Photograph taken from Japanese plane during torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island; view looks about east, with supply depot, submarine base, and fuel tank farm in right center distance; torpedo has just hit USS West Virginia on far side of Ford Island (center); other battleships moored nearby are (from left): USS Nevada, USS Arizona, USS Tennessee (inboard of West Virginia), USS Oklahoma (torpedoed and listing) alongside USS Maryland, and USS California; on near side of Ford Island (left), are USS Detroit and USS Raleigh, USS Utah and USS Tangier; Raleigh and Utah have been torpedoed, and Utah is listing sharply to port; Japanese planes are visible in right center (over Ford Island) and over Navy Yard at right, Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 (Navy Ministry, Empire of Japan/U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command) A New Look at Operational Art How We View War Dictates How We Fight It By Chad Buckel A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war; each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be. —ALEKSANDR A. SVECHIN, STRATEGY ince America’s founding, most of States has enjoyed a long history of tac- our tactical experiences have been tical victories and successful campaigns. S those of success in battle and Why, then, with so many tactical victo- hard-won campaigns. Beginning with ries, is the American record of strategic General George Washington’s ability success so dismal? What has prevented Major Chad Buckel, USMC, is Aide-de-Camp on the International Military Staff at the North to avoid defeat in detail while wearing us from turning our battlefield suc- Atlantic Treaty Organization. down the British army, the United cesses to strategic victories, and why 94 Features / A New Look at Operational Art JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 have we struggled so much in attaining To clarify what operational art is, of resources used, the requirement of our stated political goals? The War of we must first understand where it came population support, the mobilization and 1812, the Banana Wars, World War I, from, how it developed, why it devel- movement of forces and resources, and Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, oped, and the purpose it was designed to the emerging link between rear area sup- and Afghanistan all saw brilliant battle- meet. Without this understanding, we are port and frontline engagements.5 field victories with limited strategic unable to adequately adopt the term and The critical turning points in the success. These failures are not a product concept to meet our future needs. The development of operational art and the of the American intellect, spirit, inge- term itself, as with the operational level operational level of war were the wars of nuity, or will. They are a failure of the of war, is a product of post–Industrial German unification (1806–1871) and American view of war and a failure Revolution warfare and was developed the American Civil War (1861–1865), of our model for operational art. The to explain how the Napoleonic concept when weapons and transport technology current method by which the United of decisive battle no longer applied to extended the battlefield in length and States views the interplay of the levels of conflict, since armies were now more mo- depth and allowed for a linking of battles war is insufficient to translate tactical bile, more lethal, and more spread out. to achieve a strategic objective. These victories into strategic and political suc- Since the term evolved from an earlier changes came to full maturation in World cesses, requiring a new way of viewing understanding of the character of warfare, War I, when armies were “unable to operational art and warfare. we must assume that it will continue to achieve decisive results on an operational evolve as that character changes. Like scale. This meant that the main of- Operational Art and any other art form, operational art must fensive thrust was often aimed at a point the Levels of War reflect the realities of its time to work in the enemy’s line that could be easily Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for appropriately. pierced tactically, not ‘along an axis that the Armed Forces of the United States, promised operational results.’”6 describes operational art as “the cog- A Brief History of As weapon ranges extended and nitive approach by commanders and Operational Art troop formations spread out, military staffs—supported by their skill, knowl- Before and during the early years of the operations began to evolve. Between edge, experience, creativity, and judg- Industrial Revolution and the Napole- World War I and World War II, Soviet ment—to develop strategies, campaigns, onic wars, the operational level of war theorists sought to find a way to break and operations to organize and employ did not exist. Weapons and tactics dic- the positional stalemate and to inject military forces by integrating ends, tated the massing of troops, with short- mobility back into warfare, discovering ways, and means.”1 By this definition, range weapons, to engage and defeat that modern warfare required the linking operational art encompasses all three an opponent in a decisive battle. At this of multiple operations to bring about levels of war (strategic, operational, point, only tactics and strategy existed, strategic success.7 Soviet theorists also tactical) by synchronizing the actions since strategy was about deploying one’s provided some of the first definitions of units executing tactical missions with forces to the battlefield, and tactics were of operational art, with G.S. Isserson the political goals that placed those about employing one’s forces on the bat- stating that “an operation is a weapon forces into a theater of operations. What tlefield. The pinnacle of this method of of strategy, while strategy is a weapon of is interesting about the joint definition warfare was Napoleon’s “strategy of the politics”8 and Aleksandr Svechin stating is that the wording indicates a holistic single point,” wherein he maneuvered to that “all branches of the art of war are approach to matching policy ends converge his forces onto the enemy at a closely interrelated: tactics takes the steps with national and regional means by single point for a decisive battle to settle that make up an operational leap, and developing appropriate ways of employ- the seasonal campaign or war.2 strategy points the way.”9 ment. The definition also suggests that As technology matured and the The U.S. military did not embark operational art is a way of thinking that Industrial Revolution changed militaries, on a serious study of the operational links all three levels of war; however, “a critical change in the pace of battle level of war or operational art until the JP 1 places this definition on page I-8, emerged.”3 As deployment and employ- 1980s. The catalyst for this change was under the operational level of war. This ment became one singular whole, the the Vietnam War and renewed interest in placement alludes to bounding the pace and tempo of battle quickened. Soviet military studies. Today, the term concept of operational art strictly at the Napoleon’s single point and Carl von and concept are under increasing pressure operational level with only limited links Clausewitz’s decisive point began to as the United States has been unable to to the other levels, despite those links lose their effectiveness as armies sought translate tactical success into strategic vic- being spelled out in the definition. This to spread out and fight each other over tory since the Gulf War. As such, a detailed duality implies that, as a profession, we “extended lines” and over longer periods and deliberate look at why we continue still do not have a solid grasp of what of time and larger spaces.4 The change to fail in our strategic goals—despite our operational art is and how to appropri- in the sizes of armies and battlefields was massive political, diplomatic, military, and ately apply the theory. accompanied by changes in the number economic power—is warranted. JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Buckel 95 Figure 1. Levels of Warfare how the United States views the three levels of war. The figure depicts a strati- fied Venn diagram with the three levels National Policy laid out linearly, with only the opera- Strategic Level tional level experiencing overlap with Theater Strategy the other levels. Furthermore, national policy is subsumed into the strategic Campaigns level. This mental construct and model survive even though JP 3-0 clearly states Operational Level Major Operations that tactical actions can have strategic consequences. JP 3-0 also offers a model of how Battles operational art interacts with strategy Tactical Level Engagements and the three levels of war. Figure 2 shows operational art interacting with Small-Unit and Crew Actions strategy at theater/functional strategic objectives, overseen by the chief of mis- Source: Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: sion and combatant commanders. In The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), I-7. this depiction, operational art is seen starting with the strategic objectives set by the national command author- Figure 2. Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art ity and delivered via operational and tactical objectives. An arrow and text below indicate that unified action is Department and achieved via this model and that success- President Chief of Mission Chief of Mission Agency ful operational art “links tactical action National Security Operational-Level Combatant Representatives 12 Staff Joint Force with strategic purpose.” The reader Commander Tactical Commander should once again note that this is a Agency Heads Commander linear model, showing the ideal situation of tactical actions nested in operations, which are in turn nested to strategic objectives.