The Accidents: Who heard the whispers that were coming from the shuttle’s Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on a cold January morning in 1986? Who thought the mighty A Nation’s , designed to withstand the thermal extremes of space, would be negatively affected by launching at near-freezing temperatures? Very few Tragedy, NASA’s understood the danger, and most of the smart people working in the program Challenge missed the obvious signs. Through 1985 and January 1986, the dedicated and talented people at the NASA Human Spaceflight Centers focused on readying the Challenger and her crew to fly a complex mission. Seventy-three seconds Randy Stone Jennifer Ross-Nazzal after SRB ignition, hot gases leaking from a joint on one of the SRBs impinged on the External Tank (ET), causing a structural failure that resulted in the loss The Crew Michael Chandler of the vehicle and crew. Philip Stepaniak Most Americans are unaware of the profound and devastating impact the Witness Accounts—Key to accident had on the close-knit NASA team. The loss of Challenger and Understanding Columbia Breakup her crew devastated NASA, particularly at (JSC) and Paul Hill Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) as well as the processing crews at (KSC) and the landing and recovery crew at Dryden Flight Research Center. Three NASA teams were primarily responsible for shuttle safety—JSC for on-orbit operation and crew member issues; MSFC for launch propulsion; and KSC for shuttle processing and launch. Each center played its part in the two failures. What happened to the “Failure is not an optio n” creed, they asked. The engineering and operations teams had spent months preparing for this mission. They identified many failure scenarios and trained relentlessly to overcome them. The ascent flight control team was experienced with outstanding leadership and had practiced for every contingency. But on that cold morning in January, all they could do was watch in disbelief as the vehicle and crew were lost high above the Atlantic Ocean. Nothing could have saved the Challenger and her crew once the chain of events started to unfold. On that day, everything fell to pieces.

Seventeen years later, in 2003, NASA lost a second shuttle and crew—Space Transportation System (STS)-107. The events that led up to the loss of Columbia were eerily similar to those surrounding Challenger. As with Challenger, the vehicle talked to the program but no one understood. Loss of foam from the ET had been a persistent problem in varying degrees for the entire program. When it occurred on STS-107, many doubted that a lightweight piece of foam could damage the resilient shuttle. It made no sense, but that is what happened. Dedicated people missed the obvious. In the end, foam damaged the wing to such an extent that the crew and vehicle could not safely reenter the Eart h’s atmosphere. Just as with Challenger, there was no opportunity to heroically “save the day” as the data from the vehicle disappeared and it became clear that friends and colleagues were lost. Disbelief was the first reaction, and then a pall of grief and devastation descended on the NASA family of operators, engineers, and managers.

