New Institutional Economics: a Report Card
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Microeconomics Exam Review Chapters 8 Through 12, 16, 17 and 19
MICROECONOMICS EXAM REVIEW CHAPTERS 8 THROUGH 12, 16, 17 AND 19 Key Terms and Concepts to Know CHAPTER 8 - PERFECT COMPETITION I. An Introduction to Perfect Competition A. Perfectly Competitive Market Structure: • Has many buyers and sellers. • Sells a commodity or standardized product. • Has buyers and sellers who are fully informed. • Has firms and resources that are freely mobile. • Perfectly competitive firm is a price taker; one firm has no control over price. B. Demand Under Perfect Competition: Horizontal line at the market price II. Short-Run Profit Maximization A. Total Revenue Minus Total Cost: The firm maximizes economic profit by finding the quantity at which total revenue exceeds total cost by the greatest amount. B. Marginal Revenue Equals Marginal Cost in Equilibrium • Marginal Revenue: The change in total revenue from selling another unit of output: • MR = ΔTR/Δq • In perfect competition, marginal revenue equals market price. • Market price = Marginal revenue = Average revenue • The firm increases output as long as marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. • Golden rule of profit maximization. The firm maximizes profit by producing where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. C. Economic Profit in Short-Run: Because the marginal revenue curve is horizontal at the market price, it is also the firm’s demand curve. The firm can sell any quantity at this price. III. Minimizing Short-Run Losses The short run is defined as a period too short to allow existing firms to leave the industry. The following is a summary of short-run behavior: A. Fixed Costs and Minimizing Losses: If a firm shuts down, it must still pay fixed costs. -
Notes on Behavioral Economics and Labor Market Policy
Notes on Behavioral Economics and Labor Market Policy Linda Babcock, Carnegie Mellon University William J. Congdon, The Brookings Institution Lawrence F. Katz, Harvard University Sendhil Mullainathan, Harvard University December 2010 We are grateful to Jeffrey Kling for extensive discussions of these topics. We thank the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation for their support of this project. 0. Background and motivation Recent years have been trying ones for American workers. The unemployment rate has reached double digits for the first time in over a quarter of a century. Worker compensation growth has all but stalled. The human costs of labor market turbulence have rarely been clearer, and the value of public policies, such as unemployment insurance and job training programs, that assist workers in managing that turbulence, gaining new skills, and navigating the labor market have rarely been more apparent. And, even in the best of times, the United States’ labor market is a dynamic and turbulent one, with high rates of turnover (over five million separations and five million new hires in a typical month in normal times) but substantial frictions as well. As a result, labor market programs and regulations are key components of economic policy. Such policies help support the unemployed, provide education and training opportunities, and ensure the fairness, safety, and accessibility of the workplace. The challenge for policymakers is to design such policies so that they meet these goals as effectively and as efficiently as possible. Labor market policies succeed in meeting their objectives, however, only to the extent that they accurately account for how individuals make decisions about work and leisure, searching for jobs, and taking up opportunities for education and training. -
Schweizerische Bibliographie Über Geld, Währung Und Zentralbankenwesen Bis 1982
abcdefg Schweizerische Bibliographie über Geld, Währung und Zentralbankenwesen bis 1982 Zusammenzug der 1957 und 1982 von der SNB herausgegebenen Bibliographien zum Thema Vorbemerkung zur Internetfassung Anlässlich des Jubiläums zum ihrem 50-jährigen Bestehen gab die Schweizerische Nationalbank 1957 in Ergänzung zur Festschrift eine «Schweizerische Bibliographie über Geld, Währung und Notenbankwesen» heraus. Beim 75-Jahre-Jubiläum 1982 wurde unter dem Titel «Schweizerische Bibliographie über Geld, Währung und Zentralbankwesen» die Fortsetzung publiziert. Bei der Feier zu ihrem 100-jährigen Bestehen verzichtete die SNB auf die Fortführung dieses Projektes. Eine «schweizerische» Bibliographie schien bei der Internationalisierung, die der Bereich Geld, Währung und Notenbankwesen erfahren hatte, nicht mehr angebracht. Zudem erleichtern heutzutage Online- Kataloge die Literatursuche, und ausschliesslich im Web erhältliche Publikationen spielen eine wichtige Rolle. Für historische Fragestellungen sind die beiden Bibliographien allerdings immer noch ein wertvolles Arbeitsinstrument, zumal sie auch sogenannte «graue Literatur» verzeichnen. Im Rahmen des Ausbaus des Internetangebotes zur Geschichte der SNB wurden daher die beiden Bibliographien digitalisiert und zusammengeführt. Aus der Zusammenführung ergeben sich folgende Besonderheiten: • Die Zusammenführung erforderte eine Harmonisierung der Kapitelstruktur. Da die Bibliographie von 1982 feiner gegliedert ist, musste für eine Reihe von Einträgen aus der Bibliographie von 1957 eine neue Zuordnung -
