International Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research

Vol. 4(2), pp. 031-044, September, 2019. © www.premierpublishers.org. ISSN: 0615-3011

Research Article

Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan : Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in

Dr. Yemane Desta Department of Public Administration, College of Business and Social Sciences, University of Asmara, P.O.BOX 1220 Asmara, Eritrea E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]; Tel: 291-1-7645753

This article presents an analysis of data from a corruption perception survey administered to 90 Public Administration University of Asmara students in the month of June 2018. Respondents were asked for their opinions regarding the pervasiveness, causes, and potential remedies for corruption in Eritrea. The majority of the surveyed university students believe corruption in Eritrea is a serious problem that needs to be addressed by its leaders. The findings clearly indicate that the respondents believe the primary drivers of corruption in the Eritrean public sector include lack of adequate public sector pay, lack of meritocratic personnel policies, the self-serving behavior of public officials and lack of accountable/transparent political process. An overwhelming majority of the respondents recommended the urgent design and implementation of anti-corruption initiatives in Eritrea focusing on civil service reforms (improved public sector pay, heavy penalties and meritocratic personnel policies), accountability reforms (anti-corruption commission, anti-corruption legislation and the Auditor-General office) and political reforms (respect for rule of law, visible leadership commitment and legislative oversight).

Keywords: anti-corruption, corruption, corruption perception, Sub-Saharan Africa, transparency, university students

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘Corruption’ originates from the Latin word– developing countries, corruption seems to be an inherent corrumpere, which means ‘bribe, mar or destroy’ Much feature of all societies including those of the developed evidence suggests that it has been around the world from world (Iyada, 2012). time immemorial, and, in recent times, it has occupied a front seat in global discussions (Bechem, 2018). Quoted by Thompson (2013) in his foreword to the United Corruption, broadly defined as the abuse of public office Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, for private gain by the World- Bank, has been the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that: acknowledged as a universal problem. Cited in (Genemo (2014) Faniel (2009) asserts that corruption, the worst Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide social evil on earth, has, no doubt, become a major global range of corrosive effects on societies. It threat to the stability and security of societies and the undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads flourishing of values of democracy, expansion of ethical to violations of human rights, distorts markets, values, and enhancing sustainable development. Iyada erodes the quality of human life, and allows (2012) observes that corruption is a universal problem, organized crime, terrorism and other threats to which is not a restricted preserve to any nation race or human security to flourish. This evil phenomenon section but rather transcends states’ borders and is found in all countries – big and small, rich and symbolizes a universal phenomenon. While several poor – but it is in the developing world that its instances of corruption have been witnessed in the effects are most destructive.

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Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by majority of the respondents considered corruption in diverting funds intended for development, Eritrea to be primarily driven by lack of adequate public undermining a Government’s ability to provide sector, pay, lack of meritocratic personnel policies, the basic services, feeding inequality and injustice self-serving behavior of public officials and lack of and discouraging foreign aid and investment. accountable/transparent political process. Moreover, the Corruption is a key element in economic surveyed University of Asmara students indicated strong underperformance and a major obstacle to preference for civil service reforms (improved public sector poverty alleviation and development. pay, heavy penalties and meritocratic personnel policies), accountability reforms (anticorruption commission, When examining the nature of corruption, it is important to anticorruption legislation and the Auditor-General office) note that there are three theoretical explanations - and political reforms (respect for rule of law, visible personalistic, institutional and systemic are used to put the leadership and legislative oversight) to prevent emergence study of corruption in perspective. Personalistic or of corruption at a grand scale in the country. Thus, the individual explanations associate corruption with study was designed to serve as diagnostic tool for individuals, who provided with enough opportunities, will identifying and hopefully designing and implementing anti- act corruptly and as such the phenomenon of corruption is corruption measures that fit the specific environment of the reduced to personalities. (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, newly independent state of Eritrea. The survey evidence 2000). According Institutional explanations, on the other gathered from prospective public administration university hand, regard corruption as deep-seated consequence of students (destined to become the future public servants in loopholes, hidden dynamics, or unintended side effects the government of Eritrea) was used as basis for inherent in a country’s institutions and laws, rather than recommendations and further debate. merely the wrong doings of few bad individuals. (Kupedeh, 1995; Johnston, 2000). Lastly, Systemic explanations, originating in the interaction between government and the PURPOSE OF STUDY public, are the most comprehensive explanation as corruption is regarded as a form of influence within the This research upon which this article is based was political system, rather than the failing of individuals and undertaken to achieve the following objectives: institutions. (Kupendeh, 1995). The systemic explanation • To explore the nature of corruption in Sub-Saharan in includes economic, social, political and administrative Africa and the alternative anti-corruption reforms factors that contribute to the emergence and growth of available to fight corrupt practices in the region corruption in a given setting. For the purpose this study • To assess the perception of Eritrean public the conceptual framework centered on systemic administration students regarding the extent or explanations was used to bear on the analysis of pervasiveness of corruption in Eritrea corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in general an in Eritrea in • To discover the views of Eritrean public administration particular. Recognizing corruption is complex students on the main causes of corruption in Eritrea phenomenon having multiple causes, this article utilized a • To discover the views of Eritrean public administration holistic approach to examine the sum total of the students on the potential remedies for corruption in institutions and practices within a given country that Eritrea address aspects of maintaining the honesty and integrity • To identify anti-corruption reform priorities among of government and private sector institutions. alternatives derived from anti-corruption theory as well as local realities Because of the limited previous research on corruption in sub-Saharan Africa countries and the likelihood of the differences among these countries, there is a need for RESEARCH QUESTIONS conducting studies of corruption at the country-level in order to fully account for unique contextual factors. The research methodology relied on research questions Accordingly, this study started by reviewing the overall aimed at gauging Eritrean public administration students’ corruption levels and the range of ant-corruption strategies perceptions about the extent, causes and anti-corruption available for preventing and combating corruption in the reform priorities of corruption in the context of Eritrea. They context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Then, data was analyzed were as follows: and presented by canvasing the opinions of 90 graduating 1. What is the prevalence of corruption in Eritrea as public administration University of Asmara students perceived by Eritrean public administration students? regarding the extent, causes and possible cures of 2. What are the causes of corruption in Eritrea as corruption in Eritrea drawing on close-ended questionnaire perceived by Eritrean public administration students? survey. 3. What are the perceptions of Eritrean public administration students regarding anti-corruption The findings of the indicate the majority of the respondents strategies that can be effective in curbing corruption in regarded corruption as a serious problem in Eritrea Eritrea? requiring the urgent attention of its leaders. A significant

