Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Volume 21 Article 2 Number 1 Fall 1997 1-1-1997 Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina Jonathan Miller Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_international_comparative_law_review Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 77 (1997). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol21/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina By JONATHAN MILLER* I. Introduction Constitutional trends in the world today reveal a strong movement among new democracies to provide for judicial review.' The precise model may vary from that of the United States, with many countries prefer- ring to send all constitutional issues to a single court and some providing for review before a law takes effect.3 However, no one can doubt the basic trend toward review exercised by a judicial or quasi-judicial organ. Given the fractious nature of political competition, the most obvious reason for the rise of judicial review is that pluralist societies require a respected in- stitution or institutions to resolve disputes over the interpretation and ap- * Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law.