SCOTTISH INDUSTRIAL HISTORY Volume 2.2&3 1979 Cl(tliGPAII.K' FACTOI'ZY GLASG-Gw Cover Illustrations Front Craigpark Factory, Glasgow, demolished 1979. (see Site News) Back ~ Cathcart Mill, Glasgow, being rebuilt. (see Site News) bottom Bonthrone Maltings, Ladybank, Fife, for sale, mid 1979. Scottish Industrial History is published jointly by for Industrial Archaeology, the Scottish Society f the Scottish Society Historical Machinery and the Business Archives C or.~he Preservation of Details of membership of these organisations mayo~nc~ of Scotland. respective secretaries (see end page for names ande d:d from the is edited by Dr. Charles W. Munn, Department of Ec a ~ess~s). The journal · · 1 onomtc Htstory un 1verstty of Glasgow, G asgow Gl, T.G. Bell Tayba k S . • Crescent, Invergowrte,. DD2 5DT·, and MlSs· Sylvia' Clarkn • Dtat ton d · p · 1 "' h · 1 , epartment of General Stu 1es, a1s e~ .e~ n1ca. College. It is published three times a year. ?ontrtbuttons wtlJ ~§ welcomed, and should be sent to ~~'f <)f Jb.e edltors. SCOTTISH INDUSTRIAL HISTORY Volume 2 Nos. 2 & 3 1979 CONTENTS The Committee of Ex-Secretaries of State for Scotland and Industrial Policy, 1941-1945, by R,H. Campbell 3 The Aubin Journal, by Allan Cunningham 11 The Gairdner Correspondence, by C.G.D. Tennant 19 Summary Lists of Recent Archives, Surveys and Deposits 35 Society Notes 73 News from other Organisations 75 Site News 77 Book News 83 Who's Who lOO The Editors wish to apologise for the late appearance of this joint issue. From this issue I will cease to be joint editor of Scottish Industrial History. I would like to thank all the contributors who have \.Jritten for the journal, and its. predecessor the Newsletter of the SSIA and SSPHM; the various typists who have prepared the text, especially Carolyn MacLean and Sheila Gardiner, and last but by no means least the long­ suffering staff of the Printing Department of the University of Strathclyde without whom there would have been no publication! Charlie Munn who has been largely responsible for the success of SIH volumes 1 & 2, continues as joint editor, and is joined by Tom Bell (SSIA) and Sylvia Clark (SSPHM). I wish them, and the journal, every success in t.b.e i.ut.urc. John R Hume The Committee of Ex-Secretaries of State for Scotland and Industrial Policy, 1941-1945 R. H. Campbell In the House of Commons of 11 September 1941 the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Thomas Johnston, announced the appointment of an advisory council of all living ex-Secretaries of State 'for the purpose of surveying problems of post-war reconstruction in Scotland'. 1 Living up the the ILP's role of unofficial wartime opposition, John McGovern wondered if it was not possible to 'get any more die-hard Tories to put on this organisation?', but generally the move was welcomed, and the Council has been regarded by some as a major constitutional achievement, particularly of Johnston, one which, regrettably perhaps, cannot be repeated in the more divisive politics of peacetime. Some assessment of its work, more especially on matters of industrial policy, is now possible by an examination of its recently opened records. 2 Various titles accorded to the Council during its relatively short life can cause confusion. The fullest, which provides an accurate description of its composition and function, was the Advisory Council of ex­ Secretaries of State on Post War Problems, but only parts of this rather long-winded title were commonly used, usually the Council on Post-War Problems or the Council of Ex-Secretaries of State. The term Council of State, by which it has come to be known, especially perhaps by those who look with favour on its activities, first appears in the minutes of the ninth meeting on 2 September 1942, but the use of the term was questioned in parliament in February 1944, particularly because of its possible confusion with the council of state appointed in absences of the sovereign. Thereafter the term was dropped in favour of the more prosaic Scottish Council of Ex-Secretaries of State. The changing name may be more than a matter of terminology, and possibly reflects an uncertainty over the exact function of the committee, and, in the use of the term Council of State, an attempt to elevate the function into something grander than it was. The circumstances in which the Council was born were favourable to experimental concern with post-war planning and how it affected Scotland. In the spring of 1941 Johnston became involved in objections raised when the Scottish Development Council set up a committee to undertake post-war economic planning. The Convention of Royal Burghs and others, representing local authority interests in general, saw the move as a threat to their authority. At the same time two official investigations were requiring Scottish attention. The first came from the work of Arthur Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio, in charge of reconstruction. In September 1941 he appointed a Committee on Post-War Internal Economic Problems on which the Scottish Office was represented 4 and as early as July 1941 the Permanent Under Secretary of State was asking for 2 names of individuals who might be persuaded to serve on various advisory bodies on post-war problems. 