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4. What are the initiatives and concrete steps that need “as the abuse of power for private gain” (World Bank, to be taken on lesser and greater scales in Eritrea as 1997a). The definition covers various forms of interaction part of a sweeping public sector reforms according to between public sector officials and other agents. Eritrean public administration students? Sometimes, money is involved, such as in or 5. What are the implications of the findings for Eritrea for kickbacks for public procurement contracts. In other cases, Sub-Saharan Africa in general? private gain can be non-monetary, as in cases of patronage or . (Kolstad et al, 2008). Corruption Significance of the Study is a problem for all countries; however, Africa is regarded as least able to bear the heavy costs in view of the Conducting survey research aimed at gauging the continent’s debilitating poverty (Olowu,1999). The attempt perceptions of citizens, business people and public by Sub-Saharan countries to break the cycle of officials regarding corruption in a country is important, not underdevelopment has subverted by the high levels of only to contribute to understanding corruption, but to corruption in the region. (Nathniel, 2014). Sub-Saharan reveal valuable insights to guide strategies and policy Africa is very rich in resources but the sub-continent has frameworks to mitigate corruption (Kaluya and Elliot, paradoxically remained the poorest due to unstable, 2018). Therefore, the primary purpose of the study was corrupt governments and dishonest leaders. (Kimaro, to examine the perceptions of university students 2014). Nathniel (2014) asserts that Africa is rich in natural regarding the pervasiveness, causes and remedies of resources, however the proceeds from the sales of these corruption in Eritrea. From the theoretical perspective the natural resources to other countries are mismanaged by study’s significance is two-fold: first, it makes a timely African leaders through corrupt process citing for instance contribution to the knowledge we have about corruption that Nigerian leaders had stolen more than 400 Billion US and the ways of preventing/fighting corruption in dollars from oil revenue alone between in the country’s developing Sub-Saharan Africa with view of drawing independence in October of 1960 and 2006. According to valuable lessons for the newly independent African one official of the Word Bank corruption has been dubbed country of Eritrea. Second, the study provides an as the “Aids of democracy” for developing countries important perspective from Eritrea that can be used in a including the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. cross-country study of corruption that would be undertaken Empirical research to measure corruption is quite a new in the near future. From the practical perspective the undertaking that only began in earnest in 1993 with the study’s significance rests on its contribution to efforts establishment of Transparency International, a civil society aimed at designing and implementing the relevant reforms organization dedicated to curbing both national and in the Eritrean public sector in the fight against corruption international corruption and the widespread application of in the country. Our knowledge about corruption in Eritrea corruption indices developed by Transparency so far has been largely anecdotal. This empirical study of International (TI).The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), corruption in Eritrea offers evidence for proposing concrete which was introduced in 1995 by Transparency policies that can be taken by Eritrean leaders to address International, is a composite index, drawing on 16 surveys the problem of corruption. from 8 independent institutions. The surveys embrace the perceptions of business people, the general public and Limitations of the Study country analysts. The CPI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among The limitations of the study are centered on two grounds. politicians and bureaucrats. The Berlin-based First, the respondents were young university students Transparency International annually develops the global being trained for entry level government positions. Hence, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on a score of their experience with actual acts of corruption might be zero to 100 (zero being highly “corrupt” and 100 being minimum. There is greater likelihood their perceptions highly “clean”). The 2018 CPI depicts a disturbing picture regarding corruption in terms of its forms, pervasiveness about the pervasiveness of corruption in the world and and causes might be impacted by the experiences of other especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. older people (family members, neighbors, friends and classmates) in their surroundings. Second, the full picture • Two out of three countries score less than 50 out of a of corruption in a country can be presented only when the clean score of 100 in the CPI 2018, which reflects surveys embrace the perceptions of business people, the perceived level of corruption among politicians and general public, public officials and country analysts. This public officials in 120 countries. empirical study undertaken drawing on the perceptions of • Five out of ten developing countries scored less than university students is only a positive step in assessing the 30 out of 100, indicating a high level of corruption state of corruption in Eritrea. • Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region on the index with average score 32 out of a clean score of Portrait of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 100 • Only eight out of forty-nine countries in the Sub- The most widely used definition of corruption is provided Saharan Africa region scored above the global by the World Bank. Corruption is defined as corruption average score of 43. Simply translated 88% of the

