Moscow Defense Brief Your Professional Guide Inside # 1, 2010

Worth the Wait CONTENTS

Defense Industry #1 (19), 2010 Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game 2 PUBLISHER Centre for Analysis of Energy Security Strategies and Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market 3 Technologies Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry 6 CAST Director & Publisher Ruslan Pukhov Editor-in-Chief Arms Trade Mikhail Barabanov Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections 9 Advisory Editors Konstantin Makienko Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Alexey Pokolyavin Growing Security Risks 17 Researchers Ruslan Aliev Sergey Denisentsev Armed Forces Polina Temerina Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Dmitry Vasiliev Commander of the Russian Navy 21 Editorial Office 3 Tverskaya-Yamskaya, 24, office 5, Moscow, Russia 125047 Facts & Figures phone: +7 495 251 9069 fax: +7 495 775 0418 Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 25 http://www.mdb.cast.ru/ To subscribe, contact 32 phone: +7 495 251 9069 Our Authors or e-mail: [email protected]

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Cover Photo: Russia’s fifth-generation fighter, the T-50, developed under the Sukhoi corporation’s PAK FA project and first flown on January 29, 2010. Photo taken on February 12, 2010, at the Komsomolsk-upon-Amur airfield, during the T-50’s second test flight. Photo by: Sukhoi Corporation

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010 Printed in Russia # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1 Defense Industry

Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Konstantin Makienko

ussia flew a prototype of its fifth-generation fighter on •• The political risk is that cumbersome Russian bureaucracy RJanuary 29, 2010, in what analysts agree was a major could well stymie Indian participation in the program. milestone for the national aerospace industry. The Sukhoi And without the Indians, mass production becomes corporation’s T-50 jet, developed under the PAK FA (Future commercially unviable because the Russian Defense Front Line Aircraft System) program, took off from a Ministry’s order for the new jets will be very modest. Komsomolsk-upon-Amur airfield for a 47-minute maiden But although it would take at least another decade flight. The aircraft is the first radically new Russian design to turn PAK FA into a proper combat system, the maiden that looks likely to enter commercial production since the flight of the T-50 has been a major boost for the Russian first MiG-29 and Su-27 prototypes of the previous fourth aerospace industry. Its existing customers can now see a clear generation took to the air back in 1977. way forward for their national air forces, and their choice of The maiden flight of the PAK FA has broken America’s Russia as a supplier has been vindicated. Russia can now complete monopoly on the development and production of negotiate with potential foreign customers from a much fifth-generation fighter jets. It has also demonstrated that stronger position, and that includes civilian contracts as well while not America’s equal militarily, Russia is still a solid as military. Several countries, including Libya and Vietnam, second in terms of defense technology, outranking both have already expressed their interest in the future Russian Western Europe and China and punching well above its fifth-generation fighter. economic weight. Of course, any serious military, political or commercial But while the maiden flight itself was a major coup for dividends of the PAK FA program hinge on Russia’s ability Russia, the success of the PAK FA program is not a foregone to take it from the prototype stage to mass production. If conclusion. Serious financial, technical and even political that happens, America’s F-35 and the Russian T-50 will hurdles still remain. They have the potential to cause major be the only two players on the world market for combat delays or even stall the program completely. aircraft after 2020. The European offerings, which are all •• In terms of technology, the biggest worry is the remaining based on essentially fourth-generation technology, will be uncertainty over the so-called “next engine”. The existing marginalized, and Europe itself will most likely be eliminated T-50-01 prototype is equipped with deeply upgraded as a serious competitor. That opens up very alluring and fourth-generation engines. And while they provide hitherto inconceivable prospects of cooperation between the the necessary amount of thrust (even for supersonic Russian aerospace industry and some European aerospace cruising), they are not up to the fifth-generation spec in powers which still retain a large degree of sovereignty and terms of the thrust-to-weight ratio and fuel economy. independence from the United States. Many observers are skeptical about Russia’s chances At present, very little is known about the T-50’s onboard of creating a proper fifth-generation engine that could equipment, and even less about its future missile systems, so compete with America’s Pratt & Whitney F119. Problems there is no point trying to compare the Russian and American also remain with the new radar and other onboard fifth-generation fighters in terms of their combat capability. equipment, but recent progress suggests that the risks But it would not be much of a stretch to say that regardless of here are moderate. the T-50’s actual strengths and weaknesses, it is guaranteed •• The financial risks stem from uncertainty over Russia’s to seize up to 30 per cent of the market simply by virtue of not economic prospects, which are too dependent on exports being American. The new Russian-Indian fighter clearly has of oil, gas and other natural resources. The PAK FA project excellent prospects on the Asia-Pacific markets, especially could well grind to a halt if the country suffers another those which Russia has already staked. What is more, when economic shock like the one it went through in 2009, when paired with the Su-35, the T-50 could be an even more the economy shrank by 8 per cent and the budget deficit enticing offering that America’s much-vaunted bestseller of spiraled to 5.9 per cent. the future, the F-35.

2 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game Energy Security

Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market Natalia Grib, Kommersant publishing house special energy correspondent

ussia is pursuing a number of strategies to secure its with a total length of 1,220 km and annual capacity of Rpresence on the European Union’s gas market. The most 27.5 bcm, is expected to become operational in 2011. The obvious one is to build new pipelines bypassing the existing second leg should follow in 2012. But the project is facing short overland routes. These include the Nord Stream financial hurdles. A new law that came into force in Germany pipeline in the Baltics and the South Stream in the Black Sea on October 2009 limits the margin of profit for gas transit region. A closer look at Russia’s energy policy also reveals that projects to 5 per cent. But shareholders of Nord Stream Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is trying to help his AG are determined to solve that problem. Among them is Turkish counterpart to keep his hand firmly on the tap of the Gazprom itself, which owns a 51-per-cent stake, as well as proposed Nabucco pipeline from the Middle East to Europe. BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas (20 per cent each), Finally, there are signs that Moscow is trying to secure a role and Gasunie (9 per cent). If France’s GDF SUEZ accepts the for itself in future Iranian energy projects, so as to make sure invitation to join the project, it will own a 9-per-cent stake, that cheap Iranian gas does not knock down prices on the while the shares of the two German partners will be reduced European market. The results of these efforts should become to 15.5 per cent each. obvious some time after 2015. Gazprom has already signed new contracts to supply 21 bcm of gas annually via Nord Stream. The remaining 33 bcm of the pipeline’s capacity will be filled with gas rerouted from Strategy One: the gas “pincers” the existing pipelines that cross Belarusian and Ukrainian territory. As for South Stream, so far Russia has not even The idea of building offshore gas pipelines that would bothered to look for potential new customers. The new bypass transit countries came to Vladimir Putin in 2004- pipeline’s projected capacity is over 60 bcm. That makes 2005. Russia’s Yamal-Europe pipeline, which was aiming to it a viable alternative to the Ukrainian gas transit system bring 33bn cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually from Siberian (total transit capacity 120 bcm), on which 75 to 80 per cent gas fields to consumers in Germany, was facing political of Russian gas exports to Europe now depend. obstacles in Belarus and Poland. Belarusian leader Aleksandr South Stream should take the route along the Turkish Lukashenko was refusing to grant Gazprom a long-term lease shelf of the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, and then on to of the land plots for the new pipeline’s pumping stations. Italy and the south of Germany, with spurs from Bulgaria to And the Polish authorities said the Russian gas giant should Serbia and Hungary, and then on to Austria and north Italy. seek individual settlement with each Polish farmer whose The total cost of the project is 8.4bn euros; annual capacity lands the pipeline would cross - on top of demanding much 63 bcm. The projected launch date is 2015. So far, the list of higher transit fees. That is when the decision was made in shareholders includes only Gazprom and Italy’s ENI (50 per Moscow to seek a direct route to Germany, bypassing the cent each). But it is very likely that they will be joined by transit nations. France’s EDF and possibly Turkey’s Botas. Russia’s then president and now prime minister, Nord Stream has by now become a near certainty. The EU Vladimir Putin, said Germany would be taken into “gas has even granted this project trans-European status, which pincers”. That is what the two proposed new gas pipelines, means that it can use state guarantees to attract investment. Nord Stream and South Stream, looked like on the map. South Stream, however, is still in the realm of discussion The former would follow the route along the bottom of the and speculation. For example, Turkish experts argue that Baltic Sea from Vyborg in Leningrad Region to the German Ukraine’s president-elect Viktor Yanukovich could improve town of Greifswald. The latter would take Russian gas along relations with Russia in the area of gas transit so much the bottom of the Black Sea from the pumping station of that there would no longer be any need for a new pipeline Beregovaya to the Bulgarian port of Varna. bypassing Ukraine. But the Russian Energy Ministry and The Nord Stream project, with annual capacity of 55 Gazprom have already expended so much effort on getting bcm and projected cost of 7.4bn euros, is much closer to the EU countries along the proposed route of South Stream fruition than South Stream. The first leg of the pipeline, to join the project that the whole thing is now unlikely to # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3 Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market Energy Security

be simply called off – ­though the project can of course be the Blue Stream, with annual capacity of 16 bcm. Gazrpom, reshaped yet again. ENI and Botas each own a 33.33-per-cent stake in the venture. But when Russia tried in 2005 to secure Turkish consent for building a pipeline to carry Russian gas to Israel via Turkish Strategy Two: the Turkish Gambit territory, Ankara said no. Discussions are now under way on the Blue Stream-2 Turkey, meanwhile, has found itself at the very epicenter project to supply gas to Israel and Cyprus. It is not quite clear of many nations’ energy policy interests. Europe, the Middle though which part of Cyrpus would benefit from this project East, Russia and Central Asia are all now wooing Ankara for - the north, which is under Turkish control, or the rest of the political and economic cooperation. So far, only the EU has island, which is part of the EU. Moscow’s main goal in its been successful. Five European energy companies (Germany’s dealings with Ankara is to secure as much clout in the region RWE, Austria’s OMV, Romania’s Transgaz, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz on energy policy issues as only Washington has wielded, until and Hungary’s MOL) signed a memorandum with Turkey’s very recently. The United States still has a lot of influence Botas in June 2009 on building the Nabucco pipeline, using on Turkey, but Ankara has been increasingly keen to make Turkey’s system of gas pipelines as a component of the transit independent decisions. Whether or not Moscow’s ambitions route. Starting from 2015, the EU will begin to receive an will succeed depends on which of the two pipelines comes additional annual 30 bcm of gas via Turkey. first to the finish line, South Stream or Nabucco. Whoever The Nabucco project hoped to secure gas supplies from is the first to reach the consumer will secure guaranteed Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. But Russia profits. has now signed a contract to buy all Azeri gas exports in the near and medium term. The Trans-Caspian pipeline project, which would connect Turkmen gas fields with Georgia and Strategy Three: Iran as a gas Klondike Turkey, has also been shelved. Supplies from Egypt (1bn cu.m.) and Iraq (6-10bn) are clearly not enough to keep The world is changing. Every nation watching Iran now Nabucco in business. And Iran cannot be used as a supplier has one thing on its mind. Everyone is waiting to see who will for political reasons, at least for now. Against this backdrop, succeed in bringing Iranian gas to the EU market, and when. In the Turkish government has invited Russia to use Nabucco as late 2009, Russia and Iran announced an agreement between an export route. For Turkey, it does not matter where the gas the two countries’ energy ministries to develop a joint energy comes from - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Russia – so long action plan for the next 30 years. For Iran, this represents a as there’s enough of it for the pipeline to operate. chance to attract some of the 20bn dollars the country has But Russia has other plans for cooperation with Turkey. been promised by foreign energy companies to develop the In January 2010, Gazprom said that it now considers Turkey South Pars gas field (the world’s largest, containing 14 trillion a strategic partner, along with Germany and Italy. What is cubic meters of high-quality methane, which is also cheap to more, Moscow has decided to waive the 1bn dollar fine owed produce). For Russia, which is lining up to take part in Iranian to it by Turkey for buying less Russian gas in 2009 than it had projects, the true objective is to have a say in steering Middle originally contracted. In return, Vladimir Putin has secured Eastern energy flows to the consumer markets. a promise by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan Tehran has lately been busy developing cooperation that Ankara would give a formal consent to the proposed route with foreign partners in an effort to avoid UN sanctions of South Stream by November 10, 2010. Russia also expects and especially any military action by Washington, which favors from Turkey during the upcoming privatizations of experts say is becoming increasingly likely. Over the past the gas pipeline networks of Istanbul (worth an estimated year Iran has signed a memorandum with Turkey, which 2bn USD) and Ankara (500m-800m USD). Gazprom has also will invest 4bn dollars over the period of 2010-2013, as well shown interest in the new Turkish underground gas storage as several other agreements with India, the Anglo-Dutch facility now under construction in Tuz. energy giant Shell, and Gazprom. Meanwhile, Moscow and Work to secure Russian involvement in the Samsun- Delhi are trying to win Tehran’s support for the proposal Ceyhan oil pipeline, which is designed to reduce the volume to build the Peace gas pipeline connecting the South Pars of oil shipments via the Bosporus, is proceeding very slowly. field with India via Pakistan, with annual capacity of 60 Turkey wants to speed it up, but it refuses to allow Rosneft bcm. And while India’s only concern is to secure another and Transneft to take a controlling 50-per-cent stake in the energy source for its growing economy, Russia’s goals here pipeline. This is why it has been decided to invite ENI to join are more ambitions. the project. It is hoped that the Italians will help the Russians Moscow wants to make sure that new gas production and the Turks reach an agreement. Italy played a key role in in the Middle East and Central Asia is channelled to the the project to build another pipeline from Russia to Turkey, Asia-Pacific markets rather than Europe. That is why the top 4 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market Energy Security