5 The second move from Whitehall drew attention more forceful~y to the need to safeguard Scottish interests. It came from Lord Re1th who, as Minister of Works, was responsible for the structure.of post-w~r . 1 1 · and who advocated a Central Plann1ng Author1ty, ph~s 1 ca ida~n 1 ngd ived the Scottish Office of some of its independent wh1ch_wou Thave e~:hension of the Scottish Office over such apparent funct1ons.threats to Scottishe app interests are ev1dent· 1n· correspon d ence between Johnston and Reith. Johnston wrote : 'In the first place I take it that yo~ agreed that;Scottish public 0 inion would be exceed~ngly restive 1f Town Plann1ng powers were pk away from the off1ce of the Secretary of State for Scotland ta en . and entrusted to a U.K. P1 ann1ng M1n1ster. , should this proposal ever be put forward publicly. There would b~·~ howl in the House of Commons from Conservatives, Liberal and Labour members alike and there would be a pretty strong Press against this proposal'. 6 Johnston made littl~ progress. ~n November Rei~h.wrote, 'It lo~ks as "f the Scottish Off1ce were unfr1endly and susp1c1ous as of an 1gnorant ~latfooted Sassenach', to which Johnston replied, 'As for ••• being a flatfooted Sassenach and the Scottish Office being unfriendly to you - really and truly there is no justification for it. You are Scots and not Sassenach, and I am sure there is no feeling . in the Scottish Office but goodwill and a ~esire ~o co-operate in every way'. 7 That there should have been a Scott1sh adv1sory committee on post- war problems is not surprising in these circumstances, not that it took the form of a political experiment. Post·war planning was a long-term matter. A more immediate issue of industrial policy, which concerned Johnston, was the policy of the concentration of production and the consequences it might have for Scotland. The policy, outlined in a White Paper of March 1941, 8 was to concentrate· industrial production, following the imposition of restrictions on the supplies of raw materials and on the output of a wide range of goods, chiefly for the domestic consumers' markets. With production concentrated, factory space was released for other purposes and labour freed to be transferred to the manufacture of strategic supplies. The plan can be justified as part of a war economy, but its long-term consequences for Scotland could be harmful. Scotland's share of the light consumers' durables was small and tenuous and had been carefully nurtured in the 1930's. The possibility arose that these industries might be lost, unless offset by expansion of . light engineering production, as for aircraft, and that was less l1kely to be Scotland's contribution to an increased war effort than an expansion of the traditional heavy industrial complex. Johnston was 3 ~lso aware that in ti;e past Scotland had apparently suffered from the 1mplementation of industrial mergers. When warning Reith of the opposition which would follow any refusal to give planning powers to the Secretary of State, he explained : 'It merely arises from the experience which Scotland has had of the transfer of Scottish interests to a U.K. basis, - Calico Printing and banking for example, - and Scotland is exceedingly restive with any further suggestions of ~hat ki~d'. 9 Finally one possible consequence of the policy of 1ndustr1al concentration was that labour might be transferred out of Scotl~nd, a~d the political implications of that were well recognised, espec1ally 1n light of experience between the wars. In 1941 the Ministry of Labour pointed out : 'The Government policy of industrial transference was not at all popular in Scotland during the years of depression preceding the war. It was strongly opposed by Scottish National political opinion and probably most people felt rather strongly that more effort should be made to bring industry to Scotland rather than export Scottish unemployed workers to England for employment and settlement there'. 10 Though major issues of policy, both long and short-term, were involved, the frequency of the meetings of the Council of Ex-Secretaries of State does not indicate a continuing sense of urgency in tackling them. In 1942 the frequency fell slightly, then drastically: three meetings in the last quarter of 1941; eight in 1942 (five in the first half); then only two in 1943 and 1944; and one in 1945, before the end of the coalition government brought the experiment to an end automatically.