TARSKI's INFLUENCE on COMPUTER SCIENCE The
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities), 21Pp
Forthcoming in: Uncovering Facts and Values, ed. A. Kuzniar and J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities), 21pp. Abstract Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that may be buttressed by an examination of the ordinary person’s views of truth. Then, I address a concern raised by Tarski’s contemporaries who saw Næss’ results as refuting Tarski’s semantic conception. Following that, I summarize Næss’ results. Finally, I will contend with a few objections that suggest a strict interpretation of Næss’ results might recommend an overturning of Tarski’s theory. Keywords: truth, Alfred Tarski, Arne Næss, Vienna Circle, experimental philosophy Joseph Ulatowski ORDINARY TRUTH IN TARSKI AND NÆSS 1. Introduction Many of Alfred Tarski's better known papers on truth (e.g. 1944; 1983b), logical consequence (1983c), semantic concepts in general (1983a), or definability (1948) identify two conditions that successful definitions of “truth,” “logical consequence,” or “definition” require: formal correctness and material (or intuitive) adequacy.1 The first condition Tarski calls “formal correctness” because a definition of truth (for a given formal language) is formally correct when it is constructed in a manner that allows us to avoid both circular definition and semantic paradoxes. -
A Formalization of Logic in Diagonal-Free Cylindric Algebras Andrew John Ylvisaker Iowa State University
Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Graduate Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 2012 A formalization of logic in diagonal-free cylindric algebras Andrew John Ylvisaker Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd Part of the Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Ylvisaker, Andrew John, "A formalization of logic in diagonal-free cylindric algebras" (2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 12536. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/12536 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A formalization of logic in diagonal-free cylindric algebras by Andrew John Ylvisaker A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Major: Mathematics Program of Study Committee: Roger D. Maddux, Major Professor Maria Axenovich Cliff Bergman Bill Robinson Paul Sacks Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2012 Copyright c Andrew John Ylvisaker, 2012. All rights reserved. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . iii LIST OF FIGURES . iv CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND MATERIAL . 1 1.1 Introduction . .1 1.2 First-order logic . .4 1.3 General algebra and Boolean algebras with operators . .6 1.4 Relation algebras . 11 1.5 Cylindric algebras . 17 CHAPTER 2. RELATION ALGEBRAIC REDUCTS . 21 2.1 Definitions . 21 2.2 Preliminary lemmas . 27 + 2.3 Q RA reducts in Df3 ..................................... -
Weak Representation Theory in the Calculus of Relations Jeremy F
Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 2006 Weak representation theory in the calculus of relations Jeremy F. Alm Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd Part of the Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Alm, Jeremy F., "Weak representation theory in the calculus of relations " (2006). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 1795. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/1795 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Weak representation theory in the calculus of relations by Jeremy F. Aim A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Major: Mathematics Program of Study Committee: Roger Maddux, Major Professor Maria Axenovich Paul Sacks Jonathan Smith William Robinson Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2006 Copyright © Jeremy F. Aim, 2006. All rights reserved. UMI Number: 3217250 INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. -
Alfred Tarski His:Bio:Tar: Sec Alfred Tarski Was Born on January 14, 1901 in Warsaw, Poland (Then Part of the Russian Empire)
bio.1 Alfred Tarski his:bio:tar: sec Alfred Tarski was born on January 14, 1901 in Warsaw, Poland (then part of the Russian Empire). Described as \Napoleonic," Tarski was boisterous, talkative, and intense. His energy was often reflected in his lectures|he once set fire to a wastebasket while disposing of a cigarette during a lecture, and was forbidden from lecturing in that building again. Tarski had a thirst for knowledge from a young age. Although later in life he would tell students that he stud- ied logic because it was the only class in which he got a B, his high school records show that he got A's across the board| even in logic. He studied at the Univer- sity of Warsaw from 1918 to 1924. Tarski Figure 1: Alfred Tarski first intended to