managers of Gazprom were not too distraught by the launch ranks first in terms of its total gas reserves, but only about 20 of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline (annual capacity 40 per cent of this gas is economical to produce at the current bcm). China is not prepared to pay too much for its gas anyway, prices. This is why Russia is trying to orchestrate careful so the new pipeline helps Russia by removing a potential coordination of energy flows to the export markets with competitor from the European market and diverting new Iran and other members of the Gas Exporting Countries gas production to the developing Asian markets. Meanwhile, Forum (GECF). It hopes to prevent a price war with Iran on continuing economic growth in China and India gives Russia the European markets. These considerations are also part hope that in time, it will find a buyer there for its more costly of the reason why Moscow supports sanctions against Iran gas from the Siberian and Yamal fields. in the IAEA framework. It seems that political backing for The Iranian gas fields lie just below the surface, and international sanctions never comes without some energy most of the gas they hold is recoverable. Russia, meanwhile, or military project in mind.

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5 Russia’s Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market Energy Security

Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry Anton Khlopkov

he long-awaited launch of the Bushehr nuclear power The general contractor of the project, Russia’s Tplant in Iran may finally come this spring. If that happens, Atomstroyexport, undertook to deliver the first power commercial power generation could start before the year’s generation block at Bushehr in a fully operational state under end – it usually commences about six months after a reactor a contract signed on January 8, 1995, and Addendum One of goes live. However, in the case of Bushehr it could well take August 29, 1998. The contract itself was based on a Russian- longer – the reactor there is not a standard run-of-the-mill Iranian intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in unit, but rather a hybrid of Russian and German technology building a nuclear power plant on Iranian territory, signed (more on that later). The political situation over the Iranian on August 25, 1992 . nuclear program could also bring further delays - although It was 15 years on January 8, 2010 since the signing the UN Security Council sanctions now in effect against of the Russian-Iranian contract on the completion of the Iran (Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803) do not restrict Bushehr NPP. Another big date is coming this August – it will cooperation with Tehran on building nuclear power plants. be 35 years since works began at the Bushehr site. Be that as it may, Russia made a strategic decision on whether or not to finish the construction of the first reactor at Bushehr back in 2007, and that decision is unlikely to be Problems with subcontractors reversed now. Once the decision was made, first shipments of nuclear fuel to Bushehr began in December 2007. The last In January 1991 the government in Moscow ended its deliveries were made in January 2008. By February 2009, subsidies to Soviet contractors building nuclear power plants construction and installation works at the Bushehr plant were for foreign customers. Officials recognized the importance nearing completion . In January 2010, the reactor’s secondary of high-tech exports, and offered the exporters all kinds of coolant circuit passed hydraulic tests . As the date of the support - except financial. That forced many companies to look launch draws near, a closer look at the project’s turbulent for greener pastures. One such contractor, Atomenergoexport history and unusual nature might well be in order. (which later became Atomstroyexport after a merger) had Whichever way you look at Bushehr – the technology to diversify away from its core activity of building Soviet- involved, the political environment, the financial complexity designed nuclear energy reactors abroad. or the challenging physical climate – the project is quite The company ended up making a living off exports simply unique. This nuclear plant is unlike anything else the and imports of scrap metal, nonferrous metals and rare- Soviet specialists have ever built abroad – or indeed anything earth elements, consumer electronics, clothes and shoes. It their foreign counterparts have built, either. spent some of the proceeds on looking for new custom for its core nuclear business - mostly just business trips and consultations with potential clients who might want a Soviet/ Background Russian-designed nuclear power plant. In later years it also did some pre-contract work on nuclear projects. Work on the project was launched by German specialists Another obstacle faced by potential new projects to build in August 1975. The original plan was to build two 1,240 MW nuclear reactors for foreign customers was the shortage of energy reactors based on the Convoy design. The first was to Russian engineers and technicians with suitable experience. be finished by 1980, the second was to follow in 1981. But the Back at the time, the last nuclear energy reactor built in project was suspended due to lack of funding in 1979, when the former Soviet Union itself was the No 6 reactor at the Iran was facing a large budget deficit, and then completely Zaporizhzhya NPP, Ukraine. That is why Ukrainian specialists shelved after the Islamic revolution. were invited to work in Iran after they had completed their stints The first time Russian specialists visited the Bushehr at Zaporizhzhya. At some point Ukrainians made up 80 per cent site was in 1994. Their job was to assess the damage done to of all non-Iranian personnel working at the Bushehr site. what the Germans had built by the passage of time and air Meanwhile, the qualification and skills of the Iranian raids during the eight-year war with Iraq. subcontractors working at Bushehr had proved inadequate. 6 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry Energy Security

The Iranians had only minimal involvement in the project A decision was made to take stock of the existing when the Germans were in charge. But under the January equipment using only Russian expertise. That took several 1995 agreement between the Russian Ministry of Atomic years, but in the end tens of thousands of pieces of hardware Energy (Minatom) and the Atomic Energy Organization were deemed fit for use with the Russian design. All of them of Iran (AEOI), Iranian subcontractors secured a share of are now part of the nuclear power plant. construction and installation jobs. Another important detail which is now mostly forgotten It took these subcontractors three years (from 1995 to is that the initial German project would have allowed the 1997) to do the work that should have been done in 12 months. Bushehr NPP to double as a water desalination plant. But In order to keep the project on track, a Minatom delegation that idea was abandoned in the later Russian iteration of the sent to Tehran in 1998 pushed through the decision that the Bushehr design. Russian general contractor would finish the first reactor on its own. An agreement to that effect was signed on August 29, 1998 as an addendum to the main contract. Financial hurdles During the negotiations on the Bushehr contract, Climate Tehran agreed to pay in several installments upon completion of individual project milestones (as opposed to financing The climate in the Bushehr area is very harsh. It is the project by means of a Russian loan). What is more, the extremely hot and humid, and there is lots of brine in the Iranians agreed to pay 80 per cent in cash, and only 20 per cent air due to the proximity of the ocean. That puts additional in kind . That was one of the major incentives for Minatom requirements on the equipment, because in a climate like to undertake the whole complicated project of finishing a that, even stainless steel goes to rust. A special painting nuclear power plant started by the Germans . The total value technology had to be developed to protect the station’s of the contract, as agreed in the 1998 protocol, was set at just structural elements. over 1bn dollars. The high temperatures pose further problems. The Ever since the signing of the addendum to the contract summer highs at the Bushehr site can reach +50C . When in 1998, this figure has not been adjusted for inflation. A Russian specialists arrived in the late 1990s, air conditioning serious strengthening of the euro against the dollar posed was not working yet, so temperatures within the containment a further problem, since some of equipment and material area would sometimes hit 60C . The Germans who worked at the suppliers come from the Euro area. site in the 1970s had a special clause in their contract allowing In February 2007, work at the Bushehr site started to them to put all work on hold during the summer heat waves. grind to a halt due to funding shortages. By the summer of that year, the Russian contractor had reduced the number of staff there from 3,000 to just 800 people . After some hard Integration of German and Russian technology bargaining, during which the Russian general contractor at Bushehr even contemplated pulling out of the project, an agreement was reached with the Iranians that the growing cost of By the middle of 1979, when the Germans departed, a equipment and engineering works would be compensated lot of equipment at the two reactor sites had already been once the reactor goes live. The size of that compensation will installed. It was then left mothballed for 20 years, so much also be finalized once Bushehr becomes operational. This of it was damaged, and some components were lost. When resolution of the financial problems enabled Russia to make the Russian specialists arrived at Bushehr in 1994, all they first deliveries of nuclear fuel to Bushehr in December 2007, saw was heaps of machinery that had gone to rust, and no thus ruling out the possibility that the project would once manuals . again be abandoned. At the insistence of the Iranians, the Russian contractors Another difficulty the Russian contractor had to contend had to integrate most of the German hardware already in with was that it was impossible to obtain a state loan in Russia place with the Russian VVER-1000 reactor design. The itself for getting the project rolling and for signing contracts German engineers had left behind a total of 80,000 pieces of with equipment manufacturers. equipment and structural elements. Much of the technical documentation was lost, damaged or incomplete . Russia turned to Germany for help - but was rebuffed, primarily US pressure for political reasons, by the government in Berlin, which also imposed an embargo on exports to Iran of parts and In the period from mid-1990s to mid-2000s, Russia’s components for the nuclear power plant. cooperation with Iran, especially on nuclear energy, was # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7 Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry Energy Security

the biggest thorn in the relations between Washington and Conclusion Moscow. After 1995, the “Iranian issue” informed America’s stance on almost every single aspect of its dealings with 1. The Bushehr project signed 15 years ago is no longer Russia, and especially cooperation in high-tech areas, such a “life raft” for the Russian nuclear industry, which struggled as the International Space Station, peaceful use of nuclear through the 1990s after state funding had suddenly dried energy, launches of American satellites by Russian carriers, up. But it was the 1bn dollar Iranian contract signed in 1995- etc . For nearly a decade the successive US administrations 1998 that had largely enabled the entire sector to preserve viewed Russian-Iranian cooperation on Bushehr as evidence the expertise and retain specialists needed to build a nuclear of Moscow’s indirect support for the Iranian nuclear arms power plant, at least until Russia managed to secure more program. custom from the Chinese (the new reactor in Tianwan) and Washington spared no diplomatic effort to persuade the Indians (the Kudankulam project). Russia to walk away from the Bushehr project, and to 2. The project has largely lost its economic importance get several other countries to ban their companies from to Russia, and become more of a political cause. The chances taking part. As already mentioned, Germany refused to of turning a profit on the whole venture are remote: the costs cooperate with Russia for political motives and under US of this 1bn dollar contract have now spiraled to 3bn euros pressure. Ukraine and the Czech Republic soon followed or more. Therefore the key benefits of Bushehr are political, suit. Ukraine’s Turboatom was due to supply the turbine for inasmuch as it represents a practical implementation of Iran’s the nuclear plant. But those plans were cancelled during US right to develop a peaceful nuclear program, and therefore Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Kiev on March alleviates the concerns in Tehran and other capitals of the 6, 1998. Kiev pulled out of the Iranian project in return for developing world over alleged restrictions on their access to Washington’s pledge to support Ukrainian membership nuclear energy. of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and 3. For many nations mulling a nuclear energy program a (broken) promise of greater support for the country’s of their own, the project has become an indicator or Russia’s energy sector, especially in Kharkiv Region (as part of the credibility as a partner in big international high-tech projects. so called Kharkiv Initiative). The Czech Republic’s ZVVZ The country’s reputation is now at stake at Bushehr. So it really Milevsko was due to supply ventilation and air conditioning matters that despite sustained US pressure over many years, and equipment. But in March 2000, shortly before Madeleine the withdrawal of several third-country subcontractors from the Albright’s visit to Prague, the Czech government passed a project under pressure from Washington, the launch of power law through parliament which effectively vetoed the deal. generation at Bushehr is now a matter of several months. Russia’s Atomstroyexport therefore suddenly faced the 4. The Bushehr NPP is a good example of integration of problem of looking for alternative suppliers. Russian technology into Western designs. Russian hardware It also has to be said that apart from American (and has been successfully merged with the German-designed also Israeli) criticism, Minatom had to fend off domestic structural framework. That could help Rosatom, the Russian opponents (although they represented a minority point of nuclear industry giant, in its ambitions to partner with view). They argued that the Bushehr project would further foreign companies in building nuclear power plants in Russia sour the already tense relations with the West, and help Iran itself and abroad. develop military uses for nuclear energy. 5. The experience of Russian-Iranian cooperation at Not before 2005 did George W Bush recognize that Bushehr can be used to build more nuclear energy reactors the Bushehr nuclear plant poses no threat to the nuclear on Iranian territory. One obvious possibility would be a nonproliferation regime. And in December 2007 he welcomed second reactor at Bushehr itself. But any practical steps on the Russian decision to supply nuclear fuel to Bushehr, that proposal would have to wait until Iran answers the key arguing that this would remove the need for Iran to build its remaining questions on its past undeclared nuclear activities, own uranium enrichment facility or develop an independent and until the most sensitive issues of the Iranian nuclear nuclear fuel cycle capability. Part of the reason for US support dossier are resolved. Meanwhile, the very first step towards was the deal signed by Moscow and Tehran on February 28, a second Bushehr reactor would be the beginning of power 2005, under which spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr plant generation at the first reactor, which can be expected before would be shipped back to Russia. the year’s end.

