Debates still swirl around Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky 70 years after his death. He was, and remains a polarizing figure, someone whose name can cause a fight. That is true especially in Israel, but also in the United States, where Israeli militarism divides opinion. With few exceptions, Jabotinsky has been the object either of adoration or opprobrium. However, different questions come to mind: was he a good politician? how did he act politically? did he reach his goals? and if not, why not? To evaluate Jabotinsky as a politician, Was Vladimir I limit myself to the years of his most intense Jabotinsky a ‘Good’ political activity, 1925–1940, when he was the head of the Zionist Revisionist Party. Politician? Vladimir Jabotinsky was born in Odessa in 1880. A noted journalist and writer, he became interested in Zionist politics while Brian Horowitz in his 20s. He became known as the “father” of the Jewish Legion, a military unit attached to the British army, during World War I. In the Mandate period (1922 ff.) he differed from Hayim Weizmann with the call for nothing less than a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River. By “Revisionism” Jabotinsky meant a return to Theodore Herzl’s focus on politics (as opposed to practical efforts, i.e. settling the country). Concretely, he insisted on a change in Britain’s attitude toward the Zionist move- ment, including efforts to encourage mass im- migration, expansion of industry, and financial help for Jewish land purchases. The picture drawn so well by, among others, Colin Schindler, is of Jabotinsky as a failed politician who could not keep his party together. In this view the Revisionist Party began to splinter in the mid-1930s, under the pressure of independent action by members who were more radical than Jabotinsky. While a plausible argument, it rests on one main point: that Jabotinsky opposed the splintering, but failed to prevent it. Jabotinsky’s allies in Palestine, Yehoshua Yevin, Abba Achimeir,

40 and Uri Zvi Greenberg, and in Eastern Europe, Menachem Begin, seemed to defy his will. I claim that the splintering was inherent in the loose organization that Jabo- tinsky intentionally constructed in response to political weakness. Among Zionists as a whole, he lacked support in numbers and influence. What he could hope for, however,

Courtesy of the Jabotinsky Institute in Israel Courtesy of the Jabotinsky were provocations and scandals that might attract new members by forging allegiances and capturing attention. Like his so-called ex- tremist colleagues, Jabotinsky was not averse to the use of violence against Arabs or Jews if it could further his program or popularity. Central to my argument is an exami- nation of Revisionist actions in the 1920s and ’30s. Most were actually ploys or provocations. Among them, one may start with Jabotinsky’s negotiations with Semon Petliura’s regime in Ukraine during the civil war (1918–21) to save Jews from pogroms by the Ukrainian National Forces. Then came the disruptive “march to the Kotel” in 1929, his support for Betar strike- Vladimir Jabotinsky breakers in Petach-Tikvah in 1930, and his secession from the Zionist Congress in 1932. After that, we have the so-called “Petition Campaign” (1933 – 34, which gathered signatures to a petition requesting that Britain open up Palestine to mass emigration), creation of his own alternative Histadrut (confederation of labor unions), enlargement of the Irgun, and the condoning of terrorism during the Arab Uprising of 1936. Later, in 1938, we find his unsuccessful negotiations with Polish govern- ment officials to remove a million Jews from Poland. It is also important to include Jabotin- sky’s provocative statements regarding social- ism, workers’ rights, and strikes. Those who disagree that Jabotinsky favored a decentralized organization character- ized by dramatic provocation point to his desire for total control that makes him at least appear to be a dictator. Concretely, they refer to Jabo-

41 tinsky’s “putsch” in 1932, when he took control tactically weak. Nonetheless, he provided a of the Revisionist Executive. If Jabotinsky were political option for Zionists who wanted a willing to share power, they ask, why would he state and nothing less, who were attracted seize control in this undemocratic way? to paramilitarism and hostile to socialism. Briefly, Jabotinsky wanted to take the However many such people there were, they Revisionists out of the Zionist Organization, all came to him. For many reasons there were but found his way blocked and his leadership fewer such Jews than those who were at- threatened by his own Executive. Faced with a tracted to other parties and ideologies. Thus, potential rebellion from within, he unilaterally one can say that he played his hand well, but dissolved the Executive and took total power still did not have the cards to win the grand for himself. prize, namely, leadership and control of world If we evaluate Jabotinsky’s overall Zionism. political activity, one has to admit that it was largely ideological in temper, characterized by grand gestures, but without many tangible results. Neither in Palestine, nor in Eastern Europe, did the Revisionists gain enough sup- port to change Zionist political policy directly. They were unable to effectively influence the governments in the states where Jews lived. Politically, Revisionism was important within the Jewish community since it served as a home for non-Socialists, such as the so-called “small shopkeepers” from Poland in the Fourth Aliyah. Socially, however, its main strength was as a social movement especially in Eastern Europe, where Betar (Revisionist youth group) activists provided camps and organized schools and sporting activities for youth. Revisionism gave self-respect to Jews worldwide, instilling the idea that they should be proud, strong, and prepare themselves mentally and spiritu- ally for difficult obstacles ahead. In opposition to despair in Eastern Europe, Jabotinsky offered his followers empowerment as part of a group with a clear mission that placed at its center strength, health, courtesy, and chivalry. The argument of the book I am writ- ing (and which I worked on during my stay at the Frankel Institute) focuses on the Revision- ist Party’s weaknesses that led Jabotinsky to a politics of scandal. Indisputably, scandals drew many to him. He was ideologically strong, but

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