IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. Case No. 2012-CA-002842
KENNETH W. DETZNER, et al.,
Defendants. ______/
THE FLORIDA SENATE’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A COURT- APPOINTED CONSULTANT TO DRAW THE SENATE MAP
The Florida Senate and Andy Gardiner, in his official capacity as President of the Florida
Senate (together the “Senate”), hereby move for the appointment of a court-appointed consultant
to draw a remedial Senate plan, subject to Court’s approval, and state as follows:
1. On July 28, 2015, this Court entered a Consent Judgment which held that the
Senate apportionment plan adopted by the Florida Legislature in 2012 violates Article III, § 21 of
the Florida Constitution and ordered the Legislative Parties to file a remedial apportionment plan
no later than November 9, 2015.
2. The Florida Legislature convened in special session beginning on October 19,
2015, in an effort to adopt a remedial Senate plan. On October 28, the Florida Senate passed
Plan 9124 by a 22-18 vote. On November 3, the Florida House of Representatives passed an
amendment to Plan 9124 (Plan 9079) by a 73-47 vote. On November 5, 2015, the Florida Senate
rejected Plan 9079 by a 16-23 vote. The Legislature then adjourned without adopting a remedial plan.
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3. Without a legislatively adopted remedial plan to review, this Court must now
determine how to implement a remedial plan for Florida’s Senate districts. As explained below,
this Court should appoint a consultant to draw a remedial Senate plan, subject to Court approval.
The appointment of a consultant would streamline this litigation and reduce the burden to the
parties and Florida’s taxpayers by eliminating the need for costly discovery and a five-day
evidentiary hearing. It would also eliminate any suspicion that the adopted map was laden with
improper intent.
4. As Plaintiffs stated in the congressional redistricting case, “[s]hould it become
necessary for this Court to implement a remedial congressional redistricting plan, there are a
number of approaches the Court might use. The Court could request that the parties submit
alternative plans and then select from among the alternatives presented to it; or the Court could
appoint a special master to assist it in drawing a new plan; or the Court could redraw the plan
itself” (Exhibit A at 8). Plaintiffs noted recent examples where “state courts used special
masters to assist in preparing redistricting plans” or “drew the redistricting plans itself (with
assistance from technical advisors).” Id. (citing In re Petition of Apportionment Commission, No.
SC 18907 (Conn. Jan. 3, 2012); Order Adopting and Approving Special Master’s Report and
Redistricting Maps as Modified by the Court, Guy v. Miller, No. 11-0C-00042-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.
Oct. 27, 2011)); see De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (N.D. Fla. 1992)
(adopting the plan of the court-appointed special master after the Florida Legislature failed to draw a congressional plan); see also Favors v. Cuomo, Docket No. 11–CV–5632
(RR)(GEL)(DLI)(RLM), 2012 WL 928223, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting the retention of an expert to “assist . . . this court in fashioning redistrict relief” for New York’s congressional
districts); In re Reapportionment Comm’n, 36 A.3d 661, 661 (Conn. 2012) (adopting
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congressional plan drawn by a special master); In re Legislative Redistricting of State, 805 A.2d
292, 295 (Md. 2002) (noting the appointment of an expert as a technical consultant “to assist the
Court in preparing a [legislative] redistricting plan that complied with applicable federal and state law”)); Rodriguez v. Pataki, No. 02 Civ. 618(RMB), 2002 WL 1058054, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (noting retention of a special master to redraw New York’s congressional districts).
5. The Court should follow Plaintiffs’ suggestion and appoint an expert in this case to draw a remedial map. Such an appointment would streamline this litigation by avoiding unnecessary litigation over the legality of plans proposed by the parties. As a case on which
Plaintiffs relied noted, the appointment of an expert allows a court to resolve redistricting litigation in “a timely, cost effective, and practical manner.” Guy v. Miller, No. 11 OC 00042
1B, 2011 WL 7665875, at *1 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2011).
6. Under the current scheduling order, this Court will hold a five-day evidentiary hearing in from December 14 to 18 to hear evidence and argument related to any plans the parties submit (Exhibit B at 4). Moreover, unlike in the congressional remedial proceeding, the scheduling order also contemplates a period of discovery to allow the parties to request
document production and depose factual and expert witnesses (id. at 4). The appointment of a
consultant to draw a remedial map would avoid this burdensome and costly process, and reduce
the likelihood of further appeals.
7. More importantly, the appointment of a court-appointed consultant would
eliminate any suspicion that a submitted plan was drawn with improper intent to favor a political
party or incumbent. Here, Plaintiffs have a demonstrated history of asking courts to adopt a
redistricting map drawn with improper intent. In both this case and the congressional
redistricting litigation, Plaintiffs engaged a Democrat microtargeting firm, Strategic Telemetry,
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to draw their alternative maps (Exhibit C at 2; Exhibit D at 2). Discovery in the congressional litigation revealed that the alternative map prepared by Strategic Telemetry for Plaintiffs during the 2012 legislative session, and submitted by Plaintiffs to the trial court in support of their motion for summary judgment, was fraught with improper partisan intent. Indeed, Strategic
Telemetry was explicit about the “principles” that would guide its creation of the alternative map, stating that the “[u]nderlying goal is to increase the number of safe Democratic seats and the number of competitive seats” (Exhibit E).
8. Moreover, in the congressional case, Plaintiffs took the position that their intent was irrelevant (Exhibit F at 41). But if Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt one of their maps, then their maps are on trial, and they must comply with the constitutional requirements—including party and incumbent neutrality. Rather than consider plans drawn by parties who consider their own intent to be irrelevant, the Court should instead direct a consultant to prepare a plan in an incumbent and party-neutral fashion.
9. The Senate intends to engage in the necessary discovery to uncover evidence of any efforts to manipulate this remedial process and to draw maps with improper intent. This
Court and the parties could avoid the burdens of this discovery, however, and avoid a weeklong evidentiary hearing on proposed maps, if the Court appoints its own consultant to draw a remedial plan in a manner that avoids favoritism to any political party or incumbent while satisfying the remaining tier-one and tier-two criteria.
10. Should the Court agree to appoint a consultant, the Senate recommends the appointment of Dr. Nathaniel Persily, a professor at Stanford Law School who is an expert in election law and redistricting. Several courts have appointed Dr. Persily to provide map-drawing assistance in previous redistricting cases. See, e.g., Favors, 2012 WL 928223, at *2 (noting the
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retention of Dr. Persily to “assist . . . this court in fashioning redistrict relief” for New York’s
congressional districts); In re Reapportionment Comm’n, 36 A.3d at 661 (adopting congressional
plan drawn by Dr. Persily serving as special master); In re Legislative Redistricting of State, 805
A.2d at 295 (noting the appointment of Dr. Persily as a technical consultant “to assist the Court
in preparing a [legislative] redistricting plan that complied with applicable federal and state
law”); Rodriguez, 2002 WL 1058054, at *2 (noting the retention of Dr. Persily as a consultant by
a special master redrawing New York’s congressional districts). Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves
cited Dr. Persily’s work in the congressional redistricting case (Exhibit A at 8). Dr. Persily’s
curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit G.1
11. Alternatively, the Senate suggests the appointment of Dr. Bernard Grofman, a
professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently appointed Dr. Grofman as a special master to
assist and advise the court with respect to a redistricting remedy in a challenge to Virginia’s
congressional districts. Order, Personhuballah v. Alcorn, Civil Action No.: 3:13-cv-678 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 25, 2015) (attached hereto as Exhibit H). The Florida Supreme Court specifically relied on Dr. Grofman’s academic work in its Apportionment I decision. See In re Senate Joint
Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 617, 635 (Fla. 2012). The United
States Supreme Court also relied on Dr. Grofman’s work in its seminal Gingles decision. See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-48, 62, 68 (1986). Dr. Grofman’s curriculum vitae is
attached as Exhibit I.
1 Dr. Persily acted as a consultant to the Florida House of Representatives in the preparatory stages of the redistricting process in 2011. He never acted as an expert for any party, however, in either the congressional case or this case.
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12. As a third suggestion, the Senate recommends the appointment of Dr. Theodore
Arrington, a professor of political science, emeritus, at the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte. The special master in Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. v. Gantt,
796 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) retained Dr. Arrington to draw New York’s congressional redistricting plan, which the federal district court adopted. Id. at 685, 698. Moreover, numerous courts through the country have relied on Dr. Arrington’s redistricting expertise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blaine Cnty., Mont., 363 F.3d 897, 915 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Dr. Arrington’s
testimony with approval); United States v. Charleston Cnty, S.C., 365 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir.
2004) (same); Hines v. Mayor & Town Council of Ahoskie, 998 F.2d 1266, 1273 (4th Cir. 1993)
(same). Dr. Arrington’s curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit J.
13. Whomever this Court selects, the Senate submits that the appointment of a court-
appointed consultant will streamline this proceeding and ensure that the remedial Senate plan
complies with the standards set forth in Article III, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. If the
Court agrees to appoint a consultant to draw a remedial map, the Senate suggests that this case
proceed on the following schedule, which would allow the Court to consider the consultant’s
remedial map within the timeframe set forth in the current scheduling order (and is consistent
with the amended scheduling order Plaintiffs propose):
• The Court shall appoint an expert consultant by Wednesday, November 18. • The court-appointed consultant shall submit a remedial plan by Wednesday, December 2. • The parties shall file any objections to the consultant’s remedial plan, including any expert reports in support thereof, by Wednesday, December 9. • The parties shall file any responses to objections, including any expert reports in support thereof, by Monday, December 14.
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• The Court shall hold a final hearing on Thursday, December 17, to consider the parties’ objections and to determine whether it shall adopt the remedial plan.
WHEREFORE, the Senate respectfully requests that the Court appoint a court-appointed consultant to draw a remedial Senate plan, subject to the Court’s approval.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH CONFERENCE
On November 11, 2015, counsel for the Senate conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs in a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the relief requested herein. Plaintiffs oppose this motion.
The House of Representatives takes no position on the motion.
Respectfully submitted,
George T. Levesque /s/ Raoul G. Cantero Florida Bar No. 555541 Raoul G. Cantero General Counsel, The Florida Senate Florida Bar No. 552356 305 Senate Office Building Jason N. Zakia 404 South Monroe Street Florida Bar No. 698121 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100 Jesse L. Green Telephone: (850) 487-5237 Florida Bar No. 95591 E-mail: [email protected] White & Case LLP Southeast Financial Center 200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 4900 Miami, Florida 33131-2352 Telephone: (305) 371-2700 Facsimile: (305) 358-5744 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for the Florida Senate and President Andy Gardiner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by electronic transmission on November
12, 2015, to the persons listed on the following Service List.
By: /s/ Raoul G. Cantero Raoul G. Cantero
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League of Women Voters of Florida, et al. v. Detzner, et al. Case No. 2012-CA-002842
SERVICE LIST
Gerald E. Greenberg David B. King Adam M. Schachter Thomas A. Zehnder Gelber Schachter & Greenberg, P.A. Frederick S. Wermuth 1441 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420 Vincent Falcone III Miami, FL 33131 King Blackwell Zehnder Wermuth Telephone: (305) 728-0950 P.O. Box 1631 Facsimile: (305) 728-0951 Orlando, FL 32802-1631 Email: [email protected] Telephone: (407) 422-2472 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Adam S. Tanenbaum Blaine H. Winship David A. Fugett Office Of Attorney General Lydia Strom Capitol, Pl-01 Jordan Jones Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Florida Department of State Telephone: (850) 414-3300 R.A. Gray Building Facsimile: (850) 401-1630 500 S. Bronough Street Email: [email protected] Tallahassee, FL 32399 Telephone: (850) 245-6536 Counsel for Defendant, Pam Bondi, in her Facsimile: (850) 245-6127 capacity as Florida Attorney General E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for Defendant Ken Detzner, in his Official Capacity as Florida Secretary of State
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Charles T. Wells Matthew J. Carson George N. Meros, Jr. General Counsel, The Florida House of Jason L. Unger Representatives Andy Bardos 422 The Capitol GrayRobinson, P.A. 402 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Telephone: 850-717-5500 Telephone: (850) 577-9090 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]
Counsel for the Florida House of Representatives and Speaker Steve Crisafulli
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EXHIBIT A
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
RENE ROMO, et al. ) Plaintiffs ) CASE NO.: 2012 CA 412 vs. ) ) KENNETH W. DETZNER, in his official ) capacity as Florida Secretary of State, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
) THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS ) OF FLORIDA, et al., ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) CASE NO.: 2012 CA 490 ) KENNETH W. DETZNER, in his official ) capacity as Florida Secretary of State, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
COALITION PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW REGARDING THE COURT'S POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN ADJUDICATING A CHALLENGE TO A CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT PLAN
At the case management conference on March 7, 2012, this Court requested that the parties provide it with memoranda regarding the Court's powers and responsibilities in adjudicating a challenge to a congressional reapportionment plan, including a discussion of the
Court's remedial authority. The Court also requested that the parties provide examples of how such litigation has proceeded in other cases. The Coalition Plaintiffs herein respond to the
Court's request. This memorandum discusses first the Court's legal authority to adjudicate the litigation regarding the congressional redistricting plan, including its authority to implement a remedial plan if necessary, and second, the Court's practical ability to adjudicate the litigation
1 regarding the congressional redistricting plan within the timeframe proposed by the Plaintiffs,
including a discussion of past redistricting litigation in Florida and in other jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
At issue in this case is whether the congressional redistricting plan adopted by the Florida
Legislature complies with Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. The Florida
Supreme Court on March 9, 2012, construed the identical provision in Article III, Section 21
governing legislative redistricting. In the course of doing so, the Court noted that although it had
an extremely limited timeframe within which to review the legislative plans' compliance with
constitutional standards, "such a limitation cannot deter the Court from its extremely weighty
responsibility entrusted to us by the citizens of this state through the Florida Constitution to
interpret the constitutional standards and to apply those standards to the legislative
apportionment plans." In Re: Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, No.
SC12-1, _So. 3d_, 2012 WL 753122, at *2 (Fla. Mar. 9, 2012) (hereinafter "Op.") (Exhibit
A). 1 The Court noted that this was so because "the right to elect representatives-and the process by which we do so-is the very bedrock of our democracy." Jd. at *3. Therefore, "[t]he obligations set forth in the Florida Constitution are directed not to the Legislature's right to draw districts, but to the people's right to elect representatives in a fair manner so that each person's vote counts equally and so that all citizens receive 'fair and effective representation."' I d.; see id. at *7 ("The newly added constitutional standards are directly related to ensuring that the process by which citizens choose their elected officials is fair."). Those same principles apply in this case as well.
1 The Florida Supreme Court's opinion, as well as all other unpublished orders and opinions cited in this brief, are included in an appendix with this brief. 2 Despite having participated before the Florida Supreme Court in the adjudication of the
constitutional validity of 40 Senate districts and 120 House districts in less than 30 days, counsel
for the House and Senate have advised this Court that it would be impossible for this Court to
adjudicate the constitutional validity of 2 7 congressional districts in time for the November 2012
elections, which are eight months away. Moreover, counsel for the House has questioned this
Court's authority to adjudicate congressional redistricting plans at all, claiming there is a
"looming constitutional question" about a state court's role in litigation concerning congressional
districts.
As is demonstrated below, there is no question that this Court has not only the authority,
but also the responsibility to see that this litigation proceeds so that the voters of Florida can go
to the polls this November to "elect representatives in a fair manner so that each person's vote
counts equally and so that all citizens receive 'fair and effective representation.'" Op. at *3. The
Plaintiffs have proposed a schedule to ensure that this happens. The schedule is similar to, if not
more generous than, schedules in prior redistricting cases, including redistricting cases in which
counsel for the Defendants have been personally involved. The Coalition Plaintiffs therefore
respectfully request that this Court grant the Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for a Scheduling Order.
I. THIS COURT HAS BOTH THE ..L\.UTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADJUDICATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LEGISLATURE'S CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING PLAN.
This Court's jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Legislature's proposed
congressional plan, to grant injunctive and declaratory relief, and to impose a remedial
congressional plan if necessary is provided in the Florida Constitution and statutory law. Article
5, Section 5 of the Florida Constitution provides that circuit courts have original jurisdiction over matters not specifically vested in county courts by statute, and that where they do have
3 jurisdiction, circuit courts have the power to issue "all writs necessary or proper to the complete
exercise of their jurisdiction." Fla. Const. Art. V, sec. 5. The Florida Statutes provide that the
circuits have the power to issue injunctions, Fla. Stat. § 26.012 (2011), and that circuit courts
have jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments, Fla. Stat. § 86.011 (2011).
The question of circuit court jurisdiction over congressional redistricting cases was
answered in 2002, when incumbent members of Congress brought a claim in the circuit court in
Fort Lauderdale challenging the constitutionality of the congressional districts drawn following
the 2000 census. See Brown v. Butterworth, 831 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The District
Court of Appeals flatly rejected the circuit court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve
congressional redistricting cases under Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution and the
federal Elections Clause. !d. at 685, 689. Citing the Florida Supreme Court, the court explained
that Florida's circuit courts are:
superior courts of general jurisdiction, and nothing is intended to be outside their jurisdiction except that which clearly and specially appears so to be ... 'the circuit courts of the State of Florida are courts of general jurisdiction . . . clothed with [the] most generous powers under the Constitution, which are beyond the competency of the legislature to curtail ... nothing is outside the jurisdiction of a superior court of general jurisdiction except that which is clearly vested in other courts or tribunals, or is clearly out side of and beyond the jurisdiction vested in such circuit courts by the Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto.
!d. at 686 (quoting English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977) (quoting State ex. rel. B. F.
Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500 (1939))) (ellipsis in original). Finding no federal or state law basis to deny jurisdiction to the circuit court in matters related to congressional redistricting, the court held that circuit courts may not "close their doors" when asked to resolve congressional redistricting challenges. See id. at 686, 689. Yet that is exactly what the
Defendants now ask this Court to do.
4 The Defendants' position is also contrary to precedent from the United States Supreme
Court, which has expressed a strong policy preference that state courts, rather than federal courts,
adjudicate challenges to congressional redistricting plans. In Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407,
409 (1965), the Court stated that "[t]he power of the judiciary of a state to require valid
reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this
court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged." For
that reason, the United States Supreme Court has likewise held that federal cou1is generally must
permit state courts to adjudicate a congressional redistricting plan first, before stepping in. See
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("In the reapportionment context, the Court has
required federal judges to defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State,
through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself.").
It is therefore entirely proper that this Court determine the constitutionality of the State's
proposed congressional plan and to impose a remedial plan if necessary.
Nonetheless, the House Defendants have asserted that there is a "looming constitutional
question" about this Court's authority to adjudicate congressional redistricting disputes. Citing
Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002), a.ff'd, 538 U.S. 254, the House
Defendants have argued that under the Elections Clause in Article I, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution, if this Court found the congressional plan unconstitutional, it would not have
the authority to implement a remedial plan. 2 But the holding on which the House Defendants
2 This is the opposite of the position the legislative Defendants took in their briefing to the Florida Supreme Court when attempting to keep Amendments 5 and 6 from being submitted to the voters. There, the Legislature represented to the Florida Supreme Court that, as a matter of Florida law, if the Legislature's congressional redistricting plan did not comply with Article III, Section 20, "the courts will step in and impose their own plan." Brief of the Florida Legislature to the Florida Supreme Court, Advisory Opinion to Attorney General re Standards For 5 rely was an alternative ground expressly vacated by the United States Supreme Court. See
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 265-66 (2003) ("[W]e vacate [the district court's alternative
holding] as a basis for the injunction. The District Court's alternative holding is not to be
regarded as supporting the injunction we have affirmed on the principal ground, or as binding
upon state and federal officials should Mississippi seek in the future to administer a redistricting
plan adopted by the Chancery Court."). In any event, the vacated alternative holding in Smith is
easily distinguishable here. In Smith, a state chancery court in Mississippi drew a remedial plan
despite the fact that there was clear state supreme court precedent rejecting the notion that a
chancery court had the authority to hear a case concerning a congressional redistricting plan in
the first instance. The three-judge district court panel opined that the federal Elections Clause had been violated by the chancery court's remedial plan because the chancery court had exceeded its proper jurisdiction, and as a result there existed "no legislative act upon which to base the chancery court's authority to act in congressional redistricting." Smith v. Clark, 189 F.
Supp. 2d at 556? At no time has the Florida Supreme Court stated that Florida's circuit courts have no authority over cases concerning congressional redistricting. To the contrary, as the
Legislature has previously recognized, the circuit courts' authority, indeed, their responsibility, to preside over such cases and therefore to impose any necessary remedy was confirmed in
Brown. There is therefore no question as to this Court's authority to adjudicate the
Establishing Congressional District Boundaries, No. SC08-1149, SC08-1165 (Fla. July 15, 2008), available at 2008 WL 3491017, at *20. (Exhibit B) 3 Moreover, in Smith, the federal district court was not faced with the reality that its invalidation of the chancery court's plan would result in using an unconstitutional map for the upcoming elections. In fact, the federal court took steps to make sure that a constitutional plan would be in place. When it struck down the chancery court's plan, it ordered that elections be conducted under a map that it had prepared in under a week. See Smith, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 532. There is nothing in Smith that suggests that this Court cannot draw a constitutional congressional map if it finds that the Legislature has not provided a constitutional alternative. 6 constitutionality of the congressional redistricting plan and to implement a remedial plan should
that become necessary.
It is certainly true that under the Elections Clause in Article I, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution, State legislatures have the "primary responsibility for apportionment of their
federal congressional ... districts." Emison, 507 U.S. at 34; see also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.
1, 27 (1975) ("[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its
legislature or other body"). But as the United States Supreme Court has explained: "Although
the legislative branch plays the primary role in congressional redistricting, our precedents
recognize an important role for the courts when a districting plan violates the Constitution."
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006). In particular when the
"imminence of a state election makes it impractical for" the Legislature to pass a new redistricting plan in time, "it becomes the 'unwelcome obligation' of the federal [or state] court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action." Wise v. Lipscomb,
437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (principal opinion) (internal citation omitted); see also, e.g., In re
Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 298 (Md. 2002) (when "elections are imminent, there simply is no time to return the matter to the political branches" and court must draw plan itself); cf DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that
"[w ]hile it is the duty of the legislature to redistrict the state, when the legislature is unable to adopt a redistricting plan, the obligation of devising a redistricting scheme falls upon the courts"). If possible, the Court should give the Legislature the opportunity to cure any constitutional infirmity it may find, but if the election is imminent, that may not be practicable.
See generally Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn
7 Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1131 (2005). In that event, it would become the
Court's "unwelcome obligation" to implement a constitutional congressional plan.
Should it become necessary for this Court to implement a remedial congressional
redistricting plan, there are a number of approaches the Court might use. The Court could
request that the parties submit alternative plans and then select from among the alternatives
presented to it; or the Court could appoint a special master to assist it in drawing a new plan; or
the Court could redraw the plan itself. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve
Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1131,
1148-50 (2005) (identifying most common methods for crafting remedial redistricting plans).
Recently in Connecticut and Nevada, state courts used special masters to assist in preparing
redistricting plans. See Order Directing Special Master, In re Petition of Apportionment
Commission, No. SC 18907 (Conn. Jan. 3, 2012) (appointing special master) (Exhibit G); Order
Adopting and Approving Special Masters' Report and Redistricting Maps as Modified by the
Court, Guy v. Miller, No. 11-0C-00042-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2011) (adopting maps prepared by special masters) (Exhibit F); see also Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 548 (1992)
(same). And in Texas, the Court drew the redistricting plans itself (with assistance from technical advisors). See Order Adopting Interim Map for Congressional Elections, Perez, et al. v. Perry, et al., Dkt. #681, No. 5:11-cv-00360 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2012) (Exhibit H). As the
Florida Supreme Court's March 9, 2012 opinion demonstrated, all of the tools and data required for redistricting are available to the Court.
The practical consequences of the House Defendants' argument that this Court has no remedial authority to implement a new plan in the event the congressional plan is found unconstitutional demonstrate that the House cannot possibly be right. Accepting the House's
8 argument on its own terms - that the federal Elections Clause bars a state court from ever
providing a constitutional remedial plan, even a temporary one - would have the effect of
rendering every court (state and federal) powerless to protect voters' state constitutional rights in
the context of congressional redistricting. For while this Court could find that the Legislature's
proposed plan clearly violated Article III, Section 20, if the Court may not order a new plan into
place and the Legislature refuses to adopt a new plan in time for the elections, the State would be
forced to conduct the election under an unconstitutional map. At the same time, no federal court
would be able to impose a remedial plan even after finding that the State's plan violates Article
III, Section 20 because the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars a federal
court from ordering state officials to comply with state law. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Legislature's position simply goes too far. The federal
Elections Clause has never been held to bar a state court from drawing a congressional plan as a remedy when faced with the alternative of holding elections under an unconstitutional map, and this Court should not become the first to so hold.
The Defendants have also suggested that this Court does not have any responsibility to expedite this proceeding and that there would be no problem with holding elections in 2012 without first resolving whether the congressional map complies with Article III, Section 20. In the first place, Defendants are wrong about this Court's obligations. This Court does indeed have a responsibility to expedite this case under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.215.
That Rule requires that as part of the Court's duty to expedite priority cases, the Court must pay
"[p ]articular attention" to "challenges involving elections." Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215.
Moreover, assuming that Plaintiffs' claims are meritorious, the delay requested by
Defendants will guarantee that Plaintiffs, along with all Florida voters, will suffer the irreparable
9 harm of the election of members of Congress from districts that violate the Florida Constitution.
See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1343-44 (N.D. Ga. 2004), summarily a.ff'd, 542
U.S. 947 (2004) (holding that stay of court's order finding state legislative maps unconstitutional
would result in "irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, and to all voters in Georgia who have had their
votes unconstitutionally debased" and that court had "a responsibility to ensure that future
elections will not be conducted under unconstitutional plans"); Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp.
1529, 1560 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that "irreparable harm in its purest sense will be occasioned
by ... permitting use of a plan violating Plaintiffs' equal protection rights" and that the citizens
of the State "should not be denied their right to a constitutional districting plan" and thereby
enjoining use of a plan where "irreparable harm will result if the claimed constitutional
violations are proven").
The constitutional defects alleged by Plaintiffs are not minor technicalities. They are, rather, fundamental breaches of the clear commands of Florida's voters through the ballot
amendment process. Nevertheless, under the Defendants' view, voters' right to congressional districts consistent with Article III, Section 20 is wholly unenforceable in the first election following reapportionment. This would be a profound rewriting of the voters' intent. As the
Florida Supreme Court just held with respect to Article III, Section 21, courts are "obligated to interpret and apply these standards in a manner that gives full effect to the will of the voters."
Op. at * 1. "To accept the Legislature's assurances that it followed the law without any type of inquiry or any type of meaningful review by this Court would render the Court's review of ... whether the Legislature complied with the new standards, essentially meaningless." Id. at * 12.
Yet that is exactly what the Senate and House Defendants urge - that this Court accept their assurances they followed the law and that it would be fine to go ahead with elections under their
10 proposed map in 2012. "This approach would ... create uncertainty for the voters of this state,
the elected representatives, and the candidates who are required to qualify for their seats." !d.
Moreover, if the resolution of this litigation is delayed, Florida's congressional elections
- and the congressional delegation that Florida sends to Washington - will be dogged by
doubt and suspicion. Voters will be left to wonder whether their electoral options, and
ultimately, their representatives in Congress, are the product of an unconstitutional
reapportionment process in which favored parties and incumbents were able to pick their voters
and the voting rights of minority groups are diluted. And with their seats on the line, Florida's
congressional delegation will be inevitably drawn into the controversy concerning the validity of
their elections to the detriment of their constituents' interests.
If this Court does not resolve this case before the 2012 elections, and then ultimately
concludes - as Plaintiffs believe that it will- that the congressional map is constitutionally
invalid, the Court will be forced to choose between permitting Florida's delegation to serve out their terms in seats which have already been judged unconstitutional or to require a special election at great cost to the State. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 457 F.
Supp. 2d 716, 721 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (ordering special election in five redrawn congressional districts after the United States Supreme Court invalidated the districts); Wright v. City of
Albany, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1239-40 (M.D. Ga. 2003) (ordering special election because where the "voting public has been prevented from electing its leaders pursuant to a plan which meets constitutional requirements" the "citizens should not be further unduly delayed, even if inconvenient to voting officials"); cf Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v.
County ofAlbany, 357 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2004) ("It is within the scope of [a court's] equity powers to order a governmental body to hold special elections to redress violations of the
11 VRA."). Either course would substantially harm the people of Florida. The only way to avoid
that damage is for this Court to address Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge as expeditiously and
efficiently as possible, so that this case may be resolved long before Florida's voters go to the
polls in August and November.
"Constitutional violations, once apparent, should not be permitted to fester; they should
be cured at the earliest practicable date." Desena v. _Afaine, 793 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Me.
2011) (requiring the State of Maine to reapportion congressional districts in time for 2012 elections). Justices Lewis and Labarga recently recognized just this. As Justice Lewis stated, the
Court would be "derelict in our obligation under the Florida Constitution if we were to ignore these violations [under Section 21]." Op. at *84 (Lewis, J., concurring). Justice Labarga agreed that while "it would have been preferable to have the luxury of more time," it "would be a complete and unjustified derogation of our constitutional obligation if we ignore our constitutional mandate to examine the plans to determine whether they meet constitutional muster by simply saying we do not have the time." Id. at *85 (Labarga, J., concurring). This
Court should likewise find that there is no reason to delay adjudication of this case and that it can be resolved before the 20 12 elections.
II. LITIGATING ON AN EXPEDITED SCHEDULE SUCH AS THAT PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFFS IS NOT UNREASONABLE, AND IS, IN FACT, COMMONPLACE IN REDISTRICTING CASES.
Defendants claimed at the status conference on March 7, that it would be "impossible" for this Court to adjudicate this case in time for the 2012 elections. Their claims of impossibility and complaints that the standards in Article III, Section 20 are too fact-intensive to permit a thorough review in the time allotted are quite similar to the claims that they made to the Florida
Supreme Court, and that the Supreme Court emphatically rejected. See Op. at *19 ("To the
12 extent that the Senate argues that our task is futile, endless, or impossible, we reject this
argument."). This Court should likewise reject any claims of impossibility.
Florida state and federal courts have consistently and successfully dealt with the complex
and important issues involved in redistricting on an expedited basis, as the Florida Supreme
Court's March 9, 2012 opinion certainly demonstrates. For example, in Florida's last round of
redistricting in 2002, a group of Plaintiffs brought challenges to all three redistricting plans -
House, Senate, and congressional - in federal court. The redistricting plans were passed by the
Legislature in late March 2002 and the plaintiffs' complaints were filed nearly one month later.
See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2002). In that case (even though it
was brought two months later than this case), "Plaintiffs brought their claims, the case was tried,
and [the Court's] opinion was drafted in substantial part prior to the November 2002 elections."
!d. at 1278 n.l. In fact, the Court issued its order resolving the Plaintiffs' claims on July 2, 2002.
See id. at 1279 n.5. That case involved extremely complicated allegations as to all three of the
Legislature's plans, including claims that the process used to arrive at the redistricting plan was
inadequate under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, claims that the reapportionment plan led to the dilution of black voting power in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and claims that the Florida Legislature politically gerrymandered the congressional districts to favor Republicans, thereby violating the rights of Democratic voters guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 1278-79. Many of the same counsel who represented the House in those proceedings are representing the House in these proceedings as well.
In the prior 1992 cycle, redistricting litigation proceeded even more quickly. After the
Legislature ended its regular session in 1992 without adopting either congressional or legislative
13 redistricting plans, a federal district court in Florida set an expedited scheduling order to adopt congressional and state legislative plans in a matter of two months. The court established the schedule on March 27, 1992, with plans scheduled to be adopted by May 29 in time for the July
6 to July 10 qualifying period. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. at 1080. During this period, the Florida Legislature went into special session and adopted a plan for the House and
Senate Districts, which the Florida Supreme Court declared valid on May 13, 1992. In re
Constitutionality ofSenate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So. 2d
276 (Fla. 1992), amended by, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992). Challenges to the legislative plans under the Voting Rights Act then ensued in the same federal court, with a five-day trial and ruling completed by July 1. The entire case as to the legislative plans lasted slightly over one month from beginning to end. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1002 (1994).
This type of expedited scheduling is common in redistricting cases across the country, in state and federal courts. It is typical in any redistricting cycle that courts will find the need to hear cases regarding the constitutionality of a redistricting plan in an expedited fashion. In this round of redistricting litigation in Idaho, for example, the court issued its opinion resolving a challenge to the state legislative map in just over two months. Petitioners in that case filed their claim alleging violation of both the federal and state constitutions on November 16, 2011; oral argument was held on January 5, 2012; the court's opinion was published January 18, 2012.
Twin Falls County v. Idaho Commission on Redistricting, No. 39373, _ P.3d. _, 2012 WL
130416, at *1 (Idaho Jan. 18, 2012) (Exhibit M). In Missouri, a federal court entered an expedited scheduling plan for a case filed on December 23, 2011 where the time period for filing a declaration for candidacy for the 2012 general election began on February 28, 2012 and ended on March 27. Stenger v. Kellett, No. 4:11CV2230 TIA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22930, *4-5
14 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2012) (Exhibit L). In two months' time, the court completed discovery and
trial, and adopted a new apportionment plan that met all federal and state constitutional
requirements. !d. at *35. In 2003, challenges to the Texas congressional re-redistricting were
adjudicated in just two months. Plaintiffs' challenges were filed in mid-October, a court order
dated October 30 set trial for December 8, and a ruling on the complex constitutional and
statutory issues involved was made before the end of the year. Order, Dkt. #19, Session v. Perry,
No. 2:03-CV -354 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2003) (Exhibit J).
Current litigation in New York over the redistricting plans there has resulted in
particularly aggressive scheduling, with the remedy of a court-drawn map to be prepared and
presented in less than a month. With the congressional election petitioning process set to begin
by March 20, 2012, on February 28 the court assigned a magistrate judge to the task of creating a
new congressional redistricting plan (with the assistance of consultant Nathaniel Persily) in
under one month. Order of Referral to Magistrate Judge, Dkt. #133, Favors v. Cuomo, Case No.
1:11-cv-05632-DLI-RR-GEL (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (Exhibit D). The court recognized that
with no new congressional district plan in place after the reduction of New York congressional
seats from 29 to 27, New Yorkers' right to representation in the House of Representatives was at
stake. !d. The parties submitted proposed plans on February 29; members of the public and interested organizations were also invited to submit proposals by March 2. A hearing on all proposals was held on March 5. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate presented her draft redistricting plan, with an accompanying order to show cause why the plan should not be submitted to the three-judge district court panel as the magistrate's recommendation. Order to
Show Cause, Dkt. #184, Favors. v. Cuomo, Case No. 1:11-cv-05632-DLI-RR-GEL (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2012) (Exhibit E). The parties' submitted responses two days later, on March 7. !d. The
15 magistrate's report back to the main panel is due by March 12, with a hearing scheduled for
March 15.
Other states have had similarly compressed time frames during which a state court had to
come up with a congressional map. In New Mexico, the state trial court heard argument on the
congressional map over the course of three days, on December 5-6, 2011, and again on
December 22. On December 29, the court determined which of the plans presented should be
adopted, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law accordingly. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Egolfv. Duran, No. D-101-cv-201102942 (N.M. 1st Judicial Dist. Ct. Dec.
29, 2011) (Exhibit C); see also Smith v. Hosemann, No. 3:01-cv-855-HTW-CDB, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 150072, at *13-14 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2011) (establishing congressional map for
Mississippi in one month's time) (Exhibit K).
The very case on which Defendants rely to claim that this Court has no remedial
authority to adopt a congressional redistricting plan demonstrates how fast-moving redistricting
litigation can be. When the Mississippi state legislature appeared to be unable to develop a plan
in time to permit preclearance by the Department of Justice before the state's candidate
qualifying deadline, a federal district court held a trial and developed its own plan in under a month. The federal district court issued an order asserting jurisdiction to develop an interim
congressional plan on January 15 and conducted a scheduling conference on January 16. At that conference, the court issued a scheduling order for discovery and set the matter for trial on
January 28 and 29. See Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 531 (S.D. Miss. 2002). At trial,
Plaintiffs presented nine alternative plans and called seven witnesses. Intervenors presented two plans and called three witnesses. After considering these plans, the Court drafted its own plan.
See id. at 532. On February 4, 2002, the court entered an order attaching its own plan.
16 As the foregoing demonstrates, the schedule proposed by Plaintiffs is not at all unrealistic
and it is certainly not "impossible" to have this matter adjudicated in time for the 2012 elections.
The Plaintiffs' plan affords the parties sufficient time to conduct targeted discovery, fully litigate
any issues concerning legislative privilege, brief dispositive motions, and resolve pre-trial
matters by April13, 2012. More specifically, the plan provides for:
• completion of fact and expert discovery by April 11;
• an expedited process for resolving disputes concerning any legislative privileges;
• full briefing of dispositive motions by April 13.
Trial on the constitutionality of the congressional map would be held during the week of April
16, with a remedial phase scheduled for April 23 to April 25. At that point the case would be
submitted to the Court, nearly six weeks before the candidate qualifying deadline and well within
the time within which expedited preclearance could be obtained from the Department of Justice.4
Should it become necessary, however, it is well within this Court's authority to adjust the
deadlines for candidate qualifying and thereby move all of the election-related deadlines. See,
e.g., Larios, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1342-43 (noting that the "court has broad equitable power to
delay certain aspects of the electoral process if necessary" and finding "no reason why the court
could not extend [the candidate qualifying] period if this proves to be necessary to ensure
constitutional elections"). The current 2012 deadline for qualifying for federal office in Florida
4 At the hearing, various Defendants' counsel suggested that expedited preclearance may not be possible. However, as the Department of Justice explains on its website: "There are occasions when a jurisdiction may need to complete the Section 5 review process on an accelerated basis due to anticipated implementation before the end of the 60-day review period. In such cases, the jurisdiction should formally request 'Expedited Consideration' in its submission letter, explicitly describing the basis for the request in light of conditions in the jurisdiction and specifying the date by which the determination must be received." See http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ sec _51 about.php. 17 is June 4-8, 2012,5 but this deadline is a month or tnore earlier than in the two previous
redistricting cycles: in 2002, the qualifying deadline was July 15-19; in 1992, it was July 6-10. 6
These early June dates could easily be pushed back if necessary. 7 Indeed, it seems the height of
inequity for the Defendants to come to this Court arguing that they cannot possibly litigate this
case in time to meet the deadlines, when they themselves moved up the deadlines. If courts
lacked the power to adjust deadlines to remedy constitutional violations in redistricting plans, a
state legislature could always insulate an unconstitutional map from challenge for at least one
election cycle - if not more - simply by adjusting election-related deadlines. That cannot be
right.
Two Texas cases provide good examples of the feasibility of shifting deadlines when
constitutional protection of voters necessitates such changes. In Vera v. Bush, the court
acknowledged the eventuality that adjusting election deadlines would require some
administrative effort, but concluded that the details to be worked out in making such minor
adjustments as changing the candidate registration date were not insurmountable. 933 F. Supp.
1341, 1347-48 (S.D. Tex. 1996). More recently in Texas, a three-judge panel ordered
adjustments to the election schedule and other provisions of the Texas Election Code for the
2012 elections in light of the outstanding redistricting issues still under review. See Order, Dkt.
#685, Perez, et al. v. Perry, et al., No. 5:11-cv-00360-0LG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2012)
5 See Florida Division of Elections, 2012 Qualifying Information, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/candidate/Qualifying-info.shtrnl. 6 See Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, 2002 Qualifying Handbook for Candidates 3 (October 2001), available at http://edocs.dlis.state.fl.us/fldocs/dos/de/ statequalify/2002.pdf; DeGrandy, 794 F. Supp. at 1079. 7 While counsel for the Secretary of State asserted at the hearing on March 7, 2012, that the deadlines could not be moved, courts adjudicating redistricting litigation frequently require the Secretary of State or other chief election officer to submit, under oath, a sworn statement attesting to the deadlines that truly cannot be changed. 18 (Exhibit I). Recognizing the need for additional time to enter the necessary orders adopting
interim plans for the United States House of Representatives, the Texas House, and the Texas
Senate, the court adopted a modified procedure for the 2012 Texas Primary Election for federal,
state, county, and local offices. Among the various adjustments made, the court reopened the
candidate filing period and pushed back the Texas primary date. The court's stated procedure
and timeline superseded the Texas Election Code.