8 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry Arms Trade

Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Dmitry Vasiliev

ussian arms exports edged upwards by USD 150m Indeed, if export contracts signed by independent suppliers Rin 2009 to USD 8.5bn (see Figure 1). Adjusted for the of spare parts and components (worth an estimated USD 0.3 per cent deflation1 of the US dollar, the real-terms 500m) are added to the final tally, 2009 becomes the best year growth was a modest 2.1 per cent, meaning that sales have ever for the industry. essentially been flat over the past two years. That serves It appears that demand for Russian weapons has been as further indication that the Russian defense industry immune to the world economic crisis. Many observers were has reached the limits of its export revenue generating taken by surprise by the much higher than expected official capacity2. Further growth will require a serious upgrade arms exports figures - owing perhaps to the fact that many of production facilities, as well as investment in skills deals (such as the Venezuelan and Vietnamese contracts) had and training. But for all that, Russian defense contractors not been reported in the media. It is quite possible that ROE can expect a sharp rise in their rouble earnings thanks to could have raked in even more orders (especially considering favorable exchange rate conditions (the rouble fell from the ongoing talks with Saudi Arabia and Libya). But it 24.89 to 31.76 to the US dollar in 2009)3. appears that the capacity of the Russian defense contractors, hidebound as they are by all the aforementioned problems, simply cannot keep up with demand. Surprise rise in defense contracts portfolio Official figures show that Russia’s portfolio of defense Key developments in 2009 contracts had reached USD 40bn by the end of 2009 - an increase of USD 7bn on the previous year. Rosoboroneksport 1. Vietnam became Russia’s largest weapons customer (ROE), Russia’s sole authorized exporter of finished military in terms of new contracts signed in 2009. It placed a large equipment, secured an unprecedented USD 15bn of new order (estimated at USD 4bn) for six Project 636M (Kilo sales last year. The previous record - USD 14bn - was set class) conventional submarines and the requisite onshore in 2006, when the Algerian and the first Venezuelan deals infrastructure to be built by Russian companies. It also signed were announced (see Figure 1b)4. Taking inflation into a contract for eight Su-30MK2 Flanker fighter jets, becoming account, 2009 has been as successful for the Russian defense one of Russia’s top six defense customers along with India, contractors as 2006, despite the world economic crisis. China, Algeria, Venezuela and Syria.

Figure 1. Russian defense exports in 2006-2009

* – Rosoboroneksport figures plus USD 500m, the estimated worth of contracts signed by independent suppliers of components, instruments and accessories. Figures for 2006 provided by the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation. Source: FSMTC, ROE; CAST Estimates. # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9 Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

2. Venezuela, which received a USD 2.2bn loan from (See Table 1), accounting for roughly 65 per cent of the official Moscow in 2009 to be spent on Russian weapons, probably, arms exports figure of USD 8.5bn. If exports of spare parts, was the second-largest customer. But it is not clear what exactly instruments and accessories (worth about USD 1bn) are the Venezuelans have bought. The only known contract is for included in the tally, the so-called transparency index will the delivery of 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks. The increase to 0.8 (80 per cent)5. rest is pure speculation, though on the whole it is safe to assume Aerospace equipment is still the largest category of that the new Venezuelan deal includes a large number of air Russia’s military exports (61 per cent of identified deliveries, defense missile systems and artillery equipment (S-300V and see Figure 2). Arms and equipment for the ground forces Pechora-2M SAM systems, Smerch MLR systems, Msta-S and ranked second (21 per cent of the total), followed by naval Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, etc.). Unofficial reports equipment and air defense systems (9 per cent and 8 per cent, claim that the deal is actually much bigger than the size of the respectively). Meanwhile, the share of aerospace equipment Russian loan would suggest, estimating it at up to USD 4bn. in the official ROE exports figures is 50 per cent (of the 3. According to open sources, not a single large contract USD 7.44bn total), followed by arms and equipment for the was signed with India in 2009. The only new sale reported in ground forces (19 per cent), naval equipment (14 per cent) the media is the purchase of five Ka-31 Helix E airborne early and air defense systems (13 per cent). The disparity between warning helicopters worth USD 100m. the official figures and our calculations is mainly due to the 4. For the first time in several years, fighter jets made by underreporting of naval and air defense exports in the open RSK MiG have become a significant export item. Deliveries sources. have begun in earnest on an earlier contract for MiG-29K In our estimates of the destinations for Russian arms fighters to be based on India’s Vikramaditya aircraft carrier. deliveries in 2009, Algeria ranks first with 29 per cent, followed Russia has also signed a EUR 400m contract with Burma for by India (25 per cent) and China (12 per cent). ROE has not 20 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets. provided any regional breakdown of its exports figures. 5. The Russian Defense Ministry has made clear its intention to begin buying arms and military equipment Breakdown by type of equipment abroad - and not just a few samples to gain access to foreign technology, but as part of the Russian army’s routine weapons Aerospace equipment. Our estimate of aerospace procurement program. The announcement of the plan to buy equipment deliveries in 2009 is USD 3.45bn. The bulk of that a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France was the figure (USD 2.07bn) was generated by 41 fighter jets of the first signal of this new policy. Su‑30 Flanker family shipped to several countries, including: 20 Su‑30MKI aircraft to India (including 2 fully completed jets and 18 assembly kits), 14 Su-30MKI(A) to Algeria, six Identified deliveries Su‑30MKM to Malaysia and one Su-30MK2 to Indonesia. Deliveries began in earnest in 2009 on the contract The combined worth of Russian arms deliveries to to supply MiG-29K fighters for the future Indian aircraft foreign customers reported in the open sources is USD 5.64bn carrier Vikramaditya (former heavy aircraft carrying cruiser

Figure 2. Breakdown of identified 2009 deliveries of Russian weapons by type and by country*

* – based on total deliveries estimate of USD 5.64bn. These calculations do not include the deliveries of spare parts, instruments and accessories (estimated at USD 1bn) because of the scarcity of details on those exports. The regional breakdown does not include the sales of Igla man-portable SAM systems, estimated at about USD 50m annually. Source: CAST estimate based on open source information. 10 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

Admiral Gorshkov). Russia’s RSK MiG corporation handed SAM systems every year. All the other transfers of air defense over to the Indians another four jets worth an estimated USD equipment could not be identified. 180m. That means that six aircraft out of the total 16 have The beginning of shipments to Iran of the S-300PMU1 now been delivered. (SA-20) SAM systems (an upgraded version of the S-300PS Afghanistan and Azerbaijan seem to have been the two units from the Russian Defense Ministry’s existing stock) main destinations for Russian helicopter deliveries in 2009. was initially scheduled for the spring of 2009, but was later Kabul received 13 Mi-17V-5 Hip assault landing helicopters, postponed until the fall of that year, and then suspended with the United States acting as an intermediary. Baku indefinitely for political reasons. Iran has already voiced its appears to have taken delivery of six Mi-17-1V transports. At frustration on that account6. least another 15 machines of the Mi-17 family were shipped Spare parts, instruments and accessories. to Iran, Bolivia, Iraq, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan Deliveries in this category reached USD 1bn in 2009. Half and Egypt. China received three Ka-28 Helix anti-submarine of that figure was generated by independent exporters. helicopters. This list is almost certainly incomplete, as the In 2006, those exporters sold about USD 400m worth of 2009 production target of Vertolety Rossii, the umbrella their wares. Sukhoi, a combat aircraft maker, remains an corporation for Russian helicopter makers, was 180 units, of undisputed leader in this area - its sales of spare parts which 70 percent were destined for exports. and components remained unchanged from the previous As in the previous two years, China was the main year at USD 200m. destination for aircraft turbofan engines under separate contracts. The 2009 deliveries include 122 AL-31FN engines Regional breakdown (for China’s J-10 fighter jets), 15 RD-93 engines (for FC-1 fighters) and 11 D-30KP2 engines for H-6K bombers, worth Algeria, which received a large number of Su-30 fighter an estimated total of USD 600m. jets in 2009, was the top destination for Russian arms Arms and equipment for ground troops. Identified deliveries (29 per cent of the total). It was followed by India transfers of arms and equipment for ground troops in 2009 (25 per cent), which took delivery of Su-30MKI and MiG-29 add up to USD 1.18bn. For the third year running, the T-90S fighter jets, as well as T-90S tanks. China, which received main battle tank accounted for the bulk of exports in this large batches of aircraft engines, and probably SAM systems, category. Its largest recipient last year was India, which took was third (12 per cent). Syria ranked fourth with 8 per cent delivery of 100 completed T-90S tanks and possibly several after importing 20 Pansir-S1 anti-aircraft systems. Malaysia dozen assembly kits, worth an estimated USD 600m in total. and Venezuela share the fifth place with 5 per cent each. Naval equipment. Identified deliveries of naval Vietnam and Afghanistan accounted for 3 per cent each. On equipment in 2009 stood at USD 537m. But judging from the whole, Russian arms exports are fairly diverse in terms ROE’s official breakdown of deliveries by type of equipment, of the geography of their destinations. the actual figure is probably twice as high. Algeria was the largest importer - it has taken delivery of one new Project 636M conventional submarine (USD 300m) Identified new contracts and one refitted and upgraded Project 877EKM conventional submarine (USD 50m). According to aggregate data from media sources, Russia Also in 2009 Russia and India agreed on the final cost signed USD 6.89bn worth of new arms exports contracts of refit and upgrade of the Admiral Gorshkov heavy aircraft in 2009 (See Table 2). That figure does not include the carrying cruiser, which will be renamed into Vikramaditya estimated USD 1bn in exports of spare parts, components once it becomes part of the Indian Navy. The new figure is and maintenance services. But the actual grand total of USD 2.3bn, and the delivery date has been pushed back to arms deals signed last year (including those not reported in 2012. The initial sum under the 2004 contract was USD 850m, the media) is much higher at USD 15.5bn. The Venezuelan with the completion date some time in 2008. contract, details of which have not been released, can account Air defense systems. Identified deliveries of air defense for some but not all of that difference. systems fell to just USD 460m in 2009 - a third of the previous For the first time in many years, naval contracts made year’s figure. But judging from ROE official reports, actual up the bulk of the total new sales (58 per cent of identified exports were closer to USD 1bn. contracts, see Figure 3), well ahead of aerospace equipment Open-source reports have allowed us to identify only (32 per cent) and arms and equipment for ground troops the delivery of the new Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) gun-missile anti- (9 per cent). There have been some media reports about new aircraft system to Syria and the UAE. Media coverage of that air defense contracts in 2009, but their size is unclear. In contract has been fairly detailed. It is also known that Russia the regional breakdown of new Russian arms exports exports about USD 50m worth of the Igla man-portable deals, Vietnam leads with 63 per cent. China is a distant # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 11 Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

