ENCLOSURE H
3D TANK BATTALION
ACTION REPORT 1975 QIJia^AS, 3D T*u»K BATTALION, G-rtL: ml s 3D liaaifcE" DIVIblOi , FUST I«».ilfc3 FORCE, C/O PL^ET POST OPF^G^, I Serial 9 April, 1945.
Prom: To : The Commanding General, 3d Karine Division. Subject: Action Report. Reference: (a) 3dliarDiv General Order No. 137. Enclosure: (A) 5d Tank Bn Action Report for. the IWO JIliA Operation. i* In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), enclosure in) is submitted herewith. , 33 mm. BATTALION, iVISIOl!, iLBHD MARIHE FORCE, OST OFFICE, SA1T FBAHCISCO. •y>y - <• 2 April ACTIOII REPORT - IWO JIKA ' I. SUMMARY: 7 Kovembor, 19^ - 27 March, &i I* This report covers the 3& Tank Battalion^ activities in planning, training, logistical preparation, and embarkation relative to the XWO JIMA. ri3?S&ATIQlT for the period 7 November, Vjkk to 12 February, I9U5. 2» This report includes a narrative resume of this unit's activities enroute to, and while on the objective for the period 12 February, I9U5 to 22 March, ^ 3. This report further contains a ffplay by play* narrative of important events from the beginning of this battalion.1 s action to recmbarkati on-for the period 23 February, 19^5 to 27 March, ^ $* Narrative Summary (for detailed.account see Part III) 1» ' The 3& Tank Battalion, having begun embarkation on 12 February, 19^5* was completely embarked upon 2 LST!s and 2 AKA's by 16 February. All convoys sailed that date. •. • Maps were issued and officers and men were briefed as thoroughly as possible on all aspects of the operation, >.. . On 21 February the LST convoy was attacked by a squadron of" *suicide bombers" just off lIIltAtil- IWO, and LST #^77 \^as 'rammed11 about f if toon feet aft of the starboard magazine, bomb and plane penetrating iJito the tank deck. This unit suffered three men killed, ton wounded and var ious tank equipment damages. , Elements of this Battalion (ttBM company, parts of *Q* - 8 tanks, and one retriever - and B&S companies) wore landed on 23 February, 19^5-* Tieso twenty-five tanks reported to the Fourth Tank Battalion, but were subsequently attached to CO, |*ifth Tank Battalion as Reserve for a unified tank attack to be made on Ho. 2 Airfield on 2k February. Actually only two n011 company platoons and one "B11 company dozer tank were employed, and late 2^4 February !tBlf company was attached to the 21st Marines (attached ^thMar3)iv). The above tanks wore debarked from LST 6^6; "A* company, remainder of B&S and nCtr companies debarked LST %77 late 2^ February and eventually reported to CO, 3dM&rDiv, On the night 2k - 25 February all units Ashore revorted to Battalion Control, assemb|od in 21st RCT zone of action. On 25 February, Jd Tank Battalion S^as attached to 9th ECT for an attack on, and north of, Airfield ITo. 2. This was the only occasion that this battalion was employed as a battalion, "A* and HBlf companies preceded the Second Battalion across the airfield after a concentrated air, HGF, and artillpry strike. The battalion remained attached to the 9^h RCT for a continuation of tho attack on 2(? February, but only *$* company (attached First Battalion) was employed. 27 February, n B B company replaced nG" company (attached First „ Battalion). As a result of these actions, the companies were greatly depleted (see 2, bolow). Consequently, when the RCT subsequently attachod "companies11 to two or more assault battalions, they were actually two or more "platoons11* Tho outstanding characteristic of these actions was that tanks wore boing thrown against artillery and AT:fire in an effort to roach the high ground beyond the airfield. Undoubtedly, the bulk of tho tank weapons accomplished much* But it is questionable that they accomplished a s much, or saved enough infantrymen to warrant such tactics against known AT emplacements* On 28 February the tank action bc^an to resolve into the typo of warfare in which Marine Tank Units, haVo proven most effective. The tanks wore used in small but sufficient numbers in direct support of infantrf^ Where possible the tanks preceded tho infantry against limitedaad dofinod ' objectives; where this was impractical the infantry took tho load. There wpre countless situations whore the tank ra^chine-guns and flamethrowers were employed to destroy strong, though snail, pockets of^jresistance (caves, mounds, etc). " 4 c of tanks wasattached to a platoon of infantry to ers, and ether strong points. ,V » and ffAn companies respectively gave direct overhead 75^ **re support to the21st ZQT* tfhese were theonly 'concentra ted" torx^es that the tanks laid down as such. Once the high ground in the northern part of theisland was attained, tanks were placed on the • cliffs firing &own into the depress!one leading to thenorthern "b«ache/% ..*Th» remaining phase of theIWO JE-IA Operation gave the tanks.limited, "but essential opportunities. Host of the "special weapons* - smalland large capacity flamethrowers, rocket launchers, 75mia HE ammunition with 2-105 fuses - were used continuously and effectively on isolated pockets of resistance. • .' . ' ,. ,-. - , .-. • •, • • • The "battalion, less "A* company, reembarked on 22March,, X$k5and sailed forGuam. f*A* company remained attached to the9th EOT (Hone:One platoon "A* company regained with 21st BC$ until £Hth Karch), 2. Thefollowing chart is a report of tanksrused, available,and operative throughout the campaign:
01>2HAirin i riTB IITCEE HI: (Maintenance) tSestroyed A B 0 A B 0 A 3 c AB C 2k 11 15 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 x 6 5 11 *5 0 6 , 1 1 o • U lk< 0 26 g k 0 3 0 6 0 15 27 I 11 7 5 1 5 k 3 .3 3 11 0 ZZ g 6 l i 3 1 l k g 3 3 0 0 1 llarch 11 7 11 l 2 it 3 cr v 0 3 6 3 2 llarch 10 3 13 2 k 2 3 g 0 3 3 12 3 March 10 5 12 3 3 3 27 0 • o 3 12 k March 10 6 2 k 3 7 1 3 0 3 5 llarch 10 xo10 2 l .2 0 0 7 r- l 3 7 3 os 6 llarch 10 7 1 2 7 2 0 0 6 7 March 10 7 10 1 1 1 7 2 0 0 0 g llarch** 10 4 l 7 7 1 3 2 7 6 3 3 0 9 i'larcn 10 g g 3 2 1 2" 7 9 0 6 10 Iferch 11 7 7 2 3 1 2 7 r •3 1 0 11 March ., 11 9 2 2 1 2 g 5 . 3 6 3 12 March 11 I 9 2 3 1 2 g 5 3 1 13 llarch 11 5 10 2 k 0 2 g 5 0 0 0 14 Inarch 12 7 10 1 2 0 2 g 5 1 l 1 15 March 12 7 10 1 2 0 2 g 5 0 6 10 lo March 12 9 2 1 0 2 2 g 5 .0 9 17 March 10 9 9 3 0 1 2 g 5 •2 0 g IS March 12 9 l 0 2 2 g 5 " 0 0 2 19 March• 12 9 10 l 0 0 2 g 5 0 0 0 20 March 12 9 10 1 0: 0 2 g 5 0 0 0 21 March 12 9 10 1 0 0 2 g 5 0 0 3 22 March*** 12 2 2 7 .2} March 12 2 2 0 2k March" 13 1 2 0 25 March 13 1 2 0 26 March 13 1 2 0 27 March 13 1 2 0 • "A* Company's tanks were damaged enrout eas a result of enemy action, !** H3& tank plus ono diesel tank acquired f rom *4-th 3k Bn was attached 1 ( to "B * company* *•• One flamethrowing tank acquired from l*th 3?k Bn was attached to "A* - company. PAET II, A, The Preferred Operation Plan (22 January, 19*f5» 2J0P SSCRSff) assigned this oattalion the following mission: liand on order on 'baches to Tie desi^na^ed prepared to support the Division as directed^ This was no departure from the mission that had been assigned this*"unit in the i)iv , w
B# It was decided that this unit would be composed of the following per sonnel and equipment for the assault phases of the IWO JIMA. Operations
Personnel USKC USE . * OFF WO 2SJL OFF mL B&S 11 T ~25 • 2 "TT* "A" 7 0 154 2 . • irB ff 0 160 - ' 2 b Q If5 2 £OTAL 31 5 553 ~ , 10 ' (2 Officers>> 39Marin e replacements joined during 13 - 16 March) Equipment
B&S Co. «Air Co. "B« Co. *C« Co. TAKE, M4A2 1 15 15 15 SANK, retriever 1 1 1 TRUCK,', cargo, 6x6 2 • 4 4 4 . TRUCK, 1 ton, 4x4 1 TRUCK, 1/4 ton, 4x4 2 .1 1 1 TRUCK, 1/4 ton, 4x4,w/radi o 3 5 5 6 TRUCK, 2 l/2 ton, 6x6, water 1 AMHJLAttCS. 1/4 ton, 4x4 1 TRAILERS 1 ton, cargo 1 3 2 2 1/4 ton, cargo 1 1 1 l 1 ton, water 1 1 1 1 ARC WELDER, 1 ton 0. l 1 1 2 tbn, stockroom 1 : 1 ton, Lubor 1 1 ton, stockroom 0 1 1 1
C. The following: is a brief account of all activities of this unit in pre paration for the op oration.
1. S-l. Although the IfrearH and wforward0 echelons of personnel were ^ assigned in January, the actual preparation began on 2 February. A* that time companies began compiling personnel data sheets. Concurrently, tho' S-l . prepares briefs of SOPrs and embarkation rosters. The Rear Echelon was activated on 12 February as the Porw
2* S-2. Having be cm. assigned the mission, Intelligence material was immediately assembled, and briefing conducted for Staff Officers and Company Commanders.. Aerial Photographs wore "grid&od'1.to facilitate study. Aboard ship, S-2 conducted school on Intelligence Material (soo IV, 3).
3r S-3. Having been alerted by the .tentative plan, most of the necess ary training had been conducted before the actual mission was assigned (see IV, C, Operations and Training). Operations andEmbarkation orders were immediately formulated after conferences among, Battalion^and Company Comtiand ers, Staff Officors, and Special Staff Officors.
