FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DESK
All members of CCSS join in to express their condolences for the sad demise of Shri Naresh Chandra, Patron and Maj Gen RK Malhotra, an active member of the Editorial Board of Chanakya. May God take them in his shelter. The Journal this time focuses on India's domestic scene and in particular, examines the importance of law & order and the police in the maintenance of internal security. Cross-border terrorism, Kashmir, Maoism, North-East, communal conflicts and regional discords are amongst the problem areas presently challenging the national and state security agencies. India's external and internal threats to security have a cause and effect relationship that makes it all the more important that the Centre-State coordination mechanisms work at the highest level of efficiency and unity of purpose. Police is often the first responder in dealing with a threat on the ground and this is reason enough for the states to acknowledge the enlarged role of the State Police that goes beyond the maintenance of law & order to the safeguarding of national security itself and to abide by the professional guidance coming in from the central security set up. The opening article, from the Governor of J & K, emphasises the need for the Centre to find ways and means of strengthening its oversight on the performance of the State Police. The problem in Kashmir is inextricably linked with cross-border terrorism, doings of the agents of Pakistan in the State and India's foreign policy challenge in relation to a hostile neighbour. The write up on North-East, from a former DG Assam Rifles, suggests that it was not necessary to put up with 'more of the same' there since the insurgent groups were no longer driven by the cause that had set off their movements originally and since the Government of India was now in a strong position to put the region on the path of sustainable development and peace. In an incisive scan of the external security environ, a write up from a former Commandant National Defence College describes the rise of the new threat to India from the Sino-Pak alliance reflected in the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on one hand and the rapid growth of Chinese maritime influence in the Asia-Pacific region, on the other. The CCSS Paper in the Journal highlights the strategic importance of the growing Indo-US convergence on the threat of Islamic terror, for India. The Journal is expanding its readership amongst strategic analysts, institutions and universities as well as those directly or indirectly concerned with policy making in the area of national security - judging from the responses received from many of them. Chanakya will endeavour to expand the arc of contributions and enrich the content across the spectrum. DC Pathak Former Director Intelligence Bureau President Editorial Board
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COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE MARCH 2017 ISSUE OF CHANAKYA JOURNAL OF CCSS
“This Journal is an excellent piece of work and the High Commission would certainly use it as a point of reference.”
HE Mr Syed Muazzem Ali High Commissioner of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
“All the articles of this journal are highly informative and thought provoking as they have been written by experts on that particular field.
Shri Keshari Nath Tripathi Hon’ble Governor of West Bengal
“The March 2017 provides a comprehensive analysis of a wide range of contemporary subjects that would be of immense value to the policy makers and strategic analysts.”
Admiral Sunil Lanba PVSM, AVSM, ADC Chief of the Naval Staff
I find it extremely useful and topical. The seal of professionalism is noticeable in each article which is of very high quality.
AB Mathur, IPS (R) Member, NSAB
“The Journal consists of interesting and policy-oriented contributions by well-known strategic experts on topical issues and is being shared with our scholars.”
Shri Jayant Prasad DG, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses
“Topics are contemporary and contents so very enriching.”
Lt Gen Vinod Vashisht AVSM, VSM**, ADC DG, NCC & Senior Colonel Commandant Regiment of Artillery
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Lt Gen BS Nagal PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd) Centre for land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
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Lt Gen YVK Mohan SM, VSM Commandant, National Defence College
“I wish to place on record our appreciation for an extremely comprehensive Journal. The articles were extremely well researched and contemporary which, considering the luminaries who authored them, was not surprising.”
Maj Gen Neeraj Kapur Commandant, HQrs Armoured Corps Centre & School
2 CONTENTS
1 From the President’s Desk Sh DC Pathak 1 2 Editorial Dr SD Pradhan 4 3 List of Contributors 8 4 Internal Security Management: NN Vohra 11 the need for closer Centre-State understandings 5 Moving towards crime control Divakar Prasad 23 through investigation 6 Confronting internal security Lt Gen Kamal Davar (Retd) 34 challenges 7 State Police: need to enhance their Dr SD Pradhan 42 capabilities for preventive operations 8 Dealing with radicalisation in J&K Kapil Kaul 55 9 Internal Security: challenges for India Late Maj Gen RK Malhotra 67 (Retd) 10 North-East Conundrum: look East or Lt Gen Rameshwar Roy 74 act East? (Retd) 11 China - Pakistan economic V Adm P Kaushiva (Retd) 84 corridor 12 Situation in Kashmir - likelihood Maj Gen P K Chakravorty 99 of shift from sub conventional (Retd) operations to conventional conflict 13 Significance of Cyber Security for Vishal Verma 104 Indian Economy 14 J&K situation: requires firm handling Dr SD Pradhan 108 15 CCSS Paper Sh DC Pathak 115 16 Book Review Dr SD Pradhan 120 17 Book Review Dr Rakesh Datta 124 18 Book Review Dr Rakesh Datta 127 19 CCSS Organisation 131
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EDITORIAL
During the period under review,India’s interaction with a number of countries at the highest level from Eurasia, US, Japan and Australia as also neighbouring countries, underlines that India is not only pursuing an energetic foreign policy but has also become more decisive in overcoming the historic hesitation. Modi’s foreign policy is guided by pragmatism with clearly defined national interests in terms of economic growth and strengthening of security of the country along with stress on cooperation, co-existence and partnership in international arena.
Modi played host to a slew of leaders including the PMs of Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Australia besides the Presidents of Nepal, Cyprus and Turkey. His visits included Sri Lanka, Germany, Spain, Russia, Kazakhstan and the US. In the Second Raisina Dialogue (an annual conference on geo-politics and geo-economics organised since 2016 by MEA and was attended by delegates from 65 countries), Modi explained clearly the differences with China and explained India’s close partnership with US, Russia and Japan for the maintenance of stable security environment. He also pointed out India’s commitment to the vision for a “peaceful and harmonious” South Asia.
Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in May 2017 was aimed at furthering cultural connect with that country in line with India’s declared policy of “Neighbourhood First” that gives priority to building stronger ties with its neighbourhood. He went to participate in the celebrations marking the UN Vesak Day, the most important day in the Buddhist calendar, which commemorates Lord Buddha’s birth, enlightenment and passing away. Four bilateral pacts were also signed – agreement on visa, customs, youth development and building Rabindranath Tagore Memorial. He also promised to help in developing Trincomalee as a petroleum hub and announced a fresh Line of Credit up to USD 138 million for the railway sector in that country.
Later, towards the end of May 2017, Modi went on a tour to four countries. In Germany, setting a roadmap for the bilateral strategic ties between India and Germany, Modi opened the fourth India-Germany Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin. India and Germany signed 8 deals, agreeing to cooperate in multiple sectors and exchange knowledge. In a joint press conference, Modi and Merkel addressed concerns related to the growing menace of terrorism and climate change. They spoke about increasing bilateral and economic ties between the two nations, which has already seen a ‘quantum’ jump. Germany is a valuable partner for India both at bilateral and international level and to create a broad coalition of ''middle powers''. Germany and India are on same wave length concerning China’s neo-colonial ‘Belt Road Initiative’.
Modi’s next stop was Spain. He was the first Indian PM since 1988 to
4 Chanakya Journal of CCSS visit this country. Spain is the seventh largest trading partner in European Union. Two way trade totalled USD 5.27 billion in 2016. Seven agreements were signed between the two countries, including on cyber security, technical cooperation in civil aviation, transfer of sentenced persons, visa waiver for diplomatic passport holders, organ transplantation, renewable energy and cooperation between Indian Foreign Service Institute and Diplomatic Academy of Spain. Indian PM Modi and Spanish President, Mariano Rajoy, stressed the importance of resolving the disputes in the strategic South China Sea in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law. The two leaders reiterated their commitment to the freedom of navigation and over flight and unimpeded commerce based on the principles of international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Modi on his third leg of his tour visited Russia. In Russia, he attended the annual bilateral summit, combined with the 21st St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 1-3, which is Russia’s premier economic conference for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a grouping of nine of the 15 former Soviet republics. India and Russia concluded a much-awaited pact for setting up the last two units of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant with Moscow’s help. The reactors will be built by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and Russia’s JSC Atomstroyexport, a subsidiary of Rosatom, the regulatory body of the Russian nuclear complex. Each of the two units will have a capacity to produce 1,000 megawatt (MW) of power. A joint statement noted that the economies of India and Russia complemented each other in the energy sector and both countries will strive to build an “energy bridge”. It said the future of Indian-Russian cooperation holds great promise across a wide spectrum covering nuclear power, nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear science and technology. It may be mentioned that Modi's visit to Russia took place at a time when there are growing concerns in India over Moscow's newfound closeness to China and Pakistan. The average Indian citizen, long accustomed to Russia standing by India and against Pakistan, finds its recent overtures to Pakistan hard to digest. The China-Russia-Pakistan growing consensus on Afghanistan is a source for concern for India as it could change the strategic balance of the region.
Modi’s next stop was France. France and India have close relationship. The strategic relationship has centred around three crucial areas: nuclear, space and defence. Soon after the India-specific waiver was granted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 to engage in civil nuclear trade, France was the first country to sign a civil nuclear agreement with India, even before the US Senate had approved the India-US nuclear agreement. Bilateral ties between India and France have grown steadily: from €5.13 billion in 2006 to €8.5 billion in 2015. France is the ninth largest foreign investor in India.
Modi’s US visit was watched with great interest and expectations. While
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Modi stated that there was a perfect meeting of minds between Trump and him, on certain issues differences remained. On the positive side, Syed Salahuddin was designated as a global terrorist by the US State Department, Pakistan was asked to ensure that its territory was not used for launching attacks on other countries, both the countries resolved to strengthen cooperation to fight terrorism, India ordered purchase of 100 aircraft from Boeing and the prospect of a long-term $40 billion LNG deal improved. However, the differences were clear on Pakistan and China. Pakistan was not termed as the sponsor of terrorism as Indians would have wanted though in the annual Country Report on terrorism, Pakistan was listed among the nations providing safe havens to terrorists and that US was reducing aid to Pakistan. And on the Indo-Pacific region the language was much softer than earlier times. These reflect US compulsions and desire to not to upset its relations with China. This reflects while US wants closer friendship with India, US does not appear to leave Pakistan and would like to keep China playing with it to deal with North Korea. India would require to keep these factors into calculus while dealing with US.
The most publicised visit of Modi was to Israel in July 2017. This was considered important as he became the first Indian PM to visit that country. The India-Israel relationship was elevated to the ‘strategic partnership’. In addition, seven agreements were signed indicating the broadening of the relationship. During Modi's visit, the two countries signed agreements focusing on water, agriculture and space, and established a $40 million fund for research and development projects. Earlier, the Israeli Government passed a 280 million shekel ($79.3 million) budget to promote exports to India. Crucially, this also reflected India’s decision to de- hyphenate Israel with Palestinian issue.
Chinese incursions at the border continue. At the tri-junction of Tibet-Bhutan- India, the Chinese troops destroyed the Indian bunkers. India in coordination with Bhutan had asked a Chinese construction party to “desist from changing the status quo” by building a road in Donglangor Doklamarea. The Chinese reactions led to a dangerous confrontation and the Mansarover Yatra through the Nathu La Pass was cancelled. The Chinese move to unilaterally change the status quo at the tri- junction was in violation of the 2012 India-China Agreement to finalise the boundary in this region in consultation with all concerned countries. While Chinese spokesman justified the act of the Chinese company, Bhutan’s ambassador to India, Major- General V Namgyal exposed the Chinese lies. He told The Hindu that “the road construction by the Chinese Army was ‘progressing toward’ a camp of the Royal Bhutan Army at Zom Pelri” and that his government had asked the Chinese side that this construction “is not in keeping with the agreements between China and Bhutan [on resolution of their boundary].” He added that Bhutan has asked China to “stop and refrain from changing the status quo.” This act has strategic intent as is clear from the Chinese plan “to build a 'Class-40 road' in the Doklam plateau that can take the weight of military vehicles weighing up to 40 tonnes, which include light battle
6 Chanakya Journal of CCSS tanks, artillery guns and the like." This area overlooks the strategic Chumbi Valley. China is also upset with India’s stance on “One Belt, One Road” plan. The use of muscular approach by China is not new. It is doing this also in the South China Sea. It has adopted the ‘salami tactics’ to acquire more and more areas. The statement of President Xi on the 1st August 2017 that China will not allow ‘to split any part of its territory’ was meant to convey to India that it will stick to its own perception of Sino-Indian border. Of late, the use of Chinese official media to criticise and threaten India has increased significantly. India has to take well-calculated steps to counter sinister designs of China, including a fresh look at the Tibet policy.
Pakistan’s border attacks along with large-scale use of terrorists to attack the security forces continued unabated. Pakistan has full support of China and therefore, the challenge is not only from one country but from two countries who are conspiring against India. The Chief Minister of J&K has pointed out in plain words that now China is also involved in creating problems in the State. This requires much bolder steps to deal with the growing challenges.
The internal security situation particularly in J&K remained worrisome. The infiltration attempts, stone pelting incidents and attacks on police personnel continue unabated and the pro-azadi slogans have become shriller and louder. The protesters under instigation are not only throwing stones on our security forces personnel but are also thrashing and lynching them publically. A senior police officer was lynched near the Jama Masjid in Srinagar with the instigation provided by separatists. A SHO was also killed. The targeting the police and army personnel reflects the increasing audacity of terrorists and their supporters. This demands firm handling of the situation. The action against separatists must ensure their adequate punishment to deter others from indulging in these activities against the State. Some important hard core terrorists have been neutralised based on specific intelligence. It should be further intensified. The arrest of Hurriyat leaders and their supporter facilitating financially the stone pelters is the step in the right direction. The incidents of violence in the Valley confirm the view that unless Pakistan is dealt with appropriately, peace and normalcy cannot be achieved there. Hence, all efforts to raise the cost of Pak activities to unbearable level should be made. In this proxy war, the decisive point is foiling all attempts of Pakistan to create problems in J&K with the support of terrorists and separatists and this factor must be kept in our calculus while formulating a counter-strategy. Pragmatism demands that Pakistan’s capabilities for such nefarious activities should be weakened through a combination of conventional and unconventional means.
Dr SD Pradhan Former Deputy National Security Advisor Chief Editor
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Shri DC Pathak, IPS (Retd) is the President of the CCSS Editorial Board and member, CCSS Board of Management. He is the former Director IB; Chairman Joint Intelligence Committee and member of the National Security Advisory Board. He has extensively travelled abroad and has authored four books on intelligence and security issues, which were well received in both professional as well as academic circles. He writes regularly on matters of strategic interest.
Dr SD Pradhan is the Chief Editor and the Director General of the CCSS. He is the former Deputy National Security Adviser and Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. He was the Chairman of Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus (2008-2010) that reviewed the functioning of all the intelligence agencies in the country. He is the Advisor, E-Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujrat Technological University, Ahmedabad and a member of Board of Studies, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has written two books on World War I and had contributed several chapters in the official history of 1971 Indo-Pak War and authored the official history of the Role of Indian Army in the Counter Insurgency Operations. He regularly writes on strategic and intelligence issues.
Shri NN Vohra is the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir since 2008. He has served as the Defence Secretary (1990-1993), Principal Secretary to Prime Minister IK Gujral (1997-98) and was a member of the National Security Advisory Board (1998-2001). He also headed the National Task Force on Internal Security and co-chaired the India-European Union Round Table in 2001. In between, he also served as director of the India International Centre and was Chairman of the IDSA review committee. He had been the interlocutor in Jammu & Kashmir (2003-2008). He was awarded the Padma Vibhushan in 2007.
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Shri Divakar Prasad is a distinguished 1968 batch IPS Officer, who has varied experience of State Police in three States viz. Delhi, Nagaland and Himachal Pradesh as also in several organisations at the Centre. In Himachal Pradesh he served as the Director General. He had worked on senior positions in CBI for more than a decade. He supervised counter terrorism operations in Nagaland and J&K. He commanded ITBP and contributed to its expansion. He also worked in BPR&D and in Intelligence Bureau as Additional Director. He retired as the Director General of Sashashtra Seema Bal.
Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is one of India’s distinguished soldiers and military thinkers. He was wounded in action in the 1965 operations and had also participated in the 1971 war. He commanded the Ladakh Division, was Chief of Staff of a Corps HQ in Kashmir. Later, he was a Corps Commander responsible for the defence of Punjab, after a short stint as DG Mechanised Forces. After the Kargil war, he was appointed the first Chief of Defence Intelligence Agency and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He is a prolific writer and is called upon by various institutions, both at home and abroad, to address them on strategic and security issues.
Shri Kapil Kaul is a researcher and writer on international security issues, including military capabilities, arms transfers and weapons development. The focus of his research and specialization are political and security issues in the Middle East, Iran, Pakistan and Kashmir. He has several publications to his credit. He had earlier served as the Assistant Editor of Vayu Aerospace Review, Researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and as Deputy Director at the National Security Council Secretariat.
Late Maj Gen R K Malhotra AVSM, VSM (Retd) was the Secretary of the CCSS Advisory Council. He was also the Head of the Research Division & Secretary of the Governing Body of the CCSS Regional Research Studies Wing. Earlier, he had served as a Joint Secretary in the NSCS. He was an acknowledged security analyst and wrote regularly on strategic and defence issues. He suddenly expired on 16th June 2017. The article contributed by him is being published posthumously.
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Lt Gen Rameshwar Roy UYSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd) is Former GOC 16 Corps and the Director General of Assam Rifles. Earlier, he was the Chief of Staff of the Southern Command and Director General Staff Duties at Army HQ. He holds two post graduate and two M Phil degrees. Presently, he is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.
V Adm Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (Retd) is a member of the CCSS Editorial Board. He is the former Commandant, National Defence College and Director, National Maritime Foundation. He had earlier served as the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. He is a prolific writer and contributes articles on strategic affairs and maritime security issues in various newspapers and journals.
Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (Retd) served in the Indian Army in various appointments for 38 yrs. As the Defence Attaché at the Embassy of India in Hanoi, Vietnam, he was monitoring the Chinese military activities and was providing insightful analyses. Later, he served as the Additional Director General of Artillery, at the Army Headquarters. He is academically inclined with an inherent flair for research. He is an independent researcher, an acclaimed writer and an active participant in contemporary seminars.
Shri Vishal Verma is a member on the non-profit boards of Trustees and Directors for the University of California at Merced (Merced, California) and One Economy (Washington DC). He is also a member of the US-India Cyber Security Track 1.5 Dialogue hosted by the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and Observer Research Foundation (ORF), besides being a member of the Society of Fellows at the Aspen Institute. He holds a BS degree in Marketing from Santa Clara University and a Masters of Business Administration in Finance from the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business.
Dr Rakesh Datta is the Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University. He is also the Chairman of the Governing Body of the CCSS Regional Research Studies Wing. He is a former member of the National Security Advisory Board. He has written several research papers and three books and various projects on Mercantilism and India’s Maritime Interest.
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NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT: THE NEED FOR CLOSER CENTRE-STATE UNDERSTANDINGS* NN Vohra
Introduction
The security challenges facing India have assumed a worrying dimension because of the threats from across its frontiers as well as from within. India’s security environment has been progressively coming under threat on account of varied factors which include emergence of nuclear weapon States; Pakistan’s continuing proxy war in J&K; cross border terrorism; spread of Islamic fundamentalism; growing role of non-State actors; narcotics-arms nexus; illegal immigration; Left Wing Extremism, et al. Amidst these worrying developments, the capacity of the traditional security management apparatus to meet the arising security challenges has been coming under growing stress.
Problems relating to the management of internal security arise on account of varied factors: our geography, past history, burgeoning population, inadequacies of governance, poverty, disparate economic development, socio-economic disparities, and vastly varying socio-cultural and religious traditions. Geo-political developments at the regional and global levels also impact India’s security concerns.
It would do well to remember that our national security management apparatus has to reckon with over 15,000 kms of land borders, a coast line of about 7,500 kms, over 600 island territories and an Exclusive Economic Zone of about 25 lakh sq kms. We have land frontiers with six countries and maritime borders with five countries. Our island territories in the East, 1,300 kms away from our mainland, are far closer to our ASEAN neighbours! These awesome parameters apart, the extremely difficult geographical and climatic conditions which obtain in different regions of our vast country present serious challenges to our security forces which maintain a constant vigil on our frontiers.
In the foregoing context, it is needless to stress that there is urgent need for the Union Government to evolve a well-considered National Security Policy after close consultations with the States. This should be followed by putting in place a modern and well-coordinated security management system which has the capability of promptly negating any rising challenge to the unity, integrity and territorial security of our country.
*This writing is a summarised version of articles and lectures delivered by the author.
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Concept of ‘National Security’
The full implications of safeguarding the country’s security have not been adequately recognised in the past decades. In certain quarters it has been conveniently understood to mean the possession of “adequate military might for defending the nation”. However, as history has shown, mere military strength cannot guarantee the preservation of national sovereignty.
For the purpose of discussion, National Security may be defined to comprise external security, which relates to safeguarding the country against war and external aggression and internal security which relates to the maintenance of public order and normalcy and safeguarding the safety and security of the citizenry.
The first generation of India’s security analysts, who focused attention almost entirely on issues relating to external security, had found it convenient to segregate issues relating to external and internal security. However, such a sectoral approach is no longer feasible, particularly after the advent of terrorism which has introduced extremely frightening elements in the national security environment. I would go further to say that issues of internal and external security management have been inextricably intertwined ever since Pakistan launched a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s and Pakistan supported Jihadi terrorists started establishing networks in our country.
In the past decades our national security interests have also been considerably affected by geo-political developments in our immediate neighbourhood and even those further beyond. In the context of the experience gained, it is extremely important that, side by side, all necessary steps being taken for safeguarding India’s territorial security and a strong machinery being established to counter terrorism, well planned attention is also devoted for effectively securing other important arenas, particularly those relating to food, water, environment and ecology, science and technology, energy, nuclear power, economy, cyber security, et al.
In the past years, serious security challenges have emanated from Pakistan’s continuing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir; Jihadi terrorism, which has been progressively spreading its reach; the destructive activities which the Left Wing Extremist groups have been carrying out for decades now; the serious unrest created by the still active insurgencies in the North-East region and incidents of serious communal violence which have been time and again erupting in the States. Mention must also be made of the steadily growing activities of the Indian Mujahidin (IM), a terror group which has its roots in Pakistan. Another phenomenon, relatively of more recent origin, relates to the emergence of varied radical counter-groups which have been organised with the primary objective of combating the Jihadi terror networks. It needs being noted that the activities of such counter groups carry the
12 Chanakya Journal of CCSS risk of spreading disharmony and triggering divisiveness which could generate wide spread communal violence and result in irreparably damaging the secular fabric of our democracy.
Even after Operation Blue Star and the extended period of militancy which followed in Punjab, the Pak ISI has not given up its attempts to resurrect Sikh militancy by supporting the establishment of terror modules from among youth in the Sikh Diaspora. The ISI has also been recurringly pressurising Sikh militant groups to join hands with the Kashmir-centric militant outfits to establish a joint front.
The activities of the Left Wing Extremist groups, which have been continuing their armed struggle for the past several decades to capture political power, continue to pose a serious internal security challenge. While there may have been a marginal decline in the scale of incidents and the number of killings in the past years, the Naxalite groups have been continuing their gruesome attacks on the Security Forces.
India’s hinterland continues to remain the prime focus of Pakistan based terror groups, particularly LeT and IM. In the past years, indigenous groups comprising elements of SIMI and AL-UMMAH have perpetrated violent incidents in the country. Notwithstanding its frequent denials, Pakistan remains steadfastly committed to harbouring anti-India terror groups on its soil.
Need for National Security Policy
In the context of our growing security problems, it would be useful to examine the reasons for our failure to frame an appropriate national security policy and establishing pan-India institutions which are capable of effectively meeting all arising threats. In this context, it has to be remembered that, as provided by our Constitution, it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
In the decades past, the country has had to encounter external aggression on several occasions and no issues have arisen about the Union’s responsibility to protect the States against war. However, insofar as the Union’s duty to protect every State against internal disturbance is concerned, the States have not so far wholeheartedly accepted the Union Government’s responsibility to enact and enforce pan-India laws for dealing with terror acts, cyber offences and other major crimes which have country wide ramifications. In challenging the Union Government’s authority to establish the required pan-India security management agencies it has been often argued that the “Centre has no basis for interfering in this arena as it is the constitutional prerogative of the States to manage law and order within their territories”.
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Undoubtedly, the States are constitutionally mandated to make all required laws in regard to Police and Public Order, take all necessary executive decisions, establish adequate police organisations and manage appropriate security management systems for effectively maintaining law and order within their territories. However, looking back over the serious law and order situations which the country has recurringly faced in the past seven decades, it cannot be truly asserted that there have been no failures and that the States have maintained a sustained record of successfully ensuring against any breach in the maintenance of peace and security within their realms.
On the contrary, in the past decades, there have been innumerable occasions when the States have failed to timely deal with disturbances arising in their jurisdictions. This is perhaps due to the reason, inter-alia, that the States have not devoted continuing adequate care to raise, train and maintain Intelligence and Police organisations in sufficient strength for securing effective internal security management. Also, there have been occasions when the States have displayed the lack of political will to deal with a developing situation on their own. Consequently, a practice has evolved over time for the affected State rushing to the Union Home Ministry and seeking “urgent deployment of Central Armed Police Forces for restoring normalcy” in the disturbed area.
Under Article 256 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union extends to giving such directions to a State as the Government of India may consider necessary. However, in the past years, the Union Home Ministry has followed the approach of merely issuing cautionary notes and not directives, in regard to an emerging internal security situation which could perhaps spread to other neighbouring States. This approach, of only issuing “advisories” to the concerned State Governments, has not proved effective. Resultantly, in the past years, varied kinds of internal disturbances have continued to occur in different parts of the country, some of which have resulted in large scale human, economic and other losses.
Considering the gravity of the progressively increasing security threats and also bearing in mind the constitutional prescription that it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against internal disturbance, it is important that the Central Government loses no further time in holding consultations with the States for urgently finalising the National Security Policy and putting in place the legal and administrative mechanisms for its effective implementation. The National Security Policy, evolved in consultation with the States, must leave no doubt whatsoever about the role and authority of the Union and State Governments for taking all necessary steps to pre- empt or prevent any arising disturbance, anywhere in the country. In this context, it would do well to recall that in the past decades the Government of India has not succeeded in unilaterally deploying Central Armed Police Forces for protecting even its own assets which are located in the various States!
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State Police
A major factor which has adversely affected internal security management relates to the decline in the professionalism of the State police forces, which has taken place because of the day to day political interference in the functioning of the constabularies. Such interference has adversely affected the internal discipline, morale and the very integrity of the police organisations.
In the Report of the Task Force on the Internal Security (2000)* - established in the wake of the Kargil Conflict - I had stressed the urgent need for modernising and improving the capabilities of the State police organisations which are the first responders and the prime instruments for maintaining public order. As experience has shown, the failures of the police erode effective governance and also embolden criminal elements to carry out their unlawful activities with impunity. Thus, there is urgent need to restore the fitness, capacity and morale of the State police forces. Towards this objective, it would be necessary to ensure transparent recruitment and promotion procedures, enforcement of well-planned training programmes and provision of satisfactory living and working conditions. The police forces have also to be adequately sensitised to the dictates of functioning within a democratic framework. The exercise to modernise the police apparatus and to improve its public image requires to be implemented without any further delay whatsoever.
The States also need to urgently get to work for enlarging and upgrading their Intelligence, Police and Security administration systems. In this context, it is a matter for serious concern that in almost every State and Union Territory the annual financial allocations for Police comprise an extremely low percentage of the total budgeted expenditures. The scale of these allocations requires to be very significantly enhanced, particularly keeping in mind that about 80% ofthe annual State Police budgets go towards meeting the salaries and pensions of the constabularies and virtually no funds remain for undertaking any expansion or modernisation programmes. Time bound action also requires to be taken for ensuring that the sanctioned posts of police personnel, several lakhs of which continue to remain vacant for years in the States and Union Territories, are filled on a time bound basis.
It also needs to be recognised that the ailments from which the State police forces have been suffering, for decades now, shall not get cured merely by providing larger budgetary allocations for their expansion and modernisation. It is extremely important to ensure, side by side, that Police Reforms, which have now been pending for decades, are executed without any further delay.
It is a matter for grave concern that after nearly seven decades since
*hereinafter referred to as the Internal Security Report.
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Independence the police organisations in many States are still functioning under the colonial Police Act of 1861. Most States have also not taken the required steps to implement the Supreme Court’s orders (Prakash Singh & Others v/s Union of India) regarding: establishment of Police Complaint Authorities and State Security Commissions; segregation of Law and Order and Investigation Functions; setting up of separate Intelligence and Anti-Terrorist Units and taking varied other actions for establishing modern and accountable police forces which would enable the effective functioning of the security management apparatus. In the long list of matters relating to Police Reforms, the highest priority needs to be given to fully restoring the élan, morale and internal discipline, which are vital elements of the uniformed forces professionalism. Alongside, it must also be ensured that the best and most experienced officers of proven integrity are selected for appointment as State Director Generals of Police and provided assured tenures. After appointing the best available officers to key positions, from the district level upwards, the political executive must ensure against any interference or extraneous influence being exerted on the functioning of the police organisations.
Since the early 1990s the Union Home Ministry has been providing annual grants to the States for the modernisation of their police forces. Regrettably, these Central grants have not been matched by the State Governments, as per the initial understandings. Even in this limited context, it is urgently important that a national security management policy is promulgated to clearly delineate the respective roles and responsibilities of the Union and State Governments in regard to the continuous strengthening and modernisation of the State police forces. However, till the proposed National Security Policy is promulgated it would be relevant to note that, whenever called upon to do so, the Government of India has been continuing to assist the States by deploying Central Armed Police Forces and even the Indian Army, for restoring normalcy in the disturbed areas.
Functioning of NIA
The National Investigation Agency (NIA), set up under the National Investigation Agency Act (2008), has been established with the prime objective of investigating and prosecuting offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India. While NIA has been performing a progressively beneficial role since its establishment I would say, on the basis of my experience, that this Agency shall become a truly crucial instrument only when all the States provide full and prompt support to its functioning.
It is regrettable that the States have continued to oppose NIA taking over cases of serious offences right from the very dates of their occurrences. In many cases, NIA is able to take over important cases only after prolonged delays and in some cases well after the State police have filed charge-sheets! An utterly
16 Chanakya Journal of CCSS inexcusable example is that of the terror attack on Police Station Dina Nagar (Punjab) on 27th July 2015. In my view, if this case had been promptly handed over to NIA, there was every possibility that the cross-IB infiltration routes would have been identified and the Pak terror groups may perhaps never have succeeded in attacking the Pathankot Air Base on 2nd January 2016.
NIA has no extra-territorial jurisdiction and no powers to probe incidents which occur outside India, as for example the militant attack on the Consulate of India in Herat. Director NIA does not even have the power - which is enjoyed by the State Director Generals of Police - to permit an Investigating Officer dealing with a terror crime to seize or attach property. Also, unlike as in the case of the CBI, the NIA is not empowered to depute its Investigating Officers abroad for direct interactions with a foreign agency which is investigating a major terror act which directly or indirectly affects our national security interests.
In the foregoing context, the Union Home Ministry would do well to strictly enforce the statutory provision for every State to promptly report to the Government of India the commission of any Scheduled Offence. Side by side, the Union Home Ministry should, whenever necessary, suo-moto direct the NIA to investigate a Scheduled Offence. It is also important that the States ensure against any impediment whatsoever coming in the way of NIA’s investigations, even if a particular case has still to be formally taken over by this Agency.
