Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 2007

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The Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research is a new refereed academic pub- Editor lication dedicated to the study of communication, culture and society in the Noureddine Miladi Arab and Muslim world. It aims to lead the debate about the rapid changes in School of Social Sciences media and society in that part of the world. This journal is also interested in The University diasporic media like satellite TV, radio and new media especially in Europe of Northampton and North America. The journal serves a large international community of Park Campus, Boughton academics, researchers, students, journalists, policy makers and other mem- Green Road bers of the public in the West as well as the Arab and Muslim countries. Northampton NN2 7AL United Kingdom We welcome contributions on but not restricted to the following themes: Tel: +44 (0) 1604 892104 1. Communication and development in the Arab region E-mail: 2. Media and the Construction of public opinion noureddine.miladi 3. Media and social change in the Arab and Muslim world @northampton.ac.uk 4. Media coverage of wars and conflicts in the region 5. New media, culture and society in the Arab and Muslim World 6. Arab/Muslim youth, identity and the media 7. Media and women empowerment 8. Diasporic media and diasporic audiences 9. Global media and its impact on local cultures 10. Blogging and the changing face of journalism practice 11. Reality TV and the tabloidisation of Arab media 12. Pan-Arab Satellite TV and audience research 13. Media, subcultures, and resistance in the Arab and Muslim countries

Features In addition to academic refereed papers the journal includes:

• Reports from academic conferences and symposia, organised both in the Arab and Muslim countries and in the West, and which are related to the topics of concern to the journal. • Book, film and internet reviews. • Interview section with scholars, broadcasters as well as policy makers.

The Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research is published three times per year by Intellect, ISSN 1752-6299 The Mill, Parnall Road, Bristol, BS16 3JG, UK. The current subscription rates are £33 (personal) and £210 (institutional). Postage is free within the UK, £9 for the rest of Europe and £12 elsewhere. Advertising enquiries should be addressed to: [email protected] © 2007 Intellect Ltd. Authorisation to photocopy items for internal or personal use or the internal or personal use of specific clients is granted by Intellect Ltd for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) in the UK or the Copyright Printed and bound in Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service in the USA provided that the base Great Britain by fee is paid directly to the relevant organisation. 4edge, UK. JAMMR_1.1_00_FM.qxd 12/18/07 3:29 PM Page 2

Editorial Board Marie Gillespie – The Open University, UK Noha Mellor – University of East London, UK Gareth Stanton – Goldsmiths, University of London, UK Basyouni Hamada – Cairo University, Egypt Hamed Quisay – Zayed University, Dubai, UAE Ahmed Ali Al-Mashaikhi – Sultan Kabus University, Oman Mohammed Ayish – University of Sharjah, UAE Soek-Fang Sim – Macalester College, USA Ibrahim M. Saleh – American University in Cairo, Egypt Mohammed Ibahrine – Al-Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco Adel Jendli – Zayed University in Dubai, UAE Orayb Najjar – Northern Illinois University, Illinois Naila Nabil Hamdi – American University in Cairo, Egypt Gregory Kent – Roehampton University, UK Wail Ismail AbdelBari – University of Sharjah, UAE Mohammad Sahid Ullah – Chittagong University, Bangladesh Khaled Al-Hroub – Cambridge Arab Media Project, UK Bala Muhammad – Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria Amin Alhassan – York University, Canada International Advisory Board Philip Seib – University of Southern California, USA Magi Al-Helwani Hussein – Cairo University, Egypt Marc Lynch – George Washington University, USA Sulieman Salem Saleh – Cairo University, Egypt Christopher Tulloch – International University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain Steve Tatham – UK Defence Academy, MOD, UK Mohammed Zayani – American University of Sharjah, UAE Magda Bagnied – Cairo University, Egypt Nurbaiduri Ruslan – International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Richard Jackson – University of Manchester, UK Douglas Boyd – University of Kentucky, USA Fatma Alloo – Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Naser Al-Manea – Safe Route PR, Leeds, UK Lena Jayussi – Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE Faridah Ibrahim – Universiti Kebangsaan Malay, Malaysia Mohammad A. Siddiqi – Western Illinois University, USA Hemant Joshi – Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India Bouziane Zaid – Al-Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco Leon Barkho – Jönköping University, Sweden Philip Cass – Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE Makram Khoury – Cambridge University, UK Said Shehata – London Metropolitan University, UK Frank B. Kalupa – James Madison University, VA Javad Mottaghi – Asian-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, Malaysia Sabah Mahmoudi – Institute of Press & Information Sciences, Manouba, Tunisia Yasmin Ibrahim – University of Brighton, UK Ali Alkarni – King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Ivor Gaber – University of Bedfordshire, UK Abdulrahman Al-Habib – King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Fahad bin AbdeAziz Kheraiji – King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Mustapha El-Mourabit – Al-Jazeera Centre for Research and Documentation, Qatar JAMMR_1.1_00_FM.qxd 12/18/07 3:29 PM Page 3

