August 2008

Philosophy 465 – of Language Course Syllabus

Instructor : Nathan Salmon

E-mail : [email protected]

Office Hours : Mondays, 3:30 pm; Tuesdays, 12:30 pm; and by appointment. MHP 205B.

Format : Lectures on Tuesdays and Thursdays, 11:00 am—12:15 pm, VKC 211.

Description : Examination of the classical theories of and : , , and . and the theory of so-called direct reference. Issues to be discussed center on the following: What is the nature of the semantic, cognitive content of a declarative sentence, and what do the constituents of the sentence contribute to that content? How is the designatum of a term secured—e.g., how does the proper name ‘Angelina Jolie’ come to designate the person it does, instead of designating someone else altogether or no one at all? How is the semantic content of a sentence secured, and how is the contribution of the sentence constituents secured? Solutions to the classical puzzles of meaning and reference are investigated.

Requirements : One term paper, approximately 10 pages, due in class Tuesday, October 28; final exam, Tuesday, December 16, 8:00 am (ugh!)—10:00 am. Paper topics will be suggested orally during lectures.

Texts : The readings for the course are drawn from a variety of sources. The only required text is Robert M. Harnish, ed., Basic Topics in the (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994) . The following four books also contain a fair concentration of the readings. Depending on your level of interest you might consider purchasing some or all of them.

M. Davidson, On Sense and Direct Reference (McGraw Hill, 2007).

Jay L. Garfield and Murray Kiteley, eds, Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern (New York: Paragon House, 1991).

S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, eds, Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1986, 1991).

Nathan Salmon and , eds, and Attitudes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1988).

N.B.: NO GRADE OF INCOMPLETE WILL BE GIVEN FOR THIS COURSE WITHOUT A LEGITIMATE MEDICAL EXCUSE, CONFIRMED IN WRITING BY YOUR PHYSICIAN. Philosophy 465 Course Syllabus Page 2 August 2008

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

The following schedule, though tentative, is to be used as a guide. One’s reading should stay one step ahead of the lectures.

Weeks 1-8, August 25—October 16: Fregean Theory

Nathan Salmon, “Introduction to Sense and Reference,” in Harnish, pp. 99-105; John Stuart Mill, “Of Names,” in Har- nish, pp. 130-141 [also available in Garfield & Kiteley, pp. 8-34].

Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference” (“ Über Sinn und Bedeutung ” alternatively translated “On Sense and Nominatum” or “On Sense and Meaning”) in Harnish, pp. 142-160 [also available in G&K, pp. 35-52; Nuccetelli & Seay, pp. 113-127; Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language ; Copi and Gould, eds., Contemporary Philosophical , pp. 65-83; Geach and Black, eds., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege , pp. 56-78; Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy , pp. 157-177; and elsewhere]; “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (“ Der Gedanke ” alternatively translated “Thoughts”), in Harnish, pp. 517-535 [also in Salmon and Soames, eds Propositions and Attitudes , pp. 33-55; Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic , pp. 17-38; Frege, Logical Investigations , pp. 1-30; Frege, Collected Papers , pp. 351-372]. Recommended: Frege, “Compound Thoughts,” in the Collected Papers , pp. 390-406 [also in Logical Investigations , pp. 55-77].

Salmon, “Introduction to Sense and Reference,” Harnish, pp. 110-114; Frege’s Puzzle (excerpts), in Harnish, pp. 447- 450; in Davidson, pp. 280-326; , Introduction to Mathematical Logic I , “Introduction,” Sections 00-04, pp. 1-39, in Davidson, pp. 54-81.

Recommended: Church, “Introduction,” Sections 06-09, pp. 39-68; “On Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief,” in Linsky, ed., Reference and Modality , pp. 168-170; “Propositions and Sentences,” in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Language , pp. 276-282; “Intensional Semantics,” in Martinich, pp. 40-47 [also in Copi and Gould, Contemporary Philosophical Logic (under the title “The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis”), pp. 166-176]. Also recommended: Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (the book), pp. 14-24.

Frege, “Function and Concept,” in the Translations , pp. 21-41 [also in the Collected Papers , pp. 137-156]; “On Concept and Object,” in the Translations , pp. 42-55 [also in the Collected Papers , pp. 182-194].