second with 10 per cent, followed by Burma with 8 per Air Force. The deal was mediated by the Pentagon. Another cent. ROE has not released its own regional breakdown big contract (five Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters, figures for 2009. worth USD 100m) was signed with India - that in fact was the only known Indian contract signed last year. By type of equipment Equipment for ground troops. The estimated total of the contracts for this type of equipment signed last year Naval. This category came out on top last year thanks is USD 625m. The largest of those was for the delivery of 92 solely to the signing of the large Vietnam contract for six upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks from the Russian Project 636M conventional submarines, worth an estimated army stock, worth about USD 400m, to Venezuela. USD 2.1bn. The contract also includes the creation of on- Air defense systems. Estimating the value of air defense shore infrastructure, which will have to be built from scratch contracts signed in 2009 is difficult because these contracts because Vietnam has never had any submarines. The total were quite unusual. Kazakhstan bought ten S‑300PS (SA‑10) value of the contract is therefore much higher that the price of SAM systems from the Russian Air Force stock. But since the subs themselves – USD 4bn is a conservative estimate. the country is a member of the Collective Security Treaty The Vietnam deal was the largest not only in the Organization, it clearly must have paid much less for them naval equipment category, but across all categories. It was than other countries would have had to fork out. There undoubtedly the contract of the year for Russia’s defense have also been reports that Venezuela has agreed to buy an industry. unspecified number of tracked chassis mounted S-300V (SA- Aerospace equipment. Our estimate for new sales in 12) SAM systems - but it is not clear whether a firm contract this category is USD 2.24bn. The largest deal (worth about has actually been signed. The last time such a system was sold EUR 400m) was signed with Burma for 20 MiG-29 fighter abroad was many years ago. jets (which had already been partially built when the contract was signed). Regional breakdown A big contract, estimated at USD 320m, was signed for eight Su-30MK2 fighter jets with Vietnam. The deal does not The Vietnamese contracts for diesel-electric subs include airborne weapons, which Vietnam intends to buy and Su-30MK2 fighters account for the bulk of identified later. Another big contract (worth an estimated USD 720m) weapons deals signed in 2009 (62 per cent in dollar terms). was signed with China for Al-31FN and D-30KP2 turbofan China, which signed several contracts for Russian aircraft engines to be fitted on Chinese aircraft of indigenous engines, came second with 10 per cent. Burma is third with design. 8 per cent (20 MiG-29 fighters), followed by Venezuela (6 Russia’s largest helicopter contract last year (22 Mi‑171 per cent, T-72M1M tanks) and Iraq (5 per cent, Mi-171 helicopters, worth USD 345m) was signed with the Iraqi helicopters).

Figure 3. Breakdown of identified arms exports contracts by type of equipment and region, 2009*

* – based on estimated total of USD 6.89bn. The figure does not include contracts for spare parts, instruments and accessories (USD 1bn) because no details on them are available. Source: CAST estimate based on media reports.

12 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

Prospects for 2010 Imports The existing portfolio of defense contracts should keep The Russian Defense Ministry last year clearly stated its Russian arms exports revenue steady for another five years. intention to begin importing arms and military equipment. Projections for 2010 include the sale of about 40 fighter What the generals have in mind is not just individual samples jets of the Su-27/30 Flanker family. Of these, India will to gain access to foreign technology, but bulk contracts. receive 30 Su-30MKI jets, Indonesia three Su‑27SKM’s and Right now they see France, Israel and possibly Italy as the Vietnam four Su-30MK2’s. Final deliveries will probably key partners in this area. The announcement in 2009 of the be made on the Indian contract for 16 carrier-based plan to buy a large (21,300 tonnes) warship from France – a MiG‑29K fighters. But deliveries will commence on two versatile assault landing helicopter carrier of the Mistral other contracts with India - one for the upgrade of MiG‑29 class, to be precise - was a real shocker. The price of the ship fighters to MiG‑29SMT specification, the other for 80 Mi- is estimated as EUR 500m, and the entire program at about 17V-5 helicopters. That means that India will probably EUR 1bn. The rationale for the decision remains less than become the largest importer of Russian weapons in 2010 obvious – neither the Russian armed forces nor the national in terms of actual shipments. Russia is also expected to defense industry would benefit from such a purchase. The make first deliveries of the Yak-130 trainers to Algeria – Defense Ministry came under heavy criticism following the the contract represents an important achievement for the announcement, and plans for the deal have now been shelved Russian aerospace sector. – but not necessarily cancelled altogether. The main event in naval equipment exports will be the Last year Russia also signed a deal with France on transfer to India of the recently completed Project 971I Nerpa licensed production of Thales Catherine thermal images for its (Improved Akula class) nuclear-powered attack submarine. T-90 tanks (the sample batch of the imagers was purchased in In air defense sector, the contract with Syria for the Pantsir- 2008). Production should begin in 2010 at the Vologda optical S1 systems will be completed, but deliveries will continue to equipment plant, at the rate of 20-30 imagers per month. the UAE. Syria is likely to receive the first Buk-M2E (SA-17) Russia has also signed a framework agreement with France’s air defense missile systems under a large 2007 contract. In Safran and Thales, outlining prospects for joint development of the category of arms and equipment for ground troops, the electronic systems. Last but not least, Moscow has begun talks main exports will include T-90S tank assembly kit supplies with the French on buying their FELIN infantry combat suit. to India, as well as the Venezuelan contracts (including the Last year the Russian Defense Ministry bought upgraded T-72M1M tanks). 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Israel Aerospace The biggest sales Russia hopes to secure in 2010 Industries for USD 53m, including the mini-class Bird-Eye include proposed deals with India (for an additional batch 400, tactical class I-View MK 150 and medium class Searcher of Su‑30MKI jets and MiG-29K carrier-based fighters), China Mk II drones. First deliveries on the contract will be made in (new RD-93 aircraft turbofan engines), Vietnam (another 2010, and the ministry is already in talks to buy more. The batch of Su‑30MK2 fighters) and Greece (under the BMP‑3M FSB, the Russian security service, has decided to follow the infantry fighting vehicle program), as well as with Saudi Defense Ministry’s suit and is now looking to place an order Arabia and Libya. for its own UAVs with Israel’s Aeronautics Defense Systems.

Table 1. Major* Identified Deliveries of Russian Arms in 2009 Recipient Weapon No. Year of Year(s) of Delivered in 2009 Delivered by Notes designation ordered contract deliveries 2010, units mln USD units ASIA China AL-31FN jet 122 2009 2009** 500 122** Completed Contract value – USD 500m. engines For Chinese J-10 fighters India Su-30MKI fighter 140 2000 2004- 430 18** 69 Contract value – USD kit 2012 3.3bn. Delivery of kits to be (2014) completed by 2012, India to complete assembly by 2014 Su-30MKI 40 2007 2008- 80 2** 6 Contract value – USD 1.6bn fighters 2010

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 13 Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

Recipient Weapon No. Year of Year(s) of Delivered in 2009 Delivered by Notes designation ordered contract deliveries 2010, units mln USD units India MiG-29K/KUB 12 / 4 2004 2008- 180 2 / 2 3 / 3 Contract value – USD 732m. carrier based 2010 For airborne carrier fighters Vikramaditya (ex Admiral Gorshkov) IL-38 aircraft 5 2001 2005- 80 2* Completed Contract value – USD 205m. upgrade program 2009 Airplanes equipped with Sea Dragon multimission avionics and electronic warfare suite. Contract includes delivery of 20 Uran Kh-35 (AS-20) anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and other arms T-90S MBTs / 124 / 2007 2008- 600 100 / 124 / n/a Contract value – USD 1.24bn T-90 MBT kit 223 2011 n/a Smerch MLR 38 2005 2007- 80*** 4-10** Completed Contract value – USD 450m systems 2009 Vietnam Bastion coast 1 batt. 2006 2009 150 1 Completed Contract value – USD 150m. based anti-ship Contract includes R&D works missile system and a set of Yahont anti-ship missiles Malaysia Su-30MKM 18 2003 2007- 300 6 Completed Contract value – USD 910m, fighters 2009 of which 30 % is paid in kind (palm oil). Another USD 270m will be offset against the Russian share in an aircraft servicing and component production joint venture to be set up in Malaysia. Afghanistan Mi-17-V5 61 n/a 2009- 100 9 9 Estimated contract value – helicopters 2016 USD 670m. US Department of Defense acts as an intermediary in the contract. MIDDLE EAST Algeria Su-30MKI(A) 28 2006 2007- 1200 14 Completed Contract value – USD fighters 2009 2.4bn, of which USD 1.4bn represents the cost of armament and infrastructure Kilo class 2 2006 2009- 300 1 1 Contract value – USD 600m (Project 636M) 2010 submarines Syria Pantzir-S1 air 36 2006 2008- 330 20** 30** Estimated contract value – defense systems 2010 USD 600m T-72 MBTs 1000 2006 2007- 100 200 600 Contract value – USD 500m upgrade program 2010 UAE Pantzir-S1 air 50 2000 2009- 80*** 4-6** 4-6 Contract value – USD 800m defense systems 2012

14 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

Recipient Weapon No. Year of Year(s) of Delivered in 2009 Delivered by Notes designation ordered contract deliveries 2010, units mln USD units LATIN AMERICA Venezuela Construction of - 2007 2007- 100 n/a n/a Contract value – USD 400m a MRO center 2010** for Russian helicopters Construction of a - 2006 2008- 160 n/a n/a Contract value – USD 475m plant for license 2010 production of AK-103 assault rifles and 7.62 cartridges * – delivery value more than USD 80 mln. ** – CAST estimate. *** – estimate based on a mid-value. Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates.

Table 2. Major* Identified Contracts for Delivery of Russian Arms Signed in 2009

Recipient Weapon designation No. ordered Year(s) of deliveries Contract value, Notes m USD ASIA China AL-31FN jet engines 122 2009** 500 For Chinese J-10 fighters D-30KP2 jet engines 55 2009-2011 220** For Chinese H-6K air bombers India Ka-31 airborne early 5 n/a 100 warning helicopters Vietnam Su-30MK2 fighters 8 2010-2011 320 Fighters to be delivered without armament or training equipment Kilo class (Project 6 2011-2016** 4000 The contract includes the construction 636M) submarines of the whole infrastructure for these submarines. Currently Vietnam doesn’t have a submarine fleet. The cost of the submarines themselves is estimated at USD 2.1bn. Myanmar MiG-29 fighters 20 2010 560** Contract value – EUR 400m. The fighters are from production reserve. Turkmenistan Kamaz trucks 1052 n/a 100 MIDDLE EAST Iraq Mi-171 helicopters 22 2009-2011 345 US Department of Defense acts as an intermediary in the contract. Yemen BTR-80A APCs 100 n/a 100 120-mm 2B1 towed 50 n/a mortar Kamaz trucks 400 2009 LATIN AMERICA Venezuela T-72M1M MBTs 92 n/a 400 Upgraded ex-Russian * - contract value more than USD 80m. ** - CAST estimate. Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates. # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15 Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

1 http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/CurrentInflation.asp. 2 Rosoboroneksport would have been quite happy simply to repeat the financial results of 2008, let alone surpass them. 3 Average exchange rate for the respective years. 4 That year ROE, which had not yet been designated Russia’s sole arms exporter, signed USD 9bn worth of contracts. 5 In our roundup of 2008 results (see Moscow Defense Brief, No 1, 2009) we managed to identify 80 per cent of the transfers, but the figure did not include exports of components and spare parts. Had those been taken into account, the ratio would have been 0.9 (90 per cent). 6 However, it cannot be ruled out that up to three battalions of Buk-M1 (SA-11) SAM systems from the Russian army stock were secretly delivered to Iran in 2009. The transfer of these systems to Iran (“customer 102”), along with the S-300PS systems, was mentioned in the table of transfers of equipment assigned to Russia’s air defense units (under the Russian Air Force and Air Defense) as part of their reform. The table, which was based on directives of Russia’s Defense Ministry, has been circulating on the Web since early 2009. It is available at: www.ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php/topic,382.0.html.

