavior has been inconclusive. In addition, gest results are highly site- and program-specific because population raises sensitive and ideo- Ãii]Êi°}°]Ê,LÃÊEÊ,ÃÃ]ÊÓääÇÆÊ-V ÕÌâ]Ê logical issues, population policy has been mired £Ç®°ÊÊPoverty Reduction: An Effective Means Ê«ÌV>Ê`iL>ÌiðÊ/ iÊVL>ÌÊvÊÃÜÊ of Population Control, Mohammed Sharif progress in both the research and policy spheres attempts to use both theoretical and empiri- on the role of population growth in develop- cal analysis to take a fresh look at the topic. ment, and what governments should do to Unfortunately, the book is contradictory and influence that growth, has pushed this crucial inconclusive—and certainly not fresh. 120 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Until very recently, policy advocates and his book to cross-country regression analysis researchers seemed to agree that high rates of intended to demonstrate that poor people may population growth adversely affect development be acting rationally in choosing large fami- and poverty, and that family planning policies lies. Unfortunately, the analysis presented is are important tools of development assistance. largely undermined by the failure of his data Recently, however, attention to international and methodology to adequately answer “what population issues has declined alarmingly, causes what?” stemming from a combination of complacency Sharif compiled data on poverty and related (due to lower population growth in some coun- Û>À>LiÃÊvÀÊnÎÊ`iÛi«}ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊvÀÊÛ>À- tries) and a paucity of effective tools to meet the ous UN sources to test multiple specifications ongoing twin challenges of poverty reduction of his model. With countries as the unit of anal- and fertility reduction (Cleland et al., 2006; ysis, he finds that high fertility is not a cause of Ü>Ì]Ê7>}ÃÌ>vv]ÊEÊ9>âLiV]ÊÓää{®° poverty, and illiteracy is not causally related to While fertility has declined in many develop- contraceptive prevalence. Sharif concludes that ing countries, and most of the developed world the fertility choices of poor developing-country is experiencing stagnant or declining popula- citizens are rational, and argues by implication tions, the “population problem” is not solved. that international family planning advocates In 16 developing countries, total fertility rates have failed because they have not understood The highest exceed 6.0, and low contraceptive prevalence is poor families’ choices and decision-making >Ê>ÀÊL>ÀÀiÀÊÌÊ`iÛi«iÌÊ*, ]ÊÓään®°Ê processes. Half of Sharif’s message is certainly viÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊ Fifty-five countries have fertility rates of 4.0 right: Poor people are rational. But they are }iiÀ>ÞÊvÕ`Ê and higher. Depending on death rates in those also extremely constrained in their choices, countries, this implies their populations will >VViÃÃÊÌÊvÀ>Ì]Ê>`ÊÌiÊ ÀâðÊÃÊ>Ê among the `ÕLiÊÊ£ÇÊÞi>ÀÃÊÀÊiÃðÊ>Þ]ÊÊÌ iÃiÊ>`Ê result, their choices may not be optimal—for other developing countries, the highest fertil- themselves or society. Sharif does not explore poorest fifth of ity rates are generally found among the poorest this possibility, and therefore the book does not Ì iÊ««Õ>Ì° wvÌ ÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>Ì°Ê/ ÕÃ]ÊÌ iʵÕiÃÌÊvÊ advance our knowledge of what policies would population growth and its relationship to pov- be useful in reducing these constraints. erty is not inconsequential, leaving substantial Setting aside the book’s polemics attacking room for debate about appropriate policies. international family planning advocates, Sharif’s Mohammed Sharif’s book takes us back to cross-country analysis of the determinants of an earlier time by re-opening the debate about poverty suffers from measurement and econo- whether family planning is good for poor fami- metric issues—not the least of which is the lies. Sharif’s main arguments are that high fer- problem of intervening variables. No reasonable tility is a rational, often beneficial choice for person doubts that poverty affects childbearing poor families; and that poverty makes a higher decisions in a household, and that numbers of number of children desirable. He concludes children affect a household’s likelihood of being that only reductions in poverty will bring down impoverished—but many other variables inter- fertility rates among the poor. Sharif examines vene as well. Researchers have spent years trying these assertions empirically, and then derives to specify models in which fertility choice can policy implications from the results. be isolated from the variables that determine Researchers on this topic have always faced Ì°Ê9iÌÊ- >ÀvÊVÌiÃÊ>ÃÌÊiÊvÊÌ iÊÛÕ- the challenge of demonstrating a direct causal nous empirical and methodological literature in relationship between poverty and fertility. this area (e.g., Birdsall et al., 2001; Eastwood Many correlates of poverty are also associated EÊ «Ì]Ê£ÆÊ-V ÕÌâ]ÊÓääxÆÊ Û >VVÊEÊ with high fertility rates. How do we know iÊ->ÌÃ]ÊÓää{ÆÊ"ÝvÀ`]Ê£{®°Ê`ÊÃiÊvÊ what causes what? Sharif devotes much of his results are anomalous; for example, he finds 121 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM that—in addition to fertility—urbanization upon than earlier population policy researchers, and illiteracy have no effect on poverty. Sharif has not made headway in the analytical It is difficult to compare Sharif’s data and challenges of separating determinants of fertility results with other studies. For his preliminary from those of poverty and other related factors. assessment of poor people’s rationality, he relies Most observers would not doubt Sharif’s on (quite old) data from the government of assertions that there are close links between Bangladesh, even while noting its poor reliabili- fertility and his selected variables. Where ty. He uses the UN Statistics Division for cross- they would part from him is in accepting the country data, but not the Demographic and anomalous results of his econometric analy- Health Surveys for important variables such as sis, and in deriving policy conclusions from unmet need, which is commonly defined as the those inconsistent and confusing relationships. percentage of women or couples who wish to Policymakers will obtain little guidance in find- postpone or avoid pregnancy but who do not ing the road ahead from this backward look at use contraception. population policy. What causes high fertility? Sharif calculates both poverty and fertility as functions of inde- pendent variables, and then in the second stage References estimates each as a function of the predicted À`Ã>]Ê >VÞ]ÊiÊ °Ê iiÞ]ÊEÊ-ÌiÛiÊ-`}°Ê value of the other. He finds that fertility and (2001). Population matters. Oxford: Oxford poverty are negatively related. He interprets this University Press. Cleland, Bernstein, et al. (2006). “Family planning: finding to mean that children serve as assets for / iÊÕwà i`Ê>}i`>°»ÊThe Lancet 368, 1810- poor, rural families and are therefore desired. £nÓÇ°Ê / ÕÃ]Ê iÊVVÕ`iÃÊÌ >ÌÊ } ÊviÀÌÌÞÊÃÊÌÊ >ÃÌÜ`]Ê,LiÀÌ]ÊEÊ V >iÊ «Ì°Ê£®°Êº/ iÊ only a rational, but also a beneficial choice for impact of changes in human fertility on poverty,” poor people. The Journal of Development Studies 36£®]Ê£Îä° Ü>Ì]Ê >Û`ÃÊ,°]Ê`>Ê7>}ÃÌ>vv]ÊEÊL`Ê Sharif acknowledges that family plan- 9>âLiV°Ê `î°ÊÓää{®°ÊReaching the poor ning programs have increased contraceptive with health, nutrition, and population services. use across the world, but points out that the Washington DC: World Bank. increase is found largely among the well-off in Livi-Bacci, Massimo, & Gustavo De Santis. (2004). developing countries, and not among the poor. Population and poverty in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. He faults the UN Population Fund for pushing Oxford, Cassen. (Ed.) (1994). Population and develop- family planning as the solution to high fertility, ment: Old debates, new conclusions. New Brunswick, and recommends that policymakers focus on \Ê/À>Ã>VÌÊ*ÕLà iÀð other factors that underlie poverty. Population Reference Bureau (PRB). (2008). World In these conclusions, Sharif may be half- population data sheet 2008. Washington, DC: PRB. right. It is reasonable to push for poverty reduc- ,LÃ]Ê7>ÀÀiÊ °ÊEÊ Ê°Ê,ÃÃÊ `ð®°ÊÓääÇ®°Ê The global family planning revolution. Washington, tion through a multi-pronged approach that DC: World Bank. addresses underlying causes. No country or -V ÕÌâ]Ê/°Ê*>հʣǮ°º/ iÊ`i>`ÊvÀÊV `ÀiÊÊ global policymaker would dispute the impor- low-income countries.” In Mark R. Rosenzweig & tance of that goal. But what is the policy les- Oded Stark (Eds.), Handbook of population and family son from his finding that high fertility reduces economicsÊ««°ÊÎ{{Îä®°ÊÃÌiÀ`>\Ê ÀÌ Ê>`° -V ÕÌâ]Ê/°Ê*>Õ°ÊÓääx®°ÊEffects of fertility decline «ÛiÀÌÞ¶Ê`Ê ÜÊÕV ÊV>ÊÜiÊÀiÞÊÊÌ >ÌÊ on family well-being: Opportunities for evaluat- finding? Unfortunately, despite the benefit of a ing population programs.Ê iÜÊ>Ûi]Ê /\Ê9>iÊ much stronger intellectual foundation to draw University. 122 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 The Price of Neglect: From Resource Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom By Bishnu Raj Upreti Kathmandu, Nepal: Bhrikuti Academic Publications, 2004. 446 pages. Reviewed by SALEEM H. ALI Ì Õ} ÊÃÕÀÀÕ`i`ÊLÞÊVyVÌÊÛiÀÊÌ iÊ>ÃÌÊ Saleem H. Ali is an associate professor of two centuries, the Himalayan nation of Nepal iÛÀiÌ>ÊÃÌÕ`iÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ has been resilient in the face of colonialism. 