Photograph taken from Japanese plane during attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island; view looks about east, with supply depot, submarine base, and fuel tank farm in right center distance; torpedo has just hit USS West Virginia on far side of Ford Island (center); other moored nearby are (from left): USS Nevada, USS Arizona, USS Tennessee (inboard of West Virginia), USS Oklahoma (torpedoed and listing) alongside USS Maryland, and USS California; on near side of Ford Island (left), are USS and USS Raleigh, USS Utah and USS Tangier; Raleigh and Utah have been torpedoed, and Utah is listing sharply to port; Japanese planes are visible in right center (over Ford Island) and over Navy Yard at right, , December 7, 1941 (Navy Ministry, /U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

A New Look at Operational Art How We View War Dictates How We Fight It

By Chad Buckel

A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war; each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be.

—Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy

ince America’s founding, most of States has enjoyed a long history of tac- our tactical experiences have been tical victories and successful campaigns. S those of success in battle and Why, then, with so many tactical victo- hard-won campaigns. Beginning with ries, is the American record of strategic General George Washington’s ability success so dismal? What has prevented Major Chad Buckel, USMC, is Aide-de-Camp on the International Military Staff at the North to avoid defeat in detail while wearing us from turning our battlefield suc- Atlantic Treaty Organization. down the British army, the United cesses to strategic victories, and why

94 Features / A New Look at Operational Art JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 have we struggled so much in attaining To clarify what operational art is, of resources used, the requirement of our stated political goals? The War of we must first understand where it came population support, the mobilization and 1812, the Banana Wars, , from, how it developed, why it devel- movement of forces and resources, and Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, oped, and the purpose it was designed to the emerging link between rear area sup- and Afghanistan all saw brilliant battle- meet. Without this understanding, we are port and frontline engagements.5 field victories with limited strategic unable to adequately adopt the term and The critical turning points in the success. These failures are not a product concept to meet our future needs. The development of operational art and the of the American intellect, spirit, inge- term itself, as with the operational level operational level of war were the wars of nuity, or will. They are a failure of the of war, is a product of post–Industrial German unification (1806–1871) and American view of war and a failure Revolution warfare and was developed the (1861–1865), of our model for operational art. The to explain how the Napoleonic concept when weapons and transport technology current method by which the United of decisive battle no longer applied to extended the battlefield in length and States views the interplay of the levels of conflict, since armies were now more mo- depth and allowed for a linking of battles war is insufficient to translate tactical bile, more lethal, and more spread out. to achieve a strategic objective. These victories into strategic and political suc- Since the term evolved from an earlier changes came to full maturation in World cesses, requiring a new way of viewing understanding of the character of warfare, War I, when armies were “unable to operational art and warfare. we must assume that it will continue to achieve decisive results on an operational evolve as that character changes. Like scale. . . . This meant that the main of- Operational Art and any other art form, operational art must fensive thrust was often aimed at a point the Levels of War reflect the realities of its time to work in the enemy’s line that could be easily Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for appropriately. pierced tactically, not ‘along an axis that the Armed Forces of the , promised operational results.’”6 describes operational art as “the cog- A Brief History of As weapon ranges extended and nitive approach by commanders and Operational Art troop formations spread out, military staffs—supported by their skill, knowl- Before and during the early years of the operations began to evolve. Between edge, experience, creativity, and judg- Industrial Revolution and the Napole- World War I and World War II, Soviet ment—to develop strategies, campaigns, onic wars, the operational level of war theorists sought to find a way to break and operations to organize and employ did not exist. Weapons and tactics dic- the positional stalemate and to inject military forces by integrating ends, tated the massing of troops, with short- mobility back into warfare, discovering ways, and means.”1 By this definition, range weapons, to engage and defeat that modern warfare required the linking operational art encompasses all three an opponent in a decisive battle. At this of multiple operations to bring about levels of war (strategic, operational, point, only tactics and strategy existed, strategic success.7 Soviet theorists also tactical) by synchronizing the actions since strategy was about deploying one’s provided some of the first definitions of units executing tactical missions with forces to the battlefield, and tactics were of operational art, with G.S. Isserson the political goals that placed those about employing one’s forces on the bat- stating that “an operation is a weapon forces into a theater of operations. What tlefield. The pinnacle of this method of of strategy, while strategy is a weapon of is interesting about the joint definition warfare was Napoleon’s “strategy of the politics”8 and Aleksandr Svechin stating is that the wording indicates a holistic single point,” wherein he maneuvered to that “all branches of the art of war are approach to matching policy ends converge his forces onto the enemy at a closely interrelated: tactics takes the steps with national and regional means by single point for a decisive battle to settle that make up an operational leap, and developing appropriate ways of employ- the seasonal campaign or war.2 strategy points the way.”9 ment. The definition also suggests that As technology matured and the The U.S. military did not embark operational art is a way of thinking that Industrial Revolution changed militaries, on a serious study of the operational links all three levels of war; however, “a critical change in the pace of battle level of war or operational art until the JP 1 places this definition on page I-8, emerged.”3 As deployment and employ- 1980s. The catalyst for this change was under the operational level of war. This ment became one singular whole, the the and renewed interest in placement alludes to bounding the pace and tempo of battle quickened. Soviet military studies. Today, the term concept of operational art strictly at the Napoleon’s single point and Carl von and concept are under increasing pressure operational level with only limited links Clausewitz’s decisive point began to as the United States has been unable to to the other levels, despite those links lose their effectiveness as armies sought translate tactical success into strategic vic- being spelled out in the definition. This to spread out and fight each other over tory since the . As such, a detailed duality implies that, as a profession, we “extended lines” and over longer periods and deliberate look at why we continue still do not have a solid grasp of what of time and larger spaces.4 The change to fail in our strategic goals—despite our operational art is and how to appropri- in the sizes of armies and battlefields was massive political, diplomatic, military, and ately apply the theory. accompanied by changes in the number economic power—is warranted.