Short Run Supply Curve Is
Review 1. Production function - Types of production functions - Marginal productivity - Returns to scale 2. The cost minimization problem - Solution: MPL(K,L)/w = MPK(K,L)/r - What happens when price of an input increases? 3. Deriving the cost function - Solution to cost minimization problem - Properties of the cost function (marginal and average costs) 1 Economic Profit Economic profit is the difference between total revenue and the economic costs. Difference between economic costs and accounting costs: The economic costs include the opportunity costs. Example: Suppose you start a business: - the expected revenue is $50,000 per year. - the total costs of supplies and labor are $35,000. - Instead of opening the business you can also work in the bank and earn $25,000 per year. - The opportunity costs are $25,000 - The economic profit is -$10,000 - The accounting profit is $15,000 2 Firm’s supply: how much to produce? A firm chooses Q to maximize profit. The firm’s problem max (Q) TR(Q) TC(Q) Q . Total cost of producing Q units depends on the production function and input costs. Total revenue of is the money that the firm receives from Q units (i.e., price times the quantity sold). It depends on competition and demand 3 Deriving the firm’s supply Def. A firm is a price taker if it can sell any quantity at a given price of p per unit. How much should a price taking firm produce? For a given price, the firm’s problem is to choose quantity to maximize profit. max pQTC(Q) Q s.t.Q 0 Optimality condition: P = MC(Q) Profit Maximization Optimality condition: 1. -
The Influence of Randomized Controlled Trials on Development Economics Research and on Development Policy
The Influence of Randomized Controlled Trials on Development Economics Research and on Development Policy Paper prepared for “The State of Economics, The State of the World” Conference proceedings volume Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee Esther Duflo Michael Kremer12 September 11, 2016 Many (though by no means all) of the questions that development economists and policymakers ask themselves are causal in nature: What would be the impact of adding computers in classrooms? What is the price elasticity of demand for preventive health products? Would increasing interest rates lead to an increase in default rates? Decades ago, the statistician Fisher proposed a method to answer such causal questions: Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) (Fisher, 1925). In an RCT, the assignment of different units to different treatment groups is chosen randomly. This insures that no unobservable characteristics of the units is reflected in the assignment, and hence that any difference between treatment and control units reflects the impact of the treatment. While the idea is simple, the implementation in the field can be more involved, and it took some time before randomization was considered to be a practical tool for answering questions in social science research in general, and in development economics more specifically. 1 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo are in the department of economics at MIT and co-director of J-PAL Michael Kremer is in the department of economics at Harvard and serves as part-time Scientific Director of Development Innovation Ventures at USAID, which has also funded research by both Banerjee and Duflo. The views expressed in this document reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. -
Working Paper No. 39, Neoliberalism As a Variant of Capitalism
Portland State University PDXScholar Working Papers in Economics Economics 12-12-2019 Working Paper No. 39, Neoliberalism as a Variant of Capitalism Justin Pilarski Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_workingpapers Part of the Economic History Commons, and the Economic Theory Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Citation Details Pilarski, Justin "Neoliberalism as a Variant of Capitalism, Working Paper No. 39", Portland State University Economics Working Papers. 39. (12 December 2019) i + 14 pages. This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers in Economics by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. Neoliberalism as a Variant of Capitalism Working Paper No. 39 Authored by: Justin Pilarski A Contribution to the Working Papers of the Department of Economics, Portland State University Submitted for: EC445 “Comparative Economic Systems” 12 December 2019; i + 14 pages Prepared for Professor John Hall Abstract: Economic systems evolve over time in adapting to the needs and deficiency of the system. This inquiry seeks to establish Neoliberalism as—in the language of Barry Clark—a variant of capitalism that evolved out of retaliation of the regulated variant of capitalism. We utilize Barry Clark’s work on the evolution of economic systems in establishing the pattern of adaptation in American capitalism. Then we establish and analyze the neoliberal variant of capitalism in how this evolution retaliated against the existing system rather than adapting the preceding variant. -
SIMON on ALTRUISM, NEAR DECOMPOSABILITY, and DESIGN: EXTENSIONS on a BEHAVIORAL APPROACH to STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT1 Mie-Sophia