6iÀ̽ÃÊ,ÕLiÃÌiÊ-V ÊvÊ >ÌÕÀ>Ê ÛiÊ`ÕÀ}ÊÌ iÊ ÀÌà Ê,>]ÊÌ iÊviÕ`>ÊÀÕiÀÃÊvÊ ,iÃÕÀViÃ]Ê>`ÊÃÊÊÌ iÊ>`ÕVÌÊv>VÕÌÞÊ Nepal managed to stay relatively independent vÊ ÀÜÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞ½ÃÊ7>ÌÃÊÃÌÌÕÌiÊvÀÊ by offering diplomatic and military support to ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê-ÌÕ`iðÊÃÊÃÌÊÀiViÌÊi`Ìi`Ê the British. However, for 10 years, contempo- ÛÕiÃÊ>ÀiÊEarth Matters: Indigenous Peoples, the Extractive Industries and rary Nepal was beset by a civil war that killed CSRÊÀiii>v]ÊÓään®]Ê>`ÊPeace Parks: £Î]äääÊ«i«i°ÊÊvÀ>}iÊ«i>ViÊ>}ÀiiiÌÊÃ}i`Ê Conservation and Conflict ResolutionÊ /Ê ÊÓääÈÊi`ÊÌÊ ÃÌÀVÊiiVÌÃÊÊ«ÀÊÓään]Ê *ÀiÃÃ]ÊÓääÇ®°Ê ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÕÛ°i`ÕÉHà >É but the years of internal strife exacted a serious toll on the country. Overtly, the conflict began as an ideologi- capital, Kathmandu. In the book’s first six chap- cal clash between a monarchic system and a ters, Upreti offers an introduction to resource socialist egalitarian ideology influenced by the conflict, covering theories of conflict and their writings of the Chinese revolutionary leader application to environmental resources such as >Ê ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM links the rebellion and resource depletion since strategic interdependence is not adequately dis- Mao’s own philosophy was deliberately anti- cussed in the book and deserves greater atten- nature (Shapiro, 2001). ÌÊ LÞÊ ÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ ÃV >ÀÃ°Ê ÃÊ ÌÀ>ÃLÕ`>ÀÞÊ / iÊ>ÃÌÊvÕÀÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊvÊThe Price of Neglect, cooperation becomes even more of an ecologi- which are devoted to analyzing the role of cal necessity, the shifting balance of power may resources in the Maoist conflict, are the most provide a vent for social movements predicated widely marketable. Upreti blames both the land on inequality. tenure tradition of guthi, which is meant to be / iÊL½ÃÊÕÃivÕÊ>««i`ViÃÊ«ÀÛ`iÊ>ÊwÀÃÌ- a trust but is often exploited by the culturally hand narration of Maoist demands and gov- elevated elite, as well as the panchayat system of ernment counter-offers, as well as the corre- communal governance, for the Maoist uprising. spondence between Baburam Bhattarai and the Ê«>ÌÀ>ÀV >Êà «ÊÃÞÃÌi]Êguthi is an impor- International Crisis Group. However, further tant social structure among the Newar indig- analysis of these exchanges in the light of some of enous communities of the Kathmandu valley. the earlier chapters of the book would have pro- Under the more widely practiced panchyat gov- vided greater structural continuity to the text. ernance structure—found throughout South The Price of Neglect ends on an optimistic Ã>pÛ>}iÊi`iÀÃÊ>VÌÊ>ÃÊ>Ê`ëÕÌiÀiÃÕÌÊ note, stating that the Maoist conflict was not council. However, the elders are often not related to ethnicity or territorial separatism selected by the community but rather through and hence should be easy to resolve, since it is arcane preferences of family lineage. fundamentally about internal political reform. Unfortunately, Upreti does not explore some / iÊÓääÈÊÌÀi>ÌÞÊÃiiÃÊÌÊ«ÀÛiÊ1«ÀiÌÊÀ} Ì]Ê of the more interesting environmental aspects but will the Maoist-led government maintain of the rebellion. For example, how does forest the peace? Despite the shortcomings outlined degradation and overuse of land correlate with above, Upreti’s book is a worthwhile effort at the Maoists’ regional strengths? Some prelimi- bringing local flavor to resource conflict dis- nary research in this regard by Jugal Bhurtel and VÕÀÃiÊÊ-ÕÌ ÊÃ>° myself (2009) could have been further devel- «i`ÊÊÌ ÃÊL°ÊÃ]Ê>Ê`iÌ>i`ÊiÌ }À>« VÊ References analysis would have helped explain the poten- tial linkages between resource degradation and ÕÀÌi]ÊÕ}>]ÊEÊ->iiÊ°Ê°ÊÓä䮰ʺ/ iÊ}ÀiiÊ conflict. In addition, Upreti does not address roots of red rebellion: Environmental degradation and the rise of the Maoist movement in Nepal.” the possibility that the conflict itself has led Ê > i`À>Ê >ÜÌÊEÊÕ«Ê*> >ÀÊ `ð®]ÊThe to immense environmental damage, creating a Maoist insurgency in Nepal: Dynamics and growth in i}>ÌÛiÊvii`L>VÊ«Ê ÕÀ« ÞÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääx®°Ê the twenty-first century.Ê iÜÊ9À\Ê,ÕÌi`}i° Ì iÀÊÃÃ}ÊiiiÌÊÃÊ`>½ÃÊ«iÀViÛi`Ê Murphy, Mark, Krishna Prasad Oli, & Steve Gorzula. influence on Nepal—the diminution of which Óääx®°ÊConservation in conflict: The impact of the Maoist-government conflict on conservation and bio- is an ardent part of the Maoist agenda. By lever- diversity in Nepal. Winnipeg: International Institute aging environmental factors such as water avail- for Sustainable Development. ability and hydropower potential, Nepal could Shapiro, Judith. (2001). Mao’s war against nature. «ÌiÌ>ÞÊVÀi>ÃiÊÌÃÊyÕiViÊÊ`>°Ê/ ÃÊ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 124 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Security By Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership Edited by Lael Brainard Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007. 364 pages. Reviewed by SEAN PEOPLES / iÊV>ÃÊvÀÊ>ÊÀiÊivviVÌÛiÊ1°-°ÊvÀi}Ê>ÃÃÃ- Sean Peoples is a program assistant for the tance framework have been deafening lately. ÛÀiÌ>Ê >}iÊ>`Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊ*À}À>Ê Ì Õ} ÊvwV>ÊvÀi}Ê>`Ê >ÃÊVÀi>Ãi`ÊÃÕL- -*®°ÊÃÊ>Ài>ÃÊvÊvVÕÃÊVÕ`iÊÌ iÊÀi> stantially over the last five years, its fragmented Ìà «ÊLiÌÜiiÊ`i}À>« VÊ`Þ>VÃ]Ê À}>â>ÌÊ>`Ê>VÊvÊVi>ÀÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}VÊLiVÌÛiÃÊ >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViÃ]Ê>`ÊLÀ>`iÀÊ`iÛi«iÌÊ have come under fire. Many prominent voices ÃÃÕiðÊ*ÀÀÊÌÊ}Ê -*]Ê iÊÜÀi`Ê in the development community argue that sub- as associate director for Congressional *À}À>ÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ*«Õ>ÌÊ,iÃÕÀViÊ iÌiÀ°Ê stantial reform is needed to effectively alleviate poverty, strengthen security, and increase trade and investment in developing countries (e.g., -iÜi]ÊÓääÇ]Ê-iÜiÊEÊ iV>>ÊÓäänÆÊ*>ÌÀV]Ê }ÊÜÀ`»Ê >ââ]ÊiÌÊ>°ÊÓääÇ]Ê«°£®°ÊÊÌ iÊwÀÃÌÊ ÓääÈÆÊ iÃ>]Ê ÓääÇ®°Ê , Ê ÌiÀ>Ì>½ÃÊ chapter of Security By Other Means, Brainard >ÕViiÌÊÌ >ÌÊÌÊÜÕ`ÊvÀ}Êf{xÊÊ explains that aid is not distributed purely on a year in federal funding is a clear indication that Ì iÊL>ÃÃÊvÊii`\ʺÊ`>ÀÊÌiÀÃÊiÀV>ÊV- our development strategy is still plagued by sig- tinues to place far greater emphasis on bribing wV>ÌÊ«ÀLiÃÊ Õ}}iÀ]ÊÓääÇ®°ÊÊSecurity By non-democratic states than on promoting their Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, democratization” (p. 18). and American Leadership, several leading schol- / iÊivwViVÞÊ>`ÊvÀ>}iÌ>ÌÊvÊÌ iÊ ars—including Steven Radelet, Charles Flickner, current U.S. foreign aid structure stems from and Lael Brainard—offer innovative approaches several cumulative factors, including: numerous to reforming U.S. foreign assistance. V«iÌ}ÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}VÊLiVÌÛiÃÆÊVyVÌ}Ê>- / ÃÊ À}ÃÊÃÌÌÕÌÊÛÕi]Êi`Ìi`Ê dates among government and non-governmen- LÞÊ >iÊ À>>À`]ÊÃÊÌ iÊ}ÀÜ}ÊV ÀÕÃÊvÊ tal organizations; congressional and executive criticism of foreign assistance reform in offer- LÀ>V iÃÊViÞ}ÊvÀÊVÌÀÆÊ>`ÊVÕÌiÃÃÊ }Ê>ÊVi>ÀÊÃiÌÊvÊwÀÃÌÊÃÌi«Ã°ÊÊ ÃÊÓääÇÊ«>«iÀÊ organizations with overlapping efforts. Wading for Brookings, Desai recommends consolidat- Ì ÀÕ} ÊÌ iÊÜiLÊvÊi}Ã>Ì]ÊLiVÌÛiÃ]Ê>`Ê ing the numerous aid agencies and departmen- organizations comprising U.S. foreign assis- tal programs into one cabinet-level department tance efforts is a dizzying exercise. for international development. Stewart Patrick Helping us untangle this confusing web is (2006) advocates a complete overhaul of the Security By Other Means, which compiles the £È£ÊÀi}ÊÃÃÃÌ>ViÊVÌ]Ê}ÛiÊÌ iÊÕÌ- findings of the Brookings Institution-Center moded law’s lack of clarity. In another report, vÀÊ -ÌÀ>Ìi}VÊ >`Ê ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê -ÌÕ`iÃÊ/>ÃÊ Patrick and his former colleagues at the Center ÀViÊÊ/À>ÃvÀ}ÊÀi}ÊÃÃÃÌ>ViÊÊ for Global Development analyzed President the 21st Century into a manual of sorts for Õà ½ÃÊ 9ÓäänÊ LÕ`}iÌÊ >`Ê vÕ`Ê Ì >ÌÊ ºÌ iÊ reforming foreign assistance. Not shying away U.S. continues to devote a relatively small share from the nitty-gritty of foreign assistance pol- of its national wealth to alleviate poverty and icy, the book’s contributors delve deep into the promote self-sustaining growth in the develop- current development assistance framework and 125 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM recommend valuable reforms, which include: Globe Commission report, encourages a much- integrating strategic security concerns; formu- needed discourse not only on foreign assistance, >Ì}ÊVi>ÀÊLiVÌÛiÃÆÊÕ`iÀÃÌ>`}ÊÀiV«iÌÊ LÕÌÊ>ÃÊÊ1°-°ÊvÀi}Ê«VÞÊÊ}iiÀ>°Ê/ iÊ country capacities; and building effective part- authors provide a timely service for the new nerships that exploit comparative advantages. presidential administration by taking an inte- Covering a wide range of development chal- grated look at development challenges and dis- lenges, some chapters offer prescriptions, while couraging the use of cookie-cutter approaches others provide case studies or context. In his to foreign assistance allocation and humanitar- chapter on strengthening U.S. development ian interventions. assistance, Steven Radelet, a senior fellow at Some readers may find Security By Other the Center for Global Development, rightfully Means lacking. For instance, Capitol Hill staff- highlights how poorly