Waterfall Fire Lessons Learned
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WaterfallWaterfall FireFire LessonsLessons LearnedLearned JulyJuly 20042004 CarsonCarson City,City, NevadaNevada PetePete Anderson,Anderson, StateState ForesterForester--FirewardenFirewarden InitialInitial FireFire InformationInformation July 14, 2004 ¾ Detection and Initial Dispatch: 0257 ¾ Cause: abandoned campfire ¾ Location: hills west of Carson City ¾ Responding Resources: Carson City Fire Department (CCFD) and Nevada Division of Forestry (NDF), and USF Humboldt-Toiyabe Forest (HTF) ¾ Type-3 Organization formed at 0600 with IC’s from NDF, CCFD and HTF ¾ Type-2 ITM ordered at 0800 based on complexity analysis ConditionsConditions PriorPrior toto IgnitionIgnition ¾ Steep canyon slopes with urban developments immediately adjoining the wildland forest boundary ¾ Fuel loading moderate to heavy ¾ Road systems a combination of paved, gravel and unmarked single lane, and narrow roads on the sides of slopes common ¾ Prolonged drought resulting in very low fuel moistures ¾ Energy Release Component above 97% level ¾ Predicted Haines Index of 5 with potential of large fire growth high ¾ Multiple jurisdiction area – Sierra Front Cooperators TheThe SierraSierra FrontFront WildfireWildfire CooperatorsCooperators Director Agencies Associate and Cooperating Agencies ¾ Donner Summit Fire Department ¾ Bureau of Indian Affairs, Western Nevada ¾ Lake Valley Fire Protection District Agency ¾ Meeks Bay Fire Protection District ¾ Bureau of Land Management, Carson City ¾ Fallon Naval Air Station Fire Department District and Bakersfield District ¾ California Department of Forestry ¾ Nevada State Fire Marshal’s Office ¾ Carson City Fire Department ¾ Northstar Fire Department ¾ Central Lyon County Fire Protection ¾ Sierra Pacific Power Company District ¾ South Lake Tahoe Fire Department ¾ East Fork Fire Protection District ¾ Smith Valley Fire Protection District ¾ Mammoth Lakes Fire Protection District ¾ Sparks Fire Department ¾ Nevada Division of Forestry ¾ Squaw Valley Fire Department ¾ North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District ¾ Truckee Fire Protection District ¾ North Tahoe Fire Protection District ¾ Yerington/Mason Valley Fire Protections District ¾ Reno Fire Department ¾ Storey County Fire Department ¾ University Of Nevada Cooperative Extension ¾ Tahoe Douglas Fire Protection District ¾ Nevada Division of Emergency Management ¾ U.S. Forest Service, Humboldt-Toiyabe ¾ California Office of Emergency Services National Forest, Inyo National Forest, ¾ Camino Dispatch Center Tahoe National Forest, Lake Tahoe Basin ¾ Owens Valley Dispatch Center Management Unit ¾ Sierra Front Dispatch Center ¾ Grass Valley Dispatch Center ¾ National Weather Service GeographicGeographic AreaArea ofof JurisdictionJurisdiction FireFire FactsFacts 8,7008,700 AcresAcres BurnedBurned z 2,7822,782 HumboldtHumboldt ToiyabeToiyabe z 2,5072,507 CarsonCarson CityCity z 2,4952,495 PrivatePrivate LandLand z 710710 StateState ofof NevadaNevada z 206206 TribalTribal LandLand 100%100% Containment:Containment: JulyJuly 20,20, 20042004 WaterfallWaterfall FireFire ProgressionProgression JulyJuly 1414th –– 1717th 20042004 StagingStaging AreaArea 22 PriorPrior toto BurnBurn OverOver FactorsFactors ContributingContributing toto EntrapmentEntrapment andand BurnBurn Over:Over: InjuriesInjuries andand MedicalMedical EvacuationEvacuation ¾ At 1105 hand crew reported 2 potentially serious injuries from falling rocks. ¾ Technical rescue was required resulting in diversion of tactical suppression resources. ¾ EMS personnel and equipment were dispatched from CCFD. ¾ Response led to increased radio traffic and increased vehicle traffic into Staging Area 2.. FactorsFactors ContributingContributing toto EntrapmentEntrapment andand BurnBurn Over:Over: TrafficTraffic ¾ RescueRescue ofof injuredinjured ledled toto increasedincreased vehiclevehicle traffictraffic intointo StagingStaging AreaArea 2.2. ¾ DIVSDIVS BB personnelpersonnel forcedforced toto egressegress backback towardtoward StagingStaging AreaArea 2.2. ¾ UncontrolledUncontrolled accessaccess onon KingsKings CanyonCanyon RoadRoad allowedallowed unauthorizedunauthorized personnelpersonnel andand vehiclesvehicles toto enter,enter, including:including: • private parties • unassigned fire and non fire personnel • media • incoming Type-2 IMT members FactorsFactors ContributingContributing toto EntrapmentEntrapment andand BurnBurn Over:Over: FireFire WeatherWeather andand ConditionsConditions July 14, 2004, 1230 – 1300 ¾¾ MainMain firefire spottedspotted overover KingsKings CanyonCanyon road.road. ¾¾ SpotSpot firesfires grewgrew immediatelyimmediately beyondbeyond control.control. ¾¾ AdditionalAdditional spottingspotting andand downdown canyoncanyon windswinds spreadspread firefire