study biology, but be- came interested in mathematics, philosophy, and logic, as the university was the center of the Warsaw School of Logic and Philosophy. Tarski earned his doctorate in 1924 under the supervision of Stanislaw Le´sniewski. Before emigrating to the United States in 1939, Tarski completed some of his most important work while working as a secondary school teacher in Warsaw. His work on logical consequence and logical truth were written during this time. In 1939, Tarski was visiting the United States for a lecture tour. During his visit, Germany invaded Poland, and because of his Jewish heritage, Tarski could not return. His wife and children remained in Poland until the end of the war, but were then able to emigrate to the United States as well. -
Alfred Tarski and a Watershed Meeting in Logic: Cornell, 1957 Solomon Feferman1
Alfred Tarski and a watershed meeting in logic: Cornell, 1957 Solomon Feferman1 For Jan Wolenski, on the occasion of his 60th birthday2 In the summer of 1957 at Cornell University the first of a cavalcade of large-scale meetings partially or completely devoted to logic took place--the five-week long Summer Institute for Symbolic Logic. That meeting turned out to be a watershed event in the development of logic: it was unique in bringing together for such an extended period researchers at every level in all parts of the subject, and the synergetic connections established there would thenceforth change the face of mathematical logic both qualitatively and quantitatively. Prior to the Cornell meeting there had been nothing remotely like it for logicians. Previously, with the growing importance in the twentieth century of their subject both in mathematics and philosophy, it had been natural for many of the broadly representative meetings of mathematicians and of philosophers to include lectures by logicians or even have special sections devoted to logic. Only with the establishment of the Association for Symbolic Logic in 1936 did logicians begin to meet regularly by themselves, but until the 1950s these occasions were usually relatively short in duration, never more than a day or two. Alfred Tarski was one of the principal organizers of the Cornell institute and of some of the major meetings to follow on its heels. Before the outbreak of World War II, outside of Poland Tarski had primarily been involved in several Unity of Science Congresses, including the first, in Paris in 1935, and the fifth, at Harvard in September, 1939. -
Alfred Tarski, Friend and Daemon Benjamin Wells
Alfred Tarski, Friend and Daemon Benjamin Wells Engaging Tarski When I had passed doctoral exams in 1963 and Alfred Tarski’s name stayed with me after I read sounded Bob Vaught and John Addison on their about the Banach-Tarski paradox in [3] during availability for supervising my research, both said high school. I then discovered logic (and Tarski’s that the department recognized me as Tarski’s definition of truth) in the last year of college but student. News to me, despite the second opinion. still considered myself to be a topologist, not from So I called him to learn more about my fate. He love but from intimate contact in four courses as acknowledged the claim, “Good,” and invited me an undergraduate. So before arriving at UC Berke- for the first serious nighttime talk. ley in fall 1962 for graduate work, I thought only Source of the Title vaguely about taking a course with him. But my inclinations were shifting: dutifully registering Throughout cooperation and separation, Alfred for fall classes in topological groups and algebraic and I were friends, cordial and personable, but geometry, I added metamathematics and Tarski’s not really personal. He also established another general algebraic systems. The next fall, Tarski of- role, that of daemon in the sense of [4]: a leonine fered set theory. These two courses were my only externalized conscience, at least. The scope of Tarski lectures, but there were numerous seminars. this conscience was foremost mathematical, with a hope for political, a goal of cultural, a reserva- Visitors to Berkeley constantly identified Tarski tion on philosophical and moral, and a hint of with whatever topic occupied him so fruitfully and spiritual. -
Download Download
