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Veganism of harm to animals. Other famous vegan advo- cates, before the term was coined by Watson, were Alejandra Mancilla the British doctor William Lambe (1765–1848), Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), who adopted a vegan diet based on health and Faculty of Humanities, The University of Oslo, ethical considerations, and the British poet Percy Oslo, Norway Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), who publicly objected to the consumption of dairy and eggs. In a recent poll, it was estimated that there are Introduction at least 542,000 vegans in Britain, a steep increase from the 150,000 estimated in 2006 (Vegan Soci- Narrowly understood, veganism is the practice of ety 2016a). In the USA, a recent study showed excluding all animal products from one’s diet, that 3.3% of the population declared to be vege- with the exception of human milk. More broadly, tarian, half of which claim to be vegan – that is, veganism is not only a food ethics, but it encom- around five million people (The Vegetarian passes all other areas of life. As defined by the Resource Group 2016). Vegan Society when it became an established There are two main moral justifications for charity in the UK in 1979, veganism is best under- veganism, both of which rely on a common stood as “a philosophy and way of living which assumption: that sentience, i.e., the capacity to seeks to exclude – as far as is possible and feel pleasure and pain, is the necessary and suffi- practicable – all forms of exploitation of, and cient trait to be morally considerable. (Although it cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any is a disputed matter whether insects possess this other purpose; and by extension, promotes the trait or not, vegans tend to avoid the consumption development and use of animal-free alternatives of products such as honey or the use of products for the benefit of humans, animals and the envi- like silk, and generally oppose the idea of eating ronment” (Vegan Society 2016b). insects. Cf. McWilliams 2014.) In what follows, The Vegan Society was founded in 1944 in I present these two arguments and a third one Leicester by Donald Watson (1910–2005), his which, although less popular, captures some core wife, Dorothy, and five other friends. But, like intuitions among vegans. I then present a chal- vegetarian principles, vegan principles have been lenge faced by veganism and two arguments that around for much longer – for example, among reject it as discriminatory, and briefly conclude. adherents of Jainism who avoid doing any sort

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2016 P.B. Thompson, D.M. Kaplan (eds.), Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_578-1 2 Veganism

Arguments for Veganism male chicks and free-range laying hens who are no longer productive are routinely killed, and painful The Argument Against Unnecessary Suffering debeaking remains a standard procedure. It is Vegans and vegetarians coincide that the human hypocritical at worst, because it seeks to legiti- interest in nourishment and gustatory pleasure mize certain forms of animal rearing while derived from consuming nonhuman flesh is condemning others, occluding the cruelty inherent largely outweighed by the interests of nonhumans to these practices. in not being subject to the conditions of factory Depending on how they interpret P2’, vegans farms. Moreover, vegans accept the most influen- can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, tial argument for vegetarianism, known as the principled vegans believe that it is simply not the welfarist argument. This could be summarized case that the rearing of nonhuman animals for thus: food can be done in a way that causes no suffer- ing. It is therefore always impermissible to con- P1. It is morally wrong to cause unnecessary sume all animal products. On the other hand, suffering to nonhuman animals. contingent vegans believe that under current con- P2. The production process of meat and of many ditions it is morally wrong to consume all other nonhuman animal products causes nonhuman animal products, but this is not inevi- unnecessary suffering to nonhuman animals. table and could change in the future – for instance, C: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro- if our patterns of consumption and modes of pro- ducer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so duction changed radically. forth) in the production process of meat and of Among both groups, moreover, there is a sub- many other nonhuman animal products. set who aspires not merely to change human diets into vegan diets, but to turn the whole natural The main complaint of vegans against vegetar- world into a vegan world where suffering is inso- ians, however, is that the second, factual premise far as possible eradicated. Along these lines, Jeff does not go far enough and should be replaced by McMahan asks whether we should gradually get the following one: rid of carnivorous species in their entirety, given that they cause so much pain to others. P2’. The production process of all animal prod- McMahan’s point is that, “even if we are not ucts causes unnecessary suffering to required to prevent suffering among animals in nonhuman animals. the wild for which we are not responsible, we do have a moral reason to prevent it”–so long as our This leads to the following conclusion: acting on that reason does not bring about worse effects than those we could prevent, like massive C’: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro- ecosystemic imbalances and loss of biodiversity ducer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so (McMahan 2010, his emphases). This position fi forth) in the production process of all has been identi ed by some as a reductio against nonhuman animal products. the ideals of veganism.