Notes for Contributors

Submissions sparingly for emphasis. Also because double quote marks for a second The Journal of Arab and Muslim Media italics are used for other purposes such as quotation contained within the first. All Research welcomes contributions from the titles of books, films or plays, etc. long quotations (i.e. over four lines or 40 around the world about the above words long) should be ‘displayed’ – i.e. set mentioned areas of enquiry. Manuscripts Images and Captions into a separate indented paragraph with to be considered for publication should These are never essential within an an additional one-line space above and be submitted electronically, via e-mail, to item, but are always welcome. In below, and without quote marks at the the Editor. Each manuscript should be particular, discussions of particular beginning or end. no more than 8000 words in main text buildings, sites or landscapes would be and 150 words in abstract. Review assisted by the inclusion of illustrations Referencing, Notes and as this enables readers to see them. articles should be between 1500–2000 Bibliography words and interviews should approxi- They do not absolutely need to be submitted at the time of the initial This journal requires the use of Harvard mately be 3000 words. All submissions references embedded in the main text in will be blind-refereed. submission of the article, although it is preferable if they are. The omission of a the following format (Harper 1999: 27), Articles should be original and not be caption is only acceptable if you feel the and a single bibliography at the end of under consideration by any other impact of the image would be reduced the article for works that are cited, and publication. They should be written in a by the provision of written context. only works that are cited. For books, clear and concise style. All submissions please try to ensure that there is always should be made electronically via e-mail. All illustrations, photographs, diagrams, a date of publication; the place of Margins should be at least 2.5cm all maps, etc. should follow the same publication and the name of the round and pagination should be numerical sequence and be shown as publisher whenever possible. Figure 1, Figure 2, etc. The source has continuous. Full articles and all Said, Edward W. (1978), Orientalism: correspondence with respect to any to be indicated below. Copyright clearance should be indicated by the Western Conceptions of the Orient, aspect of editorial policy should always be London: Penguin. addressed to the Editor. contributor and is always the responsibility of the contributor. When they are —— (1994), Culture and Imperialism, Refereeing on a separate sheet or file, an indication London: Vintage. The Journal of Arab and Muslim Media must be given as to where they should Journal articles need to be referred to with Research is an academic journal and be placed in the text. Reproduction will the name of the first author, the year of always refereed. Articles are sent to two be in greyscale (sometimes referred to publication [(nnnn),], the article title [‘abcd or three scholars with relevant experience as ‘black-and-white’). If you are defg’,], the full journal title [abcddefg,], the and expertise for comment. Anonymity is supplying any article images as hard issue number [nn,] – or the volume accorded to authors and referees. copy, these should be prints between number and issue number together 10–20 cms wide if possible, and [nn:nn,] – and the range of the pages of the Opinion preferably greyscale if being submitted article within the journal [pp. nn–nn]. The The views expressed in the Journal of as illustrations for articles. However, number of the page from which the Arab and Muslim Media Research are colour prints, transparencies and small reference is actually taken is shown on the those of the respective authors, and do images can be submitted if you need to page of the article, as in (Harper 1999: 27). not necessarily coincide with those of the supply these. If images are supplied A footnote should not be made specifically Editor or Editorial and Advisory Board. electronically, all images need to have a to make a bibliographical reference as resolution of at least 12 dpm (dots per footnotes should only be used to provide Checks before any submission millimetre) – or 300 dpi (dots per inch). explanations or expansions to the main stage Tables should be supplied either within text of the article. Publications can be Contributors must check that each of the Word document of the main text or referred to in footnotes using the Harvard the following been supplied to the editor as separate Word documents. 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If a tion (comma/colon/full stop) at the end and e-mail addresses need to be mistake is identified in a diagram, make of a quotation should always follow the included at the head of the article. the amendments and re-supply. reference if a quotation is within the Reviews require a full reference for main body text, but should be placed book/DVD/recording under review, Numbered notes before the reference if it is an indented reviewer name, reviewer address and These are never essential within an paragraph quotation. item and should always be kept to a reviewer biography. Abstract and Website references are similar to other keywords are not relevant, and minimum. They must be submitted correctly at the time of the initial references. There is no need to decipher references are not usually relevant, but any place of publication or a specific they are always an option in this case. submission as they will need to be copy-edited. It is not acceptable to add publisher, but the reference must have an Bold type should be used only for headings notes at a later stage. author, and the author must be referenced and sub-headings within articles. It Harvard-style within the text. Unlike paper should not be used for emphasis, or in the Quotations references, however, web pages can names of organizations, conferences or Style for quotations embedded into a change, so there needs to be a date of exhibitions. Italics should only be used paragraph is single quote marks, with access as well as the full web reference. JAMMR_1.1_00_FM.qxd 12/19/07 11:16 AM Page 4