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Buckel 95 Figure 1. Levels of Warfare how the United States views the three levels of war. The figure depicts a strati- fied Venn diagram with the three levels National Policy laid out linearly, with only the opera- Strategic Level tional level experiencing overlap with Theater Strategy the other levels. Furthermore, national policy is subsumed into the strategic Campaigns level. This mental construct and model survive even though JP 3-0 clearly states Operational Level Major Operations that tactical actions can have strategic consequences. JP 3-0 also offers a model of how Battles operational art interacts with strategy Tactical Level Engagements and the three levels of war. Figure 2 shows operational art interacting with Small-Unit and Crew Actions strategy at theater/functional strategic objectives, overseen by the chief of mis- Sore: Joint Publication 1, Dotrine for the Armed ores of the United States (Washington, DC: sion and combatant commanders. In The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), I-7. this depiction, operational art is seen starting with the strategic objectives set by the national command author- Figure 2. Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art ity and delivered via operational and tactical objectives. An arrow and text below indicate that unified action is Department and achieved via this model and that success- President Chief of Mission Chief of Mission Agency ful operational art “links tactical action National Security Operational-Level Combatant Representatives 12 Staff Joint Force with strategic purpose.” The reader Commander Tactical Commander should once again note that this is a Agency Heads Commander linear model, showing the ideal situation of tactical actions nested in operations, which are in turn nested to strategic objectives. Both of these models fit well with Colonel Arthur Lykke’s ends-ways- Theater/ National means model. Functional Operational-Level Tactical-Level Strategic Strategic Objectives Objectives Both JPs place operational art at the Objectives Objectives operational level. Within these publica- tions we find the seeds of failure planted. Strategy Operational Art Any veteran or student of conflict will understand that warfare is not a linear event. Small occurrences can have major Unified Action impacts on skirmishes, battles, opera- tions, campaigns, strategies, and political policies. These disruptions are becoming Note: Operational art links tactical action to strategic purpose. Operational art governs the deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve and strategic objectives. even more pronounced as the informa- Sore: Ibid., I-13. tion age allows for the transmission of events and ideas to audiences around The Current Model—And cate resources, and assign tasks to the the world in near-instantaneous time. Why It Is Failing appropriate command.”10 JP 3-0, Joint Professor Harry Yarger points out that Our current joint doctrine spells out Operations, further elaborates this point “with the advances in transportation and how the United States views the rela- by stating that “tactical actions can communications there has been a spatial tionship between the levels of war and cause both intended and unintended and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art. JP 1 states, “There are strategic consequences, particularly in operational art, and tactics. Increasingly no finite limits or boundaries between today’s environment of pervasive and . . . events at the tactical level have more these levels, but they help commanders immediate global communications and immediate and, potentially, greater strate- design and synchronize operations, allo- networked threats.”11 Figure 1 shows gic consequences.”13