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Sub-Saharan African countries score below the global Table 2: Looting of National Wealth in Sub-Saharan Africa average score of 43. Name Country Fortune in • Five out of the ten bottom scoring with highest USD perceived corruption are found in Sub-Saharan Africa General Sani Abacha (Late) Nigeria $20 billion President H. Boigny (Late) Ivory Cost $6 billion Table 1: A partial profile of corruption around the world General Ibrahim Babangida Nigeria $5 billion (2018 rankings) President Mobutu Sese Seko Zaire $ 4 billion Least Corrupt (in Most Corrupt (in President Mousa Traore Mali $ 2 billion descending order) descending order) President Henri Bedie Ivory Cost $300 million New Zealand Somalia President Dennis N’guesso Congo $200 million Denmark South Sudan President Omar Bongo (Late) Gabon $ 80 million Norway Syria President Paul Biya Cameroon $70 million Finland Afghanistan President Haile Mariam $30 million Switzerland Yemen (Deposed) Singapore Sudan President Hissene Habre $3 million Sweden Libya (Late) Canada Guinea Bissau Source: Ayittey (2000). Luxemburg Equatorial Guinea Netherlands North Korea Thus, a large number of Sub-Saharan Africa governments United Kingdom Venezuela have designed and implemented various anti-corruption Germany Iraq reforms in recognition of the pervasiveness and the Source: (Transparency International, 2018). destructive consequences of corruption albeit with dismal record of success. This article identified and discussed the Corruption is perceived to be pervasive Somalia, South main anti-corruption reforms available in the fight against Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Guinea corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa with the aim of prioritizing Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Venezuela and those reforms that fit the country-specific conditions in Iraq with a score of less than 20 in the current index. Eritrea. (Transparency International, 2018). Denmark and New Zealand top the index with 88 and 87 points respectively. Alternative Anti-Corruption Strategies Somalia and South Sudan and Syria are at the bottom of index, with 10, 13 and 13 points, respectively. The highest At the outset the study underlined that corruption has scoring region is Western Europe, with an average score various causes, manifestations, and consequently the of 66, while the lowest scoring region is Sub-Saharan tools for combating corruption are also numerous. Africa with an average score of 32. Forty Sub-Saharan Moreover, curbing corruption is exceedingly complex African countries of the total forty-nine (that is more than because it is not practiced by trespassers and outsiders. 80% of countries) scored below the global average of 43. (Asea, 2018). Instead, it is often institutionalized within However, all is not doom and gloom in the region as government agencies that ensure that corrupt activities are Seychelles (score=66), Botswana (score=66), Cape Verde continued and reinforced. Individuals with good intentions (score=61), Ruanda (score=57), Namibia (score=53), cannot easily revoke the system. (Asea, 2018). Mauritius (score=51), Sao Tome and Principe (score=46), Transparency International (2000) argues that there is no and Senegal (score=45) have registered above the global one sure approach to preventing/combating corruption, average of 43. South Africa considered one of the rather anti-corruption initiatives that are multi-pronged and powerhouses in the region managed to score 43 the same inclusive are needed. To address the problem of as the global average. corruption effectively a holistic approach is needed that includes each of the institutions (pillars) from the The brazen theft of the much-needed resources in Sub- executive, legislative, and judiciary, to the private sector, Saharan African countries is well-documented. According the media and civil society organizations, the various to Ayitttey (2000) the massive amount of the region’s institutional inter-relationships and the equilibrium of the resources looted by its unscrupulous heads of the state system as a whole. (World Bank, 1997b). The National are presented below: Integrity System (NIS) comprises the principle governance institutions in a country that are responsible for the fight

Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in Eritrea Int. J. Public Admin. and Pol. Res. 035 against corruption. (Transparency International, 2000). officials of the power to extract bribes. Deregulation can These institutions – or ‘pillars’ –comprise the executive, help reduce the discretionary power of politicians, but only legislature, judiciary, the public sector, the main public if this reform is undertaken in a transparent and non- watchdog institutions (e.g. supreme audit institution, law discriminatory way; otherwise we run the risk that the enforcement agencies), as well as political parties, the deregulation reform process itself will be corrupted. media, civil society and business as the primary social (Mollah & Uddin, 2002). forces which are active in the governance arena. (Transparency International, 2000). Thus, this study Tax Reforms – Mollah & Uddin (2002) point that applied twenty-nine types of anticorruption reforms corruption in customs and tax administration lowers grouped into four broad categories. The four categories of government revenues, creates a distorted private sector anticorruption reforms are: Market/Economic Reforms, environment and is often is linked with smuggling and Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms, Accountability/ organized crime. By simplifying and streamlining the tax Transparency Enhancing Reforms, and Democratic code of a country, corruption is minimized as the tax laws Accountability Enhancing Reforms. While not claiming become uncomplicated and predictable. The World Bank to present an exhaustive list of the tools for fighting (2010) argues that in most cases tax reforms that eliminate corruption, the article discussed the main strategies at the multiple rates and exemptions and limit the discretionary heart of a credible, effective corruption fighting effort. powers of tax officials help reduce corruption. However, the World Bank warns that tax rates that exceed taxpayer’s 1. Economic/Market Reforms view as legitimate or what the tax office can administer encourage the growth of the informal economy and These reforms involve economic liberalization designed to induce tax evasion and the corruption of tax officials. promote a vibrant private sector and reduce public sector waste. The principal aims economic/market reforms are to Competitive Service Provision – Competition in public attack the influence of powerful elites in the decisions and service reduces opportunity for corruption by removing the policymaking of the state, the so-called “state capture” and monopoly power of any on government office. In so doing, promote the creation of fair, competitive, honest and it discourages extortion since customers can take their transparent private sector. (World Bank, 2010). Under business to a competing office when confronted with economic/market reforms there are five approaches: irregular demands or service. (USAID Handbook, 2002). Accordingly overlapping jurisdictions, in the case of motor Program Elimination – By reducing or eliminating vehicle bureaus or passport agencies, or private and government programs which present opportunities for public provision of service, in the case of mail delivery or corruption and are a source of waste, corruption can be trash removal, are two ways of instituting competition in minimized (USAID Handbook, 2002). Rose-Ackerman public service. (1997) points that the most obvious economic approach is simply to eliminate government programs that are 2. Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms permeated with corruption. If the state has no authority to restrict export or license businesses, no one will pay bribes These reforms encompass civil service reforms designed in those areas. If a subsidy program is eliminated, the to enhance the performance of the government bribes that accompanied it will disappear. If price controls bureaucracy. They include: are lifted, market prices will express scarcity values, not Codes of Ethics–Codes of ethics generally refer to rules bribes. (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). and regulations designed to achieve a type of public servant who is vigilant, upright, honest and just. (Hope et Privatization – Privatization of state-run enterprises and al., 2000). These rules and regulations governing ethical services can curb corruption because private sector behavior on the part of public servants are concerned with accounting methods and competitive market pressures prohibiting conflict of interest and self-dealing, reduce the opportunities for wrongdoing and make it more encouraging political and other forms of partiality, and difficult to hide. (Pope, 1999). By removing the (increasingly) service to the community government from economic activities, privatization eliminates opportunities for recurrent corrupt dealing in Public Procurement Reform – Few activities create great employment, procurement, and financing contracts temptation or offer more opportunities than public (USAID Handbook, 2002). However, Pope (1999) argues procurement where every level of government and every that the benefits of privatization must be weighed against kind of government organization purchase goods and the possible adverse effects of privatization: services, often in quantities and monetary amounts that unemployment of civil servants and the risk of private defy comprehension. (TI Source Book, 2000). Competitive sector monopolies. public procurement limits the authority of the government officials thereby guarding against corruption. Competitive Deregulation - It offers a more straightforward means to procurement removes personal discretion from the limit state authority by eliminating tariffs, quotas, exchange selection of government suppliers and contractors by rate controls, and permit requirements thereby stripping prescribing an open bidding process.