Contents

Editorial Noureddine Miladi 5

Articles Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Middle East reporting Leon Barkho 11

The never-ending story: Palestine, Israel and The West Wing Philip Cass 31

Reverse glocalization? Marketing a Turkish cola in the shadow of a giant Christine L. Ogan, Filiz Çiçek and Yesim Kaptan 47

The US media, Camp David and the Oslo ‘peace process’ Andrew Piner 63

What is a blatte? Migration and ethnic identity in contemporary Sweden Corina Lacatus 79

Book Reviews New Media and the New Middle East, Philip Seib (ed.), (2007) Olivia Allison 93

Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin, Risto Kunelius, Elizabeth Eide, Oliver Hahn and Roland Schroeder (eds.), (2007) Shabana Syed 98 JAMMR_1.1_01_edt_Miladi.qxd 12/18/07 3:30 PM Page 5

For several decades public opinion in the Arab and Islamic world has been of strategic importance to the western powers due to its huge oil and gas resources, in addition to other cultural and political interests. Arab audiences have been at the receiving end of foreign Arabic-speaking radio broadcasting such as Radio Monte-Carlo Arabic service, Radio France Internationale, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America, Radio Moscow and the German Deutsche Welle Radio. As recently as 1999, ‘Arabic [remained] second only to English as an international broadcasting language’ (Boyd, 1999: 5). However, the phenomenal mush- rooming of Arab independent satellite TV channels in the region and the mass production of reasonably cheap satellite dishes and decoders have transformed the relationship between Arab audiences and western media. Suddenly state-owned television channels have also found themselves grappling with very fierce competition in catering for viewers’ appetite for more accurate and comprehensive news and information. Given this reality, there has been a growing concern recently about commercial/’independent’ Arab satellite TV, headed by the Al-Jazeera channel, and its potential in mobilizing the public, and power in taking audiences away from state broadcasters who are perceived as obstacles to the free flow of information. One would have expected a radical change in Arab state broadcasting because of the pressure from satellite TV, which is winning ground day by day. Yet compared to the transformation taking place in other developing countries, very little improvement in the freedom of expression and objective reporting has taken place in Arab state broadcasting. The main changes seen in state broadcasters’ practices have not been to open up to opposing opinions, or to decrease their biased stance in favour of ruling parties, but an intensification of their entertainment programmes in a multitude of genres. Most of such channels are still not viewed as sites of public debates or sources of information about national and global affairs, but sources of non-stop entertainment. Genres like continuous musical performances, sitcoms, soaps and game-shows remain dominant in the schedule of most state television channels in the region. Although Arab viewers have little input into the content of satellite TV, many broadcasters have found it appropriate to maintain active links with the transnational Arab community. The popularity of Direct Broadcasting via Satellite (DBS) systems amongst diasporic communities, for instance, in Europe has become a symbol of community self-assertion. Unlike Internet services, which is still restricted to the affluent and educated among these communities, satellite TV services have been more popular and adopted by people from different strata of society. Such an opportunity