32 The Historical Legacy The Challenger Accident its pace because NASA simply lacked and blown by the O-ring seals on the the staff and facilities to safely fly an booster field joint. The joints were accelerated number of missions. designed to join the motor segments together and contain the immense heat By the end of 1985, pressure mounted and pressure of the motor combustion. on the space agency as they prepared to As the Challenger ascended, the leak launch more than one flight a month the became an intense jet of flame that next year. A record four launch scrubs penetrated the ET, resulting in and two launch delays of STS-61C, structural failure of the vehicle and which finally launched in January 1986, loss of the crew. exacerbated tensions. To ensure that no more delays would threaten the Prior to this tragic flight, there had 1986 flight rate or schedule, NASA cut been many O-ring problems witnessed the flight 1 day short to make sure as early as November 1981 on the Columbia could be processed in time second flight of Columbia. The hot Pressure to Fly for the scheduled ASTRO- 1 science gases had significantly eroded the As the final flight of Challenger mission in March. Weather conditions STS-2 booster right field joint—deeper approached, the prohibited landing that day and the than on any other mission until the and the operations community at JSC, next, causing a slip in the processing accident—but knowledge was not MSFC, and KSC faced many pressures schedule. NASA had to avoid any widespread in mission management. that made each sensitive to maintaining additional delays to meet its goal of STS-6 (1 983) boosters did not have a very ambitious launch schedule. By 15 flights that year. erosion of the O-rings, but heat had impacted them. In addition, holes were 1986, the schedule and changes in the The agency needed to hold to the blown through the putty in both nozzle manifest due to commercial and schedule to complete at least three joints. NASA reclassified the new Department of Defense launch flights that could not be delayed. field joints Criticality 1, noting that the requirements began to stress NASA’s Two flights had to be launched in failure of a joint could result in “loss of ability to plan, design, and execute May 1986: the Ulysses and the Galileo life or vehicle if the component fails.” shuttle missions. NASA had won flights, which were to launch within Even with this new categorization, support for the program in the 1970s by 6 days of each other. If the back-to-back the topic of O-ring erosion was not emphasizing the cost-effectiveness and flights missed their launch window, discussed in any Flight Readiness economic value of the system. By the payloads could not be launched Reviews until March 1984, in December 1983, 2 years after the until July 1987. The delay of STS-61C preparation for the 11th flight of the maiden flight of Columbia, NASA had and Challenger’s final liftoff in January program. Time and again these flown only nine missions. To make threatened the scheduled launch plans anomalies popped up in other missions spaceflight more routine and therefore of these two flights in particular. The flown in 1984 and 1985, with the more economical, the agency had to Challenger needed to launch and deploy issue eventually classified as an accelerate the number of missions it a second Tracking and Data Relay “acceptable risk” but not desirable. flew each year. To reach this goal, Satellite, which provided continuous The SRB project manager regularly NASA announced an ambitious rate of global coverage of Earth-orbiting waived these anomalies, citing them as 24 flights by 1990. satellites at various altitudes. The shuttle “repeats of conditions that had already would then return promptly to be NASA flew five missions in 1984 and a been accepted for flight” or “within reconfigured to hold the liquid-fueled record nine missions the following year. their experience base,” explained Centaur rocket in its payload bay. By 1985, strains in the system were Arnold Aldrich, program manager for The ASTRO- 1 flight had to be launched evident. Planning, training, launching, the Space Shuttle Program. and flying nine flights stressed the in March or April to observe Halley’s agency’s resources and workforce, as Comet from the shuttle. Senior leadership like Judson Lovingood believed that engineers did the constant change in the flight On January 28, 1986, NASA launched “had thoroughly worked that joint manifest. Crews scheduled to fly in 1986 Challenger, but the mission was problem.” As explained by former would have seen a dramatic decrease never realized. Hot gases from the Chief Engineer Keith Coates, “We in their number of training hours or the right-hand Solid Rocket Booster motor knew the gap was opening. We knew agency would have had to slow down had penetrated the thermal barrier

The Historical Legacy 33 the O-rings were getting burned. Although the design of the boosters not been compiled. Wiley Bunn noted, But there’d been some engineering had proven to be a major complication “It was a matter of assembling that data rationale that said, ‘It won’t be a for MSFC and Morton Thiokol, the and looking at it [in] the proper fashion. failure of the joint.’ And I thought engineering debate occurring behind Had we done that, the data just jumps justifiably so at the time I was there. closed doors was not visible to the entire off the page at you.” And I think that if it hadn’t been for Space Shuttle Program preparing for the the cold weather, which was a whole launch of STS-51L. There had been Devastated new environment, then it probably serious erosions of the booster joint The accident devastated NASA would have continued. We didn’t like seals on STS-51B (1985) and STS-51C employees and contractors. To this it, but it wouldn’t fail.” (1985), but MSFC had not pointed out day Aldrich asks himself regularly, any problems with the boosters right Each time the shuttle launched “What could we have done to prevent before the Challenger launch. successfully, the accomplishment what happened?” Holding a mission Furthermore, MSFC failed to bring masked the recurring field joint management team meeting the morning the design issue, failures, or concern problems. Engineers and managers of launch might have brought up the with launching in cold temperatures to were fooled into complacency because Thiokol/MSFC teleconference the the attention of senior management. they were told it was not a flight safety previous evening. “I wish I had made Instead, discussions of the booster issue. They concluded that it was safe such a meeting happen,” he lamented. engines were resolved at the local level, to fly again because the previous The flight control team felt some even on the eve of the Challenger missions had flown successfully. In responsibility for the accident, launch. “I was totally unaware that these short, they reached the same conclusion remembered STS-51L Lead Flight meetings and discussions had even each time—it was safe to fly another Director Randy Stone. Controllers occurred until they were brought to light mission. “The argument that the same “truly believed they could handle several weeks following the Challenger risk was flown before without failure is absolutely any problem that this vehicle accident in a Rogers Commission often accepted as an argument for the could throw at us.” The accident, hearing at KSC,” Arnold Aldrich safety of accepting it again. Because of however, “completely shattered the recalled. He also recalled that he had this, obvious weaknesses are accepted belief that the flight control team can sat shoulder to shoulder with senior again and again, sometimes without a always save the day. We have never management “in the firing room for sufficiently serious attempt to remedy fully recovered from that.” Alabama approximately 5 hours leading up to the them or to delay a flight because of and Florida employees similarly launch of Challenger and no aspect of their continued presence,” wrote felt guilty about the loss of the crew these deliberations was ever discussed Richard Feynman, Nobel Prize winner and shuttle, viewing it as a personal or mentioned.” and member of the presidential- failure. John Conway of KSC pointed appointed Rogers Commission charged Even the flight control team “didn’t out that “a lot of the fun went out of to investigate the Challenger accident. know about what was lurking on the the business with that accident.” booster side,” according to Ascent Operational Syndrome Flight Director Jay Greene. Astronaut Rebounded Richard Covey, then working as capsule The Space Shuttle Program was also Over time, the wounds began to heal communicator, explained that the team “caught up in a syndrome that the and morale improved as employees “just flat didn’t have that insight” into shuttle was operational,” according to reevaluated the engineering design and the booster trouble. Launch proceeded J.R. Thompson, former project manager process decisions of the program. The and, in fewer than 2 minutes, the joint for the Space Shuttle Main Engines. KSC personnel dedicated themselves to failed, resulting in the loss of seven The Orbital Flight Test Program, which the recovery of Challenger and returning lives and the Challenger. ended in 1982, marked the beginning of as much of the vehicle back to the routine operations of the shuttle, even Looking back over the decision, it is launch site as possible. NASA spent the though there were still problems with difficult to understand why NASA next 2½ years fixing the hardware and the booster joint. Nonetheless, MSFC launched the Challenger that morning. improving processes, and made over and Morton Thiokol, the company The history of troublesome technical 200 changes to the shuttle during this responsible for the SRBs, seemed issues with the O-rings and joint are downtime. Working on design changes confident with the design. easily documented. In hindsight, the to improve the vehicle contributed to the trends appear obvious, but the data had healing process for people at the centers.