4. S-4. Furnished individual equipment and clothing , as available, to personnel of the battalion; requisitioned supplies to i for j ^^J nces* <$! personnel were briefed on combat supply prbbleSsT^ Administer,.vo Plans wero drawn up to accompany K Bn SnB 0 and Opn 0 {see IV, 35, below). ' t 5* Transport Quartermaster - After shipping space had toon assigned ^ the Battalion, allotments wore* given to the companies in accordance with existing Division orders. Submitted UP.& TO?16,. loading plans and manifests to Dlv T($4. Made changes as advised, il l material was moved to staging area as per instructions (see IV, E, "below), ill loading completed,"by l6 February, X^l+5. , 6. Ordnance. • A. Combat Vehicles - Immediately following the. Guam Operation, all vehicles were completely inspected and necessary maintenance performed. Battalion welding machines and maintenance personnel, augmented 3& Crdnanco Company's Tank Maintenance Platoon vftile adding extra turret and eponson armor, and installing Deep Water Fording Kits. Operation of first and second echelon maintenance Was continuous during the training period. Preventive maintenance school was^ conducted regularly for all tank crews. B** Weapons - All tanks Wore inspected to ascertain the condition of 75 ^ gunc, machine guns. Gyro-stabilizers, and Hydraulic traverse units* All necessary repairs and adjustments were made. Thirteen (13) 3ftB Flamethrowers wore installed in tanks and intensive training was given operators and assistant operators on filling, charging, and firing. periments were conducted in mixing HaPaln fuol. All CO-2 fire extinguishers were checked andrefilled. Tanks were issued organizational spare parts. C. Ammunition - The following is an approximate resume of all typos of ammunition embarked in each tank: .30 Cal. (tracer l-in~5) . 9,000 rds. 75mm APC M6l w/fuze BD K66A1 w/traccr *K) rds. HS UkS w/fuze PD 1&8 suporquick- --*---.-.- 50 rds. Smoke WP X-OC II w/fuzo PDUk6 10 rds. G-r qnados, incendiary -.«------— — — - - 2 Grenades i fragmentation- -•.-•.------• h Grenades, smoke, HC^ -«^ ^ - -. ^ 7» Chemical Vforfare - Training coiisisted of schooling for all personnel -in recognition of various chemical agents, protective measures, first aid, ir m dpcont&aination, and use of Graphic Aid 3-2 card", llasks were fitted, tested, and ro~cratod for transportation. * . v * S. Medical - Tetanus, typhoid, cholera, plague, and typhus innoculations wore completed for all personnel, including replacements, prior to embarka tion. - Clothing was impregnated with JDinethylphthalato an*d DDT as a protect ion against Tsutsugamushi and Typhus Covers. Two (2) percent of the Battalion porsonnel wero instructed as litter bearers. SI. Signal «- SCR-50H, 528 radios were installed during the period 19 ITovember - 3 Docember, 19*4i. During this time mountings for tho SCR 300 radios woro prepared and installations of the Tanto-Infantry telephones wore made. SCR-300 installations were Completod and realigned in time to aid Tank-Infantry training. SCR 5^0 radios woro made available just prior to January 19^5• Waterproofing of radio gear was completed prior to embarkation. Porsonnel had participated in.all CPXfs and Tank-Infantry training. In tensive study was devoted to SOI, SOP, and all aspects of the operation. 10, Battalion Chaplain - Arranged for initial welfare and morale equip ment which was embarked with troops. Communion services were conducted aboard ship, and chaplain landed with unit.
JII CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT Of TH3 ACTIOH minus ten (k) time, Sf.st longitude time).
ent embarked aboard USS LI3RA and USS JUPITER
12 February 1945 Troops, tanks, and five radio kxk % - ton trucks embarked aboard LST #^77. . '
13 February Troops and Tanks embarked aboard LST £&4-6. Embarkation complete.
16 February , Convoy sailed. Maps issued to personnel.
2Q February Three and one-half (3#) miles off shore IWO JIKA.
• 21 February- Convoy sailed about thirty fivo (35) miles off shore. 1720 Enemy air attacic launched against Convoy. One enemy plane hit LST #^ (see I, B, above).
•23 February Received orders to beach and unload elements aboard LST #Uj7 (tJ pmy "AntGoixpMiy r-0li less two platoons, Staff tank). Due to damage from the air attack t£iis was impossible* The tanks were needed for a coordinated tank att'ack on 2k February. CO, 5thTk3n was to coordinate all tank., in a drive across airfield #2* Since LST $4?7 could not beach, the orders were trans mitted to LST #646. Company "3" and tv/o platoons plus two Company Headquart ers tanks of Company "C'f disembarked accordingly, and Tank 3attalion Executive Officer reported to CO, 5th Tank Battalion.
Remained aboard LST #f7
fl3" • Received orders to land on IWO-JIMA. Company landed at approx imately 1500. Ordered to report to Fifth (5th) Tank Battalion. Tracks on three tanks were broken as they attempted to execute sharp turns on the sandy beach. Company Mvouacod at TA l6U Queen.
LST #646 beached on "Beach Yellow". The track of- one tank was broken while making a turn in 'the loose sand. The equipment landed from this LST was as follows: eight(8) tanks and ono (l) retriever, "Upon landing .the retricVer was tali en over by the Bn-X to be used as a Battalion Command Post. 1700 - Reported to and attached to 5th Tank Battalion, 5**1 Marino Division. Moved tanks from "Beach Yellow" to assembly area at TA-16UQ on SW edge of airstrip #1. 183Q - Received heavy enemy artillery fire throughout the night. 1930 - Condition "Jled". • 2*1 February Tank Battalion (less Company "B" and two platoons of Company UC") disembarked at 13^-5 0*1 Beach Green and reported to Fourth Marine Division according to instructions from CC-, 3diiarDiv. 3n assembled TA lUSC. Received orders to report to CG-, 3clMarDiv at 1200. At this time orders were received attaching Tank Battalion to 9th Marino for attack on 25 February passing through 21st .Ilarines. In the meantime those elements attached to 5^h Tank Battalion were employed in the attack on Airfield Ho. 2. Company "3" loss n bulldozerr was held in Reserve, while one-platoon of Company C" was further attached to the 21st i-iarinos, and another platoon was attached to 27th Ilarines, , . All units assenbled vicinity 16^3 by 2^00 prepared to revert to 3n control at O7OO, 25 February, ^
"A* Landed at 1330, moved immediately to TA l^S 0 (SE end of Airfield llo. X) and "dug intt for the night. At 2230 recoivod o D (IT end. of Airfield Ho. l); arrived at 2^00 and remained of night, so as to be available for support of 9th. CT onj Conpany ?Br^Id^i«4f<3) platoons of Conj&ny "C* were attached to J«ifth (5th) Tank Battalion to bo employed in support of the 21st Roginont in a drive across airstrip-#2, Conpany ffBrf was held in reserve, The bulldozer ' was employed with tho leading plenehts of the 5th Tank Battalion, This t&nk was hit by a nortar sholl causing that tank to run into a hole. Crow evacuated safely and rovumed to canp. This occurred in vicinity of TA 181 Tare, At I63O the conpanv was detached fron the 5th Tank Battalion and attached to tho 21st Regiment.- ;
"C" 0730 « The Ibcocutivo Officer, Conpany 2jj February The Battalion was attached to the 9th Marines, Company ffAr' (11 tanks) and Conpany 'ff]Bir (13 tanks) were further attached to the 2d Bn, 9th Marines for the attack across Airfield #2, • Conpany "Cff renaincd in B.eminental Reserve. ' • "A" 0800 - 11 tanks sent in support of 2d Bn, 9th Marines in $ittack across S¥ end of Airfield ITo, 2. Targets of opportunity were engaged, Pour inoperative tanks were repaired and sent*to join others. The heavy fires encountered resulted ins two tanks being burned up; 1 bogged down in loose sand, broke a track, and was tcnporarily.abandoned; 5 ethers had to withdraw, all of which had received hits on the suspension systen, 1 had a punctured radiator also, I;1lanethrowors nountod in "tanks proved invaluable against pillboxes which ^QTO in defilade fron our flat trajectory.fire,, Conpany lr3:J was attached to the 2nd Bn, 9th Martnes. This "battalion wae to.continue the attack in a northerly diroctionpassing through the 2d 3n, 21st with- +,anl" Companies Able and 3akor attachod to tho 9th Roginont. Conpany Baker vjas onplo;"od in the right zone of action, The loading olononts of the infantry woro~held up "by terrific artillery fire in TA 195 33AY, 0910 - Conpany UI>'' tarJ^s woro to precede the infantry in an effort to neutralize the gunfire that was holding up the advance. 1010 ~ One fourth platoon tank was hit by artillery fire. The crow was safely evacuated by another tank. *• *r 10^0 - A first- platoon tank was hit on the turret but no serious danagc was done. 10^5 ~ larks that had expended all of their ammunition return ed to bivouac area for nore annunition, 1300 - Conpany lfB" was relieved by CQnpany 0700> The Conpany was attached to 9th Marines and held Iti Reserve. / 26 February The Battalion remained attached to the 9^n Marines and Conpany "0" (15 tanks) was further attached to the 1st Battalion, 9^*1 brines for tho norning attack across the northeastern end of airfield #2. , J>rt 12^+5 Conpany "A" (11 tanks).was attached to the 2nd Bn, 9th Marines, Conpany "3" was held in Reginental Reserve* f § 9th Marines for close-in support mission; returned at 1500• i ™ ffclffS more tanks to 2d Bn, 9th marines; returned at 1630. Total of 6 tanks inacTion* 2 of which were partially disabled by AT and arty fire* 3 645 - 15 minute enemy artillery concentration was layed on tank assy ares at jtf end of Airfield #1; 1 tank was partially disabled. v- ;• Company "£"" was held in Re^iciental Reserve* ffC tt 0630 - Company nCu was attached to 1st Bn, 9-b Marines far the day*s attack* 0730 - Company wBtf requested a platoon or tanks to cssist them in seizing the hill and high ground jn vicinity of TA-300P* 0750 - Conpany OoFE^rd ta.uk and one platoon raovsri out to report to CP&pany WBM» AttccTc coordinated with the infantry MD! coi:arer,!»ed "A" Attached to 9-:;h M-rines. No tanks committed. Coiupany "B" «<"s attached to the 1st Bn, 9th Marines and VILS. to precede ttLff advacolng in a NE direction* The line of departure was in the vicinity of TA SCO 0, 0730 - Elevca (1A) tanks moved out in the advance* 0750 - Third ;ola':oon leader's tank was disabled by a m?.ne«, Three (3) nore tanks were disabled b^ mines in an attempt to maneuver around tanks that had been hit and knock-ad out.. Only throo (3) tanks were successful .in passing the line of departure and t-wc (S) of these v;ere immediately knocked jut by M! fire* 0822 -All tanks F^r-e ordered to withdraw'by the CO, l^t Bn, 9th Marines. During this bried ac^'cLi of approximately twenty (2^'; ainutes, si:: (6) tanks were knocked out and feu: msn ^ers killed* Ton (,".C) non and tLree crffiaers were wounded and o:*e i^~a is missing in action* Bscelidnt work waa 'ioce by the tank crews in evaeurt!r>:3 the wounded men* 0630 - Coopany {fC': in regimental Rcsorvo» ^6 February • The Battalion wat. attached to the Slst Marines cffoc.tivo ylyin that ment prepared to pass through the 9th Marines* Company ftA" (8 tanks) and com pany ttCrt (11 tanks) nor-Q attached to the 1st and 3rd Bns. 21st Marines* resi>oct ively. The Tank Battalion (loes Comj?anies wAtt k rtG*ff vias in Regimental Attached to 1st Bn, 21st Marines* 3 tanks cor*r Company ttBw was not employed* 0700 - C3on58yH^jM^IAiPcli#d to 3d Battalion, 21st Marines and refin ed in the assembly OTfaJjfeJgb. to support the Infantry as ordered* 1530 - The eleven (11) opeSSftoijal tanks displaced forward to target area 199 X & J #hero they had the mission of covering bott. r-unvrays of air strip #2 '•• . 