96 Features / A New Look at Operational Art JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 These publications also note that tactical and operational success do not Figure 3. Operational Art and the Levels of War always translate into strategic victory or attaining political goals. The history of human conflict teaches one critical Operational Art lesson: Battlefield (tactical) success is useless and meaningless if it does not support political ends. Professor Yarger National even argues that changes at the strategic Strategy level can have simple causes and that when those changes occur, they create a feedback loop that causes changes across the strategic environment.14 Our models and understanding of the interplay of Tactical the three levels of war and how op- Actions erational art ties them together do not Policy/ account for these anomalies and thus do Politics not lay the intellectual framework and Campaign/ understanding for best practice opera- Theater/ tional art. Country Plan One of the chief intellectual failures of the current model is that operational art is “binned” under the operational Operations level of war but is shown to traverse the strategic to the tactical level. This al- lows for two methods of understanding operational art and how it is supposed to serve the commander and his or her staff. Those who see it as a tool of the operational level lose sight of how tacti- profound strategic and political effects. The political objective is the goal, war is cal actions can be linked with strategic Once again, this tactical action links di- the means of reaching it, and means can effects. This issue is reinforced by the rectly to the strategic and political levels. never be considered in isolation from linear model that we use to frame the in- The final issue with this model is that their purpose.”15 terplay of the levels of war and warps our it does not represent political concerns The current model fails in several mental model to believe that every tacti- or interests, domestically or internation- ways to provide an adequate picture of cal action must link with an operational ally. National policy gets an honorable how human conflict evolves. As conflict design to affect the strategic level—a mention in the JP 1 model, but political continues, policies, goals, and will tend false assumption. This linear model also considerations are otherwise not con- to change. Long wars start under one set leads us to attribute unit or headquarters sidered or understood. Indeed, the U.S. of political circumstances and often end size to a specific level of war, forcing us military does not participate in political under a different set. Policies change, to equate force structure to each level discussions or decisions, but their ef- and as a result, strategies to attain those versus mission or capability. fects are felt throughout the force and policies must also change. This means To illustrate this point, we need only through all three levels of war. Rules that operational designs and tactical look at our special operations forces and of engagement, alliances, coalitions, actions are affected by political and long-range bomber assets. When a special force size, and missions are all affected strategic decisions, with the relationship operations team or B-2 execute a mission, by politics and political decisions. By going both ways. This two-way relation- they are executing a tactical action that failing to acknowledge this level and ship is not a linear one wherein effects may have strategic or political effects. its immense impact on how wars are are felt only up and down the chain When this occurs, there exists a direct conducted, we hamper the civil-military of command and levels of war. Effects link between the tactical and strategic dialogue and delink the political cause happen at different points, at differ- levels, based on mission and capability for conflict with the actual fighting. As ent times, and with different intensity. and not the headquarters size or type. Clausewitz stated, “War, therefore, is an Our inability to recognize and account Another example is that of the “strategic act of policy. . . . Policy . . . will perme- for phenomena leaves us at a major corporal,” wherein we recognize that the ate all military operations, and . . . it will disadvantage. actions of a lone infantryman can have have continuous influence on them. . . .