34 The Historical Legacy The Crew Following the breakup of Challenger (STS-51L) during launch over the Atlantic Ocean on January 28, 1986, personnel in the Department of Defense STS Contingency Support Office activated the rescue and recovery assets. This included the local military search and rescue helicopters from the Eastern Space and Missile Center at Patrick Air Force Base and the US Coast Guard. The crew compartment was eventually located on March 8, and NASA officially announced that the recovery operations were completed on April 21. Reconstruction of the Columbia from parts found in East . From this layout, NASA was The recovered remains of the crew were able to determine that a large hole occurred in the leading edge of the wing and identify the burn patterns that eventually led to the destruction of the shuttle. taken to Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and then transported, with military honors, were dispatched to various disaster field personnel transported the crew, with honors, to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology offices for crew recovery efforts. The Lufkin, to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, for where they were identified. Burial Texas, office served as the primary area preliminary identification and preparation arrangements were coordinated with the for all operations, including staging assets for transport. The crew was then relocated, families by the Port Mortuary at Dover and deploying field teams for search, with military honor guard and protocol, Air Force Base, Delaware. Internal NASA recovery, and security. Many organizations to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology reports on the mechanism of injuries had operational experience with disaster medical examiner for forensic analysis. sustained by the crew contributed to recovery, including branches of the federal, Burial preparation and arrangements were upgrades in training and crew equipment state, and local governments together with coordinated with the families by the Port that supported scenarios of bailout, many local citizen volunteers. Remains of Mortuary at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. egress, and escape for Return to Flight. all seven crew members were found within Additional details on the mechanism of Following the breakup of Columbia a 40- by 3-km (25- by 2-mile) corridor in injuries sustained by the crew and lessons (STS-107) during re-entry over Texas and East Texas. The formal search for crew learned for enhanced crew survival are Louisiana on February 1, 2003, personnel members was terminated on February 13, found in the Columbia Crew Survival from the NASA Mishap Investigation Team 2003. Astronauts, military, and local police Investigation Report NASA/SP-2008-565.

Making the boosters and main engines All NASA centers concentrated on how Flight mission, which focused on safety more robust became extremely they could make the system better and and included a series of revised important for engineers at MSFC and safer. For civil servants and contractors, procedures and processes at the centers. Thiokol. The engineers and astronauts the recovery from the accident was not At KSC, for instance, new policies at JSC threw themselves into just business. It was personal. Working were instituted for 24-hour operations developing an escape system and toward Return to Flight was almost a to avoid the fatigue and excessive protective launch and re-entry suits religious experience that restored the overtime noted by the Rogers and improving the flight preparation shattered confidence of the workforce. Commission. NASA implemented the process. All of the improvements NASA Safety Reporting System. Safety, NASA instituted a robust flight then had to be incorporated into the reliability, maintainability, and quality preparation process for the Return to KSC vehicle processing efforts. assurance staff increased considerably.