U.S. assistance is allocat- ers would likely find a condensed and more ed: “Significant amounts of aid go to middle- visually stimulating version of greater utility. income countries that have access to private sec- Policy wonks would benefit from several more tor capital and have graduated from other aid case studies peppered within appropriate chap- programs” (p. 100). ters. Prominently placed case studies strongly ÃÊv`ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞ]ÊÛiÌÊVyVÌ]Ê>`Ê>ÌÕ- support Cronin’s chapter on development in 7>`}ÊÌ ÀÕ} Ê ral disasters wax and wane, humanitarian assis- conflict contexts, but other chapters did not tance continues to expand in scale and scope. give cases the same emphasis, even though suc- the web of Steven Hansch’s sobering chapter provides a cessful reform requires learning from past mis- i}Ã>Ì]Ê blueprint for the ways the United States can takes and successes. draw on its military’s comparative advantages ÌÊ >Ê ÕÞÊ ÓääÇÊ -i>ÌiÊ ÌÌiiÊ Ê LiVÌÛiÃ]Ê>`Ê and more effectively coordinate the world’s Foreign Relations hearing on foreign assistance, donors for emerging humanitarian needs. Ì i ÀiVÌÀÊvÊ1°-°ÊÀi}ÊÃÃÃÌ>ViÊ>`Ê organizations Patrick Cronin argues that conflict prevention 1°-°Ê}iVÞÊvÀÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê iÛi«iÌÊ comprising V>ÊLiÊÌi}À>Ìi`ÊÌÊ`iÛi«iÌÊÀivÀ\ÊºÊ `ÃÌÀ>ÌÀÊiÀiÌÌ>ÊÀiÊVÌÌi`ÊÌÊ serious—but realistic—capacity to turn swords simplifying the process and integrating the 1°-°ÊvÀi}Ê into plowshares and prevent conflict before it numerous spigots of money flowing outward. assistance begins must be a core mission of the U.S. gov- Brainard and two other leading experts on ernment in the twenty-first century” (p. 161). foreign assistance—Sam Worthington, presi- efforts is Building and strengthening the capac- `iÌÊ>`Ê "ÊvÊÌiÀVÌ]Ê>`Ê,>`iiÌp ity for creativity within the legislative branch testified that rapid globalization and the inevi- >Ê`ââÞ}Ê is also critical. Charles Flickner, former staff table integration of international economies iÝiÀVÃi° `ÀiVÌÀÊvÀÊÌ iÊ««À«À>ÌÃÊ ÌÌii½ÃÊ are the impetus for a more unified and har- Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export âi`ÊvÀi}Ê>`ÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi°ÊÊVi>ÀÊV- Financing, and Related Programs in the U.S. sensus emerged from their recommendations: House of Representatives, acknowledges the promote local capacity and stakeholder owner- resource and cultural challenges (especially ship; favor long-term sustainability over short- congressional committee culture) faced by term political goals; and encourage the con- those in charge of appropriating foreign assis- Ã`>ÌÊ>`ÊVÀ`>ÌÊvÊÌ iÊ`ÃÌi`Ê Ì>ViÊ«°ÊÓÎn®°Ê U.S. foreign assistance structure. Security By Other Means successfully pro- While federal aid flounders, private foun- vides a realistic assessment of the challenges to dation donations are growing steadily and are strengthening U.S. leadership in development poised to overtake official governmental aid. >ÃÃÃÌ>Vi°Ê/ iÊL]Ê>}ÊÜÌ ÊÌ iÊi«}ÊÌÊ Moreover, businesses have steadily expanded >ViÊÌ iÊ Ûi `ÊvÊ*i«iÊÀÕ`ÊÌ iÊ the scope of their humanitarian work. Private 126 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 businesses and foundations can avoid much V}`iÛ°À}ÉVÌiÌÉ«ÕLV>ÌÃÉ`iÌ>É£ÎÓÎ2 of the bureaucratic red tape that strangles iÃ>]Ê,>Ê °ÊÓääÇ]Ê >ÞÊÓ®°ÊRevitalizing America’s government aid. Nevertheless, an attempt by foreign aid regime. 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê/ iÊ À}ÃÊ ÃÌÌÕÌ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www.brook- business interests, private foundations, and }ði`ÕÉ«ÃÉÓääÇÉäxÓ>VÀiVV federal foreign assistance to integrate their ÃÚ`iÃ>°>ëx approaches and build technical capacity could Õ}}iÀ]Ê i>Ê7°ÊÓääÇ]ÊÕ}ÕÃÌʣȮ°Êº , ÊÌÕÀÃÊ only be a positive step. down federal funds for food aid.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes. / iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊvÊSecurity By Other Means suc- Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ VÉÓääÇÉänÉ£ÈÉÜÀ`É>vÀV>É£Èv`° Ìl cessfully parse the many challenges and oppor- Patrick, Stewart. (2006). U.S. foreign aid reform: tunities posed by U.S. foreign assistance reform. Will it fix what is broken? (Center for Global }ÊÜÌ Ê>Ê}ÀÜ}ÊÕLiÀÊvÊVÀÌV>ÊÛViÃ]Ê Development Essay). Washington, DC: Center this book provides a basis for further discussion vÀÊL>Ê iÛi«iÌ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ and action on a number of fronts, including http://aideffectiveness.developmentgateway.org/ uploads/media/aideffectiveness/CGD.F.Paper. integrating diverse donor funds, seriously delib- Sept06.pdf erating the comparative advantages of various -iÜi]Ê °ÊÓääÇ®°ÊThe realpolitik of ending poverty: organizations, and streamlining competing for- An action plan for U.S. foreign policy. Washington, eign assistance mandates. \Ê7`ÀÜÊ7ÃÊ iÌiÀ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ°ÜÃViÌiÀ°À}É`VÃÉÃÌ>vvÉ-iÜiÚÀi>- References politik.pdf Sewell, John, & Karin Bencala. (2008). A memo to Bazzi, Samuel, Sheila Herrling, & Stewart Patrick. the next president: Promoting American interests ÓääÇ®°ÊBillions for war, pennies for the poor: Moving through smarter, more strategic global policies. the President’s FY2008 budget from hard power to Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. smart power. Washington, DC: Center for Global Û>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://wilsoncenter.org/news/ iÛi«iÌ°ÊÛ>>LiÊiÊ>ÌÊhttp://www. `VÃÉ-iÜiÚi°«`f The Shape of Things To Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World By Elizabeth Leahy, with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock, and Tod Preston Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2007. 96 pages. Available online from http://www.populationaction.org Reviewed by JOHN F. MAY In the past two decades, the study of the world’s John F. MayÊÃÊ>ÊÃiÀÊ««Õ>ÌÊëiV> evolving demographic trends has led population ÃÌÊÊÌ iÊvÀV>Ê,i}Ê>ÌÊÌ iÊ7À`Ê >°Ê ÃV >ÀÃÊÌÊÀi>ÃÃiÃÃÊÌÜÊV>ÃÃVÊ«>À>`}ðÊ/ iÊ iÊëiV>âiÃÊÊ««Õ>Ì]ÊÀi«À`ÕVÌÛiÊ first paradigm held that the theory of demo- i>Ì ]Ê>`Ê6É -Ê«ViÃÊ>`Ê«À}À>Ã]Ê graphic transition—a country’s transition from ÜÌ Ê>Êi« >ÃÃÊÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>° high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility—was a set of hypotheses regarding fer- was that population growth and demographic tility with limited predictive value, and far from trends have no impact on (or, at least, are “neu- a universal model encompassing mortality, fer- tral” to) economic development. ÌÌÞ]Ê>`Ê}À>Ì°Ê/ iÊÃiV`Ê«>À>`}p Recent demographic trends appear to have ended the period of intellectual doubt first held by many economists until quite recently— 127 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM «ii`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ*ÀViÌÊ*ÀiV̽ÃÊÜÀÊÊviÀÌ- of age structures and population pyramids across ity decline in Europe (Coale & Watkins, 1986). the world, Elizabeth Leahy and her co-authors Mortality and fertility levels have declined rapid- guide the reader through the consequences of ÞÊiÛiÀÞÜ iÀiÊiÝVi«ÌÊÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>°Ê/ iÃiÊ the demographic transition and changes in age declines have often been followed by transitional structures, as well as their implications for eco- }À>ÌÀÞÊÛiiÌðÊ/ iÊÌ>ÊÌÕÌÊÌ >ÌÊ VÊ}ÀÜÌ °Ê/ iÞÊ>ÃÊiÝ«ÀiÊÌ iÊ«>VÌÃÊvÊ the demographic transition (also known as the changing age structures on security, democratic demographic “revolution”) would reach virtually development, governance, vulnerability to civil all the corners of the world has been proven cor- VyVÌ]Ê>`ÊÃV>ÊÜiLi}°Ê/ iÃiÊ`i- rect (Chesnais, 1992). Moreover, the rapid demo- ÃÃpiÝ>i`Êi>ÀiÀÊLÞÊ*ÊÊThe Security graphic transition has brought about unexpected DemographicÊ VÌÌ>ÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääήp>ÀiÊ>À}Õ- results, such as extremely low levels of fertility— ably more difficult to analyze. far below what is needed to replace the current / iÊwÀÃÌÊvÊÌ iÊÀi«À̽ÃÊÃiÛiÊà ÀÌÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊ population—in some countries, as well as the explains the meaning of population structures. phenomenon of rapid aging, both of which have / iÊiÝÌÊvÕÀÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊvVÕÃÊÊvÕÀÊÌÞ«iÃÊvÊ had far-reaching consequences for the economy. age structures and introduce a new classification iÜÊÀiÃi>ÀV ]ÊvVÕÃi`ÊÊ >ÃÌÊÃ>]Ê >ÃÊ>ÃÊ system: very young, youthful, transitional, and challenged the conventional wisdom regarding mature. Seven countries—namely, Germany, the independence of demographic trends and Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Korea, iVVÊ`iÛi«iÌ°Ê/ ÃÊÜÀÊ >ÃÊ`i- >`Ê/ÕÃ>p«ÀÛ`iÊV>ÃiÊÃÌÕ`iðÊThe Shape strated that changes in age structure, dependency of Things To Come also addresses two atypical ratios, and labor force size have contributed to age structures, caused either by large migra- at least one-third of the region’s rapid economic ÌÀÞÊÛiiÌÃÊÀÊÌ iÊ6É -Êi«`iV]Ê }ÀÜÌ ]Ê`ÕLLi`ÊÌ iʺÃ>ÊÀ>Vi»Ê ÀÃ`>ÊiÌÊ as well as a speculative age structure illustrating >°]ÊÓä䣮°ÊÊVÕÌÀÞ½ÃÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi]Ê««Õ>- a country that moves beyond the demographic tion pyramids, and changes in rates of popula- ÌÀ>ÃÌÊÊ>««ÀÝ>ÌiÞÊÓäÓx°Ê>Þ]ÊÌ iÊ tion growth are now being recognized as more last chapter wraps up the authors’ findings and important determinants of economic develop- considers future demographic possibilities. ment and poverty reduction than population size / iÊ >ÞÕÌÊ ÃÊ ÌÀÕÞÊ ÃÌÕ}\Ê/ iÊ VÀÃÊ itself (and, to some extent, population density). of the graphs and population pyramids skill- / ÃÊiÛ`iViÊÃÊiV>«ÃÕ>Ìi`ÊÊ>ÊiÜÊÌ iÀÞ]Ê vÕÞÊ } } ÌÊ>ÀÊV >}iÃÆÊiÞÊiÃÃ>}iÃÊ>ÀiÊ the “demographic dividend,” which emphasizes prominently displayed; and a very simple but the gains brought by growing numbers of work- quite powerful graph plots the percentage of the ers with fewer dependents to support (Lee & ««Õ>ÌÊ>}i`ÊäÓÊÛiÀÌV>Ê9>ÝîÊ>}>ÃÌÊ Mason, 2006). Indeed, as neatly stated by Nancy the percentage of the population aged 60+ Birsdall et al. (2001), researchers have once again ÀâÌ>Ê8>Ýî°Ê/ ÃÊ}À>« ]ÊÜ V ÊÀiVÕÀÃÊ returned to the idea that “population matters.” throughout the study, enables the reader to Ê ÀiViÌÊ ÃÌÕ`ÞÊ LÞÊ *«Õ>ÌÊ VÌÊ immediately position a country on the demo- ÌiÀ>Ì>Ê *®]Ê The Shape of Things To graphic transition “scale.” Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More The Shape of Things To Come offers a few key Equitable World, provides a timely illustration of findings: these trends and their current interpretations. / iÊÀi«ÀÌÊÃiiÃÊÌÊ`iÃÌÀ>ÌiÊÌ >ÌÊÊÌ`>Þ½ÃÊ UÊ ÊVery young and youthful age structures are changing world, investment in well-designed most likely to undermine countries’ develop- population and reproductive health policies can ment and security; play an important role in advancing national UÊ ÊCountries with a transitional age structure 128 >`Ê}L>Ê`iÛi«iÌ°Ê/ ÀÕ} ÊÌ iÀÊ>>ÞÃÃÊ (i.e., in the middle of the demographic tran- ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 sition) stand to benefit significantly from Furthermore, some of the report’s bolder demographic change; claims—namely, the link between population UÊ ÊCountries with a mature age structure (i.e., trends and political stability—rest on rather xxÊ«iÀViÌÊvÊÌ iÊ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊ>LÛiÊ>}iÊÎä®Ê à >ÞÊ}ÀÕ`ðÊÌ Õ} ÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊvviÀÊÌ iÊ have generally been more stable, democratic, necessary caveats, some of the analytical con- and highly developed; and clusions presented in the book appear to result UÊ ÊSocieties and governments can influence age from connecting facts that may or may not be structures by enacting policies that support causally related. For example, while it is one access to family planning and reproductive thing to say that 80 percent of civil conflicts health services, girls’ education, and econom- `iwi`Ê>ÃÊV>ÕÃ}Ê>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊÓxÊ`i>Ì Ã®ÊVVÕÀÀi`Ê ic opportunities for women. in countries in which 60 percent or more of the ««Õ>ÌÊÃÊÕ`iÀÊ>}iÊÎä]ÊÌÊÃÊ>Ì iÀÊÌ }Ê / iÊVÀÕV>ÊÀiÊvÊ«ViÃÊ >ÃÊLiiÊÌÊvÌiÊ altogether to prove statistically that the youth- ÛiÀi`ÊÊÀiViÌÊ`i}À>« VÊÃÌÕ`iÃÆÊ*Ê fulness of the population is a cause of civil con- deserves credit for addressing it in a straightfor- flict. Such conclusions depend on the size of the ward manner. sample, which should be discussed in greater / iÊÀi«À̽ÃÊÀ}>Ê>>ÞÃÃÊ>`ÊÌ iÊÜi>Ì Ê `iÌ>°Ê/ iÊ«ÀiÛÕÃÊ*ÊÀi«ÀÌÊÊÌ iÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ of information accompanying it could have been demographic, to which this report refers, faced enhanced in a number of ways. First, the authors similar difficulties. could have further analyzed the effects of the demo- In conclusion, The Shape of Things To Come graphic transition on age structure by using, for could have examined several issues in more example, the concept of the transitional multiplier detail. Despite these omissions, Leahy and her ÌÊV«>ÀiÊ`vviÀiÌÊÌÀ>ÃÌðÊ/ iÊÌÀ>ÃÌ>Ê co-authors offer a timely and useful tool to chart multiplier is obtained by dividing the total popula- the changes in age structures that are brought tion at the end of the transition by the total popu- about by the demographic transition that con- lation at the beginning of the transition; the same tinues to spread around the world. concept can be extended to specific age groups i°}°]Ê iÃ>Ã]Ê£äÆÊ£Ó®°Ê/ iÞÊVÕ`Ê>ÃÊ >ÛiÊ References further explored top-heavy population pyramids with older age structures. Moreover, they could À`Ã>]Ê >VÞ]ÊiÊ °Ê iiÞ]ÊEÊ-ÌiÛiÊ7°Ê-`}Ê have highlighted the importance of the time factor, (Eds). (2001). Population matters: Demographic since a country’s pace through the demographic change, economic growth, and poverty in the develop- transition varies, which can lead to different age ing world°Ê iÜÊ9À]Ê 9\Ê"ÝvÀ`Ê1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀiÃð Chesnais, Jean-Claude. (1990). “Demographic transi- structure outcomes (e.g., a stalled fertility decline tion patterns and their impact on the age structure.” V>Ê >ÛiÊ`À>>ÌVÊivviVÌî°Ê``ÀiÃÃ}ÊÌ iÃiÊ«ÌÃÊ Population and Development Review 16Ó®]ÊÎÓÇÎÎÈ° would have helped The Shape of Things To Come to Chesnais, Jean-Claude. (1992). The demographic transi- more completely chart demographic changes. tion. Stages, patterns, and economic implications: A In addition, it is not easy to sort countries into longitudinal study of sixty-seven countries covering the only four age structure categories; allusions to a period 1720-1984. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cincotta, Richard P., Robert Engelman, & Daniele fifth category, a post-mature age structure, could >ÃÌ>ðÊÓääή°ÊThe security demographic: >ÛiÊLiiÊiÝ«Ài`ÊvÕÀÌ iÀ°Ê/ iÊÃÃÕiÊvÊnegative Population and civil conflict after the Cold War. population momentum (as in the case of Russia) 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê*«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>° also merits more consideration. Finally, the suc- >i]ÊÃiÞÊ°]ÊEÊ-ÕÃ>Ê °Ê7>ÌÃÊ `î°Ê£nÈ®°Ê cinct discussion of migratory movements could The decline of fertility in Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. have been expanded to include the possibility ii]Ê,>`]ÊEÊ`ÀiÜÊ >ðÊÓääÈ®°Êº7 >ÌÊÃÊÌ iÊ that such movements might cause countries to demographic dividend?” Finance and Development regress across some age structure categories. 43ή]ʣȣǰ 129 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century Edited by Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007. 175 pages. Reviewed by STEWART PATRICK Stewart Patrick is a senior fellow and city to weak institutions to malignant political director of the Program on International leadership to demographic trends. Like spiders’ ÃÌÌÕÌÃÊ>`ÊL>ÊÛiÀ>ViÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ webs, each country is unique; there is no single ÕVÊÊÀi}Ê,i>ÌÃÊ ,®°Ê*ÀÀÊ route to prosperity (or penury), no single path- ÌÊ}Ê ,]Ê iÊ`ÀiVÌi`ÊÌ iÊ iÌiÀÊvÀÊ way to peace (or war). L>Ê iÛi«i̽ÃÊ«ÀiVÌÊÊ7i>Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ À>ÜÊ vÀÊ >Ê Õ}ÕÃÌÊ ÓääÈÊ VviÀiViÊ >`Ê1°-°Ê >Ì>Ê-iVÕÀÌÞ°ÊÃÊÃÌÊÀiViÌÊ Ã«ÃÀi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊëiÊÃÌÌÕÌi]ʺ/ iÊ/>}i`Ê LÊÃÊThe Best Laid Plans: The Origins of 7iL\Ê/ iÊ*ÛiÀÌÞÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ iÝÕÃ]»ÊÌ ÃÊÃÊ American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the ÛÕiÊÃÊ`Û`i`ÊÌÊÌÜÊ«>ÀÌðÊ/ iÊwÀÃÌÊV >«- Cold WarÊ,Ü>ÊEÊ ÌÌivi`]ÊÓään®° ters usefully distill recent findings (including some published elsewhere by the same authors) on specific links between poverty and conflict. Five years ago, the World Bank published / iÊ>ÌiÀÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊÀiÛiÜ]ÊÀiÊÕiÛiÞ]ÊÌ iÊ Breaking the Conflict Trap, a groundbreaking practical dilemmas confronting external actors book identifying intrastate war as a critical bar- seeking to engage poor, conflict-prone states. rier to poverty eradication in a large cohort / ÀÕ} ÕÌ]ÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÕÃiÊÀivÀià }ÞÊVi>À]Ê vÊ`iÛi«}ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ iÀÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääή°Ê >À}vÀiiÊ«ÀÃiÊ>i`Ê>ÌÊ>Êi`ÕV>Ìi`Ê«VÞÊ Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and audience. Security in the 21st Century picks up where Paul }ÊÌ iÊÃÌÊÌiÀiÃÌ}pvÊVÌÀÛiÀ- Collier and his colleagues left off, this time sial—chapters is Susan Rice’s examination of focusing on the impact of poverty on violent the negative implications of developing-country VyVÌ°Ê/ iÊL½ÃÊLÀ>`ÊÌ iÃÃÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊ>iÛ- poverty for global (as opposed to human) secu- ating poverty in the 21st century is not only a rity. (Full disclosure: Rice and I are frequent moral but also a security imperative. collaborators.) She makes an impassioned case “Extreme poverty literally kills,” write edi- that poverty breeds insecurity by undermin- ÌÀÃÊ >iÊ À>>À`Ê>`Ê iÀiÊ iÌÊ«°Êή°Ê ing the capacity of states to deliver four sets of / ÃÊ V>Ê ÃÊ ÌÀÕiÊ LÌ Ê `ÀiVÌÞpÌ ÀÕ} Ê critical goods: basic physical security, legitimate hunger, malnutrition, and disease—and indi- governance, economic growth, and social wel- rectly, by leaving poor countries vulnerable to fare. Beyond bringing misery to their inhab- domestic upheaval and war and by generating itants, such poverty-induced capacity gaps transnational threats that endanger regional and produce negative “spillovers” for regional and ÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞ°ÊÌÊÌ iÊÃ>iÊÌi]ÊÌ iÊ global security, in the form of cross-border ter- poverty-insecurity nexus constitutes a “tangled rorism, crime, disease, and environmental deg- web,” with overlapping threads of interven- radation. She contends that in an age of global ing variables and strands of reverse causality. threats—from terrorists in Mali to Ebola in Poverty and violence reinforce one another, but the Democratic Republic of the Congo—the their specific relationship is mediated by con- United States cannot afford to be indifferent to 130 text-specific drivers ranging from resource scar- poverty that weakens state capacity. ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 Rice’s chapter raises as many questions as ÌÊ>ÃÜiÀðÊ/ iÊÜÀ`ÊÃÊvÕÊvÊÜi>ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃ]ÊvÊ course, and not all generate negative spillovers, much less those of the same type or magnitude, which suggests that intervening mechanisms and ÃÌÕ>Ì>ÊÛ>À>LiÃÊ>ÀiÊÛÛi`°ÊÀiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ / iÊ«ÛiÀÌÞÃiVÕÀÌÞÊiÝÕÃÊVÃÌÌÕÌiÃÊ>Ê suffer from particular types of weakness more ÃÕÃVi«ÌLiÊÌÊ«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÊÌÞ«iÃÊvÊÌ Ài>ÌöÊ`Ê ºÌ>}i`ÊÜiL]»ÊÜÌ ÊÛiÀ>««}ÊÌ Ài>`ÃÊvÊ does a state’s vulnerability depend on whether its weak performance is a function of the politi- ÌiÀÛi}ÊÛ>À>LiÃÊ>`ÊÃÌÀ>`ÃÊvÊÀiÛiÀÃiÊ cal will of its governing regime, a low level of V>ÕÃ>ÌÞ°Ê state capacity, or some combination of the two? Rice is more persuasive in showing the linkage between weak states and transnational spillovers than in demonstrating how poverty is linked to interact with one another in the same country ÃÌ>ÌiÊÜi>iÃðÊÌ Õ} Êà iʵÕ>wiÃÊ iÀÊ>À}Õ- over time. Kahl’s distinctive contribution is to ment by noting that “though poverty underlies recognize that resource “scarcity” is not only a state weakness” the latter is “also a consequence natural but also a social phenomenon, reflect- of other capacity deficits,” her use of the blood- ing political and economic competition, and less term “capacity” gives too short shrift to the that the relationship between demographic and role of human agency (and particularly the role environmental pressures and conflict is medi- of corrupt, misgoverning elites) in generating ated by (among other factors) the strength of «ÀÊÃÌ>ÌiÊ«iÀvÀ>ViÊ«°ÊÎ{®°Ê the state, the nature and quality of its govern- / iÊÀiÊvÊÌiÀÛi}ÊÛ>À>LiÃÊÃÊvÀÌÊ>`Ê ing institutions, and the identity, solidarity, and center in Colin Kahl’s chapter addressing the power of societal groups. links between demography, environment, and VVÀ`}ÊÌÊ iÀiiÞÊiVÃÌÊ `Ü>À`Ê civil strife in the developing world, based on Miguel, “the poverty-violence link is arguably his similarly titled book (Kahl, 2006). In recent the most robust finding in the growing research years, the environmental security literature has literature investigating the causes of civil wars” been dominated by two diametrically opposed «°Êx£®°Ê ÕÌÊÃÊ«ÛiÀÌÞÊLÀii`}ÊÛiVi]ÊÀÊÛViÊ «iÀëiVÌÛiðÊ/ iʺi >Ì ÕÃ>»ÊÛiÜÊ>ÌÌÀ- ÛiÀÃ>¶Ê/Ê>ÃÜiÀÊÌ ÃʵÕiÃÌ]Ê }ÕiÊ>`ÊÌÜÊ butes civil strife to deprivation brought about colleagues employ an intriguing natural experi- by population growth, environmental deg- iÌ\Ê/ iÞÊ>>ÞâiÊÌ iÊ«>VÌÊvÊ`ÀÕ} Ìp>Ê À>`>Ì]Ê >`Ê >ÌÕÀ>Ê ÀiÃÕÀViÊ ÃV>ÀVÌÞ°Ê/ iÊ purely exogenous economic shock that increas- alternative “resource abundance” thesis con- es poverty—on state propensity for conflict in tends that an embarrassment of resource riches vÀV>°Ê/ iÀÊw`}ÃÊ>ÀiÊÃÌ>ÀÌ}\ʺ/ iÊÃâiÊvÊ fuels violence, whether by creating a tempting the estimated impact of lagged economic growth “honey pot” for factions to fight over or by on conflict is huge,” Miguel writes, with a one subsidizing institutional pathologies (the well- percent decline in GDP “increasing the likeli- known “resource curse”). Kahl considers this hood of civil conflict by more than two percent- dichotomy a false one, noting that scarcity and >}iÊ«Ìûʫ«°Êx{xÈ®°ÊÊVÌÀ>ÃÌ]ÊÌ iÞÊw`Ê abundance can occur simultaneously at differ- little correlation between violent conflict and ent levels of analysis. For instance, abundance variables like political repression, democratic in one resource can create scarcity in another; freedom, ethnic fragmentation, colonial his- different sorts of resources present different tory, or population density. In sum, “economic risks for developing countries; and the patholo- v>VÌÀÃÊÌÀÕ«Ê>ÊÌ iÀÃÊÊV>ÕÃ}ÊvÀV>ÊVÛÊ gies of scarcity and abundance can occur and VvVÌÃ»Ê «°Ê xx®°Ê }ÕiÊ ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÊ Ì >ÌÊ Ì ÃÊ 131 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM robust finding has clear policy implications: tial asset in building a more peaceful future. Very little foreign aid, he observes, addresses Ironically, he notes, “it often seems that nations the immediate triggers of civil conflict. Donors do not know what to do with their own young could change this by directing a significant people while armed groups keep discovering proportion of external assistance toward help- new ways to make use of them” (p. 102). Somers ing countries cope with the sharp income fluc- calls for carefully targeted programs that har- tuations created by exogenous shocks, such as ness the energy and vision of youth and provide poor weather or collapsing commodity prices. young men, in particular, with the opportunity By extending such insurance, the international to gain both employment and dignity. community could help remove support for rebel Rotberg looks at the other end of the status movements. hierarchy, highlighting the critical role of leader- / iÊ«>ÃÌÊ`iV>`iÊ>`Ê>Ê >vÊ >ÃÊÃiiÊ>ÊÃÕÀ}iÊ Ã «ÊÊÛiÀV}Ê«ÛiÀÌÞÊÊvÀV>°Ê/ ÀÜ}Ê in policy attention to the possible security a bucket of cold water on those who still attribute implications of demographic change—some poverty in developing countries primarily to a vÊÌÊÌ Õ} ÌvÕÊi°}°]Ê VÌÌ>ÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÎÆÊ lack of foreign aid, he argues that the divergent 1À`>ÊEÊ ÀÕLÀ}]ÊÓääx®]ÊÃiÊvÊÌÊÃiÃ>- ÌÀ>iVÌÀiÃÊvÊvÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊV>ÊLiÊiÝ«>i`Ê tionalized (e.g., Kaplan, 1994). Henrik Urdal’s overwhelmingly by their quality of governance, V >«ÌiÀÊ«ÀÛ`iÃÊ>ÊÕ`VÕÃÊ>ÃÃiÃÃiÌÊvÊÌ iÊ and specifically the personal leadership qualities potential risks and rewards of “youth bulges” of heads of state or government. He pointedly in developing countries. He finds a robust cor- ÕÝÌ>«ÃiÃÊÌ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÌ>À>Ê,LiÀÌÊ Õ}>Li]Ê relation between a country’s youth cohort and the former independence hero who has man- its propensity for low-intensity conflict. “For >}i`ÊÌÊ`ÀÛiÊVi«ÀëiÀÕÃÊ<L>LÜiÊÌÊ each percentage point increase of youth in the ground, with visionary leaders like South the adult population,” he writes, “the risk of vÀV>½ÃÊ iÃÊ >`i>]Ê ÌÃÜ>>½ÃÊ iÃÌÕÃÊ conflict increases by more than four percent” }>i]Ê>`Ê-ii}>½ÃÊL`>ÞiÊ7>`i°Ê,ÌLiÀ}Ê «°ÊÈ®°Ê`ÊÞiÌÊ>À}iÊÞÕÌ ÊV ÀÌÃÊ >ÛiÊÌ iÊ documents a rising demand for good gover- potential to be a blessing rather than a curse, >ViÊÊvÀV>]ÊLÕÌÊÜ >ÌÊvÊÌ iÊÃÕ««Þ¶ÊiÀiÊ particularly if they precede significantly small- the answers are less clear. Rotberg claims that iÀÊV ÀÌðÊÃÊviÀÌÌÞÊÀ>ÌiÃÊVÌÕiÊÌÊ`iViÊ ÃÕL-> >À>ÊvÀV>Ê>««i>ÀÃÊÌÊ>Vʺ>Ê«À>VÌV>Ê (sometimes dramatically) in the coming years, ethic of public service,” but he offers few ideas much of the developing world stands to gain on how outside actors might work with internal a “demographic dividend,” in the form of reformers to help instill such an ethos. increased economic growth and lower vulner- / iÊL½ÃÊiÊà ÀÌV}Ê} ÌÊLiÊÌ iÊ ability to violence. `iÃÌÞÊvÊÌÃÊ>ÃÊ>`ÊV>ðÊ/ iÊi`ÌÀÃÊ / iÊÃiV`Ê«ÀÌÊvÊÌ iÊLÊÃÊ`iÛÌi`Ê could have been bolder in seeking to break new to several policy challenges confronting exter- conceptual ground, to offer more definitive nal actors in violence-prone poor countries. conclusions on the basis of current research, and / iÃiÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊ>``ÀiÃÃÊÜÀ}ÊÜÌ ÊÞÕÌ ÊÊ to address the policy implications of the book’s war-torn countries (Marc Somers); bolstering overall findings. Like many conference volumes, responsible political leadership where corrup- it lacks an overarching theoretical framework or tion is the norm (Robert Rotberg); operating conceptual model to lend coherence to its dis- as private actors in insecure environments (Jane parate chapters and to explain how the various Nelson); and promoting democracy as well as drivers and intervening variables can and do fit security and basic needs (Jennifer Windsor). Ì}iÌ iÀ°Ê/ iÊÌÀ`ÕVÌ]ÊvÀÊÃÌ>Vi]ÊVÕ`iÃÊ Somers observes that young people—and par- no trend lines or maps of current levels of pov- ticularly young males—are typically demonized erty or conflict, leaving the reader to wonder if 132 as a national liability, rather than as a poten- the situation is as dire as described—and which ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 ÃÌ>ÌiÃ]Ê«ÀiVÃiÞ]Ê>ÀiÊiÌÜi`ÊÊÌ iʺiÝÕð»Ê`Ê 7>à }Ì]Ê \Ê*«Õ>ÌÊVÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>°Ê although the editors review some prominent iÀ]Ê*>Õ]Ê6° °Ê ÌÌ]ÊFÛ>À`Êi}Ài]ÊiÊ debates, they generally abstain from evaluating Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas ->L>ðÊÓääή°ÊBreaking the conflict trap: Civil purported causal linkages or proposing steps to war and development policy. Washington, DC: VÕÌÊÌ i°Ê/ iÊ>LÃiViÊvÊ>ÊVVÕÃÊÀivÀViÃÊ World Bank. the depressing sense that the filaments of “the Kahl, Colin. (2006). States, scarcity, and civil strife tangled web” will remain tightly knotted. in the developing world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. >«>]Ê,LiÀÌ°Ê£{]ÊiLÀÕ>ÀÞ®°Êº/ iÊV}Ê>>À- References chy.” The Atlantic Monthly. Cincotta, Richard P., Robert Engelman, & Daniele 1À`>]ÊiÀ]ÊEÊi}iÊ ÀÕLÀ}°Ê `ð®°ÊÓääx]Ê >ÃÌ>ðÊÓääή°ÊThe security demographic: July). Journal of Peace Research: Special Issue on the Population and civil conflict after the Cold War. Demography of Conflict and Violence 42( 4). Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development Edited by Oli Brown, Mark Halle, Sonia Pena Moreno, and Sebastian Winkler London & Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2007. 204 pages. Reviewed by JOHN W. SEWELL Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace John W. Sewell is a senior scholar at the and Development undertakes the challenging Woodrow Wilson International Center for task of assessing the interrelationships between -V >ÀÃ]ÊvÀiÀÊ«ÀiÃ`iÌÊvÊÌ iÊ"ÛiÀÃi>ÃÊ trade and aid, as well as the complex causes of iÛi«iÌÊ ÕV]Ê>`Ê>ÕÌ ÀÊvÊÕiÀÕÃÊ conflict within the poorest countries. Emerging >ÀÌViÃÊ>`Ê>>ÞÃiÃÊvÊ}L>â>Ì]Ê`iÛi« from a four-year research collaboration between iÌ]Ê>`Ê1°-°Ê>Ì>ÊÌiÀiÃÌÃ]ÊVÕ`}Ê the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and ºÊ iÊÌÊÌ iÊ iÝÌÊ*ÀiÃ`iÌ\Ê*ÀÌ}Ê the International Institute for Sustainable iÀV>ÊÌiÀiÃÌÃÊ/ ÀÕ} Ê->ÀÌiÀ]Ê ÀiÊ Development (IISD), this edited volume col- -ÌÀ>Ìi}VÊL>Ê*ViÃ]»ÊV>ÕÌ Ài`ÊLÞÊvÀ iÀÊ -*Ê*À}À>ÊÃÃÃÌ>ÌÊ >ÀÊ iV>>° lects six papers by specialists in trade, aid, con- yVÌ]Ê>`ÊÃÕÃÌ>>LÌÞ°Ê/ iÊi`ÌÀýÊ}>ÊÃʺÌÊ ÃiiÊÌ iÃiÊLiVÌÛiÃpÌÀ>`i]Ê>`]Ê>`ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞp trade policy, building markets for conflict-free as interlocking components of the overriding goods, promoting conflict-sensitive business in LiVÌÛiÃÊvÊ«i>ViÊ>`Ê`iÛi«iÌ°»Ê conflicted areas, and managing resources (both Trade, Aid and Security is, in many ways, a >ÌÕÀ>Ê>`Ê>`®Ê>ÀiÊ«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊÃÌÀ}°Ê/ iÃiÊ pioneering volume. Starting from the premise analyses synthesize a great deal of information that both aid and trade policies have sometimes and research not normally considered by trade exacerbated tensions and violent conflict within or aid specialists. the poorest countries, it also argues that aid and My definition of an “interesting” book is one trade policies can be tools to help prevent exist- that not only provides new information but also ing tensions or conflicts from turning violent. stimulates my own thinking about the broader / iÊV >«ÌiÀÃÊÊ`iÃ}}ÊVvVÌÃiÃÌÛiÊ À>wV>ÌÃÊvÊÌÃÊ>>ÞÃiðÊ/ iÊ>ÕÌ ÀÃÊÊÌ ÃÊ 133 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM volume raise the right issues and shed much light financial institutions, to convert inward-ori- on the choices that will have to be made. But like ented, state-dominated economies to more all good analyses, Trade, Aid and Security raises open market-driven approaches, while also some questions that have not yet been discussed strengthening fragile new democracies. Either seriously, especially by policymakers. of these reforms is difficult to carry out under First, the papers present a seeming para- the best of circumstances; reconciling them is dox: By its very nature, economic, political, even more difficult. and social development requires change— Globalization has made both economic and in laws, customs, practices, and even human political reform more difficult. Opening mar- behavior. But change is inherently conflictual kets creates winners and losers, thereby shifting and destabilizing. Some states in the process the distribution of economic power and wealth of development actually “fail”; others, unable within developing countries. Various groups— to deal with the politics of change, give rise to ethnic, religious, political, and regional—have authoritarian governments. been winners and losers in this process, which / iÀiÊÃÊLÀ>`Ê>}ÀiiiÌÊÌ >ÌÊVÀi>Ã}ÊÌ iÊ has led to tension, contested policies, and number of established market democracies ben- increased conflict. efits both rich and poor countries. Democracies Moreover, globalization has limited the tend to make better political and economic powers available to governments to manage choices than non-democratic governments, and conflicts brought about by economic change. democratic states tend not to start wars with one Before globalization, governments could man- another. Market economies also generate resourc- age the speed of change by closing markets es that can be used to invest in people, and mar- >`ÊÌ}Êw>V>ÊyÜðÊ/ iÃiÊÌiV µÕiÃÊ ket policies eventually promote democratization. are no longer effective, as the globalization of / iÀiÊÃÊiÊV>ÌV ]Ê ÜiÛiÀ\Ê/ iÃiÊLiiwÌÃÊ financial markets has made capital flows more are realized only by established market democ- volatile, and new trade agreements have pro- À>ViðÊ/ iÊ ÃÌÀÞÊvÊ ÕÀ«iÊ>`ÊÌ iÊ1Ìi`Ê hibited many of the measures used previously States in the 19th and 20th centuries should ÌÊ«ÀÌiVÌÊ`ÕÃÌÀiÃÊ>`Ê}ÀիðÊÃÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌ]ÊÌÊ remind policymakers that achieving stable open is much harder for governments to redistribute markets and open societies was neither easy income, assets, and economic power to com- nor automatic. Indeed, the social welfare state pensate “losers” in the processes of change. was created specifically to deal with the social "iÊÌ }ÊÃiiÃÊVi>À\Ê/Ê>>}iÊÌ iÊ«- costs of unfettered market forces. Policymakers tics of economic and political change, policy- ignore the links between political and economic makers and analysts must put a much higher reform in countries where neither is established premium on strengthening the institutions that at their peril. mediate conflicts within countries and on build- But if conflict is inherent in development ing “constituencies for change” among groups and democratization, then conflict-prevention within these countries (Rodrik, 1999). policies need to be linked to strategies for pro- Many of the authors in Trade, Aid and moting market reforms and creating strong Security emphasize the need to develop conflict- democratic institutions. Support for domes- sensitive policies, particularly in aid programs. tic institutions that mediate internal conflicts, Indeed, they make a number of useful recom- whether economic or political, is essential, as mendations for specific policies designed to are institutions that bridge ethnic or geographic diminish conflict. But they fail to consider that divisions within countries, such as democratic the development promotion business and the institutions and civil society groups. role of the outsider have changed. Governments in many countries are under Fifty years ago, official development assis- 134 great pressure, particularly from international Ì>ViÊ" ®ÊÛÕiÊ>`Ê«VÞÊÜ>ÃÊÊ`>Ìi`Ê ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 by the United States; the World Bank still was situation. Outside agencies must consider how a bank; and the International Monetary Fund best to help those who want to change politics (IMF) was focused on the problems of the within their own countries. OECD countries. Politics also have a considerable impact /`>Þ]ÊÌ iÊ`iÛi«iÌÊ>`ÃV>«iÊÃÊÕV Ê on rich countries’ development policies. For ÀiÊV«iÝ°Ê/ iÊ ÀiÌÌÊ7`ÃÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊ instance, U.S. and European agricultural poli- now dominate the development debate, but cies are designed to benefit domestic agricultur- «ÀÛ`iÊÞÊ>ÊÃ>Ê«iÀViÌ>}iÊvÊÛiÀ>Ê" °Ê al constituencies, despite the fact that subsidies / iÊÃÌÕ>ÌÊÃÊvÕÀÌ iÀÊV«V>Ìi`ÊLÞÊÌ iÊ«À- and lack of market access disadvantage produc- liferation of other bilateral providers and multi- ers in poor countries. In addition, donors still lateral programs. Each has its own history and give a great deal of aid to middle- and upper- constituencies, as well as national and regional income developing countries to support politi- interests. International NGOs are now impor- cal or commercial interests that may be legiti- tant players in development, both as providers >Ìi]ÊLÕÌÊ`ÊÌÊ«ÀÌiÊ`iÛi«iÌ°Ê9iÌ]Ê of assistance and as active lobbyists on the glob- until recently, those groups trying to reduce >ÊiÛi°Ê`Ê« >Ì À«VÊvÕ`>ÌÃ]ÊÌ>LÞÊ conflict have not focused on the trade and aid the Gates Foundation, have become important policies of rich countries. providers, while multinational corporations are Finally, Trade, Aid and Security would have /Ê>ÞÊ" Ê establishing their own aid programs. been strengthened by a chapter on the impact Ê/ iÊVÕÀÀiÌÊÀi>ÌÞÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊÌÊ>ÞÊ" Ê of the international financial system on con- «ÀÛ`iÀÃÊ>ÀiÊ providers are trying to do too many things, yVÌÊ>`ÊÃÕÃÌ>>LiÊ`iÛi«iÌ°ÊÃÊÌ iÊÃ>Ê ÌÀÞ}ÊÌÊ`ÊÌÊ in too many countries. We need to seriously financial crises of the 1990s demonstrated, rethink the ways and instruments though which poor people and poor countries suffer dispro- >ÞÊÌ }Ã]Ê " ÊÃÊ«ÀÛ`i`Êi°}°]Ê-iÜi]ÊÓään®° portionately from financial instability. Barry / ÃiÊÃii}ÊÌÊ«ÀiÛiÌÊVyVÌÊà Õ`Ê>ÃÊ Eichengreen (2004) estimates that financial ÊÌÊ>ÞÊ focus on the politics of change, both within the ÃÌ>LÌÞÊÊÌ iÊ£näÃÊVÃÌÊ >ÌÊiÀV>Ê VÕÌÀið poorest countries and within the rich coun- countries at least two percentage points of eco- tries. Several chapters in Trade, Aid and Security nomic growth. Other analyses show that over make the case that resources, whether derived the last quarter-century, financial instability has from aid flows or legitimate trade, often are not reduced the incomes of developing countries by equitably distributed or used to end poverty or ÀÕ} ÞÊÓxÊ«iÀViÌ°Ê promote sustainable development. Instead, they Restructuring the international financial sys- are captured by special interests or steered to tem by making existing financial institutions political elites. Furthermore, globalization