R E C E N Z J E ROCZNIKI FILOZOFICZNE Tom LIX, numer 1 – 2011 Anita Burdman-Feferman, Solomon Feferman, Alfred Tarski. aycie i logika , przeł. Joanna Goli Lska-Pilarek, Marian Srebrny, Warszawa: Wydaw- nictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne 2009, ss. 475. ISBN 978-83-60501-94-8. Nie trzeba by 4 „rasowym” logikiem lub filozofem, by wiedzie 4, kim był Alfred Tarski (1901-1983). Powszechnie znany jest jako „człowiek, który zdefiniował praw- dB” lub – w Bb szemu gronu – jako współautor twierdzenia o paradoksalnym rozkładzie kuli. Wywarł znacz =cy wpływ na rozwój całej XX-wiecznej logiki i podstaw mate- matyki, a tak be – poprzez badania z zakresu semantyki formalnej i podstaw logiki – na epistemologi B, metodologi B nauk i filozofi B j Bzyka. Stworzył semantyk B logiczn =, przyczynił si B do rozwoju metamatematyki oraz teorii modeli, osi =gn =ł znacz =ce rezultaty w teorii mnogo Vci, topologii, geometrii i arytmetyce. Ksi =b ka Alfred Tarski. aycie i logika autorstwa Anity i Solomona Fefermanów została wydana przez Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, w profesjonalnym przekładzie Joanny Goli Lskiej-Pilarek i Mariana Srebrnego. Szkoda jedynie, be polski przekład pojawił si B dopiero pi B4 lat po opublikowaniu oryginału ameryka Lskiego Alfred Tarski. Life and Logic przez University of Cambridge. Nie jest chyba przypadkiem, be identyczny podtytuł nosi biografia innego wiel- kiego uczonego, który wraz z Tarskim, lecz niezale bnie od niego, zmienił oblicze logiki XX wieku – Kurta Gödla (John Casti, Werner DePauli, Gödel. aycie i logika , tłum. P. Amsterdamski, Warszawa: Wyd. CiS 2003). Z jednej strony samo bycie, jak be ró bne w obu przypadkach: pełne pasji i nami Btno Vci pierwszego, wyobcowane i egocentryczne drugiego; z drugiej – logika, wielka miło V4 ich obu. -
Coll041-Endmatter.Pdf
http://dx.doi.org/10.1090/coll/041 AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY COLLOQUIUM PUBLICATIONS VOLUME 41 A FORMALIZATION OF SET THEORY WITHOUT VARIABLES BY ALFRED TARSKI and STEVEN GIVANT AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND 1985 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primar y 03B; Secondary 03B30 , 03C05, 03E30, 03G15. Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Tarski, Alfred . A formalization o f se t theor y withou t variables . (Colloquium publications , ISS N 0065-9258; v. 41) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Se t theory. 2 . Logic , Symboli c an d mathematical . I . Givant, Steve n R . II. Title. III. Series: Colloquium publications (American Mathematical Society) ; v. 41. QA248.T37 198 7 511.3'2 2 86-2216 8 ISBN 0-8218-1041-3 (alk . paper ) Copyright © 198 7 b y th e America n Mathematica l Societ y Reprinted wit h correction s 198 8 All rights reserve d excep t thos e grante d t o th e Unite d State s Governmen t This boo k ma y no t b e reproduce d i n an y for m withou t th e permissio n o f th e publishe r The pape r use d i n thi s boo k i s acid-fre e an d fall s withi n th e guideline s established t o ensur e permanenc e an d durability . @ Contents Section interdependenc e diagram s vii Preface x i Chapter 1 . Th e Formalis m £ o f Predicate Logi c 1 1.1. Preliminarie s 1 1.2. -
The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935
The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935 Paolo Mancosu Richard Zach Calixto Badesa The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900–1935 Paolo Mancosu (University of California, Berkeley) Richard Zach (University of Calgary) Calixto Badesa (Universitat de Barcelona) Final Draft—May 2004 To appear in: Leila Haaparanta, ed., The Development of Modern Logic. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 Contents Contents i Introduction 1 1 Itinerary I: Metatheoretical Properties of Axiomatic Systems 3 1.1 Introduction . 3 1.2 Peano’s school on the logical structure of theories . 4 1.3 Hilbert on axiomatization . 8 1.4 Completeness and categoricity in the work of Veblen and Huntington . 10 1.5 Truth in a structure . 12 2 Itinerary II: Bertrand Russell’s Mathematical Logic 15 2.1 From the Paris congress to the Principles of Mathematics 1900–1903 . 15 2.2 Russell and Poincar´e on predicativity . 19 2.3 On Denoting . 21 2.4 Russell’s ramified type theory . 22 2.5 The logic of Principia ......................... 25 2.6 Further developments . 26 3 Itinerary III: Zermelo’s Axiomatization of Set Theory and Re- lated Foundational Issues 29 3.1 The debate on the axiom of choice . 29 3.2 Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory . 32 3.3 The discussion on the notion of “definit” . 35 3.4 Metatheoretical studies of Zermelo’s axiomatization . 38 4 Itinerary IV: The Theory of Relatives and Lowenheim’s¨ Theorem 41 4.1 Theory of relatives and model theory . 41 4.2 The logic of relatives . -
Lecture 1: Tarski on Truth Philosophy of Logic and Language — HT 2016-17