1 March The Battalion was attached tb the 21st Regiment, company "AM (11 w t? ) was further attached to the 1st Bn# and Company B (7) tanks) was attached to the2d Bn, 21st Marines* The Battalion (less companies rtAw and ^B*) remined in Regimental Reserve. However, at 1500 one platoon of Company tfCw reinforced Company wB{ffs tanks. ' "A* . • Attached to 21st Marines. Three (3) tanks committed with 1st Battulion* Fair results norc obtained on* caves by using T-105 (armored) fuses with 75mm HE shells* These fuses penetrated too deep in earth fortifications, however, their performance was'excellent against stone and concrete* One man wounded in action by mortar burst near Company CP. * •' < 0630 - CO of company nB* &n& platoon leaders reported to CO of 2d Battalion 21st Marines at TJ± 200 potor. The direction of attack was in a northerly direction in the vic-r inity of la 217 W« The infantry was encountering machine ^un and mortar fire and the tanks were called to aid the advance at TA 217W and X. 1030 "- The second platoon moved out to support Company "E*, 2d Battalion 21st Marines. The Company Comnia.nder of Comixmy nBrt used the pack set (SCR 510) carried by Reconnaissance aen to direct the tanks.' 1100 - Second platoon of tanks received hits from a £un of un-1 kriown caliber but were unable to spot the gun. All tanks were receiving heavy fire from rockets and mortar. 1102 - Jap tanks wore spotted beinr, used as emplacements. Tho infantry save our tanks*close support in keeping the enemy away from our.units. , 1115 - The tanks effectively attacked Jap tanks and infantry. v 1255 -vTtoc t^ird platoon vras brought up to aicl the second platoon which was running. Ion on arinunition. 1355 - The tJiird platoon leader1 s tank was hit. After the crevj had evacuated the Japs attempted to blow up the tank by placinc dynamito under it. Thpy \vere cut dovm by machine &un fire. M 1510 - Six (6) tanks were employed in this action. Three of them were knocked out "by enemy fire and remained on the front lines. During the night two (2)-of these tanks were "burned "by the Japs? The three re maining tanks returned safely to the bivouac area. As a result of this action eight (8) of the enemy's tanks were de stroyed and one (l) truck, and numerous pillboxes and emplacements. One officer and three of our men were wounded. 0700 - Company "C" stood by in assembly area prepared to support the infantry as ordered. 1500 - One (l) platoon was detached from the Reserve and was attached to Company ffBw , 3d. Tank Battalion, While moving up to join Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion, in TA 217-W and passing through the defile at TA-2OOD, one (1) tank was hit by a high explosive projectile presumably fired from a dual purpose AA. gun. The traversing nechanisiu of this tank's turret was slightly damaged* ^ - Company n C n was attached to 9th Marines. 2 March Battalion reverted to Division Control; Company "3" was attached to the 21st uarinos and Company n C M was attached to'tho 9th Rcgincnt ifor attack this morning. Company'W3n was further attached, to 3& Battalion, 9*h Mar ines (also attached to the 21st), Company WC" attached platoons to both the 1st and 2d 3attalions, 9th. "A" Ccnpany MAW • tanks WQTC not employed this date. Tho bulldozer was called by the 2dBn, 28th Regiment, 5th Division. This Battalion was held up .by the Japs because the tanks working with the "battalion were unable to cross the A. T. ditch located at TA 2l6 iTan. The "bulldozer success fully filled in this ditch, under fire, end: the infantry v/as able to ad vance. "B" attached to the 21st Regiment. 5 tanks in action with 3d3n, 9th Marines using both close-in J5m firo on "bunkers and caves, and medium range over head fires in area of Airfield 17o. 3# at 217 J m& o n high ground at 235 V. Infantry reported excellent results. 2 tanks hit land nines and were a bandoned at TA 217X. 1 1-iAO jeep put out of action. itcn O63O - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines. 1100 - Two (2) tanks moved up to assist Cotipany •&*, 2dBn, 9th i-iar incs in TA-218U. By firing on ridge at 218M&R, they destroyed a gun of unidentified caliber and several pillboxes and caves. 1300 - These two (2) tanks expended their unit of fire and were re placed by two (2) more tanks, who again supported Company "G-", 2d3n, 9th Marines. They assisted the infantry by knocking out several pillboxes and automatic weapons in TA-21SV. Thc^c two (2) tanks completed their mission and returned to the assembly area. 1600 - The 3rd platoon moved out to support Company "A", lstBn, 9^h Marines. The platoon leader contacted the company commander and the tanks were employed to place fire on several enemy nc.ciiinc gun positions and caves at TA-201C. 3 March The 3d Tank Battalion (loss two companies) rcnaincd in Division Reserve. Company M 3 W was attached to the 21st Regiment and held in Reserve; ono platoon was used for a direct overhead fire nisoion against Eill 3&2 (TA 219U). Company "C" was attached to the 9th Marines and the Company (loss two platoons) was further attached to the 2cD:i, Two platoons of Company "C" were attached to the 1st Battalion, , ' "A" Division Roscrvo. ITo tanks comnitt The Company was attached tp the 21st Regiment, This regiment was advancing in an easterly direction toward Kill J62, located in TA 219 Unit. The second platoon fired on the hill as the 21st advanced. O63O - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines. O725 - The 4th Flatoon moved up to support Company "A11, lstBn, 9th Marines, in TA-201D.. There, by firing into TA-2O2J\&3, they destroyed several bunkers and caves."* • ' • 0815 - One (l) tank was hit lay a gun of unidentified caliber, wound ing one crew member. All other crew members safely evacuated the. knocked out tank. O73O - The 2d Platoon moved up to support 'tJcfepanloG*M&n afarf* *^*Jo, 2nd3n, 9^h Marines in TA-21SR. There they destroyed numerous caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. 1050 - The Headquarters Platoon moved up to assist ^fepe&jr^E'1! 2dBrj., 9th Marines in TA-21SW. *dhilo passing through the defile at 200D our tank ; dozer less blade sustained a hit^from a gun of unidentified caliber with the result that a track was-"broken, The disabled tank continued to fire. The %two (2) remaining tanks continued on their mission and assisted tfonn3^«, 2nd3n,' 9th Marines, by firing on ridge at 218G&M. Two (2) emplacod enemy tanks, one pillbox and numerous enemy infantry1 were destroyed, 11^5 - The 1st Platoon moved up to assist 'Sfr^W, lstBn, 9th Marines in TA-201C. There they assisted our infantry by firing into the ridge at 202D. They destroyed,one pillbox and several automatic weapons. One (l) of. jfcifo tanks (knocked out" in 2A-201C) was destroyed by one of the tanks ,of the 2nd Platoon after friendly infantry had reported seeing Japs getting inside. k March The Battalion (loss two companies) was in Division Reserve pre*» pared to support either assault Regiment on order. CompanyttjLH (10 tanks) was attached to the 21st Marines, and Company "C" (10 tanks) was attached to the 9"kn Marines (further attached to 2nd Battalion) "A" Attached to 21st Marines for direct overhead fire mission on Hill 362 TA 219-U. Unobserved results due to extremely low cloud formation, «B" Company "3" was not employed. O63O - Company "C" attached to 9*h Marines* O725 - The Uth Platoon moved out to assist Company "G", 2d3n, 9th Marines in TA-21SRW. ^825 - While moving into attack, positions one (l) tank of this pla-s toon was #it by an enemy AT gun. Three (^ members of this tank were able to safely ovacuate even thougl). one of .those was slightly wounded. 5 March ^ Battalion (less SwbpftnloB-^A^.an'a'^C*) in Division Reserve. ITo cliango in attachments* • . , • ' " "A" Attached to 21st Marines, lTo tanks' committed. Company "3" was not employed. Remained in Battalion Reserve, O63O ** Ho operations. Attached to 9th Regiment 6 March Battalion (less Companies "A" and HC") in Division Reserve. ITo change in attachments. rrAn Attached to 2lst Regiment, Ho tanks committed. Company "Btt was not employed. Battalion Reserve, "C" O63O - Company nC" attached to 9th Marinas. 0S00 - The 1st Platoon moved out to support the 1st bn, 9*h Karines ill TA-201C, They were used to fire on ridge at 2011 and assist the advances of the infantry by destroying several "bunkers, pillboxes, and automatic weap ons. O915 -(0ne (l) tank hit a mine witli the result that a track was "broken. Jour (h) of the crew members were safely evacuated from the tank but the fifth crew member was killed by enemy sniper fire as he attempted to come up out of the turret. 1015 - Another tank of this platoon hit a mine and broke a track. All crew members of this tank were able to safely evacuate it. 0S15 - The 3d Platoon moved out to support Co' W 2d Bn, 9th Mar ines in TA-21S2, There, by overhead fire placed on ridge at 21SSX they sup ported the attack of our infantry. 0900 - One (l) tank was hit in the right sponson with an AT gun.. Two crew members were killed and the other three wounded' in this tank, 7 March . • • Battalion" (less Companies "A" and nCn) In Division Reserve. ITo change in attachments, • Attached to 21st Harinos, ITo tanks committed. "3" Company was not employed. Battalion Reserve. "C" 0630 - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines. 0655 - The 2d Platoon moved out to support Company "3W , 2d Bn, Marines in, TA.-218B.WSk This platoon was employed to blast caves in this area. They destroyed a gun of unidentified caliber in TA-218T* 1^-02 - This platoon moved out to support Company "P1', ;2dBn, Jill br ines-and was released by Company n/3n * In moving up through a narrow defile one (l) tank hit a mine breaking a track. All of the crew safely evacuated the tank. This tank blocked the approach for the other two tanks of the platoon to tjonpany.."3111* As a result they were ordered to return to Company "3". I6OO - Due to the fact that Company "7" whs surrounded and pinned down another two (2) tanks of the 1st Platoon wore ordered to nnkc their wc.y to the "company. 