has more effective can help dampen the costly insta- led to increased income inequalities even within bilities inherent in a globalized financial system rapidly growing developing countries (as well as that has no effective international regulation. between rich and poor countries). / iÀiÊ>Ài]Ê ÜiÛiÀ]Ê«ÌV>ÊVÃÌÃÊÌÊÀivÀ}Ê Nigeria’s situation is illustrative of the com- Ì iÊiÞÊÕÌ>ÌiÀ>ÊÃÌÌÕÌðÊ/ iÊ`iVà plexity of the trade-aid-security nexus. Rich making structure of the IMF was originally set up in natural resources, it is rife with ethnic and so that both borrowers and lenders had a voice in religious conflicts and highly political disputes the fund’s policies. But no industrial country has over the distribution of oil and gas revenues. LÀÀÜi`ÊvÀÊÌÊÃViÊÌ iÊ`£ÇäÃÆÊÌ iÊ>Ê Nigeria does not lack the resources to end pov- borrowers are now poorer developing countries, erty and sustain its deteriorating environment, which have much less voice in the institution’s but successive civilian and military regimes governing board. More adequate representation have squandered its riches, and recent elected in international financial institutions for devel- governments have not substantially changed the oping countries would increase the legitimacy of 135 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM financial policies now seen by the South as being References imposed by the North. / iÀiÊ>Ài>`ÞÊ>ÀiÊ>ÞÊÛÕiÃÊÊÌÀ>`iÊ V i}Àii]Ê >ÀÀÞ°ÊÓää{]Ê«À®°ÊFinancial instability. Paper prepared for a meeting of the Copenhagen and its impact on poverty and aid policies. Few, Consensus, Copenhagen, Denmark. however, transcend the compartmentalization Rodrik, Dani. (1999). The new global economy and of both academic disciplines and policymak- the developing countries: Making openness work. ers. Trade, Aid and Security does, and for this Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. reason alone, it should be read by students and -iÜi]Ê °ÊÓään]Ê«À®°Ê“Foreign aid” redux: Can official development assistance be made relevant for «À>VÌÌiÀðÊ/ iÊ«ÀÌ>ÌÊÃÃÕiÃÊÌÊÀ>ÃiÃÊ>ÀiÊ the 21st century?Ê1«ÕLà i`Ê>ÕÃVÀ«Ì°ÊÛ>>LiÊ a welcome contribution to the knowledge of online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/docs/staff/ the links connecting aid, trade, and conflict. -iÜiÚÀi}`,i`ÕÝÚ«ÀÚÓään°«`f The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization By Thomas Homer-Dixon Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006. 448 pages. Reviewed by RICHARD MATTHEW Richard A. Matthew is an associate pro His latest book, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, viÃÃÀÊvÊÌiÀ>Ì>Ê>`ÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization, deserves «ÌVÃÊÊÌ iÊ-V ÃÊvÊ-V>Ê V}ÞÊ>`Ê a wide readership and should be the focus of ani- -V>Ê-ViViÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ >vÀ>Ê >Ìi`Ê`ÃVÕÃÃÃÊÊV>ÃÃÀÃ]ÊÕÀ>Ã]Ê>`Ê >ÌÊÀÛi]Ê>`Ê`ÀiVÌÀÊvÊÌ iÊ iÌiÀÊvÀÊ policy arenas around the world. 1VÛiÌ>Ê-iVÕÀÌÞÊvv>ÀÃÊ ÌÌ«\ÉÉÜÜÜ° In his first study, Environment, Scarcity, and VÕÃ>°ÕV°i`Õ®°Ê,iViÌÊLÃÊ>`ÊVi`Ìi`Ê Violence, Homer-Dixon argued that societies were Reframing the Agenda: ÛÕiÃÊVÕ`iÊ experiencing natural resource scarcities that, in The Impact of NGO and Middle Power turn, often triggered or amplified diffuse forms Cooperation in International Security Policy vÊÛiÌÊVyVÌ°ÊÊ ÃÊÃiV`Ê>ÀÊÜÀ]ÊThe *À>i}iÀ]ÊÓääήÊ>`ÊLandmines and Human Ingenuity Gap, he built on his earlier research to Security: International Relations and War’s Hidden LegacyÊ-1 9Ê*ÀiÃÃ]ÊÓää{®°Ê argue that contemporary societies often fail to generate or deliver ingenuity where it is needed to solve serious social and environmental problems. With The Upside of Down, he has moved 1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ/ÀÌÊ*ÀviÃÃÀÊ/ >ÃÊiÀ Vw`iÌÞÊÌÊÌ iÊÀi>ÊvÊ}À>`ÊÌ iÀÞ°Ê/ iÊ Dixon writes provocative and influential books on L½ÃÊ>ÀÊ>À}ÕiÌÃpÜ V ÊV>ÊLiÊV>ÃÃ- issues of global importance, roaming effortlessly fied into three sets—are concise, accessible, and across scholarly disciplines and distilling insights supported by 100 pages of detailed notes that from complex theoretical literatures. His argu- suggest mastery of an enormous and diverse ments illuminate complicated global processes, literature. He integrates ideas in novel ways to describe the problems they generate and their like- generate compelling explanations, but he is also ÞÊÌÀ>iVÌÀiÃ]Ê>`Ê`iÌvÞÊÀiëÃiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ`Û`Õ- cautious, emphasizing areas of uncertainty and als, businesses, and policymakers should consider. pointing out possible alternative analyses. 136 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 / iÊwÀÃÌÊÃiÌÊvÊ>À}ÕiÌÃÊvVÕÃiÃÊÊÌ iÊ the collapse of the Roman Empire, the genesis converging human-generated processes that of the 1906 San Francisco fire, and many other Homer-Dixon believes are creating the condi- examples. Homer-Dixon asks the reader to think tions for catastrophe. He identifies five of these of societies in terms of their energy requirements. “tectonic stresses”: Initially, easy access to cheap energy (such as oil fields) can enable rapid growth. But if, over time, UÊ ÊEnergy stress, due to a general imperative for the society remains committed to growth, it growth that is now at odds with the declin- inevitably will have to draw energy from further ing availability of cheap and easily accessible >wi`Ê>`Ê>ÌÊ>ÊÕV Ê } iÀÊVÃÌ°ÊÃÊÌ iÊ iÀ}ÞÊ p Õ>`½ÃÊ>ÀÊiiÀ}ÞÊÃÕÀViÆ Return on Investment (EROI) deteriorates, UÊ ÊEconomic stress, a complex problem that has the society will discover that it is overextended, much to do with income inequality (and has dependent, and vulnerable to breakdown. recently moved to the top of the agenda); Homer-Dixon then introduces ecologist UÊ ÊDemographic stress, as populations grow C.S. Holling’s (2002) “panarchy” theory, which rapidly in areas like the megacities of the describes the life cycle of an ecosystem in terms developing world, which are hard-pressed of growth, collapse, regeneration, and a new to provide their residents with the means to phase of growth. Complex systems from forests survive and flourish; to human societies do not develop to some opti- UÊ ÊEnvironmental stress (the focus of Homer- mal size and then maintain themselves, argues Dixon’s earlier work), which worsens as we Holling; instead, they grow too large and become continue to degrade forests, fisheries, and rigid and vulnerable to external shocks. When other natural resources; and the day of reckoning arrives, they disintegrate, UÊ ÊClimate stress, the result of greenhouse gas creating the opportunity for a renaissance. emissions that alter the composition of the Homer-Dixon applies this cycle to the pres- atmosphere in ways that have dramatic, ent day, arguing that human societies, which alarming, and often unpredictable impacts have internalized the particularly aggressive across the planet. imperative of growth known as capitalism, are Not only are these stresses interconnected in doing whatever they can to maintain a high rate ways that augment their lethality, but their cur- of economic growth. Unfortunately, they are rent and potential impact on humankind is fur- doing this in the context of the multipliers and ther enhanced by technologies that deepen and stressors—including the looming end of cheap expand connectivity, and that give small groups oil—discussed earlier, a situation he regards as and individuals unprecedented power that can grave and untenable. be exercised toward good or bad ends. Finally, Homer-Dixon argues that the politi- ÞiÊ v>>ÀÊ ÜÌ Ê VÌi«À>ÀÞÊ Ì- cal realm is ignoring the tensions between erature on global change will recognize these a culture of economic growth and a world of stresses, as they have all received considerable growing stresses. When societies experience attention in recent years. But Homer-Dixon has a catastrophic problem, whether it is 9/11 or an exceptional talent for pulling familiar ideas Hurricane Katrina, governments do not pro- together in a lucid, sensible, and authoritative pose policies that tackle deeper causes of vul- manner, building a worldview that is compel- nerability. Short time frames, special interests, ling and easy to grasp. and cognitive commitments are powerful con- / iÊÃiV`Êii}>ÌÊÃiÌÊvÊ>À}ÕiÌÃÊ«>ViÃÊ straints on political innovation, and so political these contemporary stressors and multipliers in elites spend billions of tax dollars trying desper- a more general theory of social breakdown and ately to maintain the status quo. In short, we renewal, amply illustrated with discussions of are in dire straits. 