The Historical Legacy 35 JSC’s Mission Operations Director the shuttle when it emerged from the The Columbia Accident Eugene Kranz noted that Mission Vehicle Assembly Building on Operations examined “every job we July 4, 1988. The Star-Spangled Banner do” during the stand down. They played as the vehicle crawled to the microscopically analyzed their pad, while crew members and other processes and scrutinized those workers from KSC and Headquarters decisions. They learned that the flight spoke about the milestone. David readiness process prior to the Hilmers, a member of the crew, tied the Challenger accident frequently lacked milestone to the patriotism of the day. detailed documentation and was often “What more fitting present could we driven more by personality than by make to our country on the day of its requirements. The process was never birth than this? America, the dream identical or exact but unique. Changes is still alive,” he exclaimed. The Return were made to institute a more rigorous to Flight effort was a symbol of program, which was well-documented America’s pride and served as a healing and could be instituted for every flight. moment not only for the agency but also for the country. Tip Talone of Astronaut Robert Crippen became the KSC likened the event to a “rebirth.” NASA flew 87 successful missions deputy director of the National Space following the Return to Flight effort. Transportation System Operations. Indeed, President Ronald Reagan, who As the 1990s unfolded, the post- He helped to determine and establish visited JSC in September 1988, told Challenger political and economic new processes for running and workers, “When we launch Discovery, environment changed dramatically. operating the flight readiness review even more than the thrust of great and mission management team (headed engines, it will be the courage of our Environment Changes by Crippen), as well as the launch heroes and the hopes and dreams of commit criteria procedures, including every American that will lift the shuttle As the Soviet Union disintegrated temperature standards. He instituted into the heavens.” and the Soviet-US conflict that began changes to ensure the agency in the mid 1940s came to an end, Without any delays, the launch maintained clear lines of responsibility NASA (established in 1958) struggled of STS-26 went off just a few days and authority for the new launch to find its place in a post-Cold War after the president’s speech, returning decision process he oversaw. world. Around the same time, the Americans to space. The pride in federal deficit swelled to a height that Retired Astronaut Richard Truly also America’s accomplishment could be raised concern among economists and participated in the decision-making seen across the country. In Florida, citizens. To cut the deficit, Congress processes for the Return to Flight effort. the Launch Control Center raised and the White House decreased Truly, then working as associate a large American flag at launch time domestic spending, and NASA was not administrator for spaceflight, invited the and lowered it when the mission spared from these cuts. Rather than STS-26 (1988) commander Frederick concluded. In California, at Dryden eliminate programs within the agency, Hauck to attend any management Flight Research Center, the astronauts NASA chose to become more meetings in relation to the preparation exited the vehicle carrying an cost-effective. A leaner, more efficient for flight. By attending those meetings, American flag—a patriotic symbol agency emerged with the appointment Hauck had “confidence in the fixes of their flight. Cheering crowds of NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin that had been made” and “confidence in waving American flags greeted the in 1992, whose slogan was “faster, the team of people that had made those astronauts at the crew return event at better, cheaper.” decisions,” he remarked. Ellington Field in , Texas. The launch restored confidence The shuttle, the most expensive line Return to Flight in the program and the vehicle. Pride item in NASA’s budget, underwent After Challenger Accident and excitement could be found across significant budget reductions throughout the centers and at contract facilities the 1990s. Between 1993 and 2003, the As the launch date for the flight around the country. program suffered from a 40% decrease approached, excitement began to build in its purchasing capability (with at the centers. Crowds surrounded inflation included in the figures), and its