Under the schedule proposed by Plaintiffs, there would be no need to adjust any dates as
the litigation is scheduled to conclude well in advance of the candidate qualifying period.
However, moving various deadlines is within the Court's power and the Court can request from
the Secretary of State a declaration under oath of the "real" deadlines involved in the election
process so it is aware of how much flexibility it truly has. Finally, if the House continues to
attempt to obstruct these proceedings through its invocation of Florida Statute Section 11.111
and the Court accepts that invocation (which it should not), the solution would be to allow
Plaintiffs to drop the House as a Defendant and proceed to litigate the case. The House is not an
indispensable party in a constitutional challenge to a map it has passed. And it is the voters, not
the legislature, "who have the rights in the process by which their representatives are elected."
Op. at *61.
CONCLUSION
This Court has both the authority and the responsibility to expedite these proceedings to
ensure that the voters of Florida have their constitutional rights vindicated in time for the 2012
elections. The discovery, trial, and remedy schedule proposed by Plaintiffs is reasonable and in keeping with schedules in other redistricting cases both in Florida and in other states. The
19 Coalition Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that the Court enter an order adopting the joint schedule and rejecting the House's invocation of Section 11.111.
Respectfully submitted, ~Mer RONALD c\) MEYER Florida Bar No.: 0148248 [email protected]
JENNER & BLOCK, LLP Paul M. Smith psmith@j enner .com Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending Michael B. DeSanctis mdesanctis@j enner. com Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending Jessica Ring Amunson jamunson@j enner.com Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending Kristen M. Rogers krogers@j enner.com Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending 1099 New York Ave NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: 202-639-6000 Facsimile: 202-639-6066
J. Gerald Hebert [email protected] Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending 191 Somervelle Street, #415 Alexandria, VA 223 04 Telephone: 703-628-4673
Ronald G. Meyer MEYER, BROOKS, DEMMA AND BLOHM, P.A. 131 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 1547 (32302) Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 878-5212 (850) 656-6750 facsimile
Counsel for Coalition Plaintiffs
20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy o~ ~ubmission was furnished by email and by overnight mail to the following parties on this~~y of March, 2012.
Blaine Winship OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL George T. Levesque PL-01, The Capitol General Counsel Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 FLORIDA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Telephone: (850) 414-3300 422 The Capitol Facsimile: (850) 488-4872 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 [email protected] Telephone: (850) 488-0451 George.Levesque@myfloridahouse. gov Attorney for the Attorney General
Ashley E. Davis Miguel De Grandy Daniel E. Nordby 800 Douglas Road, Suite 850 FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE Coral Gables, Florida 33134 500 South Bronough Street, Suite 100 Telephone: (305) 444-7737 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Facsimile: (305) 443-2616 Telephone: (850) 245-6536 [email protected] Facsimile: (850) 245-6127 Ashley .Davis@DOS .myflorida.com Attorneys for the Florida House of [email protected] Representatives
Attorneys for Florida Secretary ofState Andy Bardos Charles T. Wells Special Counsel to the President George N. Meros, Jr. THE FLORIDA SENATE Jason L. Unger 404 South Monroe Street, Suite 409 Allen C. Winsor Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles B. Upton II Telephone: (850) 487-5229 GRAYROBINSON, P.A. [email protected] Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Telephone: (850) 577-9090 Michael A. Carvin Facsimile: (850) 577-3311 JONES DAY Charles. [email protected] 51 Louisiana Avenue N.W. [email protected] Washington, D.C. 20001 Jason. U nger@gray-ro binson.com [email protected] Allen. Winsor@ gray-ro binson.com [email protected]
21 Joseph W. Hatchett Cynthia Skelton Tunnicliff AKERMAN SENTERFITT Peter M. Dunbar 106 E. College Ave., Ste. 1200 PENNINGTON, MOORE, ET. AL. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 215 South Monroe Street, Second Fl. Telephone: (850) 224-9634 Tallahassee, FL 3 23 0 1 Facsimile: (850) 222-0103 Telephone: (850) 222-3533 j [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Jon L. Mills BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP Attorneys for the Florida Senate 100 SE 2nd Street, Suite 2800 Miami, Florida 3 3131-2144 Telephone (305) 539-8400 Facsimile (305) 539-1307 [email protected]
Karen C. Dyer BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP 121 S. Orange Ave., Ste. 840 Orlando, Florida 32801 Telephone: ( 407) 425-7118 Facsimile: ( 407) 425-704 7 Email: [email protected]
Marc Elias Kevin J. Hamilton John Devaney AbhaKhanna PERKINS COlE, LLP 700 13th St. N. W., Ste 600 Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (2020 654-6200 Facsimile: (202) 654-6211 melias@perkinscoie. com [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Counsel for Ramo Plaintiffs
22
EXHIBIT B
Filing # 31045888 E-Filed 08/19/2015 11:43:09 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. Case No. 2012-CA-002842
KENNETH W. DETZNER, et al.,
Defendants. ______/
AGREED SCHEDULING ORDER
On July 28, 2015, this Court entered a Consent Judgment which directs the Legislative
Parties to file with the Court and serve on Plaintiffs a remedial apportionment plan for Florida's
Senate districts (the "Remedial Senate Plan") no later than November 9, 2015. On July 29,2015,
this Court entered an Order Setting Case Management Conference that directed the parties to
confer and, if possible, submit to the Court an agreed scheduling order for the remedial
proceedings. The parties having conferred and submitted an agreed scheduling order, and the
Court, having reviewed and approved the parties' proposal, enters this Order.
1. The Legislative Parties anticipate that the Legislature will enact the Remedial
Senate Plan by November 9, 2015. The Legislative Parties reserve the right to seek relief from
this Agreed Scheduling Order should unanticipated contingencies arise during the legislative
process which prevent the Legislature from enacting the Remedial Senate Plan by November 9,
2015, and Plaintiffs reserve their right to contest any such relief. 2. Within one business day after enactment of the Remedial Senate Plan, the
Legislative Parties shall make all submissions required of them by paragraph b. of the Consent
Judgment.
3. Within fourteen (14) days after enactment of the Remedial Senate Plan,
Plaintiffs shall:
a. File and serve their response to the Remedial Senate Plan, which, at a minimum,
and subject to ongoing discovery, shall identify (i) any districts in the Remedial
Senate Plan that Plaintiffs challenge; (ii) each constitutional standard that each
challenged district allegedly violates; and (iii) the factual bases of each alleged
violation;
b. File and serve any alternative maps that Plaintiffs wish to introduce in support of
their claims in this proceeding in the manner set forth in the Consent Judgment
(or, if Plaintiffs have already filed and served in this action the alternative maps
that they wish to introduce, Plaintiffs shall identify the specific alternative maps
they intend to introduce in support of their claims);
c. Serve any expert disclosures, which shall include the identities and qualifications
of all experts on whose opinions Plaintiffs intend to rely, as well as a complete
statement of their opinions and the production of all materials on which the
experts relied in forming their opinions; and
d. Subject to ongoing discovery, serve a list of all fact witnesses, including known
impeachment and rebuttal witnesses whom Plaintiffs might call at the evidentiary
hearing, and of all exhibits that Plaintiffs might offer to introduce. The witness
list shall contain the name, address, and telephone number of each witness and
2 segregate all witnesses into three groups: (a) witnesses whom the party in good
faith intends to call; (b) witnesses whom the party might or might not call,
depending upon what witnesses the opposing parties call or other unanticipated
matters; and (c) witnesses whom the party does not intend to call, but who are
listed from an abundance of caution in light of their knowledge of the facts or the
issues in dispute.
4. Within fourteen (14) days after Plaintiffs make all disclosures required by
Paragraph 3 of this Order, the Legislative Parties shall:
a. File and serve their reply to Plaintiffs' response to the Remedial Senate Plan,
which, at a minimum, and subject to ongoing discovery, shall reply to each
challenge identified in Plaintiffs' response;
b. Serve any expert disclosures, which shall include the identities and qualifications
of all experts on whose opinions the Legislative Parties intend to rely, as well as a
complete statement of their opinions and the production of all materials on which
the experts relied in forming their opinions; and
c. Subject to ongoing discovery, serve a list of all fact witnesses, including known
impeachment and rebuttal witnesses whom the Legislative Parties might call at
the evidentiary hearing, and of all exhibits that the Legislative Parties might offer
to introduce. The witness list shall contain the name, address, and telephone
number of each witness and segregate all witnesses into three groups: (a)
witnesses whom the party in good faith intends to call; (b) witnesses whom the
party might or might not call, depending upon what witnesses the opposing
parties call or other unanticipated matters; and (c) witnesses whom the party does
3 not intend to call, but who are listed from an abundance of caution in light of their
knowledge of the facts or the issues in dispute.
5. To the extent that a party identifies any witnesses or exhibits after service of the parties' witness and exhibit disclosures as set forth above, the witnesses or exhibits so identified shall be disclosed immediately (but no later than noon on December 10, 2015) in a supplemental witness and exhibit disclosure that conforms to the requirements of Paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
6. Discovery shall conclude by December 11, 2015. The Court anticipates that the parties will serve and respond to requests for discovery in good faith and as promptly as circumstances permit. The parties may take discovery after the discovery deadline only by leave of court granted upon a showing of good cause or by the agreement of all parties.
7. Any Defendant other than the Legislative Parties that wishes to present argument or evidence at the evidentiary hearing referenced in Paragraph 8 below shall comply with the disclosure requirements set forth in Paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
8. The parties may file a motion seeking an extension from the Court of the deadlines set forth in this Scheduling Order, but such extension will be granted only for good cause shown.
9. The Court will conduct an initial pretrial conference on December l, 2015, beginning at 1:00 p.m. The Court will conduct a second pretrial conference, if necessary, on
December 10,2015 beginning at 1:00 p.m.
10. The evidentiary hearing shall begin at 9:30 a.m. on December 14, 2015, in
~h Courtroom _____:.-.-l ..... Q.c...-=.V _ __• The hearing shall continue from day to day as necessary, but conclude no later than December 18,2015.
4 11. It is the understanding of the Court that in the event Plaintiffs are successful in any challenge presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court will set out its factual and legal bases for such a ruling and refer the matter back to the Legislature to redraw the map.
12. Any party may move for reconsideration of any part of this order for good cause shown.
DONE AND ORDERED this tf day of August, 2015. a~y;;- George S. Reynolds, III Circuit Judge
Copies to all counsel of record
5
EXHIBIT C
Filing # 32027692 E-Filed 09/14/2015 04:45:19 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
RENE ROMO, ET AL. CASE NO.: 2012-CA-00412 PLAINTIFFS,
VS.
KEN DETZNER AND PAM BONDI,
DEFENDANTS.
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, CASE NO.: 2012-CA-00490 ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS,
VS.
KEN DETZNER, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS.
COALITION PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF SERVICE (.doj) OF PROPOSED REMEDIAL CONGRESSIONAL PLANS
Coalition Plaintiffs hereby give notice of the service (in native .doj format) of their
Alternative Remedial Maps (CP-1, CP-2, and CP-3), and disclose the individuals who were
involved in drawing, reviewing, directing, or approving the Alternative Remedial Maps, as
follows:
Coalition Plaintiffs’ proposed remedial Congressional plan CP-1 is identical to the last
plan passed by the House during the August 2015 special session (c9071), except that it offers an
alternative configuration of Congressional Districts 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 in South
Florida that eliminates the Tier-1 violation in Congressional Districts 26 and 27, that results in
the same or increased compactness in seven out of eight of the districts, and that has seven fewer
city splits than either the House plan (c9071) or the Senate plan (c9062).
Coalition Plaintiffs’ proposed remedial Congressional plan CP-2 is identical to the last plan passed by the House during the August 2015 special session (c9071), except that it offers an alternative configuration of Congressional Districts 26 and 27 that eliminates the Tier-1 violation in those districts, that maintains nearly identical compactness scores, and that has the same number of city and county splits as the House and Senate plans.
Coalition Plaintiffs’ proposed remedial Congressional plan CP-3 is also identical to the last plan passed by the House during the August 2015 special session (c9071), except that it offers a second alternative configuration of Congressional Districts 26 and 27 that eliminates the
Tier-1 violation in those districts, that maintains nearly identical compactness scores, and that has the same number of city and county splits as the House and Senate plans.
Coalition Plaintiffs’ Alternative Remedial Maps (CP-1, CP-2 and CP-3) were drawn by
John O’Neill, a mapping software technician employed by Strategic Telemetry, located in
Washington, D.C. Mr. O’Neill drew the remedial plans in coordination with, and at the direction of, Fritz S. Wermuth of King, Blackwell, Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A., legal counsel for Coalition
Plaintiffs. David B. King, Thomas A. Zehnder, and Vincent Falcone III of King, Blackwell,
Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A. also reviewed the Alternative Remedial Maps and provided additional, albeit limited, direction in the drawing process. Allan J. Lichtman, PhD, a
Distinguished Professor at American University, reviewed, assessed, and analyzed the minority districts in the Alternative Remedial Plans, as will be reflected in his forthcoming Expert Report.
Finally, the Alternative Remedial Maps were reviewed and approved by Ellen Freidin, Esquire, legal advisor for the League of Women Voters of Florida and Common Cause; Pamela
Goodman, President of the LOWV; and Peter Butzin, Volunteer State Chair (Florida) of
Common Cause.
2
Dated: September 14, 2015 Respectfully Submitted,
/s/David B. King David B. King Florida Bar No.: 0093426 Thomas A. Zehnder Florida Bar No.: 0063274 Frederick S. Wermuth Florida Bar No.: 0184111 Vincent Falcone III Florida Bar No.: 0058553 KING, BLACKWELL, ZEHNDER & WERMUTH, P.A. P.O. Box 1631 Orlando, FL 32802-1631 Telephone: (407) 422-2472 Facsimile: (407) 648-0161 [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Secondary) [email protected] (Secondary)
-and-
Gerald E. Greenberg Florida Bar No. 0440094 Adam M. Schachter Florida Bar No. 647101 GELBER SCHACHTER & GREENBERG, P.A. 1441 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420 Miami, Florida 33131 Telephone: (305) 728-0950 Facsimile: (305) 728-0951 [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Primary) [email protected] (Secondary)
Counsel for the Coalition Plaintiffs
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 14, 2015 I filed the foregoing using the State of
Florida ePortal Filing System, which will serve a copy by email on all counsel listed on the
Service List below.
/s/ David B. King David B. King Florida Bar No.: 0093426
Counsel for the Coalition Plaintiffs
4
SERVICE LIST
Gerald E. Greenberg Michael B. DeSanctis Adam M. Schachter Jessica Ring Amunson GELBER SCHACHTER & GREENBERG, P.A. Paul Smith 1441 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420 JENNER & BLOCK, LLP Miami, Florida 33131 1099 New York Ave NW, Suite 900 [email protected] Washington, DC 20001 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ronald G. Meyer Lynn Hearn J. Gerald Hebert MEYER, BROOKS, DEMMA & BLOHM, P.A. 191 Somervelle Street, #415 131 North Gadsden Street Alexandria, VA 22304 Post Office Box 1547 [email protected] Tallahassee, FL 32302 [email protected] Counsel for Coalition Plaintiffs [email protected] [email protected] Adam S. Tanenbaum [email protected] General Counsel FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE Counsel for Coalition Plaintiffs R.A. Gray Building 500 S. Bronough Street Blaine Winship Tallahassee, FL 32399 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA [email protected] The Capitol, Suite PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 [email protected] Counsel for Florida Secretary of State [email protected]
Counsel for the Attorney General
George T. Levesque Charles T. Wells General Counsel George N. Meros, Jr. THE FLORIDA SENATE Andy Bardos 404 South Monroe Street, Suite 409 GRAYROBINSON, P.A. Tallahassee, Florida 32399 P.O. Box 11189 (32302) [email protected] 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 [email protected] Tallahassee, Florida 32301 [email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] Michael A. Carvin Louis K. Fisher [email protected] JONES DAY [email protected] 51 Louisiana Avenue N.W. [email protected] Washington, D.C. 20001 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
5
[email protected] Matthew J. Carson Raoul G. Cantero General Counsel Jason N. Zakia Florida House of Representatives Jesse L. Green 422 The Capitol WHITE & CASE LLP Tallahassee, FL 32399-1300 Southeast Financial Center, Ste. 4900 [email protected] 200 South Biscayne Boulevard [email protected] Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 371-2700 Counsel for Florida House of Facsimile: (305) 358-5744 Representatives [email protected] [email protected] Allison J. Riggs, Admitted Pro Hac Vice [email protected] Anita S. Earls [email protected] Benjamin Stevenson [email protected] SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE [email protected] 1415 W. Highway 54, Suite 101 [email protected] Durham, NC 27707 [email protected] Counsel for the Florida Senate [email protected] [email protected]
John M. Devaney Victor L. Goode Mark E. Elias Dorcas R. Gilmore PERKINS COIE, LLP NAACP 700 Thirteenth Street, NW, Suite 700 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Washington, D.C. 20005 Baltimore, MD 21215-3297 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Intervenor/Defendant, NAACP
Abha Khanna Mark Herron, Esq. Kevin J. Hamilton Robert J. Telfer III, Esq. PERKINS COIE, LLP Angelina Perez, Esq. 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4800 MESSER, CAPARELLO & SELF, P.A. Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Post Office Box 1876 [email protected] Tallahassee, FL 32302-1876 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Romo Plaintiffs [email protected]
Counsel for Romo Plaintiffs Florida Supreme Court [email protected]
6
EXHIBIT D
KING, BLACKWELL, ZEHNDER & WERMUTH, P.A. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW 25 EAST PINE STREET
POST OFFICE Box 1 631 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802-1 631
WWW.KBZWLAW.COM DAVID B. KING TELEPHONE BRUCE B. BLACKWELL [RETIRED] (407) 422-2472 THOMAS A. ZEHNDER
FACSIMILE FREDERICKS. WERMUTH (407) 648-0161 TAYLOR F. FORD November 2, 2015 VINCENT FALCONE Ill DKING@KBZWLAW. COM
TEA SISIC
VIA EMAIL ONLY
Chairman William Galvano Chairman Jose Oliva c/o George Levesque, Esq. c/o Matthew Carson, Esq The Florida Senate The Florida House of Representatives Committee on Reapportionment Select Committee on Redistricting 404 South Monroe Street 402 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399 Tallahassee, FL 32399
Re: Alternatives to Plans 9124 and 9079
Dear Chairman Galvano and Chairman Oliva,
The League of Women Voters of Florida and Common Cause (the "Coalition") continue to watch developments in the special session with great interest. In light of the House Redistricting Committee's passage of Plan 9079, the Coalition is concerned that the Legislature's proposals continue to reflect constitutional infirmities and evidently fail to take into account ongoing developments in minority voting in certain communities.
As previewed in the October 27, 2015letter submitting the Coalition's first alternative map, the Coalition has continued working to develop alternative Florida Senate plans that are based in part on updated 2012 and 2014 voter data. On behalf of the Coalition, we offer two additional alternative plans, CPS-2.doj and CPS-3.doj, both of which reflect substantially superior, constitutionally compliant alternatives to the plans adopted by the Senate (Plan 9124) and House Redistricting Committee (Plan 9079).
As compared with Plans 9124 and 9079, enclosed alternative plan CPS-2 has significantly lower population deviation; better respects political and geographic boundaries, with only 9 split cities (and only 20 aggregate city splits) and only 14 split counties; and has superior average compactness, with an average .49 Reock score and average .81 Convex-Hull score. In addition, CPS-2 demonstrates that a district in which African Americans can elect candidates of their choice Chairman Galvano and Chairman Oliva November 2, 20 15 Page 2 of3 can be drawn entirely within Hillsborough County, without crossing Tampa Bay. It also shows that a fourth district in which Hispanics can elect candidates of their choice can be drawn in South Florida.
As compared to Plans 9124 and 9079, enclosed alternative plan CPS-3 is also a superior, constitutionally compliant alternative that has significantly lower population deviation; better respects political and geographic boundaries, with only 10 split cities (and only 23 aggregate city splits) and only 15 split counties; and has superior average compactness, with an average .50 Reock score and . 81 Convex-Hull score. CPS-3 demonstrates that a fourth district in which Hispanics can elect candidates of their choice can be drawn in South Florida, with changes limited to Miami-Dade County.
CPS-2 and CPS-3, like the Coalition's previous submission, are the direct result of considering only constitutional compliance in light of objective criteria. The Coalition's map drawer, John O'Neill, consistently drew the proposed plans in compliance with tier-one requirements and to maximize tier-two compliance. In contrast, Plan 9079, while better than Plan 9124, retains features that appear intended to create a more favorable map for Republicans at the expense of equality of population, compactness, and respect for geographic and political boundaries. Moreover, the Coalition believes the Legislature may violate the Florida Constitution if the Legislature neglects to create a fourth majority-minority Hispanic district in South Florida, in light of the evident ability to draw such a district.
The Coalition is disappointed that neither the Senate nor the House appears to have made any effort to take updated 2012 and 2014 voter data into account. Now that a week has passed since the Coalition provided such data to the Legislature, the Coalition must ask why the Legislature has failed to use that data or produce updated 2012 and 2014 data of its own. Again, it only took the Coalition a matter of days to compile and validate the data. We note that CPS-2 and CPS-3 fare well even using the older MyDistrictBuilder data. But the Legislature's unreasonable excuses, failure to use updated data, and refusal to even try to generate updated data (notwithstanding its purported interest in protecting minority voter rights) suggest that the Legislature is intent on limiting its consideration to stale data that it considers more favorable to its partisan goals. The Florida Constitution does not afford the Legislature that luxury.
There is still time to draw and enact a remedial Senate map that is constitutionally compliant, rather than perpetuate an unconstitutional status quo under the guise of attempted compliance. CPS-2 and CPS-3 demonstrate that the Legislature can (and must) do better than Plans 9124 and 9079. We sincerely hope that the Legislature will consider CPS-2 and CPS-3 in good faith, which is the spirit in which they are being offered. The citizens of Florida deserve what the Florida Constitution requires - the opportunity to vote for candidates in non-partisan, constitutionally compliant districts in 2016. Chairman Galvano and Chairman Oliva November 2, 2015 Page 3 of3
With kindest regards, I am
David B. King DBK/ap enclosures cc: Pam Goodman, President of the LOWV of Florida Peter Butzin, Volunteer State Chair of Common Cause/Florida
EXHIBIT E
From: Brad Wieneke [[email protected]] on behalf of Brad Wieneke Sent: Sunday, October 16, 2011 10:59 PM To: Ken Strasma Subject: Fwd: Fwd: Monday's call-- agenda
------Forwarded message ------ From:
** Weird. I would send a heads up to ken so he doesn't reply all.
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile
*From: * Brad Wieneke
FYI -- Ellen had a mini freak out over this email and asked me to do the follow up email as she didn't want our actual principles in writing. I find it a little odd as a. She is a lawyer, so we are covered by privilege. b. our maps are being created to discredit the opposition, they are maps to attack with, I think the idea that a court would wholesale adopt our maps (rather than making the legislature go back and try again) and as such we would be subject to discovery is a bit of a fantasy c. If you want me to write out my principles to have a discussion with, but you don't want my actual principles, you should probably call me to tell me what you actually want ...
------Forwarded message ------From: Brad Wieneke
Ellen,
From my notes, my principles are below. They are definitely Congressional District-centric, but should apply to the State House and Senate. If you think it is appropriate, we can use these as a jumping off point for discussion tomorrow.
We were going to start from the current CD map. It might be worth discussing if there is any value in starting from the Libby map?
On the map legend -- I don't love this map, I just threw it together in 5 minutes, very late last night to make sure I had the political data in Maptitude and that I had proof of it for
COALITION0001 010 you and Ken. We will be making many blue-purple-red political maps in the coming weeks and I'll make sure they have good legends. That said, if you really want the legend, I can go back and look it up.
Regards, Brad W.
Our mapping principles:
1. Preserve Minority-Majority Seats a. Goal 3 AA seats (Current 3, 17, 23) and 4 H seats (Current 18, 21, 25) i. All of the AA seats have lost relative population ii. Iteration One: Try preserving CD 3 (maybe make it more Orlando/Gainsville centric) iii. Iteration Two: Do not preserve CD 3. Is there anyplace to carve out an additional district? (it does not seem like it) iv. Three of the Hispanic seats will likely be Republican (Cuban) and in the greater Miami area v. Try to carve out a Hispanic seat in Central or Central/East Florida b. Look to Preserve or increase minority percentages in coalition districts i. CD 11 -- Castor (this seat also lost relative population) ii. 19 (Deutch), 20 (Wasserman) 111. Create new coalition districts? c. Section 5 Districts i. make sure we are not diluting "ability to elect" ii. question -- what is the threshold for when minorities never had the ability to elect? iii. Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsbourough (most important), Monroe iv. Current CDs that go through these counties 9, 11 (Coalition-Castor), 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23(Black), 25 (Hispanic) 2. Equal Weighting 1: Compact a. Note, this can be a relative measure -- "more" compact than the maps we think the State House will put out b. There is not a universal measure for compactness, Maptitude can run reports on multiple compactness measuers 3. Equal Weighting 2: Do not Favor Disfavor Party or Incumbent a. OK, generally we want a map that looks like it is doing this, but Democrats currently have 6 of 25 seats and all 6 of those seats are minority majority or minority coalition seats. Underlying goal is to increase the number of safe Democratic seats and the number of competitive seats. b. Also, probably best if we preserve Debbie Wasserman's Seat 20 c. Goal -- X? "safe" Dem Seats i. Dems seem fairly naturally packed, this goal will be in opposition to "compactness", so this number will likely be limited. d. Goal -- Y? competitive Seats e. Need to look up addresses for all current incumbents so we can measure our maps and competitive maps on this criteria 4. Equal Weighting 3: Honor existing Political and Geographical Boundaries a. County and City borders b. Note: TV broadcast area can be considered a natural boundary c. Communities of Interest d. Question --If you are honoring an existing political boundary, aren't you favoring the incumbent? 5. Criteria that goes without Saying 1: Contiguous 6. Criteria that goes without Saying 2: Equal Population 7. General Principles: a. Avoid Districts that span East Coast to West Coast i. West Coast towns dislike being in CD 25
COALITION0001 011 b. In both Panhandle and Gold Coast, don't feel the need to respect beach communities, put "compactness" higher
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 12:50 PM, Ellen Freidin
> Brad - great! > On the map you attached, what is the legend? (what do the colors mean) > Are you clear on what principles you will use when preparing the > draft? We can go over that in the AM on our call if it would be helpful. > > > From: Brad Wieneke
COALITION0001 012 » >> We received notice from NCEC that they have data for us. Assuming >> they post it to our ftp site, I will pull it down tomorrow and make >> sure that we can bring it into Maptitude as expected. If so, we >> should be able to have first drafts of maps by lues/Wed. » » Regards, » Brad W. » >> On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 6:12 PM, Ellen Freidin
COALITION0001 013
EXHIBIT F
Filing # 33606162 E-Filed 10/23/2015 11:48:20 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA et al.,
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Case No.: SC14-1905 L.T. No.: 2012-CA-00412; KEN DETZNER, et al., 2012-CA-00490
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA, CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT FOR IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION
COALITION PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON REMEDY
KING, BLACKWELL, ZEHNDER & THE MILLS FIRM, P.A. WERMUTH, P.A. John S. Mills David B. King Andrew D. Manko Thomas A. Zehnder Courtney R. Brewer Frederick S. Wermuth 203 North Gadsden Street, Suite 1A Vincent Falcone III Tallahassee, FL 32301
P.O. Box 1631 Orlando, FL 32802-1631 GELBER SCHACHTER & GREEN- BERG, P.A. Adam Schachter Gerald E. Greenberg 1441 Brickell Avenue, Ste. 1420
RECEIVED, 10/23/201511:53:30 AM,Clerk,Supreme Court Miami, Florida 33131-3426
Counsel for Appellants The League of Women Voters of Florida, Common Cause, Brenda Ann Holt, Roland Sanchez-Medina Jr., J. Steele Olmstead, and Robert Allen Schaeffer
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... i
TABLE OF CITATIONS ...... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO ASSIST THE READER ...... v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ...... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...... 7
ARGUMENT ...... 9
I. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS...... 9
A. Appellate Standard of Review ...... 9
B. Legal Principles Governing Review of Remedial Plans ...... 9
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IN RECOMMENDING CP-1 FOR APPROVAL...... 13
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT THE TRIAL COURT’S RECOMMENDATION TO APPROVE THE CONFIGURATION OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHWEST FLORIDA IN PLAN 9071...... 15
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DISTRICTS 26 AND 27 IN CP-1 BEST FULFILL THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...... 17
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DISTRICTS 20 THROUGH 25 IN CP-1 BEST FULFILL THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...... 33
VI. THE LEGISLATURE’S ACCUSATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP ARE IRRELEVANT AND UNFOUNDED...... 37
VII. THE COURT SHOULD RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER...... 43
CONCLUSION ...... 43
i
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...... 45
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...... 47
ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) ...... 29
Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) ...... 29
Daniels v. State, 4 So. 3d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ...... 30
DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992) ...... 10
Div. of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp. v. Samter, 393 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ...... 30
League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015) (“Apportionment VII”) ...... passim
Myron v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 703 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ...... 28
People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) ...... 10
Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ...... 27
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012) (“Apportionment I”) ...... 43
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) ...... 30
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS
Art. III, § 2, Fla. Const...... 7
iii
§ 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2015) ...... 29
§ 90.705, Fla. Stat. (2015) ...... 28
28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) ...... 29
SECONDARY SOURCES
Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 7470 (Feb. 9, 2011) ...... 29 http://results.elections.myflorida.com/ ...... 25
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO ASSIST THE READER Citations to the Record on Appeal are as follows:
• (R__:___) indicate citations to the Record on Appeal previously filed in Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla., No. SC14-1200. This Court granted Appellants’ Motion to Utilize that record in this appeal by order dated October 31, 2014;
• (SR(1-24):___) indicate citations to the Supplemental Record on Ap- peal filed by the clerk of the lower tribunal, also pursuant to this Court’s order dated October 31, 2014, of materials filed since the Bainter record was compiled. This supplemental record was transmit- ted to the Court on October 30, 2014 and November 6, 2014;
• (SR(25-73):___) indicates citations to the Supplemental Record on Appeal filed by the clerk of the lower tribunal, pursuant to this Court’s order dated July 9, 2015. This supplemental record was transmitted to the Court on October 21, 2015.
• (TT__:____) indicates citations to the merits trial transcript, which was included at the end of the Bainter record and subject to its own volume numbering separate from the record on appeal;
• (Ex. LD-___) indicates citations to the Legislature’s exhibits admitted during the merits trial, which were filed by the clerk of the lower tri- bunal on a disc with the Bainter record;
• (R. Ex. CP-___) indicates citations to Coalition Plaintiffs’ exhibits admitted during the relinquishment proceedings, which were filed by the clerk of the lower tribunal on a disc with the supplemental record transmitted to the Court on October 21, 2015;
• (R. Ex. H-__) indicates citations to the House’s exhibits admitted dur- ing the relinquishment proceedings, which were filed by the clerk of the lower tribunal on a disc with the supplemental record transmitted to the Court on October 21, 2015;
• (Ex. Ex. S-___) indicates citations to the Senate’s exhibits admitted during the relinquishment proceedings, which were filed by the clerk v
of the lower tribunal on a disc with the supplemental record transmit- ted to the Court on October 21, 2015; and
• (J.A. ___) indicates citations to the parties’ Joint Appendix, which was filed by the Senate on October 16, 2015.
Citations to the briefs are as follows:
• (H.S.B __) indicates citations to the House’s Supplemental Brief filed on October 16, 2015;
• (S.S.B __) indicates citations to the Senate’s Supplemental Brief filed on October 16, 2015; and
• (Leg. A.B. ___) indicates citations to the Legislature’s Answer Brief and Initial Brief on Cross Appeal filed on December 19, 2014.
vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Because the Legislature failed to enact a remedial congressional plan in re- sponse to the decision in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 172 So.
3d 363 (Fla. 2015) (“Apportionment VII”), this Court has been thrust into the unu-
sual posture of adopting a remedial plan to ensure constitutional elections. The trial
court thoroughly analyzed the seven maps proposed by the parties, recommended
approval of 19 legislatively drawn districts, and found that eight South Florida dis-
tricts in CP-1 best fulfill the requirements of the Florida Constitution while correct-
ing the specific defects identified in Apportionment VII.
Attempting to salvage its less compliant proposals, the Legislature offers on-
ly distortion, speculation, and diatribes against Coalition Plaintiffs and the judici-
ary. In doing so, the Legislature falls far short of its burden under Apportionment
VII. This Court should accept the trial court’s recommendation and adopt CP-1 as the plan governing congressional elections in Florida.
The Special Session. On July 9, 2015, this Court issued its Apportionment
VII opinion, which invalidated the Legislature’s 2014 congressional plan and relin-
quished jurisdiction to the trial court for a period of 100 days for remedial proceed-
ings. The trial court promptly entered a scheduling order that was dependent on the
Legislature enacting a remedial plan by August 25, 2015. (J.A. 2.)
1
The Legislature announced that it would convene a special session to con-
sider a remedial plan from August 10, 2015 to August 21, 2015. (R. Ex. H-190.)
Before the special session commenced, the Legislature directed staff to draw a
“base map” that would be used as a starting point for the remedial plan. (R. Ex. H-
118 at 1; J.A. 32.) The base map was not drawn in public, and there is no written, audio, or video recording of the closed-door drawing sessions or of the conversa- tions among staff during those sessions. (J.A. 273-75, 286-87, 341.)1
In redrawing Districts 26 and 27, staff considered only two options that
made the smallest possible changes to versions of District 26 and 27 invalidated in
Apportionment VII. (J.A. 873.) One version left Homestead whole within District
26, while the other left Homestead whole within District 27. (R. Ex. CP-32-35.)
Staff opted for the version that placed Homestead in District 26 and replaced the
lost population in District 27 with three predominantly African-American commu-
nities in Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine. (J.A. 32.)
By shifting predominantly Democratic African-American communities into
District 27, the Legislature increased the Republican performance in District 26,
thereby replicating – and, in fact, exacerbating – the partisan effect of the prior
Homestead split. (Compare J.A. 29 with J.A. 37.) To justify this maneuver, staff
1 In the ongoing Senate remedial process, the Legislature has elected to rec- ord the drawing sessions for the proposed base maps. (J.A. 677.)
2
did not claim that they shifted African-American population into District 27 to avoid retrogression. Indeed, the Legislature represents that staff had no knowledge of the performance or demographic information necessary to conduct a functional analysis when drawing Districts 26 and 27. (See S.S.B. 34.) Instead, staff stated that they were merely attempting to follow major roadways in equalizing popula- tion and drew in Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine when
connecting Highway 1 with the Florida Turnpike. (R. Ex. CP-13 at 128-29.)
After publication of the base map, Coalition Plaintiffs sent a letter to the
Legislature expressing concern that the base map “accomplished the same partisan
result” as the Homestead split by shifting Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and
West Perrine into District 27. (R. Ex. CP-29 at 2.) Coalition Plaintiffs “submit[ted]
that ... the population removed from CD 26 was chosen because that particular
population, if left to remain in CD 26, would have made the district more Demo-
cratic and improved tier-two compliance in the region as a whole.” (Id.) The letter
urged the Legislature to “find a non-partisan way to draw CD’s 26 and 27.” (Id.)
The Legislature did not attempt to redraw Districts 26 and 27 in a more compliant
manner after receiving the letter or at any other time during the special session. In-
stead, the Legislature launched a misguided attack, accusing Coalition Plaintiffs of
making a “blatant request to make District 26 ‘more Democratic’ ” and asking “the
Legislature to engage in partisan gerrymandering.” (R. Ex. CP-30 at 3.)
3
During the special session, the House passed a slightly modified version of
the base map, designated Plan 9071. (J.A. 38.) The Senate passed Plan 9062, which
made more significant changes to the base map in Central and Southwest Florida.
(J.A. 44.) The House and Senate could not agree on which map to adopt, and the
special session concluded without a legislatively adopted remedial plan. (J.A. 865.)
Because the initial instructions on relinquishment assumed that the trial court and this Court would review a legislatively enacted remedial plan, this Court entered a further order directing the trial court to
hold a hearing in which it shall consider “proposed remedial plans from the parties” ... especially focusing on the map passed during spe- cial session by the House, and any amendments offered thereto; the map passed during special session by the Senate, and any amendments offered thereto; and the areas of agreement between the legislative chambers.
(J.A. 7) Emphasizing that “the burden remains on the House and Senate to justify their chosen configurations,” this Court instructed the trial court to “make a rec- ommendation to the Court ... as to which map proposed by the parties—or which portions of each map—best fulfills the specific directions in [Apportionment VII] and all constitutional requirements.” (J.A. 7-8.)
The Remedial Hearing. The trial court then entered a second scheduling order directing the parties to submit proposed plans and setting a three-day eviden- tiary hearing. (J.A. 15-18.) Before the hearing, the parties filed seven plans:
4
(1) Plan 9071 (House) – Plan 9071, adopted by the House in the special session, largely follows the base map, except that it keeps whole four additional cities: Groveland, Auburndale, Riviera Beach, and Sunrise. Plan 9071 includes (a) the same East-West version of District 5 as in the map designated Romo Plan A at trial, (b) a version of District 14 that does not cross Tampa Bay or divide Pinellas County, (c) a “stacked” configu- ration of Districts 21 and 22, (d) a version of District 25 that keeps Hendry County whole, and (e) a version of District 27 that does not include any portion of Homestead, but replaces the lost population with predominantly African-American communities in Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine. Plan 9071 includes 18 split counties and 20 split cities.
(2) Plan 9062 (Senate) – Plan 9062, adopted by the Senate in the special session, modifies Districts 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 17 from the staff-drawn configurations in the base map. Primarily, Plan 9062 keeps Sarasota County whole, whereas Plan 9071 divides it. In exchange, Plan 9062 divides Manatee County, whereas Plan 9071 keeps it whole, and does not include a district wholly within Orange County (as is District 10 in Plan 9071). Plan 9062 includes 18 split counties and 20 split cities.
(3) Plan 9066 (Senate) – At Senator Galvano’s direction, Senate staff drew Plan 9066 after the special session. Plan 9066 differs from Plan 9071 only as to Districts 9, 15, 16, and 17. Plan 9066 keeps both Sarasota County and Manatee County whole, while Plan 9071 divides Sarasota County. In exchange, Plan 9066 di- vides Longboat Key, portions of which are located in both Sar- asota County and Manatee County, and reduces the compact- ness of Districts 9, 15, 16, and 17 as compared with Plan 9071 by either two or all three of the accepted compactness metrics. Plan 9066 includes 17 split counties and 21 split cities.
(4) CP-1 (Coalition Plaintiffs) – Coalition Plaintiffs offered CP-1 as their principal remedial plan. CP-1 includes 19 identical dis- tricts to Plan 9071 in North and Central Florida, but differs sub- stantially from Plan 9071 in South Florida. First, CP-1 config- ures Districts 26 and 27 in a way that eliminates the split of Homestead, is substantially more compact than the legislative proposals, and follows major roadways more closely than the 5
legislative proposals. Second, CP-1 reconfigures Districts 20 through 25 in a way that avoids at least seven city splits and improves compactness in four out of the five affected districts. CP-1 includes 18 split counties and 13 split cities.