The Union Home Ministry should also take urgent steps to ensure that NIA’s legal framework is suitably modified to enable effective investigations in terror cases. The existing Schedule to the NIA Act also requires to be reviewed for enlarging the list of offences to particularly cover, among others, those under the Ranbir Penal Code, Arms Act, NDPS Act, Explosive Substances Act and Cyber terrorism offences. Attention also needs to be given to upgrade and enhance powers and techniques for undertaking special investigations and rationalizing the obtaining systems and procedures for the establishment of Special Courts, completion of trials within envisaged time frames, et al.
National Counter Terrorism Centre
There have been recurring pronouncements that the Central Government is setting up the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to deal with terrorism and matters relating thereto. Considerable time has since elapsed and several States, which have been opposed to the establishment of NCTC in its present form, have suggested that the proposed framework of this body should be entirely revised in consultation with the States. Some other States have taken the position that NCTC should not be established through an executive order but through a law enacted by the Parliament and that it should function under the administrative control of the
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Union Home Ministry instead of under the Intelligence Bureau. As terror acts and other federal offences cannot be dealt with by the existing security management apparatus, it is of crucial importance that the Government of India holds urgent discussions with the Chief Ministers to resolve all doubts and issues which may have been raised by the State Governments.
For commencing a purposeful dialogue with the States, with the objective of securing the requisite Centre-State understandings in the arena of national security management, the Union Home Ministry would do well to utilise the still well regarded aegis of the Inter State Council, of which the Prime Minister is the chairperson.
For progressively enhancing meaningful Centre-State relations in regard to national security management it would be useful for the Union Government to also consider various possible initiatives for promoting enhanced trust and mutual understandings between New Delhi and the State capitals. Towards this objective, to begin with, the Government of India could consider inducting representatives of the States in the National Security Advisory Board and the National Security Council, even if this is to be done on a rotational basis. The Union Government could also consider setting up one or more Empowered Committees of Home Ministers of States to discuss and evolve pragmatic solutions to various important security related issues, including the long pending proposal to set up the National Counter Terrorism Centre. Such an approach, of evolving agreed approaches through close consultations with the States, was very successfully followed recently for the GST legal framework being enforced on pan-India basis.
Some of the doubts voiced by the States about the management of security related issues arise from the style of functioning of institutions which have been exclusively controlled by the Union Government, right from their inception. In this background, perhaps a more productive approach could be for certain important security related institutions being run jointly by the Government of India and the States. An excellent example in this regard is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) which was established by USA in the aftermath of 9/11. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces located in various cities across the USA include representatives from the Federal, State and Municipal enforcement agencies and perform several important roles, including the clearing of all terrorism related information. Over time, functioning through joint institutions will enable the States to gain a better informed pan-India perspective of the highly complex issues which concern national security management and in this process, also erode their perennial complaint against the Government of India “interfering with the powers of the States in the arena of internal security management”.
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Criminal Justice
It is necessary to recognise that national security cannot be safeguarded unless the entire apparatus of the criminal justice system discharges its duties with competence, speed, fairness and complete transparency. As reported from time to time, there are crores of criminal cases under the Indian Penal Code and Special Laws which continue to await trials for years and years. This sad state of neglect, accompanied by progressively declining conviction rates, has rightly generated the perception that crime is a low risk and high profit business in India!
The functioning of the judicial apparatus, particularly at the lower and middle levels, suffers from serious logistical deficiencies - grossly insufficient number of courts and judges, prolonged delays in filling up long continuing vacancies, lack of the required staff and essential facilities in the courts and so on. Questions are also being recurringly raised about the competence and integrity of those manning the judicial system and in the recent years, allegations of shameful delinquencies have been made even against those who man the highest echelons in the judicial system, up to the august level of the Chief Justice of India!
Needless to stress, the most urgent measures are required to be implemented for enforcing complete objectivity and fairness in the selection and appointment of judicial officers and judges at all levels and stringent steps being taken for enforcing the highest judicial standards and accountability for establishing a clean and strong judicial system which incites fear and respect, among one and all, for the Constitution and the Rule of Law.
It is also necessary to ensure prompt and professional investigations, competent and time-bound trials and award of deterrent punishments to all those found guilty of violating the law. Towards this end, it shall be necessary to create cadres of competent Investigation Officers and Criminal Law Prosecutors and urgently enacting a well-considered pan-India law for dealing with the rapidly increasing economic offences. Drawn up in appropriate consultation with the States, such a comprehensive law should cover the enlarging spectrum of economic and other major offenses, some of which are closely linked with the funding of terror and organised crime networks; very little has so far been done to detect and punish the heinous crimes committed by such networks.
Dealing with corruption
Corruption at various levels, with which the entire governmental machinery is permeated, is another factor which adversely impacts our national security interests. Year in and year out, for decades now, major scams and scandals have been getting exposed and India continues to hold a shamefully high position in the Global Corruption Index.
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It needs to be stressed that corruption vitiates and disrupts the Rule of Law and destroys the very foundations of the administrative and legal apparatus. The prevalence of corrupt practices at various levels generates anger, despair and helplessness among the people at large, compelling them to lose trust in the functioning of the governmental machinery. The loss of hope and cynicism engender an environment which leads to the alienation of the common man and paves the way for support to extremist ideologies and adoption of the gun culture.
As regards the subversion of the governmental machinery from within, it may be recalled that, consequent to the serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in March 1993, the Government of India had set up a Committee to ascertain how Dawood Ibrahim and other mafia elements had been able to establish such powerful networks. The Report of this Committee (generally referred to as “Vohra Committee Report” or the “Criminal Nexus Report”) had concluded that, in several parts of the country where crime syndicates/mafia groups have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with government functionaries, political leaders and others, the unlawful elements have been able to carry out their criminal activities with ease and impunity.
Many years have elapsed since the Criminal Nexus Report was prepared. While I am unaware of the action taken on this Report, it is a matter for concern that the criminal nexus has since spread its tentacles far and wide and today, poses a serious threat to national security.
Need for specialised security management cadre
The national security apparatus cannot function effectively unless it is manned by appropriately qualified, highly trained and trustworthy functionaries. It is, therefore, extremely important that well planned steps are taken for urgently establishing a cadre of officers, selected on an all India competitive basis, who are provided the best available training in identified areas of expertise and deployed to man the security management apparatus all over the country.
A proposal to set up a dedicated pool of trained officers, drawn from various streams, who would spend their entire careers in the security management arena, was made by me in the earlier mentioned Internal Security Report (2000), which had recommended the broad framework for raising such a cadre to man the security management apparatus throughout the country. This recommendation was approved in 2001 by a Group of Ministers chaired by the then Union Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Sixteen years have since elapsed. The decision of the Group of Ministers has not been implemented, possibly for no better reason than that this matter has not been considered important enough!
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Conclusion
I would like to conclude by briefly reiterating that:
a) In the past nearly three decades the security environment in India’s neighbourhood and beyond, has been progressively deteriorating. Grave consequences may have to be faced if there is any further delay in effectively revamping and tightening the security management apparatus all over the country. This apparatus cannot continue to be run by functionaries of varied backgrounds who are drawn from one or the other cadre on purely ad-hoc basis. To make up for the time which has already been lost, the Union Government should take the bold step of establishing a National Security Administrative Service whose members, selected on competitive basis from among the best available in the country, are imparted intensive training in specialised areas (at home and abroad) before being deployed to run the security management system all over the country.
b) We can no longer afford to follow disparate approaches and continue to deal sectorally with problems of internal and external security management as the same have been inextricably intertwined for the past many years now. I would reiterate the urgent need to formulate the National Security Policy and time bound steps being taken to establish an institutional framework which is responsible for: (i) ensuring the efficient implementation of each and every decision relating to national security; (ii) undertaking constant monitoring of situations emerging on various identified fronts; (iii) evolving dynamic approaches which harmonise the respective mandates of the various Central ministries and agencies concerned with security management as also the issues which may be raised by the States.
c) If the sovereignty, unity and integrity of our country is to be preserved it is of crucial importance to urgently establish strong Centre-State understandings in regard to every matter which relates to safeguarding national security. The capability of the Union Government’s agencies to effectively deal with situations caused by grave threats to internal security - which has been seriously eroded over the years - needs to be urgently restored, enlarged and visibly strengthened. I had made certain recommendations in this regard in the Internal Security Report which included revisiting the emergency provisions under Article 352 and 359 and prudently utilising the vast untapped constitutional potential relating to the power of issuing directives to the States, under articles 256 and 257.
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d) Urgent steps being taken for enlarging and upgrading the State Police Forces and ensuring that there is no further delay in the States carrying through the very long delayed Police Reforms.
e) Another important recommendation which had been made by me nearly two decades ago relates to the vital responsibility of the States to take timely and effective steps for meeting the felt needs and grievances of their people. Experience has shown that indifferent responses of the ruling political regimes in the States and their failures to appropriately resolve long pending demands of the people have invariably resulted in triggering disturbances which become endemic. It needs being clearly understood that the failure to address the root causes of internal disturbances cannot be remedied merely through the application of force - by deploying Central Armed Police Forces or even the Indian Army in the disturbed area.
f) The States need to devote sustained attention to the timely, efficient and transparent implementation of various developmental schemes and welfare programmes and promptly ameliorating the difficulties faced by the citizenry, particularly the poor and neglected segments of the society. The politico-administrative apparatus must vigorously carry out its duties to provide satisfactory governance, alongside the security forces carrying out operations to restore normalcy. If the avowed goals of peace, normalcy and equitable growth and development are to be achieved, the States shall have to provide clean and efficient administration which equitably promotes the welfare of one and all. It needs being reiterated that unrests and continuing disturbances arising from maladministration, nepotism and corruption cannot be dealt with merely by “handing over the disturbed areas to the security forces for restoring order”. While the police and security forces carry out the tasks assigned to them, the State remains constitutionally responsible for providing efficient and accountable governance.
(The writer is serving as the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir)
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MOVING TOWARDS CRIME CONTROL THROUGH INVESTIGATION Divakar Prasad
Successes in criminal investigations play a key role in controlling crimes by deterring criminals. Failures in investigations on the other hand, not only embolden criminals to continue with their illegal activities but also amount to denial of justice to victims, which in turn could result in violent social unrest. The specialised criminal investigation process has been aptly described as a battle between the police and the perpetrator over crime related information. If the perpetrator is able to minimize the amount of information made available to the police or if the police are unable to recognize the information left behind, then the perpetrator will remain at large and win the battle. If the police are able to collect a significant number of signals from the perpetrator, then the criminal will be identified and apprehended and the police will achieve victory. Hence the need for enhancing the capabilities for investigation by the police cannot be overestimated. Notwithstanding the fact that technology assists the investigators significantly, the human traits such as common sense, logical reasoning and ability to observe, remain crucial in investigations.
Specialised process of investigation
Investigation, as defined in Section 2 (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 (CrPC),“includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf.”
According to Crime and Information Theory, by M A P Willmer, the criminal investigation process resembles a battle between the police and the perpetrator over crime-related information. In committing the crime, the offender emits "signals" or leaves behind information of various sorts (fingerprints, eyewitness descriptions, murder weapon, etc), which the police attempt to collect through investigative activities. If the perpetrator is able to minimize the amount of information made available for the police to collect or if the police are unable to recognize the information left behind, then the perpetrator will not be apprehended and will win the battle. If the police are able to collect a significant number of signals from the perpetrator, then the perpetrator will be identified and apprehended and the police will win. This perspective clearly underscores the importance of information in a criminal investigation.
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Criminal investigation is an applied science that involves the study of facts, scrutiny of the information left behind by the criminal and collection of evidence that would identify, locate and prove the guilt of an accused so that they latter could be connected with the crime in accordance with the provisions under the CrPC. After evaluation of the admissibility & relevance of evidence gathered under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the final step will be to establish commission of offence and its legal ingredients as laid down under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and/or under the other Local & Special Laws.
Collection and detection of clues and their preservation is done with the help of various scientific aids to investigation like Forensic Science (requiring opinion of the experts of the Biology, Chemistry, Anatomy, fire arms, physical examination experts of Fibres and other substances, etc), examination of Questioned Documents, finger & foot prints, DNA tests, medico-legal experts, brain mapping, narco analysis, polygraph test and various other scientific methods. It is not intended to discuss in thread bare the bricks and mortar of scientific aids to investigation in this article, however suffice it would to add that this knowledge in great detail is imparted to all ranks of the State Police, during their initial training and is updated during in- service training courses. Modestly adequate (thought not ideally sufficient to cope with the volume of crimes) infrastructure & facilities, existing under the State and Central Governments are made available to all investigating agencies including those of States.
It is necessary to emphasise the importance of human factor of Investigating Officers and responsibility of their supervisory officers as well as the needfor restructuring of State Police Forces to improve investigative skills and standards because police investigation of a crime is the first step in delivery of justice. A tardy investigation amounts to denial of justice to the victim of crime and if the criminal is not brought to justice it emboldens him to continue to pursue crime, which sometimes can result in social or communal unrest leading to violence. Such mishandling of investigations is well known and one instance is that of Muzaffarnagar communal riots that occurred in August-September 2013. In this case, the cause of rioting ranged from a traffic accident to an eve-teasing incident and if these events were investigated promptly, effectively, objectively and in accordance with the law, they may not have resulted in the worst kind of violence that occurred there.
An investigator requires a lot of common sense and logical reasoning to crack a crime. Sherlock Holmes, a fictional private detective created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is known for his proficiency with observation, forensic science and logical reasoning that borders on the exceptional and which he employs when investigating cases. Some of the quotes of Holmes can guide Investigating Officers of today in carrying out examination of a scene of crime. “You see but you do not observe. The distinction is clear”; It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has
24 Chanakya Journal of CCSS data as otherwise you will twist facts to suit theories, instead of having theories that suit facts; “Little things are infinitely the most important”; “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains must be the truth” and “Crime is common. Logic is rare. Therefore, it is upon the logic rather than upon the crime that you should dwell.” – These are some of the suitable tips for them.
Some illustrative cases
a) Arushi murder case of Noida (2008). Here the Investigation Officer, after visiting the scene of crime, guessed that the domestic help Hem Raj was the killer of Arushi and he started theorising before he had the data and even before completely searching the scene of crime and the house where the crime was committed. The result was that he failed to detect the dead body of Hem Raj on the roof of that very house in which murder took place.
b) Highway robbery of a bus in District Una, Himachal Pradesh (1980). This is an example of “You see, but you do not observe.” I was Superintendent of Police and on visiting the scene of crime I asked the Investigating Officer about the evidence found on the spot. He presented a magazine of 7.62 calibre SLR rifle and stated that there were no finger prints on it to link them to the perpetrators of crime. He had seen but not observed, because when I examined the bullets inside the magazine I found thumb prints on each bullet which could later lead to identification of the criminals behind this robbery.
c) Bride burning case at Ponta Sahib, District Nahan (1982). A young bride before succumbing to 90% burns had given a dying declaration, recorded by a police Sub Inspector in the presence of a Medical Officer, to the effect that the fire which engulfed her was accidently caused by the stove burst in the kitchen. Her father, however, stated that she had confided to him before dying that she was burnt by her husband and his mother and father. While supervising the investigation as District SP, I had to first eliminate the dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. For this the treatment records were seized and an independent opinion by a freshly constituted medical board was obtained which opined that due to short time span between the heavy sedation injected to the patient and the time of recording of dying declaration, she could not have been in her senses to give any statement. My examination of the scene of occurrence ruled out bursting of stove in the kitchen. A different spot where the victim was burnt was detected and the study of post mortem report established that she was burnt in lying position with her face down. The victim’s face, hair, bottom and groin were not
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burnt and she was not standing in the kitchen. Perpetrators of crime were connected with the crime and after trial were convicted with life imprisonment. Eliminating the impossible helped to reach the truth.
Need for specialised cadre for investigation
If investigation is the first step of delivering justice, then it must get the importance it deserves in the existing police administration. District Police administration headed by a Superintendent of Police comprises of Police Stations under the Station House Officers of the rank of Inspectors or Sub Inspectors and is responsible for prevention & detection of crime, traffic, law & order, VIP arrangements, fair & festival police arrangements and court attendances etc. In the current scenario of increasing crimes and social & communal tensions protests, agitations and bandhs etc which consume most of the time of the officers and other ranks of the District Police, investigation of crimes gets inadequate attention. As a result crime ceases to be in focus. To improve quality and standards of investigation, separation of investigative and law and order functions of the police needs to be given urgent attention.
Government of India had constituted several committees and a Commission on police reforms and working of police in the country. Notable amongst these are the National Police Commission (1977-81), JF Riberio Committee (1998), the Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reforms (2000), the Malimath Committee on Reforms in the Criminal Justice System (2002-03), Review Committee (2004) and an Expert Committee to draft a New Model Police Act (2005). However, as Police is a ‘State Subject’ as per Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the State Governments which have to implement Police reforms did not consider any of these reports seriously. On 22nd Dec 2006, Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh v/s Union of India delivered a historic judgement instructing the Central and State Governments to kick-start police reforms. In its order the Supreme Court issued several directives to give functional autonomy to the police and enhance police accountability. One of the directives was for separation of investigative and law and order functions of the police.
In September 2005, the Ministry of Home Affairs, with the intention of introducing police reforms by replacing the Indian Police Act of 1861, drafted by the Colonial British Government, set up an expert Committee to prepare a new Model Police Act. The Committee submitted a Model Police Act on 30th October 2006. The Model Act emphasized the need to have a professional police ‘service’ in a democratic society, which is efficient, effective and responsive to the needs of the people and is accountable to the Rule of Law. The Model Act recognised the importance of professionally conducted investigation and sought earmarking of dedicated staff for crime investigation as a distinct cadre for Civil police vis-à-
26 Chanakya Journal of CCSS vis Armed Police. The Act laid emphasis on police accountability and called for evaluation of both performance and the conduct of policemen.
A copy of draft Model Police Act framed by the Committee was forwarded to State Governments for consideration and appropriate action and so far 17 States, viz, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himchal Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura & Uttarakhand have either enacted the Police Act or amended the existing Act but creation of a separate dedicated staff for crime investigation as a distinct cadre for civil police, is still a far cry.
A division bench of the Kerala High Court said in a judgment (Crl. A. No. 866/2009) in 2017 - "Established facts unravel a saga tending to destroy the credibility of the investigative machinery by delaying investigation and distorting evidence on unjustifiable reasons. Genuine, committed and timely action on the part of the investigating officer would have earned much more credibility to the police force and it would have been easy to gather reliable evidence without much effort. It is high time for the government to take some concrete action in the matter of separating crime investigation and maintenance of law and order. Investigation of serious crimes entrusted to unskilled and vulnerable to influence police officers will do great amount of disservice to the citizenry."
Investigation of crime requires sustained and focussed efforts by a team of dedicated professional investigators which should be closely monitored, guided and supervised. Success of investigation lies not only in solving the crime and apprehending the culprits but in securing conviction after due process of prosecution and trial. Therefore, investigation has to be in accordance with the legal provisions under the CrPC & the Indian Evidence Act. A complete criminal investigation under the CrPC includes visit to the spot, ascertaining of the facts and circumstances of the case, identification and arrest of the suspected offender, collection of evidence through examination of various persons, recording of their statements wherever appropriate and search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for being produced at the trial. Finally, a decision has to be taken on whether on the material collected, there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so necessary steps initiated for the filing of a charge sheet under Section 173 of CrPC.
Detailed rules & instructions for procedure & documentation of each of the above stated steps of investigation have been framed by respective State Police Departments like the Punjab Police Rules which are applicable in the States of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Haryana. Central Bureau of Investigation has also prepared an exhaustive manual on crime investigation. Investigating officers and supervisory staff follow the manual so that there are no legal lacunae in the investigation which would be detrimental to prosecution case during trial. There may
27 Chanakya Journal of CCSS be a complete Treatise or Compendium containing investigative techniques, scientific aids to investigation, interrogation techniques and other trade crafts required for a scientific and professional investigation but there are some serious concerns about what obstructs the successful conclusion of investigation that would end in conviction.
Confidentiality is required for effective investigation
A trend has developed that as soon as the crime is committed, a running commentary begins on the progress of investigation, what the police had done, what evidence had been collected, who had been arrested and so on and more often than not contradictory statements are made on sound bites given by police officers of various ranks on half baked facts. This is very damaging to investigation because the co-accused not yet apprehended by police may destroy the evidence, may eliminate or influence witnesses whose identity had been compromised and disclosure of investigative techniques could alert other conspirators or abettors of that crime. State police forces shall do well to learn from CBI. It is only after a case is charge sheeted that the CBI issues a press release or does a press briefing.
Cordoning, guarding & preserving the scene of crime
What is happening these days is that as soon an offence is committed, media teams start trampling over the scene for ‘Breaking News’ live broadcast. The process of investigation demands that sanctity of undisturbed scene of crime and its confidentiality should be maintained till a thorough search and seizure of evidence is completed and it had been examined by scientific and forensic experts. Visits of unauthorised persons at the scene of crime are most likely to damage the evidence. It is only after the investigation team is satisfied that there is nothing that had been missed and thorough search by the team of investigators and experts had been done that the place of occurrence may be given access to the public.
Prompt submission of case diaries
Section 172 CrPC mandates an Investigating Officer that he “shall day by day enter his proceeding in the investigation in a diary, setting forth the time at which the information reached him, the time at which he began and closed his investigation, the place or places visited by him and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation. The statements of witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under Section 161 shall be inserted in the case diary.”
Case Diaries (CD) document the progress of investigation, steps taken by Investigating Officer (IO), evidence collected and witnesses examined. CDs are submitted to the sub divisional supervisory officers and to the District SP by the
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IOs. Late submission of CDs leaves a scope for manipulations. CDs are reports of investigation through which supervisory officers can monitor the progress and wherever considered necessary, issue supervisory notes to give specific directions and thus share their knowledge and experience in working out the case or detecting lacunae in investigation in time so that the investigation proceeded in right direction or rectified. CDs reflect the professional efficiency, efforts and investigative acumen of the IOs and of supervisory officers.
Developing & refreshing special investigative skills
Besides academic and practical knowledge imparted to police officers on investigative and forensic techniques during the existing basic, refresher & special courses for detectives as well as special courses for crime investigators should also be designed to develop and promote special expertise in the following areas:
• Interrogation skills (for interviewing victims, witnesses and offenders).
• Developing and managing informants.
• Conducting covert surveillance, including the use of advanced surveillance technologies.
• Identifying and locating potential witnesses and sources of intelligence.
• Preserving and developing evidence.
• Preparing cases for prosecution and liaising with prosecutors in the lead-up to and conduct of a trial.
• Protecting, managing and preparing witnesses for trial.
• Sequencing of investigative steps in an investigation, so as to optimize chances of success during trial.
• Maintaining record of knowledge on criminals and criminal gangs.
Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS)
Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) is a Mission Mode Project under the National e-Governance Plan of Govt of India. CCTNS project will interconnect about 15000 Police Stations and additional 5000 offices of supervisory police officers across the country. It will digitize data related to FIR registration, investigation and charge sheets in all police stations through e-Governance and creation of a nationwide networking infrastructure for evolution
29 Chanakya Journal of CCSS of IT-enabled-state-of-the-art tracking system around 'Investigation of crime and detection of criminals'. The objectives of the scheme can broadly be listed as follows:
a) Make the Police functioning citizen friendly and more transparent by automating the working of Police Stations.
b) Improve delivery of citizen-centric services.
c) Provide the Investigating Officers of the Civil Police with tools, technology and information to facilitate investigation of crime and detection of criminals.
d) Improve Police functioning in various other areas such as Law and Order, Traffic Management etc.
e) Facilitate Interaction and sharing of information among Police Stations, Districts, State/UT headquarters and other police agencies.
f) Assist senior Police Officers in better management of Police Force.
g) Keep track of the progress of cases, including those in courts.
h) Reduce manual and redundant Records keeping.
It will be a modern aid to investigation and will introduce digitisation in investigation. Supervisory officers will be able to monitor cases more effectively at every stage from registration of FIR to trial. The Project has been launched in a few states but all the police stations of each state have yet to be connected and its full implementation is still in progress. Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs has approved the proposal of the Ministry of Home Affairs for extension of the implementation of the Crime and Criminals Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) Project for another year beyond 31st March 2017.
Police accountability in investigation
Accountability is defined as a system of internal and external checks and balances aimed at ensuring that police carry out their duties properly and are held responsible for any failure to do so. Such a system is meant to uphold police integrity and deter misconduct and to restore or enhance public confidence in policing. Police integrity refers to normative and other safeguards that keep police from misusing their powers and abusing their rights and privileges. Corruption, criminalisation in politics and vote bank politics are major causes for this besides lack of professionalism on account of which investigations were not fair and impartial and were mishandled due to lust of money or under political influence. Strict adherence to crime investigation
30 Chanakya Journal of CCSS manuals and effective reporting system for monitoring by supervisory staff can be an effective safeguard to maintain fairness and impartiality of investigations. Also in place should be a Complaint Authority to punish the delinquent investigating officers and supervisory officers for wilful distortion of facts and evidence of cases, for favouritism and for criminal neglect in investigations.
The Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh case felt the need of insulating police from the influence & pressures of the State Governments. In its order the Apex Court has directed constitution of a State Security Commission (SSC), to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the police. SSC will also lay down broad policy guideline and evaluate the performance of the State Police. The order further directed setting up of Police Complaints Authority at State and District level to inquire into public complaints against police officers in cases of serious misconduct. Similar provisions have been incorporated in the draft Model Police Act, to consolidate and amend the law for the regulation of the Police. The preamble of the Act declares:-
WHEREAS the Nation’s founding faith is the primacy of the rule of law and the police must be organized to promote the dynamic rule of law and render impartial service to people;
AND WHEREAS the police has a paramount obligation and duty to function according to the requirements of the Constitution and law and yet be accountable to aspirations of the people;
AND WHEREAS such functioning of the police requires it to be professional and service oriented and free from extraneous influences and yet accountable to the people;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary to provide the police with the appropriate powers to ensure it’s functioning as an efficient and effective agency for the above purposes;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of the police and exercise of powers and performance of functions by policemen for the investigation and prevention of crimes, maintenance of public order and security of State;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary to provide for certain other purposes, hereinafter appearing; it is hereby enacted.
Fifteen States viz Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Uttarakhand have formulated their State Police Act and two States,
31 Chanakya Journal of CCSS viz Gujarat and Karnataka have amended their existing Police Act. Thus, a total of 17 State Governments have either formulated their State Police Acts or amended the existing one but it will call for a separate study State-wise, to examine to what extent the letter & spirit of the Model Police Act Bill has remained intact in these State Police Acts and whether implementation of its provisions and of the directions of the Supreme Court have been done at the ground level.
Conclusion
As investigation is the first step of delivering justice, there is aneed to give importance it deserves in the existing police administration. The ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ are under States, it is the primary duty of the State Governments to prevent, detect, register and investigate crime and prosecute the criminals. This demands that the capabilities of State Police should be enhanced by separating investigative and law and order functions of State Police as directed by the Supreme Court, insulating investigations from political pressures, enhancing the skills and capabilities of investigators through special courses, making the new technological tools available to investigators, energising the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems and adopting the Model Police Act in letter and spirit. The effort should be to ensure conviction of the criminals. It may be emphasised that the quality of governance by the State and peace in society depends on the rate of cases successfully worked out and criminals apprehended and convicted.
The success of “Investigation” is in conviction. After investigation is completed and charge sheet is filed in the court, the process of prosecution and trial begins to deliver justice to victim as also to the society, to punish the offender and to establish the rule of law. If the crimes go unpunished it directly impacts the society. Crime and society are closely linked – for better and for worse. Society is strongly affected by crime, both due to the cost of crime, as well as the decline in the quality of life that citizens suffer as a result of crime. Therefore, the quality of governance by the State and peace in society depends on the rate of cases successfully worked out and criminals apprehended and convicted.
All India data on conviction rate for 2015, collated by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) shows that the percentage of cases in which the accused received punishment stood at 46.8%. In 2014, it was over 45%. In 2013, 40.2% while in 2012 it stood at 38.5%. Conviction rate in CBI is 70% while in FBI it is more than 90%. One of the major cause for low conviction rate is the long delay in trials because of which sometimes witnesses become untraceable or they get influenced or are not able recall their statements given during investigation. Tampering or disappearance
32 Chanakya Journal of CCSS of evidence is another reason for it. A glaring fact is that as compared to average conviction rate of States, the conviction rate in CBI is better. It is because CBI has the dedicated function of investigation only. It has professionally trained team of investigators, a comprehensive investigation protocol in its crime manual and the supervisory staff that closely monitors and guides investigations. The investigation report is scrutinised by seniors and its law officers to detect lacunae or shortcomings which if found are rectified by further investigation and it is only after all of that is the charge sheet filed in court to initiate trial. If similar system of a separate dedicated cadre for investigative functions is created in State Police forces, at least to begin with for heinous crimes, we can achieve professionalism in police investigations comparable to that of CBI to win the trust and confidence of the public which at present clamours for investigation by CBI.
Since the 'Police' and 'Public Order' are State subjects under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, it is the primary duty of the State Governments to prevent, detect, register and investigate crime and prosecute the criminals. Central Government, however, supplements the efforts of the State Governments by providing them financial assistance for modernization of their Police forces in terms of weaponry, communication, equipment, mobility, training and other infrastructure under the Scheme of Modernization of State Police forces. Therefore, it is the States which have to initiate the Police Reform but the moot question is whether the States will surrender their unbridled authority over police by insulating it from its influence or pressure.
(The author is former Director General, Himachal Pradesh Police and Sashastra Seema Bal)
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CONFRONTING INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
There are indisputable linkages between both external and internal security threats to India, making both of these a force to be reckoned with, individually and collectively. It is also a matter of fact that driven, to a large extent by external forces, internal conflicts within India, in the past few years are displaying ominous signs of resurgence and with newer contours. ….The effectiveness of the police at the grass-roots level significantly impacts the internal security health of the nation.
Among the myriad multi-dimensional challenges confronting India, the diverse sieges within, pose a formidable threat to not only India’s social fabric, political stability and economic rise but importantly, to India’s overall security. Internal security afflictions within the nation are as significant in their impact to the nation’s well-being and progress as external challenges. There are indisputable linkages between both external and internal security threats to India, making both of these a force to be reckoned with, individually and collectively. It is also a matter of fact that driven, to a large extent by external forces, internal conflicts within India, in the past few years are displaying ominous signs of resurgence and with newer contours.
The ever growing spectrum of internal security challenges confronting India range from terrorism in India’s restive States of J&K and some of the North- East, Left Wing Extremism (LWE), communal, caste and sectarian flare-ups, drug- trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, smuggling, illegal migrations and since the past few years, cyber-related crimes. That most of these grave problems can be attributed to externally sponsored machinations, especially by Pakistan, is a harsh reality of the times. However, equally, the lack of effective and sensitive governance in most States of India, the nexus and in some cases the apathy of the politico-bureaucratic combine, poor policing at the grass-roots level and long drawn out judicial processes are also to blame for internal security challenges acquiring severity. That, the rise of right-wing forces in the nation, especially in the past couple of years, is only exacerbating the overall fragile internal security health of the nation is a factor which needs to be borne in mind.