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has provided Arab audiences with the ability to assess and criticize their political leaders. This obvious impact of the non-stop news cycle is to push politicians towards increasing their PR work and increasing their effi- ciency in dealing with the media. For the first time, Arab governments have found themselves engaged in an endless process of responses to satellite TV and new media’s challenging messages. Another important feature of this evolving media sphere has been the growing sense of a pan-Arab solidarity; a rising transnational support to various causes of concern in the Arab/Muslim world. Satellite TV has brought the sufferings of Palestinian people, the war in Afghanistan, the plight of people in Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sudan and the war on Iraq into people’s homes. A common Arab understanding of these causes is being shaped up thanks to the continuous investigative journalism, and 24-hour rolling news programmes of pan-Arab satellite TV. Local and distant events, like the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) have been transformed into mass experiences lived by tens of millions of viewers around the world. Images from war zones have penetrated people’s private spheres and linked the local to the regional and international. In light of the slow communication process in the Arab world, only satellite TV has managed to build such bridges between this pan-Arab sphere. Although this constant emphasis on issues of concern to Arab audiences does not normally generate immediate responses, it seems to have left its marks on people’s frustrations and reactions as reflected in many TV discussion programmes. Thanks to new technologies, the concept of diaspora no longer means a small ghettoized migrant community in a foreign country. Diaspora has evolved into a supportive body to transnational causes. Former homes do not mean the same anymore. Instead, the new meaning of a home has come to signify a global pan-Arab community connected through global communication means where diaspora communities contribute to the welfare of the ‘home-countries’. Therefore, after decades of western domination on the global information flow, the Arab region has become less reliant and trusting of what comes from western media at least in term of news and current affairs programmes. Al-Jazeera catapulted pan-Arab media into the international spotlight. A challenge to the well-established western tradition of journalism has been posed by Al-Jazeera and other Arab channels due to its dar- ing reporting of wars and conflicts. Through their peculiar coverage of the war in Afghanistan, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the invasion of Iraq Arab media unquestionably took over the Arab street. For the first time, western media have lost not only their credibility in the Arab world but the fight for the Arab and Muslims hearts and minds. The increasing interest in public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world from western powers comes in this atmosphere of a changing world of information flows. The launch of Arabic services funded by the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Germany and Russia raises legitimate questions about the real intentions of such endeavours. Another growing influence in the region is the Internet: a significant escape from state censorship and a space of arguably uncensored inter- connectivity, information exchange, resistance to mainstream media discourse and possible radicalization. Although access to the World Wide

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Web is still slow in the region, it has been making steady progress among the middle class. Various governments in the region have attempted to pre- vent this ‘liberating’ force from ‘plaguing’ the flow of information. In spite of this, the fast development of information technologies has helped Internet users to break codes and bypass restrictions imposed by their governments. During the late 1990s, uninterrupted access to the World Wide Web made it possible for the Arab public to access not only newspapers and censored material from around the world, but also to bypass the ban, on satellite dishes. This meant that people could watch satellite TV on their laptops with the click of a mouse wherever they were. Bloggers are also in the increase and have succeeded in reaching out to the outside world with their stimulating accounts of news reporting. In this changing world of communication flow, and exciting field of academic research, the Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research offers a distinctive international platform for discussion and research about the evolving scene in communication, culture and society in the Arab and Muslim world that has been under-researched for a long time. This journal is open to debates, research reports and reviews about this fascinating development that is not only spanning the Arab region but in indeed the rest of the world. By the Muslim/Islamic world we here refer to majority Muslim countries. Thus what distinguishes this new journal is its wider scope related to media, communication and culture in not only the Muslim majority countries in Africa and Asia, but the 23 Arab countries spanning two continents, with a combined population of some 325 million people and the Arabic language forming a unifying feature. Here it looks beyond the ‘Middle East’ as a political construct. Apart from this, this journal will also be interested in diasporic media like television, radio and the Internet especially in Europe and North America. It looks at the thriving diasporic communication spaces. It will be interested to know who their audiences are, how influential those media outlets can be, how they are consumed and what impact do they have on their audiences’ sense of identity and belonging. It is also interested in studies about minority media in the Arab and majority Muslim countries like religious media outlets owned by Christian groups and other minority cultures as forms of resistance and identity formation. Finally, two points can be offered as part of the raison d’être for this journal: first is the contention that the Arab region is under-researched partly due to the lack of resources and partly due to government censorship. Social science research is very much controlled by official bodies, and serves their agenda. Funding is very much restricted to projects commis- sioned by those bodies. With varying degrees, academic institutions have hardly the freedom their counterparts enjoy in other parts of the world. Even with the proliferation of television satellite channels since the beginning of the 1990s, audience research has been marked by various financial limitations, but most of all by the lack of freedom in social science research in most of the Arab countries. Critical studies in the field, which may affect the political debates or offer an analytical academic view that questions the role of the media in society, are not normally encouraged. Arab satellite channels, I would argue, as well as the well-established international broadcasters, such as the BBC, know little about their Arab