137 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM communities—the capacity to navigate a world that contains much uncertainty. We can do this by being open to new ideas, by innovating in every area of human activity, by experiment- ing with new practices and institutions, and by Ó£ÃÌÊViÌÕÀÞÊÃViÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊ«Ãi`ÊÌÊ avoiding the appeals of extremists who promise easy solutions—(e.g., let the market solve it)— LÀi>Ê`Ü]Ê>`ÊÌ iÊLÀi>`ÜÃÊ>ÞÊLiÊ to very complicated problems. We need also à V}ÞÊv>ÃÌ]Ê«>vÕ]Ê>`ÊÌiÀViVÌi`p ÌÊ««ÃiÊÌ iÊiiiÀÊÀiëÃiÃÊvÊ}ÛiÀ- ments—which are so profoundly compromised ºÃÞV ÀÕÃÊv>ÕÀið» by special interests—to deny deep problems, and to over-invest in maintaining systems and processes that are at odds with the set of stresses The Upside / iÊÌ À`ÊÃiÌÊvÊ>À}ÕiÌÃÊÊ Àià >«}ÊÌ iÊ}L>ÊiÛÀiÌ°Ê`ÊÜiÊii`Ê of Down examines what we can and should do to interrogate the growth of capitalism and ask today. While Homer-Dixon has included some ourselves whether the benefits still warrant the caveats about predicting the future, the thrust costs of this value system. of his first two arguments is that 21st century The Upside of Down is not a perfect book; societies are poised to break down, and the it does not discuss the burgeoning networks breakdowns may be shockingly fast, painful, of social entrepreneurs who are tackling glob- and interconnected—“synchronous failures.” al challenges from the roots up by drawing We can take steps that might mitigate some of people from all sectors of society into vibrant these breakdowns; we can position ourselves transnational communities committed to cre- to weather them; and we can take advantage ating social value. I think Homer-Dixon may of the opportunities to build new institutions be right: Leviathan is, in large measure, the and values that emerge after breakdowns occur. beached artifact of modern politics. In its day, But avoiding them altogether is not a scenario the modern state achieved much, but even the Homer-Dixon explores. world’s only superpower now finds itself unable Nonetheless, The Upside of Down ends on a to revise a health care system that is wildly inef- «ÃÌÛiÊÌi°Ê/ iÊiÞÊÜÀ`ÃÊvÀÊÌ iÊVÃ}ÊÃiÌÊ ficient or reform a tax code than no one under- of arguments, especially “catagenesis” and “pro- stands, let alone apply its vast resources to a spective mind,” suggest that we need to be ready V >i}iÊiÊV>ÌiÊV >}i°Ê`ÊÞiÌ]ÊiÛiÊÊ to rebuild. We already have been given oppor- the United States, the very heartland of capi- tunities to rebuild—for example, after 9/11 and talism and big government, there is a dynamic after Katrina—and we have largely failed. Now world growing outside the Beltway, and it is we need to take advantage of each opportunity the site of new values, clever experiments, end- that presents itself because the breakdowns are less innovations, and a refreshing commitment likely to increase in frequency and scale, and it to redefining the good life. Even though The is becoming very clear that it is futile to try to Upside of Down is not perfect, it is very good; it preserve the status quo. will garner well-deserved awards and stimulate / iÊ>À}ÕiÌÃÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊi`ÊvÊÌ iÊLÊ>ÀiÊ much-needed debate. not as rich in details as those in the earlier sec- tions, and I think many readers would welcome References an expanded set of conclusions. However, the broad contours are quite clear: We need to Holling, C.S., & Lance Gunderson (Eds.). (2002). understand what is going on, pull our heads out Panarchy: Understanding transformations in human 138 of the sand, and cultivate—as individuals and and natural systems. Washington, DC: Island Press. ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 ON THE RECORD @ THE WILSON CENTER ÀiiÊÃÊ ÌÊÜ°Ê/ ÃÊÃÊÌ iÊÌi>V >LiÊiÌ°Ê7 iÊ ÜiÊÌ>Ê>LÕÌÊ>ÌÕÀiÊÌ ÃÊÌiÊ>ÀÕ`pÜÊÌ >ÌÊÌ iÊ «ÕLVÊÃÊ«>Þ}Ê>ÌÌiÌpÜiÊà Õ`Ê}iÌÊLiÞ`Ê V >ÀÃ>ÌVÊi}>v>Õ>Ê>`ÊÌ>Ê>LÕÌÊÌ iÊÛ>ÕiÊvÊ iVÃÞÃÌiÃÊÌÊ Õ>ÊÃÕÀÛÛ>°Ê Jonathan Lash, World Resources Institute, May 7, 2007 >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViL>Ãi`ÊÃÌÌÕÌÃo>ÀiÊVÀÌV>ÊvÀÊ VvVÌÊÌ}>Ì]ÊiëiV>ÞÊÊ>Ài>ÃÊÜ iÀiÊÌ iÀiÊÃÊ >Ê } Ê`i«i`iViÊLÞÊÌ iÊV>ÊÀÊÌ iÊÀÕÀ>Ê`ÜiiÀÃÊ Ê>ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViðÊMasego Madzwamuse, World Conservation 1p1 ]ÊiLÀÕ>ÀÞÊÓn]ÊÓään ÌÊÃÊÌÊÜÞÊÌÊÃ>ÞÊÌ >ÌÊ`i}À>« VÃÊÃÊ vÕ`>iÌ>ÊÌÊ`iÛi«iÌp̽ÃÊÀ} Ì° Amy Coen, Population Action International, October 2, 2007 *i«ioii`ÊÌÊVÕÌÊÌÀiiÃÊvÀÊV >ÀV>]Ê>`ÊViÊ Ì iÞÊÃiÊV >ÀV>ÊÌ iÞÊ}iÌÊÃV ÊviiÃ]ÊÀÊÌ iÞÊLÕÞÊ Ì iÀÊv`ÊÀÊÌ iÞÊLÕÞÊÌ iÀÊi`ViÃ°Ê Ü]ÊvÊÞÕÊÌiÊ Ì i]ʼ ½ÌÊVÕÌÊÌÀiiÃ]½ÊÌ iÊÜ >ÌÊiÝ̶ÊÊ̽ÃÊiÊÌi}Ê iÀV>Ãʼ`½ÌÊ`ÀÛi°½ÊEmmanuel Mtiti, Jane Goodall Institute, May 8, 2008 139 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM / iÊv} ÌÊ>}>ÃÌÊ«ÛiÀÌÞÊÃÊÌÊÕÃÌÊiÊÌ >ÌÊÜiÊV>ÀiÊ }Ài>ÌÞÊ>LÕÌÊvÀÊÀ>ÊÀi>ÃÃoÌÊÃÊ>ÃÊiÊÌ >ÌÊ ÜiÊV>ÀiÊ>Ê}Ài>ÌÊ`i>Ê>LÕÌÊLiV>ÕÃiÊvÊÌ iÊÌ>ÌiÊ >}iÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ«ÛiÀÌÞÊ>`ÊÌ iÊ`ÀÛiÀÃÊvÊ«ÛiÀÌÞ]Ê >`ÊvÕ`>iÌ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊÌ >ÌÊÊÃiÊV>ÃiÃÊV>Ê metastasize into conflict. Lael Brainard, Brookings Institution, October 5, 2007 7iÊÕÃÌÊiÛiÀÊvÀ}iÌÊÌ >ÌÊÌiÀ>Ì>Êv>ÞÊ «>}ÊÃÊ>Ê Õ}iÊÃÕVViÃÃÊÃÌÀÞ°Ê/ iÊÌÀÕLiÊÃ]Ê Üi½ÛiÊvÀ}ÌÌiÊ>LÕÌÊÌ°ÊJohn Cleland, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, September 12, 2007 7 iÀiÊ`ÊÌiÀÀÀÃÌÃÊ}¶Ê/ iÞÊ}ÊÌÊÜi>Ê«>ViÃÊ Ü iÀiÊ}ÛiÀ>ViÊÃÊÜi>Ê>`ÊÃViÌÞÊÃÊÜi>°ÊvÊ Ì iÊÃÌÀiÃÃÊvÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊÊÌ iÃiÊÜi>ÊÃViÌiÃÊ V>ÕÃiÃÊÃiÊvÊÌ iÊÌÊV>«Ãi]ÊÌÊ«iÃÊ>ÊÜ`ÜÊ for terrorists. General Paul J. Kern, U.S. Army (Ret.), May 14, 2007 *«Õ>ÌÀi>Ìi`Ê«ViÃÊ>ÀiÊÌÊ}}ÊÌÊ«À`ÕViÊ >ÞÊi`>ÌiÞÊ`ÃViÀ>LiÊivviVÌÊÊiÃÃÃo Q ÕÌRÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊÃÊ>ÊL}Ê«ÀLi]Ê>`ÊÌ ÃÊÜÕ`Ê >««i>ÀÊÌÊLiÊ>Ê««ÀÌÕÌÞ°ÊBrian O’Neill, National Center for Ìë iÀVÊ,iÃi>ÀV ]ÊiLÀÕ>ÀÞÊÓä]ÊÓään 140 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 When women are better able to manage their V `Li>À}]ÊÌ iÞÊ>ÞÊLiÊ>LiÊÌÊLiÌÌiÀÊ>>}iÊ >ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViÃ°Ê «ÜiÀiÌÊvÊÜiÊà Õ`Ê >ÛiÊiÛÀiÌ>Ê}>Ã°Ê Lori Hunter, University of Colorado—Boulder, March 13, 2008 vÊÜiÊÀiV}âiÊiÛÀiÌ>ÊÃÃÕiÃÊ>ÃÊ>Êv>VÌÀÊÊ Ài}>ÊÃÌ>LÌÞ]ÊÜiÊV>ÊÕÃiÊÌ iÊÌÊLÕ`ÊVv`iViÊ >`ÊVÕV>ÌÊLiÌÜiiÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÌ >ÌÊ>ÞÊ>Ài>`ÞÊ LiÊÃÌÀÕ}}}ÊÛiÀÊÌiÀÀÌÀÞ°Ê"ÀÊÜiÊV>Êi>ÛiÊÌ iÃiÊ ÃÃÕiÃÊÕÌi`i`ÊÕÌÊÌ iÞÊLiViÊÃÃÕiÃÊÊiiiÌÃÊ vÊVvVÌÊÃÕV Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ >ÛiÊÃiiÊÊ iÞ>°Ê Kent Butts, U.S. Army War College, March 4, 2008 7iÊÌi}À>ÌiÊÜ`viÊVÃiÀÛ>ÌÊ>`Ê«ÕLVÊ i>Ì ]Ê Ü V ÊÃÊÌiÀ`i«i`iÌÊÊ>`Ê>ÀÕ`Ê«ÀÌiVÌi`Ê>Ài>ÃÊ ÊvÀV>°Ê7iÊviiÊÌ >ÌÊÌ ÃÊÃÊÀiÊvÊ>ÊVÃÌivviVÌÛiÊÜ>ÞÊ ÌÊ«ÀiÛiÌÊÕVÌÀi`Ê`Ãi>ÃiÊÌÀ>ÃÃÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ «i«i]ÊÜ`vi]Ê>`ÊÛiÃÌV°ÊGladys Kalema-Zikusoka, Conservation Through Public Health, May 8, 2008 141 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM ÛÀiÌÊÃÊiÌ iÀÊiViÃÃ>ÀÞÊÀÊÃÕvvViÌÊÌÊÌÀ}}iÀÊ VvVÌ°Ê/ iÊiÛÀiÌÊ>ÌÌiÀÃ]ÊLÕÌÊÞÊÕ`iÀÊ ViÀÌ>ÊV`ÌÃ]Ê>`ÊÌ iÀivÀiÊÜiÊà Õ`ÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÌ ÃiÊ conditions. Colin Kahl, Georgetown University, October 5, 2007 7iÊ>Ü>ÞÃÊÃ>ÞÊÌ >ÌÊÜiÊ`½ÌÊvÕ`Ê«ÀLiÃ]ÊÜiÊ vÕ`ÊÃÕÌÃÊÌÊ«ÀLiÃ]Ê>`ÊÜ >ÌÊ>iÃÊv>ÞÊ «>}oÕµÕi]ÊÊÌ ]ÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊ̽ÃÊÌ iÊÃÕÌÊÌÊ>Ê Ü iÊ>ÀÀ>ÞÊvÊ«ÀLiðÊScott Radloff, U.S. Agency for International Development, December 5, 2007 "ÕÀÊLÌÌÊiÊÃÊÌ >ÌÊV>ÌiÊV >}iÊÃÊ>ÊÌ Ài>ÌÊÌÊ >Ì>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊ>`ÊÜÊÃÊÌ iÊÌiÊÌÊÌ>iÊÃiÃLiÊ >VÌ]ÊÌÊÌi}À>ÌiÊÌÊÌÊ>Ì>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊvÀ>iÜÀÃ]Ê >`ÊÌÊLÕ`ÊÌ iÊiViÃÃ>ÀÞÊV>«>VÌÞÊ>`ÊÀiÃiViÊÌÊ >``ÀiÃÃÊÌÊÀiëÃLÞÊÊÌ iÊvÕÌÕÀi°Ê Sherri Goodman, Center for Naval Analysis Corporation, May 14, 2007 7iÊ>ÌÊÌ iÊ iÌiÀÊÜÊVÌÕiÊÌÊ«>ViÊ>Ê } Ê«ÀÀÌÞÊ ÊÃi>ÀV }ÊvÀÊÜ>ÞÃÊÌÊ>iÊÕÀÊiÛÀiÌÊ«>ÀÌÊvÊ Ì iÊÃÕÌ]ÊÌÊëÞÊ>Ê«ÀLiÊÌÊLiÊ>>}i`°Ê Lee H. Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 3, 2007 142 ECSP REPORT U ISSUE 13 U 2008–2009 WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director Board of Trustees Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair Public Members: James H. Billington, The Librarian of Congress; Hillary R. Clinton, The Secretary, U.S. De- partment of State; G. Wayne Clough, The Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, The Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Kathleen Sebelius, The Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Adrienne Thomas, Acting Archivist of the United States; Carol Watson, Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities Private Citizen Members: Charles Cobb, Jr., Robin Cook, Charles L. Glazer, Carlos M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchi- son, Barry S. Jackson, Ignacio E. Sanchez About the Center The Center is the living memorial of the United States of America to the nation’s twenty-eighth president, Wood- row Wilson. Congress established the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relationship between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.” The Center opened in 1970 under its own board of trustees. In all its activities the Woodrow Wilson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, supported financially by annual appropriations from Congress, and by the contributions of foundations, corporations, and individuals. Con- clusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. Cover Photos: An Indian security forces soldier stands guard on a street in Srinagar, 15 January 2008, as an Indian Kashmiri vegetable vendor looks on (Credit: TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP/Getty Images). This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Population and Reproductive Health. The contents are the responsi- bility of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. Views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Center’s staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or programs that provide assistance to the Center. ECSP at the WILSON CENTER www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsp ECSP NEWS FIND US ON: monthly e-newsletter www.wilsoncenter.org/ecspsubscribe ECSP EVENTS webcasts and summaries Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars www.wilsoncenter.org/ecspevents One Woodrow Wilson Plaza ECSP PUBLICATIONS 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW free downloads of every report Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsppubs Tel. 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