For vegans, endorsing the production process The Argument Against Exploitation of some animal products (paradigmatically, free- This argument, also known as the abolitionist range dairy and eggs) while banning others is argument, runs as follows: misinformed at best and hypocritical at worst. It is misinformed at best, because it ignores the fact P1: It is morally wrong to treat sentient beings as that even the most progressive animal-rearing property. practices inflict unnecessary suffering on the ani- P2: Nonhuman animals are sentient beings. mals involved. For example, in free-range farms, Veganism 3

P3: The production process of all nonhuman ani- between veganism and exploitation. Fourth, the mal products requires treating them as only trait that matters to be morally considerable is property. sentience. Fifth, all forms of human discrimina- C: It is morally wrong to participate in any way tion, including speciesism, ought to be rejected. (as a producer, distributor, consumer, and so on Sixth, nonviolence is the core principle of aboli- and so forth) in the production process of all tionism (Francione and Charlton 2015). nonhuman animal products. Some radical abolitionists claim that at the core of their position is the idea that human and Contra welfarists, who seek to improve the nonhuman animals are moral equals and have a living conditions of farmed animals (for example, right not to be treated as resources of others. This by advocating for larger cages for factory farm is why killing animals for food is always wrong. hens, by demanding that more humane slaughter In order for this idea to gain traction, two major methods be employed, etc.), abolitionists seek a assumptions over which most human cultures total ban on nonhuman animal production which, have been constructed over centuries need to be for them, is synonymous with exploitation. As debunked: first, that human interests are more their name reveals, abolitionists regard their important than nonhuman interests and that quest as analogous to the quest of those who human lives are worth more than nonhuman rejected human slavery: just as the latter did not lives. Let me present two of the most well- demand a better treatment for slaves, but the end known arguments used to support these claims of the institution as such, contemporary abolition- and the abolitionist’s reply (Bernstein 2015). ists do not wish to better regulate the meat and When it comes to interests, it has been typically animal production industry, but fight to put a argued that the interests of individuals who are definitive end to it. claimed to possess rationality (i.e., humans) ought Gary Francione and Anna Chorlton summarize to count more than those of individuals who are abolitionism in six principles. First, there is no claimed to lack such capacity (i.e., most morally relevant trait that distinguishes humans nonhumans). It is not the case, however, that from nonhumans that justifies treating the latter as humans consistently act on this prescription. For property and, therefore, as having mere economic one thing, we do not grant a higher moral status to use for us. Just as treating humans as property is humans with a higher degree of rationality; for inconsistent with recognizing all humans as mem- another, we do grant moral status to humans who bers of the moral community, treating nonhuman completely lack this capacity. This shows that animals as property goes against their recognition speciesism (the term popularized by Peter Singer as members of the moral community. All kinds of to refer to our unjustifiable bias toward members animal use, even humane ones, are thus of our own species) determines our moral behav- unjustified. Second, if we recognize the right not ior. When it comes to the value of human lives to be treated as property, we must not seek to vis-à-vis the lives of nonhumans, a stock argu- regulate, but plainly to abolish all institutionalized ment in defense of giving more weight to the animal exploitation. It is morally wrong and prac- former comes from John Stuart Mill’s famous tically ineffective to negotiate with factory farms motto that “it is better to be a human dissatisfied better terms and conditions to promote animal than a pig satisfied” (Mill 2015, 124). Humans are welfare, because this will only result in them claimed to feel both higher and lower pleasures, continuing to exploit nonhuman animals while whereas nonhumans are claimed to feel only the making consumers more comfortable about their latter. Among the higher pleasures that humans food choices. Third, veganism is the moral base- can feel are those connected to our future plans line for animal rights advocates, and vegan non- and projects. Nonhumans, by contrast, are always violent education should be the cornerstone of tied to their present situation. In conclusion, our animal rights advocacy. There is no third path lives should be valued more than theirs. But this argument is problematic. To begin with, it is not 4 Veganism obvious why a life fully engaged in the present important moral value, Jan Deckers develops a ought to be deemed less worthy than one always moral theory based on duties to minimize negative anxious about future possibilities. Furthermore, if Global Health Impacts (GHIs) or to maximize this were the case, we should then assign more positive GHIs, where GHIs are a unit of measure- value to the lives of humans whose life prospects ment to evaluate the effects of our actions on the are more sophisticated, but we don’t – a further health of all biological organisms (Deckers 2011). mark that what is at work behind these arguments These effects are global because the concept of is the speciesist’s prejudice. health is holistic, encompassing all aspects con- For some critics, one of the most troubling ducive to flourishing, and because they take into consequences of endorsing full-fledged abolition- account the consequences of our actions not only ism is that the number of farmed animals and also for our own health but also for the health of other pets would radically diminish, eventually existing and not yet existing humans and disappearing – the assumption