1700 - This platoon was unable to find an avenue of approach into , "P" Company due to the extremely rugged terrain. g> Harch Battalion (less Companies "A" and "C" In Division Reserve. ITo change in attachments. "A" •• ' ' Attached to 21st Regiment. 9 tanks committed* in bcac.'i sector of 2d3n, 21st Marines against caves and pillboxes which wore holding up advance to beach at 219A. • ; • . Company M 3" was not employed. Battalion ~oserve. 0700 - Company *C" attached 9th Marines. 2To wJ^SWW^ttod^ 3attalioiffl«iN.l3fcppiiics "A1* riul nCM) in Division Reserve. Ho change in attachments; hoi^ever, .Company nG" was further attached to tho 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines which was also attached to the 9th Regiment. At 1100 two platoon of Company n B n were released from Division Reserve and attached to the 9th Marines to "be further attached to the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, "A* Attached to 21st Marines. 6 tanks, corxiitted, 3 of which fired a mission for 2d Bn; the other towed a rocket sled to firing point, then fired 20(rockets with fair results at 235T. ' . • Edq's platoon worked with Conpanies Grdd£g6 &nd 2Jasy», 3d-Bn> 9th in TA-219 Xray. The infantry pointed out targets for the .tanks to fire on. In this way numerous emplacements that were holding up the tidvance of the in fantry were olimine/ted. It was found that "o'y taking the infantryman into the tank turret better results were detained tlian "by any other method of target designation. The 2d Platoon worked with the 3d 3n, 9th and knocked out mor tars and pillboxes in the same type work; O63O - One tank section equipped with flamethrowers moved out to support rtKn Company,«3& Bn, 21st Marin s against.Hip pocket of .resistance in TA-201D. 0900 «- The tanks and infantry jumped off in'a coordinated attack and moved ahead about 225 yards. At this point the enemy employed smoke a gainst our tanks, apparently in preparation for attacking us with demolitions. This disorganized -the ^replacement infantrymen and caused them to beat a -hasty withdrawal. After the infantry withdrew, some 50 yards, the entire ground pro* viously held became active. It was necessary to establish a new r-.dio obser vation post and in doing this a reconnaissance man was killed by sniper fire. The tank section was forced to withdraw to the lines of the infantry, where they expended their remaining ammunition in an effort to cover the reorganiza tion. 1330 - This section was replaced by the 2d Platoon. 10 March Battalion (loss Companies "A" and "B")in Division Reserve* Company WBU (S tanks) relieved Company MC" which was attached to tho 9th Marines.. nB" was further attached to the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. "A" Attached to 21st Regiment.. 6 ;tanks committed with 1st and 2nd Bn.'s against heavy rock and concrete emplacements along beach, Ithcccllent results were obtained from use of T-105 fuzes* "3" Hdq's platoon worked in support of Companies'Gsor^eOand Hasyf 9tfr Marines. The second platoon worked with Conpany I'L'*,. 3d 3n, 21st Marines at 201D. During tho morning both platoons fired*into emplacements, pillboxes, etc. The 2d Platoon loader's tank was fired on by an unknown gun which" later was discovered to be a Company "C" tank manned by a Japy The gunner, in the assault tank was killed, A bazooka was called and knocked out the Company.nClr tank. ,-.. '• "Cn O63O - Company "C" in Division "oscrve with Tank Battalion'in ass embly area in TA-199X. 11 March Battalion (less Companies "A" raid "3" and one platoon of Company *Cir) was attached to 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines in Division Reserve. Company "Aw was attached to the 21st Regiment.% Company "3" was attached to the 9th Regi ment with platoons further attached to tho 1st and 3rd 3attalions. One pla toon of Company" "C" was attached to the 9th Ilrrinos and further attached to the 3rd Battalion, £lst Marines (also attached to 9th Ma] Attached to " 1 'm\j§g 3 Tanks in action- in beach sector of 21st CT at 219A with 2nd1Battalion, ' • . "B" ' HdoJ s and 2d platoon supported 9th regiment. 0905 -• Hdq's platoon laid down fire on ridge in TA-202CTH in pre paration for attack by Able Company, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, O935 - ^Q infantry movc-d out across an open field toward the ridge, moving in a northerly direction. The tanks preceded the infantry about twenty five yards. A successful crossing of the field was made in that, manner, Hone of the infantry was wounded in moving across the field, 1*030 - Able Company'infantry was held up by fire fro:;; the ridge. The tanics fired at alj caves and suspected sniper positions. 1200 - The Second platoon moved out to aid the 3& 3iii 9th. In order to get into-a position to aid then it v~s necessary that an armored bulldozer be used to build a road for the tanks. This was successfully accomplished and the 2d Platoon moved into position. .They fired into the other side of the ridge on which the K&q.fs platoon was firing. 1550 - HdqTs platoon joined the 2d Platoon and both platoons laid down a barrage on the ridge in order that tho 3^ Bn, 9^ could advance and take the ridge. ' • \ v . l62O - All tanks ceased firing and the infantry moved out in the at tack. Tho Hdqfs platoon returned to Able Company, 1st 3n, S'th and shielded this company with their tanks- in order that the wounded could be evacuated an.3 the rest of the company could withdraw, 1900 ~ All tanks were released and safely returned to the bivouac area. nc.i n 0600r Company "C in Division Reserve. O63O/~ The 1st Platoon moved out to support the~$a.3n» 21st marines. Only one (l) tank of this platoon was employed and it was used to t ow a rocket launcher into position where it could eliminate ITip resistance located in TA 201P. iTearly 20© of the 7-2" rockets were thrown into this pocket and still our infantry was unable to go in and occupy the ground. 12 March _ • ' Battalion (less Company "A" and "3" and one platoon of Company "C") attached to 2d Bn, 9th Marines in Division Reserve. Company t!A" attached to 21st Marines, Company |;3" att chod to 9th Marines with platoons further att ached to the 1st and 3& 3ns. One platoon Company "Cff was used as Rcginental Reserve for tho 9^h. • "A" Attached to 21st Regiiront. ITo action. 0730 — Hdq/s platoon moved out to support Company "C", 1st 3n, 9th, located in T^-20llJ* The tanks wei-o guided to Co:.ipaiiy »CWVS c? ^ in:fantrynon. ,.During the • morning and afternoon ilip positions were accurately pointed out .by he infantry and successful work in. clininating tho.se positions was done by the tanks. The terrain was cxtrencly rou/vh causing groat difficulty in maneuvering the tanlcsr 1255 - The 2d platoon moved out to support "I" Co, 3d 3n, 9th. The tanks noved out approxinateley one thousand yards from TA-21SC to TA-21SX to meet the infantry who were attacking in a westerly direction. Their mission was to knock out a machine gun that was holding up the advance of the infantry. The tank a were moving "cross ground that was s-till occupied by Japs and extreme difficulty^was experienced in crossing the very soft terrain. It was also very difficult to maintain'direction because tlje tanks, were being directed by remote controy through their'radios. HQtt O63O - Co "Cn lees one (1) platoon in Division Reserve. O7OO - One (l) platoon in reserve with the 9th i-i. 13 March Battalion (loss Conpanyics "A" and "3" and one platoon of Company nC") attached to 2d 3n, 9th Marines in Division Hcsorve. Conpany "A" ro nained with the 21st Marines; the dozer tank was attached to the $lh *aak • Battalion, Company "3" plus one platoon of Company "C'f was attached to the 9th Marines. At O73O two Conpany ffC" tanks reinforced Conpanyn 3". "A" Attached to 21st Marines, Bulldozer tank sent to 5th Division to "build a road for the flamethrower tan^s. Results were good. Kdq's and 3d platoon worked in support of the 1st In, Jth. The enemy was strongly entrenched in a "pocket" located in TA-201D formed Tby a stone wall raid enplacenents dug into ridges. This pocket was holding up the advance of the infantry, who were attacking in a westerly direction. The tanks had to operate over terrain that was very rough. They were at>le to move only short distances at a tine and then with the aid of an armored "bulldozer. When certain positions proved too "hot" for the Japs they would throw a gren-r ade and change positions, 1500 - Because of ricochets from the 75mm gun it became necessary to secure permission to fire the 75mn fron the CO of the 1st Sn, 9th. 0600 - One (l) platoon of f.lamothrowing tanks moved out to report to Company rr3", 3 Ik March Battalion (less Company "A", "13" and one platoon of "C") in Division Reserve. Attachments no change. Two Conpany "C:r traits reinforced the- Conpany "C" platoon attached to Company "3". "A" Attached to 21st P.egiuent. bulldozer attached to 5th Division on sane mission as on 13th. 31r.de hit r. r.iir.c and broke the hydraulic jack. The blade was becked out of range of flat trajectory fire and released, to be retrieved Liter. Ho damage was done to tank, which returned to the assembly area. , "3" O7OO ~ Kdq's 2d and 3& platoons again supported the 1st 3n, 9th Karines in tiic attempt to clear the !fpocl.ct" (TA-201D) of Japs. The use of our flamethrower tanks, proved successful 0:1 this occasion. One tr.nk was hit by a riflo grenade. Th.'.c caused a &.ali eirplosion in the tank, slightly wounding tho driver -^.id assistant driver. 17^5 •• ^-10 infantry moved out to attack. »C" 0600 - Co "Cn less one (l) platoon in Division Heserve. O63O - Five (3) tanks attached to Co "B", 3dTk2n. O9OO - These tanks assisted Company "3" in mopping up operations. 15 Harch 'Jo change* The reserve conpany (C) v/as employed by 2d'3n, Marines in attack against enemy picket i:i TA 201D. "A" Attached to 21st Marines. 'Jo action. Company "3" attached 9th Marines. Hot employ^ 0530 - Co "C11 H^Efl to 2d 3n, 9th Larinos, to support attack against enemy pocket in TA-201D. 0545 - ^on (10) tanks accompanied by one (l) armored bulldozer of the engineers moved out of assembly area to 2d B:i, 9th Marines. 