Detecting and Decontaminating Chemical and Biological Agents
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Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and biological agents Policy document 06/04 April 2004 ISBN 0 85403 598 2 This report can be found at www.royalsoc.ac.uk ISBN 0 85403 598 2 © The Royal Society 2004. Requests to reproduce all or part of this document should be submitted to: Science Advice Section The Royal Society 6–9 Carlton House Terrace London SW1Y 5AG email [email protected] ii | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and biological agents Contents Page Summary 1 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Background to project 3 1.2 Conduct of project 4 1.3 Types and properties of possible agents 4 1.4 Types of possible incident 5 2 Priorities, concepts of use and implementation of detection systems 7 2.1 Detection, identification and monitoring 7 2.2 Activities and decision-making at different stages of an incident 7 2.3 User requirements and concepts of use 10 2.4 Current detection and monitoring technologies 10 2.5 Issues needing to be addressed 11 2.6 Key detection system requirements 11 2.7 Validation and implementation 11 2.8 Impacts on detection 11 2.9 Conclusions and recommendations 12 3 Issues relating to sampling 13 3.1 Introduction 13 3.2 Sampling strategies 13 3.3 Sampling issues needing to be addressed 14 3.4 Distribution of agent 14 3.5 Air sampling 15 3.6 Biological agent release 15 3.7 Chemical agent release 16 3.8 Conclusions and recommendations 16 4 Current capabilities and future needs of detection 17 4.1 Technologies for detecting chemical agents 17 4.2 Technologies for detecting biological agents 17 4.3 Detecting agents by recognising and diagnosing unusual incidents 18 4.4 Requirements for research into detection systems 19 4.5 Conclusions and recommendations 20 5 How science, engineering and technology can assist in decontamination 23 5.1 Introduction 23 5.2 Personal decontamination 23 5.3 Decontamination of buildings 24 5.4 Secondary contamination of vehicles 25 5.5 Current technologies and strategies 25 5.6 Conclusions and recommendations 27 6 Decontamination and return: communication issues and scientific decision support 29 6.1 Introduction 29 6.2 Exposure limits and 'safe dose' 29 6.3 How clean is 'safe'? – scientific issues 30 6.4 How clean is 'safe'? – psychological issues 30 6.5 Communicating risk in the decision process 31 6.6 Decision-making on decontamination issues 32 6.7 Conclusions and recommendations 33 Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | iii 7 Organisational issues – a proposal for a new centre 35 7.1 The challenge 35 7.2 A proposed solution 35 7.3 Recommendation 36 8 Main conclusions and recommendations 39 8.1 Introduction 39 8.2 Organisation and procedure 39 8.3 Detection 40 8.4 Decontamination 40 8.5 Medical issues relating to detection and decontamination 41 8.6 Mathematical modelling 41 9 References 43 Annex 1 Working group 45 Annex 2 Individuals and organisations giving evidence 46 Annex 3 Mathematical modelling of chemical and biological dispersions 48 Annex 4 Scientific uncertainty, scientific advice and decision support for risk management 50 iv | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer Summary Recent global events have given greater prominence to · Assess and disseminate protocols and procedures for the threat of chemical and biological agents being used detection, sampling and decontamination. malevolently against civil targets such as key landmarks, transport hubs and postal sorting offices. Science, · Evaluate detection and decontamination equipment engineering and technology are central to reducing this and establish agreed industrial standards. threat and so making the United Kingdom safer. · Ensure information is shared effectively between The Royal Society established an independent, expert different Government Departments and agencies, the working group to examine the science, engineering and academic community, industry and other interested technology relevant to detecting when chemical or parties, including the public. biological agents have been used and to decontaminating people and buildings subjected to attack using such · Establish the maximum levels of agents below which it is agents. We took evidence extensively from key appropriate to permit a return to normal use following Government Departments, emergency service staff an incident. (or ‘first responders’), emergency planners, the academic community and industry. The evidence received forms the · Work with the academic community, industry and the basis of this report. research councils where appropriate and seek to make full use of developments and potential funding in the Rapid and effective detection and decontamination of US, Europe and elsewhere. an incident are necessary to minimise negative health impacts and reduce disruption to civil society. The UK has · Provide a clearly identified source of expert advice considerable scientific expertise in this area. This should regarding chemical or biological incidents for be harnessed to strengthen the UK’s existing resilience. Government Department and agencies, first responders, Appropriate organisation of relevant science, engineering NHS Trusts and national and local emergency planners. and technology is crucial and forms the focus of our main recommendation. The centre would work with existing expertise in the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, Health There are many similarities in dealing with the Protection Agency, Home Office, Department for the consequences of a malevolent and an accidental release Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Environment of a chemical or biological agent. Therefore, many Agency, Cabinet Office, Department of Health, Office of countermeasures will be equally applicable to either type the Deputy Prime Minister, Department for Transport, of incident. So there is much to be gained from close Research Councils, Office of Science and Technology, communication between staff now focused on Department of Trade and Industry, National Health preparedness against malevolent attack and those Service, first responders, the academic community and dealing with accidental releases. industry. It would be under independent management and require a physical location to undertake the required During our deliberations we became very aware that evaluation work. To increase information sharing and there is much knowledge and expertise available in the minimise costs, expertise and specialised equipment UK, some of which has been acquired in a military context. could be shared with existing facilities in Government, However, no single Government Department appears to academia and industry where appropriate. The budget have full responsibility for determining how this expertise required by the centre will depend on the timescale can best be utilised. While the establishment of the CBRN envisaged for the work to be done and on the (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear) Team in the sophistication of the appropriate equipment and Home Office has improved coordination and awareness, materials. Based on information received from a number considerably more organisation of the resources is required. of sources, we estimate that a reasonable figure would be of the order of £20 million per year for an initial five year Consequently, our major recommendation is that the UK period. After this initial period the funding should Government should establish a new centre to improve the continue but the level would need to be reassessed. UK’s resilience and to minimise the impact of any civilian chemical or biological incident. The centre's main All detection systems need to be designed to take into functions would be to: account how the information they generate will be used, the level of training of those who will use them, and the · Determine, commission and direct the work required on environment in which they will be used. A range of planning, preparedness, research and development detection system requirements covering monitoring, related to detection and decontamination. identification and quantification of potential agents will be needed. Some potential technologies for novel detection systems will come from academic research. Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 |1 We recommend that future work on detection systems · Detailed review of the various options for the should be concentrated on four objectives: decontamination of people, buildings, vehicles and the wider environment. · Exploitation of new and existing science, engineering and technology for robust detection of chemical and · Assessment of contact hazards from contaminated biological agents. surfaces. · Development of point detectors for use by first · Development and implementation of techniques for responders at the scene of a suspected incident. avoiding secondary contamination in hospitals and ambulances. · Establishment of what information on background interferences and natural variability of agent levels might We recommend that realistic exercises be undertaken increase the reliability and sensitivity of different regularly involving first responders, emergency planners detection systems and decision making. Where and some civilians in order to test and develop further the appropriate the relevant data should be collected. procedures for dealing with an incident. In addition to providing a considerable measure of reassurance to the · Analysis of medical intelligence to enhance resilience public, such exercises would be an integral part of staff