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viewers in the Arab and Muslim world. The interesting reality is that, overall, the television industry knows very little about its viewers. Something described by Lewis (1991: 21) as doomed to face the unknown:

Once it has passed out of the hands of the programme makers and onto the screen, television passes into the world of the unknown. Programme makers are the modern cultural equivalent of Dr Frankenstein: they have created a monster that, once unleashed into the outside world, they can no longer control or comprehend.

Second is that most audience research regarding Arab/Muslim media has been conducted within the context of western paradigms. There hardly exists comprehensive and diverse independent research concerning exposure of Arab audiences to television or radio which takes into accounts the variables of language, culture, religion and context. A significant short- coming about the claims of communication studies achieved during the past decades is ‘that western communication theories have been promoted around the world as possessing a strong element of universalism’ (Ayish 2003: 79). The media effects tradition and the subsequent theories of mass communication have yet to be seriously discussed and empirically tested on audiences in the Arab and Muslim world. Assuming that Arab audiences maintain a distinctive cultural framework from their western counterparts, which by default makes them interact with media content in a different manner, there has been a call to draw on the notion of ‘Worldview’ as suggested by Mohammed Ayish (2003) and the Islamic cultural theory as offered by Basyouni Hamada (2001). In order to deconstruct the complex relationship between media and society in that part of the world, Hamada suggests that the Arab- Islamic concept of communication would perhaps be better understood in the context of the political and cultural environment in which Arab media and public opinion operate. Drawing on the work of Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, he argues that ‘classic sociology leads us to treat both media and audiences as integral parts of a larger social system’ (Hamada 2001: 216). Therefore, analysing the Arab-Islamic cultural theory and the long-term cultural, religious and political environment to which Arab audiences are exposed will help understand the distinctive construction of public opinion that ultimately takes place. Based on this viewpoint, ‘media and audiences thus would respond to the same social forces and look to each other for a definition of those realities. Social realities portrayed by the media ensue both from their connection to social structures and from their interaction with audiences’ (Hamada 2001: 216).

References Ayish, Mohammad (2001), ‘Changing Face of Arab Communications’, in Hafez Kai (ed.), Mass Media, Politics and Society in the Middle East, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. —— (2003), ‘Beyond Western Oriented Communication Theories: A Normative Arab-Islamic Perspective’, in The Public, 10: 2, pp. 79–92. Boyd, Douglas (1999), Broadcasting in the Arab World, Ames: Iowa State University Press.

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Hamada, Basyouni Ibrahim (2001), ‘Islamic Cultural Theory, Arab Media Performance, and Public Opinion’, in Slavko Splichal (ed.), Public Opinion and Democracy: Vox Populi-Vox Dei, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 215–39. Lewis, Justin (2001), Constructing Public Opinion: How political elites do what they like and why we seem to go along with it. New York: Columbia University Press.