16 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections Arms Trade

Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks Mikhail Barabanov, Andrey Frolov

Naval build-up in Asia-Pacific and urbanized civilization, and are now transitioning to post-industrial and information-based society. Asia is at the Asia has become the most rapidly developing region of cutting edge of this transition. Rapid transformation of the our planet in the past few decades. Japan’s economy was the region’s leading nations is causing major shifts in the global first to take off in the most spectacular way; it was followed security landscape, with the emergence of new world powers by South Korea and Taiwan, and now China. The economies of (Japan, India, potentially Korea) and even superpowers India and Southeast Asia are also booming. Asia has become (China). Economic growth has enabled several AsPac a major hub of manufacturing, technological innovation and countries to achieve rapid modernization of their armed business activity. In a space of just two generations, several forces, which in many respects are now becoming some of large Asian nations and billions of their citizens have made the most advanced in the world. Growing defense budgets of a leap from the third world to the very peak of industrial leading Asian economies have turned Asia-Pacific into one of

Table/Figure 1. New-Builds Major Warships Commissioned in the World in 2000-2009

Warships USA Europe Russia China India Japan Rest Asia Rest World Total World Incl. Total Asia Nuclear- 6 1 1 3 - - - - 11 3 Powered Submarines Conventional - 11 1 25 1 8 10 12 68 44 Submarines Aircraft 2 2 ------4 - Carriers Destroyers and 28 25 1 23 7 13 18 15 130 61 Frigates Corvettes 2 8 2 - 3 - 10 3 28 13 Large 6 11 - 12 2 2 9 1 43 25 Amphibious Ships Total warships 44 58 5 63 13 23 47 29 284 146

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 17 Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks Arms Trade

the two largest regional arms markets, along with the Middle •• Concerned by China’s military build-up, other nations East. As Asian economies continue their breakneck growth, in the Asia-Pacific region have stepped up their own that market will become even more important. naval programs. In some cases that process bears all Given the lengthy coastlines of many Asian countries, the hallmarks of a regional naval arms race, directed and the importance of waterways for their global trade, it is predominantly against China. unsurprising that the region’s navies are at the forefront of •• Whereas the naval strength of the AsPac nations is growing, military modernization. Asia has become a hotspot of naval the navies of the “traditional” powers are shrinking. There build-up. Most of the new warships launched in the world is a distinct possibility that at some point in the future, over the past decade were built for the Asian navies. these powers may have trouble ensuring “free access” to This has led to a radical shift in the balance of naval the region for themselves in the event of a crisis. That is strength not just in Asia but on the global scale. While the an especially worrying possibility for the US Navy, which Asian countries are rapidly beefing up their navies, the plays a crucial role in the region’s security system. traditional powers such as the United States, Europe and •• The prospect of diminishing American naval power in the the former Soviet Union have been reducing their numerical region in the face of growing Chinese military strength strength at sea for 20 years now, ever since the end of the could force many US allies in Asia-Pacific to rely less on Cold War. America, Britain and most NATO countries are Washington’s protection and more on their own navies. now left with roughly half the numbers of ships they had That seems to be the thinking behind South Korea’s naval 20 years ago. The former Soviet Navy, inherited mostly by programs. Russia, has undergone even deeper cuts – by some 80 per cent – and a severe degradation of its combat capability. In Europe and Russia, the trend towards further reductions Submarine forces in Asia-Pacific in the naval strength continues. The latest announcement to that effect has recently come from Britain – London is One of the most visible signs of the center of world naval apparently considering a further downsizing of the Royal activity shifting to Asia-Pacific has been the numbers of Navy, which could affect plans to build a second CVF aircraft modern new subs being built or bought by the AsPac nations. carrier. Asian nations, meanwhile, are building and buying Several distinct trends have come to light: ever more ships, and the level of their technology is beginning •• China is building a new generation of nuclear-powered to approach Western standards. submarines. After wasting a lot of time with its largely The focus of naval activity and the overall “center of useless first-generation nuclear-powered submarines naval power” is now shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region. (five Type 091 Ming class attack submarines and one This has several distinct consequences: ballistic missile-carrying Type 092 Xia class submarine), •• China and, to a lesser extent, India are becoming great Beijing has started to build nuclear-powered submarines naval powers, capable of projecting that power beyond of the next generation. It already has two versatile nuclear- their own coastlines, and in future, on the global scale. powered Type 093 Shang class attack submarines and

Table/Figure 2. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (major surface warships)

Major surface warships 1990 2009

Total World Include total Asia Total World Include total Asia Aircraft Carriers 31 1 21 2 Cruisers, Destroyers and 942 236 641 239 Frigates Corvettes 360 55 232 97 Large Amphibious Ships 273 110 198 99 Total major surface 1606 402 1092 437 warships

18 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks Arms Trade

Table/Figure 3. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (submarines)

Submarines 1990 2009

Total World Include total Asia Total World Include total Asia Nuclear-Powered 367 7 153 9 Submarines Conventional 479 120 275 140 Submarines Total submarines 846 127 428 149

Conventional Submarines

Total Submarines

two nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying Type 094 •• More Southeast Asian nations have acquired Jin class submarines. Several more are probably in the conventional submarines. Over the past decade, the pipeline. If China manages to make these subs perform as number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region who possess expected, it will obtain a powerful instrument of achieving submarines has grown substantially. Rapid economic dominance at sea, as well as the capability to deliver a growth has enabled Singapore and Malaysia to acquire nuclear strike against targets on US mainland from the conventional submarines. In 2009, Vietnam signed a sea. A modern Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet contract for six Project 636M (Kilo class) submarines to would radically change the naval balance in the eastern be built in Russia. Once these are delivered, Vietnam will Pacific. China’s capable new nuclear-powered submarines possess the largest submarine fleet in the region between would pose a serious threat to the US Navy, and menace China and Australia. In future, submarines could be the fleets of America’s Asian allies. acquired by Thailand, Burma and even Bangladesh. •• India has begun building its own nuclear-powered •• The overall numbers of modern conventional submarines and acquiring them from Russia. In 2009, subs in the Asia-Pacific region are growing. While after long delays, India launched its first indigenous new nations are acquiring submarine fleets, some of nuclear-powered Arihant submarines, which was the existing conventional submarine fleets are being designed and built with Russian assistance. In 2010, the expanded. China, India and Pakistan are building and country will receive a modern Russian Nerpa nuclear- buying new conventional submarines only to replace powered attack submarine (Project 971I) under a lease the old and obsolete ones. But some other nations are agreement. Another such submarine should be handed planning to increase the overall size of their fleets. Under over to the Indians at some point in the future. Project Australia’s new Defence White Paper, the number of its 971I (Improved Akula class) represents fairly advanced submarines should be increased to 12 from the current technology, so the combat effectiveness of the Indian six. South Korea is rapidly increasing its own submarine nuclear-powered submarine fleet could even surpass fleet, and wants to have at least 18 submarines instead of that of China’s indigenously built submarines. For India 12. Indonesia, which already has two submarines, is in as well as China, developing their own nuclear-powered talks with Russia and South Korea to buy another two. submarine fleets is an important element of bolstering Finally, Taiwan has not abandoned plans to acquire six their superpower credentials. new submarines. # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 19 Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks Arms Trade

Table/Figure 4. Combined number of submarines in the navies of AsPac nations (projection)

Submarines 2009 2020 Nuclear-Powered Submarines (for China and India only) 9 25 Conventional Submarines 140 192

New security risks posed by growing reasons why many of the region’s nations are so interested in submarine forces in Asia-Pacific acquiring submarines. The acquisition of modern nuclear-powered submarines Such a rapid growth of the submarine forces of the Asia- by China and India will shift the naval balance even further. Pacific nations will make these forces much more effective. The nuclear-powered submarine is the battleship of the 21st Meanwhile, the ability of most of the AsPac navies to century. Second-rate navies can do next to nothing against defend against the increasingly capable submarine forces such a submarine. In any confrontation with such a navy, of the region’s leading nations is clearly inadequate. Apart the nuclear-powered submarines is the “ultimate weapon”, from Russia, Japan is the only nation in the region that has which can obliterate the enemy’s entire naval strength and advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are establish complete dominance at sea. Apart from Russia, nearly as effective as America’s own. Some other countries Japan is the only nation in the eastern Pacific that has some have technologically advanced but numerically limited anti- limited and uncertain ability to defend against nuclear- submarine warfare capabilities - these include Australia, powered submarines on its own, without America’s support. South Korea, Taiwan, India, and possibly Singapore. China Even a small number of nuclear-powered submarines could is so far lagging behind in that respect. As for the rest of give India massive advantage over Pakistan’s navy, or China the region’s nations, their navies cannot defend themselves against the navies of Taiwan and other potential adversaries. against modern submarines. That means that even a small Chinese and Indian nuclear-powered submarines can fleet of submarines can be an extremely potent weapon in effectively control all the strategic straits, representing a any conflict with the technologically “backward” nations serious threat in the region for the navies of other great (or in a conflict between these nations themselves). On the powers, especially the United States. The bottom line is, other hand, even a small number of non-nuclear powered modern nuclear submarines will give India and China a submarines (especially in the littoral zone) can pose a serious strategic capability which they previously could not even threat even to the most advanced navies, such as America’s. dream of. In many situations (such as various local crisis Just as 100 years ago, the submarine remains the only “legal” scenarios) this capability would be even more effective weapon which a small nation can rely on to pose a serious and flexible than that offered by nuclear-armed ballistic threat to a large nation. That is undoubtedly one of the key missiles.

20 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific: Growing Security Risks Armed Forces

“The Navy should reflect the national interests and economic potential of our country” Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Commander of the Russian Navy

Q: How would you describe the current state and the result. And then we need to start thinking about the day after prospects of the Russian Navy? tomorrow. We need to start thinking now - in fact, we should A: The Navy is an instrument of foreign policy, its have already started. We have already laid some foundations. military support component, and an element of our country’s But if we start redesigning the whole system, we will not see naval presence. It is needed in the areas where we need to any serious results in missile building over the next few years. defend the political and economic interests of our country. So, to answer you previous question, the missile is not flying We believe that the shape of our Navy should be based on YET, but it will fly. It will have to fly. It just needs to be built two key premises. First, the Navy should reflect the national properly. But that is something our manufacturers need to interests and economic potential of our country, and second, sort out. the Navy should be well-balanced. Right now, everything is in Q: What was the cause of the failure during the latest place for us to develop the Russian Navy in this direction, and tests? that is where we are heading. We cannot allow an imbalance A: The cause of the failure? What does it matter, whether in favor submarines of surface ships. We need to pursue well- it was the ejection cartridge or not? Yesterday it was the balanced development, but the nuclear-missile carrying fleet ejection cartridge, before that is was the poor engineering remains out priority. And we are not talking just about ships and manufacturing of the steering mechanism of the first or subs, we are talking about entire combat systems. And stage, next time it could be something else. It makes no proceeding from the premise that the Navy needs to be well- difference. The real question is whether or not our defense balanced, we also need to understand that this type of the contractors can manufacture such a missile. Are they up to armed forces should be built using open architecture, where the task? I think we have what it takes to build such missiles. combat systems are fully fit to serve the key tasks facing the Our defense industry has that capability, we just have some Navy. The choices we are making now will shape the Russian problems that need to be resolved. Navy beyond 2020 or 2030 - they will shape it up until 2050. Q: What about the Sineva liquid-fuel missile, which is So there is simply no room for mistakes. already operational? Can it become a replacement for the Q: What is going on with the Bulava missile? Why is it Bulava? not flying? A: Replacing the Bulava with the Sineva is just empty A: The situation is difficult but not hopeless, as some talk. Even those who have never served in the Navy understand seem to believe. The overall idea behind the Bulava is sound. this. These are two completely different weapons systems, The problem is that our technological and manufacturing with very different launch requirements. The Sineva may be capability, as well as our ability to bring various defense a good missile, but it cannot serve as our main missile up contractors together to deliver this project have turned out until 2050, because it was designed back in the late 1990s. to be much weaker than we expected. We are facing a crisis in And what we are trying to do now is lay the foundations for some areas of technology. The Bulava is a litmus test that will the Navy that will last up until 2050. As for redesigning the show whether we can overcome this crisis or forever become Borei-class subs to carry the Sineva missiles, we are not going a third-rate world power. to do that either - such a redesign is simply impossible. Q: So what now for the Bulava? Q: Any chance of the Bark program being resurrected? A: We need to finalize the designs and eliminate all A: We should not be going back, we should be moving the teething problems. We need to obtain a result, a reliable forward. Resurrecting the Bark missile complex, which was