0720 - While moving up to the infantry lines one (l) tank-hit a land nine breaking the track. Tho crew safely evcuated and,the Company Commander moved into another tank. 0S00 - One (l) platoon of tanks plus tho tank-dozer and the ar mored Bulldozor moved up to the Infantry lines. The tank-dozor was used to breach a sto-ne v/all .behind which the ITips were firing at our troops onch tine they tried to scale the wall. After "broaching tho wall a tank section moved through and with flamethrowers and tank guns destroyed numerous pillboxes' and caves in the area. As the terrain prohibited noving the tanks more than twenty five (25) yards through the wall the armored bulldozer was used to build trjak approaches and cover and fill the mcuiy caves, trenches and bunkers. 1300 - The armored bulldozer was attacked with a satchel charge which caused, a leaky radiator. . It was pulled "back to fill the radiator at which time the operator was killed by sniper fire. This deprived us of its further employment that day. 1500 - The tanks continued firing on the enemy positions and \Mhcn their ammunition was expended they wore replaced by another platoon. 1600 - A large capacity fIanothrowing tank was secured from the 5th Tank.Battalion and used against the pocket with good results. Many enemy infantry were caught by our guns running rwr.y from tho fire with cartridge belts exploding about their waists. 16 March Battalion (less Companies "A" and n C") ronr.ined in Division Pucservo prepared to support 21st "Regiment (which had relieved elements of the 5til Marine Divitr.on) Conpony UAI! was attached to 21st l.'r.rines for the attack, while Company irC" vas .attached-to the 9th II rincs rod further attached to tho 2d Bn, 9%h R.gircnt, for "aepping up" :.n A"jtachel to 2J.st Bo^inent. 9 truiks-committgd on terraces and cliffs overlooking beach in 21st sccbor. Excellent results were obtained on dug-in enemy strongroints "by tho neutralizing fires of 75 m 'n-n^ flamethrowers. Company i;j3'; was not employed. ifCn OGOO - Co |:C", attached to 2d En, 9th iMarines to continue attack against encay pocket in TA-2OI3. 064-5 - One (l) platoon of t"."iks plus the armored bulldozer, of the Engineers moved cut .f .t.hc asaenbiy area and into position shortly behind our lines in TA-HG.'D, " « *0'/^5 - xtc r.rmorcc*. bulldog or cover ec. by ru suction of tanks and in fantry breaLtioc .?. 2t1.ro tnl] c-.i'd v.ddciiod it irvto a t^.nk,approach, 06'CO -.ax ?.c.r^o zr.r.p.^ity fLanothrowing tr:.ii-: from hth Tank Battalion Wcis employ .d, The fl^ziethrowing tank moved r, short di stanco through tho wall and burned thj enemy defenses in tho draw. 0^?13 - The flariothrowing t^.nk \i/ithclrew and v/-s sent back to be re— charged. One of cur tank sections moved through the wall and down the draw blasting the charred positions and the regaining dofonpos thr.t wero not affect ed by the flamethrower. tfow °93O -• Tlio 5th Tank Battalion f lane throwing tank returned and was enpToyed this tino in tho aroa whore wo made our deepest J yesterday. It' "bumed out tho onony trenches and caves in thi^^ fire to tho ru^iunitioii or. the ground and explosive charges, ot'e. • 1100 - Another platoon of tanks" moved from assembly area to support Company uG;i on the right 'of- Company H ? H . TOTAL OFFICERS SLTLISTED KIA 0 KIA 19 WIA g WIA MIA 0 MIA DOW 0 Total g Total llg A* mumi 1* The essential function of this section was the reporting of casual ties* Each company, at the end of each day, submitted a casualty report for the proceeding 2k hour period, "based on front line information submitted by company commanders, platoon leaders and tank commanders* In addition, the company first sergeants and corpsmen often contacted infantry battalion aid stations to ascertain the identity and nature of wounds of our casual ties evacuated by them* livery effort was made to learn the type of wound and prognosis in time to include such information on the initial reports* Shi* procedure facilitated more prompt preparation of airmail briefs by the rear echelon administrative section* 2. Casualty reports were submitted in accordance with division instruct ions. The upper half of $erspnnel data sheets contained administrative information, the lower half (mimeographed casualty report fora) contained the following information: name, rank, serial number, organization, type •f casualty (VIA, KIA, KIA, DOtf), space for remarks, the date forwarded, specification number, the Identifying number of the report, and a space f«r the signature of the authenticating dffleer* The original, or initial cas ualty report was detached and submitted to division, a second copy was re tained, and the third dispatched to tne rear echelon administrative section. The rear echelon forwarded amplifying airmail briefs and prepared staff re turns on casualties* 3« The 5-1 section arranged for the displacement of battalion head quarters and was also charged with the security of headquarter1 s area* The staff sections were placed in a position to facilitate staff function ing. km Mail service was executed at battalion headquarters by the STavy mail clerk. Incoming mail was delivered to the company aail orderlies each evening, and outgoing mail was submitted each morning. V«44ail and stamped envelopes were obtained for personnel of this unit* 5* Post exchange supplies were made available to all personnel* Candy, athletic material and magazines were obtained from the Division Athletic and Morale office and distributed* Additional reading material and station ery were available to all hands at the nearby division library. Hews broadcasts and latest battle news and information were a daily feature* Hot food facilities were set up as soon as conditions allowed/and hot coffee was available throughout the day. 6. This section and the medical section co-operated on all sanitation measures. Adequate heads were dug, utilising discarded oil drums and pre viously' prepared seats. Sanitary measures, including DDT spraying of the area and the sprinkling of lime around and in heads, were effected daily* Daily inspections were held, 7* Burial procedure was in accordance with Division orders and. SCP's. Prior to the inauguration of Division ©raves Service, fatal casualties of this unit were delivered to the area designated for tfre Division Cemetery. Marine dead found in o\j.r area were delivered to the cemetery by direction of this section. Several enemy dead were buried. Upon activation of Division Burial Party, this section co-operated in collection and delivery of our own casualties* 1, Aer£aTMi|t^|lMotO8, varjrijag from 1:5,000 >to 1:20,OOp, wore furnished before this %fi&tion* Mosaics and low angle obliques were also provided as well as official maps of the 1:10,000 scale. In all cases, an adequate supply was provided, The completeness of both the photos and the maps loft a lot to be desired* She aerial photos, of course, were taken be* fore the intense aerial and naval "bombardment, and, consequently, could not show road nets, etc. exactly as they w^ero at the time of landing* The.maps were inaccurate in their terrain features* and their road nets* Contour lines showed level areas and plateaus,-where* actually, very cut-up and irregular areas existed* Koad nets,shown did not conform to those existing when we landed. & Hydrographic information furnished before tho campaign, proved accurate and sufficient for our needs. Plans for landing our equipment, which was based on this information, proved to be accurate. 3. Intelligence disseminated to this unit by G-2 proved to be timely in all cases. In quite a few cases, it. proved to be quite effective, namely in giving us information as to probable mine fields. Some of these we knew of in advance and were able to make plans accordingly* Under the existing conditions, it was felt that tg tho campaign, enemy suicide squads attempted to ^ fbFng large charges of explosives on and under the vehicles* This"~waT*cT6ne without any cover of smoke or screening device. The squads of four or five men would jump up from holes and attempt to rush • the tanks Before being cut down by our fire. In one area, smoke was used extensively against our tanks a s enemy tank destroyer squads rushed forward under this screen and destroyed the tank. In this instance, the tank had to enter a narrow defile, and each time it attempted to do so, the enemy would throttf out smoke grenades and the tank would withdraw. Finally, the tank pushed into the defile without any smoke appearing, bu,t, as soon as it got well within the defile, the enemy smoked it again very heavily, and it stopped momentarily. At this time, a group of the enemy, estimated to be about twenty five, swarmed out of holes and attacked tho tank with, pole charges and "Molotov Cocktails". In one instance, enemy troops entered one of our crippled and abandoned tanks ahead of our lines at night, and b*ecame familiar with the firing mechanism of the tank. In the morning, as our tanks again advanced, the enemy fired the "J^mn cannon in this abandoned tank and succeeded in knocking out one of our'.tanks before being knocked out by bazookas. 'Enemy medium and light tanks, mounting h~lim and 5"fm& cannon, were encountered. These were buried in the sand and used as pillboxes, primarily. However, they operated as AT guns too: they were extremely difficult to locate. Minos of various types were encountered, and were usually located as anti-tank weapons. The "Yardstick Mine" placed over a 130 lb. bomb was the most common typo. "Terra Cotta" mines of the 6§ md 9§ lb. variety were found. Covering these minefields wore k~(mia A3! guns which attacked the t ank once the mines had stopped it. Those AT guns woro generally placed on the flanks of the limited avenues.of approach that the tank could use and fired into the sponson (side) of tho tank, penetrating up to four inches of armor. One coastal defense gun and emplacement had several rings of wooden box mines around it, apparently to prevent the tanks from over running and crushing the position. Quite a few single and double horn kettle mines were also encountered, as were a few type 97 magnetic minesj but no new or unusual use of them wa's employed. Japanese artillery attempted to register on our tanks numerous times but never caused extensive damage, n;id obtained few direct hits. C. OPS3ATIOITS 1, Rehearsal Bxercises» A* Training in preparation for the operation was covered in a little more than three .months. The time element was considered to bo ado-, quatc. It was the practice to hold classroom study on material pertinent to ail operation, thoa field demonstrations. Of immediate concern were lessons learned during the Guam Operation. Each company criticized the campaign in classroom* discussing tactics rnd organization; on C£Xfs following, tanks were considered close "support infantry weapons" until the first tank-artiliery-infantry problem. Tho following subjects were covered satisfactorily before tho operation! Passage of tanks through minefields. Study of enemy AT weapons. . Camouflage of vehicles and equipment. Employment and use of.flamethrowers. Tactics of platoon and company. Intelligence reviews* Passive choaical defense. Armored reconnaissance. Small arms firing. Care and waterproofing of vehicles. Preventive maintenance. Gyro stabilizer and hydraulic'traverse. Communications (radio, telephone) Gas decontamination* Air defense. itry-artillery-tank problem was conducted. Tanks moved to the liT&^ffi^j&faJoked, several hundred yards by infantry. Time fire was placed over*im$&$$.s when they were on the objective., C. When it was atfinitely known the operation would be over open terrain every effort was made to get tanks in open areas to train. This was possible after the Battalion moved to Yona. Armored force tactics were used thereafter in Tank Maneuver Area ITumber One with the Hinth Marines. All Tank Personnel were specifically. schooled on the following: Assistance between tanks by fire. Employment of platoon and. company over favorable tank terrain. Assault and reduction of a fortified position. Over-running and defending a fortified position. Covering reorganization of attacking infantry* Assembling on rallying or alternate rallying points. D. The majority of Headquarters personnel were schooled on tho following in tho latter part of the training phase: •;. . CP displacement Camouflage discipline Reconnaissance E. Each officer conducted classes^whilc enroute to the objective. Each man-was thoroughly instructed as to details of the operatic:*, pertaining to the Tank Battalion. 