The Thesis Traces the Course of Lyons's Foreign Policy

1 J.A. Lyons, the ‘Tame Tasmanian’; A Study in Australian Foreign and Defence Policy, 1932-39. David Samuel Bird Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree Doctor of Philosophy May 2004 Department of History The University of Melbourne 2 i J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister of Australia, 1932-39, presided over twin policies of conciliation and rearmament in a search for peace. The thesis discusses his individual world-view, one chiefly constructed on principles of consensus, and analyses the foreign and defence policies of his government, thereby re- evaluating suggestions that Lyons was chiefly interested in only domestic policy. The foreign policy of the Lyons years was primarily directed at the Asian-Pacific region, especially at Japan. It consisted of an Australian variety of ‘cunctation’, superseded by the variety of ‘appeasement’ found in the Australian Eastern Mission of 1934, arguably the first time that appeasement was applied in East Asia and the first of three significant external policy initiatives of the Lyons years. Lyons himself lobbied in favour of appeasement in the broader imperial context from 1935, recognising that it needed to be targeted at Rome and Berlin, as well as at Tokyo. Any Australian government could not apply appeasement in Europe directly, in the absence of an Australian diplomatic service, although Lyons sought to advance conciliation through ‘personal diplomacy’ in certain foreign capitals. It was not, however, until the premiership of Chamberlain, after May 1937, that London and Canberra were united in the desire for the application of ‘wider appeasement’, the policy adopted at the 1937 Imperial Conference. At this gathering, Lyons presented a second major initiative, the proposal for a Pacific Pact of non- aggression; his magnum opus and the ultimate opportunity for his regional peacemaking. The Imperial Conference had also discussed and endorsed measures designed to enhance the process of imperial consultation and once Whitehall subsequently began to apply appeasement in Europe, Lyons was keen to ensure that the voice of his dominion was heard. This was especially so during the first Czech crisis of September 1938 in which, it is argued, Lyons and his appeasing circle sought to play a significant consultative and intermediary role. These efforts seemed to have been rewarded by the climax of European appeasement: the 1938 ‘Munich Pact’. Appeasement was, however, everywhere dissolving from late-1938, as was the mechanism of imperial consultation, and the response of Lyons as prime minister was to initiate the process of establishing an independent Australian diplomatic service, something long considered by his government, but hitherto delayed. This initiative came too late to prevent his reluctant admission of the failure of appeasement, in March 1939. The policy of conciliation was accompanied from the beginning of the Lyons years by a muscular defence policy. That policy involved five separate rearmament programs, September 1933-December 1938. Although mindful of imperial needs, this policy was chiefly directed at the requirements of home defence and the Lyons government remained wary of the Singapore strategy. Lyons’s character was stamped on it by his decisive opposition to conscription, 1938-39. Although it was his misfortune, as a leading Australian appeaser, that conciliation was everywhere overshadowed by rearmament, the considerable defensive preparations of the Lyons years ensured that a sufficient state of readiness was attained to match the hostile scenarios envisaged in defence planning after 1932. The attempts made to secure a level of joint, imperial defence planning, however, resulted in failure. In its examination of the foreign and defence policies of the 1930s this thesis augments the revision underway in current scholarship. It demonstrates that an identifiable Australian foreign policy existed and that it was chiefly a regional one - even if the application of that policy was retarded by the absence of a diplomatic structure and by the consequent reliance on London. It nonetheless adhered to the patterns of external policy that had evolved since Federation. When combined with an examination of the robust defence measures of these years, Lyons emerges as a vigorous premier with a clear vision of Australia’s place in the world. It is argued that the search for peace of the ‘Tame Tasmanian’, 1932-39, was sustained and considerable. This is to certify that: i) the thesis compromises only my original work towards the PhD. ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used. iii) The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. Signed: I acknowledge the protracted diligence and assistance of both my supervisor, Associate Professor Don Garden, and my assistant supervisor, Dr. Paul Nicholls, of the University of Melbourne, throughout the course of my candidature. Their contributions have been marked and their generous allotment of time to my project has been much appreciated. 3 I also wish to thank Professor Michael Roe and Dr. Richard Davis, both formerly of the University of Tasmania, who contributed to the development of my interest in the great variety of Australian history. The staff of the National Archives of Australia and of the Manuscripts Room at the National Library of Australia (Canberra) also deserve my gratitude for their particular efficiency. 4 ii TABLE of CONTENTS: Introduction. Pages 1-42. Preliminary comments − patterns in external policy, 1901-31 − survey of the foreign policy and the argument − Lyons and policy formulation − aspects of defence policy − the contribution of the thesis − literature review − sources − methodology. Chapter 1: Cunctation in East Asia, January 1932-December 1933. Pages 43-80. The political and personal background of Lyons to 1932 − the eastern situation in 1932 − sanctions and consultation − the question of ‘Manchukuo’ − disarmament − defence and the Japanese threat, 1933 − the first rearmament program − conclusion: the end of cunctation. Chapter 2: The Genesis of Australian Appeasement − The ‘Australian Eastern Mission’ of 1934 and its Aftermath. Pages 81-116. Trade and diplomacy − the conception and nature of the AEM − diplomatic goals − defence goals − composition and itinerary − the diplomatic success of the AEM − the defence warnings of the AEM − diplomacy, trade and the Japanese perspective − the British perspective − Lyons and the aftermath − the Melbourne memorandum − the Hankey mission. Chapter 3: The ‘Amateur Diplomat’, February-September 1935. Pages 117-152. Preparations for the London summit − Lyons and the ‘pact’ − further London meetings − the war graves − Rome − Washington − sentimental reflections − the Debuchi mission. Chapter 4: The Shadow of War, September 1935-June 1936. Pages 153-193. Qualified assurances − the question of sanctions − war in Abyssinia − the rebirth of External Affairs − the end of sanctions and Abyssinia − the Rhineland − the second rearmament program. Chapter 5: annus mirabilis − The Imperial Conference and its Aftermath, May 1936-December 1937. Pages 194-254. Trade diversion – League reform – conference preparation − Italian appeasement – the Imperial Conference and the Pact proposal – initial responses – defence and the conference – conference outcomes –the third rearmament program – the October election and conscription. Chapter 6: annus horribilis − The Climax of Appeasement, January-September 1938. Pages 255-319. Anglo-Italian accord – Anschluss – the fourth rearmament program – sanctions and Yampi embargo – the Czech crisis – September days and nights – ‘X-day’. Chapter 7: ‘Parts of it Welcome’ − the Endgame of Appeasement, October 1938- April 1939. Pages 320-389. PART A: The aftermath of Munich – Kristallnacht and colonies – Abyssinian recognition – the Pact redux and diplomatic representation – the fifth rearmament program – conscription. PART B: the end of Mediterranean appeasement – the end of eastern appeasement – the debate on German appeasement – the Reichstag speech – the second Czech crisis – Singapore – the ‘new imperial policy’. Conclusion. Pages 390-407. Estimates of Lyons – critical assessment of Lyons and external policy – critical assessment of Lyons and defence policy – future research. 5 Bibliography. Pages 408-436. Appendices. Pages 437-440. 6 Introduction 1 ‘A Pacific policy we must have.’ Alfred Deakin, Melbourne, November 1910. ‘International peace is needed to-day more than ever it has been in the history of the world. Without it international co-operation is impossible and it is by international co-operation alone that we can triumph over the present world-wide economic depression.’2 J.A. Lyons, 14 March 1932. Preliminary comments − patterns in external policy, 1901 -31 − survey of the foreign policy and the argument − Lyons and policy formulation − aspects of the defence policy− the contribution of the thesis − literature review − sources − methodology. The cover of Time magazine on 8 July 1935 pictured a beaming Joseph Aloysius Lyons above the caption: ‘Premier of the Commonwealth of Australia. Up From Down Under, he topped the Irish Question.’3 Also referring to his reputation as a conciliator, the magazine elsewhere labelled him the ‘Tame Tasmanian’, an appellation that serves as a suitable title for a review of Lyons’s reputedly tame outlook on the world during his period in office, 1932-39.4 This thesis seeks to examine Lyons’s individual thinking, or world-view,

Load more