Suggested citation Miladi, N. (2007), ‘Editorial’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 5–9, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.5/2

Contributor details Noureddine Miladi obtained an MA and Ph.D. in Communication from the University of Westminster (UK) where he taught journalism and mass communication. His research interests are about Arab and diasporic media, satellite TV and the construction of public opinion, media and war coverage, and new media and social change. He is currently Lecturer in Media Studies and Sociology at the University of Northampton (UK), founder of the Centre for Arab and Muslim Media Research (http://www.cammro.com), and associate editor of the Journal of African Media Studies. His works have been published in various journals and books: War and the Media (edited by Daya Thussu and Des Freedman), Contemporary World Television, (edited by John Sinclair), Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Question de Communication (in French). He has appeared on various television and radio current-affairs programmes in the United Kingdom and beyond. To name a few: BBC World Service, Al-Jazeera, Sky News, Islam Channel, ChannelS, Al-Majd, Al-Hewar TV, CNN and CNBC Arabia.

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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.11/1 Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Middle East reporting

Leon Barkho Jönköping University, Sweden

Abstract Keywords To understand the language of journalism in relation to the moments of why and BBC how news is differently structured and patterned, English online stories tackling CNN the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, issued by the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera, were Al-Jazeera critically analysed following Fowler and Fairclough’s seminal texts. The results of Palestine the findings were discussed in interviews with the editors of the three interna- Israel tional networks in order to see what links these linguistic features have with the critical discourse interviewees’ social assumptions, ideologies and economic conditions. The article analysis finds first that the discourse within the news pyramid is composed of four major online news layers: quoting, paraphrasing, background and comment. Second, it demonstrates that there are marked differences in the discourse structures and layers that the three networks employ in the production of the news stories they issue in English. Third, Al-Jazeera English exhibits marked differences in the discursive features and their social implications at the four layers of discourse to report the conflict when compared with both the BBC and CNN. Fourth, the article shows that the differences in linguistic patterns largely reflect and respond to each network’s social and political assumptions and practices as well as economic conditions.

Introduction In this article I mainly follow Fowler and Fairclough (Fairclough 1989, 1995, 1998; Fowler 1985, 1991; Fowler et al. 1979) to uncover whether online hard news stories from the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera reveal what journalists and their institutions call ‘impartiality and even-handedness’, which from a journalistic code of ethics must be represented in the balanced selection of structures like quotes, paraphrases, background information, comment, choice of lexical items and grammatical structures, among others. Journalists are supposed to have at their disposal the means and devices that enable them to provide a balanced and factual account of events through an even-handed representation of the sides to the dispute. Why is it then that their selection is usually framed in a manner that legitimates the actions and deeds of one side at the expense of the other? Using Halliday’s (1970, 1971, 1973) systemic and functional linguistics as a guideline, pioneer critical linguists have shown how the presence or absence of certain grammatical structures can be indicative of authority, power and status (cf. Kress 1994; Kress and Hodge 1979; Bell 1991; Van Dijk 1988). The influence of Halliday is not confined to the functions of lexical or

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syntactic structures. Critical linguists base much of their investigation of media texts on Hallidayan linguistics’ emphasis on the generic or rather universal functions of language. Halliday (1971: 333) says that languages carry out three main functions at the same time, which he calls ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’. While critical analysts dwell at length on the first two functions, they do not have much to say about the third. And of the different media genres, prominent critical scholars have given news, and particularly the hard type of it, the most attention. They have demonstrated how language structures can be used to unravel the social assumptions behind the news reports. In their analyses, they have shown how the use of language can contribute to the construction of social reality. Here the ideas of Foucault (1972, 1984) on how to derive meaning from language play a vital role. Foucault believes language is not what one arrives at by just attaching meaning to its structures. The meanings of language structures hinge on their social associations and relations that are prevalent among those exercising control, authority and power. The ideas of Foucault mirror in the definition Fowler gives to discourse:

‘Discourse’ is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs (etc.) constitute a way of looking at the world or organization or representation of experience – ‘ideology’ in the neutral, no-operative sense. (cited in Hawthorn 1992: 48)

