Proquest Dissertations
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Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 UMI AN ACCOUNT OF THE JUSTIHCATION OF TESTIMONIAL BELIEFS: A RELIABILIST APPROACH DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the The Ohio State University By David Ena. M.A. The Ohio State University 2000 Dissertation Committee Approved by Professor Marshall Swain. Adviser Professor George Pappas Adviser Professor Diana Raffman Philosophy Program UMI Number: 9994859 Copyright 2000 by Eng, David All rights reserved. UMI UMI Microform 9994859 Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Copyright by David Eiif> 2000 ABSTRACT I defend a novel account of the justification of testimonial beliefs within a general reliabilist framework. I argue that an agent's testimonial belief is justified only if the agent is discriminative about testimonial reports. To be discriminative about a testimonial report requires that an agent not form a testimonial belief, had the testimonial report been different in relevant ways. In developing this account. I provide a way of determining the relevant testimonial reports an agent must be capable of discriminating that appeals to the evidence available to the agent, and I discuss the different mechanisms that allow agents to be discriminative about testimonial reports. My account treads a middle ground between two prominent accounts. Weak Individualism and the Blind-Trust account. .According to Weak Individualism, the justification of a testimonial belief must be grounded in non-testimonial evidence, while according to the Blind-Trust account, a testimonial belief is justified if it is formed on the basis of a disposition to blindly believe others. I show that Humean Weak Individualism leads to skepticism, and the Blind-Trust account licenses gullibility. On my account, since an agent has to be discriminative about testimonial reports and since an agent can be discriminative without possessing the non-testimonial evidence required by Weak Individualism, my account avoids both of these consequences. Because I adopt a general reliabilist framework. I also provide solutions to two serious problems raised for reliabilism. the Generality Problem and the New Evil Demon problem. I offer a solution to the Generality Problem, the problem of identifying the unique process that produces epistemic results in accordance with our intuitions. If the reliabilist appeals to the process that reflects the actual dynamics of belief formation, the account will produce the correct epistemic results. I also develop a solution to the New Evil Demon problem, a problem involving cases in which agents form justified beliefs that are produced by unreliable processes. I argue that if the reliability of a process is evaluated in worlds that are fixed by the evidence that is available to agents, a reliabilist account will capture our intuitions in these cases. Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank many of the faculty, graduate students, and staff at The Ohio State University for their part in helping me complete this dissertation. In particular. I would like to thank Diana Raffman for many helpful discussions, and for showing me how enjoyable philosophy can be. I am also deeply indebted to George Pappas for his comments and discussions on earlier drafts, and for his role in my development as a philosopher. I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor. Marshall Swain, for his patience, help, guidance, and encouragement through many earlier drafts. Finally. I would like to thank my wife. Sondra Bacharach. Without her patience and help, this dissertation would have never been completed. IV VITA M ay 18. 1966 .............................................. Bom - Grand'Mere. Quebec 1993 ............................................................... M.A. Philosophy. McGill University 1990-1993 .................................................... Graduate Teaching Associate. McGill University. Montreal. Quebec 1993-2000 ......................................................Lecturer The Ohio State University 2000-present ..................................................Lecturer California State University. Bakersfield FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS A bstract ................................................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................... iv V ita...........................................................................................................................................................V Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................. vi Chapters: Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... I 1. The Nature of Testimony and Testimonial Beliefs .......................................................... 7 1.1 The Role and Importance of Testimony .......................................................... 8 1.2 The Nature of Testim ony .................................................................................... 10 1.3 Coady's Account of Testifying .......................................................................... 21 1.4 Graham’s Account of Testifying ....................................................................... 27 1.5 Testim onial Beliefs ..................................................................................................29 A Critique of Individualism .................................................................................................. 39 2.1 Individualism .......................................................................................................... 40 2.2 Strong Individualism ........................................................................................... 41 2.3 Weak Individualism ............................................................................................. 47 2.4 Varieties of Weak Individualism ....................................................................... 53 3. A Critique .of the Blind Trust Account .............................................................................. 67 3.1 Varieties of Trust................................................................................................. 68 3.2 The A Priori Justification of Testimonial Beliefs ........................................ 72 3.2.1 The Argument from Inconsistency ................................................... 72 3.2.2 The Argument from Rationality ....................................................... 77 3.2.3 The Argument from Content ............................................................. 87 3.3 A Reliabilist Defense of Blind-Trust .............................................................. 91 4. A Defense ....................... of Reliabilism ............................................................................. 99 4.1 A Solution to the Generality Problem ............................................................ 101 vi 4.1.1 The Generality Problem ...................................................................... 101 4.1.2 Psychological Realism ......................................................................... 105 4.1.3 Psychological Realism versus Causal Operativeness ..................... 109 4.1.4 Solving the Generality Problem ......................................................... 115 4.1.5 The No Distinction Problem ............................................................... 122 4.2 A Solution the New Evil Demon Problem ...................................................... 127 4.2.1 The New Evil Demon Problem .......................................................... 128 4.2.2 Multiplying Concepts of Epistemic Justification