(5) CP-2 and CP-3 (Coalition Plaintiffs) – CP-2 and CP-3 are ex- emplar plans submitted by Coalition Plaintiffs to demonstrate that Districts 26 and 27 can be drawn to more closely follow major roadways without adversely affecting compactness or drawing the three African-American communities into District 27. CP-2 and CP-3 follow the district configurations in Plan 9071 other than for Districts 26 and 27. CP-2 and CP-3 both in- clude 18 split counties and 20 split cities.
(6) Romo Plan (Romo Plaintiffs) – The Romo Plan is modelled af- ter Plan 9071 in North and Central Florida, modifying only the South Florida districts. There are two significant differences be- tween the Romo Plan and Plan 9071. First, the Romo Plan re- tains the non-“stacked” configuration of Districts 21 and 22 in the 2012 and 2014 congressional plans. Second, the Romo Plan modifies the boundary between Districts 26 and 27 so that the African-American communities in Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine are in District 26, rather than District 27. The Romo Plan includes 18 split counties and 23 split cities.
(J.A. 38-79.)
The trial court then conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing during which
it heard testimony from the map drawers and expert witnesses for each of the par-
ties. On October 9, 2015, the trial court entered its order recommending approval
of 19 legislatively drawn districts reflected in Plan 9071 and eight South Florida
districts in CP-1. (J.A. 864-882.) The trial court first approved the North and
Southwest Florida districts in Plan 9071 because they are more tier-two compliant than the competing configurations in Plans 9062 and 9066. (J.A. 868-70.) It then
6
turned to the South Florida districts and found that CP-1 is “hands down the best tier two performing map of the group.” (J.A. 875.) After finding that the Legisla- ture had failed to carry its burden of justifying its less compliant versions of Dis- tricts 20 through 27 on non-retrogression or other grounds, the trial court recom- mended CP-1 as the plan that “best complies with the directions in Apportionment
VII and the requirements of Article III, section 20.” (J.A. 882.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT This Court should accept the trial court’s recommendation and adopt CP-1
as the remedial plan governing congressional elections in Florida. The trial court
faithfully followed this Court’s instructions, focused primarily on the legislative
plans, and recommended the most constitutionally compliant districts.
The trial court properly recommended adoption of the Central and South- west Florida districts in Plan 9071 (which are incorporated into CP-1) over the
Senate proposals. Plans 9062 and 9066 give rise to potential incumbent favoritism concerns, and they contain tier-two defects not present in Plan 9071.
The trial court also properly recommended adoption of Districts 20 through
27 as drawn in CP-1 because the Legislature did not meet its burden of justifying
its proposed versions of those districts. Districts 26 and 27 in CP-1 are more com-
pact and better follow major roadways and municipal boundaries than the legisla-
tive proposals without retrogression. The Legislature’s claim that CP-1’s District
7
26 diminishes the ability of Hispanics to elect their preferred candidates is incon- sistent with its prior positions and the demonstrated electoral history. The relevant metrics in CP-1 are substantially the same as in the 2012 and 2014 enacted plans, which elected both a Hispanic Democrat and a Hispanic Republican and which the
Legislature and its expert endorsed as non-retrogressive.
By eliminating an appendage extending from District 20 into District 21 and
making other changes to Districts 20 through 25, CP-1 avoids at least seven addi-
tional city splits and substantially improves compactness in the region. To dispute
these significant tier-two benefits, the Legislature offers nonsensical distinctions
that fail to satisfy its burden under Apportionment VII.
Finally, the Legislature’s prolonged, but tired attacks on Coalition Plaintiffs’
maps and motives are irrelevant and unsupported. The trial court conducted a
transparent, thorough, and non-partisan analysis and ultimately recommended 19
legislative districts and what is objectively the most compliant configuration of the
remaining eight districts. Although the trial court correctly found that CP-1 was not
drawn with partisan intent, the alleged intent of Coalition Plaintiffs and the proce-
dure by which they drew their proposed maps are ultimately irrelevant.
8
ARGUMENT
I. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS.
A. Appellate Standard of Review Coalition Plaintiffs agree that this Court reviews factual determinations for competent, substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. (H.S.B. 12 n.1;
S.S.B. 11.) The Senate, however, incorrectly suggests that de novo review applies to all aspects of the “question of ‘which map proposed by the parties—or which portions of each map—best fulfills the specific directions in [Apportionment VII] and all constitutional requirements.’ ” (Id. (quoting J.A. 7-8).) The trial court’s recommendation incorporates both factual determinations, such as whether particu- lar maps were drawn with partisan intent, and legal determinations. The factual portions of the trial court’s recommendation must be upheld if supported by com- petent, substantial evidence, while legal determinations are subject to de novo re- view.
B. Legal Principles Governing Review of Remedial Plans This Court is in the unusual posture of adopting a remedial redistricting plan when the Legislature had the opportunity to enact a plan, but failed to do so. Alt- hough the task of redistricting falls primarily to the Legislature, this Court has the authority to adopt a remedial plan to avoid elections in unconstitutional districts in the face of legislative inaction. See Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 413 (ac- knowledging that “state courts are empowered to enact constitutional redistricting 9
plans for the United States Congress ‘when the legislature fails to do so’ ”) (citing
People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1232 (Colo. 2003)); DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (adopting judicially crafted congressional districts when Legislature failed to enact plan). The Legislature has conceded as much. It was, after all, the House that requested this Court to modify its relinquishment instructions to allow for judicial adoption of a remedial plan be- fore the 2016 congressional elections, and neither chamber objected to the authori- ty of the judiciary to adopt a plan during the relinquishment proceedings.2
Now that the trial court has declined to recommend a portion of the legisla- tive proposals, the House complains that remedial districts are being “impos[ed]” in violation of “separation of powers” (H.S.B. 33), and proclaims that “judicial im- position” of the challengers’ proposed districts would “violate ... democratic val- ues” and “justify the Legislative Parties’ opposition to Amendment Six as a device intended to strip the Legislature of its constitutional authority” (H.S.B. 44). These inflammatory claims fall flat for at least two reasons. First, the House itself asked this Court to modify its relinquishment of jurisdiction and to instruct the trial court to “solicit proposed remedial plans from the parties” – not simply the two legisla-
2 The Legislature previously argued that courts do not have authority to im- pose a plan for misconduct alone, but conceded that the judiciary has the “unwel- come obligation” to adopt a redistricting plan if the Legislature “has had a reason- able opportunity to enact a remedial plan,” but “fails to respond.” (SR3:130-31.)
10
tive chambers – and then “recommend to this Court the adoption of one of the pro- posed remedial plans.” (House Mot. for Further Relinquishment at 4 (emphasis added); see also J.A. 6-8.) Second, it is neither a violation of separation of powers nor a judicial power grab to adopt districts proposed by parties other than the Leg- islature when the Legislature has failed to respond to its constitutional obligation to enact a remedial redistricting plan. If courts were strictly limited to picking a defi- cient map proposed by one legislative chamber or the other when alternative pro-
posals satisfy all constitutional requirements, the Legislature would be afforded the
very deference that this Court rejected in Apportionment VII.
This Court has properly determined that the Apportionment VII framework
continues to govern the legislative proposals despite the lack of an enacted plan.
(J.A. 7.) If the rule were otherwise, the Legislature could reduce its burden in re-
medial proceedings simply by refusing to act or manufacturing an “impasse” over
inconsequential issues. Because the Legislature drew the 2012 congressional plan
with unconstitutional intent, the burden is on the Legislature to justify its proposed
remedial district configurations, and this Court affords no deference to the Legisla-
ture in reviewing its proposed districts. See Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 396-
97. This Court described the effect of the burden shift as follows:
Because there are many ways in which to draw a district that complies with, for example, the constitutional requirement of compactness, which party bears the burden of establishing why a decision was made to accept or reject a particular configuration can ultimately be deter- 11
minative. ... Since the trial court found that the Legislature’s intent was to draw a plan that benefitted the Republican Party, the burden should have been placed on the Legislature to demonstrate that its de- cision to choose one compact district over another compact district, or one tier-two compliant map over another tier-two compliant map, was not motivated by this improper intent. This is particularly true where the challengers presented evidence that the Legislature’s choices ulti- mately benefitted the Republican Party and also showed alternative maps that performed more fairly.
Id. at 400-01.
The Legislature maintains that the trial court’s analysis should have been strictly limited to deciding whether the legislative proposals corrected the specific constitutional defects identified in Apportionment VII. (H.S.B. 38-41; S.S.B. 43.) If the Legislature’s position were accepted, the trial court would be required to rec- ommend a legislative proposal for approval as long as it corrects the identified de- fects and meets some minimum threshold of tier-two compliance. That result would be inconsistent with the unique posture of this case, in which this Court is tasked with adopting a plan in the absence of a legislatively enacted plan, as well as the instructions on relinquishment and the Apportionment VII decision.
This Court directed the trial court to identify “which map proposed by the parties—or which portions of each map—best fulfills” not only “the specific direc- tions of [Apportionment VII],” but also “all constitutional requirements.” (J.A. 7-8)
(emphasis added).) As the parties’ competing proposals show, there are multiple ways to address the defects identified in Apportionment VII with differing levels of
12
tier-two compliance. There is no principled justification for casting aside obvious tier-two benefits simply because they are reflected in a map proposed by challeng-
ers, rather than the Legislature. To do so would afford the Legislature unwarranted
deference and eviscerate the Apportionment VII burden shift. After a finding of
improper intent, the Legislature is required not only to meet some bare threshold of
tier-two compliance, but must affirmatively justify its decision “to choose one
compact district over another compact district, or one tier-two compliant map over
another tier-two compliant map.” Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 401.
In the absence of legislative action, this Court has the constitutional authori-
ty and obligation to adopt the remedial plan that most faithfully complies with Ar-
ticle III, section 20. It should not decline to do so simply because a challenger, ra-
ther than a legislative chamber, has offered the most compliant map.
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF RE- VIEW IN RECOMMENDING CP-1 FOR APPROVAL. The Legislature claims that, in recommending CP-1, the trial court violated
this Court’s instruction to “especially focus[]” on the maps proposed by the cham-
bers. (J.A. 7.) The House, for example, argues that the trial court “gave no effect to
this Court’s direction to ‘focus’ especially on the House’s and Senate’s maps” be-
cause it did not give “meaningful precedence” to choices made during the legisla-
tive process. (H.S.B. 38-39.) The Legislature appears to have conflated “focus”
with “deference.” This Court reasonably instructed the trial court to primarily scru- 13
tinize the legislative proposals and the justifications offered by each chamber. It did not suggest that legislative choices should be afforded deference, but quite clearly explained that no deference is due under Apportionment VII.
In making its recommendation, the trial court began with the three maps
submitted by the House and Senate. It recommended that this Court approve the
legislatively drawn districts in North and Central Florida as to which there was no
disagreement and evaluated the districts that differed between the House and Sen-
ate proposals. (J.A. 868-70.) After careful consideration of each chamber’s justifi-
cations for its choices, the trial court recommended approval of the House districts
over their Senate counterparts. (Id.) The trial court then turned to the South Florida
districts that the challengers contested. Again, the trial court focused on the legisla-
tively proposed South Florida districts, considered the justifications offered by the
Legislature, and found those justifications lacking in the face of more tier-two
compliant alternatives that did not result in retrogression. (J.A. 871-81.)
The trial court faithfully complied with this Court’s instructions by focusing
on the legislative proposals, recommending 19 legislatively drawn districts for ap-
proval, and rejecting districts when the Legislature failed to meet its burden of jus-
tifying them. Having determined that the legislative proposal for Districts 20
through 27 was not the configuration that best fulfilled the directions of Appor-
tionment VII and all constitutional requirements, the trial court recommended the
14
most compliant version in the proposed plans submitted by the parties – exactly as it was instructed to do. If the trial court had accepted the Legislature’s invitation to afford deference to the legislative proposals and disregard more compliant configu- rations in the challengers’ submissions, it would have violated the instructions on relinquishment. Accordingly, the trial court applied the proper analysis and stand- ard of review during the relinquishment proceedings.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT THE TRIAL COURT’S RECOM- MENDATION TO APPROVE THE CONFIGURATION OF CEN- TRAL AND SOUTHWEST FLORIDA IN PLAN 9071. The trial court properly determined that the House’s proposed configuration
of Central and Southwestern Florida in Plan 9071 is preferable to the Senate’s pro-
posed configurations in Plans 9062 and 9066.3 Initially, the Senate proposals raise potential tier-one concerns. As the House pointed out in its submissions, Plan 9062 places the residence of incumbent Congressman Dennis Ross slightly outside of proposed District 15 and puts the city of Brandon in the geographical center of proposed District 15. (SR42:5911-12.) Senator Tom Lee, who proposed the amendment resulting in Plan 9062, resides in Brandon. (Id.) As to Plan 9066, the
House points out that the Senate placed Congressman Ross in proposed District 15 and incumbent Congressman Buchanan in proposed District 15, while creating a
3 Plan 9062 and Plan 9071 differ as to Districts 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 17. Plan 9066 and Plan 9071 differ as to Districts 9, 15, 16, and 17.
15
new, open seat consisting of Manatee and southeast Hillsborough County that would also be favorable for Senator Lee. (SR42:5912-13.)
Ultimately, this Court need not base its decision on tier-one considerations because the Senate proposals contain tier-two defects not present in Plan 9071.
Plan 9062 is slightly less compact than Plan 9071 and causes District 10 to pro-
trude from Orange County into Lake County, while Plan 9071 leaves District 10
entirely within Orange County. (J.A. 869.) Plan 9062 also reflects an inconsistent
methodology, as it “was purportedly designed to address the perceived ‘donor’ sta-
tus of Hillsborough County, but ... it exacerbated the ‘donor’ status of Orange
County.” (Id.) Plan 9066 places District 10 entirely within Orange County and
keeps an additional county whole, but causes an additional city split and leaves
several districts less compact in the process. (J.A. 869-70.) Therefore, this Court should accept the trial court’s recommendation to approve the Central and South- west Florida districts in Plan 9071, rather than the Senate proposals.4
4 The South Florida districts in CP-1 are not impacted by the selection of the differing proposals for Central and Southwest Florida in Plans 9071, 9062, and 9066. As the Senate notes in its brief, CP-1 can be “seamlessly merged” with the Senate’s proposed district configurations. (S.S.B. 26 n.2.) Accordingly, this Court should separately approve the South Florida districts in CP-1 even if it adopts the Central and Southwest Florida districts in Plan 9062 or Plan 9066.
16
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DISTRICTS 26 AND 27 IN CP-1 BEST FULFILL THE CONSTITUTIONAL RE- QUIREMENTS. In Apportionment VII, this Court found that the Legislature failed to meet its
burden of “demonstrat[ing] that the decision to split Homestead” in Districts 26
and 27 “was not done to benefit the Republican Party.” Apportionment VII, 172 So.
3d at 410. It held that “the Legislature’s asserted justification for its configuration of [Districts 26 and 27]—to protect minority voting rights—simply cannot be justi- fied” and ordered Districts 26 and 27 to be “redrawn to avoid splitting Home-
stead.” Id. The Legislature purported to “correct” these tier-one and tier-two viola-
tions by drawing a version of District 27 that replaced the predominantly Demo-
cratic African-American population in Homestead by reaching out from District
27’s border along Highway 1 to draw in predominantly Democratic African-
American population in Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine.
As the figure below demonstrates, the result of this “fix” was to make Dis-
trict 26 even better performing for Republicans than in the invalidated plan:
17
(J.A. 25, 29, 43, 49, 55.)
During the special session itself, staff claimed that mere happenstance caused them to shift into District 27 the only available population that would re- place the partisan gains achieved by the Homestead split. According to staff, they simply followed major roadways and drew in the three African-American commu- nities as they extended the border of District 27 to the Florida Turnpike. (R. Ex.
CP-13 at 128-29.) Staff represented that they were not seeking out African-
American or Democratic population to achieve any particular non-retrogression goal. In fact, they testified that they did not consider demographic or political data until after redrawing Districts 26 and 27. (S.S.B. 33-34.) Even then, staff conduct- ed only a cursory review of that data and deferred to the Legislature’s expert, Pro- fessor Moreno, for a functional analysis. (J.A. 873; see J.A. 342-43 349, 357.)
CP-1 demonstrates that Districts 26 and 27 can be drawn more compactly, avoid splitting Hialeah, better follow major roadways, and fit into an overall con- figuration of South Florida that is more tier-two compliant:
18
(R. Ex. CP-D4.) CP-2 and CP-3 further undermine the Legislature’s stated justifi- cation for its proposed configuration of Districts 26 and 27 by showing that major roads can be better followed without placing Richmond Heights, Palmetto Estates, and West Perrine in District 27. (J.A. 62, 68; R. Exs. CP-D21, CP-D22.)
Recognizing that its stated justification – adherence to major roadways – cannot withstand scrutiny in light of Coalition Plaintiffs’ alternatives, the Legisla- ture now relies entirely on trumped up retrogression concerns to argue that the trial
19
court erred in recommending the versions of Districts 26 and 27 in CP-1. Specifi- cally, the Legislature insists that District 26 in CP-1 would lead to retrogression
because Hispanics do not “control” the Democratic primary. (H.S.B. 12-24; S.S.B
36-43.) The problem with the Legislature’s argument is that it is inconsistent with
its prior positions in this case and with the demonstrated electoral history in South
Florida. Under these circumstances, the Legislature has the burden of establishing
that Districts 26 and 27 must deviate from the superior tier-two configurations in
CP-1 to avoid retrogression. It has fallen well short of that burden.
Not long ago, the Legislature represented that the invalidated version of Dis-
trict 26 – which had substantially the same demographic, registration, and primary
turnout metrics for Democrats as CP-1 – did not diminish the ability of Hispanics
to elect candidates of either party. (Leg. A.B. 114.) The following is a comparison
of the metrics between District 26 in the 2012 and 2014 plans and in CP-1:
I. HVAP 9057 – 68.9% CP-1 – 68.3% II. Hispanic Voter Registration 9047/9057 CP-1 2010 55.5% 54.7% 2012 57.3% 56.5% III. Hispanic Turnout – 2010 Primary 9047/9057 CP-1 Democrats-Hispanic 22.7% 22.8% Republicans-Hispanic 63.6% 62.4% General Election 9047/9057 CP-1 Democrats-Hispanic 32.8% 32.6% Republicans-Hispanic 64.2% 63.0%
20
IV. % of Republicans Who are Hispanic 9047/9057 – 66.2% CP-1 – 64.7% V. % of Democrats Who are Hispanic 9047/9057 – 42.6% CP-1 – 42.5%
(J.A. 25-26, 29-30, 59-60.) Based on these metrics, the Legislature represented to the DOJ that Hispanics “continue to possess the ability to elect their preferred can- didates of choice,” and the DOJ precleared the 2012 version of District 26. (Ex.
LD-34B (folder: Request for Preclearance, file: Submission Memorandum – Con- gress.pdf at 10); (folder: fromDOJ, file: 2012.04.30_DOJApprovalHSC.pdf)).
In a sharp about-face, the Legislature now insists that it is “likely and logi- cal” that a Hispanic Democrat will not prevail under essentially the same metrics that it previously argued would preserve the ability to elect. (H.S.B 13.) To reach this conclusion, the Legislature claims that District 26 in the 2012 and 2014 plans was a “Republican-leaning” district in which Democratic metrics are not “rele- vant” because the Democratic candidate is supposedly not “likely” to win the gen- eral election. (H.S.B 22.) Stated another way, the Legislature argues that District
26 in the 2012 and 2014 plans performed for Hispanics because it was a “Republi- can” district, but District 26 in CP-1 does not perform for Hispanics because it is a
“Democratic” district – despite having roughly the same metrics. Built into this ar- gument are assumptions that the invalidated version of District 26 would never elect a Democrat (in which case the Democratic primary would be irrelevant) and
21
District 26 in CP-1 would never elect a Republican (in which case the Republican
primary would be irrelevant). Both assumptions rapidly fall apart.
The Legislature has never before asserted that District 26 in the 2012 and
2014 plans was a Republican stronghold in which Democratic primary data simply did not matter. To the contrary, it made the following representation to this Court:
“Enacted District 26 [in the 2012 and 2014 plans] is a competitive district that ena- bles Hispanic voters to coalesce around a Hispanic candidate of either political par- ty. No party contends that it diminishes the ability to elect.” (Leg. A.B. 114 (cita- tion omitted).) The Legislature characterized District 26 as “extremely competi-
tive” and noted that “[t]he competitiveness of District 26 is punctuated by its recent
history,” in which “a Democrat defeated a Republican incumbent” in 2012, while
“a Republican defeated the Democratic incumbent” in 2014. (Leg. A.B. 118 &
n.44.) Even at the remedial hearing, the House called prior District 26 “a competi-
tive district . . that elected a Hispanic Democrat once and a Hispanic Republican.”
(J.A. 796.) 5
During the merits trial, the Legislature’s expert, Professor Moreno, certainly
believed that electoral data for both parties were relevant and had no trouble opin-
5 The House points out that this Court described District 26 as a “Republi- can-leaning district” (H.S.B. 22), but ignores its further explanation that District 26 was “Republican under the 2008 presidential and 2010 gubernatorial elections but Democratic under the 2012 presidential election.” Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 409 & n.19.
22
ing that District 26 in the 2012 and 2014 plans preserved Hispanics’ ability to elect. Professor Moreno did not “see a compelling case for fiddling with District
26” because “you can elect three Hispanics and even a Hispanic Democrat with
[Districts 25, 26, and 27] as they’re drawn” in the 2012 and 2014 plans.
(TT18:2337-38.) He opined that prior District 26 “may even lean a little bit more
Democrat than Republicans [sic]” and pointed out that “the enacted plan elected a
Hispanic Democrat, Joe Garcia.” (TT18:2339; see also J.A. 447-48.)
The Legislature and Professor Moreno had it right the first time around in characterizing District 26 as a district that Hispanics of either party could win. The invalidated version of District 26 was Democratic-performing in the 2012 presi- dential election and Republican-performing by only the narrowest of margins –
50.1% and 50.2% – in the 2010 gubernatorial election and the 2008 presidential election. (J.A. 25, 29.) It in fact elected a Democratic congressman in 2012, and he was the Hispanic candidate of choice. Likewise, the benchmark, whether consid- ered to be District 18 or District 25 in the 2002 plan,6 vacillated between Republi- can and Democratic performance. (J.A. 20.) In that regard, the partisan objective achieved by the Homestead split was to draw a district that Republicans could
6 District 26 in CP-1 includes portions of Districts 18, 21, and 25 in the 2002 plan. The trial court used District 18 as the benchmark district “because it was most democratic of the three predecessor districts.” (J.A. 879.) District 25 from the 2002 plan is another candidate for the benchmark, as the greatest amount of the population of District 26 in CP-1 comes from former District 25.
23
more easily win despite changing demographics that rendered the region more
Democratic – not to create an impregnable Republican district.
In CP-1, District 26 remains a competitive district in which either party can prevail. Of the thirteen statewide elections that the Legislature deems worthy of consideration, District 26 in CP-1 performed more often for Republicans than for
Democrats. (J.A. 61.) And, while CP-1’s District 26 is no longer Republican-
leaning in the 2010 gubernatorial and 2008 presidential elections, it becomes only
narrowly Democratic-leaning at 50.7% and 51.8% performance. (Id.) Thus, the
Legislature falls flat in its attempt to explain away the inconsistencies with its prior
positions by casting the invalidated version of District 26 as “Republican” and CP-
1’s version of District 26 as “Democratic” in some talismanic sense.
The Legislature does not seriously dispute that coalitions or crossover voting
provide Hispanic Democrats with the ability to nominate candidates of their choice
in the primary in District 26. As with the 2012 and 2014 version of District 26, the
Legislature describes its current proposal as a “toss-up” district (J.A. 290, 491),
that “would result in a Hispanic candidate” of either party prevailing in the general
election (J.A. 291). To plausibly claim non-retrogression under its own test, the
Legislature must believe that Hispanic Democrats can have “control” of the prima-
ry in District 26 despite representing only 25.5% of the electorate. (J.A. 42). The
Legislature has offered no logical, fact-based explanation why Hispanic Democrats
24
“control” the primary at 25.5%, but somehow have no “path to nomination and election” at 22.8% in CP-1 (H.S.B. 24) – particularly when it previously endorsed
a version of District 26 with metrics that are very similar to CP-1’s District 26. In-
deed, the Legislature’s newfound certainty on this subject is even at odds with its
own expert. Professor Moreno would not opine that CP-1 actually “lock[s] Hispan-
ics out” of the Democratic primary. (J.A. 443-44.) Instead, he merely speculated
that “we could be there,” although he was “not saying we’re there.” (Id.)
In truth, Hispanic Democrats have historically seen candidates of their
choice reach the general election in the South Florida districts despite comprising
far less than a majority of the primary electorate.7 As Professor Moreno himself opined: “If a district is competitive, the Democrats have every incentive in the world to nominate an Hispanic Democrat, because that will be the best chance of prevailing against an Hispanic Republican.” (J.A. 435.) The 2010 U.S. Senate race offers a good example of how CP-1 maintains that competitive impetus. In CP-1’s
Hispanic districts, as shown below, Rubio beat his nearest non-Hispanic competi-
7 In recent elections, the Democratic nominee has almost always been His- panic in Districts 25, 26, and 27 and their benchmark districts. (See, e.g., R. Ex. CP-D2.) See generally http://results.elections.myflorida.com/.
25
tor by over 22 percentage points and garnered more votes than the combined total for Crist (a white independent) and Meek (an African-American Democrat)8:
District Rubio (HR) Meek (BD) Crist (WI) Rubio Margin Over Nearest (CP-1) Competitor 25 65.9% 12.9% 21.2% 44.7 Percentage Points 26 50.1% 22.9% 27.0% 23.1 Percentage Points 27 52.3% 17.7% 30.0% 22.3 Percentage Points
(J.A. 61.) Accordingly, regardless of the Legislature’s effort to characterize Dis- trict 26 in CP-1 as a solidly “Democratic” district, a Hispanic Republican candidate is likely to handily win that district against non-Hispanic challengers.
Moreover, the pattern of Hispanic Democrats emerging from primaries is all the more likely to continue, as Hispanic registration – and particularly Hispanic
Democratic registration – is increasing in South Florida. (See R. Ex. CP-31 at 15
n.8 (undisputed testimony from Professor Lichtman that, “[a]mong Hispanic regis- tered voters between 2006 and 2014, the number of Democrats increased 66%
8 As the House points out, Coalition Plaintiffs have argued that the 2010 U.S. Senate election is unhelpful in analyzing racially polarized voting between African-American and white voters in District 5. (H.S.B. 22.) It does not automati- cally follow that the election is similarly unhelpful in evaluating the voter behavior of Hispanics in South Florida. As discussed below, Coalition Plaintiffs’ expert demonstrated that Hispanic performance in the 2010 U.S. Senate election is con- sistent with Hispanic performance in a spate of two-candidate races in Miami-Dade County based districts. Regardless, it is particularly ironic that the House would raise a charge of inconsistency. The House previously used Congressman Garcia’s victory to argue that District 26 in the 2012 and 2014 plans performed for Hispanic candidates of both parties. (See, e.g., Leg. A.B. 118 & n.44; TT18:2339; J.A. 447- 48.) Now, the House insists that Garcia’s victory in 2012 is entirely irrelevant and an outlier. (H.S.B. 20.) Unlike Coalition Plaintiffs, the House has claimed that the same election is both relevant and irrelevant for the same purpose.
26
while the number of Republican registered voters was nearly flat”); see also J.A.
493.) Hispanics comprised 54.7% of registered voters and 42.5% of registered
Democrats in CP-1’s District 26 in 2010, and those figures increased to 56.5% of
registered voters and 45.0% of registered Democrats in 2012. (J.A. 59-60.)
At the remedial hearing, Coalition Plaintiffs offered the opinion of Professor
Lichtman to establish that Districts 25, 26, and 27 in CP-1 preserve Hispanics’
ability to elect candidates of their choice.9 Professor Lichtman compared Districts
25, 26, and 27 in CP-1 to the analog districts in the 2002, 2012, and 2014 plans.
Professor Lichtman noted that Hispanic candidates of choice from both parties won
29 out of 29 elections that took place between 2006 and 2014 in comparable Mi-
ami-Dade County districts that had similar HVAP to the proposed Hispanic dis-
tricts in CP-1. (R. Ex. CP-31 at 5-12; J.A. 877.) Professor Lichtman also analyzed
the 2010 U.S. Senate Election and demonstrated that Marco Rubio, a Hispanic Re-
publican, carried the proposed Hispanic districts in CP-1 by landslide margins. (R.
Ex. CP-31 at 13-14.) Through ecological regression,10 Professor Lichtman showed
9 The parties agreed to submit Professor Lichtman’s report into evidence in lieu of direct testimony. Because the Legislature elected not to cross-examine Pro- fessor Lichtman, he did not offer live testimony. (J.A. 368-69, 569.)
10 Ecological regression is “the standard technique used to infer voting be- havior among distinct population groups” and allows for “reasonably accurate es- timates of majority and minority voting behavior from demographic data and, de- pending on whether voting in a specific election or party affiliation is being esti- mated, election returns and party registration data, respectively.” Reed v. Town of 27
that in CP-1’s District 26, for instance, Rubio received 71% of the Hispanic vote
(including support from non-Republican Hispanics) and substantial crossover votes
from non-Hispanic voters, even though the district performed for Sink in the 2010
gubernatorial election. (Id. at 14-15.) Professor Lichtman concluded that, “accord-
ing to the range of most pertinent factors, [District 26] in CP-1 is a Hispanic oppor-
tunity district beyond any reasonable doubt,” and that Districts 25, 26, and 27 in
CP-1 function as performing Hispanic districts. (Id. at 14-17.)
If the Legislature questions whether Professor Lichtman should have put
greater emphasis on particular data – such as primary turnout – it had every oppor-
tunity to raise that issue on cross-examination, but elected not to do so. It was up to
the Legislature to elicit and challenge the “facts and data” underlying Professor
Lichtman’s opinion that Districts 25, 26, and 27 in CP-1 preserve Hispanics’ abil-
ity to elect. § 90.705(1), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also Myron v. S. Broward Hosp.
Dist., 703 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that “the party against
whom [an] opinion is offered may conduct an examination of the witness directed
to the underlying facts upon which the opinion is predicated,” and “the burden of
challenging the sufficiency of [an expert] opinion is placed on the party against
whom it is offered”). The Legislature cannot correct its failure to cross-examine
Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Ecological regression is “a standard procedure for analyzing minority and white voting in voting-rights litiga- tion.” (R. Ex. CP-31 at 2-3.) No party contested its use or reliability.
28
Professor Lichtman by recasting consideration of primary data as an independent opinion not disclosed in pretrial submissions. (H.S.B. 19; S.S.B 38-39.)
The Legislature attempts to establish retrogression based on the testimony of
Professors Moreno and Liu. Professor Moreno compared CP-1 to Plan 9071, rather
than the benchmark. (J.A. 484-85, 494-95.) As the Legislature previously
acknowledged: “Under the diminishment standard, the appropriate benchmark for
comparison is the ‘last legally enforceable redistricting plan in force or effect,’ ”
which in this case “is the plan enacted in 2002.” (Leg. A.B. 74 n.19 (citing Guid-
ance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed.
Reg. 7470, 7470 (Feb. 9, 2011); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 96 (1997); and
28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)). Professor Moreno only purported to show that the Legisla-
ture’s proposed District 26 contains higher metrics for Hispanic Democrats than
CP-1, but that is not the relevant question. If it were, the most overpacked minority
district would always prevail regardless of tier-two compliance. Because Professor
Moreno’s analysis does not comport with the legal requirements for a functional
analysis, his testimony cannot show retrogression and does not “assist [this Court]
in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.” § 90.702, Fla.
Stat. (2015); see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th
Cir. 1999) (finding that “[p]roffered expert testimony must meet the legal as well
as the substantive issues of the case” to be admissible under Daubert).
29
Professor Moreno also speculated that the “the Democratic establishment” may not recruit and back Hispanic candidates with as much vigor if District 26 be- comes more Democratic, discussed the results of isolated local elections, expressed concern about the merits of the field of candidates in District 26, and discounted
“the Democratic Hispanic bench in Dade County” as “very weak.” (J.A. 432-41,
445-46.) In the end, Professor Moreno could only state that there was a “possibil- ity” that a Hispanic Democrat might not make it through the primary under CP-1.
(J.A. 436, 439-40.) But speculative, anecdotal comments about electoral “possibili- ties” cannot form the basis for expert testimony. See Daniels v. State, 4 So. 3d 745,
748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that expert testimony cannot be “based on specu- lation and conjecture, not supported by the facts, or not arrived at by a recognized methodology”) (alteration omitted); Div. of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp. v. Sam- ter, 393 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“[N]o weight may be accorded an expert opinion which is totally conclusory in nature and is unsupported by any dis- cernible, factually-based chain of underlying reasoning.”).
Professor Moreno did not offer a reliable methodology for predicting what
“the Democratic establishment” will do in the future, for broadly characterizing the
“Democratic Hispanic bench” in the region as “very weak,” or for his other ipse dixit statements. See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that “[t]he trial court’s gatekeeping function” under Daubert stand-
30
ard “requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word for it’ ” or accepting “the ipse dixit of an admitted qualified expert”) (citation omitted). Notably, during the
merits appeal, the Legislature attempted to rely on similarly speculative testimony from Professor Moreno to claim retrogression in an alternative version of District
26 that included lower Hispanic metrics than CP-1. (See TT18:2332-39 (testimony
from Moreno that there was a “possibility” that non-Hispanic Democrat might get
elected under Romo Trial Plans because of concerns about recruitment, existing
field of candidates, reduction of percentage of Hispanics among registered Demo-
crats to 38.9%, and outcome of county commission election.)) This Court found
that the Legislature’s prior non-retrogression argument based on this testimony
from Professor Moreno “simply cannot be justified.” Apportionment VII, 172 So.
3d at 410. Professor Moreno’s current testimony fares no better.
In the final analysis, Professor Moreno offered no reasonable explanation for
the discrepancy between his prior opinion that the 2012 and 2014 enacted versions
of District 26 did not retrogress and his current claim that the version of District 26
in CP-1 (which has very similar demographics) would retrogress. Accordingly, the
trial court was more than justified in finding that Professor Moreno’s testimony did
not establish retrogression because it was “speculative,” “had little probative val-
ue,” and “was long on pure opinion based on experience and short on systematic,
scientific analysis of accepted statistical data.” (J.A. 879.)
31
The Legislature offered the testimony of Professor Liu to argue that African
Americans and Hispanics do not vote as a coalition in South Florida. Professor Liu,
however, analyzed ten elections, only six of which involved Hispanic candidates
and three of which were non-partisan judicial races. (R. Ex. S-2-1 at 4-5; R. Ex.
CP- D8, CP-D9.) Professor Liu could not identify a single election in which Afri-
can Americans and non-Hispanic whites effectively defeated the Hispanic candi- date of choice, except for a non-partisan judicial race involving a young lawyer’s challenge to a sitting county judge. (J.A. 411-12, 417-18.) For that reason, the trial court understandably found that Professor Liu’s testimony was not “particularly helpful” because “the data he used to draw his conclusions from was suspect.”
(J.A. 878-79.) But even if the trial court had accepted Professor Liu’s opinion that
African Americans and Hispanics do not vote as a coalition in South Florida, it would have done nothing to advance the Legislature’s claim of retrogression. Pro- fessor Liu himself conceded that Hispanic candidates of choice can prevail in Dade
County with or without the support of African-American voters. (J.A. 418.) Thus, the presence or absence of a coalition is irrelevant.
Under Apportionment VII, the Legislature bears the burden of establishing that its less tier-two compliant proposal for Districts 26 and 27 is necessary to avoid retrogression. The Legislature cannot meet its burden by rewriting history to describe the invalidated version of District 26 as a Republican stronghold or by of-
32
fering unreliable and speculative expert testimony. Having contended that the 2012 and 2014 version of District 26 provided Hispanics of either party with the ability to elect candidates of choice, the Legislature is hard-pressed to argue that District
26 in CP-1, which has essentially the same demographic and registration metrics, is somehow non-performing. Because the Legislature’s own positions and demon- strated electoral history show that District 26 in CP-1 is not retrogressive, the Leg- islature has failed to meet its burden of justifying a configuration of Districts 26 and 27 that is less compact, adheres less closely to political and geographic bound- aries than CP-1, and enhances the partisan favoritism that caused this Court to in-
validate the predecessor districts. Accordingly, this Court should accept the trial
court’s recommendation to approve Districts 26 and 27 in CP-1.
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DISTRICTS 20 THROUGH 25 IN CP-1 BEST FULFILL THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. The Legislature raised no objection to Districts 20 through 25 in CP-1 in its written submission before the remedial hearing, despite being ordered to do so.
(SR42:5894-5909.) Nevertheless, the Legislature now attempts to contest District
20 in CP-1 on two grounds: (1) District 20 was purportedly “not challenged” in the underlying case, and several of Coalition Plaintiffs’ changes to surrounding dis- tricts were not specifically required by Apportionment VII (S.S.B. 43-44; see also
33
H.S.B. 37-38); and (2) District 20 in CP-1 supposedly adds a “third appendage” not present in the legislative proposals (S.S.B. 44-45; H.S.B. 28-32).
This Court invalidated five out of the eight South Florida districts modified
in CP-1: Districts 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27. The remaining three districts, Districts 20,
23, and 24, directly border the five invalidated districts. Indeed, this Court found
District 25 unconstitutional not because of a defect isolated to that district alone,
but because of the interplay between Districts 20 and 25 – namely, the placement
of a substantial portion of Hendry County within District 20 when it could have
been placed entirely within District 25. See Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 410.
This Court likewise directed the Legislature to improve tier-two compliance in
Districts 21 and 22, which also neighbor District 20. See id. at 412-13.
Improved tier-two compliance in District 20 and the other surrounding dis-
tricts is hardly an improper or unforeseen consequence of redrawing Districts 21,
22, 25, 26, and 27. To the contrary, one of the principal benefits of correcting a
constitutional defect in one district is often to enhance the tier-two compliance of
neighboring districts, as is shown most clearly in the Central Florida districts that
formerly bordered District 5. Accordingly, the Legislature’s overblown claims that
CP-1’s modifications to the South Florida districts constitute an “uninvited” effort to “outdo the maps passed by the House and Senate,” a “game of leapfrog,” and a violation of “fundamental fairness” are devoid of merit. (H.S.B. 37-38.)