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 21 Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy Armed Forces

designed 20 years ago, would be an admission of defeat. We Q: What will be the role of the Mistral-class helicopter- need new technology. Why resurrect something that can be carrying ships, which the Navy is planning to buy from nothing more than a stopgap? Our strategy is to overcome abroad? these problems we are facing now and move on to a new A: For us the technology of building such ships is more generation of technology. Let me remind you that the Bark important than the actual ships. We need to learn how to missile weighs about 100 metric tons. It is yesterday’s build such ships here in Russia, using the latest technologies. generation of technology. This experience will help us in building the future aircraft Q: How many submarines, including strategic subs, does carriers, so this has relevance to your previous question. the Russian Navy require to ensure our country’s security and Q: How many Mistral-class ships are you planning to deal with any threats from the sea? buy from France? A: We have a clear understanding of what we should A: We have determined that we need to buy one such get rid of, and what we should keep. Of course, we should ship, and build at least three more at the Russian shipyards, have a nuclear fleet, and it should have a very high degree using technical assistance from the French. of standardization in terms of the components that we have Q: And what if the French refuse to provide such now. But we are not talking about numbers. I am not going to technical assistance in building the ships in Russia? talk about the numbers at all. What is really important is the A: In that case we will work with other countries, which quality, the capability that we can achieve. Once we achieve also have very modern and advanced technologies in building the quality that we need in some areas, then we can talk about such ships - including the Netherlands, Spain, and others. the numbers. We already have the strategy of how the Navy Q: There have recently been some reports in the media should be used, it has already been approved. But the strategy that the naval Su-33 aircraft will soon be replaced with the of building this Navy has been under discussion for many new MiG-29K. years, and it has yet to be approved. A: It is true that the service life of the Su-33’s expires The Navy should be made up of diversified forces, not in 2015. We are preparing for their replacement, and in the just ships and submarines. No Navy has fought on its own in very near future we are planning to buy a batch of at least the second half of the 20th century. Naval strength has always 24 aircraft to be based on our aircraft carrier, the Admiral been deployed as part of a diversified group of forces. The Kuznetsov. The first tests of these fighter jets have been essence of this approach is to have a diverse structure in the successful. Over the period of September 28 - October 2, Armed Forces to fight on the ground, on the seas and in the several MiG-29K’s performed successful landings and take- air. The Navy, with is missile carriers and auxiliary ships, will offs from the aircraft carrier. be an element of that. There is nothing new in this approach, Q: Does the Russian Navy command have any plans to but that is the right approach. modernize the logistics base in the Syrian port of Tartus? Q: What will be the role of aircraft carriers in the whole A: The Russian Navy command has plans to create a strategy of building the Russian Navy? naval station for combat ships in Tartus, including the ships A: An aircraft carrying fleet is not just aircraft carriers. of the Black Sea fleet. Right now this Navy logistics base It is a powerful combined-services group of forces. It has a there is the only Russian military base in the far-abroad general purpose, but it is also an element of strategic offensive [foreign countries that were not part of the former Soviet forces, which serves a wide range of purposes. The most Union]. If an agreement is reached with the Syrians, the important for us is the issue of missile defense, air defense opportunities are very good there. The plan now is to create and space defense, where we have a serious gap. The aircraft a proper naval station there, where ships of the Russian carrying fleet should be an integral component of our single Navy will be able to replenish their water and food supplies missile defense, air defense and space defense system. or undergo repairs, and where the crew can spend some Q: At what stage is the development of the new aircraft time ashore. By the way, in mid-July two Black Sea Fleet carrier? tug boats brought a new mooring float to Tartus. Of course, A: Development is already under way. Under the existing it is a bit too early to speak now about creating a fully- schedule we should have the basic designs with the key tactical fledged military naval base there, but we have such plans and technical specifications by the end of next year. After that, for the distant future. We have a lot of respect for our Syrian work will commence on more detailed designs. colleagues. They are our allies who did not turn away from Q: When can we expect the launch of the new ship? the Russian Navy even during the most difficult times, A: It is difficult to give a specific time frame. We need a which I am glad to say are now in the past. At the same separate federal program to finance this work - funding this time, the Russian Navy’s financial capabilities are not what project from the general military procurement budget would they were even as recently as 2008. We have to take into hardly be feasible. With a bit of luck I think the ship can be account that our finances have taken a hit in 2009 and 2010 launched by 2020. compared to 2008 due to the economic crisis. 22 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy Armed Forces

Q: Have there been any negotiations with other countries not dependent on whether or not we are going to stay in about setting up Russian naval bases there, for example, to Sevastopol. We are creating a capability for the entire group counter piracy? of Russian Armed Forces in the region, including the Navy, to A: There have been, let us say, discussions rather than have a base on the Russian territory. That is our main and only negotiations. There is an understanding of the need for this. purpose. Everything that can be used as a base for the fleet on When the right time comes, we can talk about it. It is a very the Russian territory will be used, within reason – and that is delicate issue. what we are already doing now. Q: Will Russia use Abkhazia as a base for the Russian Q: The Black Sea Fleet command has repeatedly Black Sea Fleet? complained about problems with rearming the fleet. Part of A: There will be a naval station in Ochamchira for the problem is Ukraine’s negative attitude to this issue. The several ships. Before this happens we need to complete the fleet is becoming old and obsolete, while new armaments discussions with the Abkhaz side - that will happen in the are not being delivered. How are you going to address this very near future. But there will not be any large naval bases problem? there, there will just be a good naval station. We will just keep A: To begin with, Ukraine cannot forbid us from doing a limited number of small ships there, ships of the second or what needs to be done here. And second, starting from this third rank - no more than what we strictly need there. year and every year after that, we will begin the construction Q: What awaits the Black Sea Fleet after 2017? Some of one new ship and one new submarine for the Black politicians in Ukraine say that the Russian fleet needs to start Sea Fleet. That is starting from 2010. Those ships will be preparing right now for future withdrawal from Sevastopol, earmarked specifically for the Black Sea Fleet. We need to take so that no Russian ships are left there by 2017. into account that the area of the Black Sea Fleet’s operations is A: That is a matter of international relations and the entire Mediterranean. And much depends on what kind politics. Withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol of fleet we want to have in the Black Sea in the first place. I, is not a pleasant topic for discussion for either Ukraine or for one, am not at all sure that we really need to have heavy Russia. But I have never heard Ukrainian President Viktor cruisers or nuclear-powered submarines there. Yushchenko talk about it. On the contrary, he has always said Q: There have been many reports lately that the Caspian that all of Ukraine’s commitments in terms of stationing Flotilla is ceasing to exist. Is it true that the flotilla will be the Black Sea Fleet will be fulfilled. Geographically, there replaced with an operational command? is no better location on the entire Black Sea coast than the A: This is all at the stage of discussion for now. We are now Akhtiarskaya Bay in Sevastopol to serve as a naval base. But reaching the point where will be able to deploy the Caspian apart from geography, there is also history. Have our relations forces even beyond the Black Sea region. So the question is, with Ukraine really become so bad that we need to withdraw should all those forces be placed under the single command from Sevastopol after 2017? Does the majority of Ukrainian of the Black Sea Fleet? They probably should. This needs to citizens demand the Russian fleet’s withdrawal after 2017? be considered. But for now, this is only a discussion. There is a great many people in Ukraine whose opinion on Q: Before the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, ships of this issue is very sound. The presence of the Russian Black the Black Sea Fleet took part in the NATO anti-terrorist Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a firm guarantee of stability along operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. Will our the entire Black Sea coast of the CIS nations. This needs ships continue taking part in that operation? to be considered very seriously. There are also proposals A: We made a deliberate decision to end our participation about [using the Black Sea Fleet] as an instrument to jointly in Active Endeavour. In August 2008, NATO took a very clear address shared problems, taking into account Russian and stance on that conflict. We were actually asked to recall the Ukrainian national interests. The Black Sea Fleet is a very Ladnyy ship, which had been specially prepared for the powerful instrument. So the situation is not hopeless. We operation and which was already on its way to take part in should not harbor any delusions, but we should not despair the exercise. We are not saying we should not take part, but either. we need to see what we are doing this for. If there is a need, if Q: Could the military naval base in Novorossiysk be it is in Russia’s interests, then we will take part. used as an alternative to Sevastopol? Q: Will Russia continue its participation in countering A: There have never been any plans to turn the piracy off the Somali coast? Novorossiysk military naval base into the main base of the A: The anti-piracy effort is a completely different matter. Black Sea Fleet. What we are talking about is having the It is a task for the entire civilized world. We believe that this capability for some of the Black Sea Fleet ships to be based effort should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, on the northern coastline of the Russian Caucasus. So let but we are prepared to cooperate with everyone, with any us not confuse this with actually moving the main base of potential ally, in whatever way is practical. I stress – we are the fleet there. What we are now doing in Novorossiysk is ready to cooperate with any potential ally. But that does not # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 23 Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy Armed Forces

mean we are going to work under their command. We can the same as for a Pacific Fleet ship. But it would be more participate in joint operations with NATO, as well as with expensive – sending just one ship via the Suez Canal will cost others - such as the European Union, first of all, but also with us several hundred thousand dollars, maybe even more. We the naval forces of Egypt, China, Turkey and other countries. could be talking millions of dollars here. There is no doubt that we need a coordination of joint efforts Q: There have been reports in the media that the Black – but without our forces being subordinated to anyone else. Sea Fleet ships on patrol off the Georgian coast have taken to Q: Will only the Pacific Fleet ships be taking part? shooting down Georgian drones. A: The Russian Navy ships will be taking part, A: Shooting down foreign drones is allowed only in one’s predominantly the ships of the Pacific Fleet, because the own territorial waters. In the open seas, you are allowed to Indian Ocean is its area of responsibility. It is easier, simpler shoot them down only if you are sure they are attacking you. and cheaper to use the Pacific Fleet for this. The time it would Apart from the events of August 2008, there have been no take to deploy a Black Sea Fleet ship in that area is about such incidents with the Black Sea Fleet.

Admiral Visotskiy was interviewed by RIA Novosti correspondent Sergey Safronov for Moscow Defense Brief

24 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy Facts & Figures

Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010* Mikhail Lukin, Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 1 March 14, Su-24 Klimshchina 1st guard bomber 0 Crew error In adverse weather conditions, the pilot Maj Aleksey Semushkin, 2000 village (Smolensk air regiment erroneously engaged drag flaps, which led Capt Igor Kanyshkin Region) to increased fuel consumption. The crew did not monitor the remaining fuel level, and when the fuel ran out, the engines stopped in mid-air 2 April 6, MiG-31 11 Kotlas 458th guard fighter 1 Pilot error The plane undershot the runway trying to Col Gennadiy Mashevskiy, 2000 (Arkhangelsk air regiment land in adverse weather conditions. The Maj Yevgeniy Stroitelev Region) impact broke the starboard main landing gear leg. The plane skidded from the runway, rolled over and caught fire. The pilot cabin dug itself into the ground 3 May 11, Su-27K 71 red Severomorsk 279th independent 0 Technical Steering system failure as the aircraft was Col Pavel Kretov 2000 (Su-33) (Murmansk naval fighter air problem flying upside down Region) regiment 4 June 9, Su-25 Bashanta 368th assault air 1 Unknown Several versions, including the plane falling Capt Andrey Morozov 2000 (Stavropol regiment into a spin, engine failure, steering system Ter r itor y) failure, explosion of an unguided missile 5 June 21, Il-76MD RA-76723 Privolzhskiy 117th military 0 Technical Steering, fuel and hydraulic system failure Lt Col Andrey Zelenko, 2000 airfield (Astrakhan transport air problem due to a short circuit in mid-flight, followed Capt Sergey Lyulin, Region) regiment by a fire onboard. The plane was consumed Capt Oleg Medvedev, by flames after emergency landing, but over Capt Viktor Perepelitsyn, 200 passengers and the crew escaped with Senior Lieutenant Pavel their lives Statsyuk, senior warrant officer Sergey Kochetkov 6 June 26, Su-24M 12 white Baltimor 455th bomber air 0 Pilot error Hard landing and fire onboard after the Maj Leonid Bezdetkin, 2000 (Voronezh) regiment plane undershot the runway due to pilot Col Yuriy Barkalov error 7 July 21, Mi-8T 34 Levashovo 138th independent 19 Pilot error Autorotation of an overloaded helicopter Maj Sergey Khlenkin, 2000 (Leningrad combined air and crash landing due to pilot error Capt Aleksey Kovtunenko, Region) regiment Capt Sergey Moskalev 8 October 25, Il-18 RA-74295 Batumi (Georgia) 8th air division 84 Navigation The navigator lost orientation in adverse Lt Col Valeriy Osyko, 2000 error weather conditions, the air traffic controller Lt Col Andrey Staroverov, also made an error, and the plane flew into Maj Vladimir Afanasev, a mountain Maj Aleksandr Kotov, Maj Oleg Urin, Senior Lieutenant Roman Strashnikov, Senior Lieutenant Yevgeniy Koryakovtsev, Maj Aleksandr Avkhimenya, Maj Sergey Savichev, warrant officer Aleksandr Blagodarov, warrant officer Leonid Ponomarev 9 February MiG-31 22 red Monchegorsk 174th guard fighter 0 Technical Power system failure and fire in the Lt Col Mikhail Satanovskiy, 26, 2001 Zakhar (Murmansk air regiment problem starboard engine with subsequent failure Maj Vladimir Ovchenkov Sorokin Region) of the hydraulics. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to land the burning plane without loss of life

