The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902
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( 217 ) CHAPTER IX CLOSE OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN, 1901 Western Transvaal, Free State, and Cape Colony (February-May, 1901) We have now brought events in the Eastern Transvaal, from Scheme of e c ap er * Pietersburg in the north to the Natal border in the south, * down to the beginning of the winter. It remains to carry the campaign in the Western Transvaal, in the Free State, and in Cape Colony down to this same point, which marks a distinct epoch in the history of the guerilla war. I. Western Transvaal. (February-May) It was at the beginning of February that we broke off the Situation in narrative in the Western Transvaal.* At that date there ^^5™ were three British forces in the field. Babington with 2,000 beg. of Feb. men held an intrenched camp on the Naauwpoort heights, eight miles south of Olifant's Nek ; Cunningham with 2,300 M West. men was at Eoodepoort, on the branch railway between em Trans- Krugersdorp and Johannesburg ; and on the Bechuanaland volume, border, in the far west, Methuen was at Taungs. The only Boer " force in being " was that of Smuts in the Gatsrand. This force had just captured Modderfontein Post and, firmly established on the heights above it, had repulsed Cunning- ham's attack and compelled that general to retire to Koode- * See chap, iv., p. 116, 218 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA [1901 poort. Be la Key himself, in the hills to the west of Babington, was inactive ; but Kemp, his ablest and most daring lieutenant, having ended a long partnership with Beyers in the first days of French's big movement,* had just brought back the Krugersdorp commando to its own district and was endeavouring to supply his men with fresh horses and equipment. Save for the small detachments which made up Smuts's force, the commandos, generally speaking, were dispersed over their own districts. Do la Roy's On the Boer side, the spirit of offence in the Western difficulties. Transvaal had begun to die down. The stirring memories of Nooitgedacht were growing faint, and the small success won by Smuts at Modderfontein did little to revive enthusiasm. I)e la Eey found an increasing difficulty in persuading his burghers to quit the neighbourhood of their homes and permit the amalgamation of small local groups into compact striking forces. Another of his cares was the scarcity of horses. In despatches written to his Government at this period he complains bitterly of his need for remounts, a need he was trying to meet, and eventually did meet, by purchases in the Free State. Meanwhile his headquarters were in the Zwartruggens, that wild region of bush and mountain lying to the west of the Magaliesberg. Here it was his policy to keep constantly within call a " flying commando " of picked men on picked horses, with which he could speed at short notice to any threatened point within the Western Transvaal. Outside the border he was resolved not to go ; for although in the month of February there was some question of a descent on Cape Colony to support de Wet's invasion, in March, on a report from Hertzog of de Wet's total failure, the idea, for the time, was abandoned. Kitchener's With his limited resources strained to the utmost by plans for the West. French's movement against Botha and by de Wet's raid upon Cape Colony, Kitchener could do no more than throw two additional columns into the Western Transvaal. Lieut. -Colonel Shekleton f was given 1200 men of the new Mounted Infantry * See chap, vi., p. 163, footnote, t Shekleton's Column.—Gth M.I. 8th M.I., 4 guns "P" Battery, 2 guns 38th Battery, 2 pom-poms. 1901] CLOSE OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN 219 * and six guns ; and Lieut-Colonel Benson (the officer whom we have seen since working under Blood) took the field with 1,400 men and six guns, thrown together from many sources and comprising no less than fourteen combatant units. Kitchener's main concern was to prevent a diversion by De la Eey which might dislocate French's movement, and at the same time to drive the enemy from the country round Johannesburg and Pretoria in order to permit the resumption of civil life in these important towns and in the mining districts near them. Smuts had to be dislodged from the Gatsrand and Kemp from the Krugersdorp district. Dealing with the former first, Kitchener ordered Cunningham from Eoodepoort, Benson from Potchefstroom and Shekleton's column (temporarily under the command of Colonel Flint) from Elandsfontein, to converge on the Gatsrand and attack Smuts. To supplement this movement Methuen was ordered to march up from the western border to Klerksdorp, while Babington, at Naauwpoort, was to keep De la Eey