Factors impacting internal security
There are a variety of causative factors which impact the internal well-being of the nation. Some of these are enumerated below with a few simple suggestions for improvement in India’s internal security health:-
34 Chanakya Journal of CCSS a) A huge nation and a hugely diverse society. India is one of the largest countries in the world with a population of over 1.30 billion people scattered over 3.2 million sq kms land mass, land boundaries with seven nations (including Afghanistan when Gilgit-Baltistan is considered as Indian territory notwithstanding being in current occupation of Pakistan) of over 6000 kms and a 7500 kms coastline. The mere enormity of its geographical vastness coupled with the diversity of its multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic populace is indeed mind-boggling. By conservative estimates, India is home to over 1660 languages and dialects (22 official languages), nearly 3000 castes and sub-castes and virtually all religions of the world. Though India is a crucible of civilizations and nearly all global faiths exist here, yet it is also a fact that India constantly remains, virtually perched on a tinderbox, which can be ignited by those inimical to India’s unity. Accordingly, all efforts have to be constantly endeavoured by the governments at the Centre and States, its institutions and importantly, by its civil society to ensure ‘unity in diversity’, where strict adherence to inclusive and secular ideals remains the cornerstone for the survival and growth of India. India’s enemies will constantly strive, as in the past, to stoke the fires of communalism and divisiveness must be factored in our security calculus. That some political parties, also, display a propensity to not follow the cardinals of fostering mutual harmony and exploit societal schisms, is indeed unfortunate and may prove fatal for Indian nationhood. b) Insensitive governance and widening economic disparities. Apart from the many ethnic, cultural and social disparities within the Indian society, far more pronounced and alarming is the ever-widening economic disparity between various sections of society. As India boasts of an increasing tribe of billionaires and millionaires within the country, there exists, at least, one-third of India’s population below the poverty line. While hundreds and thousands of the super-rich splurge shamelessly, millions in India are bereft of even the basic necessities. One of the contributory factors to the rise of the Naxal-Maoist insurgencies has been economic disaffection among the deprived sections of society. As the government must determinedly battle the violent adherents of LWE, it will have to also reach out, by taking poor-friendly economic initiatives especially in the impoverished regions of the nation. c) Pakistan’s enduring anti-India obsessions. Since the last many decades, Pakistan’s overly virulent and consistent anti-India policies have also substantially and adversely impacted India’s internal security paradigm. Heightened tensions between the two nations, in recent years, have aggravated India’s internal security challenges in J&K, among a section
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of the Indian Muslims besides Pakistan, once again, trying to revive the now nearly dead ‘Khalistani’ movement in Punjab. That Pakistan is on an over-drive to induct terrorists into India from the porous Nepal and Bangladesh borders is a well established practice by Pak’s notorious ISI since the last three decades or so. If internal security issues are tackled with sincerity and determination, subversion of even our own restive sections of our population by external forces will be difficult.
d) Drug trafficking. With the ‘Golden Triangle’ (Burma, Thailand ,Laos and its influence permeating into many SE Asian nations) and the ‘Golden Crescent’ (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran), in India’s neighbourhood, drug trafficking is in rampage in these nations which impacts India and fuels insurgency, terrorism and other forms of unrest within India. Thus, the nation has to undertake all measures to minimize the evil effects of the scourge of drug trafficking.
e) Ascendancy in Right Wing Extremism. India, already beset with a few sieges within, can do without newly ones emerging. Unfortunately, since the last two years, right-wing extremists have been on the ascendant in communally-sensitive hotspots within the nation. Such undesirable upsurges within - pit one community or caste against the other - which, in reality, neither helps any cause or any community but weakens Indian unity.
f) Money laundering and counterfeit currency. External forces which are determined to create social unrest and trigger terrorist acts inside India, have been indulging in illegal money transactions through various innovative measures to their henchmen in India. Pakistan, over the years has perfected the art of printing and thence smuggling into India, counterfeit currency through the porous Nepal and Bangladesh borders. Accordingly, Indian intelligence and other security agencies with the assistance of the banks and financial monitoring institutions will have to keep a ‘hawk eye’on dubious transactions and various forms of money laundering by anti-national elements. Strict surveillance and checks at the official transit points and other routes frequented by smugglers and traffickers, along the international borders will have to be scrupulously ensured.
Re-energizing internal security
With the Indian Army’s major role and thus the focus largely on ensuring the nation’s security from external threats, it will be called up to beef up the nation’s internal security only when the Police, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and
36 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the para-military forces cannot do so. However, in its aid to civil authority, the Army has been called out on countless occasions to assist the State Governments. Thus, the Army, as the last bastion of the State, too has to be conscious of and be well prepared to provide adequate security cover in internal security challenges being faced by the nation, in coordination with its civilian security counterparts. It is a matter of pride and an unquestionable fact that the Indian Army’s record in internal security missions also has been commendable.
As an aftermath of the Kargil Conflict in 1999, the then Vajpayee government had set up the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) to re-visit the entire gamut of security and higher defence management in the country. The KRC, under the distinguished security analyst, K Subhramanyam, had made far-reaching recommendations to re-energize national security including the roles of various CAPFs. It brooks no elaboration to state that the bulk of the internal security challenges, getting more exacting by the day, have to be confronted by the State Police forces, CAPFs and the para-military. The role and responsibilities of each of these security forces was spelt out by the Group of Ministers (GOM) who had vetted the KRC’s comprehensive recommendations and duly approved by the then government.
Internal security responsibilities rest with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The States and their police units have the main responsibility to maintain law and order in their respective States while the central agencies, comprising the CAPFs, para-military and intelligence units provide specialized support as and when required. 28 States and 7 Union Territories are covered by around 2 million personnel at the State level and there are central agencies like the BSF, ITBP, CISF, CRPF, SSB and intelligence agencies also of the Centre to augment the internal security grid. It will indeed be prudent for the MHA if it implements the pending recommendations of the KRC, it has not been able to do so, till now, for whatever reasons.
Central Armed Police Forces. Editor-in-Chief of a well known security journal, the Defence and Security Alert, former parliamentarian Manvendra Singh, succinctly observes in the journal’s Feb 2016 issue that “India has a vast network of Central Armed Police Forces and it is growing exponentially. So much so that it seems empire building is the norm rather than an exception. Over the years, various governments have allowed CAPFs the luxury of expanding their numbers without taking stock of what is rational, what is required and how much is necessary. So much so that the various CAPFs are multiplying to such an extent that they now seem to be duplicating roles and some even triplicating as well. So now there is sight of some BSF battalions doing duty on Delhi roads. And the ITBP proudly displaying its dog squad. How guarding borders brings troops to manning Delhi roads is a mystery and what use do expensive and well trained sniffer dogs have on the cold mountains of the Indian-Tibetan border is even baffling.“ Manvendra Singh has also questioned the wisdom of the ITBP, in its role of guarding the India-China
37 Chanakya Journal of CCSS border, for raising an all women battalion suggesting that though gender equality is desirable we need an Indian model to adopt rather than caring for the whims of the UN or foreign NGOs !
Police Reforms. The basic and a very important aspect of safety and security of the common citizenry and enforcement of the law of the land is the primary responsibility of the police. The effectiveness of the police at the grass-roots level significantly impacts the internal security health of the nation. However, the institution of the police has been neglected for long by successive governments at the State and even by the Centre. Many pragmatic police reforms suggested by various review committees have not been implemented despite even the Supreme Court’s rulings on the subject. Notwithstanding being the world’s largest democracy, India continues to follow the outdated British imperial system of policing. State police forces do not carry any good reputation of either being people-friendly or being effective in ensuring law and order by professional policing - murders, rapes and other crimes are rising rapidly. The police has to be motivated, modernized, well-equipped and professionally trained to meet the challenges emanating from tech-savvy and well-funded criminals, trouble-makers and terrorists. Even with central agencies coming into play in thwarting serious internal security problems, the police are always the ‘first-responders’ and thus must be made physically, psychologically and technologically capable of carrying out their mission at the local levels. That apart, the police has to remain strictly apolitical, fair to all communities, people-sensitive and constantly endeavour to win the confidence of the people it is designed to serve. Community policing by them should be accorded some priority. Governments must shed their apathy towards the police while it makes them far more accountable for their effectiveness and integrity. Currently, the performance and image of the police, sadly, is dismal.
Tackling terrorism through a holistic approach. Terrorism, the scourge of the modern age, has been perfected and extensively employed by Pakistan in its neighbourhood especially in India and even Afghanistan. Realizing correctly, that it cannot wrest the State of J&K ever by force, Pakistan conceived a well- caliberated strategy, a few decades back, to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir by funding separatists inside the State and training, equipping terrorists inside POK to feverishly engage in fomenting terror inside the Valley. That its evil machinations have succeeded to some extent must be factored in by the Indian establishment and corrective measures put into place before further damage is done to the nation. India needs to put into place a coherent, consistent strategy to rid the State of Pakistan’s perfidy. First, the main separatist leaders (Hurriyat) must be immediately arrested and taken out of the State and stringently tried under the anti-sedition laws of the nation. Keeping them in comfortable house-arrests inside the Valley serves no purpose. Second, the Army must be given a free hand in restoring the writ of the Indian State. Third, the current failed combination of the PDP and BJP coalition
38 Chanakya Journal of CCSS government be put under suspended animation and Governor’s Rule imposed with a new Governor, armed with sweeping powers, appointed. Additionally, after law and order has been restored, the Centre must talk to all political parties and representatives of the people and work towards a healing touch. It must be clear to all that the nation is prepared to go to any extent to meet the aspirations of the Kashmiri people within the ambit of the Indian Constitution but no anti-national activities whatsoever will be tolerated. In addition, Pakistan should be made to realize that as India is prepared to discuss all contentious issues with it but any act of terrorism directed against India will invite major retaliation. India will have to translate its resolve into appropriate action on the ground. India also needs to keep its options open to exploit Pakistan’s many fault-lines, if necessary and build up a credible covert actions capability. For the moment, there is no other alternative but to raise the costs substantially for Pakistan if it employs in the future, terrorism for its political and ideological ends.
Combating LWE. The Naxal-Maoist threat, referred to as LWE, has spread over 200 districts in 16 States of the Union with nearly 45 districts being severely affected. That these ultra-left wing militants have established a ‘Red Corridor’ in the centre of the Indian hinterland from the Nepal-Bihar border to Karnataka and Kerala, with their areas of influence growing is an ominous development. The LWE has clear external linkages makes the tasks of the security forces battling these militants more arduous. To merely attribute the spread of LWE, as some peaceniks surmise, to poverty and lack of development in the regions afflicted, will be a rather simplistic formulation. In addition, those apologists who opine that the Maoist leadership can be brought into the nation’s democratic process and weaned away from their violent ways, are not aware of the motivations and extremist ideologies of these left-wing ultras. Though the Centre has prudently not employed the Army against the Naxal- Maoists, yet the Army with its small Special Forces detachments can be employed to carry out lightning raids against the top leadership of the Naxals-Maoists. Training by the Army of the CAPFs in special operations, handling of mines/IEDs and other counter-measures against mines and explosives should be given additional fillip. In addition, the IAF assets including light aircraft, helicopters, drones and microlites should be employed for surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, casualty evacuation and command and control purposes. However, for any anti-LWE strategy to succeed there has to be synergy between the political and security elements at the local, regional and national levels. Genuine coordination and cooperation between the various constituents of the security forces and intelligence units needs to be achieved.
Miscellaneous suggestions
(a) To better secure the international borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh,
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the BSF should be given state-of-the art, all-weather surveillance systems and modern, long range small arms. Wherever there are gaps/unfenced areas in the border fencing, these should be speedily completed. Floating border outposts and light, high speed, MMG mounted boats to dominate riverine areas must be procured for the BSF. The latter should enhance their local intelligence gathering abilities with the local police and citizenry of the areas concerned.
(b) The CRPF, the nodal force to be deployed in the internal security threat areas of the nation, needs far larger technological upgradation in its weaponry, mobility and surveillance equipment. Importantly, its training in riot control and to handle large unruly mobs requires impetus. The CRPF also, by virtue of its deployment in extremist affected areas, has to strengthen its intelligence capabilities at the grass-root levels. A larger deployment in stress areas is necessitated to avoid the ‘fatigue factor’ for its personnel which leads to operational ineffectiveness. The CRPF needs to introspect on its training and leadership standards, at the junior levels, to bring down the casualties figures it is, unfortunately, getting while it operates against the Maoists.
(c) The ITBP, mandated to guard the Indo-Tibet borders, needs far greater operational coordination with the army formations which are co-located in certain border areas so that gaps in surveillance, patrolling etc do not exist. Overall the operational responsibilities, in peace-time, needs to be fine-tuned.
(d) Smart Policing should be endeavoured for all State Police forces in a gradual manner. Smart Policing will ensure the expansion of the reach and capabilities of the police in identifying crime threats and enhancing community policing - together it will ensure crime prevention and easier and speedy crime detection. Additional employment of scientific tools into the work of the police will augment Smart Policing efforts. Some efforts in incorporating IT enabled tech innovations are taking place and these measures need to be further strengthened. Basic improvements to the police station, even in remote areas, has to be accomplished without further delays.
(e) Though easier said than done, politicians and governments must curb their proclivity to use the police for their nefarious political ends and let them emerge as protectors of the common people.
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Conclusion
The Centre may wish, now, to carry out an in-depth review, on the lines of the KRC and GOM, of the overall roles and responsibilities of each of the CAPFs and State Police forces their functioning, their strengths and areas where upgradations and improvements are desired.
It is an unfortunate fact of the current era, that internal security challenges have become increasingly lethal, multi-faceted and complex. To combat these diverse challenges, synergy of all the institutions and instruments of the State is warranted. The Centre may wish, now, to carry out an in-depth review, on the lines of the KRC and GOM, of the overall roles and responsibilities of each of the CAPFs, their functioning, their strengths and areas where upgradations and improvements are desired. The temptation to keep adding additional manpower and even unthought of and unnecessary technical upgradations or other accretions will turn out to be a waste of meagre national resources. Many functional and allocation of resources problems, if and where existing, between the MOD and MHA can be sorted out amicably in the larger national interest.
(The writer was the first Chief of DIA and the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff)
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STATE POLICE: NEED TO ENHANCE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR PREVENTIVE OPERATIONS Dr SD Pradhan
Our internal security environment is changing at an incredibly fast pace with increasing cross border terrorism, insurgent violence, activities of non-State actors, Islamic fundamentalism, smuggling of narcotics and arms, audacious attacks on security forces by left wing extremists, money laundering, hawala transactions, illegal immigration and caste, communal and sectarian violence. These are gravely impacting on the security of the country. The rapid advancement in technology not only facilitates these activities but also adds an entirely new dimension of threats and challenges such as cyber-attacks to disrupt financial, transportation, supply of water and electricity channels. These underscore the need for enhancing the capabilities of the State Police - the first responders - for preventive operations.
While a number of commissions and task forces had been constituted in the past to improve the capabilities of the State Police forces, the progress on this issue has been tardy. When the Group of Ministers that reviewed the national security system in 2000-2001 (GoM) underlined the urgent need for improving the effectiveness of the police forces and in 2006, when the Supreme Court gave its landmark judgement on police reforms, it was expected that effective steps would be taken expeditiously resulting in the enhancement of the capabilities of the State Police forces. However, nothing of the kind happened. The Chief Justice of India in exasperation remarked in March 2017, “Police reforms are going on and on. Nobody listens to our orders.” Most of the recommendations are still valid but due to a number of factors, they remain unimplemented in letter and spirit.
This paper is divided in three parts in order to place the issue in proper perspective. The first part briefly recapitulates the main recommendations made by the GoM, those contained in the Supreme Court ruling and the recommendations of the Commission on Centre-State relations under Justice Punnchi; in the second part the problems relating to the implementation of those recommendations and the main flaws in the system are described; and the third part contains a few suggestions, which may be considered under the circumstances for implementation.1
Our internal security environment is changing at an incredibly fast pace with increasing cross border terrorism, insurgent violence, activities of non-State actors, Islamic fundamentalism, smuggling of narcotics and arms, audacious attacks on security forces by left wing extremists, money laundering, hawala transactions,
42 Chanakya Journal of CCSS illegal immigration and caste, communal and sectarian violence. The security threats which India faces have assumed dangerous dimensions. The nature of challenge has significantly changed. We now face elusive shadowy networks of terrorists, left wing extremists and insurgents of various hues who are bringing great chaos and sufferings to our people. This threat is not limited only to a few areas, it covers every part of the country. The terrorists and insurgents are also receiving external support and are being used as tools by our adversaries for creating trouble for India. Presently they constitute the important elements of a dirty proxy war unleashed on this country. This is gravely impacting on the security of India. The rapid advancement in technology not only facilitates these activities but adds entirely new dimension of threats and challenges such as cyber-attacks for disrupting financial, transportation, supply of water and electricity channels. There are an increasing number of crimes using the cyber space. Today, the terrorists and insurgents are better organised to penetrate our open society and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. This further underscores the need for enhancing the capabilities of the State Police - the first responders - for preventive operations.
Important recommendations for the State Police
Group of Ministers’ recommendations
Emphasis on improving the efficacy of the State Police. Within the internal space of the country, the security threats are principally to be dealt with by the State Police as the first responders. They are supported by the central police organisations and armed forces at a later stage, if required. The GoM aptly concluded, “The State Police is the most visible symbol of administrative authority and its failure to effectively maintain law and order has not only eroded the credibility of the Government but has also emboldened criminal elements to persist with their unlawful activities with impunity. Hence, there is a need to restore the fitness, capacity and morale of the State Police forces, through a transparent recruitment and promotion process, a well thought-out training regimen and improved living and working conditions.”2 Therefore, the GoM suggested that an exercise to modernise the police apparatus should be undertaken on a priority basis. Significant improvement in training was recommended. For modernising the State Police, it recommended substantial financial aid to States from the Centre. The GoM also suggested creation of new structures for assisting the State Police for dealing with the growing security challenges both in training and operations. The charters of these new structures are given below:-
a) Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI). The GoM recommended the constitution of the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI)3 to determine intelligence priorities, requirements and the specialised training needs of
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each State and suggest measures to enhance their intelligence collection capabilities and to convert the information into actionable intelligence. The JTFI was tasked to keep the special requirements of the States in view of the nature of threats being faced by them. The charter of the JTFI included the continuous guidance to States in ensuring that necessary steps have been put in place including manning of the intelligence units by well trained and competent officers. The JTFI is led by the Intelligence Bureau.
b) Inter-State Intelligence Support Teams (ISISTs). Realising that there are several threats which affect more than one State, the creation of Inter-State Intelligence Teams (ISISTs)4 was recommended to support the affected States by providing them with actionable intelligence. The charter of these teams focused on terrorism, left-wing extremism and insurgency. These teams were tasked to keep in touch with all the States and provide intelligence support to operating units of different States in a coordinated manner. These teams are being manned by the senior Intelligence Bureau officers.
c) Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres (SMAC). On the GoM’s recommendation, the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) at the Centre and Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres (SMACs) in various States comprising representatives from various security agencies were created for streamlining intelligence efforts and to take appropriate timely steps to prevent the anti-national elements from harming the nation. However, the 26/11 attacks brought out that the system was not functioning properly. The then Union Home Minister of India reviewed the security situation and the Multi Agency Centre (functions, powers and duties) order, 2008 was issued on 31st December 2008 for energising the system. As a follow up of the above order, 24x7 Control Rooms had been set up at the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) at New Delhi and the Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres (SMACs) at State level to ensure timely sharing of information and better co- ordination between intelligence agencies through daily meetings of nodal officers of member agencies.5 The MAC-SMAC system too is led by the Intelligence Bureau.
Supreme Court decision on Prakash Singh v/s Union of India
The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgement on 22nd September 2006, listed the steps to be taken for improving the functioning of the State Police by reducing the political interference, making the officers accountable for actions and ensuring the appointments on the basis of merit. It directed that the three important institutions should be established in each State immediately – ‘State Security Commission’ with
44 Chanakya Journal of CCSS a view to insulating the police from extraneous influences; ‘Police Establishment Board’ to give it functional autonomy and ‘Police Complaints Authority’ to ensure its accountability. Besides, the apex court ordered that the Director General of Police shall be selected by the State Government from amongst the three senior-most officers of the department empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission and that he/she shall have a prescribed minimum tenure of two years. Police officers on operational duties in the field would also have a minimum tenure of two years. The court also ordered the separation of investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people. The Union Government was asked to set up a ‘National Security Commission’ for the selection and appointment of heads of Central Police Organisations, upgrading the effectiveness of these forces and improving the service conditions of its personnel.6
Commission on Centre-State Relations under Justice Punnchi
This commission was established in 2007 and in 2010 it submitted its recommendations in seven volumes. The volume V dealt with Internal Security, Criminal Justice and Centre-State Cooperation. While its main focus was over-all management of internal security, it did mention about the need for strengthening the capabilities of the State Police and providing them with latest technological tools. The commission supporting the directions of the Supreme Court stressed the need to improve the poor civil police to population ratio, avoid long delays in filling up of vacancies, amend the Police Act-1861 in harmony with the needs and requirements of the times, separate the investigation and prosecution assistance wings from the other normal police duties and equipping the police force to keep pace with the times to handle the new and emerging crimes such as terrorism, cybercrimes, sophisticated economic crimes, crimes pertaining to violation of human rights etc.7 It recommended the creation of a NCTC like structure at national level to deal with the increasing number of terrorist incidents, which are instigated and planned by external forces. It also suggested that all the previous recommendations made by GoM, task forces and committees to enhance the capabilities of the State Police should be given serious attention for implementation.8
Problems relating to implementation of the recommendations
The implementation of the recommendations has generally been far from satisfactory. While the Centre released funds for modernisation, this did not bring the desired results. The MHA in the past did not show willingness to monitor this effectively after writing to the States, which often used the funds for different purposes. Despite the Monitoring Committee under the Cabinet Secretary sending instructions to the States through the Ministry of Home Affairs, the desired steps
45 Chanakya Journal of CCSS were not taken by States. The MHA constituted a review committee in 2005 and with this even the modicum of exercise to monitor the implementation of GoM recommendations came to an end.
The Supreme Court ruling too did not bring any change. Sri Prakash Singh in an open letter to the PM on 26th November 2016 aptly summed up the situation, “The Supreme Court’s directions on police reforms have not been complied with in letter and spirit by any State. Seventeen States have enacted laws to legitimise the status quo and circumvent the implementation of the Court’s directions. The remaining States have passed executive orders which dilute or amend the SC’s directions. No wonder the Justice Thomas committee, which was set up to monitor the implementation of the Court’s directions, expressed a sense of “dismay” over the indifference to judicial directions.”9
The reasons are not far to seek. The States are not willing to accept the changes that would take away their powers to control the police force. In addition, the attitude of the personnel at the cutting edge level also does not allow changes. At that level, assignments that pertain to investigation, intelligence and training units are not preferred and are normally regarded as punishment postings. The allurement of making money and opportunities to please political leaders make the positions in normal civil police units far more attractive. The officials openly talk of sookhi postings and malaidar postings and most prefer the latter.10 Besides, the number of police personnel is woefully short. In 2013, the UN collected data from several countries and found that India’s 138 police personnel per lakh was the fifth lowest in the list of 71 countries.11 The already understaffed system is also hit by a number of vacancies. A question in the Parliament in January 2015, revealed that there was a shortfall of 5.6 lakh police personnel against the sanctioned strength of 22.8 lakh. This meant that about 25% of the sanctioned posts were vacant.12
Another problem with the State Police is that they are busy with several tasks requiring their immediate attention like agitations, strikes, common crimes, VIP movement etc. Under these circumstances, it is not always possible for them to devote time to develop leads to draw a reasonably complete picture of the emerging security challenges. The structures created by the GoM had also not been able to provide necessary support. The then Home Minister, Shri P Chidambram, admitted on 23rd December 2009 that the MAC and SMAC system was not working satisfactorily and he issued an executive order to energise the system.13 MAC- SMAC system suffers from both structural and procedural deficiencies. While the MAC and SMACs are created to share inputs speedily and disseminate them to the concerned forces, MAC does not have the authority for tasking agencies to develop leads or the operating units to undertake preventive operations. Additionally, there are no structures to support its collection system below the State Headquarters.
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The changes introduced after 26/11 only ensured that the inputs were shared but no system was put in place for developing the leads collectively in the States. Shri Chidambram himself pointed out a year later in 2009 that the system still needed improvement and was by no means satisfactory. In this context, he mentioned the need for creation of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The matter was considered in several committees/commissions like Centre State Commission, Administrative Reforms Commission, as also the Task Forces that were established since 2008 and they all supported the formation of NCTC though they differed on defining the responsibilities and roles of this organisation. However, they all concluded that MAC and SMACs were not able to achieve the objectives for which they were established.
Flaws in the system
An examination of the failures of providing timely warning/prediction of terrorist attacks reveals that almost in all cases it was either the failure of making assessments or of connecting indicators and not of collections of indicators. Some indicators on all ‘failures’ that were there, showed that they were either not collated or not subjected to accurate assessment. These include assassinations of Mrs Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, Kargil intrusions and 26/11 Mumbai attacks. The exercise also brought out the critical systemic weaknesses in the functioning of the structures created for coordination between the central intelligence agencies and State Police. The SMACs and MAC did not get all the inputs. While acknowledging that on the basis of reports from central agencies a number of modules had been busted, the reports pertaining to the “failures” from the central agencies were usually in the nature of general warnings based on available indicators that did not indicate intelligence gaps or the need to develop further those leads. State Police on the other hand wanted every detail to catch the terrorists like addresses, photographs, details of other members of the group, possible hide outs, etc. This leads to blame game that is always witnessed after every intelligence failure to forewarn the State Police about the incident. The functioning of SMACs, ISISTs and JTFI suffers from systemic inadequacies. The following flaws in the system were noted:-
a) The ground situation with regard to inter-agency coordination remains poor. Unwilling to share inputs with others on the part of the personnel of different agencies and turf rivalries, are still dogging the system and coordination is largely dependent on personal equations rather than institutional mechanisms.14 Often the police personnel at cutting edge level did not understand the true significance of the input, as it was seen in isolation. Hence, they did not pay any attention. Later, after the incidents, such indicators are brought to notice. On scrutiny, it was observed that the available indicators were significant and could point
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to the emerging threats. It was also noted that often all the inputs did not go to the concerned units. This revealed the systemic weakness of collation of all inputs not occurring at one place. This was an important impediment in completing the other processes of the intelligence cycle like evaluation, integration, analysis, assessment and finally taking pre- emptive actions on the basis of all available indicators.
b) The agencies hardly exchange any actionable intelligence in MAC or in SMACs. They generally discuss background information, strategic intelligence and post mortem of events.15
c) Functioning of MAC under the aegis of one of the member-agencies namely the IB is considered a systemic impediment in some quarters.16
d) In SMACs, the State Police - the first responder - is not given primacy for assessing the gaps, giving directions to its officials/other agencies operating in the State to quickly develop the leads and taking follow up preventive actions. SMAC is seen as the IB driven exercise with State police providing inputs as one of the several agencies. The Director Generals (Police) of States are not involved in the meetings. Often the IB officer chairing the SMACs is junior to the DG Police of the State and therefore a junior officer attends the meetings on his/her behalf. This is also proving a systemic impediment although in Intelligence and Security empowerment for decision making does not come from rank.
e) There is no arrangement in SMACs of tasking the participating organisations and agencies to develop leads.
f) There is no mechanism to ensure that all the leads/inputs available at district and police station levels are collated and sent to the State Headquarters. In addition the intelligence collection capabilities are far from satisfactory at district and police station levels and there are also no well-trained intelligence analysts at lower levels.17 There is no impartial system of evaluation of the quality of reports from ISISTs to State Police. The State Police usually blame the central agencies for not providing specific inputs. Lack of a system of accountability is a systemic weakness.
g) The JTFI’s task of ensuring proper training systems and recruitment procedures in each State leaves much to be desired. There is no timely effort to provide the State Police with the latest techniques and tools of the terrorists used elsewhere.
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Suggestions
First, introduction of the concept of Intelligence-led policing in the States to detect, defeat and destroy the threats including those which are less visible. Second, the SMACs should be placed under the DGs of Police of the States. This would ensure their involvement in the process of collection of inputs and undertaking timely preventive operations. Third, the District Collation Centres under the District Police Chiefs should be established for collation of all information being received from thanas and transmit them in real time to SMACs. Fourth, the State Police personnel should be given advanced training to identify Terrorist Attack Pre-Incident Indicators (TAPIs) so that preventive operations can be undertaken. Fifth, there should be a system of audit of ISISTs’ reports by MHA to ensure that they serve the purpose for they have been created.
The State Police forces are not only the first responders in all incidents but also the backbone of our intelligence and investigation agencies. Up-gradation of State intelligence units and coordination with the central intelligence are essential to launch successful pre-emptive and preventive operations. For this, the State Police must have the capabilities to neutralise the threats before they knock at our door. If we are to tackle these security challenges effectively, there is no getting away from having a professional force, well trained and equipped, highly motivated and committed to upholding the law of the land and constitution of the country. While the recommendations in this regard made by various commissions, task forces etc are still valid, some of them are difficult to be implemented due to the stance undertaken by States. Pragmatism demands that those steps which can be implemented easily under the circumstances be given priority for implementation. In view of the foregoing, the steps mentioned in the subsequent paragraphs are suggested.
Intelligence-led policing
We need to introduce the concept of Intelligence-led policing in the States, ie, the practice of gathering data and using it to guide operations and resource deployment. Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and is linked to community-oriented policing and problem solving strategies. Intelligence-led policing is a process whereby strategy and priorities are determined through a more objective analysis of the criminal and security environment. Through this strategy less visible but serious threats can be discerned through the process of intelligence cycle, ie, collection, collation, evaluation, integration, analysis and assessment. To implement intelligence-led policing in States, it is imperative that State Police forces re-evaluate their current policies, protocols and structures. Intelligence must be incorporated into the planning
49 Chanakya Journal of CCSS process to focus on grave threats and issues. Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice. And most important aspect is that intelligence must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The development of analytical techniques, training and technical assistance needs to be supported. The operatives must understand that intelligence is analysed information and not merely information, though often information itself is useful for launching operations.
At the grass root level the beat constable of the area plays a very significant role in collection of intelligence. The beat constables are considered to be the backbone of policing on the ground as they frequently patrol the area under their jurisdiction and are usually the first of the first responders for incidents taking place in their area. They have comprehensive knowledge of the locality’s geography as also demography. They also create network of informers and obtain inputs from them. They maintain logbooks of all unlawful activities in the locality which fall into about 60 categories, including pick-pocketing, snatching, theft, money laundering, gambling, smuggling of arms and narcotics, robbery, illegal betting, other crimes etc.
From the information of the beat constables, supplemented by the operatives of the District Intelligence Unit (DIU), intelligence leads are collected. It has been found in most cases that beat constables had the intelligence leads about some subsequent event but these were not developed into an actionable intelligence. While their information pertaining to usual crimes are acted upon, those relating to terrorist/insurgent activities either remain unclear or do not get the attention which the pre-incident indicators should be given. In the current scenario, such inputs deserve greater importance. Our problems also get compounded because of external involvement. A look at India’s map makes it clear that barring Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Telangana, all other States have land or coastal international borders. Thus, all States are vulnerable in their external dimensions. All of this demands a robust system of collection, collation, analysis of inputs obtained from different sources including the beat constables and other senior levels to discern the ultimate game plans of adversaries and their supporters.
Structural changes
For improved functioning of the State Police the following structural changes are needed:-
• The Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres should be placed under the Director Generals of Police of the States. This would ensure their involvement in the process of collection of inputs and undertaking timely counter- terrorist operations. The IB officer should be the convenor of the SMACs and should serve as the main link between the MAC and SMACs.