being that any rela- nonhumans. The resulting prescription is quali- tionship between humans and domesticated fied moral veganism which, while not setting a nonhumans will necessarily be exploitative. The total ban on the consumption of animal products, earth’s landscape in an abolitionist utopia would maintains that vegan diets ought to be the default thus be one of stark division and limited inter- diets for the vast majority of the human population course between humans and wild nonhuman ani- (Deckers 2016; for another version of veganism mals, where domesticated nonhumans would that tolerates exceptions, see McPherson 2016). have gone extinct (Wayne 2013 and Zamir To safeguard their psychological health, more- 2004). Another focus of criticism refers to the over, Deckers suggests that human moral agents second and third points mentioned by Francione should endorse animalism,defined as “an interest and Chorlton. By denying the possibility of a in attributing greater moral significance to either morally acceptable third path between veganism dead or living animals than to other biological and exploitation, abolitionists hinder rather than organisms,” and compound it with evolutionism, promote “pro-animal strategic protest” that seeks “an interest in attributing greater moral signifi- to create better living conditions for farmed ani- cance to those animals biologically closer to us” mals (Zamir 2004, 368). To the former charge, (Deckers 2016). Contra those wary of being abolitionists may reply that more is not necessar- accused of defending prejudices, Deckers happily ily better, and that it is morally preferable to have a acknowledges that keeping these will help to cre- world with fewer, rather than more, lives that ate overall positive GHIs (which is tantamount to ought not to be lived. That domestication has saying that it would diminish negative ones) and been considered for centuries an acceptable prac- should therefore be maintained. All these ideas tice is no justification for its continuation (the should be realized by the Vegan Project, a political possibility of there being a lamb or pig raised for project that aims to pass laws that would authorize meat, but leading a flourishing, but short life is the consumption of nonhuman animal products thus precluded). To the latter charge, meanwhile, only in a very limited range of cases (Deckers abolitionists may respond that creating better con- 2013, 2016). ditions does not address the real problem, which Because of his holistic definition of health, is that the practice itself is wrong. Deckers’ defense of qualified veganism highlights a moral concern with the consumption of animals The Argument Against Negative Global who die naturally or accidentally, an issue that has Health Impacts been largely overlooked by advocates of the first While less mainstream, an innovative defense of two arguments. It also encompasses two argu- veganism refers to the overwhelmingly negative ments for this dietary choice that are more popular Global Health Impacts (GHIs) associated with among laymen than with philosophers. One is that non-vegan diets. Starting from the assumption qualified veganism is better for human health that health, holistically understood, is the most (zoonoses, or diseases transmitted from Veganism 5 nonhumans to humans, being one major source of mice killed by owls) and those directly killed by concern in relation to non-vegan diets). The other the agricultural machinery employed. By failing is that veganism is the best dietary choice if we to make this distinction, Davis has either to care about the environment, i.e., if we care about acknowledge that predation in nature is a moral the health of the planet as a whole. If the majority evil that has to be eliminated (a contentious posi- of the world population stopped consuming ani- tion defended by a small subgroup of vegans, as mal products, this would save enormous amounts shown above), or else do the math again and of energy, soil, and water; it would drastically accept that fewer animals are directly killed by a diminish the pollution of air and watercourses purely vegan regime than by a mixed regime such with organic and industrial residues; and it as that proposed by him. Second, livestock farms would cut greenhouse gas emissions by 18 %, cause harms to humans that vegan farms don’t. more than the transport industry (FAO 2006; see Among such harms are the production of manure, also ▶ Vegetarianism, where a similar argument is which is a carrier of diseases such as Escherichia presented). coli; a larger number of accidents among workers; dangerous jobs at slaughterhouses; and the contri- bution to global warming due to methane emis- Arguments Against Veganism sions (Lamey 2007, 340–41). These harms should also be taken into account. Third, Davis does not Does Veganism Really Minimize Harm? distinguish between accidental and deliberate Perhaps the main moral motivation for vegans harms, ignoring the fact that deaths caused by who reject the consumption of all animal products accident are standardly not deemed as wrong as because of the suffering involved in their creation deaths brought about deliberately. To this last is that, through their dietary choices, they believe point, Davis can of course reply that it is at least themselves to be abiding by what the animals doubtful that deaths systematically caused by rights theorist, Tom Regan, calls the Minimize agricultural methods fit the definition of acciden- Harm Principle (MHP): tal; or, as he actually does, he can reply that deaths ...whenever we find ourselves in a situation where are deaths, no matter whether they are brought all the options at hand will produce some harm to about intentionally or not (Davis 2002, 392). those who are innocent, we must choose that option If the moral relevance of the distinction that will result in the least total sum of harm (Regan between accidental and deliberate harms is 2004, 302). rejected, a different way to defend veganism That vegans actually realize this principle, against burger veganism is to remark that what is however, has been questioned. As Steven Davis problematic about diets that