34
The Legislature’s second objection – that CP-1 adds a “third” appendage to
District 20 –defies common sense. District 20 in CP-1 does extend between Dis- tricts 23 and 24 to pick up the whole city of Miramar, but it eliminates altogether the jagged finger-like appendage cutting into District 21 in the legislative proposals and makes an appendage into District 22 less pronounced. In doing so, District 20 in CP-1 keeps seven additional cities whole, maintains the same level of metric compactness as the legislative proposals, and allows for surrounding districts to be redrawn more compactly. Accordingly, to preserve Districts 20’s majority- minority status and achieve significant tier-two benefits, CP-1 merely trades one appendage (extending under District 23) for another (dipping into District 21). And the area in CP-1 that extends between Districts 23 and 24 follows the municipal boundary of Miramar, whereas the finger-like appendage in the legislative pro- posals adhere to no political boundary and divides a host of cities:
35
C9062/ C9066/ C9071 CP-1
Jupiter
18
Palm W!lling~n- - -~k. Palm Beach Palm Beach GreenacreslakW'rth p tana iN BoyntJ ach iW
Delray Beach
iZO
Broward Broward
25
Reock Score Convex-Hull Score Polsby-Popper Score c9062 c9066 c9062c9066 c9062 c9066 CP-1 CP-1 CP-1 c9071 c9071 c9071 S lit Cities CD20 0.48 0.48 0.75 0.75 0_20 0.20 c9071 20 C0 2 I 0.37 0.37 0.64 0.64 0_24 0.30 CD22 0.41 0.48 0.70 0.74 0_15 0.23 c9062 20 C0 23 0.27 0.35 0.63 0.65 0.25 0.26 c9066 21 CD24 0.38 0.47 0.73 0.77 0.28 0.30 CP-1 13 CD25 0.47 0.41 0.73 0.67 0.38 0.35 CD26 0.18 0.1 8 0.46 0.48 0.20 0.22 CD27 0.46 0.54 0.82 0.85 0.42 0.47 Avo, 0.38 0.41 0.68 0.70 0.27 0.29
(R. Ex. CP-D20, CP-D24.)11
11 Gray shaded areas reflect municipal boundaries. 36
The Legislature’s tortured response is that the long finger reaching south in- to District 21 does not count as an appendage because it is joined to another ap- pendage that juts west from the main body of District 20 towards the coast. In oth- er words, the Legislature contends that attaching an appendage to another append- age really only counts as one appendage. (See J.A. 270-71 (testimony from Poreda that he “would consider [appendage into District 21] as part of the northern ap- pendage that is still there”).) Proceeding from this dubious premise, the Legislature proclaims that its configuration is more visually compact because it only contains two appendages. (H.S.B. 32-33.) The trial court correctly rejected this “unified ap- pendage” theory as a spurious distinction that did not meet the Legislature’s bur- den under Apportionment VII or justify an increase in city splits by more than 50%
(from 13 in CP-1 to 20 in Plans 9071 and 9062 or 21 in Plan 9066) or loss of the other tier-two benefits in CP-1. This Court should do the same.12
VI. THE LEGISLATURE’S ACCUSATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP ARE IRRELEVANT AND UNFOUNDED. Undeterred by its own history of unconstitutional behavior, the House con- cludes with a lengthy diatribe casting Coalition Plaintiffs as partisans who are not committed to transparency. (H.S.B. 33-46.) The Senate is somewhat more re-
12 In recommending CP-1 for adoption, the trial court also rejected Romo Plaintiffs’ proposed configuration of Districts 21 and 22. (J.A. 876.) This Court should do likewise because CP-1’s configuration of those two districts is more compact and avoids more city splits than the alternatives in the Romo Plan.
37
strained in its tone, but likewise insinuates that Coalition Plaintiffs drew CP-1 with
partisan intent. (S.S.B. 28-31, 34-35, 45.) The Legislature repeatedly accuses Coa-
lition Plaintiffs of writing a letter requesting that it make District 26 “more Demo-
cratic” by increasing its “Democratic performance index.” (See, e.g., H.S.B. 6, 43,
45; S.S.B. 13, 31, 34-35, 45.) The claim is entirely fabricated. What Coalition
Plaintiffs actually wrote to the Legislature belies the baseless accusation:
[T]he Base Map's configurations of CD 26 and CD 27 perpetuate the same violation of tier-one principles that caused the Court in Appor- tionment VII to order that the districts be redrawn. That is, in both the enacted map, H000C9057, and the Base Map, there appears to have been a targeted effort to shift Democratic, African American popula- tion into CD 27 in order to maintain a lower Democratic performance index in CD 26. ... We submit that, in fact, the population removed from CD 26 was chosen because that particular population, if left to remain in CD 26, would have made the district more Democratic and improved tier-two compliance in the region as a whole. ... We hope you, your staff or other members of the legislature will find a non- partisan way to draw CD’s 26 and 27 and will offer amendments to the base map to accomplish this goal.
(R. Ex. CP-29 at 1-2.) Coalition Plaintiffs thus urged the Legislature to avoid par- tisanship and improve tier-two compliance. Rather than attempt to redraw Districts
26 and 27 in a more compliant manner, the Legislature used the letter solely as a weapon to cast Coalition Plaintiffs as partisans, repeating dozens of times the un- founded claim that they simply requested a “more Democratic” district.
The Legislature then criticizes Coalition Plaintiffs at length for not drawing their maps in public or on the record. It suggests that the work product of Coalition
38
Plaintiffs’ map drawer, John O’Neill, is untrustworthy in some vague sense be- cause he is an independent contractor for Strategic Telemetry, a company that has
Democrats among its clients. (See, e.g., H.S.B. 6-7.) Absurdly, the Legislature complains that he drew CP-1 in an “apartment in Los Angeles.” (Id.) O’Neill, however, testified at the remedial hearing that he strove to draw the most tier-two compliant configuration of South Florida, did not consider political or incumbent data in drawing his maps, and was not given any other direction but to comply with
Article III, section 20 and Apportionment VII and to improve compactness and ad-
herence to major roadways where possible. (J.A. 705-06, 737, 763-65, 773.)13
Unable to challenge CP-1 on the merits, the Legislature offers unfounded
accusations that Coalition Plaintiffs are the “true partisans” (H.S.B. 44), and lobs
an ad hominem charge that O’Neill’s testimony was “carefully choreographed.”
(H.S.B. 41.) Name-calling aside, the Legislature had an opportunity to cross-
examine O’Neill, and did so. After considering O’Neill’s testimony and observing
his demeanor, the trial court “found him to be straightforward in his testimony,
logical in his approach to drawing the districts and persuasive in his conclusions”
and found “no evidence to suggest that CP-1 was drawn with improper partisan in-
13 The Legislature insinuates that O’Neill did not retain his work product or emails. (H.S.B. 7.) O’Neill, however, actually testified that he did, in fact, “re- tain ... all of [his] emails and draft [maps].” (J.A. 737.)
39
tent.” (J.A. 877.) The Legislature does not even attempt to argue that the trial court lacked competent, substantial evidence for that factual finding.
Nor does the Legislature gain any ground by complaining that CP-1 was not drawn in public. Throughout this litigation, the Legislature has steadfastly refused to accept that it and private challengers are held to different standards. It has in- stead made every effort to deter Plaintiffs and drive up their costs by attempting to put their maps and motives on trial. It sought extensive discovery into Plaintiffs’ maps and supposed intent (R57:7273-R61:7967; R71:95520-R72:9763); attempted
to excuse its own constitutional violations by claiming Plaintiffs had unclean hands
and engaged in fraud on the court (R55:7242-44; R76:9988); and argued that more
compliant alternative maps should be ignored because they were allegedly drawn
with persons “aligned with the Democratic Party” or are “of unknown origin,” Ap-
portionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 401 n.11. This Court rejected those efforts, holding
that “alternative maps are not on trial themselves, as is the Legislature’s map,” but
merely provide “relevant proof that the Legislature’s apportionment plans consist
of district configurations that are not explained other than by the Legislature con-
sidering impermissible factors, such as intentionally favoring a political party or an
incumbent.” Id.
For good reason, this Court offered guidelines for the Legislature to follow,
but did not impose preconditions on the submission of alternative maps – such as
40
that they be drawn on the record, by any particular person, or in any particular lo- cation – or authorize discovery into Coalition Plaintiffs’ maps or alleged motives.
It is now the decisionmaking process of the judiciary – not of Coalition Plaintiffs –
that is relevant, and that process has occurred transparently and on the record. Af-
ter a three-day evidentiary hearing in which all parties were given an opportunity
to present evidence and argument, the trial court offered sound, non-partisan rea- sons for recommending approval of 19 legislatively drawn districts and rejection of the remaining eight districts in favor of more compliant versions in CP-1.
If this Court were to countenance the Legislature’s strategy, it would multi-
ply discovery and trial proceedings by creating a “mini-trial” for each alternative
map and compel private challengers to bear the expense of fashioning a quasi-
legislative process to draw alternative plans. The result would be to deter challeng-
es to redistricting plans and exclude entire categories of potential plaintiffs based
on cost and burden alone. The FairDistricts Amendments are meant to provide
constitutional grounds for challenging gerrymandered redistricting plans – not to
erect obstacles to such challenges. See id. at 398 (“[T]he framers and voters of the
Fair Districts Amendment clearly desired more judicial scrutiny of the Legisla-
ture’s decisions in redistricting.”). Thus, Coalition Plaintiffs’ supposed motives
and the process by which they drew their plan are entirely irrelevant.
41
The Legislature also draws a false comparison between its conspiracy with partisan operatives and the trial court’s observation that “evidence that a map drawer might be a partisan or have a bias” is not a reason to “automatically reject” a proposed map. (H.S.B. 4l-42; see J.A. 876.) The trial court, however, specifically found that O’Neill did not draw CP-1 with partisan intent and never stated or im- plied that Coalition Plaintiffs or their map drawer are “partisans.” (J.A. 877.) More to the point, this Court did not invalidate the enacted plan solely because the Legis- lature received “input and advice from partisans” (H.S.B. 41), but because the Leg- islature repeatedly and elaborately schemed with partisan operatives to develop a partisan map, went to great lengths to hide its unconstitutional behavior from the public, destroyed the evidence of what it had done, and then drew districts with numerous tier-two defects that benefited the Republican Party. Efforts to rewrite the history of this case do not advance the Legislature’s cause.
In the end, there can be no reasonable dispute that CP-1 contains what the trial court characterized as “hands down” the most tier-two compliant version of the South Florida districts or that the trial court offered logical, non-partisan justi- fications for its recommendation. (J.A. 875-82.) It is perhaps for that reason that the Legislature’s briefs are long on inflammatory rhetoric and vague accusations of partisanship and short on legitimate criticisms of CP-1’s merits. This Court, like the trial court, should reject the Legislature’s unfounded attacks on Coalition Plain-
42
tiffs and once more clarify that it is the intent of the Legislature, not the challeng-
ers, that is at issue in redistricting cases.
VII. THE COURT SHOULD RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER. As this Court has recognized, congressional redistricting proceedings are
“time sensitive” because elections and pre-election deadlines are fast approaching.
Apportionment VII, 172 So. 3d at 372. Two congressional elections have already been conducted under unconstitutional redistricting plans due to the delay that ac- companies litigation in the ordinary course. Because rights that form “the very bed- rock of our democracy” are at stake, In re Senate Joint Resolution of Apportion- ment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 600 (Fla. 2012) (“Apportionment I”), this Court should
retain jurisdiction to ensure that prompt remedial action can be taken if the Legisla-
ture attempts to adopt an unconstitutional successor plan.14
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should accept the trial court’s recom-
mendation, adopt CP-1 as the apportionment plan that shall govern congressional
elections in this state, and retain jurisdiction over this matter.
14 The prospect that the Legislature may attempt to enact a successor plan is hardly speculative. In requesting a further relinquishment of jurisdiction, the House asked this Court to prospectively declare the remedial plan to “be an interim or provisional plan that will remain in place only until superseded by subsequent leg- islation.” (House Mot. for Further Relinquishment at 3.)
43
Respectfully submitted,
KING, BLACKWELL, ZEHNDER & THE MILLS FIRM, P.A. WERMUTH, P.A. /s/ John S. Mills David B. King John S. Mills Florida Bar No.: 0093426 Florida Bar No. 0107719 [email protected] [email protected] Thomas A. Zehnder Andrew D. Manko Florida Bar No.: 0063274 Florida Bar No. 018853 [email protected] [email protected] Frederick S. Wermuth Courtney Brewer Florida Bar No.: 0184111 Florida Bar No. 0890901 [email protected] [email protected] Vincent Falcone III [email protected] (secondary) Florida Bar No.: 0058553 203 North Gadsden Street, Suite 1A [email protected] Tallahassee, Florida 32301 P.O. Box 1631 (850) 765-0897 Orlando, FL 32802-1631 (850) 270-2474 facsimile (407) 422-2472 (407) 648-0161 facsimile GELBER SCHACHTER & GREEN- BERG, P.A. Adam Schachter [email protected] Florida Bar No. 647101 Gerald E. Greenberg [email protected] Florida Bar No. 440094 1441 Brickell Avenue, Ste. 1420 Miami, Florida 33131-3426 (305) 728-0950 (305) 728-0951 facsimile
Counsel for Appellants The League of Women Voters of Florida, Common Cause, Brenda Ann Holt, Roland Sanchez-Medina Jr., J. Steele Olmstead, and Robert Allen Schaeffer
44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by email to the following attorneys on October 23, 2015:
Michael B. DeSanctis Blaine Winship Jessica Ring Amunson Office of the Attorney General Paul Smith of Florida Jenner & Block, Llp The Capitol, Suite PL-01 1099 New York Avenue NW Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Suite 900 [email protected] Washington, DC 20001 [email protected] Counsel for Attorney General Pam [email protected] Bondi [email protected] J. Andrew Atkinson J. Gerald Hebert Ashley Davis 191 Somervelle Street, #415 Dep. of State, 500 S. Bronough Street Alexandria, VA 22304 Tallahassee, FL 32399 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ronald G. Meyer [email protected] Lynn Hearn Meyer, Brooks, Demma Counsel for Florida Secretary of State and Blohm, P.A. Ken Detzner 131 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 1547 Charles T. Wells Tallahassee, Florida 32302 George N. Meros, Jr. [email protected] Jason L. Unger [email protected] Andy Bardos Gray Robinson, P.A. Counsel for Coalition Plaintiffs 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George T. Levesque [email protected] The Florida Senate, 422 The Capitol [email protected] Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] 45
Michael A. Carvin Louis K. Fisher Matthew J. Carson Jones Day General Counsel 51 Louisiana Avenue N.W. Florida House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20001 422 The Capitol [email protected] Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 [email protected] [email protected]
Raoul G. Cantero Counsel for Fla. House and Speaker Jason N. Zakia Jesse L. Green Allison J. Riggs, Pro Hac Vice White & Case LLP Anita S. Earls 200 South Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 4900 Southern Coalition For Social Justice Miami, FL 33131 1415 W. Highway 54, Suite 101 [email protected] Durham, NC 27707 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Victor L. Goode Dorcas R. Gilmore Counsel for Fla. Senate & Senate Pres. NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Abba Khanna Baltimore, MD 21215-3297 Kevin J. Hamilton [email protected] Perkins Coie, LLP [email protected] 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4800 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Nancy Abudu [email protected] ACLU Foundation of Florida [email protected] 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 340 [email protected] Miami, FL 33137 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for NAACP Counsel for Romo Plaintiffs
Martha A. Pardo LatinoJustice PRLDEF 523 West Colonial Drive Orlando, FL 32804 [email protected] 46
Counsel for Amicus Curiae LatinoJus- tice PRLDEF, Florida New Majority, and Mi Familia Vota /s/ John S. Mills Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief is in Times New Roman 14- point font and complies with the font requirements of Rule 9.210(a)(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
/s/ John S. Mills Attorney
47
EXHIBIT G
2/8/2015
NATHANIEL PERSILY
Stanford Law School 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305-8610
Phone: (917) 570-3223 Email: [email protected] Fax: (650) 725-9875 Web: http://www.persily.com/
ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL STANFORD, CA JAMES B. MCCLATCHY PROFESSOR OF LAW 2013 – present
Courtesy Appointments: Departments of Communication and Political Science Courses: Regulation of the Political Process; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Constitutional Law, First Amendment. Service: Appointments Committee, Careers in Teaching Committee.
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL NEW YORK, NY CHARLES KELLER BEEKMAN PROFESSOR OF LAW AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2008 – 2013 PROFESSOR OF LAW 2007 – 2008
Courtesy Appointment: Department of Political Science (2007– 2013). Courses: Constitutional Law; Advanced Constitutional Law: The Political Process; Freedom of Expression; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Redistricting and Gerrymandering. Service: Lateral Appointments Committee Chair (2010-2012), Curriculum Committee Chair (2009-2010), Advisory Committee Chair (2008-2009), Intellectual Life Committee; Resources and Development Committee, Committee on Professional Development. Center for Law and Politics: Founding Director. DrawCongress.org: Founder. Instructor in University of Amsterdam Summer Program, July 2011.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL PHILADELPHIA, PA PROFESSOR OF LAW 2005 – 2007 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW 2001 – 2005
Secondary Appointment: Department of Political Science (2003-2007). Courses: Law and the Political Process; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Constitutional Law, First Amendment.
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Service: Tenure and Promotion Committee, Judicial Clerkship Committee, Nominations Committee, Committee on Academic Standing; Coordinator of Faculty Retreat and Legal Studies Workshop. Teaching Award: Winner of the Robert A. Gorman Award for Excellence in Teaching.
VISITING PROFESSORSHIPS
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE LAW SCHOOL August 2014 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Law and Public Affairs Fellow Woodrow Wilson School 2012-2013 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM (COLUMBIA LAW PROGRAM) Summer 2010 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL SIDLEY AUSTIN VISITING PROFESSOR Fall 2007 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL Spring 2006 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL Fall 2004
OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION June 2013 - Jan. 2014 Senior Research Director
SPECIAL MASTER OR COURT-APPOINTED EXPERT
Redistricting of New York Feb.-Mar. 2012 Congressional Districts New York, NY
Appointed by U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York to assist Magistrate Judge in drawing state’s Congressional districts pursuant to Favors v. Cuomo, 2012 WL 928223 (EDNY 2012). Plan adopted on March 19, 2012,
Special Master for Redistricting of Jan.-Feb. 2012 Connecticut Congressional Districts Hartford, CT
Appointed by Supreme Court of Connecticut to draw state’s Congressional districts, pursuant to In Re Petition of Reapportionment Commission, Ex. Rel., 36 A.3d 661 (Ct. Sup. Ct. 2012). Plan adopted Feb. 12, 2012.
Redistricting of Georgia General Feb.-March 2004 Assembly Atlanta, GA
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Appointed by U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to draw districts for Georgia House of Representatives and Senate. Plan adopted in Larios v. Cox, 314 F.Supp.2d 1357 (N.D. Ga., 2004).
Redistricting of Maryland State June 2002 Legislative Districts Annapolis, MD Appointed by Maryland Court of Appeals to draw Court plan, currently in effect, for 2002 state legislative districts. Plan adopted in In re Legislative Redistricting of State, 805 A.2d 292 (Md. 2002).
Redistricting of New York May-June 2002 Congressional Districts New York, NY Pursuant to Rodriguez v. Pataki, 2002 WL 1058054 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), appointed by Special Master, Judge Frederick B. Lacey, to draw plan for New York State’s congressional districts, later superseded by state legislature’s plan.
REDISTRICTING CONSULTANT
Consultant to Redistricting Commission of 2011 Prince George’s County Upper Marlboro, MD Consultant to redistricting commission of Prince George’s County, Maryland, concerning County Council Districts.
Consultant to the Chief Justice of Puerto Rico 2011 San Juan, PR Consultant to Chief Justice Federico Hernández Denton during the process of redistricting of districts for the Senate and house of Representatives of Puerto Rico.
EXPERT WITNESS California State Senate 2002-2003 Redistricting Litigation Sacramento, CA Served as an expert to evaluate the 2002 California Senate and Congressional redistricting plans concerning those plans’ compliance with state constitutional provisions requiring respect for political subdivisions and geographic regions.
OUTSIDE COUNSEL Bethlehem Area Unified School District 2008 Bethlehem, PA Consultant to school district in settlement concerning lawsuit alleging vote dilution in school district boundaries.
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Miami-Dade County Attorneys Office 2002 Miami, Florida Consultant to Miami-Dade County in litigation involving the 2000 redistricting process and challenges to the structure of local government.
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL 1999-2001 Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law New York, NY
LAW CLERK 1998-1999 The Honorable David S. Tatel Washington, DC U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit
LEGAL EXTERN June-August 1996 The Honorable John T. Noonan San Francisco, CA U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
GRADUATE STUDENT INSTRUCTOR & RESEARCH ASSISTANT 1994-1995 Professor Nelson Polsby Berkeley, CA Institute of Governmental Studies, U.C. Berkeley
EDUCATION
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, J.D. with Distinction, 1998 President, Volume 50, Stanford Law Review.
U.C. BERKELEY, M.A., 1994; Ph.D. in Political Science, 2002 Recipient of the Edith Pence and Jacob Javits Scholarships. Thesis Title: When Political Parties Go to Court. Thesis Committee: Nelson Polsby, Bruce Cain, Raymond Wolfinger, Robert Post.
HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM, 1992-1993 Raoul Wallenberg & Rotary Foundation Scholar.
YALE UNIVERSITY, B.A. & M.A. in Political Science, 1992 Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Distinction in the Major, Recipient of the Haas Prize, Richard Sewall Cup, and Frank M. Patterson Prize for the finest senior project in American Politics.
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PUBLICATIONS
th THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5 ed., Foundation Press, forthcoming 2016) (with Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan & Richard Pildes), When is a Legislature Not a Legislature? When Voters Regulate Elections Through Direct Democracy?, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming 2015) (with Samuel Byker, William Evans, and Alon Sachar). Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority Districts Cause Expressive Harms, NYU LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2015) (with Stephen Ansolabehere). SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015) Bush v. Gore in the American Mind: Reflections and Survey Results on the Tenth Anniversary of the Decision Ending the 2000 Election Controversy (with Amy Semet and Stephen Ansolabehere) in Michael Alvarez and Bernard Grofman eds., ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM AFTER BUSH V. GORE (2014). Shelby County v. Holder and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, Aug. 2013 (with Thomas Mann). THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Oxford University Press, 2013) (edited with Gillian Metzger & Trevor Morrison). Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARVARD. LAW REVIEW FORUM 205 (2013) (with Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III). Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The DOJ, the VRA, and the 2011 Redistricting Process, 23 STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 345 (2012). Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 356 (2011) (with Jamal Greene and Stephen Ansolabehere). Measuring Election System Performance, 13 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 445 (2011) (with Stephen Ansolabehere). The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 755 (2011). Foreword: The Legacy of Bush v. Gore in Public Opinion and American Law, 23 ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW 325 (2011). “Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election Controversy: What the World Can Learn from the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in the United States, 44 INDIANA LAW REVIEW 85 (2010). Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, in 9 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL 325 (2010); reprinted in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:
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RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Heather Gerken, et al. eds.) (2011) (with Joshua Fougere and Stephen Ansolabehere). Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1385 (2010) (with Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart). Court Decisions and Trends in Support for Same-Sex Marriage (with Patrick J. Egan), POLLING REPORT, Aug. 17, 2009. Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 89 (2009). Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1644 (2009) (with Jennifer Rosenberg). The Constitutional Relevance of Alleged Legislative Dysfunction, 117 YALE LAW JOURNAL POCKET PART 256 (2008). Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1737 (2008) (with Stephen Ansolabehere). PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Oxford University Press, 2008) (edited with Jack Citrin & Patrick Egan). Eat Dessert First, 5 THE FORUM (2007) The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE LAW JOURNAL 174 (2007). Political Questions and Political Cases: The Evolving Justifications for Judicial Involvement in Politics, in Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). Strict in Theory, Loopy in Fact, 105 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43 (2006). The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in MICHAEL MCDONALD & JOHN SAMPLES EDS., THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY (Brookings Inst. Press 2006). Options and Strategies for Renewal of the Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 255, 257 (David L. Epstein, et al. eds., 2006); reprinted and revised in, 49 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL 717 (2006). Forty Years in the Political Thicket: Evaluating Judicial Oversight of Redistricting Since Reynolds v. Sims, in Thomas Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING (Brookings Inst. Press, 2005). The Law of American Party Finance, in Keith Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Hart, 2005). When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1131 (2005).
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Regulating Democracy through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 997 (2005) (with Melissa Cully Anderson). Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 119 (2004) (with Kelli Lammie). Soft Parties and Strong Money, 3 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL 315 (2004). Contested Concepts in Campaign Finance, 6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118 (2003). The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions and Prescriptions in Election Law, 35 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 1511 (2003). Suing the Government in Hopes of Controlling It: The Evolving Justifications for Judicial Involvement in Politics, 5 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607 (2003). In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 115 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 593 (2002). Soft Money and Slippery Slopes, 1 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL 401 (2002). The Legal Implications of a Multiracial Census, in Joel Perlmann & Mary Waters, THE NEW RACE QUESTION (Russell Sage Press, 2002). The Complicated Impact of One Person One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1299 (2002) (with Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan). The Blanket Primary in the Courts: The History and Precedent of California Democratic Party v. Jones, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE: CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIMENT WITH THE BLANKET PRIMARY (Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth Gerber eds.) (University of California Press, 2002). Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 88 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 2181 (2001). Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. LAW REVIEW 750 (2001). The Right to Be Counted, 53 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1077 (2001) (reviewing PETER SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS? (2000)). Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 899 (2001). THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM: CENSUS 2000 DATA AND REDISTRICTING TECHNOLOGY (Brennan Center 2000) (Editor and Contributor). The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 775 (2000) (with Bruce Cain).
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The Right to Bail in International Extradition Proceedings, 34 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (1998). The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICHIGAN LAW & POLICY REVIEW 11 (1997). The Parliamentary Option for California Government, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds.) (IGS Press 1995) (with Bruce Cain).
CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER TESTIMONY
New and Necessary Innovations to Improve Voter Participation and Registration, Hearing Before Senate Select Committee on Science, Innovation and Public Policy, California State Senate (March 11, 2014). Redistricting and the 2010 Census: Enforcing Section 5 of the VRA, United States Commission on Civil Rights (Feb. 3, 2010). United States v. Stevens: The Supreme Court’s Decision Invalidating the Crush Video Statute, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (May 26, 2010). Voter Registration: Assessing Current Problems, Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 111th Cong. (March 11, 2009). Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Preclearance, Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (May 17, 2006). The States’ Choice of Voting Systems Act: Hearing on H.R. 1173 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Sept. 23, 1999).
U.S. SUPREME COURT AMICUS BRIEFS
Brief of Nathaniel Persily, et al., Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, (No. 13-1314) (to be argued March 2, 2015). Brief for Nathaniel Persily, et al., Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322). Brief for Nathaniel Persily et al., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (No. 07-689). Brief Amicus Curiae of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support of Appellees, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714). Brief Amicus Curiae of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support of Respondents, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949).
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BAR, EDITORIAL BOARD, AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIPS
Member of the New York and United States Supreme Court Bars. Editorial Board, Election Law Journal and The Forum. Social Science Research Council, Advisor to Anxieties of Democracy Project. American Law Institute, Member and Advisor, Principles of Election Law Project. United Nations Roster of Electoral Experts. American Political Science Association, Advisory Committee to Law and Political Process Study Group. Hewlett Foundation, Consultant and Academic Advisor. Advisory Committee, Electoral Institute, Veracruz, Mexico.
RECENT SPEECHES AND PAPER PRESENTATIONS
The Law of the 2012 Election, Stanford Alumni Dean’s Circle Event, Newseum, Washington, DC, Nov. 13, 2014. Caught Between the Rock of the Constitution and the Hard Place of the Voting Rights Act, University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, Chicago, IL, Nov. 7, 2014. Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, Symposium on Empirical Studies of Constitutional Law, University of Chicago Law School, Oct. 23, 2014. Political Parties and Campaign Finance, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, Oct. 16, 2014. Redistricting Reform: People, Principles and Processes, Ohio State University, Apr. 18, 2014. Solutions to Political Polarization Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop, New York, NY, Nov. 6, 2014. University of Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Workshop, Melbourne, Australia, Aug. 7, 2014. University of New South Wales Law School Faculty Workshop, Sydney, Australia, August 4, 2014. Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop, Stanford, CA, July 16, 2014. SSRC Presents – Anxieties of Democracy: Why Is America So Polarized?, Roosevelt House, New York, NY, Feb. 18, 2014. The American Voting Experience: Report of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration Australian Election Network, University of Melbourne, Aug. 6, 2014. Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop, Feb. 19, 2014 National Association of State Election Directors, San Francisco, CA, Aug. 22, 2014. George Washington Law School, Jan. 22, 2014. Evaluating Redistricting Reforms, Bauman Foundation, Washington, DC, Dec. 9, 2013. The Law of the 2012 Election, Columbia Alumni Clubs of Sarasota and Tampa, Apr. 4-5, 2012. The Law of Democracy in American Constitutional Law, Dean Alfange Jr. Distinguished Lecture, U. Mass Amherst, Amherst, MA, Mar. 26, 2012
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Politics as Bloodsport: Redistricting Controversies Past and Present, Columbia Law Washington Program and Alumni Presentation, Washington, DC, Feb. 29, 2012. The Law of Redistricting, CSPAN: American History TV, Columbia Law School, Feb. 27, 2012. Citizens United, the Media, and the Medium, Stanford Department of Communications, Stanford, CA, Feb. 23, 2012. Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands, Stanford Law and Policy Review Symposium , Stanford, CA, Jan. 28, 2012. Judges and Redistricting, Yale Law and Policy Review Symposium, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Oct. 22, 2011. Redistricting New York 2012: Issues and Controversies, The Center for Electoral Politics and Democracy at Fordham University, New York, NY, Oct. 5, 2011. Bush v Gore, 10 Years Later: Election Administration in the United States, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, Cal Tech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Laguna Beach, CA, April 16-17, 2011. Race, Party and Community Representation in the Redistricting Process, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Feb. 25, 2011. The Causes of Party Polarization in Congress, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION Symposium, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Feb. 24, 2011. Politics and the Roberts Court, EMORY LAW JOURNAL Thrower Symposium, Emory Law School, Atlanta, GA, Feb. 10, 2011. The 2010 Census and Election, Columbia Law School Federalist Society, Feb 9, 2011. The Shifting Sands of Redistricting Law: Unanswered Questions for the 2010 Cycle, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Harbor, MD, Jan 23, 2011. The Constitutional Politics of the Tea Party Movement, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, Jan. 6, 2011. Profiling Originalism, Law, Economics, and Organization Workshop, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Dec. 9, 2010; University of Chicago Law School Faculty Workshop, Chicago, IL, Nov. 11, 2010; George Washington University Law School Faculty Workshop, Washington, DC, Sept. 21, 2010. The Tenth Anniversary of Bush v. Gore, Columbia Law School Alumni Breakfast Series, Greenberg Traurig, New York, NY, Dec. 2, 2010. Bush v. Gore: A Decade Later, ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW Symposium, Miami, FL, Nov. 12- 13, 2010. Redistricting 2011: Decisions of a Decade, Council of State Governments Intergovernmental Affairs Committee, Providence, RI, Dec. 5, 2010. Expert Witnesses in Redistricting, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, VA Oct. 9, 2010. Citizens United, UNC First Amendment Law Review, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, Oct. 8, 2010. Redistricting Cases Since the Last Census, National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Task Force, Providence, RI, Sept. 26, 2010. American Law Institute Conference on Election Law, Philadelphia, PA, June 10, 2010. “United We Stand, United We Fall?”, Panel Discussion on Citizens’ United v. FEC, Stanford Law School Alumni Event, Waldorf Astoria, May 4, 2010. Voting and Democratic Participation, Conference on “Acknowledging Race in a ‘Post- Racial’ Era,” Cardozo Law School, New York, NY. Apr. 30, 2010. The Law of Democracy in the Age of Obama and Roberts, Columbia Law Alumni Association, Ropes and Gray, LLP, Boston, MA, April 13, 2010.
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The Law of the Census, Indiana Law Review Conference on the Law of Democracy, Indiana Law School, Indianapolis, IN, April 9, 2010. A Closer Look at Key Decisions Since 2000, National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Task Force, Austin, TX, Mar. 26, 2010. Race and the Law in the Age of Obama and Roberts, 2010 Edward Brodsky Legal Conference, Anti Defamation League, New York Times Building, March 4, 2010 (moderator). Taking Politics as Markets (Too) Seriously, The Past Present and Future of Election Law: A Symposium Honoring the Work of Daniel Lowenstein, UCLA Law School, Los Angeles, CA, Jan. 29, 2010. The Redistricting Experience – Tales from the Field, Redistricting Reform & Voting Rights - Identifying Common Ground and Challenges, Warren Institute, UCDC, Washington, DC, Nov. 10, 2010. “Democracia Electoral, Hacia Una Nueva Agenda,” Electoral Institute of Veracruz, Veracruz, Mexico, October 15-16, 2009. Election Law in the Age of Obama and Roberts, Stone Agers Luncheon, St. Regis Hotel, New York, NY, Sept. 30, 2009. Race, Region and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election, The Ohio State Moritz College of Law Faculty Workshop, Columbus, OH, Sept. 23, 2009. Originalism in the American Mind, James Goold Cutler Lecture, William and Mary Law School, Williamsburg, VA, Sept. 17, 2009. Gay Marriage, the Courts and Direct Democracy, Roundtable at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 4, 2009. Reflections on the Supreme Court’s Recent Voting Rights Cases, New America Foundation, Washington, DC, June 30, 2009 New Developments in the Meaning of the Voting Rights Act, National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Task Force, San Francisco, CA, June 14, 2009. Voter Registration Reform, AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project, Washington, DC, June 2, 2009. The Meaning of the Voting Rights Act in the Age of Obama, Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop, Stanford, CA, Mar. 18, 2009. Election 2008: Looking Back and Moving Forward, American Friends of the Hebrew University, New York, NY, Mar. 17, 2009; Columbia Law Alumni and Admittee Event, Washington, DC Mar. 17, 2009. Election Administration Issues in the 2008 Election, Tobin Project/ALI Elections Scholarship Conference, Duke Law School, Durham, NC, Feb. 27, 2009. The Associational Rights of Political Parties: Recent Cases and Reform Efforts, New York Bar Association, Election Law Committee, New York, NY, March 26, 2009. Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, University of Miami Law Review Symposium, Miami, FL, Jan. 4, 2009; University of Minnesota Law School Public Law Workshop, Minneapolis, MN, Jan. 6, 2009. Redistricting War Stories, American Mathematics Society, Washington, DC, Jan. 8, 2009. Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Election Law, Ezra Stiles College Master’s Tea and Fellows Dinner, Yale University, New Haven CT, Oct. 30, 2008. Litigation in the 2008 Election, New York State Bar Association Committee on Minorities in the Profession, New York, NY, Oct. 28, 2008. The Crawford Decision and the Future of Voter Identification, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, Oct. 16, 2008.
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Reforming the Presidential Nomination Process, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, Oct. 3, 2008. Defacing Democracy: The Rising Importance and Salience of As-Applied Challenges in the Roberts Court, Rutgers-Camden Law School, Camden, NJ, Sept., 22, 2008; Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, MN, Oct. 17, 2008. The Law and Politics of the 2008 Election, Columbia Alumni Association of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Oct. 15, 2008; New York Alumni Event, New York, NY, Oct. 7, 2008. Litigating the 2008 Election, Connecticut Bar Association, District of Connecticut Bench-Bar Conference, Sept. 19, 2009. Improving our Elections: Future Research and Reform, Carnegie Foundation, New York, NY, Sept. 18, 2008. Legal Issues in the 2008 Election, Cardozo Law School, Mar. 26, 2008. Voting Rights, Voter Fraud and Election Administration, Harvard Journal on Legislation conference on “Voices on Voting: Election Law in 2008,” Cambridge, MA, Mar. 6, 2008. Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder, Columbia Law School, Feb. 26, 2008; University of Chicago Law School, Mar. 4, 2008. The New Voting Rights Act, Journal of Law and Politics, University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, VA, Feb. 23, 2008. Redistricting in Democratic Theory, Byron White Center Symposium on Reapportioning Colorado, Old Supreme Court Chambers, Colorado State Capitol, Denver, CO, Jan. 25, 2008. Preview of the 2008 Election Campaign, Election Law Society, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Oct. 10, 2007; Columbia Law School Alumni Association, Nov. 8, 2007. Preliminary Results from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (with Stephen Ansolabehere), Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA Apr. 6, 2007. The Implications of the 2003 Texas Redistricting Controversy, Symposium on Lines in the Sand, University of Texas Law School, Austin, TX, March 2, 2007. Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy, Symposium on Positive Approaches to Constitutional Law and Theory, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, PA, Feb. 24, 2007. The Implications of the 2006 Elections for Legal Debates over Partisan Gerrymandering, NYU Annals of American Law Conference, New York University Law School, New York, NY, Feb. 23, 2007. The Promises and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, Faculty Workshop, Columbia Law School, New York, NY, Jan. 11, 2007; USC Center on Law and Politics, Los Angeles, CA, Apr. 10, 2007; Northwestern Law School, Chicago, IL, Apr. 17, 2007; Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Oct. 4, 2007. Nonpartisanship, Competition and Minority Voting Rights, UNC Center for Civil Rights, Chapel Hill, NC, Feb. 3, 2006; Humphrey Inst., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, Apr. 25, 2006. The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Washington, DC, Mar. 9, 2006. The Place of Competition in American Election Law, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, Mar. 9, 2006. Public Funding of Election Campaigns: Options for Reform and Questions for Research, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, Jan. 28, 2006. Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Sept. 1, 2005; Emory Law School Faculty Workshop, Sept. 21, 2005;
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University of Michigan Law School Faculty Workshop, Nov. 16, 2005; Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jan. 2, 2006; Bar Ilan Law School, Jan. 3, 2006; Tel Aviv Law School, Jan. 5, 2006; Williams Institute at UCLA Law School, Feb. 24, 2006, Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop, March 22, 2006; Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop, June 13, 2006; Northwestern Law School, April 17, 2007. Options and Strategies for Renewal of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, Conference on “Lessons From the Past, Prospects for the Future: Honoring the 40th Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,” Yale University, April 23, 2005; Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY, June 24, 2006; Howard Law School, Branton Symposium, Oct. 28, 2005. New Politics, Conference on “The Constitution in 2020,” American Constitution Society, Yale Law School, Apr. 9, 2005. Constitutional Issues in the Terry Schiavo Case, Penn Law School, Mar. 29, 2005. Regulating Democracy Through Democracy, Conference on “The Impact of Direct Democracy,” Initiative and Referendum Institute, U.C. Irvine, Irvine, CA, Jan. 15, 2005. Conflicts of Interest in Comparative Perspective, University of Trento, Trento, Italy, Sept. 17, 2004. Partisan Gerrymandering after Vieth v. Jubelirer and The Constitutionality of Counting the Overseas Population, National Conference of State Legislatures, Salt Lake City, UT, July 20-21, 2004. Money, Elections and Political Equality: Campaign Finance After McConnell, American Constitution Society, Washington, DC, June 19, 2004. Homeland Security and Civil Liberties, Joint Conference Sponsored by U.S. Army War College and Penn Law School, June 18, 2004 (conference organizer). Understanding McConnell v. FEC, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, May 27, 2004. Redistricting Georgia, Ad Hoc Workshop, Penn Law School, April 22, 2004. Forty Years in the Political Thicket: Evaluating Judicial Oversight of Redistricting Since Baker v. Carr, The Brookings Institution, Apr. 16, 2004. American Election Law, The Moscow School for Political Studies, National Constitution Center, March 26, 2004. The Constitutional Law of American Elections, Fels School of Government, University of Pennsylvania, March 11, 2004. American Election Law, Penn Law Board of Overseers, Penn Club of New York, March 12, 2004. The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, U.S. Census Bureau, March 4, 2004. Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance, Southwestern Law School, Feb. 23, 2004; American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sept. 3, 2004, Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley, CA, Sept. 7, 2004, Seton Hall Law School, Oct. 29, 2004, NYU Law School, Nov. 15, 2004. The Law of Democracy, Conference Organizer and Panelist, Penn Law Review, Feb. 6-7, 2004. Redistricting Controversies, Dianne Rehm Show, National Public Radio, Dec. 4, 2003. Judging in the Current Era, American Constitution Society, Penn Law School, Nov. 18, 2003 (moderated panel of four federal judges). Panel on Appointment of Federal Judges, Penn Law Public Interest Program, Oct. 29, 2003. Recent Supreme Court Decisions, Chestnut Hill Academy, Sept. 2003. McConnell v. FEC: Understanding the Decision and Its Implications, Penn Law, May 15, 2003 (conference organizer and speaker).