2. Methods used to guide tank, across reef to beach. (Sinco the 3^ Division was in Corps Reserve, there v/as no problem . of ship*-to~ shore movement. Landings were made on well-established beach heads from LST's). 3» Weapons (including amaunition and fuze setting) most effective against fortifications; 'A. Tiyrrct Installed Tank iTlamoth.rowers (CB-H-l). This flamethrower nadc it possible to cover large areas whore there were numerous caves and do-. prcssions. The weapon was very offectiyc against large, underground caves, and when special 75mm gun ammunition was not available, tho flamethrower gained .» good results against tho largest pillboxes and bunkers. 3. 7*2" Rockets. Rockets were used against pockets of resistance consisting of numerous enemy "spidertraps". Often tho rocket launcher was th©i only weapon that could bo used'effectively. Indirect fire v s necessitated by a high mask. Effect was sustained against fortified positions such as blockhouses. . C» T 105 concrete fuzes for 75^ H.3. These fuzes were used a gainst pillboxes with satisfactory effect. Pillboxes that were fired on by tanks could not withstand this fire. All tank personnel were highly impressed with res-tilts. h. Efficiency and Employment of Flamethrower (tank mounted). A. The (sfe2-5Rl) flame thrower Vs installed in our tanks were upp& effectively in some instances gainst enemy personnel, pillboxes, and caves. Thoir efficiency is undermined by tho short range and the narrow field of fire. . ... 3. A turret installed flamethrower tank was borrowed from tho Ufch Division. Zxtcnrive areas could be covered by this weapon and the great range made maneuver easier for the tanks. C. The policy of this Battalion was to reserve the flamethrowers for targets that could not bo reduced effectively by any other ncans. I). The mechanical efficiency was considered adequate. )ccial U'se of Tank (i.e. as supporting artillery, assault guns). ;c used as supporting artillery on problems held preceding mt this practice was not encouraged. [wo Jima Operation one tank was equipped with spaced •armor on both sldc^ and sandbags protected., tho final c.rivc and the turret* There were no AT guns encountered after completion of this/tank, so effective ness is undetoTmind^fcHowever it is-believed 47mm A^S&re will not, penetrate* 6. A. While -subjects enumerated In paragraph 1 were being studied, numerous problems were conducted with the infantry teams. Orientation courses were given, acquainting the troops with potentialities and limit ations of our tanks in maneuveringt firing, and communications, 3. Close infantry-tank support problems were executed over varied terrain. Enough time was given, to the majority of the infantry squad* to imparts* them ijlth the importance 6f close support in closed terrain, C. There was not enough firing done on problems to acquaint in fantry teams with our firing limitations. D. Communication between tank and infantry was stressed on each problem. Telephones were installed in each tank for use by the infantry* SCR 300*8 were used between, command tanks and infantry company commanders* If communication failed entirely, tank crews and fire teams relied on hand signals. E. Coordination between tanks and. infantry was highly developed (using Armored Porce tactics). 7# Enemy Anti-tank Measures (see B, Intelligence, above). 9- SDHPLY y , 1.. Adequacy of all typos of mounting out supplies: Class X« The availability of Class I supplies was sufficient. Rations and water were readily furnished and issued as called for. The system of filling empty water drums from 5th Field Depot locations nearer to Sumay embarkation points was very efficient and avoided loss of timo that would have been necessary if water drums had been filled from points nearer Division area and transported to Sumay. '....' Class II. A continued shortage of certain items of individual equip** ment was in effect for quite some time and wore hurriedly furnished just prior to movement to staging areas. Clothing othor than service sunmor re quired for combat w*s in the hands of personnel in amounts necessary before embarking* Generally clothing needed for combat has boen available. How-* ovor, there has boon a persistent shortage of small or odd sizo service summer trousers, garrison caps, and chevrons. Transportation used for movement to dock areas was organic and sufficient. Rolling stock to be em barked was in good condition, as was proved in conbat. Vehicle shortages in this battalion wore; l-2jton 6x6, 75° gallon, gasoline truck, 2-1 ton *W car^o trucks, 1-Jton ambulance, 2rJ;ton cargo trailers, 5"*lt°n cargo trailers* 1-K16A1 machine shop truck, 3 grease trailers, 2 water trailers* Class III. All types of fuel were available when mounting out and wore drawn and movod to dock areas In good order and before troop and organic equipment movement started* This avoided oongostion of vehicles in dock areas* Class IT. All items were available as required and were preloaded into vehicles. Class Y. An approximate 5 additional units of firo of caliber .30 AP&T belted was drawn for tanks and was available. All othor type.s of ammunition was available and furnished when required. 2. Adequacy of resupply* Class !• Rations were available in sufficient amounts and supply of same appeared to be grcator than that for the: Guau oporatlon, Water supply was very limited, many tinojs to a maximum of 1 gallon por man. Water fron drums was drinkable. Limited amounts of frosh foods w^i^e available for th$ last 5 0* 6 days of the operation* Class II. Clothing replenishments were available in limited amounts* Planncl shirts and utility jackets" wore insufficiently furnished. Class III. Estimated fuel allowance for tanks was over consumption because tank novenont was not as groat as estimated. G-asolino was not used in as great amounts as anticipated* Special weight oils, othor that SAJ 50, available when needed* 3« Jifficicttcy of all shore based supply facilities. In general, supply facilities wore tavorabj^jtfitha few exceptions* Initially, I^nn* BE, Super Charge, w/lHiso M^S ox Hj needed 1 iff IT ltf|jiij IjfyiiijfJ to locate in established dunps because all types of atLriiwtiitio^fe4^(j&jpxhGr» One specific type of oil, SAU 5O not available after iM days and it was aiocoesary to drew same from 4th Division dm3p3~ 3*\D?. was difficnl,b to load Into trucks, >v.o to the fact that it was i*i sxicil holes and it w~.s r.ocoss'.try to lirst get druns on ground level and *;ho:\ load into tvu&s. i. c.:ano would 3i?,vc expedited nishing fuel to all units. H. Salvage and salvage collection* il l organizational and individual oqulpnuit found in CP areas of this "battalion were collected and t.u^nod. into the Division Salvage Section,. Gas nasks wcr,o picked up by Division Salvage truck. All uj^scbXe aiiErunit-* ion (75fl&i cal.»3^ "b^ltod-danaged rounds, rusted snail arras JMUEIO) was turnod into Corps Annunition Bump as directed ty G-4. • 5» Transportation. ' A very narked shortage in track laying oquipnont was the TD-1S Tractor that this organization is authorized, "but was nob allowed to take on the XMO JIM** operation. ' illl other transportation enbarked was sufficient, with the exception of one ^ton nabulanec. Sparc parts and naintonanco facilities were always available and were called for and used as required* Initially, repair work on tanks rras acconpiished by Tank Bnttalion personnel as Ordnance Conprx.y i^is not established for maintenance. 1. The tine required to load LST ^77 and 6^6 was two hours each* four norc hours wero needed to secure tanks. This1 was done underway- "ino re quired to load A2A«-12 was approxinatoly twenty^two (22) hours. This ship was attached to Transport Division 32 and carried lty pieces of Tank lion wheeled oquipaont, in addition to 21st ilr-rines ECT equipnont and supplies. 2* Ti:ne required to unload IiST^ U77and 646 was one hour each. LS2 646 used an L8T beach oat to expedite unloading of tanks on the beach* This was vory helpful. AEAr-12 unloaded Irak Battalion vciaiclcs irregularly* duo to lack of appropriate landing craft. Last vehicle of Tank Battalion disonbarked 27 February, ^ 3« Snail land crr^t wore very difficult to load into fron transport area, Eough seas and strong winds shifted landing craft position very often and, in sone cases, caused danagc to landing craft and qquipnent "being lowered. The nain difficulty Was insufficient large landing craft such as LCT*s or LSI's, The so could "be tiod up to the larger ship in a way that afforded stability to a certain extent and could hold no re equipment • The LStf was the nost favorable type of landing craft used. Its length poraits an A£& or APA to discharge froxi oorq that one hr.tch at a tino and thui oxpodito delivery ashore. k* One inrprovqaent would have "been to have each piece of whoolod nont nount its own sling or neane of lifting fron the ship into landing craft so that ship*s slings would not have to "bo recoverod fron each lift* 5, A chart, showing this unit's vehicles embarked, follows: 5 a> o n o uo o 8 o bQ 0 u a • o. - o r*4» I OJ CM 1 i s LST 477 29 25 USS-LIEHA X3 3 H9 0SS-J0PITSR XI S09WS is •3. ?, 0RD1IAITCE p A. $his unit lnndod witli , aad the foXXowing weapons were nountod: X70 3O mchinc X3 ftancthroyer* Iho folXowing anas carried: 2XS Q MX 313 Cal, 5 3. 