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• The District Collation Centres under the district police chiefs should be established for collation of information at that level. The officials of the IB and other intelligence agencies in the district should be involved in identifying the inputs that can be useful for SMACs. The preliminary analysis of inputs should be done at the District Collation Centres. These District Collation Centres should also be used to share information requiring the attention of district police by central agencies.
• The beat officers’ inputs which can be helpful in discerning emerging threats should be sent speedily through the SHOs to the District Collation Centres. In each area citizens’ intelligence network should be established by having links with the RWAs, schools, senior citizens’ associations etc. The local police station personnel should remain in touch with such networks to obtain inputs. Citizens should be told in meetings with the police personnel to look for suspicious activities that could be linked to terrorist attacks.
• There should be incentives for officials to take up intelligence related assignments. A system of recognition of their work and awards should be introduced. Incentives should be worked out for all police personnel for intelligence assignments.
Training for identifying the Terrorist Attack Pre-incident Indicators (TAPIs)
All State Police personnel should be given advanced training to identify pre-incident intelligence indicators of terrorist attacks. The most critical component of terrorism education is learning how to recognise and predict an attack. While intelligence personnel receive advanced professional training to watch suspects’ behaviour, their background etc and point out the potential terrorists, the State Police personnel receive only short briefings. It is essential to provide the State Police personnel the training as they are at the front line of the internal security.
The Terrorist Attack Pre-incident Indicators (TAPIs) are the individual bits or data fragments of intelligence information that produce patterns and allow operatives to understand the potential courses of action. The different stages of planning and execution provide intelligence indicators. The indicators can be of different categories - group related, target related, incident related etc. The quality of indicators can be different - from ambiguous to unambiguous. They could include tip- offs, chatter, cyber information, surveillance of target, elicitation of information using common communication means, looking for weaknesses in the security system, securing funds usually through illegal means, purchasing weapons, explosives and ammunitions for the terrorist act, dry-runs etc.
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The JTFI was created to identify the needs of training of personnel of each State. The JTFI should design training modules for ability and skill enhancement to ensure that they are able to identify the pre-incident indicators and undertake pre- emptive action. Terrorist recognition and identification can be effectively performed through intelligence profiling of suspects.
In the present situation the cyber surveillance should be given importance. This can provide invaluable intelligence as most terrorists use cyber space for communication. The use of technology for gathering relevant information should also be included in the training modules. The officers manning the District Collation Centre and SMACs should be given training in intelligence analysis. Each District Collation Centre after receiving inputs from thanas should do the first stage of analysis with the help of ISISTs. There are softwares also available that can assist in the preliminary analysis, though trained and perceptive human minds play an important role in producing the final product. In view of shortage of personnel, long training courses would be impractical. The JTFI should use the distance learning methods to impart training to the State Police personnel.
System of accountability
It may also be pointed out that lackadaisical attitude towards the profession of Intelligence is also developing because no one is held accountable for intelligence failures. In contrast, Admiral Blair, former US Director National Intelligence had to resign from the post for not including the name of Abdul Muttalib in the “no fly” list, a bomber who unsuccessfully tried to blow an aircraft while going to US, on whom inputs were available. A system of rewards and punishment must exist so that the personnel would continue to take their assignments seriously and would not be inclined merely to please their political masters. An effective system of accountability both at the Centre and State levels should be introduced.
Changes at the Centre
At the Centre two steps are also needed for improving the functioning of the State Police, intelligence sharing system between the central intelligence agencies and State Police and management of the entire Indian Intelligence Community. These are:-
• First, there is a need for some central organisation that should receive all inputs from all agencies and State Police forces. The MAC suffers from systemic weaknesses explained earlier. In this context, it is suggested that the MAC should be upgraded to National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). It should be a full time stand alone organisation. The NCTC’s
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role should include the integration of all inputs, preparing authentic assessments, plan joint counter-terrorist operations and assign lead roles to designated forces and providing intelligence support to the counter terrorist forces and police as well as the investigating agencies. The NCTC should also prepare joint strategic plans for civilian and military efforts (where needed) and assign lead role and responsibilities to the concerned forces and ensure proper execution of its plans. However, it should not assume the operational responsibilities.
• The second is that there should be professional supervision of a large number of intelligence agencies, which are currently functioning as autonomous units. There has to be some authority to manage all agencies. Someone should be responsible to ensure that all inputs are thoroughly examined before taking action and also to ensure that timely appropriate actions are taken. In this context, a few Task Forces and (late) Shri K Subrahamaniam, a well-known security expert, who headed the Kargil Review Committee, had suggested the need for creation of the position of National Intelligence Advisor (NIA). Under him a system of audit of performance of intelligence agencies should be introduced. National Intelligence Advisor would not only supervise the functioning of all intelligence agencies but would also ensure uniform standards for collection of inputs and analytical practices across the entire Indian Intelligence Community. National Intelligence Advisor would also ensure effective coordination among them to operate as an integrated and mission driven workforce to achieve targets. National Intelligence Advisor could also provide with a single window to the policy makers, including the National Security Advisor, on issues related to intelligence. His/her functions would be totally different from the National Security Advisor who has to assist the PM to design policy options taking into account all aspects like economic, diplomatic, military, technological, domestic opinion, nuclear environment, external pressures etc and function as the representative of the PM for talks with other countries. There is a considered view that the cause of national security would be well served by a NSA-NIA combine. This suggestion should be given a serious consideration to improve the functioning of the entire intelligence system.
While all the recommendations of the Supreme Court and GoM are important and should be implemented, one important aspect that both the Centre and States have to take up seriously is the poor police personnel to population ratio. While India has one policeman for 709 people, UN recommended ratio is one policeman for every 450 people. This is a huge gap. The population is increasing and so are the perpetrators of crime and violence. A favourable police-population ratio is correlated
53 Chanakya Journal of CCSS with a lower crime rate globally. Hence, there should be a reasonable increase in the number of police personnel besides immediately filling up of the vacancies.
(The writer is the former Deputy National Security Advisor)
Notes
1. The author was the Nodal Officer of the Kargil Review Committee, Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus, Group of Ministers that reviewed the national security system and the Cabinet Secretary’s Committee for the implementation of the GoM’s recommendations. After retirement he served as the Member of the Task Force on Internal Security in the MHA and as the Chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus (2008-2010) in the National Security Council Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. 2. Report of GOM to review the national security system in its entirety and in particular to consider the recommendations of the KRC, p.42, Govt. of India, 2001. 3. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/2012/nctc_2012.pdf. Accessed 28th May 2017. 4. Ibid. 5. http://cbi.nic.in/mac/mac.php. Accessed 28th May 2017. 6. http://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/cover-story/police-reforms-rejuvenate-and-transform- the-police/story/227523.html. Accessed 28th May 2017. 7. http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/volume5.pdf. Accessed 5th June 2017. 8. Ibid. 9. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/26-11-attack-anniversary-dear-pm-narendra- modi-india-needs-police-reform-4395453/. Accessed 2nd June 2017. 10. http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/volume5.pdf. Accessed 5th June 2017. 11. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-ratio-of-138-police-personnel-per- lakh-of-population-fifth-lowest-among-71-countries/articleshow/48264737.cms. Accessed 2nd June 2017. 12. http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2016-pdfs/ls-260716/1509%20E.pdf. Accessed 8th June 2017. 13. Sri P.Chidambram’s (then Union Home Minister) speech on the 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture delivered on 23rd December 2009. 14. http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Suppl_VolI_Task_Forces.pdf. Accessed 5th June 2017. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Shri P. Chidambram’s speech, op.cit.
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DEALING WITH RADICALISATION IN J&K Kapil Kaul
This article attempts to bring out the core issues of the imbroglio in Kashmir, and explores options available with India to counter Pakistan’s strategic designs. It analyses objectively the causal factors of the radicalisation of the Kashmiri youth. The deep rooted xenophobia of a section of Kashmiri people which is the product of a number of factors, has been constantly fuelled by steady dose of radicalism from their co-religionist across the border in Pakistan and beyond. This has created serious challenges for the integrity and security of the J&K State as well as for the Indian nation through acts of religious bigotry and terrorism that led to genocide of the Kashmiri Pandits and their consequent migration.
An unbiased study of the current problem in J&K unravels a complicated web of deceit, political ambitions of a few and Pakistan’s repeated attempts to dismember India by inducing a section of Kashmiris to rise up against the Indian State. The people of J&K have gone through a painful journey of agitations and violence provoked and funded by separatist groups to seek accession to Pakistan, ‘azadi’ and finally the conversion of Kashmir Valley into “Dar-ul-Islam.’ While the groups of separatists may differ in the goals and modus operandi, there is a common thread of provocation, indoctrination and stratagem from Pakistan and its Salafi cohorts. The Kashmir issue has pitted Pakistan’s reputation as the ‘sword of Islam’ against the secular and inclusive ethos of India.
For a large part, since 1947, India has followed a policy of restraint vis-à- vis Pakistani machinations. This approach had put India repeatedly on a defensive footing, be it India taking the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948, acceding to pressures in Tashkent in 1965 and not exploiting the victory over Pakistan in 1971 to settle the Kashmir issue once and for all. Major political parties showed a marked lack of seriousness in launching any sort of initiative to counter the growth of radicalism and xenophobia in the Valley. For all practical purposes, the Central Government in India followed a hands-off policy, leaving the fate of the Kashmiri people in the hands of local leaders, who proved incapable of even delivering the basics like health, electricity, roads and economic opportunities leave alone the desired objective of national integration and nation building.
India’s idealism and justness of its Kashmir cause induced it time and again to argue its case in the international fora, ignoring the fact that politics of pragmatism and strategic goals of each country may not necessarily prompt it to see the Indian point of view. Lack of any effective opposition to Pakistan’s gifting of Aksai Chin to China under the 1963 accord and its continued efforts to wrest Kashmir through
55 Chanakya Journal of CCSS direct military intervention and through non-State actors has presented India as a ‘Soft State’. It is this factor that Pakistan continues to exploit. Even after both India and Pakistan became nuclear powers, the latter continues to challenge the Indian threshold of restrain by adopting the instruments of terror and even trying to grab areas.
Kashmiriyat and demographics
The unique identity of the culture of Kashmir has been repeatedly touted by local politicians under the nomenclature of Kashmiriyat - exploited first to enjoy a special status under Article 370 and later as an instrument of politico-economic blackmail under the garb of autonomy and ‘azadi’ demands. However, Jammu & Kashmir is no different from any other State of India. It is a multi-lingual, multi- ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural geographical entity, sharing with rest of the country the burgeoning problems of underdevelopment, unemployment and corruption.
The well calculated deception of Kashmiriyat has been deliberately propagated to present a picture of Kashmiris as a peace-loving people. This concept was used to instill a false sense of security in the minority community and to deceive the leadership of India. The fear and insecurity amongst the minority community compelled them to play along with this charade. The concept of Kashmiriyat lay exposed and shattered several times, from the medieval to the modern era, culminating in large scale persecution of Kashmiri Pandits resulting in their migration. The acts of ruthless cold blooded murders executed by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and its ilk from 1984 and well into the 1990s were aimed at changing the demography of the valley. The end result of these repeated acts of religious bigotry was that the Hindus became a helpless lot there while the demographic imbalance created a fertile ground for reassertion by Muslim radicals to control power in the State.
Currently Muslim population numbers around 96 Lakhs, mainly concentrated in 17 out of 22 districts of J&K. The Indian census of 2011 recorded J&K’s Muslim population at 85.67 lakh or about 68.31 per cent of its total population of 125.41 lakh. Hindus numbered 35.66 lakh or 28.43 per cent of the total. Hindus are the majority community only in 4 districts of the Jammu division. In Ladakh, the Buddhists are the majority in Leh, while the Shias are in majority in Kargil. The local politics of the State has ensured that only State subjects are allowed to own land in the State. Old migrants and women who have married outside the State are not allowed land ownership or treated as a State subject. Ironically, the Central Government remained a mute spectator when leaders like Sheikh Abdullah encouraged Muslim Kashmiris from PoK to settle in the State. Among these were those who had run away after committing large scale rape and arson in places like Rajouri. What we
56 Chanakya Journal of CCSS are witnessing at present is an attempt to establish a “Dar-ul-Islam” (Home of Islam) to replace what they considered as “Dar-ul-Harb” (Home of Conflict) in Kashmir.
Radicalisation of youth
Objectively speaking four factors are responsible for the growth of radicalisation of youth in J&K. First, is the change in the demographic pattern that has allowed the Valley to emerge as the stranglehold of radicalised groups which constitutes the basic factor for the current problems in the J&K. Second, the effort of political parties to seek support of radical Islamic groups motivated by electoral gains, results in creating a larger than life size image of such groups. The Congress initiative to tie-up with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) to check the rising popularity of Abdullah was to have grave consequences. The 1972 elections in the J&K saw Jamaat emerge as a political force winning five seats and launching Syed Ali Shah Geelani into the political arena. It encouraged a worldwide Muslim movement to introduce Islam “as a comprehensive system of life and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic State”.1 The JeI became a bridge between the Kashmiri and other Muslim struggles across the world. Third, the events in the neighbourhood also energized the process of radicalisation of the Kashmiris. A wave of Islamic revivalism was witnessed which received encouragement from the Americans to reduce the Russian influence by their own. The Muslim organizations, especially those who followed a radical approach began to re-assert themselves. Kashmir, too, got caught up in this ‘Islamic’ wave and those involved in fighting the State authorities and the Indian Government saw the success of their movement within easy grasp. The propaganda of ISIS is also now influencing the youth in the region. Fourth, Pakistan, which had close links with these radical groups and found the situation favourable, began to exploit them as a part of their well-calculated strategy to destabilize J&K by radicalising the youth in the Valley.
Crucially, the fundamentalist groups formulated plans to place the radicalised youth in important positions to achieve their objective. A booklet ‘Hizbe Islam’ published by the Jamaat-e-Islami says: “We want infiltration of our men into the administration so that normal function of police, banks, transport, communications and other departments is rendered useless; we will create anti-India thinking in the minds of students and farmers, so that we can win them over to our side against the State administration” (We will) “Train youth in handling arms so that they are able to engage and face Border Security Force and other Indian Police personnel with help of Sikh extremists, terror should be created in Jammu province”. Kashmiri Muslims should “take control of areas where Indian forces are not stationed. A special force of retired army officers of POK, combined with Afghan mujahideen should be raised and thereafter it should infiltrate into Kashmir”… “The last step of the plan will be freedom of Kashmir and formation of an Islamic State”.2
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Within the J&K, the JeI carried out a relentless destructive war against the Kashmiri ethos through its “network of 11,000 Urdu and Arabic schools … and its nodal organizations like Islamic Students League, Islamic Student Organization, Jamaat-e-Tulba et al.”3 The Jamaat-e-Tulba was particularly effective through its strong presence in the university and college campuses in the Valley. They carried out the process of indoctrination through seminars, debates and talks on religio- political themes. According to a journalist, Muzamil Jaleel, who had enrolled in a college in 1988, “the entire militant movement belonged to my generation. The movement was the only topic of discussion on the street, in the classroom and home”.4 The JeI’s activities gathered momentum after the death of Sheikh Abdullah. It was during this period that Azam Inqalabi wrote ‘Qual-i-Faisl’ advocating separation from India. Sixty years after JeI was established in J&K, its leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani is still making statements that merger of Kashmir with Pakistan is a ‘matter of faith’.5 Over a period of time the cadre and sympathizers of JeI had infiltrated ‘vital limbs’ of the administration and provided covert and overt support to the growth of radical movements in the State.
The JeI also began to exert influence on the local media. Newspapers like the Al Safa conveyed messages and slogans of the militants, “Your land is Islam, your tribe is Mustafa; creating any platform for nationalism is tantamount to paving the way for furthering the interests of the infidels”. Hizbul Mujahideen (JeI’s militant arm) stated in the Srinagar Times on 9th January 1991 that “Taking up arms is not a compulsion but a religious obligation. Adopting an apologetic attitude on this issue is un-Islamic.” The press became the link between the militants and the masses. The identification of local media with militant groups became so pronounced that people who felt threatened started issuing pleas via notices printed in the local newspapers.6 JeI’s contribution was to facilitate introduction of fundamentalist ideals into the socio- political fabric of Kashmir and exhort its sympathisers to launch a violent struggle to convert Kashmir into an Islamic State. The trend continues. On 9th May 2017, the successor of Hizbul Mujahideen’s (HM) Burhan Wani, commander Zakir Rashid Bhat has come out with a video where he is heard saying that the militants should not aim at creating a new nation of Kashmir but achieving the supremacy of Islam.
Besides JeI, Ahl-e-Hadith, which claims to have 15 lakh members, has also played an important role in promoting radicalism in J&K. According to reliable sources, Ahl-e-Hadith is believed to have built 700 mosques and madrassas and funded 150 schools, several colleges, orphanages, clinics and medical diagnostic centers. It has also proposed an Islamic university ‘Trans-world Muslim University’ (TWMU), in Hyderpora, Srinagar, to "facilitate a new generation of leaders in medicine, science, technology and religion based on the Shariah". Ahl-e-Hadith is already engaged in setting up key faculties within its existing institutions across Srinagar. The organisation's rapid proliferation and increasing popularity among youth is making Kashmir's predominantly Sufi-Hanafi community anxious.7
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The role and goal of Pakistan
Pakistan is using terrorism to ‘bleed India through its policy of a thousand cuts’. It openly supports and provides sanctuary to terror groups like Taliban, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujahideen etc, which carry out terror strikes in J&K and beyond in India. It overtly houses the United Jihad Council (an umbrella organization of 13 terrorist outfits) in Muzzafarabad, PoK which plans, trains, arms and infiltrates terrorists inside Kashmir with active support of the Pakistan Army and ISI. Vitriolic hate mongers like Hafiz Sayeed of Jammat-ud-Daawa (JuD) continue to spew venom against India and recruit the gullible by projecting India as an existential threat to Pakistan. They are motivated by a legacy of hatred towards India and a deliberately cultivated vision that the Muslims of South Asia were the historical and genealogical inheritors of the great Mughals and linked by Islam with the great empires of the Ottoman caliphs. The political and religious rhetoric went a long way in generating among the Pakistani masses a feeling of having been wronged. Akbar S Ahmad has concluded that the Muslims of South Asia suffer from the Andraluse Syndrome and goes on to say that it becomes too easy for Muslim scholars to exaggerate the plight of Muslims in countries ruled in the past by Muslim rulers.8
Pakistan has played a crucial role in introducing violence and terrorism to Jammu & Kashmir. The strategy of training Kashmiri youth to fight a guerrilla war on behalf of Pakistan is basic to Pakistani thinking since its inception and this is well documented. Pakistan’s utilisation of terrorism or low intensity conflict option of dealing with India in the post 1989 era stems from the fact that it is a cheaper alternative to an all-out war. Pakistan’s involvement in J&K and its assuming direct control of the terrorist activities there since 1990, has a larger objective as well. Pakistan is convinced that annexation of Kashmir is central to its future development. With Kashmir under its control it can be a key player in China’s Trans-Asian Axis design.
Current situation
The situation in the Valley presents a grim picture and needs to be urgently managed. Last year the violence erupted after the killing of Burhan Wani and other Hizbul Mujahideen terrorists and since then situation has not remained normal. The following negative developments are noticeable:-
• The incidents of stone pelting and protests remain unabated. The protesters chant the slogans of ‘azadi’. The aim is to show that people of the Valley were not with India.
• There are increasing number of bold attacks on security forces or on
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their posts. The purpose is to project that the Indian security forces are not invincible. This also gives encouragement to people and terrorists that they can achieve their objective of ‘azadi’.
• Incitement is given by the separatist leaders and ISI to people particularly in the Valley to continue their activities against India.
• The ISI and the Pak Army are using the Border Action Teams (BATs) comprising Pak soldiers and terrorists to attack Indian posts along the LoC and to push infiltrators into India.
• ISI is providing funds to the stone pelters. A recent sting operation confirmed that while the senior separatist leaders like SAS Gillani are receiving funds in crores, the stone pelters are paid Rs 7,000/- per month. Another sting operation carried out by India Today has exposed the trail of terror financing from the Gulf countries to India and from lanes of Chandni Chowk in Delhi to the lanes of Srinagar. It is estimated that an average of Rs 100 Crores per month is pumped into Kashmir to keep it on the boil.9 In addition, the recent NIA investigations have brought out that funds generated from cross border barter trade with Pakistan could be anything between Rs 500 Crores and Rs 800 Crores per year. A part of these funds also reach the separatists for organising protests and stone pelting incidents.10
• While a number of terrorist outfits are operating in the Valley, Pakistan’s main tools are United Jihad Council, Hijbul Mujahidden, Jaish-e- Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Dukhtaran-e-Millet.
• The number of locals in the terrorist outfits are on the increase. In 2014, out of 80 militants operating, only 20 were locals. Currently, militant numbers are the highest in a decade, with estimates of militants operating in the Valley ranging from 250 to 300. Of these, nearly 150 are locals, majority of them coming from South Kashmir.
• There are a number of terrorist training camps in PoK as also elsewhere. Important ones are situated at Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Maju, Bader, Samani, Fagosh, Jarikas, Dudhnial, Gojra fort, Gani Dupatta, Nikial, Sensa, Chakothi, Naukot Sharif, Chananian, Mandakuli, Chumula, Jura, Shankot, Maksar, Kundal Shahi, Bhimbar and Kahuta. At any given time approximately 2000 to 3000 mujahideen are undergoing training at these camps. There are additional training camps situated on Pakistan territory at Berhali, Gujjar Khan, Miramshah, Manshera, Ojheri, Jhang, Kohat, Sinkiari, Sialkot, Risalpur, Zaffarwal, Shakargarh and Narowal. The Training camps are run exclusively by the ISI.11
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• There is a surge of violent activities in the radicalised Islamic world elsewhere. ISIS or ‘Daesh’, as it is popularly known in the Arab world, went on a rampage in Iraq and Syria in its efforts to establish an Islamic Caliphate. While military victories of ISIS have been temporary, its propaganda has left an indelible mark on many Muslims who are dissatisfied with the prevalent political systems in their respective countries. These people are hard-selling Islam as a viable political option. Even educated youth are coming under the influence of radical leaders like Baghdadi, Zawahiri and Awlaki. Terror strikes in Belgium, France, US and UK in recent times are indicative of this trend. Recently, US has designated the India head of Daesh - Mohammad Shafi Armar alias Yousuf-al-Hindi - as Specially Designated Global terrorist for his acts of recruiting Indian youth. He has formed Junood al Khalifa e Hind (JKH) after dismantling Ansar-ul-Tauhid. This group has recruited about 50 youth.12 A radicalised Muslim majority Valley could not have remained unaffected by this trend.
Notwithstanding the above, there are some positive developments which are listed below:-
• Despite the killing of Lieut Umar Fayaz a young army officer, while defying terrorist threats, the Kashmiri youth are showing interest in joining the security forces and police. They are turning in large numbers for recruitment tests. The rejection by the youth of regressive bandh calls given by separatists in the name of a bright future is an important positive indicator. This also shows that there is a section of youth which is not under the influence of radical elements.
• In response to the recruitment for five India Reserve Battalions about 1,40,000 persons applied in the State. There were about 6,000 girl applicants.13 This is also a new positive development.
• The Army has organised coaching centre for young persons to help them in appearing in JEE.14 Army and Tata motors are also organising training courses for Automobile Service Technical Course. These are receiving good responses.
Conclusion
India needs to reverse the process of radicalisation and build on positive developments to bring in normalcy. This demands coordination between various agencies of the government and non-government organisations to wean away the youth from the clutches of the purveyors of terrorism. All
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efforts should be made to restore demographic balance by bringing back the migrants by providing them security and suitable employment. There is also a need for looking at the Article 370 again, particularly in view of a large number outsiders having been settled in PoK and Giligit-Baltistan.
The State Police can play a key role in checking radicalisation of youth at different stages along with other measures. In UK, a study has concluded that by adopting the ‘prevent strategy’ this objective can be achieved. There is an urgent need to enhance the capabilities of State Police to enable them to adopt this strategy. The State Police should focus on preventing the youth before he or she becomes a criminal by taking note of indicators in the early stages.
Internal options
For India the fight against terrorism in the Valley has both internal and external dimensions, though it remains mainly the Pak sponsored terrorism. Internally, a clear understanding of the factors responsible for inciting the youth for stone pelting and terrorist acts is central for countering them. Those who are indulging in these acts are influenced by the Pak propaganda and the radicalization efforts made by separatists and fundamentalist Islamic parties. This phenomenon is seen in other countries as well. A dispassionate analysis points out that unless the process of radicalisation is checked and the society is de-radicalised, more recruitment by the organisers of protests and stone pelting movement would continue to be added. Hence, serious efforts in this direction are needed. Broadly speaking India needs to reverse the process of radicalisation and build on positive developments to bring in normalcy. This demands coordination between various agencies of the government and non-government organisations to wean away the youth from the clutches of the purveyors of terrorism. In this context the following steps are suggested:-
a. The process of radicalisation and the appeal to its ideology must be understood and analysed to counter it. Those who are radicalising youth - whether they are terrorist groups, fundamentalist Islamic parties or ISI - do not operate in vacuum: rather they feed on the ideas that have proliferated in the Muslim communities for several decades. At the core of the ideology is some Islamic beliefs laced with conspiracist strategy. These take into account the local problems to suggest that all their difficulties could be removed if they follow the radical Islam. Their projection includes the beliefs that democracy is man-made and only ‘extremist understanding’ of God's law should be enforced; that violent jihad is a Muslim obligation until "God's law" is manifest; that those who die pursuing it, including suicide bombers, are martyrs and that the
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greatest obstacle to Islam's dominance is the ‘kafir’ dominated India. Killing “Kafir” Indians, therefore, weakens an enemy that oppresses Muslims. Unless such ideas are challenged and discredited, extremist groups will continue to flourish no matter how many terrorists are killed. Hence, our focus should be on this aspect. It must, however, be admitted that this is not an easy task and cannot be achieved in a short duration. b. An effective counter propaganda should be launched describing the harmful impact of radicalism on the youth. India should go for an all- out offensive to counter the separatist propaganda and the Pakistan narrative in Jammu & Kashmir. This should take into account the issues which the separatist are exploiting. The support of Muslim thought leaders who appreciate the harmful impact of radicalism may be enlisted. c. At the State and national level, it is essential that the governments in association with the well intentioned Non-Government Organisations take more effective steps to promote confidence-building measures, to instill a sense of security in the people, especially those living in the bordering regions of India. d. It must be realized that problem of unemployment can, in this environment, easily win over youth to radicalism. The initiatives taken in this regard by the security forces and private entities should be given a greater push. e. As the separatists and ISI and their supporters are using social media platforms, effective measures in this regard should be taken. Initiating the round-the-clock presence of a professional, well-informed network of web-savvy persons who are well versed in Kashmiri, Punjabi, English, and Urdu chat rooms as well as social media for refuting the separatist propaganda with factual and scriptural arguments is essential. The purpose is not only to dissuade jihadis but also to ensure that virtual audiences do not assume that extreme narratives are unchallenged and hence preponderant. f. The radicals and fundamentalists implement various strategies to discredit the security forces in the eyes of the public as well as the international community, especially on the human rights front. Security forces are deliberately fired upon by militants from amongst mobs of civilians, so that in retaliatory fire for self-defence by the security forces causalities may take place which can be highlighted as human rights abuse. This aspect should be kept in view. The security forces should adapt to the rapidly changing narrative and rules of engagement in Kashmir. Real-time initiatives and responses have to be taken according
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to developing situation on ground, as exemplified by action of Major Nitin Leetul Gogoi, who tied a stone-pelter to his jeep, using him as a human shield to prevent violent protesters from attacking his vehicle. It may be mentioned that using more force than what is necessary can prove counter-productive. Therefore, such initiatives are desirable.
g. With the migration of Kashmiri Pandits demographic pattern has changed which facilitates the growth of radicalism. All efforts should be made to restore demographic balance by bringing back the migrants by providing them security and suitable employment. There is also a need for a relook at the Article 370 particularly in view of a large number outsiders having been settled in PoK and Giligit-Baltistan. In both these places the number of Kashmiris have been reduced considerably.
h. Politicians of Opposition are making statements on sensitive issues to garner the support of separatists and militants. They have even given statements against the Parliamentary Resolution that PoK belongs to India. Some checks on them are necessary.
i. The Hurriyat leaders have become a liability. So far they have not helped in any way to resolve the issue. On the contrary they are inciting youth at the bidding of their Pak masters. Their security should be immediately withdrawn which is causing a heavy burden to the government. Besides, providing them with security helps them in legitimizing their position as an important leader of the J&K without ever facing an election.
j. The State Police can play a key role in checking radicalization of youth at different stages. So far this aspect has not received due attention. There is an urgent need to enhance their capabilities in this field. Studies have shown that they can prevent the youth’s drift towards radical ideology. The recent cases have shown that in most cases, family members were unaware of their child’s behaviour or beliefs or that the extremists online were encouraging them to undertake acts of violence. The State Police can be the first point of contact with the radicalised youth. This may occur when members of the public tip off police or when youth come to police attention through surveillance and online monitoring. In the present circumstances, there are two issues which need to be addressed. First, the Muslim communities exhibit low confidence in police and don’t perceive the police to be legitimate. Second, the police personnel and their families are themselves targeted by terrorists and therefore they often hesitate to disclose the information to the parents. The situation is complex but police engagement with Muslim communities and the building of trust are important for tackling
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risks associated with radicalisation. In view of increasing terrorist attacks in UK and Europe and their concern about the radicalization of youth, in depth studies have been made, which have concluded that the police can play a greater role in tackling radicalization. The Universities Police Science Institute, Cardiff University, UK has made a deep study of the problem on the basis of available data and a number of interviews and came to the conclusion that by adopting ‘Prevent Strategy’ by State Police the process can be checked in the initial stages.15 This strategy calls upon the State Police to focus on preventing the youth before he becomes a criminal by identifying the early indicators of the drift of youth towards radicalisation and taking preventive steps. For this State Police should identify partners to assist them in this task. The J&K State Police should also gear itself to adopt this strategy. The ‘Prevent Strategy’ of the State Police should be based on the following three objectives16:-
i. Challenging terrorist ideology by working closely with other local and national agencies and partners, including our communities. State Police should engage with diverse groups for this task. There are sections in the Valley which can provide support to the State Police.
ii. Supporting vulnerable individuals through intervention projects.
iii. Work closely with institutions which may be facing some risks such as education and health establishments.
The State Police has to adopt innovative ways to win the trust of the Muslim Community. A degree of situational configuration to respond to local circumstances is both necessary and desirable. With some training in Prevent Strategy and necessary resources, the ability of the State Police can be enhanced to take on the daunting task of keeping youth from becoming radicalised, though this may take time to achieve the objective.