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The Law and Technology of the Redistricting Process, Columbia Law School, Feb. 6, 2003; NYU School of Law, Sept. 30, 2002. The Effect of the BCRA on State Political Parties, National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, DC, Dec. 12, 2002. American Election Law, Speech to visiting election officials from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Sponsored by the Carter Center, National Committee on U.S. Chinese Relations, Women’s Campaign International. Fels School of Government, Nov. 3, 2002. In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent- Protecting Gerrymanders, National Conference of State Legislatures (Washington, DC, Dec. 12, 2002); University of Miami Law School, (Oct. 25, 2002); University of Pennsylvania Department of Political Science (Oct. 10, 2002); Rutgers-Camden Law School (Sept. 9, 2002); University of Pennsylvania Law School (Aug. 15, 2002). Parties, Money and Corruption, “The Funding of Political Parties Workshop,” Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, July 5-6, 2002. Redistricting New York, University of Pennsylvania Law School Ad Hoc workshop, Summer 2002. The Law and Technology of the 2000 Redistricting Process, Harvard Law School, Apr. 22, 2002. Strategies for Election Reform and their Legal Consequences, Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy, Georgetown University Law Center, Feb. 25, 2002. The Political Impact of One Person, One Vote, Symposium on Baker v. Carr, University of North Carolina Law School, Chapel Hill, NC, Nov. 2-4, 2001. Understanding and Complying with Bush v. Gore, Election Law Task Force of the National Conference of State Legislatures, National Press Club, May 9, 2001. Multiraciality and the 2000 Census, Brennan Center at NYU Law School, May 4, 2001. Latino Representation and the 2000 Redistricting Process, National Meeting of the Latino Law Students Association, Columbia Law School, Mar. 2, 2001. The Law, Politics, and Technology of the 2000 Redistricting Process, Eagleton Institute of Public Affairs, Rutgers University, Dec. 18, 2000. The Legal Regulation of Party Primaries, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sept. 1, 2000.
Selected Media Appearances and Interviews Television: NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, FoxNews, Bloomberg, CNNfn. Radio: NPR, CBS Radio, ABC Radio, BBC Radio, Voice of America. Newspapers and Wire Services: New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Philadelphia Inquirer, Washington Times, Houston Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor, Dallas Morning News, Miami Herald, Atlanta Journal Constitution, Detroit Free Press, Baltimore Sun, the Guardian, McClatchy, Knight Ridder, Gannett, Associated Press, United Press International. Other periodicals: The New Yorker, The New Republic, Congressional Quarterly, Roll Call.
14
EXHIBIT H
Case 3:13-cv-00678-REP-LO-AD Document 241 Filed 09/25/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID# 5553
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
GLORIA PERSONHUBALLAH, et at., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No.: 3: 13-cv-678 ) JAMES B. ALCORN, et at., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER
The Court hereby appoints Dr. Bernard Grofman as special master to assist and advise
the Court with regard to the redistricting remedy. The Special Master's appointment is governed
by the following provisions:
I. The Special Master will review the redistricting plans and briefs submitted in
response to the Court's orders and recommend to the Court a proposed plan, a modified version
of a proposed plan, or a plan devised by the Special Master, that remedies the deficiencies
identified in the Court's June 5, 2015 opinion (ECF 170).
2. The following deadlines are established for the purpose of enabling the Court to
adopt a redistricting plan at the earliest practical opportunity after November 17, 2015:
a. The Special Master shall submit his report and recommendation to the Court by
no later than October 30, 2015;
b. Any non-parties wishing to comment on the Special Master's report and
recommendation shall do so by no later than November 10, 2015, by submitting
their comments electronically through the Court's CMIECF filing system; Case 3:13-cv-00678-REP-LO-AD Document 241 Filed 09/25/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID# 5554
c. Parties may file comments or exceptions to the Special Master's report and
recommendation by no later than November I 0, 20 15, and may reply to any
exceptions filed by no later than November 17, 20 15.
3. The Special Master's report and recommendation shall contain:
a. a color map showing the proposed remedial plan;
b. Shapefiles and Block Equivalency Files compatible with Maptitude For
Redistricting software for the proposed remedial plan; and
c. analysis explaining the basis for the proposed remedial plan and the
recommendation of that plan over any of the other proposals previously submitted
by parties and non-parties.
4. Upon request from the Special Master, the parties shall promptly make available
to the Special Master electronic copies of the trial exhibits and trial transcript. Such a request
shall be communicated by way of an email message addressed to counsel of record for plaintiffs,
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and for Intervenor-Defendants:
Stuart A. Raphael ([email protected])
Trevor S. Cox ([email protected])
Michael A. Carvin ([email protected])
John M. Gore [email protected])
Kevin J. Hamilton ([email protected])
Marc Elias ([email protected])
5. The Virginia Division of Legislative Services shall promptly respond to the best
of its ability to any reasonable request by the Special Master for supporting data or information
reasonably necessary to carry out his assignment.
2 Case 3:13-cv-00678-REP-LO-AD Document 241 Filed 09/25/15 Page 3 of 3 PageID# 5555
6. The Special Master shall fi le hi s report electronically on the Court's CM/ECF
system. The Shapefiles and Block Equivalency Files sha ll be delivered electronica ll y to the
parties via FTP, Dropbox, or equivalent method ensuring timely deli very. The Virginia Division
of Legislative Services shall promptl y post the Special Master's report and supporting electronic
fi les to its red istricting website (http://redistricting.d ls.virginia.gov/).
7. Parties and non-parties may not engage in any ex parte communication with the
Special Master regarding the subject matter of this li tigation. The Special Master may
communicate ex parte with the Court, provided he promptly advises the parties that the
communication has occurred and di scloses any material guidance he has received.
8. The Special Master will be compensated in the amount of$400h per our for his
time and wi ll be reimbursed for reasonable expenses. He is also authorized to employ assi stants
(and to determine their reasonable compensation) as necessary to carry out his duties under this
appointment. The Special Master must submit any motion for reimbursement of fees and
expenses through the Court's CM/EC F system . Upon the di sposition of the motion by the Court,
and in accordance with the Order of September 3, 20 15 (ECF No. 207), the Commonwealth of
Virginia shall be responsible to pay the fee s of the Special Master except as the Court may
otherwise direct.
9. The parties may seek to mod ify this order for good cause shown.
It is SO ORD ERED.
/s/ l.i,un 0 " I(G> rJJi~ Court U t 1it~d States Di strict Ju
/ Date: Sep t emb e~, 20 15
3
EXHIBIT I
VITA
BERNARD N. GROFMAN, Professor
EDUCATION
B.S. University of Chicago, Mathematics (1966) M.A. University of Chicago, Political Science (1968) Ph.D. University of Chicago, Political Science (1972)
HONORARY DEGREES
2010 Honorary Doctorate in Political Science (Doctor scientarium politicarum honoris causa), University of Copenhagen
CURRENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS HELD
2008- Jack W. Peltason (Bren Foundation) Endowed Chair, University of California, Irvine 1980- Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine. 2001- Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine.
2008- Director, Center for the Study of Democracy, UCI Interdisciplinary Organized Research Unit
FORMER ACADEMIC POSITIONS
1970-71 Instructor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook. 1971-76 Assistant Professor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook 1976-80 Associate Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine . PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
American Political Science Association Public Choice Society Law and Society Association American Institute of Parliamentarians
VISITING POSITIONS AND FELLOWSHIPS
1973 Visiting Lecturer (Gastdozent), Department of Political Science (Lehrstuhl für Politische Wissenschaft), University of Mannheim (Summer Semester). 1975 Adjunct Assistant Professor, Applied Mathematics, SUNY at Stony Brook (Spring Semester). 2
1975-76 Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine (Winter and Spring Quarters). 1984 Guest Scholar (Sabbatical), Governmental Studies Program, Brookings Institution (Winter Quarter). 1985 College Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle (Spring Quarter). 1985-86 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford 1989 Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan (Fall Semester). 1990 Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Legal Studies, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan (June-July) 2001 Fellow, University Institute of Advanced Study and Scholar-in-Residence, University of Bologna, Italy (May-June) 2002 Scholar-in-Residence, Berlin Science Center (Wissenschaft Zentrum) Germany (July) 2003 Gaspar de Portola Scholar-in-Residence, Department of Economics, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona (May-June) 2006 Scholar-in-Residence, New York University School of Law (Sept.-Dec.) 2007 Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (April- June) 2008 Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (April-May) 2008 Scholar-in Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (June) 2009 Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (June-July) 2010 Scholar-in-Residence, New York University School of Law (Sept.-Dec.) 3
BOOKS AND EDITED BOOKS
Books (published)
(P1) Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi. Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
(P2) Merrill, Samuel III and Bernard Grofman. A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
(P3) Adams, James, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors. New York: Cambridge University Press.
(P4) Regenwetter, Michael, Bernard Grofman, A. A. J. Marley and Ilia Tsetlin. 2006. Behavioral Social Choice: Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Edited Books (published)
(E1) Grofman, Bernard N., Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982.
(E2) Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral System. New York: Praeger, 1984. (2001 co-recipient of the George Hallett Prize of the Representation and Electoral Systems Section of the American Political Science Association for books with a lasting contribution to the study of electoral systems.)
(E3) Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986. (2001 co-recipient of the George Hallett Prize of the Representation and Electoral Systems Section of the American Political Science Association for books with a lasting contribution to the study of electoral systems.)
(E4) Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986.
(E5) Grofman, Bernard N. and Donald Wittman (Eds.), The “Federalist Papers” and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press, 1989.
(E6) Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 1990.
(E7) Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. (Designated by the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights in North America as one of the outstanding books published in 1992 on intolerance.)
4
Edited Books (published) (cont.)
(E8) Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An `Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
(E9) Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. (Richard Fenno Prize of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association for the best book published in 1994 in the field of legislative studies.)
(E10) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1996.
(E11) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press, 1998.
(E12) Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
(E13) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000.
(E14) Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
(E15) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.). Political Science as Puzzle Solving. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
(E16) Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (Eds.) The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries. New York: Agathon Press, 2002.
(E17) Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman (Eds). Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
(E18) Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler, and Andre Blais (Eds.) Duverger’s Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2008.
(E19) Sigelman, Lee, Kenneth Newton, Kenneth J. Meier, and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) The Wit and Humor of Political Science. American Political Science Association and European Consortium for Political Research, 2010
(E20) Giannetti, Daniela and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform: Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan. Springer, 2011.
5
Edited Books (published) (cont.)
(E21) Dolez, Bernard, Bernard Grofman and Annie Laurent (Eds.) In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections. Springer, 2011.
6
MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS
2011-12 Monitoring the Nature and Impact of Public Input into the Legislative and Congressional Redistricting Process (Sloan Foundation, $119.756) 2007-09 Political Competition. Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, (SSHRCC #410-2007-2153, $87,290: Associate Investigator: co- Pls, Stanley Winer and J. Stephen Ferris). 1998-01 Collaborative Research on Probabilistic Models of Social Choice. National Science Foundation Program in Methodology Measurement and Statistics, (NSF# SBR-97-30578, $213,000 with Anthony Marley, Co-PI) 1994-95 Electoral Laws, Electoral Lists and Campaigning in the First Non-Racial South African General Election, National Science Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF# SBR-93- 21864, $39,512, with Arend Lijphart). 1991-93 The Impact of Redistricting on the Representation of Racial Racial and Ethnic Minorities, The Ford Foundation (#446740-47007, $166,000). 1988-92 Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: Implementation, Effects, and Implications for Law and Society. National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES #88-09392, $231,000, with Chandler Davidson); Supplementary Grant for Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: The Effects of Changing Electoral Systems on the Election of Women. National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 88-09392, $8,500, with Chandler Davidson and Susan Welch). 1987-89 Ethnic Voting Patterns in Metropolitan Toronto (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, $14,480, with Janet Landa and Michael Copeland). 1985-87 The Dynamics of Spatial Voting Games and Games on Graphs, National Science Foundation, Decision and Management Sciences Program (NSF SES #85-06376, $99,300, with Guillermo Owen). 1985-86 The Impact of Laws Relating to Elections and Representation, National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SES #85-15468, $23,200). 1983-84 Analysis of the Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES #82-18588, $35,000). 1981-83 Reapportionment and Representation. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 81-07554, $49,970 with Guillermo Owen) 1980-82 Applications of Game Theory to the Study of Political Institutions. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 80-07915, $31,300 with Guillermo Owen) 1978-79 Modeling Jury Decision Processes: The Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 77-24702, $73,800). $8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association). 1978-79 Electoral System: What Difference Does it Make? National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 77-24474, $35,800, with Howard Scarrow). 1976-77 Modeling Jury Decision Processes, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 75-l409l, $68,200).
7
PROFESSIONAL HONORS AND AWARDS
2001- Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2000-02 President, Public Choice Society 1991-93 Chair, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association. 1982-85 Co-Chair, Conference Group on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RESEARCH AND TEACHING HONORS AND AWARDS
2005 University of California, Irvine Academic Senate Distinguished Faculty Award for Research 2001 Lauds and Laurels Award for Faculty Achievement, UCI Alumni Association. 1997 The campus-wide winner, Award for Teaching Innovation and Excellence: UCI Dean for Undergraduate Education. 1996 The School of Social Sciences winner, Award for Teaching Innovation and Excellence: UCI Dean for Undergraduate Education. 1995 Lauds and Laurels Award for Professional Achievement, UCI Alumni Association.
PAPER AWARDS
2003 Co-recipient (with Timothy Brazill) of the Duncan Black Prize of the Public Choice Society for best paper published in Public Choice in 2002, (“Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court through Multi- Dimensional Scaling: Analysis of the ‘Natural Courts” 1953-1991”) 1985 Co-recipient (with Philip Straffin) of the Carl B. Allendoerfer Award, Mathematical Association of America, for exposition in mathematical writing for undergraduates. 1979 Pi Sigma Alpha Award, Best Paper, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
LISTINGS
Who's Who in the World, Providence, NJ: Marquis, yearly editions beginning in 1998.
American Political Scientists: A Dictionary. Glenn H. Utter and Charles Lockhart (Eds.) Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002, pp. 138-140.
Directory of American Scholars, 10th ed. Gale Group, 2002.
Rowley, Charles K. and Friedrich Schneider. Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Vol. 1. 2004. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London. Grofman Biography, pp. 355- 356 8
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print)
(1) Grofman, Bernard N., and Edward Muller. 1973. The strange case of relative gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve. American Political Science Review, 67:5l4-539.
(2) Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. 1973. Probability and logic in belief systems. Theory and Decision, 4:l79-l95.
(3) Grofman, Bernard N. 1974. Helping behavior and group size, some exploratory stochastic models. Behavioral Science, l9:2l9-224.
(4) Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. 1974. The logical foundations of ideology. Behavioral Science, l9:225-237.
(5) Grofman, Bernard N. 1975. The prisoner's dilemma game: Paradox reconsidered. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, 1:101-119.
(6) Mackelprang, A. J., Bernard N. Grofman, and N. Keith Thomas. Electoral change and stability: Some new perspectives. 1975. American Politics Quarterly, 3(3):3l5-339.
(7) Grofman, Bernard N. 1975. A review of macro-election systems. In Rudolph Wildenmann (Ed.), German Political Yearbook (Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch fur Politik), Vol. 4, Munich Germany: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 303-352.
(8) Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. 1975. Bayesian models for iterated prisoner's dilemma games. General Systems, 20:l85-l94.
(9) Grofman, Bernard N. 1976. Not necessarily twelve and not necessarily unanimous: Evaluating the impact of Williams v. Florida and Johnson v. Louisiana. In Gordon Bermant, Charlan Nemeth and Neil Vidmar (Eds.), Psychology and the Law: Research Frontiers. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, l49-l68.
(10) Grofman, Bernard N. 1977. Jury decision-making models. In Stuart Nagel (Ed.), Modeling the Criminal Justice System, Sage Criminal Justice Systems Annuals, Vol. 7, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, l9l-203.
(11) Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. 1977. How to make cooperation the optimizing strategy in a two-person game. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 5(2):l73-l86.
(12) Grofman, Bernard N. 1978. Judgmental competence of individuals and groups in a dichotomous choice situation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 6(1):47-60.
(13) Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. 1979. Iannucci and its aftermath: The application of the Banzhaf Criterion to weighted voting in the State of New York. In Steven Brams, Andrew Schotter and Gerhard Schwodiauer (Eds.), Applied Game Theory. Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 168-183.
9
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(14) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. A preliminary model of jury decision making. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3, 98-110.
(15) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. Jury decision-making models and the Supreme Court: The jury cases from Williams v. Florida to Ballew v. Georgia. Policy Studies Journal, 8(5):749-772.
(16) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. The slippery slope: Jury size and jury verdict requirements--legal and social science approaches. Law and Politics Quarterly, 2(3):285-304.
(17) Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. 1980. Mathematics, social science and the law. In Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron (Eds.), The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 117-127.
(18) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Mathematical models of juror and jury decision making: the state of the art. In Bruce D. Sales (Ed.), Perspectives in Law and Psychology, Volume II: The Trial Processes. NY: Plenum, 305-351.
(19) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. The theory of committees and elections: The legacy of Duncan Black. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Toward a Science of Politics: Essays in Honor of Duncan Black. Blacksburg, VA: Public Choice Center, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 11-57.
(20) Weisberg, Herbert and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Candidate evaluations and turnout. American Politics Quarterly, 9(2):197-219.
(21) Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 1981. Weighted voting in New York. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 6(2):287-304.
(22) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Alternatives to single-member plurality districts: Legal and empirical issues. Policy Studies Journal, 9(3): 875-898. (Reprinted in Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982, 107-128.
(23) Taagepera, Rein and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Effective size and number of components. Sociological Methods and Research, 10:63-81.
(24) Landa, Janet, and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Games of breach and the role of contract law in protecting the expectation interest. Research in Law and Economics Annual, 3:67-90.
10
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(25) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. A dynamic model of protocoalition formation in ideological n-space. Behavioral Science, 27:77-90.
(26) Grofman, Bernard N., Scott L. Feld, and Guillermo Owen. 1982. Evaluating the competence of experts, pooling individual judgements into a collective choice, and delegating decision responsibility to subgroups. In Felix Geyer and Hans van der Zouwen (Eds.), Dependence and Inequality. NY: Pergamon Press, 221-238.
(27) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. Reformers, politicians and the courts: A preliminary look at U.S. redistricting in the 1980s. Political Geography Quarterly, 1(4):303-316.
(28) Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 1982. Current issues in reapportionment. Law and Policy Quarterly, 4(4): 435-474.
(29) Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. 1982. A game theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks. Social Networks, 4:213-224.
(30) Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. 1983. Thirteen theorems in search of the truth. Theory and Decision, 15:261-278.
(31) Grofman, Bernard N. 1983. Measures of bias and proportionality in seats-votes relationships. Political Methodology, 9:295-327.
(32) Grofman, Bernard N. and Janet Landa. 1983. The development of trading networks among spatially separated traders as a process of proto-coalition formation: the Kula trade. Social Networks, 5:347-365.
(33) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Coalitions and power in political situations. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 137-143.
(34) Grofman, Bernard N. 1984. The general irrelevance of the zero sum assumption in the legislative context. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 100-112.
(35) Glazer, Amihai, Deborah Glazer, and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Cumulative voting in corporate elections: Introducing strategy into the equations. South Carolina Law Review, 35(2):295-309.
(36) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members. Public Choice, 42: 273-285.
11
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(37) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice, 42:311-325.
(38) Shapley, Lloyd S. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies. Public Choice, 43(3):329-343.
(39) Grofman, Bernard N., Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. 1985. The `totality of circumstances' test in Section 2 of the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act: A social science perspective. Law and Policy, 7(2):209-223.
(40) Grofman, Bernard N. Criteria for districting: A social science perspective. 1985. UCLA Law Review, 33(1):77-184.
(41) Grofman, Bernard and Carole Uhlaner. 1985. Metapreferences and reasons for stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the debate. Theory and Decision, 19:31-50.
(42) Taagepera, Rein and Bernard Grofman. 1985. Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR systems--parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of Political Research, 13:341-352. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Eds.). Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian Perspectives. Englewood City, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988.)
(43) Niemi, Richard, Jeffrey Hill and Bernard Grofman. 1985. The impact of multimember districts on party representation in U.S. state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 10(4):441-455.
(44) Uhlaner, Carole and Bernard Grofman. 1986. The race may be close but my horse is going to win: Wish fulfillment in the 1980 Presidential election. Political Behavior, 8(2):101-129.
(45) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. On the possibility of faithfully representative committees. American Political Science Review, 80(3):863-879.
(46) Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. 1987. Does redistricting aimed to help blacks necessarily help Republicans? Journal of Politics, 49:143-156. (Reprinted in Ann M. Bowman and R.C. Kearney, State and Local Government. Boston, MA: Houghton Miflin, 1990.)
(47) Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, Nicholas Noviello and Amihai Glazer. 1987. Stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context. American Political Science Review, 81(2):539-553. 12
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(48) Grofman, Bernard N. Models of voting. 1987. In Samuel Long (Ed.), Micropolitics Annual, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 31-61.
(49) Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Marc Robbins. 1987. Partisan and incumbency effects of 1970s congressional redistricting. American Journal of Political Science, 30(3):680-701. (Reprinted in Susan A. McManus (Ed.), Reapportionment and Representation in Florida, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin: Paladin House, 1991.)
(50) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartley, Mark O. Kilgour and Nicholas Miller. 1987. The uncovered set in spatial voting games. Theory and Decision, 23:129-156.
(51) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1987. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority winner in n-dimensional spatial voting games: An intuitive geometric approach. American Journal of Political Science, 32(4):709-728.
(52) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. 1988. Optimal partisan gerrymandering. Political Geography Quarterly, 7(1):5-22.
(53) Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1988. The core and the stability of group choice in spatial voting games. American Political Science Review, 82)(1):195-211.
(54) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. 1988. Rousseau's general will: A Condorcetian perspective. American Political Science Review, 82(2):567-576. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and Harvey Pasis (Eds.), Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian Perspectives, NJ: Prentice Hall of Canada, 1990. Translated and reprinted in abridged form as La volonté generale de Rousseau: perspective Condorcéene. In P. Crepel and C. Gilain (Eds.), des Actes du Colloque International Condorcet. Paris: Editions Minerve, 1989.) (Reprinted in Literature Criticism, Vol. 104, Warren, MI: Gale Group; also reprinted in John T. Scott (ed) Jean Jacques Rousseau: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Routledge, 2006).
(55) Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi. 1988. Minority voting equality: The 65 percent rule in theory and practice. Law and Policy, 10(1):43-62.
(56) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Ideological consistency as a collective phenomenon. American Political Science Review, 82(3):64-75.
(57) Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. 1988. Estimating the extent of racially polarized voting in multicandidate elections. Sociological Methods and Research, 16(4):427-454.
(58) Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. 1989. Finagle's law and the Finagle point, a new solution concept for two-candidate competition in spatial voting games. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2):348-375.
13
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(59) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1989. Black representation: Making sense of electoral geography at different levels of government. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14(2):265-279.
(60) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. 1989. Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12(4/5):405-416. (Reprinted in Paul E. Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling in Political Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989.)
(61) Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Testing the regulatory threat hypothesis: Media coverage of the energy crisis and petroleum pricing in the late 1970s. American Politics Quarterly, 17(2):132-152.
(62) Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1989. The geometry of majority rule. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(4):379-406.
(63) Grofman, Bernard and Barbara Norrander. 1990. Efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension. Public Choice, 64:213-227.
(64) Grofman, Bernard N. 1990. Toward a coherent theory of gerrymandering: Bandemer and Thornburg. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 29-63.
(65) Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Regulation via threats: politics, media coverage and oil pricing decisions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 54(1):48-63.
(66) Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci and Thomas Hofeller. 1990. Measuring compactness and the role of a competent standard in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering. Journal of Politics, 52(4):1155-1181.
(67) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Collectivities as actors, Rationality and Society, 2(4):429-448.
(68) Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias. American Political Science Review, 84(4):1149-1166.
(69) Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1991. The impact of the Voting Rights Act on black representation in southern state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16(1):111-127.
(70) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1991. Incumbency advantage, voter loyalty and the benefit of the doubt. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(2):115-137.
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.) 14
(71) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Statistics without substance: A critique of Freedman et al. and Clark and Morrison. Evaluation Review, 15(6): 746-769.
(72) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1992. Identifying and remedying racial gerrymandering. Journal of Law and Politics, 8(2):345-404.
(73) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. 1992. Group decision making over multidimensional objects of choice, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 52:39-63.
(74) Grofman, Bernard. 1992. Expert witness testimony and the evolution of voting right case law. In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 197-229.
(75) Grofman, Bernard. 1992. What happens after one person-one vote: Implications of the U.S. experience for Canada" in John Courtney and David Smith (Eds.), Drawing Boundaries, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 156-178; translated into French, Que se passe-t-il après “une personne, une voix”? L’expérience Américaine, for Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Elections Canada.). An earlier and shorter version appeared as “An expert witness perspective on continuing and emerging voting rights controversies: From one person, one vote to political gerrymandering.” Stetson University Law Review, 1992, 21(3):783-818
(76) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Would Vince Lombardi have been right if he had said, `When it comes to redistricting, race isn't everything, it's the only thing'? Cardozo Law Review, 14(5):1237-1276.
(77) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Toward an institution rich theory of political competition, with a supply-side component. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 179-193.
(78) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. The use of ecological regression to estimate racial bloc voting. University of San Francisco Law Review, 27(3): 593-625.
(79) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Public choice, civic republicanism, and American politics: Perspectives of a `reasonable choice' modeler. Texas Law Review, 71(7):1541-1587. (A portion of this [pp. 1541, 1553-66] is reprinted in Tushnet, Mark and Lisa Heinzerling, The Regulatory and Administrative State. Oxford University Press, 2006.
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
15
(80) Brischetto, Robert, David R. Richards, Chandler Davidson, and Bernard Grofman. 1994. Texas. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 233-257.
(81) Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. 1994. The effect of municipal election structure on black representation in eight Southern states. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 301-334.
(82) Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman. 1994. The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 335-350.
(83) Glazer, Amihai, Robert Griffin, Bernard Grofman and Martin Wattenberg. 1995. Strategic vote delay in the U.S. House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20(1):37-45.
(84) Skaperdas, Stergios and Bernard Grofman. 1995. Modeling negative campaigning. American Political Science Review, 89(1):49-61.
(85) Grofman, Bernard. 1995. New methods for valid ecological inference. In Monroe Eagles (Ed.), Spatial and Contextual Models in Political Research. London: Taylor and Francis, 127-149.
(86) Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. 1995. Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination: With application to post-war cabinets in the Netherlands. European Journal of Political Research, 26:155-170.
(87) Landa, Janet, Michael Copeland and Bernard Grofman. 1995. Ethnic voting patterns: a case study of metropolitan Toronto. Political Geography, 14(5):435-449.
(88) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1995. 1990s Issues in voting rights. University of Mississippi Law Journal, 65(2):205-270.
(89) Grofman, Bernard. 1996. Extending a dynamic model of protocoalition formation. In Norman Schofield (Ed.), Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 265-280.
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(90) Grofman, Bernard, Phillip Straffin and Nicholas Noviello. 1996. The sequential dynamics of cabinet formation, stochastic error, and a test of competing models. In 16
Norman Schofield (Ed.) Collective Decision Making: Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 281-293.
(91) Grofman, Bernard. 1996. Political Economy: Downsian Perspectives. In Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.) New Handbook of Political Science. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 691-701.
(92) Grofman, Bernard. 1997. The Supreme Court, the Voting Rights Act, and minority representation. In Anthony Peacock (Ed.), Affirmative Action and Representation: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of Voting Rights. Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press, 173- 199.
(93) Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. 1997. Directional and proximity models of voter utility and choice: a new synthesis and an illustrative test of competing models. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(1):25-48
(94) Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. 1997. Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination: A synthetic literature review and critique. British Journal of Political Science, 27:419-451.
(95) Anderson, Richard and Bernard Grofman. 1997. Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union. Public Choice, 93:287-314
(96) Merrill III, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. 1997. Modeling large electorates with Fourier series: With applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition. Social Choice and Welfare. 14(4):545-562.
(97) Falmagne, Jean-Claude, Michel Regenwetter and Bernard Grofman. 1997. A stochastic model for the evolution of preferences. In Anthony J. Marley (ed.) Decision and Measurement: Essays in Honor of R. Duncan Luce. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 111- 129.
(98) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. 1997. Estimating the likelihood of fallacious ecological inference: Linear ecological regression in the presence of context effects. Political Geography. 16(8):657-690.
(99) Grofman, Bernard, Thomas Brunell, Janet Campagna. 1997. Distinguishing between the effects of swing ratio and bias on outcomes in the U.S. electoral college, 1900-1992. Electoral Studies, 16(4):471-487.
17
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(100) Grofman, Bernard, William Koetzle, Thomas Brunell. 1997. An integrated perspective on the three potential sources of partisan bias: Malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares. Electoral Studies, 16(4):457-470
(101) Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Choosing subsets: A size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering, Social Choice and Welfare, 15(3):423-443.
(102) Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Approval voting, Borda winners and Condorcet winners: Evidence from seven elections. Management Science, 44(4):520- 533.
(103) Handley, Lisa, Bernard Grofman, and Wayne Arden. 1998. Electing minority-preferred candidates to legislative office: The relationship between minority percentages in districts and the election of minority-preferred candidates. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press, 13-39. (An earlier and shorter version of this appeared as Wayne Arden, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. The impact of redistricting on African-American representation in the U.S. Congress and State Legislatures in the 1990s. In Georgia Persons (ed.) Race and Representation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.)
(104) Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1998. Estimating the impact of voting-rights-act- related districting on Democratic strength in the U.S. House of Representatives. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press, 51-67.
(105) Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman, and Guillermo Owen. 1998. A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash. Public Choice, 97:23-34.
(106) Grofman, Bernard. 1999. SNTV, STV, and single-member district systems: theoretical comparisons and contrasts. In Bernard Grofman, Sung- Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non- Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 317-333.
(107) Grofman, Bernard. 1999. SNTV: An inventory of theoretically derived propositions and a brief review of the evidence from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Alabama. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 375-416.
(108) Merrill, Sam, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. 1999. Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two-candidate spatial competition. Public Choice, 98:369-383.
18
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(109) Brians, Craig L. and Bernard Grofman. 1999. When registration barriers fall, who votes? An empirical test of a rational choice model. Public Choice, 99:161-176.
(110) Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen and Christian Collet. 1999. Rethinking the Partisan Effects of Higher Turnout: So What’s the Question? Public Choice, 99:357-376.
(111) Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, Thomas Brunell and William Koetzle. 1999. The power of ideologically concentrated minorities. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(1):57- 74.
(112) Regenwetter, Michel, Jean-Claude Falmagne, Bernard Grofman. 1999. A Stochastic Model of Preference Change and its Application to 1992 Presidential Election Panel Data. Psychological Review, 106(2):362-384.
(113) Grofman, Bernard and Heathcote W. Wales. 1999. Modeling Juror Bias. Legal Theory, 5:221-234.
(114) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Lijphart and the new institutionalism. In Markus L. Crepaz, Thomas Koelble and David Wilsford (eds.) Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 43-73.
(115) Grofman, Bernard, William Koetzle, Michael McDonald, and Thomas Brunell. 2000. A new look at split ticket voting for House and President: The comparative midpoints model, Journal of Politics, 62(1):34-50.
(116) Grofman, Bernard and Andrew Reynolds. 2001. Electoral Systems and the art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings. In Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio (eds.) Rules and Reason: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy, New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 125-163. (Translated into Ukrainian and reprinted in Journal of Comparative Research of Political Institutions, Socio-Economic Systems and Civilizations (Volodimir Bilotkach). Kharkov, Ukraine: Regional Branch of the National Institute of Strategic Developments, 2005, pp. 29-70).
(117) Brians, Craig and Bernard Grofman. 2001. Election day registration's effect on US voter turnout. Social Science Quarterly, 82:170-183.
(118) Grofman, Bernard and Thomas Brunell. 2001. Explaining the ideological differences between the two U.S. senators elected from the same state: An institutional effects model. In Peter Galderisi (ed.) Congressional Primaries in the Politics of Representation. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 132-142.
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.) 19
(119) Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and David Lublin. 2001. Drawing effective minority districts: A conceptual framework and some empirical evidence. North Carolina Law Review, 79:1383-1430.
(120) Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and James Adams. 2001. Assimilation and contrast effects in voter projections of party locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the U.S. European Journal of Political Research, 40:199-221.
(121) Grofman, Bernard, William Koetzle, A. J. McGann. 2002. Congressional leadership 1965-1996: A new look at the extremism versus centrality debate." Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27(1):87-100.
(122) McGann, Anthony, William Koetzle and Bernard Grofman. 2002. How an ideologically concentrated minority can trump a dispersed majority: Non-median voter results plurality, run-off and sequential elimination elections" American Journal of Political Science, 46(1):134-148.
(123) Grofman, Bernard and Timothy Brazill. 2002. Identifying the median justice on the Supreme Court through multidimensional scaling: Analysis of ‘natural courts’ 1953- 1991. Public Choice, 112:55-79.
(124) Brazill, Timothy and Bernard Grofman. 2002. Factor analysis versus multidimensional scaling: Binary choice roll-call voting and the U.S. Supreme Court. Social Networks, 24:201-229.
(125) McGann, Anthony, Bernard Grofman and William Koetzle. 2002. Why party leaders are more extreme than their members: Modeling sequential elimination elections in the US House of Representatives" Public Choice, 113:337-356.
(126) Regenwetter, Michel, James Adams, and Bernard Grofman. 2002. On the Condorcet efficiency of majority rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity. Theory and Decision, 53:153-186.
(127) Regenwetter, Michel, Anthony Marley and Bernard Grofman. 2002. The general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences 43(3):405-428.
(128) Grofman, Bernard and Robert Stockwell. 2003. Institutional design in plural societies: Mitigating ethnic conflict and fostering stable democracy." In Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Guiseppe Sobbrio (eds.), Economic Welfare, International Business and Global Institutional Change. New York: Edward Elgar, Publishers, 102-137.
(129) Tsetlin, Ilia, Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman. 2003. The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles." Social Choice and Welfare, 21:387-398.
20
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont) (130) Regenwetter, Michel, A. A. A. Marley, and Bernard Grofman. 2003. General concepts of value restriction and preference majority." Social Choice and Welfare, 21(1):149-173.
(131) Taagepera, Rein and Bernard Grofman. 2003. Mapping the indices of seats-votes disproportionality and inter-election volatility.” Party Politics, 9(6):659-677.
(132) Grofman, Bernard, Alessandro Chiaramonte, Roberto D’Alimonte and Scott L. Feld. 2004. Comparing and contrasting the uses of two graphical tools for displaying patterns of multi-party competition: Nagayama diagrams and simplex representations. Party Politics, 10(3):273-299.
(133) Grofman, Bernard. Reflections on Public Choice. 2004. Public Choice 118:31-51.
(134) Grofman, Bernard and Samuel Merrill III. 2004. Ecological regression and ecological inference. In Gary King, Ori Rosen and Martin Tanner (eds.) Ecological Inference: New Methodological Strategies. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-143.
(135) Grofman, Bernard and Samuel Merrill III. 2004. Anticipating Likely Consequences of Lottery-Based Affirmative Action. Social Science Quarterly, 85(5): 1447-1468.
(136) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Downs and two-party convergence. In Polsby, N. (ed.) Annual Review of Political Science, 7:25-46.
(137) Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman. 2004. A Neo-Downsian model of the alternate vote as a mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies. Public Choice, 121:487- 506.
(138) O'Leary, Brendan, Bernard Grofman and Jorgen Elklit. 2005. "Divisor methods for sequential portfolio allocation in multi-party executive bodies: evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark.” American Journal of Political Science 49(1), 198-211.
(139) Grofman, Bernard. Race and redistricting in the 21st century. 2005. In Gary M. Segura, and Shaun Bowler (eds) Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp 253-277.
(140) Grofman, Bernard and Tom Brunell. 2005. “The art of the Dummymander: The Impact of Recent Redistrictings on the Partisan Makeup of Southern House Seats.” In Galderisi, Peter (Ed.) Redistricting in the New Millennium, New York: Lexington Books, pp. 183- 199.
(141) Adams, James, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman. 2005. “Does France’s Two-Ballot Presidential Election System Alter Candidates’ Policy Strategies? A Spatial Analysis of Office-Seeking Candidates in the 1988 Presidential Election.” French Politics, 3(2):98- 123.
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PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(142) Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman. 2006. Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji. Comparative Political Studies, 39(5): 623-651.
(143) Grofman, Bernard. 2006. Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity and Control. Election Law Journal 5(3): 250-282.
(144) Grofman, Bernard and Thomas Brunell. 2006. Extending Section 5: Law and Politics. In David L. Epstein Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Sharyn O’Halloran and Richard H. Pildes (Eds). The Future of the Voting Rights Act. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 311-339.
(145) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. 2006. Two-Stage Electoral Competition in Two-Party Contests: Persistent Divergence of Party Positions. Social Choice and Welfare, 26:547-569.
(146) Owen, Guillermo, Ines Lindner, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman and Leonard Ray. 2006. A Simple ‘Market Value’ Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems. International Journal of Game Theory, 35:111-126.
(147) Grofman, Bernard and Gary King. 2007. Partisan Symmetry and the Test for Gerrymandering Claims after LULAC v. Perry. Election Law Journal, 6 (1):2-35.
(148) Godfrey, Joseph and Bernard Grofman. 2008. Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress. In Braham, Matthew and Frank Steffen (Eds.) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 139-158.
(149) Owen, Guillermo, Ines Lindner and Bernard Grofman. 2008. Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting. In Braham, Matthew and Frank Steffen (Eds.) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 119-138.
(150) Winer, Stanley, Michael Tofias, Bernard Grofman, and John Aldrich. 2008. Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth of Government, 1930- 2002. Public Choice, 135 (3-4): 415-449.
(151) Samuel Merrill, III, Bernard Grofman, and Thomas L. Brunell. Cycles in American National Electoral Politics, 1854-2004. 2008. American Political Science Review, 102: (1)1-17.
(152) Grofman, Bernard and Jon Fraenkel. 2008. Electoral Engineering, Social Cleavages and Democracy. In Nardulli, Peter (Ed.) Democracy in The Twenty-First Century II: Domestic Perspectives. Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 71-101. 22
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print and forthcoming)
(153) Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. 2008. Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political Competition and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962-2006. In Margaret Levi, James Johnson, Jack Knight, and Susan Stokes (Eds.), Designing Democratic Government. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 117-140.
(154) Grofman, Bernard, Frank Wayman and Matthew Barreto. 2008. Rethinking Partisanship: Some Thoughts on a Unified Theory, in John Bartle and Paolo Bellucci ( Eds.) Political Parties and Partisanship: Social Identity and Individual Attitudes. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science, 60-74.
(155) Regenwetter, Michael, Bernard Grofman, Anna Popova, William Messner, Clintin P. Davis-Stober, and Daniel R. Cavagnaro. 2009. Behavioural Social Choice: A Status Report. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B – Biological Sciences. 364 (Issue 1518): 833-843.
(156) Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. 2009 “Testing Sincere versus Strategic SplitTicket Voting: Evidence from Split House-President Outcomes, 1900-1996.” Electoral Studies, 28: 62-69.
(157) Grofman, Bernard and Peter Selb. 2009. A Fully General Index of Political Competition. Electoral Studies 28(2): 291-296.
(158) Bowler, Shaun, Bernard Grofman and Andre Blais. 2009. Duverger’s Law in the United States. In Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler, and Andre Blais (Eds.) Duverger’s Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 135-146.
(159) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 2009. Interpersonally Consistent Social Action. In P. Bearman and P. Hedstrom (Eds.). Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, XXX-XXX
(160) Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman. Redistricting. 2009. In Jan E. Leighley, (Ed.) Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior. London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, XXX-XXX
(161) Grofman, Bernard. 2011 forthcoming. Electoral Rules and Ethnic Representation and Accommodation: Combining Social Choice and Electoral System Perspectives. In Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary (Eds.) Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, XXX-XXX
(162) Lemennicier, Bertrand, Honorine Lescieux- Katir and Bernard Grofman. 2010, The 2007 French Presidential Election. Canadian Journal of Political Science. 43(1):137-161,
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PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print and forthcoming)
(163) Grofman, Bernard and Carsten Schneider. 2009. An Introduction to Crisp-Set QCA, With a Comparison to Binary Logistic Regression. Political Research Quarterly, 62 (4): 662-672.
(164) Grofman, Bernard and Peter Selb. 2011. Turnout and the (Effective) Number of Parties at the National and At the District Level: A Puzzle Solving Approach. Party Politics 17 (1): 93-117.
(165) Lublin, David, Tom Brunell, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley.2010 Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived its Usefulness? In a Word, No. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 34(4): 525-553.