SIMON ON ALTRUISM, NEAR DECOMPOSABILITY, AND DESIGN: EXTENSIONS ON A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT1 Mie-Sophia Elisabeth Augier 70 Cubberley, Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-3096 Phone: (650) 723-9898 Email: [email protected] Saras D. Sarasvathy 3322 Van Munching Hall R.H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 Phone: (301) 405-9673. Email: [email protected] 1 Thanks to Jim March and Stuart Read for comments on the ideas in this paper; and to Herb Simon for his conversation that inspired and encouraged us to attempt this. SUMMARY This paper develops a view of strategic management that is based on the ideas of Herbert Simon in particular, and insights from the behavioral theory of the firm in general. Building on certain well-received elements of his work in strategy, we add implications from his other (rather under-studied) work, especially on altruism, near-decomposability, and design. Each of these fills an important gap at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels of analysis in mainstream strategic management theorizing today. We argue that these three extensions, when integrated, can re-shape future scholarship in strategic management in a manner consistent with key results both from the dynamic capabilities view, and the resource based view. Keywords: Behavioral Theory of the Firm; Dynamic capabilities; Opportunism; Organizations; RBV; Strategy 2 Several notable scholars of strategic management have observed and utilized important connections between issues in strategy and the behavioral ideas of Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert and James G. March. For instance, Rumelt et al (1994) noticed that “much of the modern stream of thinking about [strategic] management has its origins in the Carnegie School’s ‘behavioral’ model of the firm” (p. -
Understanding Development and Poverty Alleviation
14 OCTOBER 2019 Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2019 UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION The Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, founded in 1739, is an independent organisation whose overall objective is to promote the sciences and strengthen their influence in society. The Academy takes special responsibility for the natural sciences and mathematics, but endeavours to promote the exchange of ideas between various disciplines. BOX 50005 (LILLA FRESCATIVÄGEN 4 A), SE-104 05 STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN TEL +46 8 673 95 00, [email protected] WWW.KVA.SE Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2019 Understanding Development and Poverty Alleviation The Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel October 14, 2019 Despite massive progress in the past few decades, global poverty — in all its different dimensions — remains a broad and entrenched problem. For example, today, more than 700 million people subsist on extremely low incomes. Every year, five million children under five die of diseases that often could have been prevented or treated by a handful of proven interventions. Today, a large majority of children in low- and middle-income countries attend primary school, but many of them leave school lacking proficiency in reading, writing and mathematics. How to effectively reduce global poverty remains one of humankind’s most pressing questions. It is also one of the biggest questions facing the discipline of economics since its very inception. -
Parental Socioeconomic Status, Child Health, and Human Capital Janet
Parental Socioeconomic Status, Child Health, and Human Capital Janet Currie and Joshua Goodman ABSTRACT Parental socioeconomic status (SES) may affect a child’s educational outcomes through a number of pathways, one of which is the child’s health. This essay asks two questions: What evidence exists about the effect of parental SES on child health? And, what evidence exists about the effect of child health on future outcomes, such as education? We conclude that there is strong evidence of both links. Introduction Investments in education pay off in the form of higher future earnings, and differences in educational attainments explain a significant fraction of the adult variation in wages, incomes, and other outcomes. But what determines a child’s educational success? Most studies point to family background as the primary factor. But why does background matter? While many aspects are no doubt important, research increasingly implicates health as a potentially major factor. The importance of health for education and earnings suggests that if family background affects child health, then poor child health may in turn affect education and future economic status. What evidence exists about the effect of parental socioeconomic status (SES) on child health? And, what evidence exists about the effect of child health on future outcomes, such as education? A great deal of evidence shows that low SES in childhood is related to poorer future adult health (Davey Smith et al., 1998). The specific question at the heart of this review is whether low parental SES affects future outcomes through its effects on child health. In most of the studies cited, SES is defined by parental income or poverty status, though some measure SES through residential neighborhood or parental schooling attainment. -
Evolutionary Economics Geoffrey M