36 The Historical Legacy workforce correspondingly decreased. morning of January 16, Columbia area opened their arms to the thousands To secure additional cost savings, launched from KSC for a lengthy of NASA employees who were grieving. NASA awarded the Space Flight research flight. On February 1, just They offered their condolences, while Operations Contract to United Space minutes from a successful landing in some local restaurants provided free Alliance in 1995 to consolidate Florida, the Orbiter broke up over food to workers. Ed Mango, KSC numerous shuttle contracts into one. East Texas and Louisiana. Debris launch manager and director of the littered its final path. The crew and recovery for approximately 3 months, Pressure Leading up to the Accident Columbia were lost. learned “that people love the space program and want to support it in any As these changes took effect, NASA Recovering Columbia and Her Crew way they can.” His replacement, Jeff began working on Phase One of the Angermeier, added, “When you work in Space Station Program, called Recovery of the Orbiter and its crew the program all the time, you care Shuttle-Mir. Phase Two, assembly of began at 9:16 a.m., when the ship deeply about it, but it isn’t glamorous to the ISS, began in 1998. The shuttle was failed to arrive in Florida. The rapid you. Out away from the space centers, critical to the building of the outpost response and mishap investigation NASA is a big deal.” and was the only vehicle that could teams from within the agency headed launch the modules built by Europe, to Barksdale Air Force Base in As volunteers collected debris, it Japan, and the United States. By tying Shreveport, Louisiana. Hundreds of was shipped to KSC where the vehicle the two programs so closely together, NASA employees and contractors was reconstructed. For the center’s a reliable, regular launch schedule was reported to their centers to determine employees, the fact that Columbia necessary to maintain crew rotations, how they could help bring the crew would not be coming back whole was so the ISS management began to dictate and Columbia home. Local emergency hard to swallow. “I never thought I’d NASA’s launch schedule. The program service personnel were the first see Columbia going home in a box,” had to meet deadlines outlined in responders at the various scenes. said Michael Leinbach of KSC. Many bilateral agreements signed in 1998. By that evening, representatives from others felt the same way. Working with Even though the shuttle was not an local, state, and federal agencies were the debris and reconstructing the ship operational vehicle, the agency worked in place and ready to assist NASA. did help, however, to heal the wounds. its schedules as if the space truck could The recovery effort was unique, quite As with the loss of Challenger, NASA be launched on demand, and there unlike emergency responses following employees continue to be haunted by was increasing pressure to meet a other national disasters. David Whittle, questions of “what if.” “I’ll bet you a February 2004 launch date for Node 2. head of the mishap investigation team, day hardly goes by that we don’t think When launch dates slipped, these recalled that there were “1 30 state, about the crew of Columbia and if there delays affected flight schedules. federal, and local agencies” represented was something we might have been able On top of budget constraints, personnel in the effort; but as he explained, we to do to prevent” the accident, admitted reductions, and schedule pressure, the “never, ever had a tiff. Matter of fact, Dittemore. Wayne Hale, shuttle program program suffered from a lack of vision the Congressional Committee on manager for launch integration at KSC, on replacing the shuttle. There was Homeland Security sent some people called the decisions made by the mission uncertainty about the program’s lifetime. down to interview us to figure out how management team his “biggest” regret. Would the shuttle fly until 2030 or be we did that, because that was not the “We had the opportunity to really save replaced with new technology? Ronald experience of 9/11.” The priority of the the day, we really did, and we just didn’t Dittemore, manager of the Space Shuttle effort was the recovery of the vehicle do it, just were blind to it.” Program from 1999 to 2003, explained, and the astronauts, and all of these “We had no direction.” NASA would agencies came together to see to it that Causes “start and stop” funding initiatives, like NASA achieved this goal. Foam had detached from the ET since the shuttle upgrades, and then reverse While in East Texas and Louisiana, the the beginning of the program, even directions. “Our reputation was kind of space agency came to understand how though design requirements specifically sullied there, because we never finished important the Space Shuttle Program prohibited shedding from the tank. what we started out to do.” was to the area and America. Volunteers Columbia sustained major damage on This was the environment in which traveled from all over the United States its maiden flight, eventually requiring NASA found itself in 2003. On the to help in the search. People living in the the replacement of 300 tiles. As early