(166) Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 2010. Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach. In Ad van Deemen and Agnieszka Rusinowska (eds.) Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory, Berlin: Springer Verlag, XXX-XXX
(167) Nikolenyi, Csaba and Bernard Grofman. 2010 . The Puzzle of Minority Government in the Lok Sabha. In Csaba Nikolenyi. Minority Governments in India. London: Routledge, 87-120.
(168) Adams, James, Thomas Brunell, Bernard Grofman and Samuel Merrill. 2010 Why Candidate Divergence Should be Expected to be Just as Great (or even Greater) in Competitive Seats as in Non-Competitive Ones. Public Choice, 145 (3-4): 417-433
(169) Söderlund, Peter, Hanna Wass and Bernard Grofman. 2011 forthcoming.The effect of institutional and party system factors on turnout in Finnish parliamentary elections, 1962– 2007: A district-level analysis. In Manfred Holler and Mike Wildgren (Eds.). “Essays in Honor of Hannu Nurmi.” Special Issue of Homo Oeconomicus . XXX-XXX
(170) Merrill, Samuel III, Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell. 2011. Do Party Politics in Britain Exhibit Cycles? British Journal of Political Science, 41: 33-55.
(171) Grofman, Bernard. 2010. Thinking about Minority Political Influence: Did Georgia v. Ashcroft Get it Right and, if Not, why Not? Election Law Journal 9(4): 349-379
(172) Grofman, Bernard and Reuben Kline. forthcoming. How Many Political Parties are There, Really? A New Measure of the Ideologically Cognizable Number of Parties/Party Groupings. Party Politics,
24
PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print and forthcoming) (cont.)
(173) Grofman, Bernard, Thomas Brunell and Scott Feld. forthcoming. Bicameralism: The Neglected Contributions of the Calculus of Consent. Public Choice.
(174) Godfrey, Joseph, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. 2011 .Applications of Shapley-Owen Values and the Spatial Copeland Winner. Political Analysis
25
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print)
(Rl) Grofman, Bernard N. 1969. Some notes on voting schemes and the will of the majority. Public Choice, 7:65-80.
(R2) Grofman, Bernard N. 1972. The l97l American Political Science Association election. PS (commissioned for Summer l972), 278-289.
(R3) Pool, Jonathan and Bernard N. Grofman. 1975. Computer programs as a means of efficiency and control in cross-cultural experimental games. Experimental Study of Politics, 4(2):27-57.
(R4) Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. 1976. A note on clique avoidance in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors: Comparisons of manpower savings in six- and twelve-member juries. Public Choice, 26:l45-l50.
(R5) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1977. Variation in class size, the class size paradox, and some consequences for students. Research in Higher Education, 6(3):2l5-222.
(R6) Grofman, Bernard N. 1979. A pilot study of individual behavior as mediated by the group context: three- and five-member mock juries. Experimental Study of Politics, 7:41-54.
(R7) Grofman, Bernard N. 1979. Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies. Public Choice, 34(2):189-200.
(R8) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1980. Conflict of interest between faculty, students and administrators: Consequences of the class size paradox. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, 3:111-116.
(R9) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Fair apportionment and the Banzhaf index. American Mathematical Monthly, 88(1):1-5.
(R10) Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 1980/1981. Introduction to `Special Issue on Reapportionment.' Policy Studies Journal, Special Issue 3(9) and 9(6):817-825.
(R11) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Fair and equal representation. Ethics, 91:477-485.
(R12) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. For single-member districts, random is not equal. In Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,55-58.
(R13) Brody, Richard and Bernard N. Grofman. 1982. Stimulus differentiation vs. stimulus complexity as factors affecting turnout in two-candidate and multi-candidate races. Political Behavior, 4(1):83-92. 26
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(R14) Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. 1982. Average competence, variability in individual competence, and the accuracy of statistically pooled group decisions. Psychological Reports, 50:683-688.
(R15) Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. 1984. Group size and the performance of a composite group majority: Statistical truths and empirical results. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 33:350-359.
(R16) Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman. 1984. Introduction. In Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral System. NY: Praeger, 3-12.
(R17) Grofman, Bernard N. 1985. The neglected role of the status quo in models of issue voting. Journal of Politics, 47:231-237. Reprinted in Kai Arzheimer and Jocelyn Evans (Eds.) Electoral Behaviour. SAGE Publications. June 2008.
(R18) Grofman, Bernard N. and Nicholas Noviello. 1985. Jai-Alai outcomes as a function of player position and player skill level. Simulation and Games, 16(2):211-223.
(R19) Grofman, Bernard N. 1985. The accuracy of group majorities for disjunctive and conjunctive decision tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 35:119-123.
(R20) Grofman, Bernard N. 1985. The effect of restricted and unrestricted verdict options on juror choice. Social Science Research, 14:195-204.
(R21) Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart. 1986. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. NY: Agathon, 1-15.
(R22) Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski and Nicholas Noviello. 1986. Effects of multimember districts on black representation in state legislatures. Review of Black Political Economy, 14(4):65-78.
(R23) Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. 1986. Condorcet models: Avenues for future research. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 93-102.
(R24) Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. 1986. Determining optimal weights for expert judgment. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 67-172.
(R25) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. Partial single-peakedness: an extension and clarification. Public Choice, 51:71-80.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.) 27
(R26) Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. 1987. Two plus two plus two equals six: Term lengths of representatives and senators. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12(4):555-563.
(R27) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. 1987. A theorem on the optimal allocation of effort. Revista Colombiana de Matematicas, Vol. 21 (1987) 201-212.
(R28) Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Limitations of the spatial model. Public Choice, 58:161-167.
(R29) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. 1988. Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the yolk. Public Choice, 59:37-50.
(R30) Norrander, Barbara and Bernard Grofman. 1988. A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities. Public Choice, 57:187-192.
(R31) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision making. Public Choice, 59:239-252.
(R32) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space. Public Choice, 59:167-176.
(R33) Grofman, Bernard. 1989. Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, Richard II, and Santa Claus. Journal of Politics, 51(1):165-173.
(R34) Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not. Public Choice, 61:29-39.
(R35) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Toward a sociometric theory of representation. In Manfred Kochen (Ed.), The Small World. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988, 100-107.
(R36) Owen, Guillermo, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1989. Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem. Mathematical Social Sciences, 17:1-6.
(R37) Grofman, Bernard. 1989. The comparative analysis of coalition formation and duration: Distinguishing between-country and within-country effects. British Journal of Political Science, 19:291-302.
(R38) Grofman, Bernard. 1989. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (Eds.), The `Federalist Papers' and the New Institutionalism. NY: Agathon Press, 7-9.
(R39) Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. 1989. A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12(4/5):437-450, reprinted in Paul E. Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling in Political Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
28
(R40) Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Bernard Grofman and Janet Campagna. 1989. The Political Science 400: Citations by Ph.D. Cohort and by Ph.D.- Granting Institution. PS:258-270.
(R41) Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Must liberals always vote for liberals, and need the more competent candidate always be preferred? British Journal of Political Science, 19:154-159.
(R42) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1989. Minority population proportion and Black and Hispanic congressional success in the 1970s and 1980s. American Politics Quarterly, 17(4):436-445; reprinted in revised and updated form under the title "Preconditions for Black and Hispanic congressional success," in Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman (Eds.) United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities. New York. Greenwood Press, 1992.
(R43) Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1989. Democratic theory and the public interest: Condorcet and Rousseau revisited. American Political Science Review, 83(4): 1328-1340.
(R44) Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. 1990. Identical geography, different party: A natural experiment on the magnitude of party differences in the U.S. Senate, 1960-84. In Johnston, R.J., F.M. Shelley and P.J. Taylor (Eds.), Developments in Electoral Geography. London: Routledge, 207-217.
(R45) Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1990. Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition. Public Choice, 64:265-277.
(R46) Grofman, Bernard N. 1990. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 3-9.
(R47) Grofman, Bernard. 1990. Investing in knowledge production: Should political scientists be paid to think? Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(2):231-236.
(R48) Campagna, Janet and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Party control and partisan bias in 1980s congressional redistricting. Journal of Politics, 52(4):1242-1257.
(R49) Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1990. The structure of the Banks set. Public Choice, 66:243-251.
(R50) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1991. The half-win set and the geometry of spatial voting. Public Choice, 70:245-250.
(R51) Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. 1991. Is the Senate more liberal than the House?: Another look. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16(2):281-295.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
29
(R52) Brady, David and Bernard Grofman. 1991. Sectional differences in partisan bias and electoral responsiveness in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. British Journal of Political Science, 21(Part 2):247-256.
(R53) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1991. Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive preferences over multi-dimensional issues. Annals of Operations Research, 23:257-263.
(R54) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Multivariate methods and the analysis of racially polarized voting: Pitfalls in the use of social science by the courts. Social Science Quarterly, 72(4):826-833.
(R55) Brady, David W. and Bernard Grofman. 1991. Modeling the determinants of swing ratio and bias in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. Political Geography Quarterly, 10(3):254- 262.
(R56) Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. 1992. A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model. Quality and Quantity, 26: 85-93.
(R57) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1992. Who's afraid of the big bad cycle? Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(2):231-237.
(R58) Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. 1992. Determinants of legislative success in House committees, Public Choice, 74:233-243.
(R59) Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. 1992. Postscript: What is the best route to a color-blind society? In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 300-317.
(R60) Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. 1992. The effect of black population on electing Democrats and liberals to The House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17(3):365-379.
(R61) Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. 1992. The effects of congressional rules about bill co-sponsorship on duplicate bills: Changing incentives for credit claiming. Public Choice, 75:93-98.
(R62) Grofman, Bernard. 1992. Meeting Dynamics. In Gregory Phifer (ed.), Readings in Parliamentary Law. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 53-58; reprinted from 1977 Parliamentary Journal, 18.
(R63) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Editor's Introduction. In Bernard Grofman (ed.) Information, Participation and Choice: “An Economic Theory of Democracy” in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1-13.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
30
(R64) Grofman, Bernard and Julie Withers. 1993. Information pooling models of electoral competition. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: “An Economic Theory of Democracy” in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 55-64.
(R65) Wattenberg, Martin P. and Bernard Grofman. 1993. A rational choice model of the President and Vice-President as a package deal. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: “An Economic Theory of Democracy” in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 173-177.
(R66) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Voting rights in a multi-ethnic world. Chicano-Latino Law Review, 13(15):15-37.
(R67) Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. 1994. Editors' Introduction. In Chandler Davidson, and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 3-17.
(R68) Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. 1994. The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction. In Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 378-387.
(R69) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1995. Racial context, the 1968 Wallace vote, and Southern presidential dealignment: Evidence from North Carolina and elsewhere. In Munroe Eagles (Ed.), Spatial and Contextual Models in Political Research. London: Taylor and Francis, 151-162.
(R70) Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Gregory Berry. 1995. House members who become senators: Learning from a “natural experiment” in representation. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20(4):513-529.
(R71) Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. 1996. The effect of term limits when competition is endogenized: A preliminary model. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Boston: Kluwer, 175-182.
(R72) Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. 1996. Gubernatorial term limits and term lengths in historical perspective, 1790-1990. In B. Grofman (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Boston: Kluwer, 279-287.
(R73) Grofman, Bernard and Andrew Reynolds. 1996. Modeling the dropoff between minority population share and the size of the minority electorate in situations of differential voter eligibility across groups. Electoral Studies, 15(2):255-261.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(R74) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1996. Stability induced by no quibbling. Group Decision and Negotiation, 5:283-294. 31
(R75) Grofman, Bernard. 1997. Seven durable axes of cleavage in political science. In Kristen Monroe (Ed.), Contemporary Empirical Political Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press, 73-86.
(R76) Hanks, Christopher and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Turnout in gubernatorial and senatorial primary and general elections in the South, 1922-90: A rational choice model of the effects of short-run and long-run electoral competition on turnout. Public Choice, 94:407- 421.
(R77) Grofman, Bernard, Thomas L. Brunell, and William Koetzle. 1998. Why is there sometimes midterm gain in the Senate but (almost) always midterm loss in the house? Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(1):79-89.
(R78) Brunell, Thomas, and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788-1994. American Political Science Review 92(2):1-9.
(R79) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Voting Rights in the 1990s: An Overview. 1998. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press, 69-79. (An earlier and shorter version of this appeared as Bernard Grofman, The 1990s round of redistricting: A schematic outline of some key features. In Georgia Persons (ed.) Race and Representation. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers).
(R80) Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Conceptualizing voter choice for directional and discounting models of two-candidate spatial competition in terms of shadow candidates. Public Choice, 95: 219-231.
(R81) Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Christian Collet. 1998. Analyzing the turnout- competition link with aggregate cross-sectional data. Public Choice, 95: 233-246.
(R82) Grofman, Bernard. 1999. Preface: Methodological steps toward the study of embedded institutions. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The ComparativeStudy of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, ix-xvii.
(R83) Grofman, Bernard, Samuel Merrill, Thomas L. Brunell, and William Koetzle. 1999. The Potential Electoral Disadvantages of a Catch-All Party: Ideological Variance Among Republicans and Democrats in the 50 U. S. States. Party Politics 5(2): 199-210.
(R84) Arrington, Theodore S. and Bernard Grofman. 1999. Party registration choices as a function of the geographic distribution of partisanship: A model of “hidden partisanship” and an illustrative test. Political Geography, 18(2):173-185. RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(R85) Brunell, Thomas, William Koetzle, John DiNardo, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. 1999. The R2 = .93: Where Then Do They Differ? Comparing liberal and conservative 32
interest group ratings. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14:87-101.
(R86) Grofman, Bernard, Evald Mikkel, and Rein Taagepera. 1999. Electoral systems change in Estonia, 1989-1993. The Journal of Baltic Studies, 30(3):227-249.
(R87) Grofman, Bernard, Evald Mikkel, and Rein Taagepera. 2000. Fission and fusion of parties in Estonia, 1987-1999. Journal of Baltic Studies, 31(4): 329-357.
(R88) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Civil rights, the Constitution, common decency and common sense. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 219-230.
(R89) Grofman, Bernard, William Koetzle, Samuel Merrill, and Thomas Brunell. 2001. Changes in the Location of the Median Voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963- 1996. Public Choice, 106(3-4):221-232.
(R90) Regenwetter, Michel, Bernard Grofman and Anthony Marley. 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data." Mathematical Social Sciences 43(3):451-466.
(R91) Ray, Leonard, Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman. 2003. Implications of Expansion of the European Union for Decisions Within the EU Council. Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche., vols. 2-3:37-58. (Published in Italian)
(R92) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. 2004. If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff) then you ought to know about the Coombs Rule. Electoral Studies 23:641- 659.
(R93) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Rein Taagepera’s approach to the study of electoral systems. Journal of Baltic Studies 35(2): 167-185.
(R94) Johnston, Gregory, Leonard Ray, Scott Feld, and Bernard Grofman. 2004. The Impacts of Voting Rules on Acceding EU Member States. Rivista di Politica Economica, #VII- VIII (year XCIV, 3rd series, pp. 105-120; Reprinted in Geoffrey Brennan (ed.) Coercive Power and its Allocation in the Emergent Europe. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005, pp. 103- 117.
(R95) Grofman, Bernard and Scott Feld. 2005. Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College. Public Choice, 123:1-18.
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)
(R96) Fraenkel, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 2005. Editor’s Introduction – Special Issue: Political Culture, Representation and Electoral Systems in the Pacific Islands. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman, eds.) 43(3):261-275. 33
(R97) Grofman, Bernard. 2006. “The Impacts of Electoral Laws on Political Parties. In Weingast, Barry R. and Donald Wittman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 102-118.
(R98) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 2007. The Laakso-Taagepera Index in a Means and Variance Framework. Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (1): 101-106.
(R99) Grofman, Bernard. 2007. Toward a science of politics? European Political Science. 6: 143-155.
(R100) Masuoka, Natalie, Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld. 2007. The Political Science 400: A 20-Year Update." PS: Political Science & Politics 40(1):133-145.
(R101) Masuoka, Natalie, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 2007. "Production and Placement of Ph.D's: 1902-2000." PS: Political Science & Politics 40: (4) 361-366.
(R102) Masuoka, Natalie, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 2007 Ranking Departments: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches. PS: Political Science & Politics 40: 531-537.
(R103) Frankel, Jon and Bernard Grofman. 2007. The Merits of New-Downsian Modeling of the Alternative Vote: A Reply to Horowitz. Public Choice 133:1-11.
(R104) Fowler, James H., Grofman, Bernard and Natalie Masuoka. 2007. Social Networks in Political Science: Hiring and Placement of Ph.D.s, 1960-2002. PS: Political Science & Politics 40:(4) 729-739.
(R105) Grofman, Bernard. 2008. A Taxonomy of Runoff Methods. Electoral Studies 27: 395- 399. 34
RESEARCH NOTES AND MINOR ARTICLES (in print and forthcoming)
(R106) Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. 2008. The Partisan Consequences of Baker v. Carr and the ‘One Person, One Vote’ Revolution. In Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 225- 236.
(R107) Lemennicier, B., Lescieux-Katir H., and Bernard Grofman. 2008. When Does the Candidate Supported by the Median Voter Win? French Presidential Elections, 1965- 2007. French Politics, (6) 388-394.
(R108) Grofman, Bernard and Matt A. Barreto. 2009. A Reply to Zax’s (2002) Critique of Grofman and Migalski (1988): ‘Double Equation Approaches to Ecological Inference When the Independent Variable is Misspecified.’ Sociological Methods & Research, 37(4): 599-617.
(R109) Grofman, Bernard. 2009. Determinants of Political Science Faculty Salaries at the University of California. PS: Political Science & Politics, 43(4) 719-727.
(R110) Grofman, Bernard and Reuben Kline. 2010. Evaluating the Impact of Vice- Presidential Selection on Voter Choice. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 40 (2): 303-309.
(R111) Grofman, Bernard and Reuben Kline. 2010. A New Measure for Understanding the Tenure of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1789-2009. Judicature, 93(6): 247-252.
(R112) Grofman, Bernard. 2010. Constraints on the Turnout Gap Between High and Low Knowledge (or Income) Voters: Combining the Duncan-Davis Method of Bounds with the Taagepera Method of Bounds. Electoral Studies 29 (4): 673-677 .
(R113) Grofman, Bernard. F. Electoral Systems. 2011. In Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino (Eds.) International Handbook of Political Science. Sage Publications, XXX
35
PREPARED TESTIMONY AND PHOTO-OFFSET CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
(T1) Mathematics and politics: Mathematical reasoning and optimal jury decision processes. Plus, Reply. In Max Black (Ed.), Problems of Choice and Decision: Proceedings of a Colloquium Held in Aspen, Colorado, June 24-July 6, l974. Cornell University Program on Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies: Photo-offset, l975, 33l-337; 544-547.
(T2) A comment on Black's 'rationality and cultural relativism.' In Max Black (Ed.), Problems of Choice and Decision: Proceedings of a Colloquium Held in Aspen, Colorado, June 24-July 6, l974. Cornell University Program on Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies: Photo-offset, l975, l6l-l90.
(T3) Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. Synopsis: A Bayesian approach to optimal decision making. In J. L. Elohim (Ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Systems and Cybernetics, Mexico City, August 13-17, 1981, photo-offset, 1981.
(T4) Comment on H.R. 2349, a bill on standards for congressional redistricting. Prepared for the staff of the Wednesday Study Group, U.S. House of Representatives, April 1981.
(T5) Report on the constitutionality of Hawaii Reapportionment Commission's proposed state legislative redistricting. Prepared testimony in Travis v. King, U.S. District Court for the State of Hawaii, March 23-24, 1982, photo-offset.
(T6) Report to the Special Master on methodology used to insure compliance with standards of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Flateau v. Anderson. U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, June 7, 1982, photo-offset.
(T7) The disadvantageous effects of at-large elections on the success of minority candidates for the Charlotte and Raleigh City Councils. Prepared testimony in Gingles v. Edmisten. U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset.
(T8) Effects of multimember districts in state legislative elections in eight North Carolina counties, 1978-1982. Prepared testimony in Gingles v. Edmisten, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. (Also see R22.)
(T9) Report on prima facie evidence of political gerrymandering in the 1983 California Congressional redistricting plan, plus Rejoinder. Prepared testimony in Badham v. Eu, U.S. District Court for the State of California, December 1983, photo-offset.
(T10) Report on the effects of the proposed redistricting plan for the South Carolina Senate. Prepared testimony in South Carolina v. U.S., U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, photo-offset, July 1984.
36
PREPARED TESTIMONY AND PHOTO-OFFSET CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (cont.)
(T11) Affidavits in Haskins v. Wilson County, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, photo-offset, 1985-86.
(T12) Affidavit in Jackson v. Nash County, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, April 1986.
(T13) Affidavits in U.S. v. City Council of Los Angeles, U.S. District Court for the State of California, July 1986.
(T14) Declarations in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, U.S. District Court for the State of California, August and October 1986.
(T15) Declarations in McGhee et al. v. Granville County of North Carolina, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 1987.
(T16) Declarations in Badillo et al. v. City of Stockton, U.S. District Court for the State of California, December 1987 and February 1988.
(T17) Affidavits in Republican National Committee of North Carolina v. James G. Martin, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, July, August 1988.
(T18) Report in Chisom v. Roemer, Civil Action No. 86-4075 in the Eastern District of Louisiana, October 1988, revised March 1989.
(T19) Affidavits regarding minority representation in the 1988 Republican National Convention, August 5, 1988, and August 8, 1988.
(T20) Report in Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. U.S. District Court for the State of California, April 1989; Declaration, October 26, 1989.
(T21) Report for the Alaska Districting Commission on racially polarized voting in elections to the Alaska legislature, May 1991.
(T22) Report in Republican State Party of Massachusetts v. Connolly, U.S. District Court for the State of Massachusetts, December 1991.
(T23) Declaration in Pope et al. v. Blue et al., U.S. District Court, Western District, Charlotte, North Carolina Division, March 5, 1992.
(T24) Declaration in Prosser v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections, U.S. District Court for the State of Wisconsin, April 1992.
(T25) Reports for State of Alaska on the 1992 legislative districts, November 1993, January 1994.
37
PREPARED TESTIMONY AND PHOTO-OFFSET CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (cont.)
(T26) Declaration in Republican Party of North Carolina v. James B. Hunt, Governor of North Carolina, April 1994.
(T27) Expert witness declaration in Bush. v Vera, U.S. District Court, Texas, July 18, 1996.
(T28) Expert witness declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, U.S. District Court, North Carolina, July 24, 1996.
(T29) Expert witness declaration in Garcia v. City of Los Angeles, U.S. District Court, California, November 20, 1996.
(T30) Expert witness reports in Arrington et al. v. Elections Bd. 173 F. Supp. 2d 856 U.S. District Court, Eastern Division, Wisconsin, January, February and March, 2002.
(T31) Expert witness affidavit in Rodriguez et al. v. Pataki, et al., Case No. 02 Civ. 618, 01 Civ. 3843, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, May 11, 2002.
(T32) Report on Election Rules for Determining Representation on New York City Community District Education Councils. Prepared for NYC Dept of Education, October, 2003.
(T33) Grofman, Bernard and Gary Jacobson. Amicus Brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on Behalf of Neither Party in Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 (2004)
(T34) King, Gary, Bernard Grofman, Jonathan Katz and Andrew Gelman. Amicus Brief, in the U.S. Supreme Court on Behalf of Neither Party in LULAC v. Perry 126 S. Ct. 2549 (2006)
(T35) Persily, Nathaniel, Bernard Grofman, Bruce Cain, Theodore Arrington and Lisa Handley. Amicus Brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on Behalf of Neither Party in Bartlett v. Strickland No. 07-689. (2008)
38
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B1) Book note: Robert's Rules of Order (New, Revised). 1970. American Political Science Review, 64:l288-l290.
(B2) The 1970 APSA election." 1972. PS, (Summer):278-289.
(B3) A note on some generalizations of the paradox of cyclical majorities. 1972. Public Choice, 12:113-114.
(B4) Book note: John Sohnquist, Multivariate Model Building. 1974. American Political Science Review, 69:l749.
(B5) Rational choice models and self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies. In W. Leinfellner and E. Kohler (Eds.), Developments in the Methodology of Social Science, Boston: Reidel, l974, 38l-383.
(B6) A comment on "Democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model." 1975. Public Choice, 21:l00-l03.
(B7) Book note: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. 1976. Theory and Decision, 23l-234.
(B8) A comment on "Single-peakedness and Guttman scales: Concept and measurement." 1976. Public Choice, 28:l07-lll.
(B9) Communication: Sloppy sampling - a comment on “six-member juries in the Federal Courts.” 1977. Social Action and the Law Newsletter, 4(2):4-5.
(B10) Communication: `Differential effects of jury size. . .' revisited. 1977. Social Action and the Law Newsletter, 4(2):7-ll.
(B11) Monopoly, the state of the art: A review of The Monopoly Book and l000 Ways to Win Monopoly Games. 1978. Simulation and Games, 9:245-251. (Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA.)
(B12) Monopoly is a capitalist plot. 1978. Simulation and Games, 9(2): 252-254. (Reprinted in 1979, Puzzles and Games, 70).
(Bl3) Book note: Keith M. Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics. 1978. American Political Science Review, 72(1): 212-213.
(Bl4) Book note: Oliver Thomson, Mass Persuasion in History. 1978. Journal of Communication, (Autumn):204-205.
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print) (cont.) 39
(B15) A comment on Dye and McManus' use of discriminant function analysis. 1978. Political Methodology, 5:241-248.
(B16) Book note: Michael Saks, Jury Verdicts. 1979. Social Action and the Law Newsletter, 5(1):9-11.
(B17) Book note: Michael Tracey, The Production of Political Television. 1979. Journal of Communication, 29(4):211-212.
(B18) A note on Abraham Lincoln in probabilityland. 1979. Theory and Decision, 11:453-455.
(B19) The case for majority jury verdicts. 1979. Trial Magazine, 18(12): 23-25, 29, 47-48.
(B20) Book review: Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation. 1980. Theory and Decision, 12:107-114.
(B21) Book note: Susan Hensley, Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication. American Political Science Review, Vol. 74 (March 1980), 166-167.
(B22) Book note: Howard D. Hamilton, Electing the Cincinnati City Council: An Examination of Alternative Electoral-Representation Systems. 1981. American Political Science Review, 75:771-772.
(B23) Comment: Should representatives be 'typical' of their constituents? In B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay, and H. Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, l982, 97-99.
(B24) Book note: Bruce J. West (Ed.), Mathematical Models as a Tool for the Social Sciences. 1982. Social Sciences Quarterly, 63:610-611.
(B25) Book review: Political geography. 1982. American Political Science Review, 76(4):883-885.
(B26) Abstract: Measuring the political consequences of electoral laws. 1983. Mathematical Social Sciences, 4(2):184-186.
(B27) Comment: Models of voter turnout: A brief idiosyncratic review. 1983. Public Choice, 41: 55-61.
(B28) Advice to the expert witness in court. 1984. PS (Winter): 60-61.
(B29) Should you brush your on November 6, 1984? 1984. PS (Summer): 577-580. (Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B30) Introduction to minisymposium: Political gerrymandering: Badham v. Eu, Political 40
science goes to court. 1985. PS (Summer): 538-543.
(B31) Grofman Declarations in Badham v. Eu (excerpts). 1985. PS (Summer 544-549, 573-574.
(B32) Expert vs. expert: Lessons from Badham v. Eu. 1985. PS (Summer): 576-581.
(B33) Book review: Reasonable methods for aggregating preferences, a review of Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn Approval Voting. 1985. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 29: 128-132.
(B34) Reflections on academia. 1986. PS (Winter): 57-61.(Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
(B35) Everything you always wanted to know about parliamentary procedure in an academic senate and were afraid to ask. 1986. PS (1986): 661-668.
(B36) Book note: Gunnar Boalt, The Political Process. 1986. Contemporary Sociology, 15(3):469.
(B37) Book review: Michael Dummett, Voting Procedures. 1986. Contemporary Sociology, 15(4):637-638.
(B38) Biographical entry: Duncan Black. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 1987. New York: Stockton Press, 250-251. (Reprinted in the 2nd edition: Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, Eds., 2007.)
(B39) Biographical entry: Lewis Carroll. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 1987. New York: Stockton Press, 371-372.
(B40) Book review: Schmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush, Collective Decision-Making: An Economic Outlook. 1987. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 168-170.
(B41) Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. 1988. The return of the native: The supply elasticity of the American Indian population, 1950-1980. Public Choice,57: 85-88.
(B42) The minimax blame rule for voter choice: Help for the undecided voter on November 8, 1988. 1988. PS (Summer):639-640. .(Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
(B43) Book note: Manfred Holler (Ed.), The logic of multi-party systems. 1988. Political Geography Quarterly, 7(3):300-301.
(B44) Book note: Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity. 1989. American Political Science Review 83(2):323-324.
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B45) Pool, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Linguistic artificiality and cognitive 41
competence. In Klaus Schubert (ed.), Interlinguistics: Aspects of the Science of Planned Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 145-156.
(B46) Uncle Wuffle’s advice to the advanced graduate student. 1989. PS (December): 838-839.
(B47) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions. Social Choice and Welfare, 7:71-74.
(B48) Hofeller, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Comparing the compactness of California congressional districts under three different plans, 1980, 1982 and 1984. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 281-288.
(B49) Kernell, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Determining the predictability of partisan voting patterns in California elections, 1978-1984. In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 289-295.
(B50) Book review: Edward Carmines and James Stimson, Issue Evolution. 1990. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 2(2):185-190.
(B51) Rejoinder: Straw men and stray bullets, a reply to Bullock. 1991. Social Science Quarterly, 72(4):840-843.
(B52) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Questions of Electoral Fairness (translated into Japanese by Kyoji Wakata) in Nomp No. 2, Kansai University Institute of Legal Studies, Osaka, Japan, 19-24.
(B53) Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. 1992. Editors' Introduction: Issues and controversies in voting rights. In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson (eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: A 25 Year Perspective on the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, 1-3.
(B54) Grofman, Bernard and Davidson, Chandler. Comment on "The study of race, history, and politics." CLIO (Newsletter, American Political Science Association Section on Politics & History), Fall/Winter, 1992/1993, 4-5.
(B55) Zimmerman, Joseph F. and Bernard Grofman. 1992. In Memoriam: Leon Weaver. PS, 25(1):97.
(B56) Grofman, Bernard. 1992. A corollary to the third axiom of general semantics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(2):238-240.
(B57) Grofman, Bernard. 1992. Book note: Laver and Schofield, Coalitions, Social Choice and Welfare, 265-266 42
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print) (cont.)
(B58) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Is turnout the paradox that ate rational choice theory? In Bernard Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: `An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 93-103.
(B59) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. On the gentle art of rational choice bashing. In Bernard Grofman (ed.) Information, Participation and Choice: `An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 239- 242.
(B60) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Advice to the Assistant Professor, PS (March):89-90.
(B61) Grofman, Bernard. The political economy of the automobile - Four approaches. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 5, No 3, (July, 1993): 409-412. .(Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
(B62) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Throwing darts at double regression and missing the target. Social Science Quarterly, 74(3):478-487.
(B63) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. Lessons of Athenian democracy: Editor's Introduction, The 2500th Anniversary of Democracy. PS, (September): 471-474.
(B64) Grofman, Bernard. 1994. Book review. John Craven, Social Choice: A Framework for Collective Decisions and Individual Judgements.Ethics, 104(2):430-431.
(B65) Grofman, Bernard. 1994. Book note: Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. American Political Science Review, 88(2):439-440.
(B66) Grofman, Bernard. 1995. Anthony Downs. In S.M. Lipset et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Democracy, Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Books, 378-380.
(B67) Grofman, Bernard. 1995. Districting. In S.M. Lipset et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Democracy, Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Books, 367-372.
(B68) Grofman, Bernard. 1995. Shaw v. Reno and the Future of Voting Rights PS (March): 27- 36.
(B69) Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. 1996. Letter to the Editor in rebuttal to Carol Swain. Chronicle of Higher Education, (November):10.
(B70) Grofman, Bernard. 1996. Introduction to the Term Limits Debate: Hypotheses in Search of Data. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1-18.
43
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B71) Grofman, Bernard and Christian Collet. 1997. Why Democrats shouldn't vote (with acknowledgments to Robert Erikson). Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(1):137-140. (Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
(B72) Brunell, Thomas, Bernard Grofman. 1997. The 1992 and 1996 presidential elections: Whatever happened to the Republican electoral college lock? Presidential Studies Quarterly. 27(1):134-138.
(B73) Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. 1997. Response to Macdonald and Rabinowitz. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(1):57-60.
(B74) Grofman, Bernard, Thomas Brunell and William Koetzle. 1997. Death, where is thy sting? The Senate as a Ponce (de Leon) scheme. PS, 1:58-59. (Reprinted in Journal of Irreproducible Results, 1999, 44(5): 25-26. (Reprinted n Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA.)
(B75) Grofman, Bernard and Shaun Bowler. 1997. STV in the family of electoral systems. Representation, 34(1):43-47.
(B76) Grofman, Bernard. 1997. Book Note: Duncan Black. "Formal contributions to the theory of public choice.” Public Choice, 7:1-3.
(B77) Grofman, Bernard. 1998. Rebuttal to Wuffle and Collet’s supposedly irrefutable evidence that higher turnout benefits Republicans. Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(2):251-255
(B78) Grofman, Bernard Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall. 1999. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall, eds. Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
(B79) Grofman, Bernard. 1999. Credo of a “reasonable choice” modeler. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(2): 203-206.
(B80) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Editor’s Introduction. In Bernard Grofman (ed.) Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1-6.
(B81) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Electoral districting. In Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst and Adam Winkler (eds.) Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
44
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B82) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Miller v. Johnson. In Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst and Adam Winkler (eds.) Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
(B83) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. In Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst and Adam Winkler (eds.) Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
(B84) Grofman, Bernard. The Downsian model of elections. 2000. In Richard Rose (ed.) International Eneyclopedia of Elections. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 70-72.
(B85) Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. Introduction: STV in an Embedded Institution. In Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the Single Transferable Vote. Ann Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1-14.
(B86) Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. Conclusion: STV’s Place in the Family of Electoral Systems. In Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the Single Transferable Vote. Ann Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press, 265-270.
(B87) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. Book Review: David T. Canon. Race, Redistricting and Representation. The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Public Choice, 105:201-205.
(B88) Grofman, Bernard. 2001. Apportionment, political; gerrymander; reapportionment. In Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Eds.) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1: 598-601.
(B89) Grofman, Bernard. 2001. A note of caution in interpreting the threshold of exclusion. Electoral Studies, 20:299-303.
(B90) Grofman, Bernard. 2003. Electoral laws, parties, and public policy (published in Japanese). In Yukio Adachi and Tosimasa Moriwaki (Eds.) Public Policy: A Festschrift for Katsumi Yamakawa. Kyoto, Japan: Shobo, Ltd. 299-311.
(B91) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Alternative voting methods. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 9-12.
(B92) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Arrow's impossibility theorem. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 25-27.
45
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B93) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Black's single-peakedness condition. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 43-45.
(B94) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Comment on Gordon Tullock’s ‘A curmudgeon’s view of the EMU.’ In Guiseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider (eds.) Changing Institutions in the European Union: A Public Choice Perspective. New York: Edward Elgar.
(B95) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. The prospects of electoral reform (foreword). In Josep Colomer (ed.), Handbook of Electoral System Choice. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. pp. xi-xx.
(B96) Grofman, Bernard. 2005. Ph.D.s Without Borders? Drawing Subdisciplinary Boundaries in Political Science. APSA Comparative Politics Section Newsletter, 16(1): 8-11.
(B97) Grofman, Bernard. 2005. Comparisons among electoral systems: Distinguishing between localism and candidate-centered politics. Electoral Studies, 24(4): 735-740.
(B98) Grofman, Bernard. 2005. Contribution and Spending Limits for Initiatives or Other Ballot Propositions: What Evidence is Needed to Justify a Particular Regulatory Regime? Southern California Law Review, 78: 927-937.
(B99) Gray, Mark M. and Bernard Grofman. 2005. Vindicating Anthony Downs. PS, 38(4): 737-740. (Reprinted in Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. APSA, 2010.)
(B100) Grofman, Bernard and Michael Lewis-Beck. 2005. “Elections Under the French Double- Ballot System: Guest Editors’ Introduction to the Minisymposium.” French Politics, 3(2):93-97
(B101) Fraenkel, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 2006. “The Failure of the Alternative Vote as a Tool for Promoting Ethnic Moderation in Fiji.” Comparative Political Studies, 39(5):663-666.
(B102) Uncle Wuffle’s Advice on Job Talks. 2006. PS: Political Science and Politics (2006), 39: 883-886.
(B103) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 2009. Editors’ Introduction. In Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman (Eds). Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-8. 46
BOOK NOTES, REVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS (in print)
(B104) Anthony Downs. 2008. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.) Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer Verlag. 91-96.
(B104) Kenneth Arrow. 2008. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.) Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer Verlag. 85-90.
(B105) Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman. Electoral Engineering, Social Clevages and Democracy. Public Choice, forthcoming
(B106) Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler and Andre Blais. 2008. Editors’ Introduction. In Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler, and Andre Blais (Eds.) Duverger’s Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K. Berlin: Springer Verlag. XXX-XXX.
(B107) Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler and Andre Blais. 2008. Guest Editors’ Introduction to the Minisymposium on Runoff Elections. Electoral Studies, XXX-XXX.
(B108) Grofman, Bernard. 2010. Reflections on Prediction. In Sigelman et al. (Eds.), The Wit and Humor of Political Science. American Political Science Association, XXX-XXX
(B109) Grofman, Bernard. 2010. Voter Advice in the Presidential Election of 2008: A Guide for the Perplexed. In Sigelman et al. (Eds.) The Wit and Humor of Political Science, APSA, XXX-XXX
(B110) Editors’ Introduction. 2011. In Giannetti, Daniela and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform: Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan. Springer, XXX-XXX
(B111) Editors’ Introduction. 2011. In Dolez, Bernard, Bernard Grofman and Annie Laurent Eds.) In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections. Springer, XXX-XXX
(B112) Editors’ Introduction. 2011. In Sigelman, Lee, Kenneth Newton, Kenneth J. Meier, and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) The Wit and Humor of Political Science. American Political Science Association, XXX-XXX.
(B113 ) Editors’ Introduction. 2011. In Dolez, Bernard, Bernard Grofman and Annie Laurent (Eds.) Mini-symposium “The Legacy of Maurice Duverger” (translated into French). Revue Internationale Politiques Comparées, XXX-XXX.
(B114) Grofman, Bernard, Craig L. Brians and Christine Coulter. Forthcoming. The Neglected Importance of Temperature: Implications for State Level Voter Turnout and for Life Expectancy. PS, XXX-XXX
47
SEMIPROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (in print)
(Sl) Grofman, Bernard. 1971. Voting tactics: A neglected study, parts I, II. Parliamentary Journal, 12(3):3-l5; 12(4):l9-26.
(S2) Grofman, Bernard and Howard Scarrow. 1977. Who knows the score on the board of supervisors? 1977. Opinion-Editorial Page, Newsday, March 6, l977.
(S3) Grofman, Bernard. 1979. My years as parliamentarian to the United States National Student Association. Parliamentary Journal, 20:18-21.
(S4) Grofman, Bernard and Howard Scarrow. 1981. The riddle of apportionment: Equality of what? National Civic Review, 70(5):242-254.
(S5) Grofman, Bernard. 1984. The Democratic party is alive and well. Society, 18-21.
(S6) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. Court should plunge deeper into gerrymandering thicket. Opinion-Editorial Page, Los Angeles Times, July 15.
(S7) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. California's gerrymander and the U.S. Supreme Court. Opinion-Editorial Page, The Sacramento Bee, July 30.
(S8) Grofman, Bernard. 1987. Should city councils be elected by district? PRO. Western Cities Magazine, 4:30-31.
(S9) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. What now for gerrymandering? Opinion-Editorial Page, The San Diego Union, November 18.
(S10) Loewen, James W. and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Comment: Recent developments in methods used in voting rights litigation. Urban Lawyer 21(3):589-604.