Course Description Evolutionary Economics Geoffrey M. Hodgson www.geoffrey-hodgson.info [email protected] YSI Workshop Antalya @ Turkish Economic Association Conference Antalya, Turkey 16-17 October 2014 16 October from 9am to 12.30pm 9am Lecture 1: “The terrain of evolutionary economics” This lecture will explore the extent of modern “evolutionary” economics, the key works and authors that have been most inspirational for it, its wide influence in theory and policy, and its links with mainstream economics and other disciplines. 11am Lecture 2: “Communality and differences within evolutionary economics” This lecture will consider the main shared assumptions and concerns within “evolutionary economics” and also show how some internal disputes are founded on different assumptions concerning the objects of study. 17 October from 9am to 12.30pm 9am Lecture 3: “Generalizing Darwinism” This lecture will consider the search for general principles that govern socio-economic evolution. The idea of using generalised Darwinian principles is addressed, along with some objections to this approach. 11am Lecture 4: “The evolution of moral sentiments” This lecture will address another new strain of thinking within “evolutionary economics” that explores the implications of (broadly Darwinian) evolutionary theory in other disciplines (such as anthropology and psychology) for our understanding of such issues as human motivation and economic organization. 1 Reading COMPULSORY READING Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (2005) ‘Can Self-Interest Explain Cooperation?’ Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2(1), October, pp. 21-41. Aldrich, Howard E., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, David L. Hull, Thorbjørn Knudsen, Joel Mokyr and Viktor J. Vanberg (2008) ‘In Defence of Generalized Darwinism’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 18(5), October, pp. -
Adam Smith 1723 – 1790 He Describes the General Harmony Of
Adam Smith 1723 – 1790 He describes the general harmony of human motives and activities under a beneficent Providence, and the general theme of “the invisible hand” promoting the harmony of interests. The invisible hand: There are two important features of Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand”. First, Smith was not advocating a social policy (that people should act in their own self interest), but rather was describing an observed economic reality (that people do act in their own interest). Second, Smith was not claiming that all self-interest has beneficial effects on the community. He did not argue that self-interest is always good; he merely argued against the view that self- interest is necessarily bad. It is worth noting that, upon his death, Smith left much of his personal wealth to churches and charities. On another level, though, the “invisible hand” refers to the ability of the market to correct for seemingly disastrous situations with no intervention on the part of government or other organizations (although Smith did not, himself, use the term with this meaning in mind). For example, Smith says, if a product shortage were to occur, that product’s price in the market would rise, creating incentive for its production and a reduction in its consumption, eventually curing the shortage. The increased competition among manufacturers and increased supply would also lower the price of the product to its production cost plus a small profit, the “natural price.” Smith believed that while human motives are often selfish and greedy, the competition in the free market would tend to benefit society as a whole anyway. -
The Institutionalist Reaction to Keynesian Economics
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Volume 30, Number 1, March 2008 THE INSTITUTIONALIST REACTION TO KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS BY MALCOLM RUTHERFORD AND C. TYLER DESROCHES I. INTRODUCTION It is a common argument that one of the factors contributing to the decline of institutionalism as a movement within American economics was the arrival of Keynesian ideas and policies. In the past, this was frequently presented as a matter of Keynesian economics being ‘‘welcomed with open arms by a younger generation of American economists desperate to understand the Great Depression, an event which inherited wisdom was utterly unable to explain, and for which it was equally unable to prescribe a cure’’ (Laidler 1999, p. 211).1 As work by William Barber (1985) and David Laidler (1999) has made clear, there is something very wrong with this story. In the 1920s there was, as Laidler puts it, ‘‘a vigorous, diverse, and dis- tinctly American literature dealing with monetary economics and the business cycle,’’ a literature that had a central concern with the operation of the monetary system, gave great attention to the accelerator relationship, and contained ‘‘widespread faith in the stabilizing powers of counter-cyclical public-works expenditures’’ (Laidler 1999, pp. 211-12). Contributions by institutionalists such as Wesley C. Mitchell, J. M. Clark, and others were an important part of this literature. The experience of the Great Depression led some institutionalists to place a greater emphasis on expenditure policies. As early as 1933, Mordecai Ezekiel was estimating that about twelve million people out of the forty million previously employed in the University of Victoria and Erasmus University.