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Meritocratic Personnel Policy– A key part of Financial Management System – The scope of financial administrative reforms is the institution of meritocratic management responsibilities in government or business system for appointment, promotion, and evaluation of civil include funding, custodial, analytical, and reporting service personnel and when feasible, establish an function among other elements. The following tasks independent civil service oversight body. (Mollah & Uddin, characterize financial management systems in both 2002). Hiring decisions should be based on merit and sectors: qualification, and senior positions should be awarded only • analyzing and assessing the financial management to candidates who have distinguished themselves and decision both prior and subsequent to implementation possess the ability and expertise to perform the duties • ensuring the necessary cash flow to finance planned assigned to them (Mbaku, 1998). Mbaku (1998) asserts activities and operations that civil service positions should not be used as rewards • safeguarding resources through appropriate financial for political support or swapped for bribes, or used to meet controls obligations to one’s ethnic cleavage. The practice of • providing financial framework for planning future political patronage in public administration continues to be activities and operations a source of corruption in many developing countries for • managing transaction processing systems which political patronage undermines continuity development produce information for the control of planned standards, institutional values, and institutional memory in activities and operations the public sector. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002). • paying attention to the concepts of efficiency and

Improved Public Sector Pay– Long term anti-corruption effectiveness and initiatives should incorporate the review of public sector • reporting and interpreting the results of activities and salaries with view to increasing them. (Mullinge & operation measures in financial terms and thereafter Lesetedi, 2002). In the majority of Sub-Saharan African ex post audit and evaluation countries civil servant are poorly paid opening the door for corrupt practices presumably to augment insufficient Heavy Penalties for Corrupt Behavior –Applying wages. sanctions to corrupt acts is an important step towards establishing accountability. In large part, sanctions are Administrative Efficiency–Improving work methods and centered on legislation that criminalizes corruption. The procedures to reduce delay help minimize the whole aim of imposing stiff penalties is to make corruption opportunities for corrupt practices. (Stapenhurst and a high-risk activity. The absence of stiffer penalty corrupt Langseth, 1997). Public officials may raise a firm’s costs culprits in Africa has failed to produce the deterrence by introducing delays and unnecessary requirements as a needed to discourage those looking for to corruption as a way of inducing payoffs, for instance, in contracting and “lucrative venture”. Hence, heavy penalties are auctioning or in administering regulatory and tax laws. recommended especially for the high-profile cases of (Rosen-Ackerman, 1999). corruption, including longer prison sentences, confiscation and forfeiture of all the assets and payment for Decentralized Decision Making – Decentralization compensations for indulging in corruption to the state in assigns decision making authority to local government that proportion to the offence committed. (Memo, 2016). can evaluate the needs of local citizens and their satisfaction with the services delivered, it removes the 3. Accountability/Transparency Enhancing Reforms information asymmetry between bureaucrats and the politicians that appoint them. (Bardahan & Mookherjee, These reforms include measure designed to open up the 2000). Bardahan and Mookherjee (2000) point that work of government to public scrutiny as way of holding decentralization can reduce corruption in the service public officials answerable for their actions. They include: delivery system inherent in traditionally centralized systems, particularly in developing countries, where Auditor-General Office – The Supreme Audit institution central government lack information necessary to monitor is responsible for auditing the state’s income and the performance of bureaucrats entrusted with local expenditure, and a watch-dog over its financial integrity. service delivery. However, in countries where the capacity As an external auditor acting on behalf of the tax-payer and and accountability of sub-national government is weak and his/her representatives in parliament, it essential that the where there are no safeguards against the manipulation of Auditor-General is not appointed by the government and municipal assets and enterprises for the private gain of that he/she enjoys appropriate tenure of office. local officials, decentralization can actually increase corruption. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002). Thus, the success of Anti-Corruption Legislation –Anti-corruption laws work decentralized decision making in the fight against to deter corrupt actions, prosecute and resurrect a sense corruption will depend on how responsive and answerable of justice, which has become a rare commodity in local-level structures are to the populations they serve. endemically corrupt countries. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002). (Ruzindawa, 1999). Laws to fight corruption should not only embrace the

