A N G E L A K I journal of the theoretical humanitie s volume 5 number 2 august 2000 n the commemorative essay written on the Ioccasion of Deleuze’s death, Derrida spoke of a “nearly total affinity” between the philosophi- cal content of his own work and that of Deleuze.2 In what follows, I am going to argue that there is only a nearly total affinity. In fact, I am going to argue that there is a difference between the philo- sophical content of Derrida and Deleuze because each develops his most basic concepts from different philosophical inspirations: Deleuze with len lawlor Bergson and Derrida with Husserl. So what follows is basically a comparison of Derrida’s 1967 Voice and Phenomenon3 and Deleuze’s 1966 Bergsonism.4 These two early books are not A NEARLY TOTAL insignificant since, on the one hand, Deleuze AFFINITY (with Guattari) says, as late as 1991 that only Bergson was mature enough for the Spinozist the deleuzian virtual inspiration of immanence,5 and, on the other, Derrida says as late as 1993 that his new concept image versus the of the specter is based on Husserl’s concept of derridean trace1 the noema.6 So, what we are going to see is that, in Voice and Phenomenon, on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida develops the priority of tendency and intuition. We shall even concept of the trace, which he associates with the see a difference in the relation of life and death simulacrum (and which is the basis for his in Derrida and Deleuze. concept of the specter); in Bergsonism, on the It goes without saying that in the examination basis of Bergson’s evolutionism, Deleuze devel- which follows I have exaggerated certain claims ops the concept of the virtual image which he made by Derrida and Deleuze in order to make also associates with the simulacrum (and which is the difference between them stand out as the basis for his concept of the concept). While clearly as possible. I believe that, if we want to my primary focus is going to be these two see “the philosophy of difference” continue, we concepts, the trace and the virtual image, I am need to determine as clearly as possible the going to examine both of these seminal books by different versions of this philosophy: distinguish following four trajectories: destruction versus Derrida from Deleuze; Deleuze from Foucault; deconstruction; purity versus contamination; Derrida from Levinas; Deleuze from Lyotard; fiction understood as the virtual image versus Foucault from Derrida, etc. Without the preci- fiction understood as the trace; and, intuition sion that such a process of distinguishing versus language. On the basis of this comparison provides, “the philosophy of difference” will of Voice and Phenomenon and Bergsonism, we die out with its founders or, worse yet, it will shall see two major differences between Derrida continue as a set of interchangeable cliches. So, I and Deleuze emerge: in Derrida, there is a prior- believe the exaggeration of positions is essential ity of form and language; in Deleuze, there is a today. ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN 1469-2899 online/00/020059-13 © 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd and the Editors of Angelaki DOI: 10.1080/09697250020012197 5 9 a nearly total affinity I then the conditions themselves must be charac- terized in new ways. So, in Ideas I, section 70, Before we turn to these trajectories, three Husserl says that essences are clarified through preliminary comments are in order. First, we “free phantasies”; indeed, he says, “fiction makes must recall some of the crucial basic concepts of up the vital element of phenomenology.”14 In phenomenology and Bergsonism. According to Bergson, the virtual is not the possible;15 it is Husserl, there can be no phenomenology without defined by being “real without being actual, ideal the phenomenological reduction;7 in “Philosophy without being abstract,”16 which means that the as a Rigorous Science,” Husserl describes the virtual too can be called a sort of fiction. reduction in this way: in order to return to an Besides these basic concepts of phenomenology “actual beginning,” “all expressions that imply and Bergsonism, we need to keep in mind that thetic existential positings of things in the frame- both the Deleuzian virtual image and the work of space, time, causality, etc. … must in Derridean trace are both memory-images. This is principle be excluded.”8 In Bergsonism, the the case because Deleuze develops the virtual concept parallel to the reduction is “the turn of image on the basis of Bergsonian duration, which experience”; in Matter and Memory, Bergson is essentially defined as memory, and because says, philosophy must return to “experience at its Derrida develops the trace on the basis of the source … above that decisive turn where … it Husserlian living present, in particular, on the becomes properly human experience.”9 Both the basis of the retentional phase or the primary phenomenological reduction and the turn of expe- memory phase of the living present. So, both the rience imply the reduction of transcendence to virtual image and the trace refer to a past and immanence. If transcendence traditionally means more precisely to a past which has never been atemporal truth, then the return to immanence present. The analysis of the four trajectories means a return to temporal experience. Thus, in therefore really amount to comparison of memory phenomenology we have the living present as the in Derrida and Deleuze. absolute form of all experience10 and in The third preliminary comment concerns Bergsonism we have duration as the absolute Heidegger. While everyone knows that Derrida tendency of life.11 If duration and the living has maintained a continuous debate with present insofar as absolute are the transcendental Heidegger’s philosophy since at least 1968 with (but not transcendent) conditions of all experi- the publication of “Ousia and Gramme,” no one ence, they cannot be identical to the experiences even seems to associate Deleuze with Heidegger. they condition. So, they must somehow be differ- I think this is a mistake. On the one hand, if ent. In his lectures on phenomenological psychol- anything the last century – the twentieth – will ogy, Husserl differentiates between psychological probably not be known as Deleuzian or Derridean experience and transcendental experience in or Foucaultian, but as Heideggerian. It is impos- terms of what he calls a “parallelism,” but this sible to underestimate the influence that parallelism is such that there is a perfect “conceal- Heidegger has exerted in all areas including, and ment” of the transcendental in the psychologi- especially, analytic philosophy. So, to refuse to cal.12 The Bergsonian concept equivalent to this bring Deleuze’s thought into confrontation with is difference in nature; in Time and Free Will, that of Heidegger will almost certainly diminish Bergson establishes a difference in nature his greatness. On the other hand – just to take one between psychological life and matter, but example – if one charts the occurrences of psychological life itself differs in nature with itself Heidegger’s name in Difference and Repetition, to the point where it evolves into matter.13 one will see that it occurs within the most impor- Compared to the philosophical tradition, the tant discussions. Indeed the first proper name concepts of parallelism and difference in nature mentioned in Difference and Repetition is that of are new kinds of differences. So, if transcendental Heidegger. With Heidegger in mind, let us now conditions can only be differentiated from the turn to the first trajectory: destruction versus experiences they condition in these new ways, deconstruction. 6 0 lawlor II coincide with what Deleuze calls a simulacrum which is related to the virtual image. Already Both “deconstruction” and “destruction” come they seem to form a sort of opposition because from Heidegger. “Deconstruction,” however, has Derrida’s deconstruction contaminates the meta- become synonymous with Derrida.17 In contrast, physics of presence with the non-presence of the Deleuze never uses the term “deconstruction”; trace, while Deleuze’s destruction purifies but, he uses occasionally the term “destruc- Platonism with the presence of the virtual tion.”18 The issue between Derridean decon- image.23 struction and Deleuzian destruction lies in the target of these practices. When Deleuze speaks of III destruction, he never uses Derrida’s phrase, “the metaphysics of presence”; instead, he speaks of This opposition between contamination and “the destruction of Platonism.” These two terms purity is the second trajectory I would like to – “the metaphysics of presence” and “Platonism” follow. When Deleuze qualifies certain terms as – coincide in that both terms refer to the tradi- “pure,”24 he is using the word “pure” in a sense tional philosophical conception of the origin of which derives from Bergson. Deleuze explains the world, ideas for example, as atemporal; “the Bergson’s well-known “obsession” with the pure destruction of Platonism” or “the deconstruction (BER 12/22) in terms of Bergson’s appropriation of the metaphysics of presence” then would be a of Plato’s method of division (BER 11/22).25 For critique of this conception of ideas, which places Bergson, it is the job of philosophy to divide the them back into temporal experience. But, the badly composed mixtures with which experience coincidence between the terms does not extend presents us in fact (BER 11–12/22). We divide a beyond this temporal critique.19 On the one factual mixture badly, for Bergson, if we make a hand, Derrida defines presence as proximity (VP quantitative difference between time and space, 83–84/75); this definition of presence as proxim- which thereby turns time into a difference of ity implies that the deconstruction of the meta- degree of space.