Media texts, whether spoken or written, have a social role. An understanding of the social world would be nearly impossible without language, which is a product of the specific social, cultural and historical contexts from which discourse emanates. Fairclough, building on Foucault and Fowler, emphasizes the social and cultural dimension in his definition of discourse: ‘Discourse analysis can be understood as an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices and socio-cultural practices’ (Fairclough 1995: 16-17). Fairclough has taken the discipline beyond the type of critical analysis Fowler and his colleagues designed, especially in his most recent works (Fairclough 2003, 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; and Fairclough et al. 2004) in which he adopts a multidisciplinary critical discourse analysis, drawing on the meta-theory of critical realism and its conceptions of the way language and discourse may unravel the patterns of social reality (Sayer 1995, 1997; Danemark et al. 2002).

Four layers of hard news discourse: quoting, paraphrasing, background and comment The critical discourse approach here pays greater attention to the hitherto rather overlooked third function of language, which Halliday (1971: 334) calls ‘textual […] since it is concerned with the creation of text’. Here is a list of the main features of this article’s approach:

1. The textual function of discourse is as important as the other two functions. In the case of hard, written news the text normally starts with a ‘nucleus’ comprising the headline and a lead supported by ‘satellite’ paragraphs

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ordered within what is traditionally called an inverted pyramid framework. The discourse within this pyramid is of mainly four layers: quoting, paraphrasing, background and comment. 2. Having identified the four layers of the inverted pyramid discourse, one can move to unpack the news value of each layer, employing critical linguistic tools. 3. It is essential to investigate the absence, presence or frequency of any of the four layers of discourse within the hard news pyramid. 4. The four layers of discourse should be first examined separately when applying Fowler’s (1993) analytic tools, namely those representing Halliday’s (1971) ideational function of language – transitivity, transformations, nominalizations and lexicalizations – and those representing the interpersonal function – modality and speech acts. 5. Each of the four layers of analysis besides its linguistic characteristics has to be studied in terms of its social structures and social practices (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2004). 6. A critical analysis solely based on the choice of language to uncover the social practices of discourse, though useful, is insufficient. To be thorough, an analysis must not overlook the fact that news production is an activity driven by the need to make a profit or exercise control or both. 7. Researchers are required to find a way to gauge the power that business and political interests exercise on discourse. Prominent critical scholars have urged in-depth interviews with senior editors though they have not practised the method themselves (Hodge 1979). Interviews as a social science method to interpret data have been found to be very useful (cf. Noaks and Wincup 2004; Denzin and Lincoln 2006).

To shed some light on the business, and social dimensions of the discourse practices of the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera, the author conducted in-depth interviews with their editors and executives (see Appendix A). Some of the interviewees were directly involved in the online news production of their networks.

News from the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera The three networks are tough competitors and vie for audiences in the Arab world, home to more than 300 million people, and the world at large. Their rivalry over influence in the region and beyond is growing. The BBC and CNN already have Arabic online services. The BBC is soon to launch its Arabic-language satellite news channel. Al-Jazeera already has a 24-hour English satellite news service. Each is keen to carve a niche in the others’ markets. Online news discourse has several dimensions that no print newspaper can match. It is so complex that a focus on one dimension inevitably leads to the neglect of others. Today’s computers provide online journalists with an incredible array of options regarding graphic formatting, typography (style and size of print), insertion of photographs, video, drawings, cartoons, tables, captions, links, etc. These ‘electronic’ or ‘digital’ options are of immense significance for online news discourse and they interact dynamically with the tools critical analysts choose to analyse language, its structures and their relations to their social assumptions.