External options
Externally there has to be a paradigm shift from a reactive orientation to a pro-active approach. The terrorism in J&K is sponsored by Pakistan and this aspect has to be dealt with effectively. It is not only aiding and sheltering terrorists but also internationalising the issue. Therefore, the machinations of that country have to be forcefully countered both diplomatically and militarily. The image of India as a soft State also encourages Pakistan to keep the proxy war going. The pressure points for Pakistan are well known and should be exploited. In essence, a bold initiative is required to tackle the problem of trans-border terrorism. According to Ruel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA covert operation expert, the only way to defeat complex
65 Chanakya Journal of CCSS terrorism is “by maintaining a strong military stance” and “by going directly to where it is coming from and dealing with the state” that sponsors it. He aptly concludes "You cannot hope to deflate Islamic extremism by losing."17
(The author is a former Deputy Director, National Security Council Secretariat)
Notes
1. Gul Mohammad Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospect (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1993), p.112. 2. Kashmiri Muslim Literature, Kasmir-Information.com/Miscellaneous/KMLit 3. M.L. Koul, Kashmir: Wail of a Valley,( Delhi: GyanSagar Publications, 1999); p.162 4. Mujamil Jaleel, ‘Kashmir: My lost country’, The Tribune, dated 13th February 2002. 5. Arun Joshi, ‘Geelani rejects polls, harps on UN decrees’, Hindustan Times, dated 27th March 2002. 6. Kashmir-information.com/Miscellaneous/Urdu Press. 7. BhavnaVij-Aurora Asit Jolly, India Today, dated 23rd December 2011. 8. Akbar S. Ahmad, Discovering Islam. 1988. Routledge & Kegan Paul; London. pp. 158-59. 9. JamshedAdil Khan and Sushant Pathak,“ Stone Pelters for Hire in Kashmir”, India Today, dated 16th May 2017. 10. The Mail Today, New Delhi, dated 16th June 2017. 11. 44. “All Pakistani Camps are run by ISI”, Hindustan Times, dated 2nd April 2002; Arun Joshi, “We were trained by the ISI at the Kotli camps”, Hindustan Times, 6th June 2002; Yashwant Raj, “Kashmiri jehadi got special training”, Hindustan Times, dated 4th April 2002. ‘In the J&K, infiltration is the undeclared war’, Hindustan Times, dated 2nd June 2002. 12. The Times of India, New Delhi, dated 16th June 2017. 13. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/govt-to-raise-women-police-battalion-in-j-k-to-deal- stone-pelters/story-zTQYuUgcUIlFJl1nkAvZMO.html. Accessed 14th June 2017. 14. The Hindustan Times, dated 14th June 2017. 15. http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20 send%202.pdf. Accessed 15th June 2017. 16. Ibid. 17. http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/gerecht_reuel_marc/. Accessed 15th June 2017.
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INTERNAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR INDIA Late Maj Gen RK Malhotra AVSM, VSM (Retd)
Externally abetted or sponsored subversion is not peculiar to India and we can find solutions to it but when internal politics gets entangled with it, additional complications come into play. …. The police-politician-criminal nexus emboldens the criminal elements and this creates an environment of lawlessness, where influential and rich people violate the law with impunity. Worst is that the entire legal system gets compromised.
Setting the perspective
A focus on Internal Security requires a comprehensive examination of a wide variety of challenges that define it and the distribution of responsibility among various segments of the government for dealing with it. Somehow in a democracy of India’s size and complexity, it is this very division that creates a problem of coordination and accountability because of the large grey zone of overlap of functions. While the existing political, demographic and geographic entity of India has existed with stability over 70 years, the fault lines of our history and democracy as also our cultural, social, linguistic, economic and religious diversity do add to the difficulty of producing an integral response. Nationalism and Patriotism in India carry diverse narratives and even lead to a lack of convergence on what the threats to Internal Security are.
The two-nation theory that created Pakistan continues to hurt us because the power dispensation of Pakistan remains rooted to this mooring. Pakistan refuses to accept the reality that India is a society that is democratic, plural and multi- religious and that India today has more Muslim citizens than Pakistan. Retention and sustenance of power in Pakistan is based on the belief that it is responsible for not only protecting its own citizens but also the Indian Muslims. The dispensation in theocratic Pakistan, dominated by the army, the feudal landlords, the bureaucracy and the religious leaders gives these classes a hold over the levers of power and playing the anti-India and Islamic cards is what sustains this arrangement. Pakistan, therefore, imposes security challenges on India that cannot be accepted from a mature neighbour.
Externally abetted or sponsored subversion is not peculiar to India and we can find solutions to it but when internal politics gets entangled with it, additional complications come into play. The rise of contentious politics based on sectarian, ethnic, linguistic or other divisive criteria, is primarily responsible for the many communal and secessionist movements flourishing in India. An examination of
67 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the conflict continuum clearly highlights how hostile neighbours intrusively fan internal conflicts in India and provide external support, including money, arms and sanctuaries for the same. The vested interests at home exploit these conditions to pursue their own agenda. The short-term horizon of politicians to stay in power, forces the concerned States to buy temporary peace by compromising with the subversive forces. Such shortsighted policies can have disastrous consequences in the long run.
The police-politician-criminal nexus emboldens the criminal elements and this creates an environment of lawlessness, where influential and rich people violate the law with impunity. Worst is that the entire legal system gets compromised. When the fear of legal punishment disappears, organised crime spreads its tentacles. Many of the insurgent and militant groups in India are driven not by ideology but by sheer greed. Money power is a bigger motivating factor than ideology. This mutually beneficial relationship between the politician and the law breakers seriously damages the quality of governance - particularly in the interior areas. The real losers are the people and the development process. This nexus combined with the tardiness of the legal system gives rise to a vicious circle. The deprived and the marginalised sections of the society, unable to survive in the prevalent system, get alienated. The militant and extremist forces thrive in this environment. The rise of Left Wing Extremism is more due to these compulsions than on ideological grounds. The mushrooming of armed ‘Senas’ on caste and ethnic lines in some parts of the country is a direct consequence of the instigated polarisation of the society. Loss of public confidence in the capacity of the State to protect their life and property gets reflected in militancy and insurgency. It is not new that the tensions in some parts of the country, especially in the tribal areas were due to a perceived threat to their identity but the rise of violence is a relatively recent development. In the border-States these movements become secessionist because of the support they receive from the hostile neighbouring States. With the ‘Golden Crescent’ and the ‘Golden Triangle’ in India’s neighbourhood, drug trafficking brings becomes another illegal conduit of support for the militants. It is not surprising that drug syndicates and foreign intelligence combine to create chaos through assurance of financial and logistics support to them. Indian response, therefore, has to be strong as well as coordinated with all organs of the State working seamlessly with synergy.
North-East
The roots of the insurgencies in the North-East lie in both, its history as well as geography. The partition of the country seriously dislocated the old system of communications with serious demographic consequences. At the heart of the problem, however, is the new political consciousness and an urge among tribal communities for asserting their identity. Another intractable problem is created by
68 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the influx of migrants from the erstwhile East Pakistan. The fear that immigrant population will one day dominate them is keeping many of the insurgent and secessionist movements alive.
The terrain in this region is eminently suitable for insurgency. The hilly expanse and dense forests provide convenient hiding places for any asymmetric manifestation. However, it needs to be emphasized that internal-external linkages prosper because of the failure of the domestic political and administrative system to cope with the conflicts. It is evident that convenience and connivance are the core drivers of fuelling unrest. As an example, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was born out of a demand to throw out the migrants from Bangladesh and yet its top leaders today find sanctuary in that country.
Jammu & Kashmir
The problem of Kashmir has been with us since independence. Even though Pakistan has no legal case there, initial hesitation of the Maharaja to accede to either India or Pakistan and the unilateral Indian offer to find out the wishes of the people of the State has given Pakistan an excuse to challenge the legality of the accession. Waging of a proxy war fits into the Pakistani designs of bleeding India. More interested in perpetuating their rule than governing the State, the political class of the State has been exploiting regional and religious differences for its gain. Anti- national forces thrive in this environment and Pakistan has missed no opportunity to support and encourage them. Over the years it has succeeded in building a small pro-Pakistan base in the State. Frustrated in their efforts to gain power through democratic means, some politicians have joined the anti-India front, more to put pressure on the Indian Government than for any ideological grounds. In a State, where the overwhelming population was against communal politics at the time of partition, the fundamentalist forces have managed to penetrate into the secular polity. The central dole that compensates for the lack of revenue and carries with it an element of arbitrary usage adds to personal greed and encourages retention of status quo. The general public is treated as exploitable and disposable pawns who can be swayed through rhetoric of hope and heightened emotions, threat and terror. Unfortunately, the status quo suits a large number of beneficiaries who stand to gain from the continuing turmoil. The only entities that suffer are India and the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
Left Wing Extremism
The root cause for the rise in Left Oriented Extremism like other security challenges remains the inability of the States to address the many genuine grievances of the people. The gap between the unrealistic expectations, fuelled by
69 Chanakya Journal of CCSS populist rhetoric and their actual fulfillment has increased and not decreased over the years. The younger generation is no longer willing to put up passively with injustice and humiliation without a fight. The bitterness of the angry young man against the prevailing unjust socio-economic system is spilling over. The prevailing educational system that produces unemployable young boys and girls has only accentuated the feeling of helplessness. Pressure on land has made the task of survival on agriculture more difficult. It is not ideology and revolutionary zeal that is driving them. For many joining the Naxalite groups, militancy is seen as the only way to survive. Their main activity is extortion. A live-and-let live attitude is mutually beneficial to all of them. The real sufferers are the very people for whom the extremists are waging this war against the State.
Joining the dots
Over the years a public perception has emerged that a government that is unable to discharge all its responsibilities is more likely to respond when the demand is loud, organised and backed by acts of violence. Once the instruments of governance are discredited, it is not too difficult to justify their destruction as in J&K, the North-East or in the States afflicted by Left Wing Extremism. In a lighter vein, it will be fair to assume that the aim of all these movements is no different from the aim of legitimate political movements. They too seek to acquire power, measured in terms of exercising influence or control over the people and acquisition of wealth that is the source of all power. Extortion, therefore, becomes an essential part of their strategy.
It is common to find political leaders of the afflicted areas indulge in double- speak. They shout nationalist slogans in Delhi but have no hesitation in switching to strong anti-national rhetoric and collaborating with the insurgent groups in the State. Nor do they have any reservation in changing parties. Money and muscle power with active support of the insurgent groups play a key role in the elections. Most of these States are happy to remain financially unviable. They hardly collect any revenue and depend almost entirely on the Union Government for financial support. The move to summer capital and huge State bureaucracy that eats up the total revenue are a sign of utter irresponsibility.
Way towards solutions
…the use of the armed forces should remain the last resort. Whenever the situation demands it, their image should never be compromised and if need be, embedded journalists should be a part of a psychological override. ….The stage for a political accord in Mizoram and Nagaland was set when population control measures were adopted; villages were
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co-opted in the law and order machinery that was implanted within. These broke the physical proximity of the insurgents with the populace inspite of the existence of a local affinity. The military should be deployed in the periphery and difficult areas from where they control ingress and egress of the militants to neutralize them whenever they try to merge with the populace. An integrated intelligence remains a pre-requisite for this.
There cannot be any classroom type of solutions to such deep-rooted problems but the direction is fairly clear. It is not impossible to find solutions to seemingly intractable political problems, if there is an environment where people are by and large satisfied with the functioning of the government agencies and are not deprived of essential services. More than anything else, it is the economic policies that would ultimately determine the future of these movements. A thriving economy, which gives hope and opportunity to the people, is more likely to defeat all types of extremist movements than any other strategy.
It is absolutely essential to reduce ethnic and social inequalities, disparities in educational and employment opportunities and create effective machinery for the redressal of public grievance. Steps to reduce economic deprivation and improve the delivery of essential services can erode the base of public support on which the extremist movements survive. Only those with contacts with the government machinery or the powerful have benefitted from the constitutional provisions of reservation and India has in fact seen greater disparity and loss of efficiency and capability. Change does not suit electoral politics but the issue of stability and security of the country demands that our political leadership rises above this syndrome. An economic criterion is a must as the base for reservations.
The need for a well-coordinated security apparatus can hardly be over- emphasized. It should include the police, paramilitary forces, army and intelligence agencies. A composite force on the lines of the National Security Guards (NSG) could be considered for all the States, even in those States where the internal security situation is not so serious. It is easier to deal with the problems at the initial stages, than later when the State Police can no longer cope with them.
The Conflict Continuum mechanics need to be understood by our bureaucracy and political leadership because this is what is being manifested and mutated in India. The phases in which it can be divided is a period of Peace, a phase of Tension (No War No Peace), Turmoil, War and Nuclear Exchange. It is not necessary that these phases follow one another and can easily be jumped over or reversed. Essentially, even when a country is at peace, there are differences and dissentions. These are exploited by providing ideological, diplomatic and financial support to the dissenters to exaggerate and aggravate the perception and gather support. This is done quite overtly and all forums are exploited. The escalation
71 Chanakya Journal of CCSS is through covert means used with complete deniability. The aim is to impose an ‘Ends versus Means’ dilemma since any restriction or harsh measures are seen as infringement of rights that helps alienation of the public. These two phases are in play in India and so-called peaceniks do not realize how easily they are becoming a part of the design of our adversaries. The stages of conflict thereafter are fairly obvious.
The legal and constitutional provisions need to be brought into public debate so that people add their weight to the decisions of their democratically elected leaders. The Union Government is charged with the responsibility of protecting the States from internal disturbances under Article 353 of the Constitution, even though law and order comes under List-II, the State List. The Union Government can issue directions to the State under Articles 257-258. Action for non-compliance of the directions from the Union Government can be taken under Article 365. A State Government can be dismissed under Article 356, if a situation arises in which the administration of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. A national emergency can be declared under Article 352. A unilateral move is, however, inadvisable and the State’s role has to be integrated with such an approach. A situation should not be allowed to develop where the State Government washes its hands off or its forces stand by without acting, instead of cooperating with the central forces. This will actually pitch the organs of the State against the instrumentalities of the Centre.
Finally, the use of the armed forces should remain the last resort. Whenever the situation demands it, their image should never be compromised and if need be, embedded journalists should be a part of a psychological override. It is surprising to see a siege mentality develop in the way that these forces are deployed or operated. If a fortress is created in areas where they are housed and a strong-armed cavalcade is a part of their movement, the people might get scared with such measures inspiring little confidence. If the forces themselves exhibit a sense of being under threat, the mental confidence of the populace will only get defrayed. No doubt precautionary and protective measures need to be put in place and any bravado avoided as this will be counterproductive in view of possible losses. These measures can be made effective and yet kept far from display. The resources required may be more but so be it. The methodology should create the impression that the law and order machinery was available and deployed ‘within’ every populace concentration. The stage for a political accord in Mizoram and Nagaland was set when population control measures were adopted, villages were co-opted in the law and order machinery that was implanted within. These broke the physical proximity of the insurgents with the populace inspite of the existence of a local affinity. The military should be deployed in the periphery and difficult areas from where they control ingress and egress of the militants to neutralize them whenever they try to merge with the populace. An integrated intelligence remains a pre-requisite for this.
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There is also a need to bring in a surge of All India Cadre at all levels. This is the only way to negate the vulnerability and ineffectiveness of the local cadre. There is a need to remove the reluctance of the All India Cadre for taking risks.
India has reached a stage that calls for ‘Second Order Change’. The status quo in regard to law and order management needs to be challenged at all levels and in all facets. Alternatives should be developed and presented at a speed that out plays the pace of the current order.
(The writer was a former Joint Secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat)
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NORTH-EAST CONUNDRUM : LOOK EAST OR ACT EAST? Lt Gen Rameshwar Roy UYSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd)
Introduction
North-Eastern States use it (insurgency) as a leverage with the Central Government to extract more aid, funds with reduced accountability. It has resulted into a mutually beneficial relationship for both; the State Governments and these insurgent groups; all of them sustain themselves through same aid and schemes that they get from the Central Government.
India has now been an Independent Nation for the last seven decades. It has been in full control of its destiny in a fiercely competitive harsh world of realities with a fair degree of autonomy. But it has yet to come out of some of the legacies of the ‘British Raj’. On top of this chart is the neglect of its North-Eastern region, notwithstanding the loud pronouncements of ‘Look East’ in 1991 and ‘Act East’ policies in 2015, of the government in recent times.
The sensitivities of the region as such get more pronounced due to the fact that after partition of the country when East Pakistan and now Bangladesh was created, the natural connectivity of this region to the outside world through Bay of Bengal was lost. This created a kind of claustrophobic environment, more so when we realise that this region has been surrounded by China (then Tibet), Myanmar and Bangladesh with a very narrow 24 Kilometres of Siliguri corridor, a cartographic relic of the British decolonization process;1 to the mainland India. Therefore, in terms of connectivity, whether through land, sea or even electronic communications; this region has been feeling completely isolated as also insecure in many ways ever since independence.
British found it unwise to integrate this region to the rest of India due to lack of financial viability and other constraints of management. They left it more as a buffer region but conveying an impression that they have done it more for ‘anthropological’ reasons having tribal sensitivities. We nearly adopted a similar approach even after independence.
Naga call for their own independence from India was just about surfacing along with our freedom from the British in 1947. In fact, they even boycotted the first General Elections of independent India in 1952 on expected lines. A few years later, in 1956 Naga Militants under leadership of Phizo, created a secretive government known as Naga Federal Government (NFG) with around 1500 armed guerrillas.2
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This started the struggle for Greater Nagaland later known as ‘Nagalim’. Indian Government reaction was typical to its natural reactive stance of divide and rule, another legacy of the British Raj. So it first sent in the army to control insurrections and then Nagaland was given the status of an Indian State in 1962. Manipur got this status in 1972 and our government kept on giving in to the demands of divisions of States more on ethnic considerations rather than their economic viability and ease of governing considerations. This allowed not only Nagaland insurgency to grow but it proliferated similar sentiments and growing sense of insecurity amongst other section of population in this region.
Therefore, it resulted in multiplying our problems and complicating them even further. This has finally got us into catch 22 situation. We need peaceful environment for an all inclusive balanced development of the region but that requires a stable security situation without which development will remain a dream. Neither of the two is possible all by itself. Time and again government finds it easy and expedient to rush in the security forces to deal with situations piecemeal - rather than going in for a long term stable and sustainable political solution. Either way it has always suited all the stake holders all the time.
Today the reality and bitter truth that no one is willing to accept is; that this whole process seems to have got institutionalised. North-Eastern States use it as leverage with the Central Government to extract more aid, funds with reduced accountability. It has resulted into a mutually beneficial relationship for both; the State Governments and these insurgent groups; all of them sustain themselves through same aid and schemes that they get from the Central Government. Although not proven very clearly on the ground, many of the contracts for various schemes are obtained by front end organisations having affiliations to various insurgent groups.
Since all these States have entirely different dynamics in terms of their security situation, it is best to review them separately and then recommend a sound policy alternative in the end.
Nagaland
This State is truly referred to as mother of all the insurgent groups in the North-East.3 One does not wish to go into history of development of various groups but suffice to say that Nagaland insurgents being the oldest group in the region with their connectivity to China through Myanmar; surely have been a source of inspiration and guidance to all other groups in the region. But for themselves they have done rather well.
Since beginning of their times, with all the factional fights and divisions between the groups; its main group NSCN (IM) has retained its superiority and
75 Chanakya Journal of CCSS dominance till date. The BJP Government itself had gone in for a much publicised agreement with NSCN (IM) during 2015, the terms and conditions of which have never been made public but are now slowly unfolding.4 It is very clear that the final answer to this vexed problem has to be found from within the frame work of our constitution and there are clear as also mixed signals emanating from New Delhi to support this assumption.
Now lately with the death of Khaplang of NSCN (K) and hardly a viable strong leadership available with them, the unquestionable leadership of IM could not be far; which augers well for the final resolution of Naga problem.5 However, given Muivah’s background of his being a Tangkhul Naga from Ukharul which is in Manipur, it will be some time before the issue of ‘Nagalim’ could be resolved. None of the adjoining States to Nagaland are going to ever agree to change of boundaries of their States. The issue of greater autonomy to the State of Nagaland itself is likely to throw open a Pandora’s Box for similar demands from other States. There are as yet unconfirmed reports that China could try to facilitate Paresh Barua, fugitive ULFA leader to take over the outfit named United Liberation Front of Western South-East Asia that Khaplang had formed on 17th April 2015.6
Manipur
Manipur remained an independent Princely State for two years after Indian independence and it merged with Indian Union only on 15th October 1949 to finally get a status of State in 1972 almost a decade later than even Nagaland.7 As on date this State offers an excellent example of ‘problem without a cause’. Yes it all started with a 'Identity Crises’ which the locals felt threatened, due to onslaught of immigrants from Bangladesh as also other States of the region, mainly from West Bengal but over the years this issue transformed itself into an issue between Meiteis and Kukis tribes. While Maetis with a claim of original inhabitants having 50% population, basically occupy 10% area mainly the plains of Imphal a much smaller area compared to Nagas and Kukis who occupy 90% of landmass of hill tracts,8 Kukis apparently brought in by Meiteis as labourers from outside. Nagas are yet the third party that is also claimant to large tracts of Manipur and its adjoining districts bordering Nagaland where they are settled. In fact Muivah of NSCN (IM) comes from Ukhrul districts of Manipur.
So what is the situation here as of today. We have a State with recurring problem of disturbances where road blockages have taken over the traditional violence that was once linked with PLA of Manipur and host of other insurgent groups that were swarming the State for a long time. Most of these outfits, approximately 19 in numbers: are under Suspension of Operations (SOO) arrangements with Government of India; where in, they are supposed to deposit their weapons under lock and key, in a camp under local police protection and maintain themselves
76 Chanakya Journal of CCSS with a sustenance allowance given by the Central Government. These allowances are being claimed based on an inflated list of their cadres submitted to Central Government through a very loose and vague verification system.
There are periodic ‘Road-Blocks’ on one pretext or the other, which not only causes shortages of essential commodities but also pushes up the prices which results in lot of hardships to people but profits for others.
The city limit of Imphal is out of the preview of AFSPA but not rest of the State and hence provides safe sanctuaries for those high profile cadres who have stakes in running the old out dated outfits as leverage for the State Government.
Therefore, we have this excellent system of mutually supporting and self sustaining system of governance, where democratic elections are being held regularly year after year with much lesser violence than many other peaceful States, if that is any indicator for peace in the State.
Assam
This is another State which had started sailing into instability like other States with the main objective of establishing a ‘Sovereign Socialist Assam State’. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) came into being on 7th April 1979, which operated from background of the popular Assam Agitation led by All Assam Students Union (AASU) against illegal influx from Bangladesh. Assam accord did come about in 1985 with Asom Gana Parishad (AGP).9 But sadly enough, the AGP despite winning elections and forming a government in Assam State with clear majority could not resolve the issue and got completely derailed from its agenda. Today the State is already having the problem of population inversion where in very soon there is every likely hood of Assamese themselves getting into minority in their own State, if not in all the States at least in some of these.
The problem of ULFA has been complete loss of their cause and State Governments own mishandling of the situation in last over three decades. What we have today is a situation of ‘Live and Let Live’. A disillusioned ULFA cadre surrenders to become Surrendered ULFA (SULFA). This he does with a view to enjoy life since he has become sufficiently tired of living like a militant. He also gets swayed by the terms and conditions being offered to him by the government as an incentive for him to surrender. But finally he also retains his option to go back to main organisation, should he not meet his aspirations in the end. So this cycle of ULFA-SULFA-ULFA is maintained.
There are major peace talks and initiatives announced just before the State elections and all become directionless and lose focus once the elections get over. This has been the pattern of last four elections in the State.
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Mizoram
This beautiful State too had its fair share of disturbances since 1966 but has been by and large peaceful since 1986, when peace accord was signed with rebel group Mizo National Army (MNA) and their political wing, Mizo National Front (MNF); their Chief Laldenda was installed as Chief Minister. This in fact truly is a model case study of how an insurgency can be defeated successfully if there is total convergence of politico-military aims and objectives.
However, of late the State has been witnessing uneasy peace; according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, Mizoram has recorded at least 46 insurgency related fatalities since 1997, including 15 civilians, 22 Security Forces (SF) personnel and nine militants. The State also continues to be a transit point for arms and drug smugglers.10
The State maintains presence of a Sector of Assam Rifles which is equivalent of roughly an army brigade. It also has an undeniable presence of a sizable population of Chin tribes all along the State International borders with Myanmar. Although there is no census that has been carried out so far but it is believed that Chin population living in Mizoram could be roughly about one million; if true it would be nearly ten percent population of Mizoram. It is a mute point whether this kind of population percentage has a definite likelihood of creating a problem for Mizoram as also the Indian State much the same way as influx of migrants from Bangladesh have done to Assam. Either way at present no one seems to take any cognisance of this issue because of ease with which the Chins have provided cheap labour for locals and have also amalgamated themselves into local population with total ease.
Tripura
The start was made by formation of militant group National Liberation Front of Tripura on March 1989 and its armed wing All Tripura Tiger Force in 1990. It had its phases of ups and down but it saw the major decline in 1996-98 and finally tapering off completely.11 If there is any State that has achieved total peace amongst the North-Eastern States after being in a state of turmoil since nineties, it is the State of Tripura.
There are very many major lessons that stand out from this case study. These can briefly be described as follows:12
(a) A very strong and thoughtful conflict resolution mechanism.
(b) Very responsible, efficient, credible and responsive State Administration.
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(c) Good surrender policy and rehabilitation system for the rebels.
(d) Zero tolerance to excesses combined with psychological operations.
(e) People’s very active and dynamic participation.
The State is also out of the preview of Armed Forces Special Powers Act since 2015.
Meghalaya
Although State of Meghalaya was separated from Assam in 1971 to subdue the feelings of Khasi, Synteng and Garo tribes, it never really was able to completely fulfil the sentiments of these people. This has resulted into these tribes forming various armed groups to supposedly protect their own imagined and conflicting interests’ since 1992. But the most positive development of all has been the State Government’s resolve to tackle this problem themselves with little assistance from the Centre.
However, with sustained operational pressure since 2004 and a very positive role played by churches in the State, it is very heartening to see a relatively peaceful environment in the State.
Arunachal Pradesh
This North-Eastern State makes news once in a while on account of its mainly two districts of Tirup and Changlang where AFSPA is also enforced. Due to safe sanctuaries which are available in Myanmar for some of the insurgent groups mainly from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam; these two districts of Arunachal Pradesh are basically being used as safe routes for infiltration by these groups. It is for this reason that these groups also maintain transit bases in the districts which remains a very major bone of contention particularly two rival groups of NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) of Nagaland. It is on account of this that we often hear of inter-group clashes that keep erupting frequently.
Money trail and budgeting of insurgent groups
Whatever may be the status of these groups, they have never run short of finances to sustain themselves - all through their existence. They have ignored the fact that if their cause is so appealing and good for the masses that they seem to be representing; then should a popular support not come from public rather than they resorting to extortions to run their outfits? In fact public at large in these States is
79 Chanakya Journal of CCSS being pressured from three sides, from the Central Government, State Government and the insurgent outfits. You visit a shop to buy an item and invariably you will come across this simple, honest and innocent explanation when you complain about the high prices of commodities. That there are three pronged taxes to be paid; Central, State and insurgents. One can imagine state of governance in such an environment. In fact extortions and taxation have been one of the main sources of income for all the insurgent groups operating in the North-East.13
Good neighbourly relations- a key to peace in North-East
If one major development that has been the core of the issue to tackling insurgency in the North-Eastern States then that credit must go solely to our very speedy and proactive improvement in relations with our immediate neighbours.
Here we must start with Bhutan. Our relations with this Kingdom have always been good but what added synergy to our tackling insurgency in Assam was when military operation, ‘All Clear’ was launched by Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) in 2003 to weed out ULFA insurgent camps from Bhutan territory which resulted in breaking the back of ULFA organisation and its leadership14 and that started the beginning of the end of these groups. On the other hand our improving relations with Bangladesh also resulted in closing the safe sanctuaries of ULFA in that country. The Bangladesh Government really displayed great resolve in making sure that not only ULFA groups from Assam but even those operating in Tripura were completely denied any safe sanctuaries for them to operate against the Indian States. The ever improving relations with these countries have maintained this continuity and pressure on these groups till date.
However, despite this continued cooperation, our biggest weakness remains with that of safe sanctuaries for these insurgent groups still existing in Myanmar. It is not that the Myanmar Government or the Myanmar Army lacks the desire to cooperate with Indian Government but truly speaking there appears to be simply lack of any such capabilities with Myanmar Government. They have their own problems on their borders with Thailand that has greater priority. It is in this backdrop that we often hear of Indian Army’s trans-border forays into Myanmar in pursuit of insurgent groups operating from across these borders. Here too it has been mainly NSCN (K) from Nagaland and PLA of Manipur which have been finding these safe sanctuaries with reports of some ULFA leaders too enjoying such patronage from these groups for monetary considerations. It is this very dimension of safe sanctuaries in Myanmar that also brings in the transit routes for these groups through the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
It is not without a reason that we also keep getting reports of Chinese involvement with these groups for supply of arms and ammunition. If we continue
80 Chanakya Journal of CCSS to present our vulnerabilities, which enemy will not exploit it, could be a simple answer to these reports. However, with China gaining bigger stature in world politics, such low level involvement of their government may not be reality in strict sense but managing arms and ammunition from Chinese can even materialise without involvement of the Government as such.
Look East to Act East?
In between all this, we have been hearing much hyped government’s announcement of policies from Look East to Act East knowing very well that none of the policies are ever going to see the light of the day unless and until security situation not only stabilises completely in this troubled region but also shows a fair degree of sustainable stability and development.
We should also be aware about the Kaladan Multi-model Transit Transport Project that will connect India’s Eastern seaport of Kolkata with its landlocked North-Eastern State of Mizoram by traversing Arakan and Chin States in Myanmar through newly constructed river and highway transport system. This project has been inordinately delayed with huge amount of upward cost escalations that upsets our Act East policy coordinates. All these ventures are going to be high investment multinational projects with much of the FDI that would also be flowing into it. Therefore, we need to show better resolve to stabilise peace in North-Eastern States at the earliest.
Action plan for government
Today Government of India itself is in much stronger position with tremendous capabilities to deal with these groups than what was the case when these groups cropped up decades back for one reason or the other. While on the other hand these insurgent groups have been reduced to terrorists outfit like existence.
The instability has persisted in the North-Eastern States one way or the other for the last seven decades. The only policy prescription that has been observed from the Government side has been to wait and watch, buy time and let the problem tire itself out for a solution. But this approach needs to change now; basically due to the fact that none of these groups are now being driven by the very cause for which they started their movement. There is no popular support of the masses; the extortion and fear driven movement itself is proof enough.
Today Government of India itself is in much stronger position with tremendous capabilities to deal with these groups than what was the case when these
81 Chanakya Journal of CCSS groups cropped up decades back for one reason or the other. While on the other hand these insurgent groups have been reduced to terrorists outfit like existence.
Finally we do not have the luxury of unlimited time that was being allowed previously to these groups to settle the issue with too much room being given to public sentiments. In any case all these States have been having regular elections without any interruptions, as part of democratic processes and their political leadership is of their own choosing. It is becoming more and more critical to develop our North- Eastern region at a faster pace to improve our security vulnerabilities in the East, particularly with ever threatening Chinese push along our borders. This is also a pressing requirement if our Government is to succeed in pursuing our Act East policy in a reasonable timeframe.
Therefore, government must make its policy prescription for North-Eastern States based on the following:-
(a) Laying down of arms as a pre-condition for peace talks. No suspension of operations by security forces supported by subsistence allowance by the Government.
(b) A very comprehensive and thought through rehabilitation package that must cater to and be in sync with ground realities, not half baked politically expedient much hyped media grabbing shows.
(c) Enhancing capabilities of State security apparatus including State armed police forces to deal with these groups so that army is pulled out of all these States and also relieve them of AFSPA.
(d) Develop these States as viable self sustaining economic entities and not keep them dependent on central aid packages to the tune of over 90% dependency that they have at present.
There is a dedicated ministry for ‘Development of North-Eastern Region’ (DONER). Its functioning is far from satisfactory. We also have a North-Eastern Council with its Headquarters based in Shillong to coordinate the development efforts in this region. We do not hear of any of these organisations any more than their mention in the passing. Is it also not the time to revive these setups and make them more vibrant and accountable to the system?