Lecture 1: Tarski on Truth Philosophy of Logic and Language — HT 2016-17 Jonny McIntosh [email protected] Alfred Tarski (1901-1983) was a Polish (and later, American) mathematician, logician, and philosopher.1 In the 1930s, he published two classic papers: ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (1933) and ‘On the Concept of Logical Consequence’ (1936). He gives a definition of truth for formal languages of logic and mathematics in the first paper, and the essentials of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence in the second. Over the course of the next few lectures, we’ll look at each of these in turn. 1 Background The notion of truth seems to lie at the centre of a range of other notions that are central to theorising about the formal languages of logic and mathematics: e.g. validity, con- sistency, and completeness. But the notion of truth seems to give rise to contradiction: Let sentence (1) = ‘sentence (1) is not true’. Then: 1. ‘sentence (1) is not true’ is true IFF sentence (1) is not true 2. sentence (1) = ‘sentence (1) is not true’ 3. So, sentence (1) is true IFF sentence (1) is not true 4. So, sentence (1) is true and sentence (1) is not true Tarski is worried that, unless the paradox can be resolved, metatheoretical results in- voking the notion of truth or other notions that depend on it will be remain suspect. But how can it be resolved? The second premise is undeniable, and the first premise is an instance of a schema that seems central to the concept of truth, namely the following: ‘S’ is true IFF S, 1The eventful story of Tarski’s life is told by Anita and Solomon Feferman in their wonderful biography, Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic (CUP, 2004). -
An Application of First-Order Compactness in Canonicity Of
An application of first-order compactness in canonicity of relation algebras Ian Hodkinson∗ June 17, 2019 Abstract The classical compactness theorem is a central theorem in first-order model theory. It sometimes appears in other areas of logic, and in per- haps surprising ways. In this paper, we survey one such appearance in algebraic logic. We show how first-order compactness can be used to sim- plify slightly the proof of Hodkinson and Venema (2005) that the variety of representable relation algebras, although canonical, has no canonical axiomatisation, and indeed every first-order axiomatisation of it has in- finitely many non-canonical sentences. 1 Introduction The compactness theorem is a fundamental result in first-order model theory. It says that every first-order theory (set of first-order sentences) that is consistent, in the sense that every finite subset of it has a model, has a model as a whole. Equivalently, if T;U are first-order theories, T j= U (meaning that every model of T is a model of U), and U is finite, then there is a finite subset T0 ⊆ T with T0 j= U. Though not nowadays the most sophisticated technique in model theory, compactness is still very powerful and has a firm place in my affections | as I believe it does in Mara's, since she devoted an entire chapter of her Model Theory book to it [26, chapter 5]. See [26, theorem 5.24] for the theorem itself. This paper was intended to be a short and snappy survey of a couple of applications of compactness in algebraic logic. -
Carnap's Contribution to Tarski's Truth
JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY CARNAP’S CONTRIBUTION TO TARSKI’S TRUTH VOLUME 3, NUMBER 10 MONIKA GrUBER EDITOR IN CHIEF KEVIN C. KLEMENt, UnIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS In his seminal work “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Lan- guages” (1933), Alfred Tarski showed how to construct a for- EDITORIAL BOARD mally correct and materially adequate definition of true sentence GaRY EBBS, INDIANA UnIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON for certain formalized languages. These results have, eventu- GrEG FROSt-ARNOLD, HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES ally, been accepted and applauded by philosophers and logi- HENRY JACKMAN, YORK UnIVERSITY cians nearly in unison. Its Postscript, written two years later, SANDRA LaPOINte, MCMASTER UnIVERSITY however, has given rise to a considerable amount of contro- LyDIA PATTON, VIRGINIA TECH versy. There is an ongoing debate on what Tarski really said MARCUS ROSSBERG, UnIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT in the postscript. These discussions often regard Tarski as pu- MARK TEXTOR, KING’S COLLEGE LonDON tatively changing his logical framework from type theory to set AUDREY YAP, UnIVERSITY OF VICTORIA theory. RICHARD ZACH, UnIVERSITY OF CALGARY In what follows, we will compare the original results with those REVIEW EDITORS presented two years later. After a brief outline of Carnap’s pro- JULIET FLOYD, BOSTON UnIVERSITY gram in The Logical Syntax of Language we will determine its sig- CHRIS PINCOCK, OHIO STATE UnIVERSITY nificance for Tarski’s final results. ASSISTANT REVIEW EDITOR SEAN MORRIS, METROPOLITAN STATE UnIVERSITY OF DenVER DESIGN DaNIEL HARRIS, HUNTER COLLEGE C 2015 MONIKA GrUBER CARNAP’S CONTRIBUTION TO TARSKI’S TRUTH couple of years ago. In particular, in addition to the previously studied languages, he decides to investigate the languages the MONIKA GrUBER structure of which cannot be brought into harmony with the principles of the theory of semantical categories.