5?he ocXow Xii9te «, . ; * ' • • • • • • • . . X5 HJ 75^ guns ft i^5® £ SO MI919A.U aaeiine guns 7 20 guns 15 Cal« . 63 CaX^^agXXiX pistols C« GencraXly, there wcro vory few naif unctions of any type* OccasionalXy thoro woro loading difficulties with thor 7$m gun which wore characterized "by broken rounds in the tube* Actually, this can be attribut ed to unclean tubes rather than faulty acinunition* •..--. .-. Hm 3>ue to eneny ar\ti«-tank eiff ectivenoss, thO. battalion ordnance section had to porforn third* fourth, and fifth echelons of maintenance upon landing, , „ '.-,- '•;. .. S# The weapons this unit us'oU were effective and presented few difficult!oi* Xt is arcconraonded that" twenty-four (2*) ^R2^5R1 flaste throw ers be mounted in the Tank Battalion1 s tank?- It is further r,ec.oi3n©ndcd ^ that this battalion be equipped wiih': . * • A platoon of pi ^ X sufficient nuobor of T*2.* rocxpt launchers* (See 7 below for detailed rcco:xioridations)# ' f If Ifll C( tn Seciioa nasaed and fired t*e f#fp reckete twice duriag the operation* there was difficulty in. getting the launcher into pesitioa, eincc it was neuatod oa ft elod with fixed elevation of M$ lo&oon* Sue to the rua-*do*a fc*ttorio§r ihere wore severe^n%m^€it*** t efeclfc tfunber ead type used DM* 9 6 15 Q repairs 15 t*akt« KalfuactUo^ nad e and f iro oil aid dutciiof on mt tnnk, 2» Ton. track* Ijrokoa - tw© troyed « Bogie wheels 4cstroy«d oa - f iv# ca«e* wh«r« fsroat and final driro vat* ooapletqly off V hittiaj; 3* Ono t 8 ^ ixit laad nino loft fwat ©f teu^c T>lowtog final drivt, front 'bogie bracket nad B «v»ral toctio^a of trackf completely off, ?pre« of axplo»ioa uad«r floor nrb\iad «oairollod differpniial tlew in floor of tctnk conrplotoly dostroying power train -unit, trtmaaisgion, driver>• controls JUplftcod fivo support propollo* f9 throe fiaft! drlro hibi vitA drJ»vo tix radiftto* uniti dostroyod >y tHoll frn^aeoti carat *ira# loplnccd four oofio gudgooa ftraa* p h«tctt©«» pi 5. Iq^ioilon froa ninot destroyed two Tloor aroor hcatM and flow: of tank witU cso^po hatch iw\ad aot ftt* Thyottlo linjca^o and ihd ofeapo hatch repaired and refitted, clutch eroM shaft raaligaod. out. 6» 3 a*9dttary gonorators or,rTmx«torf Uaot •park ?lufc cleaned and adju«toA, turiac diap* 7* Jifiht la^lS volt Vittoriot charged aad ro«har<&od, $• On© tank on 1ST ^7f ^|t |^ divo ooabejr - plajio hit tank on inr.toly clx inch holrighe ti n «rp*nsoearnern plating nenr oont* roiultinw of tiirrog in t firriaie centerin# g around tho tank. Tank had "been thoroughly vaterproofod; tnit salt water u«ed to oxtin^uiih fire entered texk through hole ta amerf filling tank approxioatoly •ix inehof aoovo turret paekct floe?. Domtraction of tho Dattcriet, rq^ula tore, wiring and aceoctorlos in lower fighting coapartncat# 5ank wa# thorough ly cloanod and ropairod aud oack in action fivo days *&%** landing, 9» 4k %Jfcreh, 15U5, one dicsol task acquired frep nC* \\h Sank 3attallcnf elutchott were ropairod, cnginot tuaat **& radio installed frm destroyed tank m& put in operational use on 10 March, 10, Whcoled Vehicle* - Ali -vohielof coarpletely cheekod and ser viced *• two radiator* roplacod m ^*Ua 4x^» • duo to fhrapnel, 3 tiro$, tubot, and vheoli 600x1^ deef rayod by »hr«pn«l and ghell firoj Z "battori o« xecharged, 5-ton ^ whoolt totally doitroyod *y fi endntions (aoo V "below) •"mM~MM>-w-mmmH>9iFe Squipaont* A. f^mJfffoM^Mec IV", 2, I, above» and V below), 3. Rockot Loftt^p (See IV, T, I, above* and V below)* C. Tank nountod bulldozers - >$hrce wore usod on several occasions and proved to bo effective in closing caVcs and filling shell holes to permit other tanks to pass through* There wore no mechanical failures. km Enemy Materiel• .. . A. Weapons — Uonc salvaged, B* Combat Vehicles *• One Japanese Light Tank, Model 95 w^s salvaged* It is in excellent condition and runs very well* 0. Ammunition - XTonp salvaged. D* Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment - Itfoae salvaged. G> CHEMICAL 1, A. Planning Phase - Individuals wore given training in recognition . of oneny agents, in protection (both individual and collective), and in decontamination. Orders for the gas sentry wero discussed and momorizod* Masks wore fittod ?md tested f6r each- individual. B* Loading Pfcaso —All gas masks were crated raid carried aboard g&ip on tho rear of the tanks. Here they wero immediately available at all tines* decontamination oquipnont was loaded last aboard trucks and was availablo at any tine* . $« Landing Phase* - Masks were Issued to the troops and tested tho day before debarkation. Consequently, everyone had his mask when ho de barked, and it was in excellent condition. Instructions were issued to each individual to retain his nask until notified otherwise. J>. Island Phase - In accordance with ordors issued by the Division Chemical Officer all ciaslcs .yrotp turned in< The individual turned his in to his Company Chemical HCO, who in turn gave then to the 2* Bnemy use of Cncaicals - The encny usod snoko against our tanks onco during the canpaiga* At that tine our tanks were ondoavoring to force a defile, and each tine a tank attempted to enter the defile, the oneny snokod tho tank with snokc. grenades. (Tank crow boliovod they wore snolco grenndoq a nd not snokc pots). The tajik withdrew each tine, and finally was able to enter the defile without being snokod. As soon as tho tank got well within the defile the enony snoked it again and halted it nonon tarily* At this tlno an ostinatod 2Jo f ^ o eneny swarnod on the tank and destroyed it with *Molotov Cocktails11 and polo charges* The snokc fron tho grcaados was described by the tank crow as being cxtronely thick and of a "ntlky, grey, white color*. 3* Salvage - A crcv/ of throe non was detailed la each company as In telligence toans* These nen wore to handle all crgptured oacny natorial, and if any enqny chemical gear appeared, they wero to turn it over to the Company Chemical 2TC0, vho was to f orward it on to the 3n Chemical Officer* Ho chonical gear was found. ^ H. " 1. Medical department personnel who boarded the tTSS LST ^77 consisted of the Battalion Surgeon and five corpsmon. Abonrd the USS LS3J 6U6 wore five corpsmon. 2. Unit8 #*hk and 1^-5 with litters were crjrried aboard tho two LSTf s. Tho reminder -of tho nodical supplies and equipment and the ambulance jeep wore cibdftjrd th© USS Jupiter and the USS Xibra* 3ach eorpsnan carr a unit ^3 with hin and tho Battalion Surgeon carried his unit #1* 3* Sanitary conditions of both ships wore very good. Other than a colds and one crisp of Catarr^al Jevort Acute, health of all the porsoanc was excellent* Tho heads wero clean and sanitary AS were living quart< and galleys* Koat of the cooks and nossmon were detailed from ships . __^ company with a few men frou the battalion helping out* C^9 U. Eoutine sick call was held nt 0900 each morning on both LST's, ^^^••^ 5« 0» the 17th of yebruary orders wero roeoived to havo clothing rinsed with fresh or salt water* Ordors word complied oro hold daily aboard both L$Tf8* 7. At i?l5» 21st of foFruary there was a suicide tanning, of the «hip by » Japanese airplane. A largo firo resulted cad part of tho tfQpn ecnuai tion cxplodod. Kino ncn, throo Marines nnd six ship% conpany enlisted nen nagazine and disonbowelcd, killing hin instantly. The remainder of the cnsur.ltics consisted of one Diagnosis TJndotdraiiiGdt (fracture, skull), ono Diagnosis Undetoninod, (fracturo, vortobrn), ono Diagnosis Undotcrnined, (fracture, left shoulder), and one nultiplc fragmentation wounds. JPhofro four noxx wore transferred on February 22nd to the tfSS Siblsy, ta addition thoro wero seven anbulatory cases, including such injuries as abrasions, contusion*, and lacerations. There wore also nany ainor casualties of ships conpany of which we havo no record. All dead wore buried at sea in cluding two Japanese. S, After landing, there wore two corpsnen with o4«sh cocipany oi tanks* Pour corpsnon wero at the Battalion Aid Station with tho Battalion Surgoon* The nodical equipnont, other than nedical units #5-^ and #5-3 wore not land ed until two to four days later. ' ; 9» Iho Br.ttalion Aid Station wsa$ got up in tho Battalion CP and con sisted of a large fox holo reinforced by sand bags. JCt was well protected and had good cover*. Medical unit* wore scattered ovef the area in fox holes. Our Battalion Aid Station was located about eight hundred yards to tho north of *BM Medical Conpany to whon were sent all evacuation cases* In tho early stage critical cases were sent to tho Spach Bmcuatlon Station. Wo wero on tho nain road to the evacuation points cihd because of our proxinity to then, walking cases did not stop at o\ar Battalion Aid Station* 10. Casualties troatpdi Jtabor kZ . Retained 19 * Svacuated 2^ * Pied 0 . Type-fragncntation wounds, abrasions> cohtuslona, lacerations, hTV d and burns* talking wowidod 21 . fcitt of. cases Vy . 11. After canp area wvas established, heads were iixiediaioly nado frou lii^^^J-P^^f1 ^!! * $9Q& consisted of canned rations andthe wntor supply was adequate. A galley vas sot up in a gun onplaceiiont on the third day after our establishment of canp. Water wafi rationed to one gallon per day per nan. Upon arrival in the aroa it was policed 'and nine dead Japanese were found nnd buried. Our own dond wor$ innodiatoly ronoved to tho 3d Ifetrine Division Conetory after identification *ft« established. Jllos wore rather plentiful in the beginning but after the liland was sprayed with #DT# they soon disappeared* 12* Ihoro wore several cases of Jaundice, Acute, Infective which wero evacuated. A few colds were present anong the nan, but prophylactic ther*» apy with sulfadiazino cut down tho incidence. 13. "B" Medical Conpany handled onorgoncy denial treatnont. 