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criminal law but should include laws governing access to president, ministers, members of parliaments and other information, freedom of expression and a free media. high-ranking civil servants when entering into office, while in office (annually) and when leaving office. (Mulinge & Honest/Effective Police – Hope et al. (1999) point out Lesetedi, 2002). Provisions requiring disclosure of officials’ that independent mechanisms should be implemented to incomes and assets can contribute to anti-corruption increase the likelihood of corruption being detected and efforts both in the judicial realm and the court of public punished. Investigators, prosecutors, and adjudicators opinion (Johnston, 2000). must be able to perform their professional duties in a transparently independent fashion and enforce the rule of 4. Democratic accountability Enhancing Reforms law against al who breach it, whatever their position. (Hope et al.1999) These reforms refer to constraints placed on the behavior of public officials by organizations and constituencies with Anti-Corruption Commission – As corrupt practices the power to apply sanctions on them. As political become even more sophisticated, conventional law accountability increases, the costs of public officials taking enforcement agencies are less placed to detect and decisions that benefit their private interests at the expense prosecute corruption cases. Specialized and independent of broader public interest also increases, thus working as anti-corruption agencies present the advantage of being a deterrent/incentive to corrupt practices. Democratic exclusively devoted to fighting corruption. Such accountability enhancing reforms include: commission should have preventive and educational Political Competition – Free and fair elections provide an components, as well as the ability to gather intelligence, important mechanism for holding public officials process complaints, and advise government and private accountable as citizens can withhold votes from agencies. (Kupendeh, 1995). incumbents as a sanction against corruption, and elect opposition candidates denouncing such dealings. Open Independent/Free Judiciary – An independent, impartial and competitive politics can be effective force supporting, and informed judiciary holds a central place in the and rewarding, good public management or at least realization of just, honest, open and accountable penalizing those governments that fail to control government. (TI Source Book, 2000) In order to hold corruption. (Johnston, 2000). An increase in political and public officials accountable to anti-corruption laws, electoral competition (i.e. democratization) has widely judiciaries need independence from the executive branch been assumed to help reduce corruption. Countries that as well as institutional capacity. Langeth et al., (1999) have had democratic systems of government for a long argue that the judiciary itself must be subject to high ethical time do tend to have lower levels of corruption (but it is standards. difficult to distinguish clearly between greater prosperity and longer histories of democratic regimes, as the two tend Independent/Free Media – Availability of information is a to go hand in hand). (Kolstad et al., 2008). prerequisite for the creation of an informed public, empowered to participate meaningfully in public debate Transparency in Party Financing–Many countries have and to hold those who govern accountable. A free and established partial public funding of political in order to independents media, accountable and ethical media reduce the scope for private interests to “buy interest and whose status is protected by the law and who is not also to impose limits on spending, because of the susceptible to political or otherwise opportunistic electorate’s resistance to excessive public expenditure. leadership can assume an important watchdog function ((Mollah & Uddin, 2002). Mollah and Uddin (2002) also and act as agent of awareness. (TI Source Book, 2000). point that setting up an authoritative and independent electoral commission responsible for the integrity of all Whistleblowing Protection Laws –Pope (1999) argues issues regarding party financing can ensure oversight. that efficient channels for complaints should be Campaign finance poses a particular challenge for fairness established for both whistleblowers within government and regarding elections. For this reason, campaign reforms members of the public, because it is essential that neither that limit or regulate donations, require disclosure of funds, feels unnecessarily exposed to reprisals. In addition, that provide free television time, and eliminate off-budget when necessary, physical protection of key informants government funding sources are an important component should be provided, whether inside or outside the country of accountability. (Pope, 1999) Oversight by NGOs–The World Bank defines non- Asset/Income Disclosure - Financial disclosure laws government organizations or NGOs as the myriad of improve accountability by enhancing the transparency of organizations, some of them formally constituted, and the officials’ finances. These laws require public officials some of them informal that are largely independent of to declare their assets and incomes and so act as a government, that are characterized primarily by deterrent to profiting through corruption. Laws on humanitarian or cooperative, rather than commercial obligatory disclosure of should be enacted and enforced objective, and that generally seek to relieve suffering, covering all public servants including the president, vice promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment,

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provide basic social services, or undertake community delay, or discharge of duties and responsibilities. (Langeth development. NGOs can play an important role in their et al., 1999). community level work in establishing norms in the way elected officials should properly behave and illustrating the Visible Leadership Commitment – Successful anti- difference between the ways the NGOs own officers corruption initiative requires a visionary leader, or behave and the ways in which government officials “champion,” who recognizes the high costs of venal bureaucracy. behave. (TI Source Book, 2000). NGOs have the potential to extend citizen empowerment by reducing the economic While focusing on the causes and consequences of and political vulnerabilities of grassroots communities and corruption, the limited research so far undertaken does not serving as watchdogs over corrupt officials. ((Mulinge & adequately address the effectiveness of anti-corruption Lesetedi, 2002) strategies. However, the role of anti-corruption agencies in Singapore and Hong Kong, the role of merit-based Legislative Oversight – Legislative Oversight provides a recruitment in Singapore, modest gains made by sweeping powerful check on executive authority, enhancing public sector reforms in Botswana and Ghana towards accountability where a dominant executive branch might controlling corruption have been well-documented. otherwise operate with impunity. According to Robert Moreover, the lessons learned from around the world and Williams (1987) corruption in Africa is primarily located in especially from Africa are that well-publicized but, poorly the executive branch of the government for the obvious organized, and halfheartedly implemented anti-corruption reason that the legislative and judicial branches have drives do not work. Presumably, successful campaigns generally lost whatever power they may have once must also be based on approaches that reflect the values possessed. To be effective legislatures require such and preference of leaders in the countries in question. The resources as a technically competent staff, strong fact remains the causes of corruption are multi-faceted, the committees, budgetary independence, significant consequences manifold – so must be a strategy trying to oversight powers, and a constitutional role in approving address it. Every effort should be made to match political appointments. (Mbaku, 1998). corruption fighting strategies with the specific causes of Respect for Rule of Law–The term “rule of law” embodies corruption rather than the symptoms of corruption. basic principle of equal treatment of all people before the law, and both constitutional and actual guarantees for RESEARCH METHODOLOGY basic human rights. In effect no public official however big he/she may be should be above the law. A predictable The study used survey research as data collecting legal system with faire, transparent, and effective judicial strategy. The instrument used in collecting data for this institutions is essential to the protection of citizens against study was questionnaire method where close-ended the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts of both questions were asked in a questionnaire that was self- organizations and individuals. administered by the respondents. A questionnaire was administered to the sample of 102 respondents Disclosure of Election Results – Accurate and timely (graduating Public Administration University students) disclosure of elections results at all levels of government selected from the total population of 625 graduating provides for the transparency of the election process, in students at the College of Business and Economics, particular during counting and tabulating of the results to University of Asmara in the year 2018. The response rate ensure full accountability. An independent electoral was 90 out of 102 questionnaires distributed or 88%. commission composed of commissioners drawn from across spectrum of politics, civil society and gender should The researcher took a great deal of time and effort to be responsible for the conduct of the whole election ensure the proper administration of the questionnaire by process. handing the questionnaire to each respondent and collecting it personally. To ensure anonymity and The Ombudsman – The Ombudsman constitutes an confidentiality, each subject was represented by a coded office which, independently of the executive, receives number, with no references to name or position and each complaints about maladministration. It gives individuals questionnaire was collected in a sealed envelope. Thus, the opportunity to have decisions which affect them to be nobody can identify or make connection between the reviewed by an independent and expert body, without the identity of the subject and his/her responses. The expenses and delays of court proceedings. The primary researcher personally distributed and collected the function of the ombudsman is to examine two kinds of questionnaire to ensure secure transport. matters. The first are decisions, processes, recommendations, and acts of omission that are contrary The questionnaire consists of seven sections covering the to law, rules and regulations; that depart from established following areas: practice or procedure; or that are perverse, arbitrary, 1. Demographic data (age, sex, and education) unjust, biased, oppressive, discriminatory, or motivated by 2. Perceptions of the extent of corruption and attitudes bribery, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism, or administrative about the potential seriousness of corruption and the excesses. The second are cases of neglect, inattention, importance of reform.