toto thethe east.east. ¾¾ NorthNorth endend ofof firefire blewblew upup withwith highhigh intensity,intensity, developingdeveloping aa significantsignificant columncolumn resultingresulting inin inin--drafting.drafting. ¾¾ DownDown canyoncanyon windswinds causedcaused thethe southsouth endend ofof thethe firefire toto spreadspread northnorth andand easteast burningburning throughthrough StagingStaging AreaArea 2.2. EntrapmentEntrapment andand BurnBurn OverOver SummarySummary July 14, 2004, 1315 ¾ BurnBurn overover lastedlasted approximatelyapproximately 22--55 minutes.minutes. ¾ EntrapmentEntrapment andand burnburn overover ofof 2121 personnelpersonnel andand 1818 vehicles.vehicles. ¾ 22 personspersons receivedreceived firstfirst andand secondsecond degreedegree burnsburns (firefighter(firefighter andand newsnews reporter).reporter). ¾ 33 vehiclesvehicles destroyed.destroyed. ¾ SeveralSeveral additionaladditional vehiclesvehicles receivedreceived minorminor toto severesevere damage.damage. Staging Area 2 After Burn Over BurnBurn OverOver InvestigationInvestigation ¾ Multi-agency investigation team formed. ¾ Investigation team comprised of diverse cadre with inter-agency representation and expertise. ¾ Team members were from BLM, NDF, USDA FS, Central Lyon County Fire District, Clark County Fire Department, and Reno Fire Department. ¾ Reviewed participating agency policies and guidelines. ¾ Interviewed over seventy people. ¾ Made several site visits. ¾ Reviewed written and photographic documentation. ¾ Grouped findings into 10 categories. BoardBoard ofof ReviewReview ¾ Five-members from multiple jurisdictions ¾ Chaired by Eldorado Forest Supervisor John Berry ¾ Nevada State Forester Pete Anderson ¾ Carson City Fire Chief Lou Buckley ¾ Humboldt-Toiyabe Deputy Forest Supervisor Ed Monnig ¾ Forest Service Wildland Fire Safety Manager Steve Holdsambeck BurnBurn OverOver InvestigationInvestigation FindingsFindings 1. EnvironmentalEnvironmental andand firefire behaviorbehavior 2. MultiMulti--jurisdictionaljurisdictional incidentincident managementmanagement 3. CommunicationsCommunications 4. FirefighterFirefighter andand PublicPublic SafetySafety 5. TransitionsTransitions 6. RolesRoles andand ResponsibilitiesResponsibilities 7. OperationsOperations andand tacticaltactical decisiondecision makingmaking 8. EntrapmentEntrapment 9. ManagementManagement 10. PolicyPolicy 1.1. EnvironmentalEnvironmental andand FireFire BehaviorBehavior ¾ Very low fuel moistures as a result of prolonged drought. ¾ Energy Release Components above 97%. ¾ Potential of large fire growth high with predicted Haines Index of 5. ¾ Fire activity (intensity, spotting, and rates of spread) increased dramatically starting about 1200. ¾ Blow-up on north end of fire and subsequent in- drafting contributed to south end of fire spreading northeast and the burn over at Staging Area 2. 2.2. MultiMulti--jurisdictionaljurisdictional IncidentIncident ManagementManagement ¾ NDF was assumed to be the jurisdictional agency. ¾ Unified Command was established at initial attack with IC from both NDF and CCFD. ¾ Agency Administrators concurred with the objectives and plan for managing the fire. ¾ Command and Operations personnel recognized a high potential for significant downhill fire spread. ¾ Trigger points for initiating disengagement and egress from area were not identified or communicated, and responsibilities were not assigned. ¾ Staging Area 1 established at Carson Middle School to receive incoming resources, with staging area manager assigned. 3.3. CommunicationsCommunications ¾ Communications plan was developed with assignment of five radio frequencies including command, two tactical frequencies, air to ground, and air to air. ¾ Poor radio discipline and/or not using assigned radio frequencies resulted in tremendous radio traffic on both command and tactical frequencies. ¾ Radio traffic congestion resulted in many overhead personnel reverting to home unit (unassigned) frequencies and cell phones for much of their communications, resulting in critical conversations not being available for all personnel who had a “need to know” creating more confusion regarding fire status and firefighting actions. 4.4. FirefighterFirefighter andand PublicPublic SafetySafety ¾ Check-in procedures did not provide complete accounting of all personnel the fire area. ¾ Quality of briefings varied widely. ¾ Assigned and unassigned personnel in fire area without wearing PPE. ¾ Uncontrolled access into Kings Canyon resulted in private parties, unassigned fire and non-fire management personnel, the media and incoming Type 2 IMT members in Staging Area 2 . ¾ Command and operations personnel observed heavy congestion at Staging Area 2 but took no effective action. ¾ 2 firefighters on hand crew received potentially serious injuries from falling