(The writer is a Former Director General of Assam Rifles)
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Notes
1. Ankit Panda,’The Siliguri corridor is terrifyingly vulnerable artery in Indian Geography’ The Diplomat, 08th November 2013. 2. Subham Dutta,’The Naga Movement: A Brief Chronological Understanding’, www.iosrjournal. Volume 21, Issue 5, Ver 2 (May 2011), pp 37-40. 3. Madhu Gurung and Ramtanu Maitra, ’Insurgent groups in Northeast India’ Executive Intelligence Review’, 13th October 1995. 4. Samudra Gupta Kashyap,’Towards the Govt-Naga peace accord: Everything you need to know’, The Indian Express, 04th August 2015. 5. Jaideep Majumdar,’ An Opening to Lasting Peace? What Khaplang’s Death Means for Nagaland’, 13th June 2017, www.swarajyamag.com. 6. Prabin Kalita,’ UNLFW: The New Name for Terror in NE’, The Times of India, 05th June 2015. 7. Shivananda H,’ Militancy in Manipur: A Conflicting Dilemma’, CLAWS Journal, summer 2011. 8. Ibid 9. A Report on Northeast India, Centre for Development and Peace Studies, Updated December 2014, [email protected] 10. M A Athul, ‘Mizoram: Unsettled Peace’, www.indiablooms.com 11. D N Sahaya,’ Triumph over Insurgency’, The Statesman, 6th July 2017. 12. Ibid 13. Brig S K Sharma,’ Taxation and Extortion: A Major Source of Militant Economy in North-East India’, Occasional Papers, Vivekananda International Foundation, July 2016, www.vifindia.org 14. Namrata Goswami, ‘ An assessment of Insurgencies in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland in 2009’, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Issue Brief.
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CHINA - PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (Retd)
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) is the flagship programme of BRI initiative through which China seeks to trump the geography and clear away her ‘Malacca Dilemma’ whose intensity is already sought to be diluted through her nine dash line claim over most of the South China Sea. CPEC connects Kashgar in the Xinjiang province of China to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.
China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) or ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), is the most ambitious international infrastructure development programme in history. It seeks to link up global markets, raw material sources and industries through economic corridors, roadways, railways, seaports, hinterland infrastructure, power generation, industrial parks and their inter-connects; covering 68 countries across three continents accounting for nearly 40% of the global GDP. In the name of a ‘win win business partnership’ based on the principle of mutual benefit, BRI interconnectivity is China’s grand strategy calibrated on the envisaged basis of nothing to lose and everything to gain.
Maritime part of the BRI has subsumed within its ambit the network of China’s individual initiatives to build up military and commercial facilities and relationships along her sea lines of communication stretching from mainland China to East Coast of Africa famously called the “string of pearls” by US consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton.
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) is the flagship programme of BRI initiative through which China seeks to trump the geography and clear away her ‘Malacca Dilemma’ whose intensity is already sought to be diluted through her nine dash line claim over most of the South China Sea. CPEC connects Kashgar in the Xinjiang province of China to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. It is an apparently logical plan but crosses the red line for India since the multimodal transportation infrastructure passes through Gilgit- Baltistan (GB) area of Jammu and Kashmir State which had joined the Union of India through a legally valid Instrument of Accession in Oct 1947. On 01st Nov 1947, however, Major William Brown of the Gilgit Scouts led a mutiny, imprisoned the GB Governor, established a provisional government and asked Pakistan to take over Gilgit-Baltistan; which was illegal but accomplished after 16 days. Subsequently, in 1963, Pakistan also unlawfully ceded more than 5,000 sq km of Shaksgam Valley or Trans Karakoram Tract in GB part of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to China. A conditional clause in the Sino-Pak agreement had taken note of the India-
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Pakistan territorial dispute. CPEC agreements now, however, do not allude to any dispute about the territory and steam roller past the Indian claims.
What some consider China’s geostrategic masterstroke, may also entail existential portends for Pakistan in case one or more of internal security challenges posed by Baloch nationalism in Pakistan, Uighur separatism in China or Pakistan funded cross border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir State of India; spiral out of control. CPEC, therefore, needs to be comprehensively analysed by India not only because it seeks to formalise the violation of her sovereignty but also because she would be the most directly affected third party in any bleak scenario.
China
Unveiled in 2013 as OBOR, BRI is a grand vision of overland connectivity from China to Western Europe via Central Asia, West Asia, Russia’s heartland across the entire landmass of continental Asia, Eastern Europe and the Baltic nations. Its maritime connectivity envisages routeing through as well as past the South China Sea into the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean developing and interlinking littoral ports and trading hubs from South Asia to West Asia and East Africa. Estimates of BRI financial outlay range from US $ 800 billion to 1 trillion but there is no ambiguity at all about China being firmly in the driver’s seat. Chinese investment, as some grants but mostly soft loans, is the main attraction for countries whose infrastructure is sought to be developed. Since China has foreign exchange reserves of the order of US $ 3.5 trillion, it is a great bargain for them to invest some of it where return would be higher than US treasury bonds, the trade would benefit all participating countries - China being the foremost among them and the recipients would not only be under obligation but indeed under a fair degree of control.
Presently, the shortest sea route from China to Europe, Africa and West Asia is via the Malacca Straits. President Hu Jintao in 2003 had lamented China’s over reliance on the Malacca Straits through which all of her industrial raw material & other imports and all her exports to the West in addition to 80% of her seaborne energy imports had to pass. He had termed this strategic vulnerability to maritime interdiction as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. This sea route is nearly 12,000 km long whereas the distance from Gwadar port to Xinjiang province is approx 3,000 km and the distance from Xinjiang to East coast of China is another 3,500 km. Thus, the CPEC connectivity will nearly halve the Chinese shipment distances to and fro West. The fuel consumed by a ship is only 15% that of a road transport and 54% of the rail transport – thereby reducing the sea borne tariff to less than a quarter of the road transport and less than a half of the rail transport for the same distance. Economics of the CPEC transportation would really be a derivative of where in China the energy /industrial raw material are going to and where the industrial produce are coming from. Admittedly, the shorter connectivity would also facilitate industrialisation
85 Chanakya Journal of CCSS of China’s relatively neglected western region and reduce its prosperity differential with the eastern & southern coastal regions. Put together, the logic of CPEC is as much, if not more, strategic than commercial.
The proverbial baby steps towards what would take shape as the CPEC had, in fact, been initiated more than half a century earlier as is brought out hereunder. Those and many of the later small steps, were not part of a grand design to start with. But as China’s economic clout strengthened, increasingly grandiose schemes came to be drawn up to provide for her evolving geostrategic options.
Historical background
Without underplaying the single minded purposefulness, deep strategic thought and sustained pursuit of objectives over generations of change in political leadership; 21st Century China is a direct derivative of Kissinger-Nixon initiated US grand plan nearly half a century ago to build China as an effective counterpoise to the Soviet Union. This was done by opening the gates to welcome, persuade and prod China into the West led economic order. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978 were the first stage wherein de-collectivisation of agriculture, opening up the country to foreign direct investment and permission for entrepreneurs to start businesses delivered almost instant dividends. The second stage of reforms late in 1980s and 90s were fully aided and abetted by the US through advanced scientific education & tools and effective help in bridging technological voids. Once the Chinese industrial juggernaut picked up momentum, western markets were the most logical and mutually convenient destinations for much cheaper Chinese industrial produce. In an unplanned twist of the plot, the Soviet Union imploded without US having to play the China card. And in a manoeuvre that Sun Tzu would approve of, the dragon chose not to fill the just vacated space but has turned to try and get the US to share if not actually vacate the strategic space the latter currently occupies as a global hegemon.
The construction of Karakoram Highway (KKH), also known as the China- Pakistan Friendship Highway, to connect Pakistani province of Punjab with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through GB in POK was initiated in 1959 but initial progress was tardy. After a re-appreciation of the degree of difficulty in constructing one of the highest paved roads in the world, through elevations of over 15,000 ft, the project was recast in 1966 and finally inaugurated in 1979. In 2006 China and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding to rebuild and upgrade KKH – expanding its width from 10 to 30 metres and tripling the transport capacity to also accommodate heavy-laden vehicles and extreme weather conditions. In 2010 a massive landslide necessitated realignment of KKH at the Pakistan end which was completed in 2015.
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Meanwhile, taking a cue from the United Nation’s non binding, voluntarily implemented action plan for sustainable development in the then coming 21st Century, viz, ‘Agenda 21’, produced at the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992; China brought out in 1996 an action plan for development of her marine programs entitled ‘China Ocean Agenda 21’. This was a set of policy guidelines to rationally develop and utilize marine resources in a sustainable manner and to protect marine environment. This was followed up by a White Paper in 1998 which, taking note of the double digit economic growth sustained over two decades, identified twenty different sectors of Chinese marine economy for development of her maritime power. These included shipping, shipbuilding, ports and harbours, fisheries, inland waterways, offshore minerals, seabed minerals, offshore oil and gas resources etc. Parallelly, sustained investments were also made in research, development, purchase and theft of science and technology including for offensive as well as defensive capabilities of the Peoples’ Liberation Army and missile & space applications.
The prioritisation and determination with which integrated development of the maritime sector was undertaken, would illustrate the seriousness of Chinese intent. In 1986 China had 523 shipyards which in 15 years grew to 1,250 shipbuilding and ship repairing enterprises, including 285 State owned enterprises, 857 collective businesses and 78 foreign funded ventures. After holding the third largest shipbuilding nation’s position for more than a decade, China is now the largest shipbuilder in gross tonnage. In 1961, China established its national shipping company COSCO with 25 ships with carrying capacity of 200,000 tons annually. China today has seven listed companies with more than 300 subsidiaries and owns around 5000 ships with carrying capacity of 30 million tons. Port development is another area where China has invested heavily and today 13 of her ports feature in the list of top twenty ports in the world. Fully consistent with the shipping, ship building and maritime infrastructure development; China has also invested deeply in PLA Navy (PLAN) development programme.
During a formal call on the then Deputy Commander in Chief of the PLA in 2007, the author had occasion to mention the massive fund allocations to PLA in general and PLAN in particular. The General brazened it out by saying that the investments were mostly towards enhancing the quality of life of PLA personnel which had been neglected for some time. And, on cue, two days later Commandant of the Nanjing Army Command and Staff College conducted the author to some very elegant five star facilities and living accommodation for the trainees. The ruse, however, fell apart when the author sought confirmation that the accommodation complex was for indeed for PLA personnel and the unsuspecting Commandant blurted out no, it was exclusively for the foreign trainees! He was requested to report back to Dy C-in-C the gist of this conversation as the latter seemed to be under a somewhat different impression!
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The Chinese Government has regularly issued a white paper every alternate year since 1998. The white paper titled ‘China’s National Defence in 2010’ had reviewed the modernisation of PLAN which was seen to evolve in line with requirement of ‘offshore defence strategy’. Even though the full scope of offshore defence strategy was not made available, it was a clear enough departure from the ‘active defence’ strategy of the 2007 white paper which itself was an upgradation from the ‘passive defence’ strategy of the 1980s and '90s. The 2011 white paper, however, did make it clear that the PLAN now sought new methods of logistics support for sustaining long term maritime missions while continuing investment in a shore based support system. As a corollary, the 2013 white paper identified the additional tasks as “....strengthen overseas operational capabilities such as emergency response and rescue, merchant vessel protection at sea and evacuation of Chinese nationals and provide reliable security support for China’s interests overseas....”. Meanwhile, the 18th CPC National Congress held in November 2012 not only heralded a leadership transition but the outgoing President Hu Jintao also declared that “We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests and build China into a maritime power”.
With most building blocks in place, the decks were cleared for President Xi Jinping to chart China’s destiny beyond second decade of the 21st Century. He would do so with all elements of China’s maritime power in advanced stages of development, fruits of three decades long economic boom ready for the pluck, scientific and technological prowess particularly in the space and cyber domains at an adequate level of disruptive potential, militaries growing and poised with asymmetric warfare capability. As President he has the mandate to depute Chinese nationals overseas for infrastructure development & commercial activities and as Commander in Chief of the Central Military Commission he has the mandate for PLA to underwrite security of Chinese nationals anywhere on earth.
Unfolding plan
CPEC is the collective name given to a large number of infrastructure projects taken up under a 2013 agreement between China and Pakistan for rapid modernisation of road and rail networks, many energy projects and special economic zones. Initiated in 2015, the project had envisaged an estimated outlay of US $ 46 billion – 35 billion for energy projects, 11 billion for infrastructure development including Gwadar port, industrial zones and mass transit schemes etc. In addition, Beijing has committed to invest US $ 8.5 billion as part of contribution towards joint energy, transport and infrastructure plans taking the total cost outlay closer to 55 billion. Chinese private banks are supposed to provide major portion of this outlay.
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The CPEC project costs are currently valued at US $ 62 billion and the figure is expected to rise.
The project envisages transportation network to link the ports of Gwadar and Karachi to Northern Pakistan, Western China and Central Asia via modern motorways and reconstructed & overhauled KKH. Pakistan’s railway network will also be upgraded to 160 kmph in the sub mountainous region and extended it to connect with China’s Southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar. A network of optical fibre cables for tele-communications and pipelines are also planned to be laid to transport liquefied natural gas and oil.
Even though most projects are at varying stages of progress, the concept was validated through partial operationalisation in Nov 2016 when nearly 250 Chinese containers were transported overland from hinterland factories via Kashgar to Gwadar port for onward shipment by sea to Bangladesh, EU, Sri Lanka and the UAE.
Speed breakers and show stoppers
Even though authentic bits of information coming out of Xinjiang are few and far in between, it does appear that harsh crack down on the largest group of Muslims in China has not resulted in an altogether satisfactory outcome. With the confidence derived after reducing the ethnic Uighur population to a minority in their own land; mosques are barred from calls to prayer, fasting during Ramadan is forbidden, children under 18 are barred from entering the mosques, Muslim sounding names are not being permitted and ethnic & religious persecution has multiplied. For nearly two decades, Uighur militants have been training and fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Taliban. There are also reports of Uighurs attacking security forces in Xinjiang. Chinese claim of having dismantled 200 terrorist groups and executed 49 militants in the last three years, in fact confirms the grim portends in Xinjiang.
Unstable security situation in Xinjiang, whether on account of perceived religious persecution or due disaffection resulting from iniquitous distribution of prosperity or from the IS tentacles taking root or from a combination of these; holds out catastrophic potential against practicability of OBOR and therefore, against CPEC.
CPEC’s legality is questionable on account of the Indian claims over Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in general and over the Saksham Valley territory illegally ceded by Pakistan to China, in particular. There are genuine apprehensions that China may intervene if Pakistan is not able to socially and politically manage the legal and moral dimensions of the imbroglio. And, in Chinese lexicon intervention means taking over first and working on its consequential effects later. Signs of such
89 Chanakya Journal of CCSS overlordship are already visible in local residents’ disaffection, summary dismissal by the Chinese of any local objections, absolute secretiveness of the plan details and massive induction of military hardware in the disputed area. For China this is a plan imperative, for Pakistan it is a small price to be paid for economic development and for India this is an unacceptable formalisation of intrusion & placement of a ticking time bomb.
For all the hubris demonstrated by China in going ahead with the CEPC, her extreme discomfiture with the legal status of the BG area is palpably manifest in the desperate attempts being made by Pakistan to change the latter’s nomenclature and constitutional status. A motion tabled in the UK House of Commons on 23rd Mar 2017, which said that GB was an integral part of the princely State of J & K which had legally acceded to India on 26th Oct 1947, has also not brought any comfort to the errant parties.
Pakistan
Borrowing the concept from the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani had in Dec 2010 described the Sino-Pak friendship as “ higher than the mountains, deeper than the ocean, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey”. Variants of this have appeared in the media since, to colourfully describe the relationship with the sentiments of “love”, “affection”, “deep affinity” etc. The effusive descriptions have mostly been used by the Pakistan’s side, their Chinese counterparts maintaining a far more dignified reserve in their expressions.
Pakistan’s journey from a member of South East Asia Treaty Organisation constituted in 1954 to contain Chinese communism, to become the facilitator for Kissinger-Nixon visits to China in 1971-72, to receiving nuclear weapon development assistance from China starting with fissile material production assistance in 1983 while continuing to receive billions of dollars in aid, military hardware etc from the United States, to now firmly embed in the dragon-fold; makes for a fascinating case study of strategic double timing.
It is of interest for Pakistan’s friends and foes alike and much more for its neighbours, to try and figure out how Pakistan is likely to unravel in the foreseeable future.
Historical background
During the first forty years of its existence, three men played pivotal roles in defining Pakistan as we know her today. The first was Mohammed Ayub Khan, a Brigadier in the undivided India’s British Indian Army who opted for Pakistan as the tenth senior most officer but was picked out of turn for promotion as a three-
90 Chanakya Journal of CCSS star Commander in Chief of the Army in 1951. During the tumultuous decade, as Pakistan experimented with democratic politics and rejected them; Ayub Khan’s responsibilities grew as Defence Minister in 1954, concurrently promoted four star General in 1957 and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) in 1958 when President Iskander Mirza mobilized the armed forces, dismissed Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon, abrogated the Constitution and declared Martial Law. It took General Ayub Khan less than three weeks to muster support of senior most Generals and their Naval & Air Force counterparts, depose his long time mentor Iskandar Mirza, exile him to England, assume Presidency, hand over Army Chief’s appointment and to promote himself Field Marshal. This was the first defining moment in the breakaway Pakistan wherein the army’s primacy in affairs of the State was so firmly established that it continues to date. In fact, the Army has so securely entrenched itself in Pakistan State that no responsibility can ever be pinned to it – be it for losing all four wars it has fought against India or for allowing Osama Bin Laden to be holed up for years within 1.3 kilometres of the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad or for allowing the US forces to take out Osama undetected or for any of its numerous other blunders. During his Presidency, Ayub Khan also introduced a liberal constitution, abolished unmitigated polygamy, placed brakes on triple talaq, pursued industrialization and rural development, adopted capitalism, invited capital for foreign direct investment, built many public sector universities and schools, revised the education syllabus on scientific lines and obtained major funding support from the US for military modernisation. During the 1950s, Pakistan had already signed up for membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), both US led, to contain southward expansion of communism – the former against China and the latter against Soviet Union. This notwithstanding, by early 1960s Pakistan had already signed a frontiers agreement with China illegally ceding POK territory to China and was gambolling with Soviet Russia after caving in to Nikita Khrushchev’s pressure. The art of strategic double timing was honed over ensuing decades.
The second person to have played a pivotal role in defining Pakistan was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Son of an aristocratic high official father and endowed with a very sharp brain, Bhutto studied political science in US and England and law in England. At 30 he was the youngest minister in Iskandar Mirza’s cabinet. Leaving Ayub Khan to manage the raising US hackles, Foreign Minister Bhutto openly flirted with China, East Germany and Poland even as he maintained prominent roles for Pakistan in SEATO as well as in CENTO. During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Bhutto was all for accepting Chinese invitation for Pakistan to join hands against India and publicly disagreed with Ayub Khan. In 1965, he actively pushed Ayub into launching hostilities to annex Kashmir from India and got well clear to launch his own political party when the operations failed, leaving Ayub to take all responsibility. Likewise after Dec 1970 elections, which he lost to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Bhutto fully supported Pakistan Army’s repression in East Pakistan but held Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya
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Khan responsible for the misadventure which saw halving of Pakistan, creation of Bangladesh and India accepting the largest military surrender since World War II. Bhutto became President and Pakistan’s first civilian martial law administrator. Within months he shuffled about the bureaucracy & military leadership and signed the Simla Agreement with Indira Gandhi to recover 93,000 prisoners of war and 5000 sq miles of lost territory from India. He consolidated his position through a new constitution, as newly empowered Prime Minister and strengthened ties with the Soviet Union, China and Saudi Arabia. He introduced industrial and economic reforms and won the 1977 elections albeit in the midst of alleged vote rigging. Political and civil unrest grew and Bhutto was deposed by his own protégé from Brigadier days and now newly appointed Chief of Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto was tried for authorising murder of a political opponent and executed in 1979.
Bhutto’s exposures during political science studies in the US had triggered in him an early interest in nuclear technology. Since 1958 he had played a key role in setting up Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission, identified key nuclear scientists and arranged funding for nuclear research. As Foreign Minister in 1965 he famously declared that “... even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bomb..”. In 1974, AQ Khan the Bhutto chosen metallurgist systematically stole uranium enrichment centrifuge design and blueprints from URENCO plant in the Netherlands which provided the technical basis for Pakistan’s nuclear bomb programme directly and fully orchestrated under Bhutto’s State patronage. Nuclear technology was also pursued through research, collaboration, purchase and every possible subterfuge from the West as well as from China through outright transfer and the deterrent was stealthily developed by mid 1980s - albeit beyond Bhutto’s lifetime. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear deterrent was the second turning point. Dubbed ‘Islamic Bomb’ by the West and gleefully adopted by Pakistan, the expression served Pakistan’s twin purposes of political expediency internally and of rallying forth the Muslim world support internationally. There was also an element of truth to the expression due proliferation of centrifuge technology to Libya and Iran. Today, there are genuine fears about possibilities of jihadis, terrorists or other self proclaimed agents of global caliphate movement gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
The third turning point in Pakistan’s short history was authored by General Zia ul Haq. The 1973 Constitution drawn up under Bhutto had declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic, Islam as State religion, created Shariat Courts and the Council of Islamic Ideology but it was Zia ul Haq who systematically drew up and implemented Pakistan’s Islamisation programme and enforced the Sharia Law. He replaced parts of Pakistan’s Penal Code (PPC) with the 1979 ‘Hudood Ordinance’ which, inter alia, added new criminal offences of adultery and fornication to Pakistan’s criminal law and new sentences of whipping, amputation and stoning to death. He also established ‘Shariat Appellate Benches’ (SABs) at the four High Courts to judge legal cases using the teachings of Quran and Sunnah and to examine country’s laws to
92 Chanakya Journal of CCSS determine whether they complied with Shariat Law and bring them into alignment if they did not. SABs were designated as the ‘final authority’ in Shariat cases. The PPCs and Criminal Procedure Code were amended three times through ordinances in the early eighties to outlaw blasphemy. The wide sweep of Zia’s ordinances and policies also covered economic Islamisation through ‘Zakat and Ushr Ordinance;’ ‘Riba’ and land reforms; criminal law & law of evidence; religious practices such as prayer timings & eating in public during Ramadan; social conventions such as women’s headgear, participation in sports/performing arts & travelling overseas unescorted and a broad spectrum of societal aspects such as textbooks, education curricula, madarssa expansion et al. It did not leave any field of national endeavour or institution untouched including the army. According to author Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, Zia’s interpretation of Islam “..contributed to the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and retrogression in Pakistan”.
Radicalisation of the society under Zia ul Haq in a short span of a dozen years combined with the development of nuclear bomb viewed not just as a deterrent but considered an Islamic asset in a country where army dictates the constitution; released the genie which is difficult to rebottle. The epithets used for Pakistan today range from ‘global hub of terror’, ‘failing to an almost failed State’, ‘unstable State with nukes in its grip, in the grip of radical Islamists’, ‘haven for terrorists’, ‘the only sovereign State to admit inability to control terror emanating from its own soil’ and many more to similar effect.
In its quest to gain equality with an unequal India in the last seventy years, Pakistan has cavorted in turn as well as concurrently with the US, Soviet Union, Germanys - East & West, Poland, the Russian Federation and is now shedding all inhibitions to leap into the Chinese fold. Successive leaders in Pakistan have disregarded the most valuable lesson of history, including in the land of their own forefathers, that sovereignty is the first price to be paid in an iniquitous strategic relationship, denudation of societal prosperity & citizens’ well being the next and loss of own national & cultural identity the very ultimate.
Located on the Makaran coast, which acceded to Pakistan in 1948, Gwadar and the adjoining area had been an overseas territory of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman since 1783. Based on the findings of a survey conducted by the US Geological Survey in 1954, Pakistan evinced keen interest in the enclave to develop it as a deep water seaport. After four years of negotiations, Pakistan purchased the territory for US $ 3 million in 1958 and integrated into the Makaran district of Balochistan province as Gwadar tehsil. For the next forty years, however, the port development plans lay dormant except that a small wharf was completed in 1992. After revival of the project in 1998, the first phase of port construction was taken up by China in 2001, completed in 2007 and the first cargo vessel docked in March 2008. Further work, thereafter, was held up due to political instability in Pakistan,
93 Chanakya Journal of CCSS lack of investment, separate security concerns posed by Taliban militants and Baloch nationalists and failure of Pakistan Government to transfer land as promised to the port operator, viz, Port of Singapore Authority. Almost as if playing out a pre determined script, in 2013, Gwadar port was handed over to the State owned China Overseas Port Holdings for phase II of development and operations. Incorporated as the southern hub of CPEC since 2015, China is covering almost 80% of the US $ 1.36 billion cost as grants and soft loans. Mushahid Hussain, Chairman of Pakistan’s Parliamentary Panel on CPEC has quite candidly admitted recently that there are 9000 Chinese engineers, technicians and specialists working on different projects under the CPEC.
Many specialised agencies, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, have tabled serious misgivings about Pakistan’s ability to manage repayment obligations of the soft loans so attractively packaged for the CPEC projects. Despite an early surge in the Pak economy, this would have deleterious implications in the long term.
Unfolding plans
At the time of breaking away from India in 1947, Pakistan Navy (PN) had inherited one third of the seagoing assets. These were all ex UK. By about the mid 1950s, UK had declined many of Pakistani requests for sale/ transfer of seagoing units including submarines. With Pakistan joining SEATO and CENTO, the PN inductions started being controlled by the US. For nearly half a century thereafter PN received operational assets from the US or from the US cleared other NATO members. The only exception was a fleet tanker received from China in 1987. In the new millennium, however, the tide turned and in a rapidly developing cosy relationship PN started receiving/constructing with Chinese know-how Frigates, helicopters, Fast Attack Craft, Patrol Craft and Missile Boats. A US $ 6 billion deal has recently been signed for six submarines from China along with transfer of technology and for modernisation and expansion of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW).
In addition to China taking over administrative control of Gwadar port, two frigates have been transferred to PN for local naval defence of Gwadar. Pakistan has also raised and deployed Special Security Division, a fifteen thousand strong force of combatants, for protecting CPEC personnel, projects and infrastructure.
Put together, all above means that China right upto its East coast will soon have multimodal modern transportation access to energy and raw material to and from markets, through the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean to West Asia and Africa at half the distance and transit time, bypassing the Malacca Dilemma; a base with customised facilities for surveillance and maritime operations less than a day’s
94 Chanakya Journal of CCSS deployment time away from two key choke points, viz, Straits of Hormuz and Bab Al Mandeb. With increasing PN inductions ex China, dual use maintenance facilities would be available close at hand in their de facto base for PLAN units on western deployments. Security for the entirety of CPEC would, naturally, be the responsibility of Pakistan. And yet, the Chinese provisions for overseeing and overriding Pakistan’s security arrangements on its own soil with PLA intervention have already been promulgated to the world. Thus, Pakistan’s route to prosperity is all too visibly paved with Chinese tiles bearing the price tag of the former’s sovereignty.
Speed breakers and show stoppers
Allegations of corruption in execution of various projects have been hampering their progress. Admittedly, the existing national infrastructure in Pakistan will improve substantively despite the time and therefore, cost overruns. There are already media reports of Chinese dissatisfaction with it all and time alone will tell as to how cost effective it would be for prime mover of the entire scheme.
Multilayer security infrastructure deployment notwithstanding, there are two specific security breach scenarios which can derail CPEC in the first instance and implode Pakistan in the next, viz, IS/Baloch separatist movement targeting the CPEC nodes anywhere from waterfront to hinterland in the province and any one of the many terror groups brazenly flourishing on the soil of Pakistan turning the heat on at the elaborate transportation and communication infrastructure web coming up in that country. The danger is not so much from disruptions which may be temporary and repairable as from catastrophic damages which may fragment the society and paralyse the administration. And the real danger is of quasi permanent Chinese intervention to stabilise Pakistan to safeguard her own stake.
The potential and probability of a grim scenario developing uncontrolled, are very high in a complex intertwined situation where credibility of both protagonists is very low as colourfully illustrated in the brief conversational exchange the author had with Richard Armitage former US Deputy Secretary of State in 2010 “.. the Chinese lie between their teeth most brazenly, how can we trust them? ...You mean, if their lips are moving, they are lying?... Yes, well put. ...We used to say that for the Pakistanis!..”.
India’s options
Time is appropriate now for India to initiate a slew of concurrent actions.
Firstly, India must learn not to whine at unfavourable developments in areas of its legitimate interests and instead, should come up with robust responses.
Secondly, India should activate Special Representative or such other apex
95 Chanakya Journal of CCSS level diplomacy route to convey to China that her going ahead with CPEC even after having recorded the acknowledgement of dispute as early as in 1963, would leave India with no choice but to seek legal intervention. And that India would like to avoid this. So should China, because an ascendant world power cannot create a perception that it does not care about visible legitimacy of all its actions and still expects to be considered credible.
Thirdly, India should go ahead and seek International Court of Justice (ICJ) intervention to stay the CPEC initiative on grounds that construction of infrastructure on disputed territory would be repugnant in law even if undertaken by a third party at the invitation of or in collaboration with, one of the litigants. Admittedly, Simla Agreement binds both India and Pakistan to resolve all outstanding disputes bilaterally and India must continue to abide by it. However, the issue at hand is not bilateral but involvement of a third party, viz, China that had in 1963 acknowledged the pre-existence of a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. In fact, Article 6 of the 1963 Sino-Pak agreement refers to the need for China and Pakistan to re- negotiate their boundary after settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Since CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan area of the State of Jammu & Kashmir which had legally acceded to the Union of India, issues such as import duty/ GST/transit tax etc as per Indian law would come into play whether or not India participates in the CPEC. This implication is equally, albeit differently, applicable to POK which is a bilateral matter between India & Pakistan and to transit through the Saksham Valley which becomes a trilateral matter due to Pakistan illegally ceding it to China. China’s comments that “OBOR is about economic cooperation and is not political in nature” and that “CPEC is for promoting economic cooperation on connectivity and has no connections to or impact on sovereignty issues” are devoid of any logic or legal merit. This is because the rights to construct and to tax are both derived directly from ownership and sovereignty.
Fourthly, India should very carefully monitor the developments in China in general and Xinjiang province in particular on the one hand and those in Pakistan in general and separately in Gwadar, Balochistan, POK, Gilgit-Baltistan on the other hand. There is need for firewalls and bolsters against any fallout of implosions or explosions crossing over into India.
Fifthly, India should have contingency plans against Pak adventurism whether to distract from its own failing State or to rope in China for a collusive confrontation with India. The action plan should include economic, trade, diplomatic and military subsets.
Sixthly, India should invest in own infrastructure as well as that of friendly countries in the region to provide for seamless flow of trade and commerce. Likewise, procedural bottlenecks must be removed. All this is not to compete with BRI or the CPEC subset thereof but merely to answer the long overdue call of the times.
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Seventhly, India must establish maritime dialogues at the level of NSAs in the maritime neighbourhood on the lines similar to India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral which was subsequently expanded to include Seychelles and Mauritius but lay dormant since the changes in governments. Admittedly, personal chemistries matter but formalised dialogue platforms should not be hostage to national politics. In fact, there is need for a similar dialogue in the East as well perhaps starting with Indonesia, Australia, Vietnam and Japan which can be expanded in due course to include China, Malaysia and Thailand as well.