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3. Views about the potential causes of corruption in Public Administration program, and 43.6% of the Eritrea respondents to finalize a four-year Public Administration 4. Attitudes towards market reforms as corruption program. In terms of age the majority of respondents fighting tools (64.4%) were aged under 25 years old with the age bracket 5. Attitudes towards administrative reforms as corruption 21-24 years including 44.4% of the total surveyed. This is fighting tools reflective of the age for university students in Eritrea. The 6. Attitudes towards accountability /transparency data was collected in June of 2018 before the students measures as corruption fighting tools graduated from their respective programs. 7. Attitudes towards democratic accountability measures as corruption fighting tools. The data analysis procedures consisted of frequency and cross-tabs. Cross-tabs are utilized to present descriptive The population under consideration was all 625 graduating statistics that can help us to answer many of the research students at the College of Business and Economics, questions. The study employed the descriptive survey University of Asmara in the year 2018. Purposive method which, according to Ary and Razaviah (2010) lacks sampling technique was be used to ensure a desirable predictive power since the research may discover and group of respondents based on nature of the research describe “what is” and unable to predict “what would be.” aims. Accordingly, care was taken to ensure that respondents, in this case the Public Administration graduating students, believed to contribute to the RESULTS AND ANALYSIS understanding of anti-corruption strategies of the country were included in the sample. This cohort of graduating Extent of corruption in Eritrea public administration students who would be occupying entry level civil service jobs was considered valuable Respondents were asked to rate government corruption source of corruption related knowledge relevant to the on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to “non-existent” objective of the study. Purposive sampling of the and 5 corresponds to “extremely prevalent” for the years homogenous type focuses on candidates who share 2015 and 2018 respectively. similar traits or specific characteristics. For example, participants in homogenous sampling would be similar in The responses for 2015 and 2018 are shown in the table terms of ages, education, cultures, jobs or life experiences. below: The idea is to focus on this precise similarity and how it relates to the topic being researched. (Ilker et al, 2015) Table 4: Perception of government corruption for the The unit of analysis is the individual graduating public years 2015 and 2018 administration student, more specifically, a total of 90 Non- Minimal Moderate Prevalent Extremely respondents that participated in the administration of the existent Prevalent questionnaire survey. Out of 102 sample of respondents Year 6.7% 45% 38.9% 7.8% 1.1% selected 90 were willing to fill the questionnaires. 2015 Year 0% 24.2% 42.2% 26.7% 5.6% Respondents’ Characteristics 2018

The following table shows the characteristics of the 90 For year 2015 more than half or 52.6% of the respondents Public Administration graduating students that participated think that corruption in Eritrea ranges between none to in the study. minimal. However, in 2018 only 24.2% the respondents

Table 3: Respondents Characteristics think that corruption in Eritrea ranges between none to minimal. Again, 68.9% of the respondents perceive the Frequency Percent N = 90 existence of corruption to be moderate/prevalent for the Sex Male 57 63.3 year 2018 as opposed to the 46% of the respondents for Female 33 36.7 the year 2015. This may be as interpreted as a significant Age 17-20 20 22.2 increase in perceived corruption in Eritrea in the three 21-24 38 42.2 years according to the participants of the study. 25-28 13 14.4 29-32 13 14.4 Survey Results on the Causes of corruption in Eritrea 33-36 6 6.7 >36 - The respondents were asked to rate the causes of Education 2-Year College 49 54.4 corruption in Eritrea on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 4-Year College 41 43.6 corresponds to “very unimportant cause” and 5 corresponds to “very important cause. The results are Out of the 90 respondents 63.3% were males while 36.7 shown in the table below: were females. 54.4% of the respondents (University of Asmara students) were about to complete a two-year

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Table 5: Survey Results of Causes of Corruption Causes of Corruption Average (Mean) Rank 1 Lack of meritocratic personnel policies 4.62 1 2 Low salary of public officials 4.49 2 3 Self-serving attitudes of public officials 4.31 3 4 Lack of accountable/transparent political system 3.94 4 5 lack of independent/free judiciary 3.67 5 6 Lack of effective corruption reporting system 3.64 6 7 Lack of independent/free media 3.54 7 8 Poor economic policies 3.20 8 9 Overloaded administrative agencies 2.41 9 10 Foreign interests 1.81 10 11 Customs that encourage corrupt behavior 1.40 11