* – the table lists air accidents and crashes which have led to a loss of aircraft from January 1, 2000 to date. The list includes only piloted planes and helicopters belonging to the Russian military. It does not include planes and helicopters lost for various reasons in 2000–2010 in Chechnya and Ingushetia, nor the aircraft lost in August 2008 in Georgia. # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25 Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 10 March 11, Su-24M Mozdok (North 4th air army 0 Pilot error The plane undershot the runway in adverse 2001 Ossetia) weather conditions and disintegrated on impact 11 March 22, MiG-29UB 35 km northeast 929th state flight 0 Technical Fire in the starboard engine Col S.Seregin, 2001 of Akhtubinsk testing center problem Maj A.Voropaev (Astrakhan Region) 12 April 19, L-39C Novyy Mir village 627th guard 0 Technical Fire in the engine Capt Vladimir Radchenko 2001 (Krasnodar training air problem Ter r itor y) regiment 13 May 17, Su-27 64 red Staraya Vasilyevka 968th training and 0 Technical Fire, steering system failure Col Aleksandr Petrov 2001 village (Tambov research combined problem Region) air regiment 14 May 22, An-12MGA RA-12135 Myakotino village 226th independent 7 Unknown Versions include shifting cargo, steering Maj Sergey Grishenko, 2001 (Tver Region) combined air system failure, engine failure Lt Igor Yeremeev, Senior regiment Lieutenant Dmitriy Bozhkov, Maj Sergey Svishev, Capt Aleksandr Novikov, Capt Mikhail Aksyuchits, warrant officer Roman Popov 15 July 11, L-39C Gavrilovka village 644th training air 2 Pilot error The plane hit the ground due pilot error Col Vladimir Rudenko, 2001 (Tambov Region) regiment while flying at extreme low altitude Maj Gennadiy Milovanov 16 July 17, Su-27K 70 Ostrov (Pskov 279th independent 1 Pilot error The pilot (Hero of Russia, Maj Gen Timur Maj Gen Timur Apakidze 2001 (Su-33) Region) naval fighter air Apakidze) chose the wrong angle of attack regiment and rate of descent during an imitation of landing on an aircraft carrier. (According to another version, the pilot blacked out during a high-G maneuver). The plane crashed onto the landing strip 17 July 20, Mi-8 Lake 11th Air Force and 0 Pilot error Rotor blades touched the surface of the water 2001 Petropavlovskoye Air Defense Army during extreme low altitude flight and the (Khabarov helicopter fell into a lake Ter r itor y) 18 November Mi-8MT Krasnyy Bor 92nd special- 6 Pilot error The helicopter flew into a 250 meter Maj Oleg Gorynin, 5, 2001 (Leningrad purpose training transmission tower Capt Aleksey Aleksandrov, Region) and research Capt Andrey Ivanov, helicopter squadron Maj Aleksandr Dubnyuk, of Army Aviation Capt Aleksey Moskalev, Lt Aleksandr Sytnikov 19 February Su-24 Myshka village 722nd bomber air 2 Pilot error The plane hit the ground during a nosedive Maj Vladimir Shostenko, 19, 2001 (Pskov Region) regiment maneuver due to pilot error Lt Col Aleksandr Drozdetskiy 20 February An-26 07 red Lakhta 403rd independent 17 Pilot error The plane descended below glide path Col Valeriy Popkov, 21, 2001 (Arkhangelsk combined air altitude during night landing in adverse Maj Yegor Kozyrev, Region) regiment weather conditions and caught the treetops Maj Viktor Karelskiy, Maj Viktor Kasukhin, Capt Sergey Khrulkov, Capt Yuriy Koledov, senior warrant officer Viktor Zakharchenko, warrant officer Aleksandr Obukhov 21 March 26, Su-27 Solovey Klyuch 22nd guard fighter 0 Technical Steering system failure in mid-flight (other Capt Aleksandr Tsvetkov 2002 settlement air regiment problem versions include engine failure and pilot (Maritime error) Ter r itor y) 22 May 7, Mi-8MT 15521 Kosh-Agas (Altay 337th independent 11 Pilot error During landing in mountainous terrain, Lt Col Aleksandr Bukharov, 2002 Republic) combat helicopter the main rotor blades nicked a rock outcrop Lt Col Sergey Ivashenkov, regiment of Army after a gust of wind and the helicopter fell Maj Vyacheslav Yurev Aviation into a deep ravine. 23 June 14, L-39C Tikhoretsk 627th guard 0 Technical Engine failure in mid-flight Capt Aleksandr Trubnikov, 2002 (Krasnodar training air problem cadet Yevgeniy Vasilev Ter r itor y) regiment

26 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 24 June 20, L-39C Borisoglebsk 160th training air 1 Pilot error Crash landing due to pilot error. The pilot Cadet Yevgeniy Popov 2002 (Voronezh Region) regiment ejected while the plane was flying upside down and smashed into the ground 25 August 12, L-39C Yuzhnaya 644th training air 0 Technical Engine failure in mid-flight Lt Col Yuriy Rogovastov, 2002 Sosnovka (Tambov regiment problem cadet Fedyaev Region) 26 September Mi-24P Verkhnyaya Vyrka 45th independent 3 Unknown Versions include pilot error in adverse Maj Valeriy Borzakov, 19, 2002 village (Kaluga helicopter combat weather conditions and a technical problem Capt Igor Andreev, Senior Region) and command Lieutenant Aleksandr regiment of Army Brazgun Aviation 27 March 26, Ka-27PS Ussurian Gulf 289th independent 4 Pilot error After a night-time take-off from the deck of Lt Col Aleksandr 2003 combined anti- the big anti-submarine ship Admiral Tributs, Topyrychev, Capt Andrey submarine air the pilot lost orientation and pulled the stick Korovin, Capt Andrey regiment back too sharply, after which the helicopter Krasnoshekov, warrant performed a semi-loop, lost speed, fell into officer Renat KhaMitov the sea and sank 28 June 19, MiG-29UB Armavir 713th training air 0 Crew error The crew failed to notice a fuel leak. The Maj Aleksandr Tarasov, 2003 (Krasnodar regiment engines stopped after fuel ran out cadet Sergey Shapovalov Ter r itor y) 29 July 2, 2003 MiG-25RB Verkhniy Nyud 98th guard 0 Crew error The pilot ejected shortly after take-off Maj Aleksandr Ryabov (Murmansk reconnaissance air because of a false engine failure alarm Region) regiment 30 July 14, L-39C Kushchevskaya 797th training air 2 Pilot error Crash landing due to pilot error. Maj Andrey Pilipchuk, 2003 (Krasnodar regiment Capt Roman Otkopnikov Ter r itor y) 31 July 24, Mi-8T Pesochnoye village 109th training 3 Technical Engine failure in mid-flight. The crew were Lt Yu.Neverov, warrant 2003 (Samara Region) helicopter regiment problem killed while trying to evacuate officer I.Ivanov, cadet S.Kiryushin 32 August 7, Su-24MR Bada 313th 2 Navigation The plane lost orientation in adverse weather Maj Aleksandr Dorokhov, 2003 (Chita Region) reconnaissance air error conditions during approach for landing and Capt Sergey Kupriyan regiment crashed into the side of a mountain due to air traffic control error 33 August 7, Mi-8T Sokol 131st training 0 Pilot error Crashed into electricity pylons during 2003 (Saratov Region) helicopter regiment extreme low altitude flight 34 August 23, 2 Mi-24V Chernigovka 319th independent 6 Pilot error In breach of their flight plan, the crews Lt Col Yuriy Aksenov, Senior 2003 (Maritime helicopter combat of six helicopters, whose flight was being Lieutenant Yuriy Usatov, Ter r itor y) and command observed by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, Senior Lieutenant Vladislav regiment attempted to perform an aerobatic stunt Gvozdev, Capt Vladimir flying in pairs along the landing strip. In Khlyshuk, Capt Dmitriy the last pair, the main rotor blades of the Belov, Senior Lieutenant wingman helicopter caught the tail rotor of Dmitriy Derbenev the leader due to pilot error; both helicopters fell to the ground and burst into flames 35 September Tu-160 01 red Stepnoye 121st guard 4 Technical Failure of the air pressurization and Lt Col Yuriy Deyneko, 18, 2003 Mikhail (Saratov Region) heavy bomber air problem drainage system in the starboard fuel tank, Maj Oleg Fedosenko, Gromov regiment which led to falling pressure within the tank Maj Sergey Sukhorukov, and its subsequent disintegration. This Maj Grigoriy Kolchin caused a fire in two starboard engines 36 October 14, MiG-31 Borovaya 3958th guard 0 Technical During the first test flight after repairs, the Maj Andrey YereMin, 2003 settlement (Tver airbase problem starboard engine fire alarm went off. As the Maj Oleg Gutyrkin Region) crew was attempting emergency landing, the RPM of the working starboard engine fell sharply, the hydraulics system failed and the plane's roll reached a critical 15 degrees, after which the crew ejected to safety 37 November MiG-29 Mt. Urasar 3624th airbase 1 Unknown The plane went into a spin during an Maj Konstantin Kardash 12, 2003 (Armenia) aerobatic stunt (another version blames the crash on a technical problem)