Eigthly, India’s contingency plans must factor in the distinct probability of Pakistan becoming China’s lackey. Since all along its history China has refrained from assuming overseas administrative responsibility and preferred to stand off & remotely exercise influence and receive tributes; it is likely to safeguard its own interests in Pakistan through proxy instead of getting embroiled in the ongoing societal turmoil there. Pakistan’s best bet, on the other hand, will be to ensure co- location of Chinese interests, assets and personnel with own vital assets so as to obtain security through physical proximity.
Ninthly, just as it does not behove India conduct itself like a regional bully it cannot allow a bundle of contradictions like Pakistan to export strife & terror across the border. It is for the latter to manage own survival and well being but India has no reason to tolerate being made a crutch for that. Whereas the suggestion is not that India engages in any subversive or destabilising activity in Pakistan, it certainly is that any attempts by the latter to do so in India should invite overwhelming responses. This should be well appreciated by China as well so that their citizens engaged in legitimate activity in Pakistan do even not inadvertently get caught in the crossfire of retaliatory consequences which must follow every Pak transgression.
And tenthly, the largest democracy on earth must cease punching well below its own weight. The quest for its manifest destiny enjoins that India comes out of the perpetual election mode, looks way beyond electoral politics of the day and engages seriously in governance. All organs of the State need to discharge their constitutional responsibilities conscientiously, meticulously and professionally without letting the din and dust of vibrant vox populi distract them. The law makers must focus upon making laws after discussing them within the portals of parliament and not on the streets or television shows; the executive must function as per the book, rewrite the book where necessary and then serve the citizens as it is meant to; the judiciary must continue to adjudicate impartially and transparently and the media must mirror the image of the society without distorting it. The citizens have a right to expect quality education and reasonable standard of living, equal opportunity and even handed justice. The feudal and colonial management modalities of patronage and favours need to be buried through forward looking governance with a modern outlook. The time to buck up is, now.
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Conclusion
India has opted to stay out of the CPEC project because it violates her sovereignty. This by itself will not negate, retard or even discourage the scheme. It is, therefore, up to India to determine, calibrate and initiate those steps which would safeguard her sovereignty and geostrategic interests. This, however, cannot be done in isolation. And, it would be a major challenge to muster international support because in the hardball of realpolitiks, convergence of geostrategic interests is a primary prerequisite for support.
China is marching resolutely down the BRI route with most of the Indian Ocean littoral nations looking forward to benefiting from it. History, geography and a lot of chicanery have placed Pakistan in a position to offer some unique contributions to the CPEC. The Chinese have invested a great deal in sugar coating to make the most ambitious international infrastructure development programme in history, attractive to the participants and to the beneficiaries. Even though a great deal of opacity surrounded many vital details of the projects, most nations have welcomed the concept and its broad outlines. There have, however, been some serious misgivings also in many quarters about different aspects of the programme including in Pakistan.
India has opted to stay out of the CPEC project because it violates her sovereignty. This by itself will not negate, retard or even discourage the scheme. It is, therefore, up to India to determine, calibrate and initiate those steps which would safeguard her sovereignty and geostrategic interests. This, however, cannot be done in isolation. And, it would be a major challenge to muster international support because in the hardball of realpolitiks, convergence of geostrategic interests is a primary prerequisite for support.
All above notwithstanding; robust defence of the nation’s turf, territory, interests and values can only be ensured in the first person plural. We can do this through collective wisdom, focused plan, sustained implementation and unwavering resolve. Our western neighbour has, ever since its birth, consistently sought a short cut to success and thought nothing of forsaking own sovereignty for short term gains. We, on the other hand, have not even momentarily thought of it in pursuance of our long term interests and focused upon first getting the fundamentals right starting with democracy. That, in cosmic terms, would be the difference between a shooting star and a rising star.
(The author is a former Commandant, National Defence College)
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SITUATION IN KASHMIR - LIKELIHOOD OF SHIFT FROM SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS TO CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (Retd)
Introduction
Indian Armed Forces must realistically view the situation and respond to the proxy war in a calibrated manner and undertake operations where our superiority in conventional strength must expose the adversary’s nuclear bluff. It is indeed creditable of our Prime Minister to point out the enemy’s fault lines in Balochistan, Gilgit and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and warn him against interfering in India’s domestic problems.
In the current milieu of Indo-Pak relations, the adversary across our western border is doing his best to nullify India’s conventional superiority by opting for a lowering of the threshold on the usage of nuclear weapons. Time and again he has been threatening India with the usage of strategic weaponry. The Tactical Nuclear Weapon which Pakistan boasts of is cold tested and its usage against mechanised columns would cause limited casualties. Indian Armed Forces must realistically view the situation and respond to the proxy war in a calibrated manner and undertake operations where our superiority in conventional strength must expose the adversary’s nuclear bluff. It is indeed creditable of our Prime Minister to point out the enemy’s fault lines in Balochistan, Gilgit and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and warn him against interfering in India’s domestic problems. Further, after the attack on Uri, the Army successfully undertook surgical strikes in the northern theatre and destroyed four posts to silence Pakistan. This worked for some time but the situation again became hot and tense. Recent exposes have shown the Hurriyat receiving funds from Pakistan and being involved in burning of schools and assisting militants in various operations. It is indeed sad that militants attacked and killed a Young Army officer who had come on leave in southern Kashmir. Also, Border Action Teams (BAT) of Pakistan had mutilated bodies of two soldiers killed in action.
Sub conventional challenge
Pakistan has been fighting a Hybrid war with India since 1990. It has realised post-Kargil that proxy war is the best way of putting down India which enjoyed a conventional superiority. There have been a series of events since the Mumbai attack on 26th November 2008, particularly the openly supported agitations
99 Chanakya Journal of CCSS in the Kashmir valley since 08th July 2016, consequent on the killing of Burhan Wani, the Commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen. Currently Pakistan agencies are concentrating on leading the protest movement in southern Kashmir with the help of ‘non state actors’ operating out of Pakistan. They undertake these operations through Fourth Generation warriors to cause chaos, consternation and casualties in India’s hinterland. Pakistan as usual denies any hand in these activities. Diplomatically, India has left no stone unturned in giving full details to Pakistan about its covert support to the militants. The Pakistanis believe that constant denials lead to issues getting diluted over a period of time. They favour protracted negotiations to keep the pot boiling. While media and the Indian establishment express optimism about improvement, a militant attack takes place and the situation comes back to where it was earlier. In the debates and statements Pakistan denies its complicity, talks of its nuclear weapons and warns India not to cross the rubicon and settle outstanding disputes. Pakistan’s strategy is to weaken India through a prolonged proxy war.
In such a situation where diplomacy does not work, India is left with no other option but to either consider curtailing water flowing into Pakistan or use Hard Power. These are discussed at all forums but when push comes to shove, India stops short of taking a decisive action. It is time we change our stance and not let fourth or possibly fifth generation warriors of the adversary spread to the ground level and start attacking our police stations, Army and Air Force Bases. These attacks are the handiwork of the ISI which functions directly under the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army. The Army and the Pakistan civil administration are not on the same page and these attacks will therefore continue to keep the Indian Armed Forces bleeding. It is pertinent to note that for the first time in its history the Pakistan Army is fighting militancy in all its four provinces. This would continue as Pakistan irrationally differentiates between a good and a bad terrorist depending upon the latter’s alignments. Pak Army does not realise that both are going to destroy the State in Pakistan. This is the reason why the surgical strikes on 29th September 2016 had a limited impact as Pakistan’s line of aiding local terrorists to keep Kashmir valley destabilised has not changed.
Need to gradually move to conventional
It is gradually becoming clear that present methods are only skirting the problem to deal with Pakistan using covert power and a defensive reaction. It is time we changed our approach and started giving more effective response to these attacks. On the civilian side we can calibrate the flow of water in a manner that Pakistan feels the pinch of receiving lesser quantity. The other step is to activate the Line of Control. This should be done carefully after removing the civilians to safer places and use Artillery to hit the enemy’s field works, Command and Control Centres as also the Gun Areas. Pakistan’s capability in terms of Guns and Ammunition is far
100 Chanakya Journal of CCSS less than ours. Pakistan always prevents India from using our Artillery as it knows that the Indian Artillery was stronger and had the capability to undertake sustained fire which would play havoc with Pakistan’s Command and Control system, Line of Communications and the day to day routine regarding defences on the Line of Control. With our detailed knowledge of the opponents Gun Positions, we have the capability to silence those Guns and decimate other targets. It may be recalled how in November 2003, Pakistan unilaterally declared cease fire which India later accepted gracefully. It was because the domination of Artillery fire was complete and Pakistan was running out of its capability to undertake sustained Artillery duels.
The next aspect pertains to our superior conventional forces. If the Pakistani Army does not change its ways after our domination of the Line of Control we must undertake conventional operations which would entail use of Intermediate Battle Groups in the Mountains and Riverine terrain in conjunction with Deep Strikes in deserts. While the Battle Groups would be used in shallow thrusts, the strike formations would undertake Deep Strikes. Pakistan has lowered its nuclear threshold and threatens to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) against these offensives.
However, the TNW is a Cold Tested weapon and its range being limited it would have to be deployed in the field at about 40 km from the Border making it vulnerable to our air and missile attacks. Nuclear weapons of Pakistan are for deterrence and for providing parity with India in a politico strategic realm. The actual possibility of use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is zero. Senior Pakistani officers have categorically stated that the Indian response to Pakistan’s first use would be a total Holocaust. In late 2010 with 90 TNWs Pakistan found it difficult to stop an Indian Armoured Division moving dispersed on a 30 km frontage. There would be a minimum inescapable requirement of 436 TNWs to stop an Armoured Division. With the reported accelerated production of plutonium from three military dedicated reactors in Khushab and a fourth under construction it would result in an inventory of 200 warheads by 2020. To further compound matters for Pakistan, the issue of miniaturising the warhead to fit into the Nasr missile with a 30 cm diameter is a complex engineering problem. Also, data shows that a TNW use against a Combat Group moving dispersed over an 8 km front would at best produce 25 casualties and damage to about four tanks. Accordingly not much should be read against the TNW and the Indian Army must retain the option of Deep Strikes particularly in the southern theatre. The Artillery must work towards locating the Nasr and develop possibly with external assistance a Make in India project the capacity to destroy the Nasr in flight.
The entire response must be synergised and it is high time we took the fight back to Pakistani soil. The strategy calls for a changed Offensive Mind-set which must work out the details and synergise the leaders, bureaucracy and the Armed Forces to meet the Pakistani challenge.
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Visualised conventional operations
While undertaking operations against Pakistan, the ideal terrain would be the desert region. Our mountains lack space while the plains are full of water obstacles which would result in time consuming break in operations that would be deliberate and enable us to undertake shallow thrusts. The deserts would have a set of minefields which could be negotiated with greater speed and intervening strong points as also nodes based upon the operational plan of the formation could be bypassed, isolated, invested or finally captured. Normally a mechanised formation with an Armoured Division, about two Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID), an Independent Armoured Brigade, an Engineer Brigade, Air Defence elements and an Artillery Division with adequate Air Support from the Indian Air Force, would be required.
The aim of the operation would be to capture an important Communications Centre as also destroy the enemy’s mechanised reserves. Prior to the operations surveillance would be undertaken in the areas of interest using all surveillance equipment with heavy reliance on Remote Sensing Satellites and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The operations would involve possibly the following phases:-
• Degradation of key objectives by Air, Artillery including rockets and missiles. The Artillery Division to suitably decimate forces and ensure effective engagements with Post Strike Damage Assessment by UAVs.
• Capture of selected enemy Border Out Posts. They must be pulverised by Artillery Fire to facilitate quick capture.
• Advance across three thrust lines using the mechanised spear heads.
• Speedily cross the enemy’s Forward Defensive Minefield, Intermediate Defensive Minefield and Depth Defensive Minefields. Undertake encounter and opportunity crossings wherever possible. Reach the projection area to undertake a tank versus tank battle against strategic reserves of the enemy.
• Based on the operational plan mechanised forces would bypass, contain and isolate strong points on the axis of advance. To open an axis of maintenance a selected node or a strong point to be captured using the formation and thereafter suitable track be developed for move of ammunition and supplies.
• Launch a sizeable Heliborne Force to capture a lightly held objective in depth. One of the mechanised spearheads to link up as early as possible with this force. Medium Artillery and Close Air Support must be provided to the force.
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• Entire operations should be completed as early as possible. Likely time would be about 96 hours.
It is envisaged that the enemy would try and impede the momentum of advance by employing his reserves at the divisional level, operational level and strategic level. The manoeuvres would be in consonance with other thrusts in the mountains, which would be against terrorist training centres, in the plains on enclaves and the deep strike in other terrains stated above. The entire operations would be short, swift and lethal. It is essential that the Indian Army acquires two major weapon systems for the manoeuvres. These are the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and the Loitering Missile. Both these weapon systems would enable us to undertake precise destruction of targets which would add to the morale of our troops.
During the manoeuvre cyber operations must be undertaken to ensure degradation of enemy’s communications and data links. Synergy of these will pay rich dividends. The operations would be such as to use Air Force only in surveillance and logistics roles.
Conclusion
…we must exploit our conventional superiority to tackle issues to our advantage without buckling in to the enemy’s ineffective nuclear threat.
…. The nuclear bluff has been exposed during the surgical strikes undertaken in September 2016.
Our western adversary needs to be dealt in an offensive manner to ensure that he stops interfering with our internal affairs. Further, we must exploit our conventional superiority to tackle issues to our advantage without buckling in to the enemy’s ineffective nuclear threat. Our mechanised spearheads are trained and they must be used if push comes to shove. The nuclear bluff has been exposed during the surgical strikes undertaken in September 2016. There is a need for us to resort to escalating issues in case Pakistan does not stop the terrorist actions in the Kashmir valley. Failure to do so would lead to worsening of the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir region.
(The writer is a former Additional Director General of Artillery, Army Headquarters)
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SIGNIFICANCE OF CYBER SECURITY FOR INDIAN ECONOMY Vishal Verma
The Indian economy is transforming from a services (outsourcing) economy to an innovation and manufacturing economy. With the transformation happening the country has to be cautious on their cyber infrastructure to protect critical and vital data. India and the US have key roles as technology leaders in collaborating in the strategic technology interchanges. The two economies are integrated due to technology partnerships and the IT industry is the key underpinning on where the critical infrastructure has been built from power to water.
The two largest democracies (USA at 350 million people and India at 1.3 billion) and largest economy (USA at $18 trillion and India at $2.1 trillion) have inherent commercial and social responsibility on cyber threats. The ‘Access of Cyber Evil’ (ACE) is as concerning to India as USA due to a growing global economy and the intrinsic geo political area surrounding India resides in.
Theft of sensitive data
• Estimated loss of US $ 2-3 trillion worth of sensitive defence related data from the United States in just the last 3 years.
• India is ranked fifth worldwide in terms of network security breaches.
• Sensitive Government of India (GOI) offices and installations hacked; possible compromise of sensitive information.
• Nearly 75% of Indian business enterprises reported data theft through online hacking.
Theft of money
• Increasing hacker attacks on financial institutions.
• Illegal electronic bank transfers & credit card fraud.
• Increasing threat of litigation and loss of business from customers.
• Estimated $15-20 bn per year stolen in the United States.
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Cyber warfare
• State-sponsored hackers are able to create ‘Complete Internet Black outs.’
• In March 2013, Europe was under cyber attack from hackers in eastern Europe (including Russia) and most networks were pulled down.
• Recent cited Chinese hacks on the United States and India.
• US Government employee information stolen.
• Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) commercial website hacked.
In the budget of 2017, the Finance Minister, Mr Arun Jaitley announced plans by the Government of India to enhance India's digital foundation. The target is to reach 2,500 crore digital transactions for 2017-18 through the different initiatives, including Aadhar, UPI, debit cards and others.
In 2016, according to the data 3.5 million debit cards were compromised with over 2.5 million were on the Visa and Master Card platform while 1,000,000 were on the RuPay platform. State Bank of India (SBI), which has over 25000 branches and HDFC bank were the worst hit. The banks blocked and re-issued most of the debit cards to customers. In this case there is a bigger hit on the level of trust the consumers have on their banks.
India and United States have a representational interest and cyber security is a key area for bilateral policy level discussions and during the Obama administration the two nations signed a framework for cooperation. Many key cyber experts in India have mentioned the concern and remarked that “I don’t know where they come from and when they come we are now sure what they take”.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already announced that “…clouds of a bloodless war are hovering over the world” and “increased innovation and greater focus are required on the global challenge of cyber security.”
India is focused on indigenization and value addition policies
• The GOI has already given preference to solutions with at least 30% value addition domestically.
• By 2020, 80% of procurement will be done from companies who have invested in localization.
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Revival of Indian Government-owned Public Sector Units (PSUs)
• The GOI is also focusing on PSUs to secure their supply chain and services models.
• Some of these firms are being funded by the GOI for product development and other innovations on new technologies.
How these problems are addressed today:
• Global vendors provide standardized COTS (commercial off the shelf) solutions.
• With standard certifications and not necessarily “better security”. Just more “thoroughly verified” under a given set of assumptions made about the operating environment.
• So most customers buy firewalls, application level protection packages, etc to provide an assurance of security.
• Increased levels hacking only proves that even these solutions have many doors for hackers to enter through.
The new name of the game is building trusted networks. Many companies have implemented different structures and below are a Trusted Service Device Product Range.
With the Prime Minister’s initiative on Digital India, Cashless Society and
106 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the IOT revolution, India is becoming a large market. India is well positioned to adopt the latest innovative and greatest technologies due to limited legacy systems in the country.
India has created a new role, a few years ago, of the Cyber Czar in the PM office. This will help with the co-ordination with the tri-services, inter-department at the Central Government level and State Government level.
Recently, there was a 'Wanna Cry' attack in over 18 States in India where the jury is still out on the damage it caused on India Critical Infrastructure. More than 50% of the attacks are for financial gains and corporate cyber espionage.
Analysis
However, India counter measures will need to be thoughtful of security in their networks and other IT roll-outs. I think everyone will agree that there is no technology in the world that doesn’t have a Non Resident Indian’s (NRI) fingerprint. The Prime Minister correctly said in a speech in Canada “he is saddened to see why Google’s birth didn’t happen in his nation.”
India will need to bring in global experts and harvest the NRI community in addition to the public and private sectors that can lead to complementary roles in meeting developmental and social needs to help build India in key strategic technologies.
(The writer is the founder of CyberIndia.org and partner at Edgewood Ventures)
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J&K SITUATION: REQUIRES FIRM HANDLING Dr SD Pradhan
A highly volatile situation in J&K exists with stone pelting incidents continuing unabated since mid-last year and pro-azadi slogans becoming shriller and louder. The protesters under instigation are not only throwing stones on our security forces personnel but are also thrashing and lynching them publically. …. The targeting of the machinery of the State which is there to maintain law and order and security reflects the increasing audacity of terrorists and their supporters. They have misunderstood the policy of restraint pursued by the security forces personnel even under grave provocative acts in order to ‘win over hearts and minds of the local people’.
A highly volatile situation in J&K exists with stone pelting incidents continuing unabated since mid-last year and pro-azadi slogans becoming shriller and louder. The protesters under instigation are not only throwing stones on our security forces personnel but are also thrashing and lynching them publically. They kidnapped an army officer, Umar Fayaz belonging to Kashmir and killed him. The death of a senior police officer Mohammad Ayub Pandith at the hand of a lynch mob highlights the growing dangers to the J&K police personnel. This year in the first six month at least 16 J&K police personnel were killed, the highest for that period in the last two decades. The attacks on the security/police forces personnel are on the increase. The targeting of the machinery of the State which is there to maintain law and order and security reflects the increasing audacity of terrorists and their supporters. They have misunderstood the policy of restraint pursued by the security forces personnel even under grave provocative acts in order to ‘win over hearts and minds of the local people’. The truth is that this approach of the Government of J&K and of the Government of India has not yielded the desired results. The elected leaders both from the ruling party and the opposition do not consider themselves responsible for coming out in the open and taking the lead to control the agitating public and counsel the parents against allowing their children to face police action. The elected leaders of Kashmir are passing on this responsibility to the shoulders of the Central Government. For political motives they are asking the Centre to reach out to “all stakeholders” and satisfy ‘the aspirations of the Kashmiri people’. They are not willing to define the ‘aspirations’ and cleverly talking in terms of generalities. The Government of India will not, under any circumstances, entertain the azadi demand and will not permit anything that made the country vulnerable to another division on religious grounds.
Several options have been talked about for dealing with the current situation varying from letting the situation improve on its own; rushing to discuss the issue
108 Chanakya Journal of CCSS with the aggressor, ie, Pakistan; on to stepping up military action for quelling the civic unrest and neutralising the terrorist support coming in from across the border. Some opposition leaders are advocating talks with Pakistan and giving recognition to Pakistan as a stakeholder in the affairs on our side. Anything against the constitution and the Parliamentary Resolution cannot be acceptable. Finding a correct approach is no doubt problematic but an understanding by the major variables that can be harnessed to achieve the desired outcome is of vital importance.
Four Challenges
India is presently facing four challenges in J&K. First, there is the inadequacy of organisational machinery for dissemination of information relating to governance and people welfare measures. Second is the daunting task of tackling of terrorism which is externally sponsored and supported by separatists. Third is the conduct of mobile warfare at the LoC, while fourth is the Pak campaign in international forums resulting in hyphenating of India with Pakistan. While all these problems together constitute the challenge of the proxy war, it is essential to understand that each of these aspects requires different techniques and counter measures and an ability to differentiate among them.
India is presently facing four challenges in J&K. First, there is the inadequacy of organisational machinery for dissemination of information relating to governance and people welfare measures. Second is the daunting task of tackling of terrorism which is externally sponsored and supported by separatists. Third is the conduct of mobile warfare at the LoC, while fourth is the Pak campaign in international forums resulting in hyphenating of India with Pakistan. While all these problems together constitute the challenge of the proxy war, it is essential to understand that each of these aspects requires different techniques and countermeasures and an ability to differentiate among them. Countering terrorist/ separatist propaganda demands an effective publicity campaign to reach out to the people. This has to combine with civic action to address the genuine grievances along with low level police action. The terrorist threat necessitates intensified police and security operations. However, common people should not be harassed and collateral damage should be at the minimum. The mobile warfare along the LoC will involve military action meant to destroy the ability of the adversary to send infiltrators to our side. In the international arena, effective diplomatic efforts are needed to deal with the Pak manoeuvrings to pressurise India to agree to the Pak demands.
The creation and implementation of counter strategy along the above lines is a complicated process as the threats in practice not only overlap and become
109 Chanakya Journal of CCSS cumulative but they often vary in the region. In view of this the State’s approach needs a careful planning and quite a lot of coordination of approaches and activities of a number of agencies and forces operating in different areas. This kind of multifaceted and sophisticated programme obviously requires coming together of political, administrative, military, police, intelligence and diplomatic efforts.
Flaws
A crucial ingredient of an effective governmental effort is the necessity of a common purpose and policy guidelines for different agencies involved, as part of an effective strategy linked to the larger objective. This places a premium on the articulation and communication of the overall strategy to all concerned which is not easily achieved. In this context it is necessary to examine the flaws of strategy and approach, which may need to be addressed. These are:-
• No effort to stymie the planned demographic changes. Pakistan in a well calculated manner indulged in demographic engineering to suit its designs. In Pok whatever population of non-Muslims was there, had been either forced to migrate or killed. A few may have got themselves converted. In Gilgit and Baltistan, by a Pak order of 1974 outsiders were allowed to settle down there. The ratio between the non-locals and locals which was 1:4 at the time of partition became 3:4 in 2011. By now non- locals may be about 50%. On the Indian side, Hindus were forced to move out of the Valley with the result that an environment was created in which Pak inspired propaganda could easily be spread. Since 1980s no serious effort was made to undo this demographic engineering. The continuation of Article 370 made it impossible for others to move into J&K.
• Lack of focus on the strategic objective. While there is a Parliamentary Resolution that the PoK belongs to India, no serious effort has been made to achieve this. Often we did not keep this in our strategic calculus. Elected politicians made remarks against this objective with a view to garnering support from separatists for electoral gains. India has been defensive in its approach and has also failed to discern the over-all sinister Pak game plan. Pakistan had created so called “Azad Kashmir” in a part of India as a part of a well calculated plan in the first phase and is now trying to create problems in the part with India with the hope that people on the Indian side would invite the forces of “Azad Kashmir” to come over and at that time Pak regular forces would be sent with it to annex this part as well. Since this larger Pak plan is not appreciated, India most of the time is reacting to the developments and to the Pak machinations.
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• Lack of effective effort to counter the propaganda of the terrorists. There has been no concerted effort to counter effectively the propaganda of the separatists and Pak agencies. This has resulted in Pakistan winning over youth to terrorism. While there were suggestions to study the appeal of ideology of terrorists both esoteric and exoteric, no serious effort was made to counter it. The Group of Ministers that examined the security apparatus in its entirety after the Kargil conflict had recommended a committee under the Home Secretary to ensure an effective publicity campaign to counter the jihadi and Pak propaganda. However, this committee remains only on paper. There was no assessment about the impact of any effort made by agencies or MEA. In UK, a serious effort was made to examine the appeal of jihadi propaganda about a decade ago which involved known experts as also Muslim leaders. Such an effort is indeed required to effectively counter the nefarious and pernicious propaganda of Pak sponsored terrorists.
• Assisting unelected Hurriyat leaders to assume a larger than life image. All governments by providing support and security to these unelected self-proclaimed Hurriyat leaders helped them to get importance which they did not deserve. They were allowed to go abroad and even to Pakistan. Pakistan is using these persons in projecting its views. It is costing heavily to the Government of India both economically and politically. This also gives an impression of their legitimacy as leaders of the J&K before certain sections abroad.
• Tactical operations without a strategy. India has been indulging in tactical operations without a strategy to achieve its objective. It starts operations to control the terrorists and then comes under the influence of those who press for talks and the operations are stopped without achieving any result. The surgical strike appeared to be one off operation and not a part of a calculated strategy. India had been swinging from talk to no talk policy suggesting that there is no strategic plan. Most of the time it was talking when there should not have been a dialogue and was not talking when there should have been a dialogue. Sharm-el Sheikh in 2009 soon after the 26/11 is an important example. India has also been unable to sustain any policy for long. Without a strategy, tactical operations howsoever they may be successful, are bound to bring disappointment.
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Desired approach
Pragmatism demands that our approach must depend on the recognition that what we are facing is a proxy war and our actions must flow from this recognition. Like any war situation, we need to move gears of governance from normal situation to war conditions. … For this proxy war, the decisive point should be identified around which we must organize all our decisions and activities in order to outperform our competitor. Once we have identified this, it’s all about focus and determination. In this case our central decisive point is foiling the efforts of Pakistan to create problems in J&K through the terrorists as also ensuring the territorial integrity of the nation. ….as the State Police is facing all the dimensions of the proxy war, its capabilities should considerably be enhanced to deal with them. It is asked to perform the two daunting tasks - duties of a normal police force and working as a force multiplier to complement the efforts Central Police Forces and the Indian Army.
Pragmatism demands that our approach must depend on the recognition that what we are facing is a proxy war and our actions must flow from this recognition. Like any war situation, we need to move gears of governance from normal situation to war conditions. Strategy is the necessary response to the inescapable reality of limited resources and unlimited challenges. For this proxy war, the decisive point should be identified around which we must organize all our decisions and activities in order to outperform our competitor. Once we have identified this, it’s all about focus and determination. In this case our central decisive point is foiling the efforts of Pakistan to create problems in J&K through the terrorists as also ensuring the territorial integrity of the nation. However, the most important aspect of this war is that the support of local population must be ensured. Hence, the strategy would have to balance all the factors. In this context, the following steps are suggested to deal with the current situation. First as in war, the local laws should be suspended. We should suspend Article 370 and ensure a balanced demographic pattern in J&K, particularly in the Valley. After the Kashmiri Pandits were forced to leave, there was no Kashmiriyat or Sufism left; there is only Pak inspired Wahabism based on violence and hatred. Without this drastic step, it is difficult to deal with the Pak inspired manipulations in the State. Second, for some time tough measures have to be undertaken to restore the respect and fear of the security forces. If the so-called 'misguided youth' are guided by an ideology that is spreading in the Islamic world, the challenge before New Delhi will remain severe and has to be countered with strong measures. Our operations should be based on accurate intelligence. In such operations human assets prove extremely useful. Recent operations to neutralise the top terrorists on the basis of specific intelligence have yielded the desired results. Our actions may result in severe criticism by advocates of human rights for which we
112 Chanakya Journal of CCSS must be prepared. Third, we must take appropriate steps to counter the pernicious propaganda of the separatists both through a well-coordinated publicity campaign and appropriate civic measures with the help of elected leaders. The latter should be asked to come forward and counsel the parents to stop their children from pelting stones. Fourth, the security provided to the Hurriyat leaders should be withdrawn as they have always created problems for us and function on the advice of ISI of Pakistan. These separatists have limited influence on the ground, one that does not go beyond their narrow constituencies, which is why, in order to avoid testing their real political strength, they spurn elections. Their complicity in providing finances to terrorists and stone-pelters has come to light and now there is no reason to provide them with the security.
Fifth, the diplomacy also demands aggressive posturing to demand the PoK. Pakistan and China are coordinating their moves for CPEC. It traverses though our area and would adversely impact the demographic pattern of the region. One can expect the area to be filled by Pak Punjabis and Hans. Sixth, all suggestions to hold dialogue with Pakistan should be dismissed. Doing this would mean rewarding those who are creating problems. In the end, it may be said that while finally it would be a political solution but any talk with the protesters or their instigators should not be considered from the position of weakness. Seventh, India should openly support people demanding independence from Pakistan in PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan. Similarly in Baluchistan those who are demanding independence from Pakistan should be given all help. India should also declare moral, political and diplomatic support to them. They should be provided help at various international forums. Eighth, India should raise the economic cost of Pak policies and should adopt all measures to hurt Pakistan economically. There should be no hesitation in making changes in the Indus Water Treaty which is highly favourable to Pakistan. India has to use more unconventional and conventional means to compel Pakistan to change its policy of using terrorism as an instrument to deal with India.
And lastly, as the State Police is facing all the dimensions of the proxy war, its capabilities should considerably be enhanced to deal with them. It is asked to perform the two daunting tasks - duties of a normal police force and working as a force multiplier to complement the efforts Central Police Forces and the Indian Army. So far the State Police was spared much of the public hatred, given the local roots of personnel who served it. But this has changed over the last year or so as the 80,000 personnel received a wider role in countering terrorism. Since they have local roots they have played an important role in providing useful intelligence to operating units. But this has also increased threats to them. The incidents of raids of houses of State Police personnel have increased as also threats to their families. This demands better security to them and their families. Their abilities to take on the terrorists have to be enhanced by providing them with advanced technological equipment and training. They should be at par with the Central Police Forces,
113 Chanakya Journal of CCSS given the fact that its geographical situation would always require it to deal with the external dimension of security. Their movement and deployment pattern should ensure security of police personnel against mob attacks. As it is desirable to depend more on State Police, their strength also needs to be suitably enhanced. It is also important that its functional autonomy is maintained. It is known that even at the best of times, policing comes under the pulls and pressures of politicians. In armed conflicts, such manipulations can be highly demoralising to the police personnel adversely affecting their performance. This should be avoided at all costs.