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Buckel 97 Soldiers with 101st Division Special Troops Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, watch as two Chinook helicopters fly in to return them to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, November 4, 2008 (U.S. Army/Mary L. Gonzalez)

A Nonlinear Model for approach a specific problem. Much and a double line indicating a stronger a Nonlinear Reality as individual atoms bond together to bond. This model, set as a 3D construct, form a molecule, these levels of war allows for decisions, events, and plan- An appropriate model for thinking of bond together to form the strategic ning to account for the fluid nature of the interplay of operational art and and operational environment, and how the international environment and how the levels of war should be nonlinear we manage these individual spheres singular events can have multiple and and show the complex linkages and and the whole environment is opera- varying effects across the spectrum, connections that exist in reality. Figure tional art. In other words, this model which is a key consideration in the 3 attempts to do just that, using a gives us a better mental picture and proper use of operational art. The larger molecular model format common in baseline of how to view and apply circle around the molecular structure chemistry to show the bonds and inter- operational art theory. shows that operational art is the con- play of atoms. These chemical models This model uses five spheres to sideration and balance of each sphere in use sticks and balls to depict the link- indicate the core parts of the model. It relation to one another. The art is in un- ages and relationships between atoms does not stratify the levels of war but derstanding how events in each sphere and how those linkages bind together represents them by showing the various affect and change the other spheres. to make a single molecule. This same parts of the environment and how they Policy and politics are central to model and mental construct can be interact with one another. The spheres this model and have the largest sphere. adapted to visualize the interplay of are sized to represent importance. As Whereas in our current model policy is the levels of war and how they interact with the chemistry models, lines depict subsumed into strategy, in this model with one another to inform the com- the strength of the bond between the it has its own sphere and holds the mander and his or her staff of how to spheres, a single line indicating a bond central location within the model.

98 Features / A New Look at Operational Art JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 This represents the idea that politics is With this new model in mind, we can also see, if we look closely enough, paramount to all international discourse must once again review our doctrinal the limitations that this model possesses. and must play a prominent role in any definition of operational art: “The By applying the proposed model, government or military action on the cognitive approach by commanders we are able to paint a much more com- international stage. Also in this model, and staffs—supported by their skill, prehensive picture. Let us start with the policy is bound to all the other four knowledge, experience, creativity, and Japanese policy (political goal) of secur- spheres, with strong bonds to all but the judgment—to develop strategies, cam- ing raw materials. The strategy for this operational sphere. Since national policy paigns, and operations to organize and policy could include economic actions is the starting point for national and employ military forces by integrating to purchase them, diplomatic options to theater strategy, it holds a strong bond to ends, ways, and means.” Since it calls for secure access, or military operations to each of those spheres. This aspect of the a cognitive approach, our model must seize them. With the U.S. embargo in model is similar to our current models. support the creation of a mental picture effect, Japan decided that economic and The drastic point of departure from cur- of the environment that allows us to diplomatic measures were insufficient. So rent thinking is the link between policy understand how actions and effects act a national strategy of military action to and tactical actions. This is a strong bond, and interact. A stratified picture of this secure the Southern Resources Area was representing the fact that individual and environment limits our thinking, but a required. This in turn created a theater small-unit actions are heavily influenced baseline mental model that represents strategy to attack Indonesia and Malaysia by political decisions. A single line con- the dynamic nature of the environment to physically seize the necessary raw nects policy to operations, showing that aids our thinking and supports more materials. In planning for these opera- a connection does exist between the two, accurate understanding. The defini- tions, however, the strategy deviated by but is balanced by the influence of and tion also calls for operational artists to considering the U.S. positions as too connections to strategy and tactics. develop strategies, campaigns, and op- risky to bypass. Again, a national strategy The other two spheres, national strat- erations to organize and employ military had to be created to deal with this issue. egy and operations, link to the other four forces by integrating ends, ways, and Japan could have used either diplomacy spheres. This shows that both of these means. By using a nonlinear model, we or military action to keep the United areas are influenced by and have influence are able to better visualize the interplay States from responding. The Japanese on the other spheres, both directly and of policies down to tactics, which will decided that military action against the indirectly. National strategic documents aid us in understanding the best ways United States best served their policy. As derive from political goals to inform and and means to achieve the desired ends. a result, the theater strategy was amended affect theater campaign plans, operational We can understand how operations and to include an assault on the , designs, and acceptable tactical actions tactical actions do or do not nest with the Mariana Islands, , and the within given theaters. Operational design policies and strategic goals, and we can , with a supporting raid accounts for national strategic goals and visualize how and why events in the against Hawaii. With the theater strategy campaign plan goals and influences tacti- environment affect each level and their set, the naval strike force was formed, and cal resourcing and decisionmaking. desired endstates. the naval operation was planned. Within Campaign plans and tactical actions that operational plan, the tactic of an air are the only two spheres that do not A Test raid was chosen, rather than a ground in- have a connection to each other. Both To test this model, let us look at the cursion, and Midway Island was bypassed these spheres are connected to policy, Japanese Naval as insignificant. national strategy, and operations to Base through a Japanese lens. Using indicate that each one has a direct influ- our linear model, we would trace the Conclusion ence or is directly influenced by those Japanese air raid as a tactical plan, which The current definition of operational spheres but must pass through any of supported the operational objectives of art still remains valid as written, but it those spheres to affect each other. For securing vital lines of communication should not be misconstrued with the example, a tactical success or mistake by crippling the U.S. Pacific Fleet to operational level of war. Our doctrinal will not directly affect a campaign plan enable the capture of U.S. Pacific bases, understanding of the concept should without first affecting an operational thereby supporting the Japanese theater reflect the “how” and not the “what.” outcome, a national strategic objective, strategic aims. These aims included Operational art, as with any art form, is or a political policy. The converse of this denying the United States the ability to about creative thinking and innovative is that a campaign plan will not directly interfere with Japanese military opera- problem-solving. To be creative—that affect a tactical plan without first af- tions in the Pacific and mitigating the is, to be a true artist—one must not fecting policy, strategy, or operational U.S. oil embargo by securing the raw only be trained and experienced, but design. This is not to say that the two do materials. By this model, we can trace also build a mental model that allows not influence each other but that they a logical line of thought and a nesting for agility and clarity of thought. By do so in an indirect manner. of tactical actions to strategic goals. We applying this model with the current