The Historical Legacy 37 as 1983, six other missions witnessed the vehicle eventually broke up over requiring exacting analysis, doing our the left tank bipod ramp foam loss that East Texas and Louisiana. homework.” As an example, he cited eventually led to the loss of the STS-107 the ET-120, which was to have been the Senior program management had been crew and vehicle. For more than 20 Return to Flight tank for STS-114 and alerted to the STS-107 debris strike on years, NASA had witnessed foam was to be sent to KSC late in 2004. the second day of the flight but had shedding and debris hits. Just one flight But, he admitted, “We knew there failed to understand the risks to the crew after STS-26 (the Return to Flight after [were] insufficient data to determine the or the vehicle. No one thought that foam Challenger), Atlantis was severely tank was safe to fly.” After the Debris could create a hole in the leading edge damaged by debris that resulted in the Verification Review, management of the wing. Strikes had been within loss of one tile. learned that some minor issues still had their experience base. In short, to be handled before these tanks would Two flights prior to the loss of Columbia management made assumptions based be approved for flight. and her crew, STS-112 (2002) on previous successes, which blinded experienced bipod ramp loss, which hit them to serious problems. “Even in During the flight hiatus, NASA both the booster and tank attachment flight when we saw (the foam) hit the upgraded many of the shuttle’s systems ring. The result was a 10.2-cm- (4-in.)- wing, it was a failure of imagination and began the process of changing its wide, 7.6-cm- (3 in.)-deep tear in the that it could cause the damage that it culture. Engineers redesigned the insulation. The program assigned the ET undoubtedly caused,” said John boosters’ bolt catcher and modified the Project with the task of determining the Shannon, who later became manager of tank in an attempt to eliminate foam cause and a solution. But the project the Space Shuttle Program. Testing later loss from the bipod ramp. Engineers failed to understand the severity of foam proved that foam could create cracks in developed an Orbiter Boom Sensor loss and its impact on the Orbiter, so the the reinforced carbon-carbon and holes System to inspect the tiles in space, due date for the assignment slipped to of 40.6 by 43.2 cm (16 by 17 in.). and NASA added a Wing Leading after the return of STS-107. Edge Impact Detection System. NASA Aside from the physical cause of the also installed a camera on the ET Foam loss became an expected anomaly accident, flaws within the decision- umbilical well to document separation and was not viewed as risky. Instead, making process also significantly and any foam loss. the issue became one the program had impacted the outcome of the STS-107 regularly experienced, and one that flight. A lack of effective and clear Finally, NASA focused on improving engineers believed they understood. communication stemmed from communication and listening to It was never seen as a safety issue. organizational barriers and hierarchies dissenting opinions. To help the agency The fact that previous missions, which within the program. These obstacles implement plans to open dialogue had experienced severe debris hits, had made it difficult for engineers with between managers and engineers, from successfully landed only served to real concerns about vehicle damage to the bottom up, NASA hired the global reinforce confidence within the program share their views with management. safety consulting firm Behavioral concerning the robustness of the vehicle. Investigators found that management Science Technology, headquartered in accepted opinions that mirrored their Ojai, California. After several months of investigation own and rejected dissent. and speculation about the cause of the Return to Flight accident, investigators determined that Changes After Columbia Accident a breach in the tile on the left wing led to the loss of the vehicle. Insulation The second Return to Flight effort When the crew of STS-114 finally foam from the ET’s left bipod ramp, focused on reducing the risk of failures launched in the summer of 2005, it was which damaged the wing’s reinforced documented by the Columbia Accident a proud moment for the agency and the carbon-carbon panel, created the gap. Investigation Board. The focus was on country. President George W. Bush, During re-entry, superheated air entered improving risk assessments, making who watched the launch from the Oval the breach. Temperatures were so system improvements, and Office’s dining room, said, “Our space extreme that the aluminum in the left implementing cultural changes in program is a source of great national wing began to melt, which eventually workforce interaction. In the case of pride, and this flight is an essential step destroyed it and led to a loss of vehicle improved risk assessments, Hale toward our goal of continuing to lead control. Columbia experienced explained, “We [had] reestablished the the world in space science, human aerodynamic stress that the damaged old NASA culture of doing it right, spaceflight, and space exploration.” airframe could not withstand, and relying more on test and less on talk, First Lady Laura Bush and Florida

38 The Historical Legacy Witness Accounts—Key to Understanding Columbia Breakup

The early sightings assessment team— showed debris being shed from the team, and put into ballistic and trajectory formed 2 days after the Space Shuttle shuttle. Final analysis revealed 20 distinct analysis as quickly as possible. The Columbia accident on February 1, 2003— debris shedding events and three Aerospace Corporation independently had two primary goals: flashes/flares during re-entry. Analysis of performed the ballistic and trajectory n Sift through and characterize the witness these videos and corresponding air traffic analysis for process verification. control radar produced 20 pre-breakup reports during re-entry. The public reports, which at first seemed search areas, ranging in size from 2.6 to n Obtain and analyze all available data to like random information, were in fact 4,403 square km (1 to 1,700 square miles) better characterize the pre-breakup debris a diamond in the rough. This information extending from the California-Nevada and ground impact areas. This included became invaluable for the search teams border through West Texas. providing the NASA interface to the on the ground. The associated trajectory Department of Defense (DoD) through the To facilitate the trajectory analysis, witness analyses also significantly advanced DoD Columbia Investigation Support Team. reports were prioritized to process re-entry the study of spacecraft breakup in the imagery with precise observer location and atmosphere and the subsequent ground Of the 17,400 public phone, e-mail, and time calibration first. The process was to impact footprints. mail reports received from February 1 time-synchronize all video, determine the through April 4, more than 2,900 were exact debris shedding time, measure relative After the Columbia broke apart over East witness reports during re-entry, prior Texas, volunteers from federal agencies, motion, determine ballistic properties of the to the vehicle breakup. Over 700 of those as well as members of the East Texas First debris, and perform trajectory analysis to included photographs or video. Public Responders, participated in walking the predict the potential ground impact areas debris fields, forest, and wetlands to find imagery prov ided a near -complete or footprints. Key videos were hand carried, as many parts as possible. This facilitated record of Columbia’s re-entry and video in determining the cause of the accident. expedited through the photo assessment

13:55:23 to 13:55:27 13:53:46 Debris Shower A Debris 1 13:53:48 13:55:24 Debris 2 13:54:33 Debris 8 Flash 1 13:55:27 13:54:36 Debris 10 Debris 6 13:55:45 San 13:55:05 Debris 12 Franciscoco Debris 7 13:55:37 Debris 11 13:54:09 14:00:05.7 Debris 5 Late Flash 1 13:53:56 13:55:56 Debris 3 13:54:02 Debris 13 13:55:58 14:00:06.7 Debris 4 Debris 14 Late Flash 2

13:55:18 13:56:10 Debris 7A Debris 15 13:57:24 14:00:02 14:00:10 Los Debris 16 Debris B Angeles 13:55:40 Debris D Debris 11B 14:00:03 14:00:11 14:00:12 13:55:39 Debris C Debris 11A 13:55:44 Debris E Debris F Debris 11C 14:00:15 Debris Shower Phoenix 13:57:54 13:59:477 San Flare 1 Debris A FortF Diego 13:58:00 WorthWo t Dallasallass Flare 2 14:00:18.3 Catastrophic Event El Paso 00:00:00 = Hours: Minutes: Seconds STS-107 Global Positioning Satellite Trajectory Austin Houston STS-107 Predicted Trajectory Debris Event San Antonio Video Observer Major City