(S11) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Voting rights, voting wrongs: The legacy of Baker v. Carr. A report of the Twentieth Century Fund. New York: Priority Press (distributed through the Brookings Institution), 1991.
(S12) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Voting rights may be an issue in Santa Ana. Opinion-Editorial Page, Los Angeles Times (Orange County Edition), August 5.
(S13) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Race and redistricting: No one is using the Voting Rights Act to "whiten" majority districts. Opinion-Editorial Page, Washington Post, October 21.
(S14) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. High court ruling won't doom racial gerrymandering. Opinion- Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, July 9.
48
SEMIPROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (in print) (cont.)
(S15) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. The Denny beating trial: justice in the balance. Opinion- Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, November 3.
(S16) Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1994. Everyone loses in South Africa boycott. Opinion-Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, March 28.
(S17) Grofman, Bernard. 1994. An introduction to racial bloc voting analysis. With an annotated select bibliography on racial bloc voting and related topics. Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Council.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
(Ol) Chicago. In David Glazier (Ed.), Student Travel in America. New York: Pyramid Publication, l968. (Under pseudonym.)
(O2) Chicago: Hyde Park and the University of Chicago, the Loop and Near-North. In Where the Fun is: East of the Mississippi. NY: Simon and Schuster, l969. (Under pseudonym.)
SOCIAL SCIENCES WORKING PAPERS AND RESEARCH REPORTS
(W1) Note: Confessions of a mad modeler, Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, University of California, June 1978.
(W2) Note: The paradox of voting in a faculty appointment decision (with Steven Brown). Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, June 1978.
WEBSITE POSTINGS
(W1) A Comment on Lowi and Calise. Posted in June, 1999, on the website of the IPSA Research Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis: http://www2.hawaii.edu/%7Efredr/grofman.htm
(W2) “Questions and Answers about Motor Voter: An Important Reform That Is Not Just for Democrats” Posted in 1995, on the website of the Center for Voting and Democracy http://www.fairvote.org/reports/1995/chp6/grofman.html
(W3) Grofman, Bernard. 2006. “This Way to the Egress and Other Reflections on Partisan Gerrymanding Claims in Light of LULAC v. Perry.” Michigan Law Review on line: http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/grofman.pdf
49
CURRENT RESEARCH
Much of my current research is in behavioral social choice, linking mathematical models of group and individual decision making to empirical evidence, with a focus on electoral behavior and voter choice and issues connected with representation and redistricting, political parties and coalitions. I also have strong side interests in individual and group information processing; political propaganda, particularly political cartooning and satire; and in law and social science, particularly in the domain of civil rights; as well as in using computers as a teaching aid; and in statistical training for citizen literacy.
CONFERENCE GRANTS
2011-12 Collaborative Workshops on Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy (NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich, $27,00, with Daniel Bochsler)
2008 Conference on Long Term Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan. Bologna Italy, November 28-29, 2008. (UCI Center for the Study of Democracy supplemental funding $7,500).
2006 Conference on Plurality and Runoff Methods in Canada, United States and United Kingdom (Canadian Embassy, $5,000, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy supplemental funding, $5,000; with Shaun Bowler), February 17-20.
2005 Conference on Spatial Social Choice, December 9-11 (UCI Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, and the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy; with Donald Saari.)
2004 2004 Conference on Pluralitarian/Majoritarian Electoral Systems (Borchard Foundation, $25,000, with $2,500 supplemental funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy; with James Adams and Shaun Bowler).
2000-01 Conference on Comparative Redistricting (National Science Foundation Program in Political Science, $22,000, with $5,000 supplemental funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, the UCI Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, and the School of Social Sciences; with Lisa Handley).
1998 Conference on Mixed Electoral Systems that Emulate the German Model (UC Center for the German and European Studies, $10,000, and $5000 supplemental funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, with Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg)
1997 Conference on Electoral and Party Systems in Scandinavia: Origins and Evolution (UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, $11,000, with Arend Lijphart).
50
CONFERENCE GRANTS (cont.)
1996 Conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote (UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, $11,000, with Shaun Bowler).
1994-95 Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Thirty Year Perspective. Joyce Foundation (#446740-49317, $18,500 with additional funding by the Federal Judicial Center).
1991-92 Conference on Japanese, Korean and U.S. Election Practices in Comparative Perspective (UC Pacific RimResearch Program, $14,700,with Sung Chull Lee, Rein Taagepera and Brian Woodall,).
1991-92 Workshops on Politics and the Democratization Process, (National Science Foundation, Political Science Program SES# 91-13984 ($42,000, with Russell Dalton and Harry Eckstein).
1989-90 A Conference on the Voting Rights Act: A Twenty-five Year Perspective (Rockefeller Foundation, $50,000, with Thomas Mann and Chandler Davidson, under the auspices of The Brookings Institution).
1988 A Conference on "The Calculus of Consent": A Twenty-five Year Perspective (Liberty Fund, with Donald Wittman).
1982 A Conference on Information Pooling. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 82-09109, $26,300, with Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld).
1980 A Conference on Representation and Apportionment Issues in the 1980s. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 79-26813, $20,200, with Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay, and Howard Scarrow; additional $8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association)
1979 A Conference on Voter Turnout. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 78-19433, $14,400, with Richard Brody and Herbert Weisberg).
51
CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished)
(C34) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Distinguishing between ideological and judgmental bases of transitive majority choice. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, August 1992; presented in revised form at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, March 24-26, 1995.
(C37) Grofman, Bernard. What is a constitution? Presented at U.C. Irvine conference on "Constitutional Design," June 1993.
(C38) Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard Grofman. Choosing an electoral system for the new South Africa: the main proposals. Presented at the Conference on Electoral Reform and Democratization, Columbia Institute for Western European Studies, Columbia University, April 18-19, 1994.
(C42) Grofman, Bernard. Are voting rights special? Presented at the Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, Washington D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994.
(C43) Grofman, Bernard, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin. Does a rising tide lift all challengers? Rethinking the partisan implications of higher turnout. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, March 24- 26, 1995.
(C49) Grofman, Bernard and H. W. Wales. Ideal of the impartial jury. Prepared for delivery at the Conference of the Role of the Jury in a Democratic society. Georgetown University Law Center, October 29, 1995.
(C51) Grofman, Bernard, Michael McDonald, William Koetzle, and Thomas Brunell. Strategic policy balancing. Presented at the Conference on Strategy and Politics, Center for the Study of Collective Choice, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, April 12, 1996.
(C54) Grofman, Bernard, William Koetzle and Thomas Brunell. Rethinking the link between district diversity and electoral competitiveness. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 29- September 1, 1997.
(C55) Caul, Miki, Rein Taagepera, Bernard Grofman. Determining the number of parties in stable democracies: Social heterogeneity and electoral institutions. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles, CA, March 9-21, 1998.
52
CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont.)
(C58) McDonald, Michael and Bernard Grofman. Redistricting and the polarization of the House of Representatives. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, April 15-16. (A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1999 Western Political Science Association Conference, Seattle, March 25-27, 1999.)
(C59) Commisso, Ellen and Bernard Grofman. Liberty, equality, fraternity: Tripolarity, cycles and the dynamics of party competition in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
(C65) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. "Issue and electoral success: The paradox of nonmonotonicity." Paper presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, March 9-11, 2001, San Antonio, TX; presented in revised form as “Theoretical and empirical findings concerning candidates' optimal choices of issue dimensions: Implications for U.S. presidential elections.” Paper presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, March 22-24, 2002, San Diego, CA; presented in revised form as “Stuck in space: The neglected importance of issue salience for political competition.” Paper presented at the European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, April 25-28, 2003, Aarhus, Denmark; presented in revised form at the UCI Institute for Behavioral Mathematical Sciences “Conference on Spatial Voting,” December 10-11, 2005; presented in revised form as “Putting a Spin on It: Geometric Insights into How Candidates with Seemingly Losing Positions Can Still Win.” Paper presented in further revised form at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August, 2007, New York, New York.
(C67) Gray, Mark and Bernard Grofman. Several (likely to be contentious) claims about the nature and prerequisites of democracy." Prepared for delivery at the Second London School of Economics Workshop on "Freedom and Democracy," London, June 15, 2001.
(C72) Grofman, Bernard and Samuel Merrill. What does it mean to offer a “solution” to the problem of ecological inference? Paper presented at the Conference on New Advances in Ecological Inference, June 17-18, 2002, Cambridge MA.
(C82) Grofman, Bernard. Statistics and Social Choice: Connections Between Sports and Politics.” Paper presented at the University of California, Irvine Institute for Mathematical Sciences Conference on Decisions, Sports, and Statistics” December 4, 2004.
(C88) Wayman, Frank, Bernard Grofman and Matt Barreto. “Party ID in the US in Longitudinal Perspective.” Presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference, Nicosia Cyprus, April 27, 2006.
53
CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont.)
(C94) Gray, Mark, Paul Perl and Bernard Grofman. “More Than an Ocean Apart: The Americas and the College of Cardinals 1903-2005.” Prepared for delivery at the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion conference, Portland, Oregon. October 19- 22, 2006.
(C96) Grofman, Bernard, James Fowler, Natalie Masuoka and Scott Feld. “Social Choice Approaches to Social Exchange Networks.” Presented at a Colloquium of the Netherlands Group in Social Choice ,Tilburg University, April 5, 2007. Also presented as a colloquium at the University of Paris, I, June 5, 2007.
(C97) Grofman, Bernard. “French Runoff Elections in Comparative Perspective.” Presented at a conference on French Legislative Elections organized by the Election Analysis Group of the French Political Science Association (in conjunction with CEVIPOF, Sciences-Po), June 10, 2007.
(C98) Schneider, Carsten Q. and Bernard Grofman. “Visual Presentation of Fuzzy QCA Data.” Paper presented at panel on “Political Methodology,” European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy, September 6-8, 2007. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Comparative Social Sciences, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, July 15-16, 2006, under the title “It Might Look Like a Regression Equation…but It Is Not! An Intuitive Approach to the Presentation of QCA and fs/QCA Results.”
(C101) Brunell, Thomas, Grofman, Bernard and Samuel Merrill, III. “Putting Critical Elections in the U.S. House of Representative in Historical Context, 1954-2006.” Prepared for delivery at the Annual Public Choice Meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada March 6 through March 8. 2009. Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, April 2-5, 2009, to be held in Chicago, IL.
(C102) Winer, Stanley, Larry Kenny and Bernard Grofman. “Explaining Variation in the Degree of Electoral Competition in a Mature Democracy: U.S. Senate Elections 1922-2004. American Political Science Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August, 2009; an earlier version was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, March, 2007.
(C104) Grofman, Bernard. “Voting as Habit.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Monterey, California, March, 2010.
(C105) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. “Creating and Maintaining a Scale-Free Core-Periphery Fractal Network” Annual Meeting of the International Society for Social Networks. Riva del Garda, Italy, June 30-July 4, 2010.
(C106) Samuel Merrill, Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell. “Dynamics of Party Differentiation.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. August, 2010.
54
CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont.)
(C107) Bernard Grofman. “Voting Rights and Minority Representation in the United States in Comparative Perspective.” Presented at a conference on The impact of Electoral Institutions and Political Parties, University of Manchester, Manchester England, September 20, 2010.
(C108) Daniela Giannetti and Bernard Grofman. “Studying Electoral Engineering via a Double-Barrelled Natural Experiment: Comparing the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan.” Presented at the Biennial Fall Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Reykjavik, Iceland, August 24-27, 2011.
(C109) Steven Ferris, Stanley Winer and Bernard Grofman. “The Impact of Keynesianism and Central Banking Practices on Canadian Budget Deficits.” Presented at the Conference on New Perspectives on Public Debt, European Center for the Study of Public Choice. Sapienza University of Rome, September 26-28, 2011. Presented in slightly revised form at the World Congress of the Public Choice Societies, Miami, March 8-12, 2012.
55
OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION
Invited speaker, Federal Judicial Center Conference for Federal Judges of the 6th and 8th Circuits, Orlando, Florida, January 13, 1992.
Chair, panel on "Issues and Controversies in Legislative and Congressional Redistricting." Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, March 19-21, 1992.
Participant, National Endowment for Humanities Workshop on Athenian Democracy, UC Santa Cruz, June 21-July 30, 1992.
Chair, "Roundtable on Ethnic and Linguistic Conflict and the Art of Constitutional Design." Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992.
Invited speaker, Southern Regional Council "Conference on Voting Rights." Atlanta, October 1-3, 1992.
Invited panelist, "Roundtable on Uses of Operations Research in the Social Sciences." Annual Meeting of ORSA-TIMS, San Francisco, November 2-4, 1992.
Chair, panel on "Social Contract Theory," Conference on Democracy, Rationality and the Social Contract. Focused Research Project in Public Choice, University of California, Irvine, December 11-12, 1992.
Organizer, Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, Washington D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994.
Discussant, panel on "Jury Decision-making." Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, March 24-26, l995.
Invited participant, IGCC Conferences on "Ethnic Conflict," University of California, San Diego, May 11-12, 1994; Palm Springs, California, December 12, 1995.
Invited panelist. National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Panel on "Redistricting Decisions of the Supreme Court." St Louis, Missouri, July 29-31, 1996.
Invited speaker. National Conference of State Legislatures. Special session on “Redistricting Issues.” Seattle, Washington, April 3-5, 1998.
Invited panelist. National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Panel on "Redistricting Issues," Chicago, July 14-17, 2000.
Roundtable participant. "The Changing Role of the Department of Justice in Redistricting" at the University of Houston Lanier Center for Public Policy Conference on "Census 200," December 8, 2000.
OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION (cont.) 56
Invited participant, University of Rome (La Sapienza) Conference on the Political Economy of the European Union, May 15-17, 2001.
Invited speaker, National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Special Session on Redistricting, San Antonio, August 13, 2001.
Invited speaker, National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Special Session on Redistricting, Denver, Colorado, July 24, 2002.
Invited participant and presenter, Conference on Political Culture, Representation and Electoral Systems in The Pacific sponsored by the University of the South Pacific, Port Vila, Vanuatu, July 10-12, 2004.
Invited speaker, Conference on Game Theory and Its Applications, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences and Center for Decision Analysis, University of California, Irvine, September 18, 2004 (paper entitled “Models of political coalition building”)
Invited discussant, “Judging Transitional Justice” Conference, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, October 30-31, 2004.
Invited discussant, “Conference on Direct Democracy,” Co-sponsored by the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, January 14-15, 2005.
Invited discussant, Graduate Student Conference on “Democracy and its Development: 1990- 2005.” UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, February 26, 2005.
Invited speaker, Marschak Conference at University of California, Los Angeles, June 10, 2005.
Panel Chair, “Party Formation Barriers and their Effect on Ethnic Party Building and Success in New Democracies.” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2, 2005
Invited Discussant, “Party Formation Barriers and their Effect on Ethnic Party Building and Success in New Democracies.” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2, 2005.
Invited Discussant, “Changing the Rules of the Game in New Democracies: Political Participation and Electoral Regime Change in Eastern Europe and Latin America.” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, 2005.
Invited Discussant, symposium on “Protecting Democracy: Using Research to Inform the Voting Rights Reauthorization Debate.” Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, sponsored by UC Berkeley and the Institute for Government Studies, UCB, Washington D.C., February 9, 2006.
Invited panellist, Voting Rights Conference “Voting Rights: Haven’t they Already Overcome?” Duke University, Durham NC, April 7, 2006. 57
Invited discussant, “Workshop on Danish Local Elections.” Department of Government, University of Aarhus, Sandberg, Denmark, August 10-12, 2006.
Invited discussant, “Modeling Law Locally.” New York University School of Law, Center for Law Economics and Organization, October 21, 2006.
Invited discussant, Conference on “Predicting French Presidential Elections,” Institute for Globalization and Economic Research (IRGEI) at the University of Paris, II, May 2, 2007.
Invited discussant, Conference on “French Presidential Elections” organized by the Election Analysis Group of the French Political Science Association (in conjunction with CEVIPOF, Sciences-Po), May 3, 2007.
Chair, panel on “Formal and Empirical Models of Voting and Elections.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, March 7-8. 2008.
Invited roundtable participant, The Voting Rights Act and the Deconstruction of the Republic.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 27-31, 2008.
Chair, Panel on Re-Examining Strategic Voting. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 27-31, 2008.
Discussant, Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Las Vegas, March 10-12. 2009.
Discussant, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Panel on “Electoral Engineering and Political Representation in Ethnically Divided Societies” Washington, D.C., August, 2008.
Discussant, Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Monterey, California, March 12-14, 2010.
Discussant, “Franco-Italian Seminar on “Two Bloc Politics in France and Italy.” Department of Political Science, University of Bologna, September 16-17, 2011.
Invited Discussant, Conference on “Revisiting Party Identification: American and European Perspectives.” CISE (Center for Italian Electoral Studies), Department of Government, LUISS University, Rome, September 26-28, 2011.
58
INVITED COLLOQUIA
June 28, 2010 Colloquium. “French Two Round Electoral Politics:Is There a Model with Bite.” CERAPS, University of Lille, II.
November 19 Colloquium. “Confesssions of an Eclectic, Puzzle Loving, Reasonable 2010 Choice Modeler, and Occasional Popcorn Machine.” Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
November 28, Colloquium, “Models of Turnout” Institute for Governance 2009 and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris, II
May, 2008. Series of talks on electoral systems and models of party competition for Economics Ph.D students associated with the Institute for Globalization and Economic Research (IRGEI), University of Paris, II.
Feb. 5, 2008 Colloquium, “Electoral Systems and the Promotion of Effective Power- Sharing.” Sawyer Seminar Series: Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnic Conflict, University of Pennsylvania.
May-June Series of talks on electoral systems and models of party competition 2007 for Economics Ph.D. students associated with the Institute for Globalization and Economic Research (IREGEI), University of Paris, II.
June 4, 2007 Center for Analysis Group in Economic Theory (GATE), University of Lyon, II, June 4, 2007.
April 6, 2006 Joint colloquium, CSDP (Center for the Study of Democratic Politics) and LAPA (Law and Public Affairs), Princeton University
March 30, 2006 Political Science Department, Rice University, Houston, Texas.
July 29, 2004 Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University Program in Economics & Social Ethics, Canberra, Australia
May 28, 2003 Department of Political Science, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona
May 26-27, Department of Economics, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona 2003
May 22, 2003 Department of Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona
May 2, 2003 Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark
April 15, 2003 Program in Decision Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University
INVITED COLLOQUIA (cont.) 59
Nov. 10, 2002 Guest Professor, Course on Voting Rights at the New York University Law School
Sept. 20, 2002 Department of Economics, University of Tilburg, Netherlands
Sept.18, 2002 Department of Philosophy, University of Tilburg, Netherlands
Sept. 17-20, Series of lectures on Public Choice at the University of Tilburg under 2002 the auspices of the Dutch National Research Group on Social Science Theory
Sept. 13, 2002 Royal Military College of the Netherlands, Breda
July 9, 2002 Berlin Science Center (Wissenschaft Zentrum)
July 2, 2002 University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Oct. 15, 2001 Department of Government, Harvard University
June 14, 2001 Department of Political Science, Nuffield College, Oxford University
June 2, 2001 Department of Political Science, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy
Dec. 6, 2000 Department of Political Science, University of Houston
Nov. 29, 2000 Department of Political Science, Duke University
May 3, 2000 Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego
October, 1995 Department of Political Science, University of Houston
October, 1995 Department of Government, Georgetown University
July 27, 1994 Department of Economics, Fern Universitët Hagen, Germany
Sept 12-17, Landsdowne Guest Speaker, Department of Political Science, University of 1992, Victoria, Canada
April 17, 1992 Department of Government, Harvard University
Nov 13, 1991 Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Canada
Nov 7, 1991 Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Canada
June 25, 1990 Department of Social Psychology, Tokyo University, Japan. 60
INVITED COLLOQUIA (cont.)
June 16, 1990 Institute of Legal Studies, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan
June 13, 1990 Department of Political Science, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan.
May 6, 1990 Program in Ethics and Public Policy, University of Chicago.
May 4, 1990 Program in Law and Economics, Columbia University Law School
GRANTS FOR INSTRUCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COMPUTER LABS, AND GRADUATE FELLOWSHIP SUPPORT
1992-93 Grant from UCI Committee on Instructional Development to develop a new course: "Introduction to Computer Use in the Social Sciences" ($15,500) 1992 Small grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to attend the NEH Summer Institute on "Athenian Democracy." ($3,250) 1992-94 Grant for graduate student support in Public Choice (Sarah Scaife Foundation, $50,000, with Amihai Glazer) 1993 Grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, University of California, to develop a new course to be co-taught with Professor Pertti Pesonen (Finnish Academy)on comparative political participation ($10,000) 1994 Grant from the National Science Foundation to develop a computer lab for the technology enhanced teaching of under-graduate statistics ($55,497, with Judith Treas). 1995-99 Grant from the UC President's Office (IAPIF) to develop a long-distance learning course "The United States in Comparative Perspective." ($17,174, with Arend Lijphart. 1997 Grant from Instructional Improvement Fund (UCI Division of Undergraduate Education) to develop “Computer-Based Tutorials, and Self-Grading Homework Assignments for SS10A, Introduction to Statistics” ($5,000) 1999-00 Seed grant from UC Center for German and European Studies for graduate research support ($3,000) 2000 Grant from UCI Division of Undergraduate Education (Hewlett Foundation) for Problem-Based Learning materials for Economics 10C statistics course ($4,500) 2000-01 Seed grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, University of California, for graduate research support ($3,000) 2004-5 Grant from Institute of European Studies to co-teach a graduate seminar with Prof. Giorgio Freddi (University of Bologna) ($12,000) 2004-5 Grant from University of California, MEXUS Program to supervise doctoral research ($12,000 to Matthew Barreto) 61
CURRICULAR MATERIALS (in print)
(CM1) Grofman, Bernard N. 1979. Note: Mo Fiorina's advice to children and other subordinates. Mathematics Magazine 52(5): 292-297.
(CM2) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. Modeling jury verdicts. University Modules in Applied Mathematics.
(CM3) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. The pure theory of elevators. Mathematics Magazine, 55(1): 30-37.
(CM4) Straffin, Philip and Bernard Grofman. 1984. Parliamentary coalitions: A tour of models. Mathematics Magazine 57(5): 259-274.
(CM5) Grofman, Bernard. 1990. Pig and proletariat: Animal Farm as history, San Jose Studies, 16: 5-39.
(CM6) Grofman, Bernard and Craig Brians. 1998. Class notes and exercises: computer-based research methods for the social sciences. New York: Longmans.
(CM7) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. A primer on racial bloc voting analysis. In Nathaniel Persily (ed.) The Real Y2K Problem: Census 2000 Data and Redistricting Technology. New York: The Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, 2000.
COURSES TAUGHT Elections and Voter Choice Computer-Based Research Methods in the Social Sciences (SS3A) Introduction to Public Choice, I and II The United States in Comparative Perspective Representation and Redistricting Elementary Statistics (S10A) Statistics for Citizen Literacy (SS10B) Statistics for Public Policy Analysis (SS10C) The Federalist Papers and the Art of Constitutional Design Law and Social Science Models of Collective Decision Making Introduction to Decision Analysis Introduction to Research Design Game Theory Applications in the Social Sciences Small Group Behavior Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences Coalition Theory Political Propaganda and Satire Comparative Public Policy Advanced Quantitative Methods in Political Science I Introductory Statistics for Political Science, I and II EDITORIAL BOARDS 62
1980-83 Editorial Board, American Journal of Political Science 1983-85 Editorial Board, Law and Society Review 1986-88 Advisory Board, ,Society for Orwellian Studies 1987-89 Editorial Board, American Politics Quarterly 1989-91 Editorial Board, Political Analysis 1991- Editorial Board, Public Choice 1996- Editorial Board, Electoral Studies 1997-01 Editorial Board, Journal of Politics 1999-01 Member, Advisory Board, Encyclopedia of Public Choice 2001- Editorial Board, Election Law Journal 2001- Advisory Board, Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche (University of Bologna) 2006-09 Editorial Board, Canadian Journal of Political Science 2008-10 Editorial Board, Political Analysis 2008-11 International Advisory Committee, Centre for Voting and Parties, University of Copenhagen 2010-12 International Advisory Board, Homo Oeconomicus
OTHER REFEREEING
1972-82 Manuscript Review Board: Behavioral Science. 1975- Occasional referee: American Journal of Political Science; Theory and Decision; Public Choice. 1976- Occasional referee: Political Methodology; National Science Foundation, Political Science Program. 1977- Occasional referee; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Social Science Research). 1978- Occasional referee: Psychological Review; National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; European Journal of Social Psychology; Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 1979- Occasional referee: Social Networks; National Science Foundation, Applied Mathematics Program. 1980- Occasional referee: Law and Policy Quarterly; National Institute of Mental Health; American Political Science Review, National Science Foundation, Sociology Program; National Science Foundation, Economics Program; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Legislative Studies Quarterly. 1981- Occasional referee: American Mathematical Monthly, Decision Sciences, Economic Inquiry. 1982- Occasional referee: Social Science Quarterly;Sociological Methods and Research; Western Political Quarterly (now Political Research Quarterly), Guggenheim Foundation; National Science Foundation, Developmental and Social Psychology Program; National Science Foundation, Decision, Risk and Management Science Program. 1983- Occasional referee: Journal of Politics, Political Geography Quarterly (now Political Geography).
OTHER REFEREEING (cont.)
63
1984- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, Information Systems Program; National Science Foundation, Program in Social Measurement and Analysis. 1986- Occasional referee: Review of Economic Studies. 1987- Occasional referee: British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Political Economy, Comparative Political Studies. 1988- Occasional referee: Social Choice and Welfare, Political Analysis, Polity. 1989- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, Program in History and Philosophy of Science; Program in Political Science 1991- Occasional referee: Demography. 1992- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Research. 1993- Occasional referee: Electoral Studies 1994- Occasional referee: Comparative Politics; Cambridge University Press 1994- Occasional referee: Urban Affairs Quarterly 1996- Occasional referee: Canadian Journal of Political Science 1997- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, Program in Geography 1998- Occasional referee: Southeastern Political Review, Social Science History 1999- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Economy 2003- Occasional referee, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) 2004- Occasional referee, Law and Society 2005- Occasional referee, European Union Politics, Scandinavian Political Studies Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 2008- Occasional referee, Austrian National Science Foundation 2009- Occasional referee, Econometrica
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
Chair, 1982-83, Lippincott Prize Committee for book-length work in political theory, American Political Science Association. Section Program Organizer, Panels on "Positive Theory," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1984. Member, 1985-86, Working Group on Collective Choice Institutions, appointed by the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council. Member, Executive Committee, 1986-89, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association. Chair, 1988-92, George Hallett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association. Section Program Co-organizer, Panels on "Political Organizations," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1990. Member, 1990-91, Lasswell Prize Committee, International Society of Political Psychology. Member, 1995-96, Carey McWilliam Award for Journalists Committee, American Political Science Association. Chair, 1995-96, Richard Fenno Prize Committee, Legislative Studies Section, American Political Science Association. Member, 1998, Luebbert Book Award Committee, Comparative Politics Section, American Political Science Association.
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE (cont.) 64
Member, 2000-2001, Advisory Board, UCLA Center for Governance. Member, 2001-2002, Comparative Politics Prize Committee, Sage Award for best paper in comparative politics at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Member, 2002, International Political Science Association Longley Prize Committee, Longley Award for best article published on Representation and Electoral Systems. External Reviewer, Ten-year review, Department of Political Science, University of Bologna, November 27-29, 2003. Member, 2007 Program Committee, First World Congress of Public Choice, Amsterdam, March 29-April 1. Member, 2007 APSA Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, Weaver Award Committee for best paper in Representation and Electoral Systems section. Member, 2007 APSA Heinz Eulau Award Committee for best paper in Perspectives on Politics External Reviewer, Ph.D. Thesis of Annelise de Ridder, School of Business, University of Nijmegen, Netherland, May 2007. External Reviewer, Ph.D. Thesis of Honorine Lescieux-Katir, Department of Economics, University of Paris, II, May 2010. Member, 2010-11, George Hallett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association
UNIVERSITY SERVICE, SYSTEMWIDE
2010- Member, Administrative Advisory Board, University of California Center, Sacramento
UNIVERSITY SERVICE, UCI
1977-79 Member, University Committee on Lectures 1977-79 Faculty Advisor, UCI Chapter, Student Model United Nations 1983-84 Member, University Library Committee 1987-89 Member, University Privilege and Tenure Committee Hearing Panel 1988-89 Member, Tierney Chair Search Committee 1988-91 Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 1991-92 Acting Chair, Focused Research Program in Public Choice 1994-96 Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 1995-96 Member, Chancellor's Taskforce on Use of Educational Technology 1999-00 Co-Coordinator, Institute of Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, Colloquia 1999-05 Member, Executive Committee, Irvine Institute of Mathematical Behavioral Sciences 2000-01 Reviewer, UC Systemwide Multicampus Research Incentive Fund (MRIF) 2001-02 Member, UCI Search Committee for new Dean of Social Sciences 2002-05 Member, Executive Committee, Center for Decision Analysis
65
SERVICE TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UCI
1978-79 Chair, Program in Politics and Society. 1979-89 Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series (one quarter per year). 1980-81 Special Schoolwide Selection Committee: Distinguished Student Scholars Program. 1981-82 Chair, School of Social Sciences Faculty. 1982-83 Acting Co-Chair, Program in Politics and Society (Spring Quarter). 1983-84 Political Science Graduate Student Adviser. 1988-89 Political Science Graduate Student Advise 1988-89 Chair, Recruitment Committee in Mathematical Political Science. 1988-91 Member, Recruitment Committee in Public Law. 1991-92 Chair, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Graduate Concentration in Public Choice. 1991-93 Member, Joint Recruitment Committee in African-American Studies and Political Science 1992-98 Member, Political Science Graduate Committee 1992- Member, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Ph.D Concentration in Public Choice 1996-02 Member, Executive Committee, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy 1996-97 Chair, Recruitment Committee for Pacific Rim FTE in Political Science 1997-98 Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions 1998-99 Member, Easton Prize Committee, Department of Political Science 1998-00 Member, Colloquium Committee, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science 1998-00 Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences 1999-01 Member, Search Committee for position in Chicano/Latino Studies 1999-00 Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions 1999-01 Member, School of Social Sciences Executive Committee 2001-02 Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Democratization and Democratic Transitions 2001-02 Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Mathematical Behavioral Science 2001-06 Member, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy Leadership Council 2001-06 Member, Executive Committee, Center for the Study of Democracy 2002-03 Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions 2002-04 Chair, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for position in Democratization and Democratic Transitions 2005-06 Chair, Search Committee for Position in Public Law/Judicial Behavior 2005-07 Graduate Director, Fellows Program, Center for the Study of Democracy 2008- Director, Center for the Study of Democracy 2011- Member, Steering Committee, Experimental Social Science Laboratory, School of Social Sciences
66
Major Redistricting Cases in which Bernard Grofman Has Participated as an Expert Witness or Court-Appointed Consultant
Consultant to Case Name Type
Republican Party of Colorado Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Congress: failure of the Supp. 68 (D. Colorado, 1982) legislature to act
Special Master, U.S. District Flateau v. Anderson, 537 F. Congress and both houses of Court, Southern District of Supp. 257 (S.D. New York, state legislatures: failure of New York 1982) legislature to act; minority voting rights.
Republican Party of Hawaii Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. State legislature: equal 554; 552 F. Supp. 1200 (D. population Hawaii, 1982)
Democratic Party of Rhode Holmes v. Burns (Super. Ct., State house: minority vote Island and subsequently State R.I. 1982) aff’d, No. 83-149 dilution, compactness, of Rhode Island (R.I. S. Ct, April 10, 1984) communities of interest
Republican National Badham v. Eu, 721 F. 2d 1170 Congress: partisan Committee (D. Calif. 1983), dismissed for gerrymandering want of a federal claim, cert. denied
NAACP Legal Defense Fund Gingles v. Edmisten, consol. Multimember districts in the with Pugh v. Brock, 590 F. state legislature; Section 2 of Supp. 345 (E.D. North the Voting Rights Act Carolina, 1984) heard sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
U.S. Department of Justice South Carolina v. U.S. State Senate: Section 5 of the (D.D.C.), 1984) settled out of Voting Rights Act court by preclearance of a new preclearance denial plan for South Carolina Senate
67
Consultant to Case Name Type State of Indiana Bandemer v. Davis 603 F. State legislature: partisan Supp. 1479 (1984), (S.D. gerrymandering, minority vote Indiana, 1983), reversed sub dilution nom Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 106 U.S. 2797 (1986); initially consol. with Indiana Branches of the NAACP v. Orr 603 F. Supp. 1479 (1984) (S.D. Indiana, 1983)
City of Boston Latino Political Action Boston City council: minority Committee v. City of Boston, vote dilution 609 F. Supp. 739 (D. Mass. 1985)
U.S. Department of Justice Ketchum v. Byrne II (D. Chicago City Council: Illinois 1985), settled by minority vote dilution consent decree
Mexican American Legal Gomez v. City of Watsonville Watsonville City Council: Defense and Education Fund (D. Calif., 1986), 863 F. 2nd Section 2 of the Voting Rights 1407 (9th cir. 1988) cert. Act denied, 109 Sct. 1534 (1989)
U.S. Department of Justice U.S. v. City of Los Angeles Los Angeles City Council: (D. Calif., 1986), settled out of Section 2 of the Voting Rights court by adoption of a new Act plan for L.A. City Council with an additional majority Hispanic seat NAACP Legal Defense Fund McGhee v. Granville County, Granville County Board of No. 87-29-CIV-5) (E.D. North Supervisors: Section 2 of the Carolina 2/5/88); 860 F. 2nd Voting Rights Act 110 (4th circuit 1988)
U.S. Department of Justice Garza v. County of Los County Board: Section 2 of the Angeles Board of Supervisors Voting Rights Act 918 F. 2d 763 (9th cir. 1990)
68
Consultant to Case Name Type Republican National Pope et al. v. Blue et al. 809 F. Congressional redistricting in Committee Supp. 392 (D. N.C, Western North Carolina: 14th District, Charlotte Division, Amendment 1992)
Republican Party of Wisconsin Prosser et al. v. Election Board Wisconsin state legislative of State of Wisconsin 793 F. redistricting: Section 2 of the Supp. 859 (D.Wisc., 1992) Voting Rights Act
State of North Carolina Republican Party v. Martin State-wide judicial elections in 980 F2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992) the State of North Carolina; partisan gerrymandering Minority plaintiffs Garcia v. City of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles Charter (D. Los Angeles, 1996) Commission: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Republican Party of Wisconsin Arrington et al. v. Elections Wisconsin State legislative Bd. of State of Wisconsin 173 districting, Section 2 of the F. Supp. 2d 856 U.S. (D. Voting Rights Act Wisconsin, 2002) Special Master, U.S. District Rodriguez et al. v. Pataki et al., Congress; failure of legislature Court, Southern District of (S.D. N. Y., 2002) to act; minority voting rights. New York Special Master, US District Larios v. Cox 305 F Supp. 2d Georgia legislative districts; Court, Georgia 1355 (N.D. GA 2004) one person, one vote.
69
COMMUNITY SERVICE: 2000-
Interviewed by Dieter Osterman of the Frankfurter Rundschau, March, 2000 for a story on U.S. presidential elections.
Interviewed by Francine Keefer, Wall Street Journal for story on likely partisan effects of the decennial reapportionment, April 12, 2000.
Interviewed by Ron Orol, Fortune Magazine re redistricting and legislative races, October 4, 2000.
Interviewed by Robert Benincasa, Gannett News Service re redistricting related issues, October, 2000.
Interviewed by Jeremy Linert, Times Leader, Wilkes-Baare, Pennsylvania, re redistricting, October, 2000.
Interviewed by David Brown, Washington Post re statistical issues in Florida Presidential recount, November 14, 2000.
Interviewed by Dan Borenstein re redistricting, February 13, 2001.
Interviewed by Rick Pearson, Chicago Tribune for a story of Chicago City Council redistricting, March 29, 2001.
Interviewed by Greg Geroux, Congressional Quarterly, for story on voting rights and redistricting, July 20, 2001.
Informally consulted with the office of a member of Congress from New York regarding congressional redistricting in that state, July 23, 2001.
Participant on panel on "Talk of the City," a live daily talk show on National Public Radio (KPCC FM), July 16, 2001.
Interviewed by reporter for the Los Angeles Times about at-large elections and racial vote dilution, October 12, 2001. 70
COMMUNITY SERVICE: (cont.)
Presented a short talk on (and display of) African and Native American masks to a troop of Cub Scouts, December 24, 2001. 150
Interviewed by Alison Mitchell, New York Times, for story on redistricting, January, 2002.
Interviewed by Dieter Osterman, Frankfurter Rundschauu, for a story on U.S. Presidential elections, March, 2002.
Inteviewed by Jerry Zrenski, Buffalo News, for a story on New York reapportionment, June 10, 2002.
Interviewed by J. R. Ross, reporter for Associated Press, on Wisconsin legislative redistricting, September 30, 2002
Interviewed by Peter Dieter Osteman, Frankfurter Rundschauu, for a story on the Governor Davis recall referendum, June, 2003.
Informally consulted by Adriene Fernandes, Staff Member, US Department of Justice, August, 2003.
Informally consulted with Ethan Kurzweil, New York City Board of Education, on plans for revamping New York City Community School Boards, September 26, 2003.
Interviewed by Edward Walsh, Washington Post regarding Texas and Colorado redistricting cases, October 20, 2003.
Informally discussed voting rights litigation issues with Jeremy Karlan, Brennan Center, New York University Law School, October 23, 2003.
Communicated with Caitlin Casey, reporter for the Atlantic Monthly for a story on congressional districting, October 29, 2003. COMMUNITY SERVICE: (cont.)
Interviewed by David Herszenhosen, New York Times for a study of changes in New York City Community School Boards, November 11, 2003.
Interviewed by Janet Klein for a potential story on redistricting for CBS “60 Minutes,” January 15, 2004.
Consulted by staff, Voting Rights Section, U.S., Department of Justice re Section 5 of the VRA remand of Georgia V. Ashcroft to the U.S. District Court, January 2004.
COMMUNITY SERVICE: (cont.) 71
Interviewed by Kenneth Jost, Congressional Quarterly for a story on partisan gerrymandering, January 26, 2004.
Discussed redistricting issues with Becky Vlamis, Associate Producer of a radio program on Chicago Public Broadcasting, February 29, 2004.
Participated in CSD-sponsored mini conference at UCI with staff, Netherlands Ministry of the Interior, to discuss proposed reform of the method for electing members of the National Parliament in The Netherlands, May 13, 2004.
Interviewed by Jennifer Dixon, Detroit Free Press, August 29, 2004 for story about term limits.
Discussed issues of redistricting with Director and staff for Democratic Governance (Los Angeles), December 17-18, 2004, August, 2005.
Interviewed by Erik Skindrud for story in Orange County Weekly on the firing of Michael Ramirez and Robert Scheer, November 17, 2005.
Discussed voting rights issues with Anna Pomykala, a consultant to the Ford Foundation, March 7, 2006.
Interviewed by Carolee Walker for article in Washington File on LULAC v. Perry, a Texas congressional redistricting case, July 7, 2006.
Informally consulted with a staff member, Robert Charney, of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, on an election law issue involving candidate filing fees, June 15, 2007.
Informally consulted with staff at the Attorney General’s office in Alaska regarding bilingual ballot provisions of the VRA, December 13, 2007.
Interviewed by Allen Breed, a national writer with The Associated Press, for a story about the evolution of minority voting patterns and how various groups came to be aligned with a given party, January 3, 2008.
Interviewed by Marvin Lee, a reporter with New University, for a story on Prop 11, the California, redistricting initiative, October 16, 2008.
Filmed and Interviewed by Jeffrey Reichert for a documentary film covering the 2008 Prop 11 referendum and redistricting methods, February 2009. The film appeared as Gerrymandering the Movie, a documentary briefly playing in movie houses in New York City and elsewhere in Fall 2010. Approximately two minutes of my remarks were incorporated into the movie.
