Veganism of Harm to Animals

V Veganism of harm to animals. Other famous vegan advo- cates, before the term was coined by Watson, were Alejandra Mancilla the British doctor William Lambe (1765–1848), Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), who adopted a vegan diet based on health and Faculty of Humanities, The University of Oslo, ethical considerations, and the British poet Percy Oslo, Norway Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), who publicly objected to the consumption of dairy and eggs. In a recent poll, it was estimated that there are Introduction at least 542,000 vegans in Britain, a steep increase from the 150,000 estimated in 2006 (Vegan Soci- Narrowly understood, veganism is the practice of ety 2016a). In the USA, a recent study showed excluding all animal products from one’s diet, that 3.3% of the population declared to be vege- with the exception of human milk. More broadly, tarian, half of which claim to be vegan – that is, veganism is not only a food ethics, but it encom- around five million people (The Vegetarian passes all other areas of life. As defined by the Resource Group 2016). Vegan Society when it became an established There are two main moral justifications for charity in the UK in 1979, veganism is best under- veganism, both of which rely on a common stood as “a philosophy and way of living which assumption: that sentience, i.e., the capacity to seeks to exclude – as far as is possible and feel pleasure and pain, is the necessary and suffi- practicable – all forms of exploitation of, and cient trait to be morally considerable. (Although it cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any is a disputed matter whether insects possess this other purpose; and by extension, promotes the trait or not, vegans tend to avoid the consumption development and use of animal-free alternatives of products such as honey or the use of products for the benefit of humans, animals and the envi- like silk, and generally oppose the idea of eating ronment” (Vegan Society 2016b). insects. Cf. McWilliams 2014.) In what follows, The Vegan Society was founded in 1944 in I present these two arguments and a third one Leicester by Donald Watson (1910–2005), his which, although less popular, captures some core wife, Dorothy, and five other friends. But, like intuitions among vegans. I then present a chal- vegetarian principles, vegan principles have been lenge faced by veganism and two arguments that around for much longer – for example, among reject it as discriminatory, and briefly conclude. adherents of Jainism who avoid doing any sort # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2016 P.B. Thompson, D.M. Kaplan (eds.), Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_578-1 2 Veganism Arguments for Veganism male chicks and free-range laying hens who are no longer productive are routinely killed, and painful The Argument Against Unnecessary Suffering debeaking remains a standard procedure. It is Vegans and vegetarians coincide that the human hypocritical at worst, because it seeks to legiti- interest in nourishment and gustatory pleasure mize certain forms of animal rearing while derived from consuming nonhuman flesh is condemning others, occluding the cruelty inherent largely outweighed by the interests of nonhumans to these practices. in not being subject to the conditions of factory Depending on how they interpret P2’, vegans farms. Moreover, vegans accept the most influen- can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, tial argument for vegetarianism, known as the principled vegans believe that it is simply not the welfarist argument. This could be summarized case that the rearing of nonhuman animals for thus: food can be done in a way that causes no suffering. It is therefore always impermissible to con- P1. It is morally wrong to cause unnecessary sume all animal products. On the other hand, suffering to nonhuman animals. contingent vegans believe that under current con- P2. The production process of meat and of many ditions it is morally wrong to consume all other nonhuman animal products causes nonhuman animal products, but this is not inevi- unnecessary suffering to nonhuman animals. table and could change in the future – for instance, C: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro- if our patterns of consumption and modes of producer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so duction changed radically. forth) in the production process of meat and of Among both groups, moreover, there is a sub- many other nonhuman animal products. set who aspires not merely to change human diets into vegan diets, but to turn the whole natural The main complaint of vegans against vegetar- world into a vegan world where suffering is inso- ians, however, is that the second, factual premise far as possible eradicated. Along these lines, Jeff does not go far enough and should be replaced by McMahan asks whether we should gradually get the following one: rid of carnivorous species in their entirety, given that they cause so much pain to others. P2’. The production process of all animal prod- McMahan’s point is that, “even if we are not ucts causes unnecessary suffering to required to prevent suffering among animals in nonhuman animals. the wild for which we are not responsible, we do have a moral reason to prevent it”–so long as our This leads to the following conclusion: acting on that reason does not bring about worse effects than those we could prevent, like massive C’: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro- ecosystemic imbalances and loss of biodiversity ducer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so (McMahan 2010, his emphases). This position fi forth) in the production process of all has been identi ed by some as a reductio against nonhuman animal products. the ideals of veganism. For vegans, endorsing the production process The Argument Against Exploitation of some animal products (paradigmatically, free- This argument, also known as the abolitionist range dairy and eggs) while banning others is argument, runs as follows: misinformed at best and hypocritical at worst. It is misinformed at best, because it ignores the fact P1: It is morally wrong to treat sentient beings as that even the most progressive animal-rearing property. practices inflict unnecessary suffering on the ani- P2: Nonhuman animals are sentient beings. mals involved. For example, in free-range farms, Veganism 3 P3: The production process of all nonhuman ani- between veganism and exploitation. Fourth, the mal products requires treating them as only trait that matters to be morally considerable is property. sentience. Fifth, all forms of human discrimina- C: It is morally wrong to participate in any way tion, including speciesism, ought to be rejected. (as a producer, distributor, consumer, and so on Sixth, nonviolence is the core principle of aboli- and so forth) in the production process of all tionism (Francione and Charlton 2015). nonhuman animal products. Some radical abolitionists claim that at the core of their position is the idea that human and Contra welfarists, who seek to improve the nonhuman animals are moral equals and have a living conditions of farmed animals (for example, right not to be treated as resources of others. This by advocating for larger cages for factory farm is why killing animals for food is always wrong. hens, by demanding that more humane slaughter In order for this idea to gain traction, two major methods be employed, etc.), abolitionists seek a assumptions over which most human cultures total ban on nonhuman animal production which, have been constructed over centuries need to be for them, is synonymous with exploitation. As debunked: first, that human interests are more their name reveals, abolitionists regard their important than nonhuman interests and that quest as analogous to the quest of those who human lives are worth more than nonhuman rejected human slavery: just as the latter did not lives. Let me present two of the most well- demand a better treatment for slaves, but the end known arguments used to support these claims of the institution as such, contemporary abolition- and the abolitionist’s reply (Bernstein 2015). ists do not wish to better regulate the meat and When it comes to interests, it has been typically animal production industry, but fight to put a argued that the interests of individuals who are definitive end to it. claimed to possess rationality (i.e., humans) ought Gary Francione and Anna Chorlton summarize to count more than those of individuals who are abolitionism in six principles. First, there is no claimed to lack such capacity (i.e., most morally relevant trait that distinguishes humans nonhumans). It is not the case, however, that from nonhumans that justifies treating the latter as humans consistently act on this prescription. For property and, therefore, as having mere economic one thing, we do not grant a higher moral status to use for us. Just as treating humans as property is humans with a higher degree of rationality; for inconsistent with recognizing all humans as mem- another, we do grant moral status to humans who bers of the moral community, treating nonhuman completely lack this capacity. This shows that animals as property goes against their recognition speciesism (the term popularized by Peter Singer as members of the moral community. All kinds of to refer to our unjustifiable bias toward members animal use, even humane ones, are thus of our own species) determines our moral behav- unjustified. Second, if we recognize the right not ior. When it comes to the value of human lives to be treated as property, we must not seek to vis-à-vis the lives of nonhumans, a stock argu- regulate, but plainly to abolish all institutionalized ment in defense of giving more weight to the animal exploitation.

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