(The author is former Deputy National Security Advisor)
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CCSS PAPER INDO-US CONVERGENCE ON DEALING WITH ISLAMIC TERROR IS CRUCIAL FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA DC Pathak
The recent attacks by ISIS converts in London in which the same modus operandi - overrunning unsuspecting civilians with a truck - was used, the 'lone wolf' bombing at a music concert at Manchester and a host of warnings of possible attacks by terrorists of Islamic State in France, Germany and Spain, are signs that the area of operation of the 'foot soldiers' of radical Islam has expanded across Europe. The more recent attack on Iranian Parliament leading to multiple deaths and the simultaneous bombing of the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini at Tehran - both claimed by ISIS - fit in with the ideological profile that is driving the outfits of Islamic radicals - ISIS, Al Qaeda and Taliban - and their affiliates globally. This is a desperate but wide-spread attempt of these faith-based entities to 'restore the political supremacy of Islam' as it existed once upon a time.
This is the kind of fanatic thinking about the restoration of the Caliphate that had produced the first 'Wahabi' movements of Jehad in Algeria, Arabia and India in the middle of the 19th Century against the western encroachment on 'Muslim land'. The motivation came from the call of the leading Ulema of the time - Al Tijani, Abdul Wahab and Shah Waliullah - to go back to the ruthless adherence to the Puritan Islam that prevailed in 'the golden period' of first fifty years after the Prophet and shed all deviations that - according to these protagonists of Jehad - had been the cause behind the fall of Islam from its height of glory. In the present context of Islamic radicals having taken on its 'enemies' in a diffused and clandestine warfare, the disparity of numbers working against them does not matter to these protagonists of Jehad since they are prepared to do their bid at the individual level - man or woman - to take to suicide bombing for the cause of Islam. They lay down their lives in the firm belief that this put them in a win-win situation. To deny that they were doing this out of this faith-based motivation does not help.
Strategic analysts must understand that the prime enemies of radical Islam are the US-led West as well as the Shiites, for reasons of history, belief and political experience. The advent of Sunnism is itself rooted in the revolt against Caliph Ali in his closing years by those who despised the claim that Ali as the Imam had divine attributes and powers. It is to be noted that terror attacks in Europe are all traced to Sunni immigrants from its erstwhile Muslim colonies who had become ISIS converts under the direct or indirect influence of the radical recruiters. The attacks in Tehran confirm the matching hatred Islamic radicals had for the West as well as the world
115 Chanakya Journal of CCSS of Shiites. Incidentally, Shia fundamentalists and the radical Sunni extremists both are inimical to the US-led West. The Sunni diehards led by Saudi Arabia share the hostility of Islamic radicals towards Iran because of the legacy of the original split within the Muslim world described earlier but they do not take on the US due to the political equation with the West enjoyed by the OIC - under Saudi chairmanship. The attacks of ISIS in Tehran seem to have been provoked by the favour shown to Iran by US under Obama administration. The radicals were taking on two enemies at the same time.
The ongoing developments thus reflect the irrevocable division of the Islamic world into Sunni and Shia segments and also the line of distinction that exists within Sunnism between the 'revivalists' - that Islamic radicals are - with their own areas of influence and the other Sunni countries of 'revisionists' including Saudi Arabia who are also staunch fundamentalists but chose to be on the side of the US-led West. The latter ideologically believe in an Islamic State that considered 'Quran as the best Constitution' but they want to politically coexist with the West. What is happening in the Muslim world is that the majority there is not willing to take on the Islamic radicals or even disown the fanaticism of the radical outfits. Radicals of Al Qaeda, ISIS and Taliban enjoy recognition within the Islamic spectrum and a line like ' terrorists have no religion' is nothing more than an empty rhetoric.
President Donald Trump in his speech at Riyadh, brought some clarity about the need for the Muslim world to unitedly fight the Islamic radicals within but he fell short of disapproving the Islamic extremism of the type practiced by Saudi rulers themselves. To India's dismay Saudi Arabia globally funded Mujahideen outfits - including Lashkar-e-Toiba which is based in Pakistan - and thus added to the aura of violence being whipped up all around in the name of religion. Wahhabism of the Islamic radicals and Salafism of the Saudi-sponsored LeT comprising Ahle Hadis, are both fostering extremism and creating trouble for democratic countries - particularly for India. Trump's visit to West Asia has instead of putting a damper on Islamic militancy, sharpened the internal rivalries among the Muslim countries in the orbit of US influence. The boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and its close allies illustrates this and puts the US in an awkward situation because it weakens the resolve within the Sunni world to combat the radicals at home.
Qatar is a friend of US and houses the biggest American air base in this part of the world for conducting the 'war on terror'. Since Qatar's support to Muslim Brotherhood is said to be a major irritant for the Saudis it is necessary to recall that the western backing of Muslim Brotherhood and its South Asia descendant - Jamaat- e-Islami - in the Cold War years was a prominent part of the geo-political strategy of the US to pull down pro-Soviet regimes of Nasser, Assad and Saddam Hussain. Post-Cold War, these militant organisations have been critical of dictatorial regimes of the Muslim world and want their replacement with Islamic States that would not
116 Chanakya Journal of CCSS be in adversarial relationship with US of course. It may be recalled that the first response of US to the advent of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt under Mohamed Morsi in place of President Hosni Mubarak, was one of welcome before internal differences led to his ouster by his own Defence Minister Gen Ahmad al- Sisi. Saudi Arabian rulers, somehow, associated Muslim Brotherhood with the 'Arab Spring' phenomenon in Egypt and elsewhere and in panic saw it as a challenge to them at par with ISIS. Developments relating to Qatar, therefore, have to be quickly sorted out by the US by giving the right message to the Saudis as otherwise the 'war on terror' will take the Americans nowhere.
Part-II Indo-US convergence It looked good from India's point of view that Donald Trump chose the Saudi capital Riyadh - the world's centre of Muslim orthodoxy - as the place and the Muslim-Arab-US summit as the occasion, to lay down what he expected out of the Muslim world in the matter of countering violence of religious extremists. He declared that Islamic radicals indulging in terrorism were not to be allowed to get away by invoking religion and announced that this new terror would be ruthlessly eliminated by a united peace-loving world under the leadership of the US. The earlier US stance of trying to be 'politically correct' in highlighting the scourge of faith-based extremism emanating from the Muslim world but not acknowledging that radicals had succeeded in using Islam as a source of motivation for terror acts, did not help matters. This kind of approach of the US benefited Pakistan - which fomented cross border terrorism against India using its own Mujahideen while pretending to be on the side of the US in the 'war on terror' against Islamic radicals. Indo-US relations consequently could not bloom sufficiently in spite of the fact that the two democracies were supposed to be 'natural friends'. At Riyadh, President Trump made no bones about where he stood on terror flaunted in the name of Islam and basically made three clear pronouncements in this regard.
First, he named India among the countries that had suffered terror and added upfront, without naming Pakistan, that 'every nation has an absolute duty to ensure that terrorists find no quarter on its soil'. By bracketing India with the nations of Europe and Australia, he denounced both Islamic radicals of Al Qaeda-Taliban- ISIS axis who attacked the US-led West and militant groups of LeT, JeM and HuM which were harboured by Pak agencies to specifically target India. The US was thus finally abandoning any distinction between 'good terrorists' and 'bad terrorists' and expressing its opposition to faith-based militancy per se.
Secondly, Donald Trump termed the fight against terrorism as a 'battle between good and evil' - a combat with barbaric elements who invoked God - and not a clash between 'the West and Islam'. And finally, he told the gathering of the
117 Chanakya Journal of CCSS leaders of 50 Muslim majority countries to do more to fight Islamic extremism. He sharply reminded the assembly that 'the nations of the Middle East cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for them' and pointed out that they 'will have to decide what kind of future they wanted for their countries and their children'.
President Trump's stand strengthens India's case against Pakistan on the issue of cross border terrorism and certainly helps to further consolidate the world opinion in favour of India on Kashmir where Pak agencies have been fomenting violence and separatism in the name of Islam and Jehad. Having failed to get their way in the valley through infiltrated Mujahideen, they had taken to the cost effective tactics of using paid agents to organise stone-pelting mobs for creating an atmosphere of civil unrest. The valley-based political parties had a history of being soft towards separatists of the Hurriyat for political gain and this was reflected in the foot-dragging that Mahbooba administration showed in firmly dealing with the masterminds behind the stone-pelting events. In the process peaceniks of uncertain antecedents also cropped up playing to the tune of pro-Pak lobbies. An absurd line taken by them is that to control law and order events including criminal acts of looting of banks, India must invite Pakistan for talks.
Modi Government must implement a firm policy of neutralising the gun- wielding terrorist with the help of army while using the civil administration to reach out to the average Kashmiri through Deputy Commissioners and District SPs in order to meet their demands and grievances. Pak inputs coming into play in the valley through separatists should be ruthlessly curbed through choking of illicit funding and action under the criminal law. Action is needed also to weed out anti-India elements hibernating in the government at various levels. The mix of politics, terrorist violence and flow of money from the enemy has remained in play even after the advent of a healthy democratic coalition in which a regional PDP and the national party ruling at the Centre had decided to work together. Public opinion in India and also the world community at large expects India to govern J&K well, restore internal security and get on with the task of development of the State.
The army is doing well to tighten up its control on the LOC. Pakistan cannot take on India in a conventional war and hence continues to resort to covert tactics to disturb peace in the valley presuming that its much touted tactical nuclear weapons were a deterrence against an open Indian attack. India must, therefore, maintain a punishing stance towards Pakistan on the LOC. China's military solidarity with Pakistan primarily helps the former in safeguarding its geo-political interest in the region and translates into support to the latter only on issues like Masood Azhar's case in UN and not in the battle field. India should see that Donald Trump maintained his tough stance against the threat of Islamic extremism and violence wherever it came from and that there was a deeper Indo-US convergence on this issue. Meanwhile, India must go all out to put down all categories of trouble makers in
118 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the State of J&K. The democratic State Government there should at the same time remain totally accessible to all citizens to enable the latter to have a free 'dialogue' with their rulers. Pak agents are desperately trying to prolong the trouble in the valley as this somewhere helps them to revive the idea of a 'tripartite solution'. India needs to put a quick stop to the instigated disorder in Kashmir.
US policy makers would do well not to mix up political considerations with the issues of terror and work with India to pursue a strong strategy of countering Islamic militancy of all sources - from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia - and at the same time, insisting on return of democratic order to all these countries. The world must disapprove of all shades of faith-based violence.
(The writer is a former Director Intelligence Bureau)
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BOOK REVIEW TERRORIST RECOGNITION HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL FOR PREDICTING AND IDENTIFYING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES Malcolm W Nance, Boca Raton, London, New York, CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2008 (Second Edition), 463 pp, ISBN 978-1-4200-7183-2
Dr SD Pradhan
Terrorism is one of the gravest threats to most of the countries in the world. Despite counter terrorist operations by nations individually, as also through global cooperation, the world continues to witness terrorist activities at an unacceptable high level. The terrorists are taking advantage of openness of societies, availability of media and advancement in technology as also the fears and hopes of the people, to continue with their activities. One of the important factors which helps them is that they remain invisible amidst the civilian population till they execute their plans. Against this backdrop this book is a welcome addition to the knowledge on counter terrorism particularly as it suggests ways of destroying the threat before it knocks at our doors.
A range of counter measures are available and all deserve to be used appropriately. These include legal punishments under domestic and international laws, as also police action and military response where these make sense as a self-defence measure meant to stop further aggression of the terrorists. The foreign support to terrorists makes action on these lines even more important. Circumstances may suggest such counter measures as extradition and prosecution and even ‘snatching’ of particular terrorists whom an unfriendly country may be trying to protect. However, the most desirable strategy is to take steps to pre-empt and disrupt terrorist outfits’ activities. The book is meant for counter terrorist operatives. It emphasises the need to collect relevant information in the pre-attack period and the importance of neutralising the threat in time.
The author Macolm W Nance is a 20 year veteran of the United States Intelligence Community and has practical experience of counter terrorism operations in various part of the world. He was deployed in intelligence operations pertaining to counter terrorism in the Balkans, West Asia - including Iraq and Afghanistan, as also in parts of Africa. His first-hand experience in terrorist strategy, modus operandi and the main elements of the counter terrorism operations is captured very well in this handbook.
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The objective of this handbook is to explain to the counter terrorist operatives that all terrorist attacks have pre-incident intelligence indicators, which if noted prior to the incidents, can help in taking preventive or pre-emptive operations. The 9/11 and our own terrorist attacks like 26/11 have revealed in the post event investigations that there were sufficient indicators and if all of those could have received due attention at appropriate level for further development, they could have indicated the impending threats more precisely. Therefore, the author suggests that focused efforts should be made to identify the Terrorist Attack Pre-incident Indicators (TAPIs) and foil the attempt of terrorists before they executed their plan.The author explains that the TAPIs are ‘behaviours’ and ‘actions’ of terrorists during their preparatory stages which they take before carrying out an attack. Usually in Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement Agencies, these are also referred to as ‘profiling’. In Israel, the Mossad has used the behaviour-recognition approach for decades and generally succeeded in stopping potential terrorists from skyjacking its airliners. The TAPIs are also noticeable during planning and pre-execution stages. The author points out that the TAPIs go beyond profiling and include identifying several steps being taken by terrorists before the attack.
The book is divided into six sections in a logical way. The first deals with profiling of terrorists, the terrorists’ beliefs, their training and why they choose this path. The second section focuses on techniques of identifying groups and their cells as also their strategies and the process of target selection. This section provides insights into different types of cells existing in terrorist outfits globally. The structures of centralised and decentralised authorities and their functioning are explained in sufficient details. The section also describes different types of cells, as also their distinctive functions and details how they communicate with their leaders and each other. The current and the most pressing threat according to the author is the one in which an individual or a small group with simple automatic weapon can attack its target. Recently vans have been used to hit the targets. The book suggests that by careful observation, the pre-incident intelligence indicators even where small number of persons are involved can be identified and the threat can be discerned. In this context, the cyber surveillance is of great value. The terrorists deploy various techniques to deceive the law-enforcement agencies. Discussion of this aspect forms an interesting part of this section.
The third section deals with the detection of key terrorist activities in the preparatory stage like organising safe houses, obtaining finances, securing means of mobility, organising supporters to hide the cell members and their tools which vary from small arms and explosives to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The handbook gives details of past attempts to use NBC weapons as also different types of chemical and biological agents. The author suggests ways of identifying such equipment and biological and chemical agents in the phase of terrorists trying to procure them before the attack. The terrorists employ a supply chain to obtain and
121 Chanakya Journal of CCSS place these materials near the targets. The book provides a number of indicators. The details of several cases given in the text not only enhance the value of the book but also make the reading interesting.
The fourth section deals with the most important part of counter-terrorism operations, ie, predicting an attack. The author explains various terrorist surveillance techniques and the ways in which terrorists approach surveillance. The most observable and predictable process of a terrorist attack is when the terrorists conduct surveillance on a potential target. The methods of surveillance by terrorists include both overt and discreet as also visual and the technical. These have been elucidated with the help of a number of examples. This section also narrates how terrorists are trained in skills to infiltrate borders, difficult targets, secured places and checkpoints. Terrorists are also trained to have good skills of local language and cultural knowledge to facilitate penetration in the target society and stay with local population without being detected. These cultural survival skills greatly assist terrorists in remaining undetected. The author gives out several instances of terrorists using false identities for penetration. Further, terrorists often use those individuals for their various tasks who do not have any history of crime or terrorism support. The author points out that the last chance to stop a terror attack is when after the decision had been taken the terrorists were moving to launch the attack. In this phase negotiations may be needed in the end to stop the terrorists from executing the plan if other measures of neutralising it fail. The section describes how predicting and preventing terrorism is possible on the basis of collected and properly analysed data.
The fifth section provides details of Al Qaeda and other global terrorist outfits including Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jaamat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Importantly this section explains the tactics, equipment and management of suicide bombers. The process of using Internet for glorifying martyrdom of suicide bombers is also referred to and deserves the attention of senior policy makers. The author concludes that the Iraq invasion by the US has brought out significant changes in the methodology of terrorism. This has inspired terrorists to share their skills globally and there is a dramatic expansion in IED design, technology and application.
The sixth section contains besides an impressive bibliography, appendices of global terrorist outfits, components of explosives, indicators of home-made explosives, illegal drug precursors and the check list for operatives.
The book directly drawing from the experience in the field and dealing with terrorist organisations in different parts of the world is of great value to counter terrorist operatives of police and security forces. The book provides actionable suggestions to prevent terrorist attacks by identifying TAPIs. This book has rightly been called a manual for those dealing with terrorists. The book contains a number of examples of the issues of counter-terrorism and elucidate the various ways of
122 Chanakya Journal of CCSS handling them. The style of writing is simple and the book explains complex issues in a readable language. Photographs and diagrams of various types make the understanding of the issues easy. There are shelves of books on terrorism but very few are useful enough for operatives and their supervisors. This book will also prove useful to those who seek to understand the strategies of various terrorist groups at the policy making level.
(The review author is former Deputy National Security Advisor)
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BOOK REVIEW INDIA’S EMERGING NUCLEAR POSTURE Ashley J Tellis, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 885 pp
Dr Rakesh Datta
The book under review is an attempt to assess the emerging nuclear posture of India, subsequent to the series of nuclear tests carried out in 1998. The event proved to be a major technological milestone for the country. Besides, it was a maiden intelligence feat owing to the hoodwinking of major powers, including the USA.
The principal objective of the book, the author claims, is to prepare US policy makers for the prospective development pertaining to nuclearisation in India. Authored by Ashley J Tellis, the book is a Rand-sponsored study (under Project Air Force). Interestingly, any promotional activity linked to India’s strategic growth generally invites special concern of the West particularly the USA and this meaningful volume of 885 pages, spread into six chapters, is no different.
In this comprehensive examination of India’s nuclear strategy, the author addresses issues in the context of a broader understanding of India’s strategic interests, its institutional structure and its security goal. He argues that truth is much more complex than most analysts believe it to be and that despite demonstrating an ability to successfully undertake nuclear explosions, India still has a long way to go before it can acquire the capabilities that would make it a nuclear power of consequence.
Explaining the heritage of nuclear ambiguity in the chapter on strategic factors affecting India’s nuclear power", the author says that even though India’s nuclear programme dates back to the pre-1947 period, yet the strategic environment the country faced after Independence did not demand that any clear decision be made regarding its nuclear status. Instead, the traditional nuclear posture continued to pivot on ‘keeping the option open’.
He talks of four variables influencing India’s nuclear posture. It includes characters of global nuclear regime, demand by regional security and threats, bilateral relations with key powers and opportunities offered by indigenous performance. Elaborating on his own views, Ashley says that if the global nuclear regime is a mixed bag, the regional nuclear environment is considered more ominous by Indian policy makers.
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The author has provided a detailed account of the growing nuclear potential of China and Pakistan, including delivery system capable of covering principal Indian targets, which still are defenseless notwithstanding the country’s impressive achievements on the nuclear front.
Ashley has suggested five distinct nuclear postures to choose from. However, cautions the author, any runaway expansion of India’s strategic programme might put New Delhi at a great disadvantage in its relationship with Washington. At the same time, it is debatable whether developing any robust nuclear force would enhance India’s security in the regional set-up.
In the chapter on "Towards a force in being and understanding nuclear doctrine," the author puts forth an argument fraught with uncertainty. For instance, he says that the draft report of the NSAB on Indian nuclear doctrine, officially released on 17th August 1999, continues to suffer from ambiguity with respect to its status as a policy document. However, the most significant and distinguishing facet of the doctrine is its consistent claim that nuclear weapons are more political instruments than military tools. Adding to this defensive outlook is development of a modest nuclear deterrent with emphasis on punitive retaliation as the focus of country’s operational policy. But even in this, according to the author, India has not addressed any issue pertaining to the character, extent or weight of Indian retaliatory action corroborating the views of Raymond Barre, who argued that it is not possible or desirable to define punitive retaliation since the employment policy is not fixed.
In the chapter, "Towards a force in being: accessing the requirements and adequacy of the evolving deterrent", the author has given an account of what India has and what it hasn’t. There is growing evidence that India has begun to focus on increasing its available stockpile of weapon-grade material. The BARC, for example, has been removed from supervisory purview of the Regulatory Board. According to the report, India possesses three kinds of nuclear weapons but the fact is mired in controversy on technical reasons. Ashley even contests the claims of Kalam, who said that our weaponisation is complete, by refuting that it has just begun in India.
Looking at India’s capabilities, the author points out a monadic delivery force consisting of only short-range, not all-weather tactical aircraft. Amongst missiles, Agni is only designated for improved range.
In the last chapter, the author mentions of no dramatic change in Delhi’s strategic capability but signals a critical shift. This portends more of an equilibrium change with strategic consequences for both China and Pakistan. Finally, giving an American perspective in the South-Asian context, Ashley says that the USA should concentrate on India (Pakistan) nuclear arsenals by de-emphasising their provocative strategic posture. There is a need for a realistic strategic vision between India and
125 Chanakya Journal of CCSS the USA and clear articulation of this alone can respond to Indian nuclearisation in an effective manner.
The author can be complimented for amassing a rich bibliography for his scholarly work. The book is a must for specialists, policy-makers, analysts and researchers engaged in strategic and international studies across the globe.
(The review writer is a Professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh)
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BOOK REVIEW A LIFE IN DIPLOMACY by Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra, Penguin Viking India (2016), 401pp
Dr Rakesh Datta
Nehru’s initiative for Tibet sovereignty - a lesser known fact in geopolitics
Nehru’s concern for Tibet was long standing. Soon after independence, Nehru sent his confidant - a Bengali gentleman to Lhasa to explain to Kashag (Dalai Lama’s cabinet) about significance of United Nations and that of becoming its member. Again after a year Nehru sent another emissary with a similar message but failed to elicit any response from Tibetan convent. Such moves were not without any historical justification as until 1950 Tibet was an independent country and if they had sought UN membership it would have indeed helped them.
Largely an unknown fact, while India is generally blamed for overlooking its geopolitical considerations, is a narrative by an accomplished diplomat, academician, poet and author Shri Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra in his book on Life in Diplomacy.
According to the author, Pannikar was too soft on China and mislead Nehru in his China policy. He had convinced Nehru to keep China in good humour and that perhaps became a quote with nearly all the successive Governments.
The book has a deep sense of insight to India’s external behavior in its formative years including the role of personalities in shaping up such textures. Interestingly, according to the author the world leaders were taking time in appreciating India’s geopolitical stance, while Nehru was seen pleading for issues related to United States, China, Korea, Japan and Russia having no vital Indian interest, instead it caused fundamental differences with America. Pakistan on other hand had an advantage being firmly on US political and foreign policy agenda in fighting communism. It called for arms aid of $25 million to Pakistan in 1954 with dangerous consequences. For instance, it scuttled Kashmir resolution even though Plebiscite was agreed between Nehru and Bogra during latter’s state visit to Delhi in August 1953.
Being a protocol officer to various personalities like Queen of Nepal; Dr Graham, UN man on Kashmir; Mr Harold Macmillan, Canadian Minister and his wife; Chinese delegation, including Mrs Vijay Lakshami Pandit and meeting with Albert Einstein to mention a few. The author was fortunate in understanding diplomatic
127 Chanakya Journal of CCSS nuances in his initial years which for a young diplomat carries both risk as well advantage.
Another significant revelation the author talked about was letter from Kennedy to Nehru offering an extra-ordinary gesture to help India conduct a nuclear test with an American device before China could become a nuclear power. The letter also emphasized, nothing is more important than National Security keeping Nehru’s views against nuclear weapons.
However, the well meaning offer of lifetime was gently and thankfully turned down on the pretext that seismic and other signatures of the test would be traced to American origin by Moscow, besides causing a moral blow to India’s non-alignment.
Somehow Indian leaders failed to understand and even until now the sane advice of Kautilya who said ‘Morality is good to rest with individuals but nations can afford to be amorals’. Interestingly, later in his letter of 19th November 1962 to Kennedy, Pt Nehru asked for arms, ammunition and communication equipment to fight the Chinese.
According to author, immediately after 1962 war six rounds of talks were held alternately in Pakistan and India. The later even had offered additional 1500 sq miles of Indian side of Kashmir territory to Pakistan (a fact not known) to resettle IB. Bhutto rejected the offer and wanted the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir leaving only Kathua to India’s possession. However, one major lesson drawn out on Kashmir affair or conflict between India and Pakistan was Britain and United States’ unflinching support for Pakistan.
Another significant overture highlighted in the book is India’s concern for every country and every International issue other than pursuing her own National Interest. For instance, Nehru was pleading more for China becoming a member of the Security Council or insistence on inviting Russia and Malaysia in Second Afro- Asian Conference; Vietnam issue; arms control but losing on membership of Islamic State Summit despite author having managed it during his tenure in Morocco.
It was during crucial phase of late 60’s that author was sent to the United States as deputy chief of mission with personal rank of Ambassador and his chance meeting with Kissinger. Despite two countries being largest democracies, Washington mood towards India had not been friendly rather that of cynicism or largely of ignorance. Imagine Dulles having remarked that Pakistan is being preferred because they had Gorkhas which were best fighters in the world or we were too inclined towards communism and too preachy. Kissinger had equally been whimsical in calling India as bastards and Chinese, a cold pragmatic bastards.
While enumerating events of 1971, the author was correct that if Washington
128 Chanakya Journal of CCSS had played its role positively, the genocide in East Pakistan could have been avoided. But the US was determined to let the things happen given Kissinger’s resoluteness towards Yahya and his open hostility towards India, including China factor.
Incredible as is generally said nations behave no different from individuals, Nixon contempt for Mrs Gandhi had actually turned State Department blind to gruesome realities in East Pakistan, besides growing influx of refugees in India. It was further considered by Nixon-Kissinger duo that given few million dollars for relief and rehabilitation would mollify India. Obviously, later, as the author narrates signing of Indo-Soviet treaty of 9th August 1971, fell like a bombshell on the United States, thereby vilifying non-alignment as a sham.
In the blame game, Dinesh Singh, PN Haksar and TN Kaul were singled out for signing the treaty being pro-Soviet. Meanwhile 5 Bengali diplomatic officers of Pakistan Foreign Service posted in Washington walked out of the Embassy of Pakistan while war for Bangladesh was crystallizing at faster pace. The author also brought out the failed meeting between Mrs Gandhi and Nixon when she was made to wait for 45 minutes to see the President. The Seventh Fleet intimidation carried another interesting episode in the 12 days war when it was reported by the author that it would take 7-8 days to reach Indian shores and by than war would be over - an act of monumental failure of US President and his NSA.
The victory of 1971 war also changed the dynamics of Indo-US relations resulting resumption of high level contacts in early 1974 but before it smoothened, the nuclear test of 1974 again hampered its progress. The author was candid in unfolding of events as after the war when negotiations were drawn to certain acts of give and take Bhutto managed the diplomatic success.
Before his appointment as High Commissioner to Britain, the author devoted a full chapter to his divine spirituality and meeting with Shri Satya Sai Baba and through him the renewal of his faith which had got lost after the death of his elder son, Yatish.
The diplomacy in London began with restructuring of India House on all fronts including thinning down of employees. Author’s close interaction with leaders of Labour and Conservative parties especially with Margaret Thatcher and Premier Edward Heath is equally chronicled. Evincing interest in the Chapter was Lord Mountbatten’s curiosity to know the likely reaction of Indian Government on his death.
In his book on Life and Diplomacy, Nepal has a significant mentioning. Many things had changed in Nepal from mid 50s when he was posted there. There was perceptible incline towards Beijing resulting from certain undefined grievances including Indo-Nepalese treaty of 1950 and Sikkim. Later, author’s ambassadorial assignment to Holland and France had a mix of placidity and warmth. For instance,
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Mr Philip of Holland wanted a world class electronics research and production center in India. However, it was conveyed by the minister in-charge to the author that country’s electronic future cannot be handed to western capitalist. Jokingly while defining Indo-French relations, the author attributed it to an old couple resigning to placidity.
Brought up in a humble family, the Ras, Kris, Krishna and Maharaja of Rasgotra as he was commonly pronounced abroad, the author as Foreign Secretary of India had prioritized the cleaning up of the working environment in MEA. According to him, the country was in a situation of diplomacy stasis as for other than Soviet Union we didn’t have relations with any other country significant being Pakistan, China and the United States based on certain hyped prejudices which needed to be dispelled. Later, President Zia ul Haq’s moral, political and arms support to Sikh extremist changed the dynamics.
Further, as Foreign Secretary the author’s indulgence with other neighbouring countries including removing mistrust with Nepal and Bangladesh over construction of dams; developing power generation projects with Bhutan, besides holding non- aligned summits makes an appealing reading. Such summits had humour when Queen Elizabeth pointing at Commonwealth Summit of 1989 remarked, “What a summit, Rajiv had not come and Benazir was heartbroken.”
Running into 26 chapters along with interesting notes and appendices, the author’s account of his voyage of diplomacy will indeed induce readers of all sections to a most fascinating and little known aspect of diplomatic history.
(The review writer is a Professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh)
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CCSS ORGANISATION PATRONS
Shri TN Chaturvedi Former: Governor of Karnataka, Home Secretary, CAG and Member of Parliament. He was awarded the Padma Vibhushan in 1990. He has authored two books and edited many more.
Shri Vijai Kapoor Former: Lt Governor of Delhi, Secretary Defence Production and Chief Secretary of J&K as well as Delhi.
Shri Shekhar Dutt SM Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Secretary. Earlier, he had served in the Indian Army and was awarded Sena Medal. He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and Honorary Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored three books on defence and national security.
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MEMBERS OF THE CCSS EDITORIAL BOARD
Shri DC Pathak Former: Director IB; Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee; Member, National Security Advisory Board. He has authored four books on intelligence and security issues and regularly contributes articles on current security problems in various newspapers and journals.
Shri Shekhar Dutt SM Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Secretary. Earlier, he had served in the Indian Army and was awarded Sena Medal. He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and Honorary Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored three books on defence and national security.
Dr SD Pradhan Former Deputy National Security Adviser and Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. He also served as the Chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus (2008-2010). He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and a member of Board of Studies, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored two books and regularly contributes article on security issues and foreign policy in various newspapers and journals.
Shri R Srivastava Secretary, Angika Development Society; Pro Vice Chairman, DPS Bhagalpur and DPS Greater Ranchi. He is also an Advisor in the India Info Sec Consortium. He contributes articles on cyber security and other current issues.
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V Adm P Kaushiva Former: Commandant, National Defence College; Director, UYSM, VSM (Retd) National Maritime Foundation; Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. He is a prolific writer and contributes articles on strategic affairs and maritime security issues in various newspapers and journals.
Dr Rakesh Datta Chairman, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University; former member National Security Advisory Board. He has authored several books on defence and security issues and regularly contributes articles in various journals and newspapers.
Shri Harpal Bawa Director, Chanakya Centre for Strategic Studies and Member Secretary, CCSS Editorial Board; former Director, National Security Council Secretariat. He had assisted the Group of Ministers in the preparation of their report on “Reforming the National Security System”. Earlier, he had occupied several important positions in the Indian Navy.
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ADVISORY COUNCIL
Shri Shekhar Dutt SM Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Chairman Secretary, Secretary Defence Production, Secretary Ministry of Health, DG Sports Authority of India.
Shri Ajai Singh Former Director ARC.
Shri Akhil Jain Former Member CAT.
Ambassador Ashok Former Diplomat. Kumar Attri
Shri Amitabh Mathur Former Director ARC.
Shri Tejinder Singh Senior Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce & Laschar Industry, Government of India.
Professor Meena Datta Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University.
Dr Jaskaran Singh Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Waraich Panjab University.
Gp Capt Rajesh Mohan Former Joint Director in NSCS. He was associated (Retd) with the National Security Advisory Board for a number of years. He is a veteran fighter pilot of the IAF, who took part in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.
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