EXHIBIT J
CURRICULUM VITAE THEODORE S. ARRINGTON
E-MAIL: [email protected] http://clas-pages.uncc.edu/theodore-arrington/ Currently residing in Albuquerque, NM
EDUCATION
The University of New Mexico, B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Senior Honors Thesis titled Bernalillo County in Statewide Elections in New Mexico, September 1963-June 1967.
The University of Arizona, M.A. Thesis titled Grass Roots Organization: A Study of Precinct Committeemen, September 1967-December 1968.
The University of Arizona, Ph.D. Dissertation titled Belief Systems in Political Party Stratarchies, January 1971-August 1973.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
The University of New Mexico, Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, September 1966-June 1967.
Research Assistant to Professor Harry Stumpf, Director of a study of the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, June 1967-August 1967.
The United States Army, Military Police, February 1969-January 1971.
The University of Arizona, Graduate Associate, Department of Government, June 1973-July 1973.
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte:
Assistant Professor of Political Science, July 1973-June 1978 Associate Professor of Political Science, July 1978-June 1985 Professor of Political Science, July 1985-June 2010
Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, July 2010
1 The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Coordinator of Internships, October 1974-August 1977.
President of the Faculty of The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, July 1983- June 1984.
Delegate to The University of North Carolina Faculty Assembly, July 1984-June 1989.
Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor for Faculty Affairs at The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, August 1986-July 1987.
Chairman of the Department of Political Science at The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, July 1987-June 1995, May 1997-June 2007.
Co-Chairman, Self-Study of The University of North Carolina at Charlotte for reaccreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, January 1990- August 1992.
BOOKS
Applied Political Inquiry (with Terrell Rhodes and Robert Mundt), Washington: University Press of America, 1983.
Elections, Parties, and Politics in Mecklenburg County (with William B.A. Culp, Jr. and Gerald Ingalls), Charlotte: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Elections, Department of Geography and Earth Sciences and the Urban Institute at The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1988.
Who Votes and Why: A Review of American Electoral Behavior (with Schley R. Lyons) New York: The Robert A. Taft Institute for Two-Party Government, 1988.
JOURNAL AND INTERNET ARTICLES
Comment on David Nexon's "Asymmetry in the Political System: Occasional Activists in the Republican and Democratic Parties: 1956-1964," The American Political Science Review 66 (March, 1972) 183-184.
Some Aspects of Political Experience on Issue Consciousness and Issue Partisanship Among Tucson Political Activists, The American Journal of Political Science 19 (November, 1975) 695-702.
Amateurs and Professionals Among Tucson Party Activists, Georgia Political Science Association Journal 4 (Fall, 1976) 79-89.
2 Comment on Christopher H. Achen's "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response," The American Political Science Review 70 (December, 1976) 1230-1231.
Equal Rights Amendment Activists in North Carolina (with Patricia Kyle), Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 3 (Spring, 1978) 666-680.
Machiavellianism of Political Activists, Georgia Political Science Association Journal 6 (Spring, 1978) 99-109.
Partisan Campaigns, Ballots, and Voting Patterns: The Case of Charlotte, Urban Affairs Quarterly 14 (December, 1978) 253-261.
Some Paradoxes of Campaign Finance Reform, Commonsense: A Republican Journal of Thought and Opinion 2 (Fall, 1979) 56-72.
The Advantages of a Plurality Election of the President (with Saul Brenner), Presidential Studies Quarterly 10 (Summer, 1980) 476-482.
Some Effects of Ideology and Threat Upon the Size of Opinion Coalitions on the United States Supreme Court (with Saul Brenner), Journal of Political Science 8 (Fall, 1980) 49-58.
Comment on Richard F. Bensel's "Creating the Statutory State: The Implications of the Rule of Law Standard in American Politics" The American Political Science Review 75 (June, 1981) 460-461.
Financing Local Election Campaigns (with Gerald Ingalls), in Warren Jake Wicker (ed.) Urban Growth and Urban Life, 1981 Proceedings: The Third Annual Urban Affairs Conference of The University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill: Urban Studies Council, 1981) 387-397.
Political Socialization of the Deaf (with Andrew Conrad), Journal of the North Carolina Political Science Association 2 (Winter, 1981-2) 91-95.
Willingness to Pay Per Capita Costs as a Measure of Support for Urban Services (with David Jordan), Public Administration Review 42 (March/April, 1982) 168-170.
William O. Douglas: Consistent Civil Libertarian or Parabolic Supporter? (with Saul Brenner), The Journal of Politics 45 (May, 1983) 490-496.
Effects of Campaign Spending on Different Types of Local Elections: The Charlotte Case" (with Gerald Ingalls), American Politics Quarterly 12 (January, 1984) 117-127.
3 Age, Race and Voter Mobilization in White Charlotte Neighborhoods, Politics and Policy 4 (Spring, 1984) 81-85.
Should the Electoral College be Replaced by the Direct Election of the President? A Debate (with Saul Brenner), PS 17 (Spring, 1984) 237-250.
Another Look at Approval Voting (with Saul Brenner), Polity 17 (Fall, 1984) 118- 144.
Race and Local Campaign Finance in Charlotte, N.C. (with Gerald Ingalls), Western Political Quarterly 37 (December, 1984) 578-583.
CONGRESS Takes You On a Presidential Quest, Rainbow Magazine 4 (June, 1985) 195-196.
Advanced and Full-Featured, CMODEM Is a Comparable Terminal Program Rainbow Magazine 4 (July, 1985) 196-198.
How to Predict Election Turnouts, Campaigns and Elections 7 (May-June, 1986) 11- 14.
Unanimous Decisionmaking on the United States Supreme Court: The Role of Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes (with Saul Brenner), Political Behavior 9 (Number 1, 1987) 75-86. Reprinted in Harold J. Spaeth and Saul Brenner (eds.) Studies in U.S. Supreme Court Behavior (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1990) 207-220.
The Role of Gender in Local Campaign Financing: The Case of Charlotte, North Carolina (with Gerald Ingalls), Women and Politics 11 (Number 2, 1991) 61-90.
The Election of Blacks to School Boards in North Carolina (with Thomas Watts), Western Political Quarterly 44 (December, 1991), 1099-1105.
Outreach Programs and Voter Registration in North Carolina (with Timothy D. Mead), State and Local Government Review 24 (Number 3, Fall 1992) 113-116.
When Money Doesn’t Matter: Campaign Spending for Minor Statewide Judicial and Executive Offices in North Carolina, The Justice System Journal 18 (Number 3, Summer 1996) 257-266.
The Limited Vote Alternative to Affirmative Districting (with Gerald Ingalls), Political Geography 17 (Number 6, April 1998) 701-728.
4 Party Registration Choices as a Function of the Geographic Distribution of Partisanship: A Model of ‘Hidden partisanship’ and an Illustrative Test (with Bernard Grofman), Political Geography 18 (Number 2, February 1999) 173-185.
Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court: Comparing the Conference Vote and the Final Vote with the Segal/Cover Scores (with Saul Brenner), Jurimetrics 41 (Summer, 2001) 505-512.
Measuring Salience on the Supreme Court (with Saul Brenner), Jurimetrics 43 (Fall, 2002) 99-113.
Strategic Voting for Damage Control on the Supreme Court (with Saul Brenner), Political Research Quarterly 57 (December, 2004) 565-573.
Testing Murphy’s Strategic Model: Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court (with Saul Brenner), American Politics Research 36 (May, 2008) 416-432.
Response to “Predicting and Dissecting the Seat-Vote Curve in the 2006 U.S. House Election.” PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (July, 2008) 473-4.
Affirmative Districting and Four Decades of Redistricting: The Seats/Votes Relationship 1972-2008. Politics and Policy 38 (Number 2, 2010) 223-253.
Redistricting in the U.S.: A Review of Scholarship and Plan for Future Research, The Forum 8 (Number 2, Article 7, 2010). DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1351 Available at: http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol8/iss2/art7
Response to Symposium: “Pracademics”: Mixing an Academic Career with Practical Politics, PS: Political Science and Politics 44 (July 2011) 499.
The Republicans’ Built-in House Advantage, Sabato’s Crystal Ball, “The Politics of the Shutdown” XI (Issue 38), 3 October 2013. http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-republicans-built-in- house-advantage/
BOOK CHAPTERS
Proportional Representation: Advance of Democracy” in John T. Rourke, You Decide! 2006. New York: Pearson Education, Inc. 2007, Chapter 23. [Also in earlier editions]
5 BOOK REVIEWS
Jack Fleer, North Carolina Government and Politics, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994 for Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 25 (Number 1, Winter 1995) 126- 127.
Maurice T. Cunningham, Maximization, Whatever the Cost: Race, Redistricting, and the Department of Justice, Westport: Praeger, 2001 for American Review of Politics, 22 (Spring & Summer 2001) 129-131.
William W. Lammers and Michael A. Genovese, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Clinton, Washington: CQ Press, 2000 for Politics and Policy, 31 (Number 3, 2003) 561-562.
SELECTED PAPERS
Equal Rights Amendment Activists in North Carolina (with Patricia Kyle), Panel on Women and Public Policy, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, 1-6 Sep 1975.
The Size Principle and Supreme Court Decision-Making (with Saul Brenner), Panel on Supreme Court Behavior, Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, Tennessee, 6-8 November 1975.
Interdependence in the Third World: A Study of Bloc Voting Cohesion in the U.N. General Assembly, 1965-1976 (with Patricia Kyle), International Studies Association Convention, St. Louis, Missouri, 19 March 1977.
Participation in Elections: A Study of Voter Mobilization in Charlotte, N,C., Panel on North Carolina Electoral Behavior, Annual Meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 30-31 March 1979.
Financing Local Level Election Campaigns (with Gerald Ingalls), Panel on Citizen Participation, Third Annual Urban Affairs Conference of The University of North Carolina titled "Perspectives on Urban Growth and Urban Life," Charlotte, N.C., 1-3 April 1981.
Financing Local Elections: Who Gives What to Whom? (with Gerald Ingalls), Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geographers, Atlanta, Georgia, 22-24 November 1981.
Financing Local Election Campaigns: Does Neighboring Help Raise Money? Does Money Win Elections? (with Gerald Ingalls), National Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, San Antonio, Texas, 26-28 April 1982.
6 A Method for Predicting Voter Turnout in Elections, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Mars Hill, N.C., 18-19 April 1986.
A Teaching Model of a Responsible Two-Party System, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Mars Hill, N.C., 18-19 April 1986.
Urbanization, Management Capacity and the Impact of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (with Timothy D. Mead), Annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Akron, Ohio, 22-25 April 1987.
Is Campaigning at the Polls Effective? A Quasi Experiment Using the 1989 Charlotte Mayoral Election, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Cullowhee, 20 March 1992.
Alternatives to Affirmative Gerrymandering: Limited Voting as One Option (with Gerald Ingalls), Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geographers, Virginia Beach, 20-22 November 1994.
The Use of Limited Voting in the United States: Potential and Practice (with Gerald Ingalls), Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Chicago, Illinois, 18 March 1995.
Is Mandatory HMO Enrollment for Dependent Populations Acceptable? Public Opinion and Its Evolution Since the Backlash Against Managed Care (with William P. Brandon and Nancy Schoeps), Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1997.
Public Opinion About Mandatory HMO Enrollment Under Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans, and Employer Payment Programs (with William P. Brandon and Nancy Schoeps), Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association, Indianapolis, November 1997.
Affirmative Districting and the Partisan Seats/Votes Relationship: 1972-2002, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, September 2003.
The Rational Losing Litigant Model and Measuring Ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court (with Saul Brenner), Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2005.
Affirmative Districting and Four Decades of Redistricting: the Seats/Votes Relationship 1972-2008, The 38th Annual Conference of The North Carolina Political Science Association, Greensboro, North Carolina, 27 February 2009.
7 SELECTED PRESENTATIONS
Chairman of the panel Toward Explaining Women's Political Patterns, Annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 4-6 November 1976.
Discussant on the panel on Evaluation of the Carter Administration, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Greensboro, N.C., 6-8 April 1978.
Chairman of the panel on American Politics, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Asheville, N.C., 18-19 April 1980.
Chairman of the Seventh Annual Undergraduate Awards Competition, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Asheville, N.C., 18-19 April 1980.
Chairman of the Thirteenth Annual Undergraduate Awards Competition, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Mars Hill, N.C., 18-19 April 1986.
Participant in the Roundtable on North Carolina Elections, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Greensboro, North Carolina, 8-9 April 1988.
Discussant at the panel on The Politics of Governing, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Salisbury, North Carolina, 30-31 March 1990.
Change for Whom? Three Decades of Electoral Change and Continuity in North Carolina Elections (with Gerald Ingalls), a presentation at the Conference on Empowering Political and Economic Transformation, sponsored by the University of Colorado and the Political Geography Specialty Group of the American Association of American Geographers, Boulder Colorado, 15-18 April 1992.
Discussant on the panel on North Carolina and the 1992 Elections, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Durham, North Carolina, 2-3 April 1993.
Discussant on the panel on Congressional politics, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Charlotte, North Carolina, 18-19 March 1994.
Discussant on the Symposium on Redistricting in Theory and Practice After Shaw Versus Reno, Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, Charlotte, North Carolina, 12 April 1996.
8 Invited presentation for The Kenelm Foundation-Campbell University Series at the Weymouth Center in Southern Pines, N.C. Two workshops on redistricting titled “From Gingles to Shaw -- The Role of North Carolina in the Formation of Districting Principles in the United States.” One workshop for the public and one for honors students. September 1996.
Invited presentation in the series “The American Presidents and the American Presidency” sponsored by the Caldwell Community College and Technical Institute at the J.E. Broyhill Civic Center in Lenoir, N.C. Presentation titled “Clinton or Dole -- Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils or the Evil of Two Lessers.” October 1996.
Chairman and discussant on the panel American National Politics, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Boone, 3-4 April 1998.
Discussant on the Roundtable on Declining Enrollments in Political Science, Annual meeting of the North Carolina Political Science Association, Boone, 3-4 April 1998.
Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. Hearing on H.R. 1173, the “States’ Choice of Voting Systems Act” Thursday, 23 September 1999, 2:00 p.m. in 22267 Rayburn House Office Building.
Member, Roundtable on Redistricting, Representation, and American Political Institutions, 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28-31 August 2003.
Written Testimony on the Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 2 November 2005. CONSULTING
Gingles vs. Edmisten, 590 F. SUPP. 345 (E.D.N.C.) 1984. Employed by plaintiff intervenors, courtroom and affidavit testimony that the use of multimember districts for the N.C. General Assembly impedes the election of blacks and Republicans. Affirmed by the United States Supreme Court Thornburg vs. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Alexander vs. Martin, Civil Action No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C.) 1987. Employed by plaintiffs. Affidavit testimony that the use of multimember districts and statewide elections for Superior Court Judges in North Carolina impedes the elections of black candidates.
9 Republican Party of North Carolina vs. Hunt, Civil Action No. 88-263-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C.) 1988-1996. Employed by plaintiffs. Affidavit and deposition testimony that the procedure of statewide elections of Superior Court judges dilutes the votes of Republicans consistently degrading the votes of Republican voters and also degrades their influence on the political process as a whole in violation of constitutional rights.
Person vs. Moore County, Civil Action No. C-89-135-R (M.D.N.C.) 1990. Employed by defendants. Affidavit and deposition testimony supported the contention that the local governing bodies in this county were in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
Ward vs. Columbus County, Civil Action No. 90-20-CIV-7-BR (E.D.N.C.) 1990. Retained by defendants. Affidavit, courtroom, and deposition testimony that black and American Indian voters were not cohesive in their voting patterns in this county.
Lake vs. State Board of Elections of North Carolina, Civil Action No. 2:91CV00254 (M.D.N.C.) 1991. Employed by the plaintiffs. Affidavit testimony on aspects of holding a special election in two counties to remedy irregularities in election for Associate Justice of N.C. Supreme Court in 1990.
Stafford vs. Burnick, Civil Action No. 2:91CV00542 (M.D.N.C.) 1991. Employed by the plaintiffs. Affidavit testimony about whether the options proposed in a referendum to be held in Guilford County North Carolina concerning consolidation of the school boards there would violate the Voting Rights Act.
Consultant for a coalition of groups objecting to preclearance of General Assembly and Congressional redistricting for North Carolina in 1991. Affidavit testimony to the United States Justice Department that the proposed districts reduced the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice.
Consultant for a coalition of groups objecting to preclearance of General Assembly and Congressional redistricting for Georgia in 1991. Affidavit testimony to the United States Justice Department that the proposed districts would reduce the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. This work was related to Jones vs. Miller, Civil Action No. 1-92-CV-330-JOF (N.D.GA) in which I would have been an expert witness for plaintiffs if that case had gone to trial.
Burton vs. Sheheen, Civil Action No. 3-91-2983-1 (The South Carolina Senate Defendant-Intervenors); South Carolina Reapportionment Advisory Committee vs. Campbell, Civil Action No. 3-91-3310-1; and Blanton vs. Sheheen, Civil Action No. 2- 91-3635-1 (D.C.S.C. Columbia Division). Employed by plaintiffs in 1991-2. Affidavit and courtroom testimony that election for Congress and state legislature in South Carolina are racially polarized, that timely known and agreed to districts are important to minority candidates election, that the 1982 districts in the state are malapportioned, and comparison of proposed plans for redistricting.
10 Re MacKinnon and Government of Prince Edward Island (1993). Before the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island, Canada. In the Matter of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in the matter of sections 147-151 of the Elections Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 Chapter E-1. 101 D.L.R.(4th) 362. Written and courtroom testimony for petitioner (City of Charlottetown) that it is practical and desirable to draw districts for the Legislative Assembly of the Province of P.E.I. that have a low population deviation. Included construction of districts with a total deviation of 4.9%, and presentation of those districts to the court.
Hines vs. Callis, Civil Action No. 89-62-CIV-2-BO (E.D.N.C.) 1992. Courtroom testimony that the town council election scheme offered by the Town of Ahoskie N.C. is a reasonable remedy for the admitted deficiencies in their system of at-large elections and would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Also see Hines vs. Mayor and Town Council of Ahoskie (Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals #92-2593) 15 July 1993.
Degrandy vs. Wetherell, Civil Action No. 92-40015-WS (N.D.FL) and Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches vs. Chiles, Civil Action No. 92-40131-WS (N.D.FL) 1992. Consultant for Common Cause of Florida, amicus curiae in the case. Affidavit and courtroom testimony before the Special Master appointed by the Court to aid in the construction of legislative and Congressional districts for the State of Florida.
Appointed in 1992 as the expert to aid Special Master Frederick B. Lacey in drawing Congressional districts for the State of New York. Lacey was appointed by the Court considering the case of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and Corchardo vs. Gantt, CV-92-1521(SJ) (E.D.N.Y.) and Waring vs. Gantt, CV-92-1776(SJ) (E.D.N.Y.). Testified by report and at trial.
Appointed in 1992 as the expert to aid Special Master Frederick B. Lacey in drawing state legislative districts for New York. Also retained to directly advise the Court on methodological questions. The cases were: The Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. vs. Weprin, 92-CV-283 (N.D.N.Y.); Norman vs. Cuomo, 92-CV-720 (N.D.N.Y.); and Scaringe vs. Marino, 92-CV-0593.
Willis vs. Town of Trenton, North Carolina, 92-CIV-4-H (E.D.N.C.) 1993. Retained by defendants to outline for the Court the evidence plaintiffs must present to prove their claim that the town election procedures impede the election of blacks. Testified by report to the Court.
Retained by plaintiff National NAACP in the combined cases of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, et al. vs. Schaefer, et al. (S-92-1409) and Marylanders for Fair Representation vs. Schaefer, et al. (S-92-510) in the Federal District Court for Maryland, 1993. Report, deposition, and courtroom testimony that the voting for General Assembly in Maryland is racially polarized, the minority community is politically cohesive, and the districts drawn by the State of Maryland
11 provide less of an opportunity for minority citizens to participate in the political process than the districts drawn by plaintiffs.
Cane, et al. vs. Worcester County, Maryland, et al., Y-92-3226 (United States District Court, Maryland District 874 F. Supp 687) 1993. Retained by plaintiffs. Testified by report, deposition, and in court that the elections in Worcester County are racially polarized and that minority candidates of choice cannot win in the at-large elections for County Commission even if the minority community is strongly cohesive in their voting patterns. Also see Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals (35F.3d 921) 1994.
In 1992, consultant to the Cleveland County (N.C.) Board of Commissioners to formulate a plan to move from at-large to a mixed at-large district system in order to increase minority participation. Newly elected commissioners decided not to submit the new plan to the U.S. Justice Department for preclearance. This resulted in legal action: Campbell and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. Cleveland County Board of Commissioners et al., 4:94-CV-11 (W.D.N.C., Shelby Division) in 1994. Testified by affidavit, but not as expert retained by any party to the legal action.
In 1992, Co-Chair of the Blue Ribbon County Governance committee, appointed by the Mecklenburg County (N.C.) Commission to study possible changes in election procedures for the county commission. Proposed a new expanded Commission and new set of districts. Co-chair of the District Proposal Election Committee, which campaigned for the new proposal, which was adopted by the voters in November 1992. In 1993 the North Carolina General Assembly revised those districts and mandated that the revised districts be used for school board elections. In Daly et al. vs. Hunt et al. 3:93CV371-MU (W.D.N.C. Charlotte Division) during 1994 the state districts were challenged on one-person-one vote grounds. Testified, in a joint affidavit with Gerry F. Cohen of the N.C. General Assembly staff, about both sets of districts.
United States of America vs. Anson County Board of Education et al. 3:93CV210-P (W.D.N.C.) 1994. Retained by the United States Department of Justice. Testified by declaration that elections in Anson County are racially polarized, the African- American community is politically cohesive, and any at-large seats on the school board would dilute the vote of minority citizens because whites vote as a bloc to prevent minority candidates from winning election.
Charles T. Sutherland vs. Everett H. Hyde et al. 3:94CV00451 (M.D.N.C.) 1995. Retained by plaintiff to testify by affidavit about the effects of the ballot order of names in primaries on the results of elections. Ballot order does affect the outcome of some primary elections in North Carolina. This case became Charles T. Sutherland, Jr. vs James Hunt, et al. 1:97-CV-1123 (M.D.N.C.).
12 Thurman Gause et al. vs. Brunswick County, North Carolina et al. CA-93-80-7-D (E.D.N.C.). Retained by defendants (Brunswick County) in 1994 to testify about polarized voting and the dispersal of minority citizens within the county. While I did not testify, I was deposed by plaintiff’s attorneys. Also see Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (No. 95-3028) 13 August 1996.
Consultant on election systems and redistricting for Albemarle, N.C. City School District (1988); Hickory, N.C. City School District (1991); City of Hickory (1991); Winston-Salem/Forsyth, N.C. School District (1991); Moore County, N.C. Commission (1991); Mecklenburg County, N.C. Commission (1991-2); Reidsville, N.C. City Council (1992); Rowan-Salisbury N.C. Board of Education (1992); plaintiffs bringing legal action against Mt. Olive, North Carolina (1993); plaintiffs bringing legal action against Laurenburg N.C. (1993); and Albemarle N.C. County Commission (1993).
City of Charlottetown et al. and The Government of Prince Edward Island. (1996) Court File GSC-14198 before the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island, Canada. In the matter of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in the matter of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 17(2) and the Schedule of the Election Boundaries Act, (S.P.E.I. 1994, Cap. 13, Bill No. 100). As a result of MacKinnon vs. Government of Prince Edward Island (see above), the Provincial legislature was forced to redistrict itself. The City of Charlottetown argued that the Province did not fully comply with that decision, and they brought suit to change the districts. Retained by City of Charlottetown, testified by report and at trial that the districts were a rural gerrymander.
Wayne Cook, et al. vs. Marshall County, Mississippi, et al. and United States of America Defendant Intervenor. (1996) CA 3:05 CV 155-D-A (N.D.MS.). Retained by the United States Department of Justice to prepare testimony on polarized voting, minority cohesion, the effects of low socio-economic status on political participation, and traditional districting practices. In this case the Justice Department defended the districts used to elect county supervisors against a challenge by white plaintiffs. Testified by declaration.
Cleveland County Association for Government by the People, et al. vs. Cleveland County Board of Commissioners, et al. (1997) CA 96-1447-SSS (U.S. District Court for D.C.). Retained by plaintiffs to testify about possible districting arrangements. Testified by affidavit that it is not possible to draw a majority minority district in a five district plan for Cleveland County, N.C. that would be considered “geographically compact” as defined by the Supreme Court in Shaw vs. Hunt given the size and dispersion of the African-American population in that jurisdiction.
The United States of America vs. New Roads Louisiana (1997) CA 96-7315-B-M2 (M.D.LA). Retained by the United States Department of Justice to prepare testimony on polarized voting, minority cohesion, and the effects of low socio-economic status
13 on the political participation of minority citizens in New Roads Louisiana. Testified by declaration.
Consultant in 1999 to the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section on various aspects of Cromartie et al. vs. James B. Hunt, et al. 99-1864 (E.D.N.C.) and Smallwood et al. vs. Cromartie et al. 99-1865 (E.D.N.C.). The United States elected not to intervene in these cases.
Dean Butch Wilson et al. vs. John W. Jones Jr. et al. (1999) CA 96-1052-BH-M. in the United States District Court, Southern District of Alabama, Northern Division. Retained by the United States Department of Justice to prepare a four district plan for Dallas County (Selma), Alabama. Testified by declaration, at trial, and at a meeting of Commissioners about the principles used to draw the plan.
Randy Royal, et al. vs. The State of North Carolina and the North Carolina Board of Elections 99 CV 13020 (2000), in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, County of Wake, State of North Carolina. Retained by Plaintiffs to examine the effects of campaign spending on General Assembly elections. Testified in writing.
The United States of America vs. Blaine County Montana (2000) CV 99-122-GF-DWM (MT), in the United States District Court for the State of Montana. Retained by the United States Department of Justice to prepare written testimony on polarized voting, minority cohesion, and the effects of low socio-economic status on the political participation of minority (American Indian) citizens in Blaine County Montana. Also drew a three single-member district plan for election of commissioners to show that Indians are numerous enough and geographically concentrated enough to form a majority in one of the districts. Testified by declaration, deposition and at trial.
The United States of America vs. Charleston County Council (2001) CA 2-01-0155-11 (SC), in the United States District Court for the State of South Carolina. Retained by the United States Department of Justice to prepare testimony on polarized voting, minority cohesion, the effects of low socio-economic status on the political participation of minority (African-American) citizens in Charleston, South Carolina and drew single-member districts to show minority numerosity and geographic concentration. Testified by declaration, deposition, and at trial during July 2002.
During the 2001 cycle of reapportionment I was consultant for the minority caucus of the Connecticut State Senate. I also drew Charlotte City Council Districts for the Alliance for a Better Charlotte and presented those districts to the City Council Redistricting Committee. My districts for the Charlotte/Mecklenburg Board of Education and Mecklenburg County Commissioners, drawn in my capacity as consultant to these bodies, were adopted.
14 Retained to advise the Minority Caucus of the Illinois House of Representatives and the Majority Caucus of the Illinois Senate. This resulted in several reports or declarations, including written and oral testimony before the Illinois State Redistricting Commission on 20 September 2001. The Commission enacted districts were challenged in Campuzano, et al. vs. Illinois State Board of Elections et al. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, Civil Action No. 01-C-50376. I was expert witness for plaintiffs in that case, and presented the districts for the Illinois General Assembly that I drew with Dr. Richard Engstrom in a declaration and at trial.
Retained by the Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the South Carolina Senate to advise them on redistricting. Since there was a deadlock between the General Assembly and the Governor of that state, the case went directly to Federal Court. The cases are Colleton County Council et al. vs. Glenn F.McConnell, et al. (Civil Action No. 3:01-3581-10); Leatherman et al. vs Glenn F. McConnell, et al. (Civil Action No. 3:01-3609-10); and Marcharia, et al. vs. James H. Hodges et al. (Civil Action No. 3:01-3892-10) all in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Columbia Division. In the legal action I was retained by plaintiffs and testified by declaration, deposition, and at trial.
I was retained at various times during the year to advise the North Carolina Republican Party on developing redistricting issues, and wrote to the General Assembly Redistricting Committee and the United States Department of Justice about certain aspects of Congressional redistricting in North Carolina. The Congressional redistricting was challenged in The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Eastern Division in the case of Foreman, et al. vs. Bartlett et al. (Civil Action No. 4:01-CV-166-B0(4). I was retained by plaintiffs in that case, and testified by declaration.
The Louisiana House of Representatives, et al. vs. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States (Civil Action No. 1:02CV00062) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In 2002 I was retained by the Department of Justice to examine whether the proposed districting plan for the Louisiana House of Representatives reduced the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. Prepared written and deposition testimony including proposed districts for Orleans and Baton Rouge parishes.
Working Families Party, et al. vs. New York City Board of Elections, et al. (Civil Action No. 03-3701) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Retained by the Brennan Center at New York University, representing plaintiffs. Testified that votes in New York City, especially those of minority citizens, are lost because the New York City Board of Elections disabled or failed to reactivate the sensor latch on the 7,000 lever voting machines used in the city. Testified by report.
15 State of North Carolina vs. John Ashcroft, et al. (Civil Action No. 1:03 CV 02477 [RBW MG RCL]) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In 2004 I was retained as consultant and then as potential expert witness for the Department of Justice to examine whether the proposed plans for the North Carolina General Assembly reduced the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. Prepared a report for the Department.
United States of America vs. Osceola County, Florida (Civil Action No. 6:05-cv-01053- GAP-DAB) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Retained as an expert witness by the Department of Justice to examine whether the at-large voting for County Commissioners violated §2 of the Voting Rights act by denying Hispanic citizens an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice and participate equally in the political process. Testified by declaration, deposition, and at trial.
United States of America vs. Ike Brown, et al. (Civil Action No. 4:05-CV-33) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. I was retained as an expert witness by the Department of Justice to examine whether various election practices, contrary to State and Federal law, in Noxubee County, Mississippi violate §2 of the Voting Rights Act by denying white citizens an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice and participate equally in the political process. Testified by declaration and at trial.
Anne Marie Calabria v. North Carolina Board of Elections, 2006. Retained by Judge Calabria to determine whether the campaign expenditures by the “527” group FAIRJUDGES.NET changed the outcome of the 2006 election between Judge Calabria and Judge Hudson for Associate Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Gary Bartlett, et al. v. Dwight Strickland, et al. in the Supreme Court of the United States. (556 U.S.1 [2009]) 17 June 2008. (with Nathaniel Persily, Bernard Grofman, Bruce Cain, and Lisa Handley). In Re 2011 Redistricting Cases in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks (Civil Case No: 4FA-11-2209CI [console-dated]. Retained by plaintiffs to testify about redistricting plans for the Alaska House of Representatives and Senate in terms of satisfaction of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Alaska Constitution. 2011-12. Testified by report, deposition, and at trial.
The State of Texas v. The United States of America in The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No: 1:11-cv-01303-RMC). Retained by the U.S. Department of Justice to testify about whether the Congressional and Texas House of Representatives plans submitted to the court for pre-clearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act were intentionally drawn to discriminate against minority voters. 2011-12. Testified by declaration, deposition, and at trial.
16 Egolf et al. v. Duran et al. (Civil Action No: D-101-CV-2011-02942 [Consolidated cases]. State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial District Court. Retained by Egolf plaintiffs to compare the various redistricting plans for the Congress and State House and Senate in terms of traditional districting principles and impact on Latino voting rights. Testified at all three trials. 2011-12.
North Carolina State Conference of Branches of the NAACP, et al. v. State of North Carolina et al. State of North Carolina, County of Wake, in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division (Civil Action No: 11-CV-01640). Retained by the Southern Coalition for Social Justice to determine how the proposed redistricting plans for North Carolina Congressional Districts, and State House and Senate used split VTDs (precincts) and whether such splits indicate any racial bias. Testified by affidavit and deposition. 2011-12.
Nueces County, Texas v. The United States of America, In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No 1:11-CV-01748). Retained by the U.S. Department of Justice to testify about whether the county commission district plan submitted to the court for pre-clearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act had the effect and/or intent to discriminate against Hispanic voters. Prepared a report for the Department. The case was settled with a compromise plan after my analysis. State of South Carolina v. United States if America, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No 12-00203). Retained by the U.S. Department of Justice to testify about whether South Carolina had the intent to discriminate against minority voters or to retrogress in the adoption of a photo identification requirement for voting. Testified by declaration, deposition, and at trial.
Zoraida Rios-Andino, Ney Rivera Garcia, Jasmine Guadalupe, Rosario Martinez v. Orange County, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Civil Action No 6:12-cv-1188-ORL-22-KRS). Retained by Latino Justice PRLDEF to determine whether Latinos are numerous enough and geographically concentrated enough to form a majority in one of the six single member districts for Orange County Commission. Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Shelby County, Alabama v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General of the United States, et al. in the Supreme Court of the United States. (No. 12-96, February 2013). (with Richard L. Engstrom and David T. Cannon). Retained by the North Forest Independent School District (Texas) to determine whether the closure of the district and its assimilation into the Houston Independent School District was retrogressive under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Declaration on the effect and intent or purpose of the closure order submitted to the U.S. Attorney General, May 2013. I submitted a slightly revised declaration for North Forest Independent School District, et al. v. Texas Educational Agency et al. in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, Case No. 4:13-cv-01786.
17 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, et al. v. The State of Alabama, et al. Case No. 2:12- CV-691 and Demetrius Newton, et al. v. The State of Alabama, et al. Case No. 2:12-CV- 1081, combined cases in The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division. Retained by plaintiffs to determine whether the redistricting for the state legislature had the effect of diminishing the ability of minority voters to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice, and whether such an effect was intentional, May 2013. Shannon Perez, et al. v. Rick Perry, et al. Case No. 5:11-cv-360, in The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Retained by the Department of Justice to summarize the history of voting rights litigation and Section 5 enforcement in Texas and to summarize my testimony in Texas v. United States, focusing on evidence that discrimination against minority voters in Texas is intentional, February 2014. Consultant to the North Slope Borough (Alaska) Election District Review Committee. The Committee formulated a proposal to expand the number of districts and members of the Borough Assembly and School Board from four districts and seven members to six districts and eleven members. Presented the proposal to the Assembly. August/September 2014.
AFFILIATIONS
The Scholars Strategy Network at Harvard University, 2015-present The American Political Science Association, 1966-present Pi Sigma Alpha, 1967-present The Southern Political Science Association, 1974-present North Carolina Political Science Association, 1974-2012 Vox Pop (parties and interest group studies group), 1981-present Representation and Electoral Systems Studies Group, 1984-present Phi Kappa Phi, 1991-present
SELECTED GRANTS AND AWARDS
National Defense Education Act Title IV Fellowship awarded by the Department of Political Science, The University of Arizona, September 1967-December 1968 and renewed for January 1971-August 1972, $7,200.
Dissertation year research grant awarded by the Department of Political Science, The University of Arizona, September 1972-August 1973, $2,400.
18 Summer research grant awarded upon recommendation of the Faculty Grants Committee from funds established for research by the Foundation of The University of North Carolina at Charlotte and the North Carolina General Assembly, to pursue a study of ticket splitting behavior, Summer 1978, $1,000.
Summer research grant awarded upon recommendation of the Faculty Grants Committee from funds established for research by the Foundation of The University of North Carolina at Charlotte and the North Carolina General Assembly, to pursue a study of campaign finance, Summer 1980, $1,000.
Summer research grant awarded upon recommendation of the Faculty Grants Committee from funds established for research by the Foundation of The University of North Carolina at Charlotte and the North Carolina General Assembly, to pursue a study of attitudes among elite African-Americans, Summer 1996, $8,196.
Faculty Service Award Recipient for 2000 from the UNC Charlotte Alumni Association for career accomplishments and service to the community.
Secretary of the North Carolina Political Science Association, 2007-2008 Vice President of the North Carolina Political Science Association, 2008-09. President Elect of the North Carolina Political Science Association, 2009-10. President of the North Carolina Political Science Association, 2010-2011.
PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1963-1991
President, Teen-Age Republicans, Bernalillo County, N.M., 1963-64 Vice President, Young Republicans, Bernalillo County, 1963-64 President, Young Republicans, University of New Mexico, 1964-65 Republican Precinct Chair, Bernalillo County, 1966 Precinct election official, Pima County, Arizona, 1968 and 1972 Republican Precinct Chair, Mecklenburg County, N.C., 1974-76 Precinct Supervisor, Mecklenburg County Republican Party, 1975-76 Vice Chair, Mecklenburg County Republican Party, 1976-77 Republican Nominee, Charlotte City Council, 1977 Information Chair, Mecklenburg County Republican Party, 1977-79
I Ceased work for the Republican Party to assume a position on the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections: Member, July 1979-July 1991, Chair of the Board, July 1985-July 1991. The political parties nominate the board members. I was nominated six times by the Mecklenburg County Republican Party.
19 CURRENT POLITICAL AFFILIATION 1991-PRESENT
After leaving the Board of Elections, I became a registered unaffiliated voter (that is, an independent) in North Carolina. When I moved to New Mexico I registered to vote in the Democratic primary, since independents can’t vote in either primary and the Democrats are dominant in New Mexico.
MEDIA PRESENTATIONS AND MEDIA CONSULTING
Articles, appearances, and background consulting for television, radio, and print media: These include over one hundred different media including: The Advocate, Albuquerque Journal, American Broadcasting Network News, Asheville Citizen-Times, Associated Press, Atlanta Constitution, Bloomberg News Service (NY), Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corporation World News Service and News America, Burlington (NC) Times-News, Business Journal (Charlotte), Business Week Magazine, CBS Television (“Today” and “60 Minutes”), Cable News Network, C-Spann Network, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Capitol Reporter, Catholic Radio News on Sirius, Charlotte Observer, Charlotte Post, Charlotte Weekly, Chicago Tribune, Christian Broadcasting Network News, Christian Science Monitor, City Journal (NY City),Congressional Quarterly, Copley News Service, The County News (NC), Cox Newspaper Chain, Creative Loafing (NC), Dailey News (Washington, DC), Dallas Morning News, Danville Virginia Register and Bee, Detroit Free Press, Durham Herald- Sun, The Economist (London), Fayetteville (NC) Observer, Fox News Network, Fox News (Charlotte), Freedom Newspaper Chain, Gannett News Service, The Gaston Gazette, Greensboro News and Record, Greenville News (S.C.), Hearst Newspaper chain, The Herald Tribune (S.E. Florida), Hickory Daily Record (NC),The Hill Newspaper, Houston Chronicle, The Independent (London), The Independent (Durham), The Independent Tribune (Concord, NC), Inside Congress, The Irish Times (Dublin), Keene Sentinel (NH), Kepplinger Newsletter, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Los Angeles Times, Mecklenburg (NC) Times, Mint Hill (NC) Times, MSNBC Network, Media General Newspaper Chain, The Nation Magazine, National Journal, National Public Radio All Things Considered, New Orleans Times Picayune, New York Daily News, New York Times, New York Times Magazine, Newhouse News Service, Newsday (New York), Newsweek, North Carolina Public Radio, People Magazine, Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia Tribune, Raleigh News and Observer, Record and Landmark (Statesville, NC), Richmond Times, Roll Call News, Sacramento Bee, San Diego Union Tribune, Scholastic News, Serius Catholic News Radio, Shelby Star (NC), Southan News of Canada, St. Louis Post Dispatch, St. Petersburg Times, Stateline.org, Statesville (NC) Record and Landmark, State Government Radio Network (NC), Thompson Newspaper Chain, Tampa Tribune, Time-Warner Cable, Time Magazine, Toledo Blade, Union Weekly Newspaper (NC), USA Today, Virginia Pilot, Washington Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, Wilson Daily Times (NC), Winston-Salem Journal, UNC Television Network, United Press International, U.S. News and World Report, Washington Post, Washington Times, Winston-Salem Journal, Women’s Voice, WBT Radio, WBTV, WCNC-TV, WDYT, WFAE, WTVI.
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