under observation ; instructions which Babington interpreted in rather too literal a sense. These and all subsequent movements needed some strong British difficulties - controlling hand in the field. Hitherto French had been in control ; but French, as we know, was now sent to the east and there was no one to take his place. Here, as elsewhere, the problem of local control was never properly solved. A bad system was being evolved, centralised at head- quarters and at the same time lacking the vitality which might have been given to it by more enterprise in the field, willingness to take risks and unselfish loyalty between column-commanders. Nor must the more fundamental diffi- culties be forgotten. Bases of supply were few, permitting but a limited radius of action; district intelligence and field intelligence were alike very imperfect ; mounted troops were not only deficient but were constantly undergoing change. * Benson's Column.—Mounted troops, 580, viz., detachments of 12th Lancers, 9th Batt. I.Y., 6th Imp. Bushmen (New South Wales), Imp. Light Horse and Kitchener's Horse. Infantry, 636, viz., detachments of 2nd Cheshires, 1st R. "Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Derbyshires, 1st Border Regi- ment, and 2nd Northampton. 2 guns "P" Battery, and 2 guns "Q" Battery ; 1 gun 37th Battery, 2 guns 78th Battery ; 1 pom-pom (G 2 Sect.). 220 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFBICA [1001 The move- The movement against Smuts, who had moved to Buffelsdoorn ment against Smuts, Pass in the western part of the range, began on February 9, Fob. 9-24. when Cunningham left Eoodepoort. The want of a definite field-commander at once became apparent ; for Flint, marching from Elandsfontein, misunderstood his orders, received no correction and after a week's marching circled back to Meyerton. Cunningham and Benson met at Buffelsdoorn on the 14th, to find that Smuts had quietly slipped away to the Losberg. Puzzled by conflicting reports, the columns slowly followed, and before they reached the Losberg Smuts had again vanished. This time the Boer leader dismissed to their farms the local men and with a few hundred followers crossed the branch railway at Witrand and made off to the north- west. On the 24th the three British columns came into Potchefstroom. Methuen's In the meantime Methuen, in one of those tedious march from Taungs to marches which so frequently fell to his lot, had been working Klerksdorp, up doggedly from the western border. Leaving Taungs on Feb. 2-18. February 2 and pushing before him scattered bands of the enemy, he was at Wolmaransstad on the 12th and rested till the 14th. Three days later, at the farm Rietfontein, news came that Du Toit of Wolmaransstad, Celliers, the new leader of the Lichtenburg commando, and Liebenberg of Potchef- stroom had concentrated a force at Hartebeestfontein, 16 miles north-west of Klerksdorp. Methuen at once resolved to attack, and, on local reports as to the nature of the position, made a wide circuit to the north. The first results were good. Celliers had left his laager at Brakpan and at dawn on the 18th Lieut.-Colonel von Donop and the Bushmen raided and captured the whole of it, together with forty prisoners. But when he approached the Boer position, Methuen found it to be far stronger than the maps indicated or his informants had led him to expect. The enemy, too, had been reinforced. De la Key, with his flying commando, eluding the watch of Babington, had ridden down from the north and found himself in command of about 1,300 men. These were in- trenched on the Cyferlaagte ridge, just to the north of the village of Hartebeestfontein. As the subsequent narrative will show, this was a favourite Boer rendezvous and a 1901] CLOSE OF THE SUMMEU CAMPAIGN 221 continual source of danger to Klerksdorp and the neighbour- ing garrisons. Methuen never declined a fight, and though his fighting strength was barely 900, he began the assault at 8 a.m. The 5th I.Y. and a pom-pom, which was handled by Lieu- Action of eB " tenant Venning with remarkable audacity, were sent against f ntein^ the Boer left and the 10th I.Y. against the right. In Feb. 18. the latter quarter the attack was reinforced by the Victorian Imperial Eegiment, the 6th Imperial Bushmen, and two companies of the Loyal North Lancashires, and under the direction of Lord Erroll, was pressed with great gallantry; but little or no impression was made on the defence. At 11 a.m. De la Eey made a counter-attack on the British left, which met with a sharp repulse, and in the afternoon the Boers left the position, leaving 18 dead on the field. Methuen' s loss was 49 killed and wounded. This action cleared the road to Klerksdorp, which Methuen entered on the next day, having covered a distance of 150 miles since leaving Taungs.