include nonhuman pointed out in a seminal article, given the large animal products is that they use nonhumans numbers of field animals killed by industrial farm- merely as a bodily means for the nonvital ends ing, the MHP would seem to require following not of others – where being treated as a bodily means a strictly vegan diet, but rather a diet that requires that its body is necessary to achieve the complemented plant-based food with pasture-fed ends of others, it does not want to be treated in that free-range cattle and their derived products (Davis way, and the loss of well-being when treated that 2002). Davis’s proposal – succinctly character- way greatly exceeds the loss of well-being of the ized as the burger vegan view – might be none- others when their ends are not met (Bruers 2015, theless rejected by vegans on at least three 272–73). Because the agricultural systems behind different grounds (Lamey 2007). First, not only vegan diets do not require using nonhumans as are Davis’s empirical data extremely limited for bodily means, they should be preferred. It could supporting the sweeping claim he makes; these be counter-argued, however, that not only using data, based on barely two studies, also do not nonhumans as bodily means but also foreseeably distinguish between animals killed by their pred- harming them is morally problematic, and that, ators as a result of the harvesting process (like insofar as vegan agriculture foreseeably causes 6 Veganism the deaths of thousands of mice, rats, opossums, the Western androcentric paradigm where adult, rabbits, and other small field animals, it is not middle-class males in industrialized countries are without moral blemish. physiologically privileged to attain the moral ideal Despite its problems, the burger vegan view (George 1994). Those who cannot opt for must be taken seriously by vegans, insofar as it veganism – because it might be nutritionally inad- suggests a different trade-off for those who wish equate (like for babies, pregnant women, and the to comply with the MHP. Pointing out that there elderly), culturally alien (like for the Inuit), or might be such a trade-off, however, does not go economically prohibitive (like for some urban against veganism unless enough empirical evi- poor) – are excused by vegan theorists. By rou- dence is gathered in its support. In the meantime, tinely excusing what they consider to be morally vegans can still claim that, in the face of episte- wrong, however, critics point out that the latter mological uncertainty, abstaining from the con- end up systematically discriminating against the sumption of all animal products seems like the vast majority of the human population. Veganism least bad path to take if one is concerned with should therefore not be considered as the morally the minimization of unnecessary human and correct dietary choice, but one choice among nonhuman suffering. many others depending on individual and social circumstances. Meaningful Omnivorism A common critique against veganism, also leveled against vegetarianism, is that it severs our connec- Conclusion tion with the natural world and reinforces the anthropocentric paradigm, whereby we see our- Veganism is a growing dietary choice, especially selves as superior to all other beings. Dominique popular among young urban dwellers in devel- Lestel, for example, argues that to avoid eating oped countries. I offered three main arguments meat and all other nonhuman animal products as to why one may opt for veganism: to avoid denies our own animality and is therefore a ges- the suffering of nonhuman animals; to avoid the ture of anthropocentric superiority. Contra exploitation and, therefore, rights violation, of Regan’s dictum that we should avoid insofar as nonhuman animals; and to diminish the amount possible harming others (and that this should be of negative Global Health Impacts, i.e., to best reflected in our eating habits), Lestel’s claim is keep one’s individual health, and the health of that we should instead embrace the cruelty human and nonhuman others. I have suggested, embedded in life: to eat meat and other nonhuman moreover, that vegans who wish to abide by the animal products is to celebrate our relationship Minimize Harm Principle face a challenge: given with the latter (Lestel 2014). Not everything the large numbers of animals who die because of goes, of course: like other meaningful omnivores current agricultural methods, it is an open ques- (see, for example, Pollan 2006), Lestel cautions tion whether pure veganism (rather than, for against greedy meat-eaters as well as against instance, a mixed diet of country mice killed by unconcerned ones. Just like native groups like the plow plus vegetables) should be the morally the Algonquin in North America used every single preferred option. I then pointed to two criticisms bit of their prey and thanked it, so should we turn of veganism: first, that it further separates us from meat-eating into a ceremony; and just like they did the natural world, and second, that it perpetuates not take more than needed, so shouldn’t the androcentric Western paradigm, where adult, we – which means rejecting contemporary West- middle-class urban males seem to be best fitted to ern hypercarnivorism. attain this moral ideal. All in all, the growing attention on the one hand toward what constitutes A Feminist Critique an ethical diet and, on the other hand, toward the Veganism has also come under attack by some moral status of nonhuman animals suggests that feminist writers who see it as a perpetuation of Veganism 7 veganism will become center stage in coming George, K. P. (1994). Discrimination and bias in the vegan discussions of food ethics. ideal. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 7(1), 20–28. Lamey, A. (2007). Food fight! Davis versus Regan on the ethics of eating beef. Journal of Social Philosophy, Cross-References 38(2), 331–348. Lestel, D. (2014). The carnivore’s ethics. Angelaki, 19(3), – ▶ 161 167. Climate Change, Ethics, and Food Production McMahan, J. (2010, September 30). The meat-eaters. The ▶ Dairy Ethics New York Times. 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