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 27 Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 38 January 22, Mi-8T 94 Lake Kalygir 317th independent 0 Pilot error Crashed during take-off from a frozen lake Maj Mikhail Ostashovich, 2004 (Kamchatka combined air in adverse weather conditions (according to Irek Nazmutdinov, Nikolay Region) regiment of the another version, the helicopter was landing, Komyshev Pacific Fleet not taking off). The wreck could not be airlifted so it was cut into pieces and the pieces then transported overland so as not to pollute the lake. 39 February Su-24M Khurba 277th bomber air 0 Technical Failure of the variable wing sweep Capt Zaytsev, Senior 12, 2004 (Khabarovsk regiment problem mechanism - the wing went into extreme Lieutenant Kalenurov Ter r itor y) sweep angle (69 degrees) and did not respond to commands to take the landing sweep angle 40 March 4, Su-24MR 08 white Shatalovo 47th independent 0 Technical Swerved from the strip during taxiing and 2004 (Smolensk Region) guard problem rolled over after repairs of the forward reconnaissance air landing gear leg. regiment 41 April 2, Mi-8 Asbest (Sverdlovsk 933rd airbase 0 Unknown Crashed during approach for landing 2004 Region) 42 April 15, Mi-24P 0 Pilot error The helicopter spun out of control during a 2004 U-turn and crashed due to a pilot error. 43 July 6, Mi-8SMV Zavorovo 226th independent 4 Unknown The helicopter exceeded critical speed after Maj Sergey Stalmakov, 2004 (Tula Region) combined air the external airflow pressure gauge started Senior Lieutenant Mikhail regiment sending incorrect readings due to icing Papanin, Capt Anton Shevtsov, Capt Aleksey Belyy 44 July 8, Tu-22M3 Soltsy (Novgorod 840th heavy bomber 4 Technical The plane's electric systems failed during Maj Oleg Tyapkin, Capt Ilya 2004 Region) air regiment problem landing, the fuel stopped flowing to the Laskov, Maj Nikolay Tolstov, engines, the ejection systems also failed Capt Aleksandr Ivanov 45 September Mi-8MT Ust-Maimlya 329th independent 0 Technical Technical problems after take-off (one 7, 2004 (Kamchatka combined air problem version is that the fuel pumps lost power). Region) squadron of The helicopter crash-landed, rolled onto the strategic missile starboard side and caught fire troops 46 April 1, Mi-24P Yurga training 337th independent 0 Pilot error Collided with a fuelling truck during Lt Col Sergey Voronov, 2005 ground combat helicopter complex and unplanned aerobatic Lt D.Safronov, Senior regiment maneuvers due to pilot error Lieutenant N.Stepanov 47 May 12, MiG-29 31 blue Andreapol (Tver 28th guard fighter 1 Pilot error The pilot, while flying at extreme low Maj Valeriy Gusev 2005 Region) air regiment altitude, attempted to perform the barrel- roll stunt, which was not part of his flight plan, botched the maneuver and crashed into the ground 48 May 21, Su-25 32 Yavan (Tajikistan) 670th air group (899 0 Technical Fire in the port-side engine and steering Maj Vadim Pryadchenko 2005 guard assault air problem system failure in mid-flight regiment) 49 June 1, 2005 MiG-31DZ Khotilovo 790th fighter air 0 Technical The port-side landing gear leg disintegrated Maj Oleg Zabolotnyy, Capt (Tver Region) regiment problem during landing due to manufacturing Aleksandr Abushenkov defects, the plane skidded from the runway, disintegrated and burst into flames 50 August 18, Mi-8MTV2 41 Khabarovsk 825th independent 0 Technical The tail rotor and boom pylon disintegrated Capt Andrey Ivanenko, 2005 (Central) helicopter regiment problem in mid-air. The helicopter went into a spin Senior Lieutenant Oleg and fell from 1,200 meters Novikov, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Korolev 51 September Su-27K 82 red North Atlantic 279th independent 0 Technical The arrester wire snapped during landing Lt Col Yuriy Korneev 15, 2005 (Su-33) naval fighter air problem on the deck of the Admiral Kuztenstov regiment aircraft carrier, the plane careered into the sea and sank 52 September Su-27P 12 red Iotishkes village 177th fighter air 0 Navigation The pilot lost orientation during a flight from Maj Valeriy Troyanov 15, 2005 (Lithuania) regiment error Leningrad Region to Kaliningrad Region. The air traffic control services were unable to help him. The pilot ejected after the plane ran out of fuel 53 September L-39C Khanskaya airfield 761st training air 0 Technical Engine failure during approach for landing Senior Lieutenant Aleksey 20, 2005 (Maykop, Adygeya) regiment problem Bokunov, cadet Andrey Zaytsev 28 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 54 January 16, Su-24MR Vozzhayevka 523rd bomber air 0 Technical The variable wing sweep mechanism Maj Voron, Koltsov 2006 (Amur Region) regiment problem disintegrated and the wing could not be configured for landing (16 degrees angle). The crew ejected after burning the fuel off 55 March 15, Su-24M 07 white Kuleshovka 455th bomber air 0 Technical Steering system failure in mid-air due to Maj Vladimir Sergeev, 2006 settlement regiment problem loss of pressure in the main and backup Capt Roman Ostroverkhov (Voronezh Region) hydraulics systems 56 June 28, Su-25 Sokolya Sloboda 899th guard assault 1 Unknown The pilot blacked out due to oxygen system Lt Col Andrey Vakhovskiy 2006 village (Bryansk air regiment failure in mid-air (another version is that the Region) pilot had a micro stroke) 57 June 28, Su-24M 66 white Ostrov (Pskov 240th independent 0 Technical The crew ejected during take-off due to a Nikolay Fedotov, Sergey 2006 Region) combined air problem failure of the forward landing gear leg, the Krushin regiment plane was destroyed by fire 58 July 10, Tu-134VKP 05 red Gvardeyskoye 318th independent 0 Bird strike Engine surge after a bird strike during Maj Oleg Gafiulov, Vladimir 2006 airfield (Crimea, combined air take-off. The pilot aborted the take-off, Aleev, Chubov Ukraine) regiment of the but the plane careered past the end of the Black Sea Fleet runway, smashed into objects on the ground and caught fire. Its passengers included the commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin 59 July 14, Mi-8 Pushkin 6th Air Force and 0 Unknown Hard landing due to technical problems 2006 (Leningrad Air Defense Army (another version blames pilot error) Region) 60 July 27, MiG-29UB 01 blue Bolshoye Savino Strizhy aerobatics 0 Bird strike Bird strikes took out both engines during Col Nikolay Dyatel, 2006 (Perm Territory) group of the 237th take-off. The crew ejected to safety Col Igor Kurilenko guard aerospace equipment demonstration center 61 July 30, Su-24M Medovoye village 4th guard 2 Pilot error Crashed into the ground while trying to Lt Col Viktor Poshekhontsev, 2006 (Kaliningrad independent naval descend below cloud level Lt Col Boris Sedov Region) assault air regiment of the Baltic Fleet 62 September Mi-8MT Yuzhnyy 4th Air Force and 11 Pilot error Crashed into trees in mountainous terrain Lt Col Aleksandr Sviridov, 11, 2006 settlement (North Air Defense Army and adverse weather conditions Ossetia) 63 September L-39C Novokubansk 713th training air 1 Unknown The pilot lost control while practising Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy 14, 2006 (Krasnodar regiment exit from spin. The pyrocartridge in the Khrebtov, cadet Zaur Ter r itor y) instructor's ejection mechanism failed to Shaushev go off 64 March 21, 2 MiG-29 Millerovo (Rostov 19th guard fighter 0 Pilot error Collision with the ground during a nosedive Lt Col Fakhradin Ulfanov, 2007 Region) air regiment maneuver Maj Denis Chirkin 65 August 9, L-39C Khanskaya airfield 761st training air 0 Technical Engine failure during approach for landing Col Aleksandr Zhukov, 2007 (Maykop, Adygeya) regiment problem cadet Konstantin Prokofev 66 August 23, Su-24M 63 white 115 km north of 277th bomber air 0 Technical Electric system failure 2007 Khurba airfielf regiment problem (Khabarovsk Ter r itor y) 67 January 28, L-39C Kotelnikovo 704th training air 1 Pilot error The crew was practising climb for another Senior Lieutenant Sergey 2008 (Volgograd regiment landing attempt from flare-out altitude. The Gorshkov, cadet Sergey Region) plane hit the landing strip (possibly due Detkov to icing). The instructor was killed during ejection 68 February 1, L-39C Armavir 713th training air 0 Technical Engine failure in mid-air Maj Andrey Serov 2008 (Krasnodar regiment problem Ter r itor y) 69 March 20, Su-25 Novoselskoye 187th guard assault 1 Pilot error The plane performed an unexpected Lt Col Sergey Yakovenko 2008 (Maritime air regiment maneuver during practice at a firing range Ter r itor y) and was hit by an unguided S-8 missile fired by its own wingman

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 29 Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

## Date Aircraft Side Location Unit Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 70 June 24, Mi-24 Kochubeyevskiy 0 Unknown Fell shortly after take-off and caught fire 2008 District (Stavropol Ter r itor y) 71 July 29, Su-27UB 44 blue Vozdvizhenka 22nd guard fighter 1 Technical Steering system failure immediately after Maj Sergey Levchenko, 2008 (Maritime air regiment problem take-off Lt Col Yuriy Abrosimov Ter r itor y) 72 October 17, MiG-29 11 white Khadakta village 120th fighter air 0 Technical The airframe disintegrated in mid-air due to Capt Mikhail Polorotov 2008 (Chita Region) regiment problem corrosion and metal-fatigue cracks 73 December MiG-29 55 white Ingoda village 120th fighter air 1 Technical The airframe disintegrated in mid-air due to Lt Col Valeryan Kokarev 5, 2008 (Chita Region) regiment problem corrosion and metal-fatigue cracks 74 December Su-24M 02 Mosalskoye village 455th bomber air 0 Technical Steering system failure in mid-air due to Lt Col Anatoliy Bolshechkov, 19, 2008 (Voronezh Region) regiment problem loss of pressure in the main and backup Maj Sergey Babeshko hydraulics systems (another version is starboard engine failure) 75 February 3, Mi-24 Nadezhdinka 626th training 3 Technical The main gearbox disintegrated in mid-air, Capt Sergey Safonov, 2009 (Saratov Region) helicopter regiment problem the rotor jammed and the blades were Lt Ilya Kartashov, Senior torn off Lieutenant Rinat Khubeev 76 March 17, L-39C Alekseyevskoye 797th training air 1 Unknown Technical problem or pilot error Lt Aleksandr Zaytsev 2009 village (Krasnodar regiment Ter r itor y) 77 May 4, 2009 Ka-27PL 45 yellow Baltic Sea 396th independent 0 Pilot error During landing on the deck of the Yaroslav Lt Col Oleg Vashenko naval anti- Mudryy patrol ship, the helicopter's blades submarine caught the deck superstructure. The helicopter squadron helicopter crashed onto the deck, then fell of the Baltic Fleet into the sea and sank 78 June 17, Su-24MR Monchegorsk 98th guard 0 Pilot error Because of a pilot error, the plane had 2009 (Murmansk reconnaissance air excessive speed and roll during touchdown. Region) regiment It bounced off the runway, then fell and caught fire 79 June 19, Su-24M Kostino- 559th bomber air 0 Technical Due to a variable wing sweep mechanism Lt Col Lev Balabanov, 2007 Bystryanskiy regiment problem failure the wings could not be configured Capt Aleksey Kazakov village (Rostov for landing. The crew ejected after burning Region) off fuel 80 June 19, Mi-28N 43 yellow (Nizhniy Novgorod 344th center for 0 Unknown Exhaust from unguided missiles fired 2009 Region) combat training and in hovering mode was sucked into the retraining of Army helicopter's air intake, causing engine surge. Aviation pilots The helicopter hard-landed from an altitude of about 40 meters and rolled over onto the port side. The main rotor and the tail pylon were destroyed 81 August 16, Su-27UB 18 blue and Zhukovskiy Russkiye Vityazi 2 Pilot error Mid-air collision due to loss of visual Col Igor Tkachenko, 2009 and Su-27 14 blue (Moscow Region) aerobatics group contact. The wingman bumped into the Col Igor Kurilenko, of the 237th leader's canopy and nose cone Lt Col Vitaliy Melnik guard aerospace equipment demonstration center 82 November Tu-142M3 55 red Tatar Strait 568th independent 11 Unknown Fell into the sea during landing Maj Vadim Kapkin, 6, 2009 combined air Capt Aleksey Timofeev, regiment of the Senior Lieutenant Pavel Pacific Fleet Cholak, Maj Aleksey Ablonskiy, Lt Artem Blank, Capt Sergey Gulyaev, Capt Konstantin Sholokhov, Lt Yevgeniy Dolgov, senior warrant officer Valeriy Voronkov, senior warrant officer Andrey Fefilov, senior warrant officer Nikolay Palamar 83 January 14, Su-27SM 86 red Galichnyy 6987th airbase 1 Unknown Versions include technical problems, pilot Col Vladimir Sobolev 2010 (Khabarovsk error, pilot blacking out Ter r itor y)

30 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Facts & Figures

Combined statistics of air accidents involving Defense Ministry aircraft in 2000-2010

Year Number of accidents Including crashes Fatalities 2000 8 4 105 2001 10 4 16 2002 8 5 34 2003 11 7 22 2004 8 2 8 2005 8 1 1 2006 10 4 15 2007 3 0 0 2008 8 4 4 2009 8 4 17 2010 1 1 1 Total 83 36 223

Aircraft lost, by type Causes

Type Number lost Fatalities Causes Number of Fatalities Su-24 15 6 accidents technical problems 33 16 L-39 13 54 pilot error 28 90 Mi-8 12 8 unknown 14 31 Su-27 10 5 navigation error 3 86 MiG-29 9 3 crew error 3 0 Mi-24 7 12 bird strike 2 0 Su-25 4 3 MiG-31 4 1 Ka-27 2 4 Tu-134 1 84 Il-18 1 17 An-26 1 11 Tu-142 1 7 An-12 1 4 Tu-160 1 4 Tu-22 1 0 Il-76 1 0 Mi-28 1 0 MiG-25 1 0

# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 31 Non-combat Losses of Russian Military Aviation in 2000-2010 Our Authors

Mikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Andrey Frolov. Graduated with an honours degree from the Faculty of Foreign Affairs of Saint Petersburg State University and in 2003 from the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations. In 2003–2004 – researcher at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center), executive editor of Yader ny Kontrol magazine (in Russian). In 2004 – project manager of Export control system transformation in Russia.

Natalia Grib is a journalism graduate of the Belarus National University. She took Reuters training courses in London and Radio Free Europe courses in Prague. Joined Kommersant, a leading Russian broadsheet, in 2002 as a special energy correspondent. Author of more than 2,000 articles on fuel and energy policy and of the book “The Gas Emperor”.

Anton Khlopkov is Director of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and Editor-in-Chief of the Nuclear Club journal. He is a graduate of Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). From 2000 to 2009 he has worked for the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), including as Deputy Director (2003–2007) and Executive Director (2007–2009). He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Encyclopedia (2009). Co-author of the monographs: “At the Nuclear Threshold: The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime” (2007); Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Guidebook (2006); Nuclear Nonproliferation in Russian- American Relations: History, Opportunities and Outlook (2000); author of the monograph Iran’s Nuclear Program in Russian- American Relations (2001). He is an expert on nuclear proliferation and atomic energy issues.

Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 1994–1997 worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House since 2003.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

32 # 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief