The Deleuzian Virtual Image Versus the Derridean Trace

Home , Jacques Derrida, Leonard Lawlor, Metaphysics of presence, Trace (deconstruction)

A N G E L A K I journal of the theoretical humanitie s volume 5 number 2 august 2000

n the commemorative essay written on the Ioccasion of Deleuze’s death, Derrida spoke of a “nearly total affinity” between the philosophical content of his own work and that of Deleuze.2 In what follows, I am going to argue that there is only a nearly total affinity. In fact, I am going to argue that there is a difference between the philosophical content of Derrida and Deleuze because each develops his most basic concepts from different philosophical inspirations: Deleuze with len lawlor Bergson and Derrida with Husserl. So what follows is basically a comparison of Derrida’s 1967 Voice and Phenomenon3 and Deleuze’s 1966 Bergsonism.4 These two early books are not A NEARLY TOTAL insignificant since, on the one hand, Deleuze AFFINITY (with Guattari) says, as late as 1991 that only Bergson was mature enough for the Spinozist the deleuzian virtual inspiration of immanence,5 and, on the other, Derrida says as late as 1993 that his new concept image versus the of the specter is based on Husserl’s concept of derridean trace1 the noema.6 So, what we are going to see is that, in Voice and Phenomenon, on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida develops the priority of tendency and intuition. We shall even concept of the trace, which he associates with the see a difference in the relation of life and death simulacrum (and which is the basis for his in Derrida and Deleuze. concept of the specter); in Bergsonism, on the It goes without saying that in the examination basis of Bergson’s evolutionism, Deleuze devel- which follows I have exaggerated certain claims ops the concept of the virtual image which he made by Derrida and Deleuze in order to make also associates with the simulacrum (and which is the difference between them stand out as the basis for his concept of the concept). While clearly as possible. I believe that, if we want to my primary focus is going to be these two see “the philosophy of difference” continue, we concepts, the trace and the virtual image, I am need to determine as clearly as possible the going to examine both of these seminal books by different versions of this philosophy: distinguish following four trajectories: destruction versus Derrida from Deleuze; Deleuze from Foucault; deconstruction; purity versus contamination; Derrida from Levinas; Deleuze from Lyotard; fiction understood as the virtual image versus Foucault from Derrida, etc. Without the preci- fiction understood as the trace; and, intuition sion that such a process of distinguishing versus language. On the basis of this comparison provides, “the philosophy of difference” will of Voice and Phenomenon and Bergsonism, we die out with its founders or, worse yet, it will shall see two major differences between Derrida continue as a set of interchangeable cliches. So, I and Deleuze emerge: in Derrida, there is a prior- believe the exaggeration of positions is essential ity of form and language; in Deleuze, there is a today.

I then the conditions themselves must be characterized in new ways. So, in Ideas I, section 70, Before we turn to these trajectories, three Husserl says that essences are clarified through preliminary comments are in order. First, we “free phantasies”; indeed, he says, “fiction makes must recall some of the crucial basic concepts of up the vital element of phenomenology.”14 In phenomenology and Bergsonism. According to Bergson, the virtual is not the possible;15 it is Husserl, there can be no phenomenology without defined by being “real without being actual, ideal the phenomenological reduction;7 in “Philosophy without being abstract,”16 which means that the as a Rigorous Science,” Husserl describes the virtual too can be called a sort of fiction. reduction in this way: in order to return to an Besides these basic concepts of phenomenology “actual beginning,” “all expressions that imply and Bergsonism, we need to keep in mind that thetic existential positings of things in the frame- both the Deleuzian virtual image and the work of space, time, causality, etc. … must in Derridean trace are both memory-images. This is principle be excluded.”8 In Bergsonism, the the case because Deleuze develops the virtual concept parallel to the reduction is “the turn of image on the basis of Bergsonian duration, which experience”; in Matter and Memory, Bergson is essentially defined as memory, and because says, philosophy must return to “experience at its Derrida develops the trace on the basis of the source … above that decisive turn where … it Husserlian living present, in particular, on the becomes properly human experience.”9 Both the basis of the retentional phase or the primary phenomenological reduction and the turn of expe- memory phase of the living present. So, both the rience imply the reduction of transcendence to virtual image and the trace refer to a past and immanence. If transcendence traditionally means more precisely to a past which has never been atemporal truth, then the return to immanence present. The analysis of the four trajectories means a return to temporal experience. Thus, in therefore really amount to comparison of memory phenomenology we have the living present as the in Derrida and Deleuze. absolute form of all experience10 and in The third preliminary comment concerns Bergsonism we have duration as the absolute Heidegger. While everyone knows that Derrida tendency of life.11 If duration and the living has maintained a continuous debate with present insofar as absolute are the transcendental Heidegger’s philosophy since at least 1968 with (but not transcendent) conditions of all experi- the publication of “Ousia and Gramme,” no one ence, they cannot be identical to the experiences even seems to associate Deleuze with Heidegger. they condition. So, they must somehow be differ- I think this is a mistake. On the one hand, if ent. In his lectures on phenomenological psychol- anything the last century – the twentieth – will ogy, Husserl differentiates between psychological probably not be known as Deleuzian or Derridean experience and transcendental experience in or Foucaultian, but as Heideggerian. It is impos- terms of what he calls a “parallelism,” but this sible to underestimate the influence that parallelism is such that there is a perfect “conceal- Heidegger has exerted in all areas including, and ment” of the transcendental in the psychologi- especially, analytic philosophy. So, to refuse to cal.12 The Bergsonian concept equivalent to this bring Deleuze’s thought into confrontation with is difference in nature; in Time and Free Will, that of Heidegger will almost certainly diminish Bergson establishes a difference in nature his greatness. On the other hand – just to take one between psychological life and matter, but example – if one charts the occurrences of psychological life itself differs in nature with itself Heidegger’s name in Difference and Repetition, to the point where it evolves into matter.13 one will see that it occurs within the most impor- Compared to the philosophical tradition, the tant discussions. Indeed the first proper name concepts of parallelism and difference in nature mentioned in Difference and Repetition is that of are new kinds of differences. So, if transcendental Heidegger. With Heidegger in mind, let us now conditions can only be differentiated from the turn to the first trajectory: destruction versus experiences they condition in these new ways, deconstruction.

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II coincide with what Deleuze calls a simulacrum which is related to the virtual image. Already Both “deconstruction” and “destruction” come they seem to form a sort of opposition because from Heidegger. “Deconstruction,” however, has Derrida’s deconstruction contaminates the meta- become synonymous with Derrida.17 In contrast, physics of presence with the non-presence of the Deleuze never uses the term “deconstruction”; trace, while Deleuze’s destruction purifies but, he uses occasionally the term “destruc- Platonism with the presence of the virtual tion.”18 The issue between Derridean decon- image.23 struction and Deleuzian destruction lies in the target of these practices. When Deleuze speaks of III destruction, he never uses Derrida’s phrase, “the metaphysics of presence”; instead, he speaks of This opposition between contamination and “the destruction of Platonism.” These two terms purity is the second trajectory I would like to – “the metaphysics of presence” and “Platonism” follow. When Deleuze qualifies certain terms as – coincide in that both terms refer to the tradi- “pure,”24 he is using the word “pure” in a sense tional philosophical conception of the origin of which derives from Bergson. Deleuze explains the world, ideas for example, as atemporal; “the Bergson’s well-known “obsession” with the pure destruction of Platonism” or “the deconstruction (BER 12/22) in terms of Bergson’s appropriation of the metaphysics of presence” then would be a of Plato’s method of division (BER 11/22).25 For critique of this conception of ideas, which places Bergson, it is the job of philosophy to divide the them back into temporal experience. But, the badly composed mixtures with which experience coincidence between the terms does not extend presents us in fact (BER 11–12/22). We divide a beyond this temporal critique.19 On the one factual mixture badly, for Bergson, if we make a hand, Derrida defines presence as proximity (VP quantitative difference between time and space, 83–84/75); this definition of presence as proxim- which thereby turns time into a difference of ity implies that the deconstruction of the meta- degree of space. Here we have, “an impure … physics of presence places the origin of presence mixed” idea measuring the mixture. When we in a distancing which makes the origin absent; in analyze mixtures into mediating ideas such as other words, ideas originate in a non-presencing. this, we have, as Deleuze says, “lost the reason This distancing and non-presencing Derrida for the mixtures” (BER 12/22). For Bergson, we calls the trace. On the other hand, Deleuze analyze this mixture well, when we divide time defines Platonism in terms of its motivation “to and space into a difference in nature between repress” what Plato himself calls in Republic X duration and extensity.26 These two qualities “phantasmata,” that is, simulacra, copies of become then, as Deleuze says, “two pure pres- copies.20 Platonism wants to repress simulacra ences” (BER 12/22).27 The two pure presences “as deeply as possible, to shut [them] up in a are the in principle conditions of factual experi- cavern at the bottom of the Ocean,”21 because ence; here Deleuze uses the “Quid facti”–“Quid the ideas originate in the simulacra. This defini- juris” distinction which in French is the “en tion of Platonism’s motivation as a distancing of fait”–“en droit” opposition. These in principle the simulacra as far as to the bottom of the ocean conditions are the true sufficient reason for the implies that the destruction of Platonism brings mixture (BER 20/28–29). Through the method of up to the surface what had been distanced; in division, we have ascended above the “turn of other words, the simulacra become proximate experience” at which experience becomes human and present. In contrast, therefore, to traces experience. So, purity first of all means for which are non-presences and distant, the simu- Deleuze en droit. lacra are presences and they come too close. We But, as Deleuze stresses, the difficulty that can see already that the trace, which Derrida plagued Plato’s method of division disappears in explicitly associates with the simulacrum in his Bergson (BER 24/32). Plato’s method of division 1972 essay on Nietzsche, Spurs,22 does not really lacked a middle term, a mediation in order to

6 1 a nearly total affinity recognize the good side versus the bad side in all from the “true” side of duration since Deleuze mixtures. Plato had to resort to “inspiration,” to suggests that essence too is a sort of fiction. a myth in order to make the selection (BER But, no matter what, when Bergson makes 24/32).28 So, in Bergson, it seems as though we extensity and duration the two sides of the must have a mediating idea of difference of Absolute, he is in accordance with how Deleuze nature, the, so to speak, good (le Bien), in order describes “Heidegger’s ontological intuition”: to know how to divide well (diviser bien). But, “difference must relate different to different according to Deleuze, Bergson makes the division without any mediation whatsoever by the identi- immediately.29 For Bergson, differences in cal.”31 Deleuze interprets Heidegger’s ontological nature occur only on the side of duration; dura- difference as a thought of immediacy, because tion itself “presents the way in which a thing Deleuze’s thought is anti-Hegelian.32 In contrast, varies qualitatively in time” (BER 24/32); and Derrida’s thought is Hegelian.33 We find the duration is first of all our duration, human, Hegelian source of Derrida’s concept of contam- psychological inner life. Duration is the “good ination in his crucial 1964 essay on Levinas, side,” the “true”30 side, the side of “essence,” as “Violence and Metaphysics”; Derrida says, “Pure Deleuze says (BER 24/32), while extensity is the difference is not absolutely different (from bad side, the false side, the side of appearance. It nondifference). Hegel’s critique of the concept of is our duration therefore which allows us to pure difference is for us here, doubtless, the most “affirm and immediately recognize other dura- uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought absolute tions above or below us,” other differences in difference, and showed that it can be pure only nature (BER 25/33; emphasis added). So, purity by being impure.”34 This “Hegelianism” deter- in Deleuze secondly means immediacy. mines Derrida’s interpretation of Heidegger’s If we rely on Bergson’s early writings, it looks ontological difference as mediation. as though duration and extensity were related as In Voice and Phenomenon’s Introduction, pure to impure, good to bad. But, Bergson, as Derrida uses Heidegger’s ontological difference Deleuze insists (BER 27/34), progresses beyond to interpret Husserl’s phenomenological reduc- this early view and realizes that extensity is one tion.35 Derrida recognizes that Husserl’s “side” of the Absolute and that the other “side” phenomenological reduction attempts to divide is duration. Duration is the contraction of all life in general into transcendental life and successive past events into a point in the present, psychological life (VP 10/11). But Derrida while extensity is the relaxation of this point into stresses that the phenomenological reduction the spatial coexistence of these events (BER does not make an “ontological duplication” (VP 56–57/60–61). On either side of this point, we 10–11/11). Here, Derrida is using the word have two sides, as in two divergent lines. Due to “ontological” in a Husserlian sense, but what he relaxation, extensity is a multiplicity infinitely is referring to is what Heidegger would call the divisible in terms of numbers, while, due to ontic.36 In Husserl, according to Derrida, the contraction, duration is a multiplicity which transcendental ego and the psychological ego are cannot be divided in terms of numbers. Since not two things separate from one another;37 they extensity is arithmetically divisible, extensity is are ontically identical but ontologically differ- the side of differences in degree; since duration entiated. Because, however, there is no ontic is arithmetically indivisible, duration is the side difference, because there is “nothing” – here of qualitative differences (BER 24/32). Making Derrida follows Heidegger’s use of “nothing” extensity one side of the Absolute means, for (VP 11/12)38 – because, we might say, there is Bergson, that science is not an artificial knowl- the “nothing” between the transcendental and edge but a natural knowledge, since it is based in the empirical, Derrida argues that every time a difference in nature. Nevertheless, as we shall Husserl tries to define the transcendental without see, the illusions that overwhelm us (like Plato’s the empirical he fails, necessarily, to be rigorous. myths) still come from the side of extensity and The transcendental is contaminated by the science; these illusions we will have to distinguish empirical and vice versa. So, unlike Deleuze who

6 2 lawlor is concerned with dividing mixtures into pure representation, is threatened (VP 73/65). Clearly, differences in nature, Derrida is concerned with Derrida stresses that Husserl, in section 16 of the a “unity” (VP 9/10) which mixes the transcen- lectures, describes retention as a “non-percep- dental and the empirical together. tion” (VP 73/65), which immediately proves The argument based on the lack of ontic Derrida’s point: the living present involves some- difference organizes Derrida’s entire considera- thing like a sign, since retention “indicates” the tion, in Voice and Phenomenon, of the problem recent past which must be absent; there is no of the sign in Husserl’s phenomenology (VP pure expression in the solitary life of the soul. 32/30). According to Husserl in the First Logical But one would mistakenly interpret what Derrida Investigation, signs can be divided essentially is doing here, if one did not recognize that between two functions, expression and indica- Derrida is following all the subtleties of Husserl’s tion. The important word for Derrida is ‘func- descriptions. Husserl calls retention “non-perception’ because function implies that the difference tion” because it is a type of mediation, like a between expression and indication is not a sign, of non-presence. But also, Husserl calls substantial distinction (VP 20/20). In other retention “perception” because it “presences” words, we are always dealing with one substantial immediately what has elapsed. Retention is at term, the sign, which undergoes two different once both a presence and a non-presence, and functions; but, since we do not have two separate this “at once” is why Derrida calls retention a signs, the two functions are always “interwoven” trace. As we already noted, soon after Voice and in any given sign. For Husserl, expression is Phenomenon, Derrida will call the trace the interwoven with indication only in fact; in prin- simulacrum, which implies that the trace can be ciple, expression and indication can be distin- characterized as a sort of fiction. guished. Throughout Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida uses the “en fait”–“en droit” distinction. IV But, unlike Deleuze, for Derrida, this distinction is not rigorous. Lacking a substantial separation, So, the trace brings us to the third trajectory whatever one distinguishes in principle must be which goes in the direction of fiction and there- the same, that is, mediated. fore truth. Heidegger, of course, had displaced Mediation even defines, for Derrida, Husserl’s the concept of truth, from the correspondence living present. In Voice and Phenomenon, between a proposition and a state of affairs to an Derrida turns to Husserl’s lectures on internal experience called aletheia. For Deleuze, Bergson time consciousness, because Husserl’s descrip- enacts a similar displacement. Bergson places tions in the First Investigation suggest that in truth no longer in the solutions to problems but “the solitary life of the soul” there is no need for in the problems themselves (BER 3/15). This indication; psychic life is present to me immedi- displacement allows Bergson to speak of true and ately. In these lectures, Husserl seems to priori- false problems. False problems and the illusions tize the primal impression of the now point of the that cause them come from a disregard for true living present as an origin, but Husserl also differences in nature (BER 13/23). Since science stresses that the living present consists in a is primarily concerned with differences in degree, spreading out that includes necessarily not only science itself invites us to see the entire world in the primal impression but also the retention of its terms. In other words, science invites us to the recent past and the protention of the near “project” this side of the absolute onto the other, future. For Derrida, what is at stake in these onto duration. Deleuze stresses, that, since the descriptions is that primal impression cannot be differences in degree determined by science are, isolated from retention. So, if retention involves for Bergson, the other side of the Absolute and anything like a signifying relation, then the “radi- therefore natural, the illusions and false problems cal difference” Husserl wants between indication which arise from them are immanent to the and expression, indeed, between perception and absolute (BER 26–27/34–35). Here Bergson recollection, or even between presentation and follows a Kantian inspiration (BER 10/20–21).39

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Being immanent, these illusions, therefore, can (BER 111/106). The virtual must not be confused only be “repressed” by the differences in nature with the possible. The possible is a term defined given to us by duration (BER 27–28/35); they in opposition to the real; the possible therefore can never be entirely eliminated (BER 10/21). always lacks reality. In contrast, the virtual is a Bergson himself calls the projection of differ- term defined in opposition to the actual; insofar ences of degree onto duration “the retrograde as the virtual is defined in opposition to the movement of the true” (BER 7/18). For example, actual it is real and positive (BER 99/96). As real the traditional metaphysical problem contained and positive, these conditions are virtual images: in the question “why is there something rather “pure presences.”40 A virtual image, for Deleuze, than nothing?” brings forth this answer. In order is a point which must be “tailored to the thing to explain why we have the particular reality in itself, which only suits that thing, and which, in front of us, we assume there was a set of possi- this sense, is no broader than what it must bilities which contained every imaginable possi- account for” (BER 19/28).41 That these condi- bility. This set of possibilities is larger than the tions do not contain more than reality is why they real, like an ill-fitting set of clothes; it implies are conditions of real experience; they are not that “the whole is already given” (BER 101/98). Kantian conditions of possible experience (BER Because the whole set of possibilities is not yet 13/23).42 That they correspond precisely to realized, it is called nothingness. The realization particular realities is why these virtual images are of the not yet realized possibilities occurs true. Therefore, for Deleuze, as well as for through the limitation of the set down to the Bergson, the true problems concern these true particular reality in front of us. So, realization conditions. The question is: “how do these differ- would be nothing more than the endowment of ences in nature relate to one another?” certain possibilities with reality. Reality then The solution to this problem is where we would not be different from the possibilities but encounter the fictional character of the virtual would rather resemble them. What has happened image. These pure presences are tendencies; thus to produce this problem, according to Deleuze, is they are, as Deleuze stresses, sens (BER 91/88), that the particular reality in front of us is directions, divergent lines which can be devel- conceived as a difference in degree of all possible oped into a convergent “virtual image” (BER reality in general (BER 101/98). Then an image 20/28). This virtual image which returns from the of this particular reality is taken and projected turn in which we made a difference in nature is backwards in time as one of the not yet realized the “original point” of convergence. This original possibilities. But, this “retrojection” means that point is the true sufficient reason of the thing it is not the real that resembles the non-real possi- (BER 20/28–29). Unlike conditions of possibility, bilities; it is the image of non-real possibilities with this sufficient reason (BER 35–36/42), “the that has been copied off the real. The image “has whole is not given” (BER 108/104).43 That the been abstracted from the real once made” (BER whole is not given means that the virtual image 101/98). Therefore, this image is an illusion, a has “the power” (la puissance) of being divided myth, a fiction. And the traditional metaphysical (BER 116/110), of being divided even into arith- problem of why there is something rather than metical units. The original point of convergence nothing is a false problem. “possesses number en puissance,” as Deleuze For Deleuze, following Bergson, every false says (BER 36/42, 40/45, 95/93, 103/100). The problem and its illusion is generated from this original point of convergence has, therefore, the combination of possibility and negation (BER power of being “explicated” (BER 98/95) into 100/98). In contrast, true problems derive from two different divergent lines. Because the origi- genuine differences in nature. Genuine differ- nal point of convergence is simple or continuous, ences in nature are conditions of experience, its explication follows the model of alteration lying beyond the “turn” in experience. As condi- (BER 23/32, 42/47), not that of alterity.44 The tions of experience, they are ideal, en droit (BER alteration makes a difference, because what it 13/23), but, for Deleuze, “en droit” means virtual creates does not correspond to or resemble

6 4 lawlor reality. This disparity with the real is why the Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of virtual image is fictional or false. While the Language,” that “ … form would be already in virtual image is an image and therefore a repeti- itself the trace … of a certain non-presence.”50 tion, it is not a re-presentation, that is, a presen- Derrida makes this comment because, in his 1962 tation of the same reality again. Rather, the Introduction to Husserl’s The Origin of virtual image is what Deleuze in “Reversing Geometry, Derrida discovered that no ideality Platonism” calls the simulacrum; it has “the could be constituted without being embodied in power of the false.”45 Repetition in Deleuze is the a repeatable form such as a sign.51 In other power to extend a sense as far as the Nth power words, signification conditions the movement where it is transformed into something different, and concept of truth (VP 26/25). For Deleuze in something that has never been present before, contrast, the virtual image is a tendency, not a the new. Calling the solution to the problem the form (BER 91/88). Second, Derrida does not use new and not aletheia means that, for Deleuze, the word “virtual” to qualify the trace; instead, the solution never closes off the problem. he uses “possibility” and “conditions of possibil- When describing the creation of the new, ity.” So, in Derrida, we seem to have a combina- Deleuze always speaks of “tracing” a line;46 so, tion of possibility and negation; he speaks, as we one could speak of a concept of the trace in have seen, of non-presence and the “nothing.” Deleuze. In addition, whenever Derrida describes But actually this combination does not resemble the trace throughout his writings, it sounds like what Bergson calls “the retrograde movement of what Deleuze calls the virtual image. This simi- the true” because the Derridean conditions are larity is especially striking in Voice and also “conditions of impossibility” (VP 113/101). Phenomenon’s fourth chapter, where Derrida The trace is at once the condition for the possi- says that “the sign is originally worked by bility and the condition for the impossibility of fiction” (VP 63/56). Derrida makes this comment presence. For Derrida, the phrase “condition of in reference not to indication, but in reference to impossibility” means a lack of power,52 an expression insofar as expression must in a sense “impuissance.”53 It is impossible that presence be fictional since expression is defined by the not be formed, which implies that presence is presentation of an ideal meaning. Derrida of always contaminated. For Derrida, however, course recalls Husserl’s comment in Ideas I impossibility also means necessity: the French about fiction. Fiction is the vital element of idiom “il faut” is a technical term in Derrida.54 phenomenology because fiction can neutralize the It is not only impossible that presence not be existence of the thing in order to give us its formed, but also it is necessary that presence be eidetic determinations (VP 4/6, 55/49).47 Since formed. The necessity of this formation or trac- indication, however, is defined by its reference to ing, however, implies a power, the power of factual things and therefore can be distant and form.55 A form, for Derrida, following Husserl, absent, indication too is in a sense fictional; as is defined by iterability, the power to be repeated Derrida says, “The indicative sign falls outside as far as possible, beyond any given presence into the content of absolutely ideal objectivity, that is, non-presence, beyond any given sense into outside truth” (VP 31/30). Therefore, for nonsense, and, so it seems, beyond truth into illu- Derrida, because indication and expression share sion (cf. VP 64–65/58). But, this power of repe- the same signifying form, it is impossible to tition, unlike the power of the virtual, does not distinguish the two senses of fiction rigorously make a difference in the sense of a difference of (VP 55–56/49–50). Due to this role of fiction, nature; every repetition is contaminated with the Derrida’s concept of trace remains very close to same form. Third, the model of repetition in the what Deleuze calls the virtual image.48 But, three trace for Derrida is alterity, not alteration as in characteristics separate Derrida’s trace from the virtuality of the virtual image for Deleuze. Deleuze’s virtual image. What is most striking about Voice and First, Derrida’s concept of trace is formalis- Phenomenon in comparison to Derrida’s earlier tic;49 Derrida says in his 1967 essay, “Form and books on Husserl56 is his association of the First

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Investigation’s descriptions of “the solitary life of difference.”60 The word “jouissance” immedi- the soul” with the Fifth Cartesian Meditation’s ately implies that intuition is based on life; descriptions of “the sphere of ownness” (VP Bergsonian intuition is primarily affective. Thus, 42/39). Derrida is led to this association undoubt- in Bergsonism, Deleuze insists that intuition has edly because of his encounter with Levinas its genesis in what Bergson calls “creative in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Derrida’s emotion” (BER 115–17/110). Many emotions emphasis of the relation with the other implies arise as a result of a representation of a thing, but that the trace is defined by representation a creative emotion, according to Deleuze, (Vergegenwärtigung) (VP 49, n 1/45, n 4). The precedes any representation and disrupts them term “Vergegenwärtigung” suggests that the (BER 116/110; cf. 16/26); it is a paradox.61 A representation of the trace is the presentation creative emotion, therefore, for Deleuze is a feel- (Gegenwärtigung) again of the same thing. ing that is unrecognizable and too close. Being But, in Voice and Phenomenon as in “Violence too close, it is a power, a power o and Metaphysics,” Derrida (again following the subtleties of Husserl’s descriptions) points out that Appräsentation, which is essentially connected to Vergegenwärtigung (VP 5/7), consists in an “irreducibly mediate … intention- ality aiming at the other as other”;57 “the other’s ownness, … the self-presence of the other, … its primordial presentation is closed to me” (VP 42/39). If there is any Husserlian concept that anticipates the Derridean concept of the trace, it is appresentation as described in paragraph 50 of The Cartesian Meditations. Appresentation implies “the necessity of mediation” and the impossibility of an intuition of the other as other. But, unlike Husserlian appresentation, which is analogical, the Derridean trace is not defined by resemblance since the trace is always a trace of an interiority which is forever closed to me. In short, the interiority of the other is not a presence which a re-presentation could resemble. The trace therefore is a form which iterates an other who has never been present; it is like a missive whose author has always already been concealed, “lethic,” a specter.58

The impossibility of an intuition of the other due to the mediation of the trace brings us to the last trajectory: intuition versus language. It is not insignificant that Deleuze begins Bergsonism with a discussion of Bergsonian intuition; in his earlier essay on Bergson, Deleuze had already characterized Bergson’s thought as a “superior empiricism.”59 But also, in this early essay, Deleuze says that “intuition is the jouissance of lawlor image allows us to understand the particular center. Lacking a center, the trace, therefore, for colors because it is at the limit of a particular Derrida is always aporetical.72 But the Derridean color, the last nuance of white. The intuition of aporia is not the same as the Deleuzian paradox. this “pure white light” extends the colors to the The Derridean aporia is signification and results Nth power, as far as they can go, in order to in an experience (cf. VP 111/99),73 while the converge and become something else, a new Deleuzian paradox is an experience which color. The intuition of this point where the colors precedes any linguistic representation. This converge is a becoming of color.65 difference in the priority of language and intu- It is not insignificant that Derrida begins his ition is why the Derridean trace ultimately is not 1967 Of Grammatology by saying “the problem equivalent to the Deleuzian virtual image. of language will never [be] simply one problem among others.”66 Unlike Deleuze, Derrida is not VI an empiricist. Indeed, in “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida criticizes Levinas’s “supe- Derrida has said that he always found himself rior empiricism,” because, all experience, even “flustered” when he read Deleuze’s work, the experience of the other, necessarily requires because the “philosophical content” of Deleuze’s speech, if it is to make a claim on you, if it is, for work displayed “a nearly total affinity” to the example, to make you promise to do some- philosophical content of his own.74 What we have thing.67 The necessity of speech, derives, as we seen is that the affinity is only “nearly total.” have already noted, from the fact that the consti- Derrida’s initial inspiration in Husserl led him to tution of presence necessarily requires being a prioritization of language and form, while embodied in indefinitely iterable signifying Deleuze’s initial inspiration in Bergson led him to forms; for Derrida, that it must be possible for the prioritization of intuition and tendency. But, presence to be embodied in iterable forms means if there is a “nearly total affinity” between that it must be possible for presence to be writ- Derrida and Deleuze, this is due to Heidegger. In 68 ten down. The possibility of being graphic in Being and Time, Heidegger renewed ontology turn implies the death of the one who writes as not simply by raising once again the question of soon as he writes. What Derrida calls écriture Being, but also by determining Being itself as a remains, necessarily, beyond the death of the questioning. Both Derrida and Deleuze (like author. In fact, Derrida stresses in Voice and Merleau-Ponty) appropriate Heidegger’s ontology Phenomenon that writing is defined by the neces- of the question. For Deleuze, every question has sity of remaining beyond the death of any given to be led back to the problem from which it subject (VP 104/93). Because of the mortality arose. More basic than the question, the problem they necessarily imply, the iterable forms are in Deleuze is the problem of intuition. The para- incommensurate with intuition. When I speak dox of presence presents an obstacle to life (BER about something I intuit right now, the forms I 5/16); in other words, being too close, presence is use still function and must function even when I always life-threatening. I leap into the ocean no longer have an intuition of the thing (VP whose engulfing presence makes me say, “I have 101/90–91). Because the form, or, more no choice but to swim; otherwise I am going to precisely, the trace, in order to function, does not die”; therefore I must learn how to swim; I must require intuition, intuition does not limit it. As come to know how to make myself be a conver- unlimited, the trace contains the possibility of an gent point through which the ocean’s divergent unlimited number of “genres,”69 that is, of forces flow. This solution is not true, but creative genera, genres, or genders; the trace contains a of something new, of new life; it is a beginning “+R,” “plus air,” “plusieurs,” as Derrida says, over. For Deleuze therefore, we have an episte- several genders.70 But, for Derrida, this dissemi- mological experience – because Deleuze focuses nation of “genders” is not equivalent to indefi- on knowing – in which life is rebegun in the nite perspectives on a central sex.71 Because the moment of death; death is the recommencement forms necessarily lack intuition, there can be no of life: life in death. But, Derrida appropriates

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Heidegger’s ontology of the question differently. Thought Vol. 3; “‘If Theory is Gray, Green is the For Derrida, every question has to be led back to Golden Tree of Life’: Philosophy and Non- the promise from which it arose. More basic than Philosophy Since Hyppolite” forthcoming in Continental Philosophy (special issue on Foucault). the question, the promise is the promise of “Looking for Noon at Two O’clock” will be the language. For Derrida, language makes all conclusion to my work in progress, The Basic promises,75 because all promises must be based Problem of Phenomenology: An Essay on Derrida’s in indefinitely iterable forms. Therefore, all Interpretation of Husserl; all of the other essays will promises are necessarily deathbed promises, be chapters in another work in progress, The Being traces of someone not present. The ghost of my of the Question: An Essay in Ontology Today. The dead father appears and commands me to Being of the Question will also include the Preface to promise to avenge his unjust murder; this my translation of Merleau-Ponty’s notes on imperative can only be an aporia: how can I keep Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry (forthcoming with the promise to avenge my father’s murder? Northwestern UP). This essay is also dedicated to I must have faith. But having nothing but faith, my old friend Fred Evans. I can never know when I have completely 2 Jacques Derrida, “I’m Going to Have to finished with the keeping of the promise; I Wander All Alone” trans. Leonard Lawlor, in Philosophy Today must keep on living for the fulfillment or (Spring, 1998): 3–5. In these “ending” of the promise. For Derrida therefore, comments Derrida seems to be saying that the we have a religious experience – religious because “form” of their works is really where the difference lies. I shall pursue this thought in another Derrida focuses on faith – in which death is essay concerning Derrida and Deleuze. refinished in the moment of life; life is the La voix et le phénomène “refinition”76 of death: death in life. So, the 3 Jacques Derrida, difference between Deleuze and Derrida (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); English trans. David B. Allison as Speech and amounts to this difference: death in life; life Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1974). in death. “Death in life” means that, for Derrida, Hereafter cited as VP with reference first to the in living one constantly aims towards death, original French, then to the English translation. towards the end of the promise. Bergsonism “Life in death” means that, 4 Gilles Deleuze, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966); English trans. for Deleuze, in death, one Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam as constantly aims towards life, Bergsonism (New York: Zone Books, 1991). towards the beginning of the Hereafter cited as BER with reference first to the problem. original French, then to the English translation. Qu’est-ce notes 5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, que la philosophie? (Paris: Minuit, 1991) 50; English 1 This essay extends and in a way completes a trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell as series of essays that I started to write in the Spring What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia UP, of 1994: “Eliminating Some Confusion: The 1994) 48–49. Relation of Being and Writing in Merleau-Ponty 6 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx (Paris: and Derrida” in Écrit and Différance, ed. M. C. Galilee, 1993) 215, n 2; English trans. Peggy Kamuf Dillon (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 1997) as Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), 71–93; “The End of Phenomenology: 135, n 6. Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty” in Continental Philosophy Review 31.1 (1998): 15–34; 7 See Eugen Fink’s authorized essay on “Looking for Noon at Two O’clock: The ‘Turn’ in Husserl’s philosophy: “Die Phänomenologische Derrida” forthcoming in The Art of Deconstructive Philosophie E. Husserl in der Gegenwärtigen Politics: Reading Specters of Marx, ed. Leonard Kritik,” originally published in Kantstudien Band Lawlor, Hugh J. Silverman and Wilhelm Wurzer; XXXVIII, 3/4 (Berlin, 1933). Collected in Eugen “The End of Ontology: Interrogation in Merleau- Fink, Studien zur Phänomenologie (Den Haag: Ponty and Deleuze” forthcoming in Chiasmi Marinus Nijhoff, 1966); English trans. “The International: A Review Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund

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Husserl and Contemporary Criticism” in The 17 See Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie Phenomenology of Husserl, ed. R. O. Elveton (Paris: Minuit, 1972) 161–64; English trans. Alan (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) 73–147. Bass as Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 134–36. 8 Edmund Husserl, “Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft” in Husserliana Band XXV (Boston: 18 See Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition Kluwer, 1987) 15 and 11; English trans. Quentin (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968) 91; Lauer as “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” in English trans. Paul Patton as Difference and Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New Repetition (New York: Columbia UP, 1994) 66. See York: Harper and Row, 1965) 89 and 83. also Gilles Deleuze, “Renverser le platonisme” in Revue de métaphysique et de morale 9 Henri Bergson, Matière et Mémoire in Oeuvres, no. 2 (1967); Logique du sens Édition du Centenaire (Paris: Presses Universitaires collected in as “Platon et le simu- de France, 1959) 321; English trans. M. M. Paul and lacre” (Paris: Minuit, 1969) 307; English trans. W. S. Palmer as Matter and Memory (New York: Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin The Zone Books, 1991) 184. Boundas as “Plato and the Simulacrum” in Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia UP, 1990) Vorlesungen zur 10 Edmund Husserl, 266. Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstsen (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929) section 36; English trans. James 19 Cf. VP 59/53, where Derrida himself seems S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of Internal Time- to make a distinction between Platonism and the Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1964). metaphysics of presence. 11 Henri Bergson, Pensée et mouvant in Oeuvres, 20 To resolve with some certainty this question Édition du Centenaire 1394–96; English trans. of the relation of “reversing Platonism” to “the Mabelle L. Andison as The Creative Mind (New deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence,” York: The Philosophical Library, 1946) 188–90. one would have to compare carefully Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” with Deleuze’s “Reversing Phänomenologische 12 Edmund Husserl, Platonism.” “Plato’s Pharmacy” was first published Psychologie (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) in 1968, one year after Deleuze’s “Reversing 343. The word rendered as “concealment” is Platonism.” “Deckung.” 21 Deleuze, Logique du sens 298; The Logic of 13 Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédi- Sense 259. ates de la conscience in Oeuvres, Édition de Centenaire 15; English trans. F. L. Pogson as Time 22 Jacques Derrida, Spurs, bi-lingual edition; and Free Will (Kila MT: Kessinger Publishing English trans. Stefano Agosto (Chicago: U of Company, no date [original date of translation is Chicago P, 1979) 127, 133, 139. 1910]) 17. 23 There are other ways to describe this funda- 14 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen mental opposition. While Derridean deconstruc- Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen tion distances the presence which had been Philosophie, I (Husserliana Band III, 1) (Den Haag: closeby, Deleuzian destruction brings closeby the Martinus Nijhoff, 1976) section 70, 132; English presence which had been distant; while Derridean trans. F. Kersten as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure deconstruction is a contamination, Deleuzian Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological destruction is a purification. Indeed, while Voice Philosophy. First Book (Boston: Kluwer, 1982) and Phenomenon demonstrates, by means of section 70, 160. Husserl’s phenomenology, the impossibility of 15 Bergson, Pensée et mouvant in Oeuvres, Édition exiting the metaphysics of presence (VP 16/16, Bergsonism du Centenaire 1341–42; The Creative Mind 120. 53/48), Deleuze’s determines the progress Bergson made in the actualization of a 16 Marcel Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu, new ontology outside of Platonism [BER 1/13, Le temps retrouvé (Paris: Gallimard, 1954) 230; 27/34–35; see also Gilles Deleuze, “La Conception English trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terrence de la différence chez Bergson” in Les études Kilmartin and Andreas Mayor as Remembrance of bergsoniennes vol. 4 (1965) 111]; in other words, Things Past, Time Regained vol. III (New York: while Derridean deconstruction, in Husserl, aims Random House, 1981) 906. at showing that the functions of the sign, indication

6 9 a nearly total affinity and expression, are not distinct, Deleuzian like this in Deleuze) allows me to make such an destruction, in Bergson, aims at establishing a unequivocal claim. See Jacques Derrida, Positions difference in nature between extensity (and its illu- (Paris: Minuit, 1972) 58–59; English trans. Alan sion) and duration. Indicative of this opposition Bass as Positions (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) between Derridean deconstruction and Deleuzian 43–44. destruction is the fact that, in Voice and 34 See Jacques Derrida, “Violence et méta- Phenomenon, Derrida always seeks contradictions physique” in L’écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, in Husserl’s argumentation (VP 64, n 1/57, n 6) – 1967) 227, n 1; English trans. Alan Bass as contradictions which imply a fundamental contam- “Violence and Metaphysics” in Writing and ination – while in Bergsonism Deleuze always seeks Difference (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 320, n consistency in Bergson’s argumentation (BER 91. 95/94) – a consistency which implies a fundamental purity. 35 Derrida always focuses on the reduction 24 Deleuze, Différence et répétition 83; Difference because of Fink’s interpretation of Husserl. and Repetition 59. See also Deleuze, Logique du sens 36 See Derrida, “Violence et métaphysique” 32; The Logic of Sense 21. 196–224; “Violence and Metaphysics” 134–151. Pensée et mouvant Oeuvres, 25 Henri Bergson, in 37 See also Jacques Derrida, Review of Edmund Édition du Centenaire (Paris: Presses Universitaires Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen de France, 1959) 1428–30; English trans. Mabelle Sommersemester 1925 in Les Etudes philosophiques The Creative Mind L. Andison as (New York: 18.2 (1963): 203–06. Philosophical Library, 1946) 232–33. In Creative Evolution, Bergson openly approves of Plato’s 38 See also, Jacques Derrida, “‘Genèse et struc- L’écriture et la image of the dialectician as the good carver, ture’ et la phénoménologie” in différence Writing and Difference cutting at the articulations of the real. See Henri 245; 164. L’Évolution créatrice Oeuvres, Édition du Bergson, in 39 Gilles Deleuze, La philosophie critique de Kant Centenaire 627; English trans. Arthur Mitchell as (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963) 37; Creative Evolution (Mineola NY: Dover, 1998) 156. English trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 26 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence” Habberjam as Kant’s Critical Philosophy 111. Also, Deleuze, Différence et répétition 83; (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984) 24. Difference and Repetition 59. 40 What here in 1966 Deleuze is calling a virtual 27 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence” 84. image will become what he and Guattari call a concept in What is Philosophy? 28 Deleuze, Différence et répétition 86; Difference and Repetition 61. Also, Deleuze, Logique du sens 41 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Qu’est-ce 294; The Logic of Sense 254–55. que la philosophie? 25; What is Philosophy? 20. 29 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence chez 42 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence” 85. Bergson” 96. 43 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson” in Les philosophes 30 See yet again, Deleuze, “La conception de la célebres, ed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Paris: différence” 87. Mazenod, 1956) 298. Différence et répétition 31 Deleuze, 154; 44 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence chez Difference and Repetition 117. Bergson” 90. See also, Deleuze, Logique du sens 32 See BER 38/44; also Deleuze, “La conception 303; The Logic of Sense 262. de la différence chez Bergson” 96. 45 Deleuze, Logique du sens 303; The Logic of 33 Undoubtedly, this claim is too unequivocal, Sense 263. since Derrida like Deleuze claims to distinguish his 46 See, for example, Deleuze and Guattari, concept of differance from the Hegelian concept Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? 36; What is Philosophy? of contradiction. But Derrida makes this distinc- 38. The word Deleuze uses is “tracer.” tion while keeping himself, as he says, “at the point of almost absolute to Hegel.” Derrida’s “almost 47 Quoted in Derrida, L’origine de la géométrie absolute proximity” (one never finds comments 29; Introduction 45.

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48 Deleuze discusses Husserl’s concept of 66 Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: noema in Logique du sens 32–33; The Logic of Sense Minuit, 1967) 15; English trans. Gayatri Spivak as 20–21. Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976) 6. 49 See for example, Derrida, Spectres de Marx 123–24; Specters of Marx 73–74. 67 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence 225–26, 225, n 2; Writing and Difference 151–52, 152, n 90. 50 Derrida, Marges de la philosophie 206, n 14; Margins of Philosophy 172, n 16. 68 Husserl, L’origine de la géométrie, Introduction par Derrida, 87–88; Husserl Origin of Geometry: an 51 Edmund Husserl, L’origine de la géométrie, Introduction 90. traduction et introduction par Jacques Derrida (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) 86, 69 See Jacques Derrida, “La loi du genre” in n 3; English trans. John P. Leavey as Edmund Parages (Paris: Galilée, 1986) 249–87. Husserl’s Origin of Geometry an Introduction (Lincoln 70 See Jacques Derrida, La vérité en peinture NE: U of Nebraska P, 1989) 89, n 92. (Paris: Flammarion, 1978); English trans. Geoff 52 Derrida, Spurs 127. Bennington as The Truth in Painting (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987). As Derrida shows in Spurs, a 53 Husserl, L’origine de la géométrie, Introduction masculine style can also at the same time be femi- par Derrida, 171; Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An nine. Introduction 153. 71 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Paris: Seuil, 54 Derrida, Spectres de Marx 123–24; Specters of 1972) 281–82; English trans. Barbara Johnson as Marx 73. Dissemination (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) 55 Derrida, Marges de la philosophie 201–02; 249–50. Margins of Philosophy 168–69. 72 See Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas 56 There is no discussion of the Fifth Meditation Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993). in Derrida’s earlier, 1953–54, Le problème de la 73 See Zeynep Direk, Derrida’s Renovation of genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (Paris: Presses Experience, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Universitaires de France, 1991). And he only Memphis, 1999. alludes to the Fifth Meditation in his Introduction to The Origin of Geometry. 74 Jacques Derrida, “Now I’m Going to Have to Wander All Alone” in Philosophy Today (Spring 57 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence” 182; Writing 1998): 3–5. and Difference 123. 75 Jacques Derrida, De l’espirt (Paris: Galilée, 58 See Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx 268; 1987) 147; English trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Specters of Marx 169. Rachel Bowlby as Of Spirit (Chicago: U of Chicago 59 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence chez P, 1989) 94. Bergson” 85. 76 I have invented this term, “refinition,” in 60 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence” 81. order to have a term parallel to “recommencement” in Deleuze. I intend with this neologism, an 61 Deleuze, Différence et répétition 250; indefinite repetition of the end, as “recommence- Difference and Repetition 194. ment” implies an indefinite repetition of the begin- 62 Deleuze, Logique du sens 175; The Logic of ning. Sense 149. 63 Deleuze, Logique du sens 303; The Logic of Sense 262. Leonard Lawlor Department of Philosophy 64 Deleuze, “La conception de la différence” 98. University of Memphis 65 Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Mille Memphis plateaus (Paris: Minuit, 1980) 356–57; English TN 38152 trans. Brian Mazzumi as A Thousand Plateaus USA (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987) 291. E-mail: [email protected]