Hilary Putnam, “Synonymy and the Analysis of Belief Sentences,” in Salmon and Soames, eds Propositions and Attitudes , pp. 149-158; Church, “Intensional Isomorphism and of Belief,” in Salmon and Soames, pp. 159-168.

**Term Papers Due in Class: Tuesday, October 28**

Philosophy 465 Course Syllabus Page 3 August 2008

**Term Papers Due in Class: Tuesday, October 28**

Weeks 9-12, October 21—November 13: Russellian Theory

Salmon, “Introduction to Sense and Reference,” in Harnish, pp. 105-110; Bertrand Russell, Selection from the Frege- Russell Correspondence, in Salmon and Soames, pp. 56-57; “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” in Salmon and Soames, pp. 16-32; “On Denoting,” in Harnish, pp. 161-173 [also in G&K, pp. 87-99; Martinich, pp. 203-211; Copi and Gould, Contemporary Philosophical Logic , pp. 84-96].

Recommended: Russell, “Descriptions,” in N&S, pp. 147-154 [also in Martinich, pp. 212-218; Rosenberg and Travis, pp. 166-175]; Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (the book), pp. 45-54; Rudolf Carnap, “The Method of Intension and Extension” (Selection from Meaning and Necessity ), in G&K, pp. 136-143; W. V. Quine, “Reference and Modality,” in Linsky, pp. 17-34; “Referential Opacity,” in Harnish, pp. 338-351. Also recommended: Arthur F. Smullyan, “Modality and Descriptions,” in Linsky, pp. 35-43.

Recommended: P. F. Strawson, “On Referring,” in G&K, pp. 108-129 [also in Martinich, pp. 219-234; also in Rosenberg and Travis, pp. 175-195; also in Copi and Gould, Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory , pp. 105-127].

Russell, “Mr. Strawson on Referring,” G&K, pp. 130-135 [also in Copi and Gould, Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory , pp. 127-132].

Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” in Harnish, pp. 174-191 [also in G&K, pp. 144-161; N&S, pp. 155-170; Martinich, pp. 235-247; Rosenberg and Travis, pp. 195-211; Schwartz, ed., Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds , pp. 42-65]. Recommended: Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” in G&K, pp. 162-188 [also in Martinich, pp. 248-267; also in French, Uehling, and Wettstein, eds., Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (also entitled Midwest Studies in Philosophy II: The Philosophy of Language )].

Week 13-15, November 18—December 4: Direct Reference

Salmon, “Introduction to Sense and Reference,” in Harnish, pp. 114-120; Kripke, Naming and Necessity (excerpts), in Harnish, pp. 192-220 [some of which is also excerpted in N&S, pp. 128-146; and in Martinich, pp. 278-294]. Recommended: John Searle, “Proper Names,” in Martinich, pp. 273-277 [also in Rosenberg and Travis, pp. 212-218]. Also recommended: Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in Davidson, pp. 84-106; Schwartz, pp. 66-101; and Kripke, Naming and Necessity (the book). [Passages omitted from the Harnish excerpts occur on pp. 1-21, 39-70, 75-77, 87-101, 106-164.]

Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” in Harnish, marked off on pp. 224-225, 228-234, 235-239, 272 [available uninterrupted in Martinich, pp. 308-315; Schwartz, pp. 119-132; Copi and Gould, Contemporary Philosophical Logic , pp. 120-131]. Recommended: Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘ Meaning ’,” in Harnish, pp. 221-274; Davidson, pp. 126-179; “Is Semantics Possible?” in Schwartz, pp. 102-118.

Salmon, “Introduction to Sense and Reference,” in Harnish, pp. 120-125; “A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn ,” in Davidson, pp. 198-234; Frege’s Puzzle (excerpts), in Harnish, pp. 450-481. Recommended: Donnellan, “Speaking of Nothing,” in Schwartz, pp. 216-244 [also in Copi and Gould, Contemporary Philosophical Logic , pp. 97-119]; Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (the book), pp. 61-76, 98-109, 119-128; in N&S, pp. 237-245; Salmon, Reference and , Chapter 1, pp. 9-41; Kripke, “A Puzzle about Belief,” in Harnish, pp. 352- 392 [also in Davidson, 1002-1036; N&S, pp. 257-263; Salmon & Soames, pp. 102-148]; Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (the book), Appendix A, pp. 129-132; Salmon, “Illogical Belief,” in Davidson, pp. 1037-1067.