The clearest finding is that the weaknesses in the civil The fifth ranking factor is lack of effective corruption service personnel system are viewed as the most reporting system. In the context of Eritrea this can be important causes of corruption. Lack of meritocratic seen as the absence of rules and regulations, procedures, personnel policies and lack of adequate pay and ranked and stuff members who are trusted for reporting suspected first and second ranked in the top five leading causes of corruption on the part of public officials as well as absence corruption in Eritrea. Lack of meritocratic personnel of fully-fledged anti-corruption body that can investigate policies that include politically motivated hiring, patronage, reports of corruption. The fact that customs/culture is seen and lack of clear rules on promotions and hiring can help at the bottom of the list of the causes of corruption is a in explaining why some bureaucracies are more corrupt testimony to the fact that the Eritrean culture is indeed than others. (Tanzi, 1998) plays a discouraging role with respect to corruption. Visiting journalists and diplomats frequently hail the “anti- The third ranking factor is the self-serving aptitudes of corruption culture” present in Eritrea. public officials indicating greedy and unscrupulous individuals are contributing to the perceived corruption in In conclusion, according to the respondents the leading government. Hence, it refers to the personal factors that contribute to corruption are weakness in pay characteristics of some corrupt public officials serving in and in personnel system, deficiencies in individual the government of Eritrea. attitudes and values, lack of transparency and accountability in the larger political processes and lack of The fourth ranking factor lack of accountable/transparent corruption reporting system. The first and second factors political system can be explained in part by the infancy of deal with public organizational systems – either the need the political institutions in Eritrea. The legal framework for for incentives and supportive regulations or the need for the formation and finance of political parties is still nascent, detection and presumably punishment. The third leading national elections are still pending (owing to the 1998-2000 factor deals with individual shortcomings while the fifth war with Ethiopia,) and the media remains largely leading factor applies to the political system as a whole. government controlled. However, after the signing of peace agreement between and Ethiopia in 2018 after 20 Survey Results on Effectiveness of Economic/Market years of no war no peace the urgency for the heralding of Reforms political competition or multi-party democracy, the introduction of vibrant private media and the political The effectiveness of reform strategies was measured by a participation of citizenry through regular parliamentary and ten-point scale. One point indicated not at all effective presidential elections becomes much more felt than before while ten points indicated the most effective strategy. .Eritrea can learn valuable lessons from the small Overall, the results presented in the table below show that comparable Sub-Saharan countries of Botswana and officials perceive weak to moderate effectiveness of Namibia characterized by dominant party led governments economic/market reforms in fighting corruption. If a score that have consistently maintained a reputation for of 8.0 or higher is chosen as a standard for highly effective cleanliness and democratization at the regional and global approaches, then none of these strategies meets the test. stage. Strengthening democracy to enhance executive accountability to the legislature, and independent judiciary Table 6: Survey Results on Effectiveness of Economic/ and decentralized government; nurturing a vibrant Market Reforms opposition; allowing the free flow of public information and Economic/Market Strategy Mean Rank introducing transparent procedures are all vital elements 1 Competitive Service provision 7.71 1 for showing demonstrable political will and developing a 2 Privatization 7.46 2 culture of honest government. (Geingob, 2004). 3 Deregulation 5.75 3 4 Tax reforms 5.61 4 5 Program elimination 5.33 5

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The findings shown below clearly indicate that officials rate The leading highly ranked corruption fighting tools aim at the effectiveness of administrative/bureaucratic reforms in enhancing accountability and transparency whose scores fighting corruption in Eritrea to be very high. The ranking exceed the acceptable average of 8 are the in government of improved public pays in the top three is indicative about are the legal framework criminalizing corrupt acts, strong the role of adequate salary in maintaining a clean civil credible specialized agency to detect and punish corrupt service. Four of these strategies meet the high behavior, and auditing body that monitors the incomes and effectiveness test average score of 8. expenditure of government bodies. Experience in countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Botswana, Table 7: Survey Results on Effectiveness of Chile, Poland, and Uganda suggest that institutions Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms dedicated to the fight against corruption (specialized Administrative/Bureaucratic Strategy Mean Rank anticorruption commissions or agencies) have 1 Improved public sector pay 8.89 1 demonstrated remarkable success in reducing corruption 2 Heavy penalties for corrupt behavior 8.70 2 in the public sector. (Geingob, 2004). 3 Meritocratic personnel policy 8.69 3 4 Code of ethics 8.19 4 Survey Result on Effectiveness of Political 5 Financial management system 7.24 5 Accountability Enhancing Reforms: 6 Public procurement 6.62 6 7 Administrative efficiency 6.0 7 The survey finding indicate that officials see the 8 Decentralized decision making 5.53 8 effectiveness of political accountability enhancing reforms ranges from weak to very high. Respect for rule of law, It seems clear that when Eritrean officials think about visible leadership and legislative score very high on measures to combat corruption, they focus much more on effectiveness while oversight by NGOs is rated as having public administration reform rather than reforms in the the weakest effectiveness in fighting corruption. economic or market area. This represents a traditional public administration focus rather than a NPM focus. The Table 9: Survey Result on Effectiveness of Political leading four administrative reforms recommended by the Reforms respondent including improved public sector pay, heavy Political Accountability Enhancing Mean Rank penalties for corrupt behavior, meritocratic personnel Strategy policy and code of ethics pass the threshold of average 1 Respect for rule of law 8.58 1 score of 8. These findings clearly indicate that respondent 2 Visible leadership commitment 8.4 2 believe bureaucratic reforms in the Eritrean government 3 Legislative oversight 8.08 3 are past due. 4 Political competition 7.65 4 5 Transparency in party financing 5.97 5 Survey Results on Effectiveness of Accountability 6 The Ombudsman 5.74 6 /Transparency Enhancing Reforms: 7 Disclosure of election results 5.11 7 8 Oversight by NGOs 3.52 8 The survey results indicate that officials the effectiveness of accountability/transparency enhancing reforms in The three leading political accountability enhancing fighting corruption to range from moderate to high. The reforms respect for the rule of law, visible leadership top three highly effective accountability/transparency commitment and legislative oversight meeting the point enhancing strategies are anti-corruption commission, anti- average 8. The graduating public administration students corruption legislation, and the auditor-general office. believe not only laws criminalizing corrupt behavior should be promulgated but also strictly enforced across that board Table 8: Survey Results on Effectiveness of irrespective how high an individual position may be in the Accountability/Transparency Enhancing Reforms government. In addition, the respondents see need for the Accountability/Transparency Enhancing Mean Rank concrete commitment of the Eritrean leadership to fighting Strategy corruption in terms of prosecuting their subordinates as 1 Anti-corruption commission 8.70 1 well as living a clean, ethical life themselves. The third high 2 Anti-corruption legislation 8.47 2 ranking factor referring legislative oversight underscores 3 Auditor-general office 8.0 3 the belief that the power of executive branch should 4 Honest/effective police 7.49 4 checked and balanced by the legislators. 5 Asset/income disclosure 7.07 5 6 Independent/free Judiciary 7.0 6 The leading strategies perceived to be most effective with 7 Independent/free media 6.45 7 a rating greater equal or greater average score of 8 are 8 Whistleblowing protection laws 6.15 8 presented as follows:

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Table 10: Table Showing the leading Anti-Corruption Reforms Administrative/ Accountability/Transparency Political Accountability Enhancing Bureaucratic Reforms Reforms Reforms Improved pay (8.89) Anticorruption commission (8.37) Respect for the rule of law (9.11) Heavy penalties (8.7) Anticorruption legislation (8.26) Visible leadership commitment (8.81) Meritocracy (8.69) The Auditor-General office (8.16) Legislative oversight (8.08)

Code of ethics (8.19)

None of the economic/market strategy methods receive observers regarding the pervasiveness of corruption in high effectiveness rating from the respondent group as a Eritrea, its leaders have the task of implementing civil whole. The common themes of the leading anti-corruption service reforms (such as increased pay, merit-based reforms/strategies listed above is focus on timely civil personnel policies), accountability/transparency reforms service reforms, law-making and law-enforcement and the (including anti-corruption commission, anti-corruption political will to fight corruption on the part of Eritrean legislation, and Attorney-General office) and demonstrate government leaders. the political will to combat corruption wherever it takes place. The fact that the top six least corrupt Sub-Saharan African countries having score above the 50 from CONCLUSION 100(clean) on the 2018 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI 2018) Seychelles The principal aim of the research was to assess the (score=66), Botswana (score=66), Cape Verde(score=61), perceptions public administration university students Ruanda (score=57), Namibia (score=53) and Mauritius regarding the extent, causes, and the remedies of (score=51) happen to be small manageable places bides corruption in context of Eritrea. The study findings well for Eritrea. Moreover, the well-documented contradict to a larger degree the reputation of Eritrea as remarkable successes in small countries and city states one of the least corrupt countries in Africa that is frequently (including Hong Kong, Singapore, Ruanda and Botswana) advanced by visiting diplomats and foreign journalists. in the fight against corruption spearheaded by According Transparency International 2018 Corruption independent, well-funded, well-staffed and empowered Perception Index (CP1) Eritrea has a low score of 24 out anti-corruption agencies should be carefully noted and of 100 (clean) with a global ranking of 157 from 180 studied by the current Eritrean leaders. countries. This Eritrean CPI score is below the global average score of 43 as well the Sub-Saharan regional average score of 32. It is difficult to measure the actual REFERENCES corruption that take place in the country, however the perceptions of the respondents as well the perceptions Ary DJ, Razaviah A. (2010). Introduction to Research in collected by Transparency International based on expert Education. London: Routledge, 550-578. and business people surveys portray the existence of the Asea Wilson. (2018). Combating political and challenging problem of corruption in the Eritrean public bureaucratic : Colossal sector. Challenges for the Church and the Citizens. Theological Studies. 74(2):72-80. Having a newly established state where corruption is not Ayittey Geroge. (2002). Biting Their Own Tails: African embedded in society’s culture as evidenced by lowest Leaders and the Internalist Intricacies – of the Rape of score given by respondents to Eritrean culture as a driver a Continent.” A key note address to SORAC. Nov, 7- of corruption is a welcome development in the future of 9, 2002 – New Jersey. Eritrea. The survey evidence confirms Eritrea’s reputation Bardan Pranaub and Dilip Mookherjee. (2000). for possessing “anti-corruption culture”. The research Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure evidence also indicates that overwhelming number of Delivery in Developing Countries. Working Paper 15, respondents do not think that foreign governments and Boston University, USA. multinational companies contribute to the corruption in Bechem Egbeyong. (2018). : Eritrea. This implies that corruption in Eritrea is driven by Public Perception on the Role and Effectiveness of the internal factors presumably requiring internal remedies. Different Anti-Corruption Agencies. Review Public This is sharply contrasting to the rest of Sub-Saharan Administration Management. 6 (1):1-6. Africa where corruption it attributed solely to external Faniel S. H. (2009) Anti- Corruption Strategies in South interference as a way of escaping accountability by the Africa Public Sector. Perspectives on the contributions sub-continent’s corrupt leaders. of complexity Thinks and ICTs. PhD Dissertation. https://scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/.../habtemic Finally, the research evidence suggested that if Eritrea is hael_anticorruption_2009.pdf. Accessed December 15, to reduce corrupt behavior on the ground while at the 2018 same time improving the outlook of internal and external

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Accepted 2 August 2019

Citation: Desta Y. (2019). Combating Corruption in Sub- Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in Eritrea. International Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, 4(2): 031-044.

Copyright: © 2019 Desta Y. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are cited.

Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in Eritrea