The Historical Legacy 39 Governor Jeb Bush were among the elected officials made the aftermath through those terrible times. All of the guests at KSC. Indeed, the Return even more difficult for the NASA team. human spaceflight centers—KSC, to Flight mission had been a source The American public and the elected MSFC, and JSC—suffered terribly from of pride for the nation since its officials expected perfection. When it the loss of Challenger and Columbia. announcement. For instance, troops in was not delivered, the outcry of “How The personnel of all three centers Iraq sent a “Go Discovery” banner that could this have happened?” made the recovered by rededicating themselves was hung at KSC. At the landing at headlines of every newspaper and to understanding what caused the Dryden Flight Research Center, the television newscast and became a topic accidents and how accidents could be astronauts exited the vehicle carrying an of concern in Congress. The second prevented in the future. Together, they American flag. When the crew returned accident was harder on the agency found the problems and fixed them. to Ellington Field, a huge crowd greeted because the question was now: “How Did the agency change following the crew, waving flags as a symbol of could this have happened again ?” these two accidents? The answer is the nation’s accomplishment. Houston Because of the accidents, the agency absolutely. Following the Challenger Mayor Bill White declared August 10, had a more difficult challenge in accident, the teams looked at every 2005, “Discovery STS-114 Day.” convincing Congress of NASA’s aspect of the processes used to prepare Standing on a stage, backed by a giant ability to safely fly people in space. for a shuttle mission. As a result, they American flag, the crew thanked That credibility gap made each NASA went from the mentality that every everyone for their support. administrator’s job more difficult and flight was completely new with a raised doubts in Congress about custom solution to a mindset that Impact of the Accidents whether human spaceflight was worth included a documented production on NASA the risk and money. To this day, doubts process that was repeatable, flight have not been fully erased on the value after flight. The flight readiness The two shuttle tragedies shook NASA’s of human spaceflight, and the questions process evolved from a process of confidence and have significantly of safety and cost are at the forefront of informally asking each element if all impacted the agency in the long term. every yearly budget cycle. was flight ready to a well-documented At the time of both accidents, the Space set of processes that required In contrast with American politicians, Shuttle Program office, astronauts, and specific questions be answered and the team of astronauts, engineers, and flight and launch control teams were documented for presentation to support personnel that makes human incredibly capable and dedicated to management at a formal face-to-face spaceflight happen believes that space flying safely. Yet, from the vantage meeting. A rigorous process emerged exploration must continue. “Yes, there point of hindsight, these teams across the engineering and the is risk in space travel, but I think that overlooked the obvious, allowing two operations elements at the centers it’s safe enough that I’m willing to take tragedies to unfold on the public stage. that made subsequent flights safer. the risk,” STS-114 (2005) Commander Many of the people directly involved Eileen Collins admitted before her final Yet in spite of all the formal processes in those flights remain haunted by the flight. “I think it’s much, much safer put in place, Columbia was still lost. realization that their decisions resulted than what our ancestors did in traveling These procedures were not flawed, in the loss of human lives. NASA was across the Atlantic Ocean in an old but the decision-making process was responsible for the safety of the crew ship. Frankly, I think they were crazy flawed with regard to assessing the and vehicles, and they failed. The doing that, but they wanted to do that, loss of foam. Tommy Holloway, who flight control teams who worked and we need to carry on the human served for several years as the Space toward perfection with the motto of exploration of the universe that we live Shuttle Program manager, observed “Failure is not an option” felt in. I’m honored to be part of that and that the decision to fly had been based responsible and hesitant to make hard I’m proud to be part of it. I want to be on previous success and not on the decisions. Likewise, the engineering able to hand on that belief or analysis of the data. communities at JSC and MSFC, and enthusiasm that I have to the younger Since 2003, NASA has gone to great the KSC team that prepared the generation because I want us to lengths to improve the processes to vehicles, shared feelings of guilt and continue to explore.” shaken confidence. determine risk and how the team Without this core belief, the individuals handles difficult decisions. A major The fact that these tragedies occurred who picked up the pieces after both criticism of NASA following the in front of millions of spectators and accidents could not have made it Columbia accident was that managers

40 The Historical Legacy did not always listen to minority and dissenting positions. NASA has since diligently worked toward transforming the culture of its employees to be On an Occasion inclusive of all opinions while working of National Mourning toward a solution. Howard Nemerov In hindsight, NASA should not have Poet Laureate of the United States made an “OK to fly” decision for the 1963-1964 and 1988-1990 final missions of Challenger and Columbia. NASA depended on the It is admittedly difficult for a whole requirements that went into the Launch Nation to mourn and be seen to do so, but Commit Criteria and Flight Rules to assure that the shuttle was safe to fly. It can be done, the silvery platitudes Since neither flight had a “violation” Were waiting in their silos for just such of these requirements, the missions An emergent occasion, cards of sympathy were allowed to proceed even though From heads of state were long ago prepared some people were uncomfortable For launching and are bounced around the world with the conditions. As a result, NASA From satellites at near the speed of light, has emphasized that the culture should be “prove it is safe” as opposed to The divine services are telecast “prove it is unsafe” when a concern is From the home towns, children are interviewed raised. The process is better, and the And say politely, gravely, how sorry they are, culture is changing as a result of both And in a week or so the thing is done, of these accidents. The sea gives up its bits and pieces and As a tribute to the human spirit, teams The investigating board pinpoints the cause did not quit or give up after either By inspecting bits and pieces, nothing of the sort accident but rather pressed on to Return Can ever happen again, the prescribed course to Flight each time with a better- Of tragedy is run through omen to amen prepared and more robust vehicle and team. Some individuals never fully As in a play, the nation rises again recovered, and they drifted away from Reborn of grief and ready to seek the stars; human spaceflight. The majority, Remembering the shuttle, forgetting the loom. however, stayed with a renewed vigor to find ways to make spaceflight safer. They still believe in the creed “Failure is not an option” and work diligently to © Howard Nemerov. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. All rights reserved. meet the expectation of perfection by the American people and Congress. NASA has learned from past mistakes and continues on with ventures in space exploration, recognizing that spaceflight is hard, complex, and— most importantly—will always have inherent risk. Accidents will happen, and the teams will have to dig deep into their inner strength to find a way to recover, improve the system, and continue the exploration of space for future generations.

The Historical Legacy 41