1^. fhoro wore no lossos Or roplacononts of ncoUcal personnel, Tho nuraber was adequat-o .and they wero always in a stato^of readiness* 15. yield Medical equipnont was adequate* tfhere-was no pilferage or losses. However all units should bo1 replaced, /including tho anbulaneo# bocauso they have been through thrde ckipaigns ai>d aro in, poor condition* In addition a fly and a pyranidal tent .should bo carr4 od in all future operations* The sinbulanco and all oquipnpnt should be brought ashoro no later -than thirty-siz hours after landing. The systen of rosupplying was satisfactory* I. SIGNAL 1. Sone intorf orenc'o on our assigned radio frequencies was encounter od. It occurred principally on the 37k Bn Cond ffet (26*2 ixs) by •-Anbition" C^i,fe?A ^^?a£ fe) and rejiuirqd repetitions thdt would otherwise not havo boon necessary*. The aseigned no« wore xnEdoquate to controx conoat traffic within the separate conpanles* * Tank platoons should b^ assigned separato frequencies that-con bo used. The volune of conbat traffic loaded the assigned channels and platoon eontrol and f thoreby. were used as well aa radio. ¥ire facilities carried about 30^™o£ the communication between the TkBn CP*s, the Tk Bn liaison officers (at infantry battalion CP's), the company offi cers in the field, and the infantry regiments, with the TkBn CP itself. Many direct installations were required that bridged;'existing switching centrals and duplicated facilities previously installed by other units. The Tk Bn has no personnel training in the installation, maintenance, and operation of wire communication facilities. Thus an added load was borne by radio and general duty personnel. This condition was remedied only in . part by the "loan" of two to four qualified linemen from the Div Sig Co. 3# In the early phases of the operation communication delays resulted from the fact thatvwiremen were inexperienced and too few in numbers to maintain the system, which was under heavy artillery and mortar fire* Combat experience showed that the range of the SGR-509, 510 is less than had been originally thought. This necessitated the establishment of relay stations and slowed down radio communication to some extent. The SC31-5O9* 510 is prone to go out of alignment when transported over rough terrain. xhis cause delay in that radios situated on'the front lines had $0 be sent to the rear for realignment and another set had to be dis patched as a replacement. The' lack of remote control equipment frequently made it necessary to set up the SCH-5O9, 510 radio in positions unfavorable for officient operation. Delay was often encountered in finding suitable locations, (see V conclusions and Eecommendations). PAE5 V CQITCLUSIOrS AED A. Coordination. 1. It is the responsibility of the Tank 3attalion and (r~3 to indoctrinate all infantry Unit Commanders ivith the inherent capabilities and limitations of tanks. One of the outstanding doctrines to be considered is that this theatre of operations- recognizing terrain and Japanese tactics - does not foster • sustained ^panzer attacks", ffven though the, occasion does^ not deny an echeloned tank drive, a sufficient reserve must be maintained to support the infantry in the close-in, inch-by inch advance into yhich every Marine Corps Amphibious Operation in the Pacific has ultimately resolved itself* 2, It would be a tactical improvement if Infantry Commanders were imbued with the doctrine of employing the tank platoon as a unit with which to team an infantry company, rather than accepting the tank company as the smallest combat tank element* This will not only make for economy of force, but will increase effective coordination. Unit commanders must consult tank unit commanders on matters of tactical employment, reconnaissance, and coordination. ' 3»"Xt is reconaonded that communication representatives from each tank battalion, Signal Company, and infantry Regiment 'combine efforts to increase the effectiveness of Tank-Infantry communication .techniques and equipment. • i+. It is.suggested that Tank companies bo rotated in training with RCTls rather than be attached as abnormal compliment" to a specific Regiment* 5. It is recommended that at least three Marines from each infantry platoon receive training as "tank guides* to facilitate passage of linos. 6* It is rccoiEiended that much closer coordination be develop ed between Taiiks and (A) Artillery, (3) Aircraft, and (C) A. It is suggested that tanks and artillery be assigned a direct radio channel* Tanks drawing heavy calibre fire now must remain at the mercy of these weapons- with or without accompanying infantry - until sufficient channels are negotiated for direct artillery support. further training should be conducted using Forward Observers in Assault Tanks. B. It would be advantageous to assign at least one air craft ^spotter* to observe tanks during training and atta,ckst thereby locating the source of the largo , calibre fire that tanks inevite.bl ;tention should be given tke.study of toch methods of nine detection and removal, * loval of mines at night and >under smoke screen, 7« It is suggested that tho UJhird .JSngiaocr Battalion Be equipped with three armored bulldozers similar to the two "by that unit during the last operation. Hoy/ever, it is recom- -~ mended that these "bulldozers have periscopes and mounts, addit-:Ili* ional armor protection, andmdios (SCR-51O) to protect the operator and increase tactical efficiency, 8., It is recommended that a greater number of personnel in this Battalion be allowed Transport Quartermaster Training conducted'by Div TQJI-i. - .'• ' -. B. . Cbmmiini cat ions- Training and Equipment. 1. It is recommended t'hat the frequencies assigned to this Battalion be. increased to eighteen (IS) in number. If the allo cation of channels be as follow, it is 'anticipated that an im proyement in channel load, platoon control, and flexibility will be made: - Div Comd, Div Smerg, Tk Bn Cmd, "A1* Co Comd, R B W Co "C" Co Comd, and twelve, (12) other frequencies to be assigned to, platoons." 2. It was found that the SGR-51O radio did not have the transmission distance anticipated, numerous relay stations were necessary thereby. It is strongly suggested that five (5) SGH-5°2 radios, mounted in jeops (truck, i ton, kxk) or "weasels" be added to our allowance and that five (5/ M&0 radios bo subtracted there from. . 3* A remote control unit such as the RM-29 (operates with SCEW6lO) would have been of invaluable service in the last operation It is recoYamondod that the possibility of adopting it for use with the SCR-509,510 be investigated with tho view of adding it to our allowance. Advantageous tactical emplymcnt could frequently have been made of this unit during the last operation h. The tank-infantry radi© SCH-300 (now model An/VRC-3) = should be installed in each tank. . 5. It is suggested that the SCR-522 radio be considered for installation, witli tho view of establishing tank-air communica— 6. It is reoommended that a mobile truck-mountod repair and maintenance unit, equipped with a 110-volt power source, be added to the T/A. 7. A wire section of seven (7) to ten (10) trained personnel including a wire chief is needed to install, maintain, and operate, such wire facilities as have proven to be necessary. It is recom mended that this section be added to the T/0. • 8. It is rccoa^ended that the Tank Battalion bo assigned a channel for tho SCE-300 during each operation thereby increasing the mobility and effectiveness of liaison teams, and decreasing traffic on the Infantry channels. C. Ordnance. 1. Because tank maintenance cannot be divorced from effective tank operation, it is recommended that The Tank Ordnance Platoon of the Third Ordnance Company become: ""* {a) An organic part of the ihird Tank Battalion, or (b) Permanently attached to the Third Tank Battalion. Such an arrangement would foster more effective tank maintenance in this Division by: (a) Centralizing control and rcsponsibility in the Tank Battalion where it belongs: (b) Allowing a coordinated tank maintenance - tank training program during preparatory phases (maintenance and training should have differ ent schedules); * (c) Giving the Ordnance Platoon a. higher landing priority because the platoon should land with the tank company maintenance can help maintain tank (d) Promoting greater interest in the tanks of thve personnel who are supposed to work on the vehicles, (e) Allowing the Battalion Maintenance Officer the perogative to shift company maintenance sections; (thus, the best>mechanics are doing higher ski Hod work). The present (Dank Ordnance system is the result of the mis conception that tank maintenance can arbitrarily "be segregated into first,' second, third, and fourth echelons during combat. It has "boon the experience of this, "battalion during throe operations, that in order to keep the maximum numbor of tanks in the line at all times, echelons' of maintenance must "be dis regarded'to a great extent. Every available man and tool must "be kept working continuously whether they are performing second or fourth echelon of inainteiuvaco. In combat the prime question each day is trhow many tanks do you have ready to go?*1 These divisions are useful only in a relative degree. Xt should "be the r asponsibility of the Tank 3a.t tali on Maintenance Officer to decide what maintenance is to "be done and who ir to do it. This will result in 1) elimination of duplication.of work, and 2) peak operating efficiency. At present, the Ordnance company is responsible for the movement forwr.rd of tank spare . parts, ¥ith our transportation, it is "believed that with coordination we could have t;mk replacement parts ashore on D plus 1 day. The Ordnance Company cannot, 2. It is further recommended that the Tables of Organ- / ization for cither the H&S Company or the Ordnance Pic.toon be revised .to allow an additional Trnk Recovery Vehicle for use of Tank Ordnance. The companies1 recovery vehicles are usually in action or well forward. Consequently, when it is necessary to recover a disabled tank, pull a turret, or re place engines there is an unnecessary shortage or delay. 3* In the event that the subsequent.recouaendations re garding reorganization and ure-equipment11 for this Battalion be considered inexpedient or impracticable, it will be nec essary to imaedictoly deris? increased araor protection for the K^A2 Medium Tank (i.e., additonal spaced armor, welded track blocks). Also, it would be expedient to line the fighting compartment with white abestos to reduce the fire hazard. D. Organizational Equipment. It is obvious from our previous operations that the present Marine Corpc TanI: Battalion is insufficiently armored, equipped, and manned, It i's rocommoiiuod that the Ilarino Corps organize an "Armored Battalion", using the present "Tank Battalionfr as a found ation with tho following organization: 1. Three (3) i-iodium Tank Companies of eighteen (IS) M26(l+5 ton) tanks per company.. • • * ' 2* One (l) Light Tank Company of eighteen-M2U tanks. 3. Six (b) Ii2o tanks in Battalion Headquarters and Service, Company. Pour (k) of these will be large capacity flame .throwing tanks, and three of these four will have jett— . isonable Rocket L'vx..cher (7.2lf) mounts. The remaining two tanks wili be for staff personnel. U, Two (2) tank-dozer mounts and blades per company. 5. Sight (o) small capacity flame throwers per tank company be retained r.s per present T/A.