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Buckel 99 Marine with Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, , 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, captures member of opposing force during urban combat training in Okinawa, Japan, February 8, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrew Kuppers)

lips, Historical Perspective of the Operational definition, we will achieve clarity The proposed model in this article Art (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of of thought and expand our mental seeks to accurately depict how the levels Military History, 2005), 4. boundaries to gain a clearer under- of war connect and how operational art 3 Wilson C. Blythe, Jr., “A History of standing of the challenges that we face. can be applied to understand the stra- Operational Art,” Military Review (November– Operational art works only when those tegic environment and apply resources December 2018), 39. 4 Krause and Phillips, Historical Perspective who are applying it can see the envi- and pressure in the appropriate time, of the Operational Art, 5. ronment for what it is and not for how manner, and place to achieve our na- 5 Ibid. they want it to be. tional goals in the most efficient manner. 6 Blythe, “A History of Operational Art,” 39. Our current mental construct of By removing the linear construct and 7 Ibid., 40. 8 the interplay of the levels of war and showing the strength of the connections Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, The Evolu- tion of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: operational art prevents us from fully between each sphere, it seeks to show Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 12. appreciating the complexity of the in- how the whole is built and how each 9 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent ternational strategic environment and part plays a role. It is also designed to D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Informa- sets us up for failure. Without a proper visualize how events in one sphere will tion Services, 1992), 269. 10 understanding of the nonlinear nature of influence or be influenced by events in JP 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, I-7. international discourse and how the vari- other spheres. By crafting a more flex- 11 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, ous levels of war interact and influence ible nonlinear model, we improve our DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2017, Incor- one another, we are unable to properly chances for success in crafting policy, porating Change 1, October 22, 2018), I-12. scope how to conceptually approach strategy, operational design, and tactical 12 Ibid., I-13. 13 Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the Na- complex and complicated international plans to achieve our national goals. JFQ tional Security Professional (Westport, CT: Prae- challenges. This prevents us from grasp- ger Security International, 2008), 23. ing the interplay of politics and tactics 14 Ibid., 31. and handicaps us in translating tactical Notes 15 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and successes into strategic and policy goal trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret 1 accomplishment. By using a linear model, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine of the (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, 86–87. we artificially constrain our thoughts and DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorpo- imagination and fail to accurately model rating Change 1, July 12, 2017), I-8. the reality that we face. 2 Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phil-

100 Features / A New Look at Operational Art JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021