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Analysis This study concentrates only on the English online news discourse of the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera as the inclusion of other digital dimensions would have made it excessively long and complicated its methodological approach. The source of discourse chosen for analysis is the hard political news type in which the reporters of the 30 online stories – 10 from each network (see Appendix B) – selected for analysis mainly rely on sources from the two protagonists to turn the material they gather into a news report. All the stories report heavy Palestinian casualties from Israeli incursions into the Gaza Strip in the period following the capture of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006. The stories share the traditional inverted pyramid structure of news in which they start with what journalists believe to be the most important (the headline and the lead) and move on to back it up through satellite paragraphs. This entails a patterned movement from the headline and lead paragraphs, through episodes or statements by witnesses or commentators ranked in an implicit order of priority (Van Dijk 1988). The transformation of the material by the reporters into news discourse is carried out in four major ways or layers: (1) quoting, (2) paraphrasing, (3) background and (4) comment. Of the four layers of hard news discourse, journalists generally try to avoid adding ‘comment’ as far as possible in a bid to show independence and impartiality. They ostensibly refrain from expressing their opinion or attitude vis-à-vis the ongoing struggle between the two protagonists. Opinions and attitudes are usually expressed in opinion, leader or comment articles. The analysis dwells on the four layers within the inverted pyramid structure, their intertextual relations and the way they relate to the social context beyond the pyramid’s parameters. The structures, whether grammatical, lexical or intertextual, will fail to provide proper understanding if they are analysed in isolation from their social world. One way to analyse the four layers is to examine what Fairclough (1995) calls the target discourse, a term he employs to see how media consume the discourse of their sources. How do the three networks exploit the four layers of discourse that are normally available for reporters transforming material into hard political news within the inverted pyramid framework? What social implications can be discerned from their discursive patterns and structures? The following sections examine the three networks separately, pointing out how the three broadcasters divide their content along the four discourse layers. The sections seek to find out the kind of language structures these layers include and the social functions they perform.

The BBC The BBC relies heavily on paraphrasing and background (see Table 1). Of the 195 paragraphs in the ten stories selected for analysis (see Appendix B), 142 are paraphrases and 32 background information. There are only 12 quotations. There are 9 paragraphs that provide comment or opinion and are framed in a way that legitimates the Israeli attacks as they transform the official Israeli discourse into news:

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(1) The attacks come at a time of extraordinary tension in Gaza with Israeli troops mounting a two-week offensive following the capture of Corporal Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants during a raid on an Israeli border post on 25 June. (2) The massive Israeli operation is aimed at releasing a captured soldier and halting Palestinian attacks. The two samples above are not the only indication of how the BBC article reveals a trend of what Hall et al. (1978: 61) describe as a general tendency in media of transforming ‘official viewpoint into public idiom’ as part of the attempt of making official discourse more palatable to the public at large. But shifting the official stance into public parlance is done to benefit one side of the story (the Israelis). The Israeli attacks and often massive military operations are in response to what the BBC normally describes as militants, activists or Islamists. These expressions, which abound in BBC discourse, are not inserted between inverted commas, indicating that the BBC’s discursive patterns are closer to Israel’s official viewpoint and its interpretation of events: (1a) The raids come amid Israeli efforts to release a soldier captured by Palestinian militants last month. (2a) Israeli forces have made regular incursions into Gaza and the West Bank following the capture of an Israeli soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, in a cross-border raid by Palestinian militants on 25 June. Paragraphs (1) and (2), and (1a) and (2a) legitimate not only the reported offensive but also previous attacks. Note the use of the simple present tense in (1) and (1a) which is normally reserved to what Quirk et al. (1985) call habit- ual actions and truths and note how what originally looks like a paraphrase particularly in (2) and (2a) has been transformed into a statement of truth with the verbs ‘is aimed’ and ‘have made’ indicating how the writer intrudes into the event via what amounts to an evaluative comment by almost sanc- tioning the Israeli operation. Had the writer opted for a paraphrase of (2), for example, he or she might have mitigated the strong message the paragraph delivers to suppress or eliminate one side of the conflict at the expense of the other by revealing the agent or source and using a reporting verb: (3) The Israelis say the massive operation is aimed at releasing a captured soldier and halting Palestinian attacks. (Author’s rewrite of (2)) Nowhere does the BBC provide an unattributed context to the Pales- tinians in order to explain why they resort to violence. Whenever there is pro-Palestinian context, the source providing it is mentioned plus a reporting verb: (3a) For their part, groups like Hamas say that their attacks are a response to Israeli military actions – not just attacks in Gaza – but raids, arrests and killings in the occupied West Bank as well. Transforming (3a) from a paraphrase to a comment, by removing the source and reporting verb, will clearly illustrate how loaded (1, 1a and 2) are in their bid to turn the official Israeli discourse into statement of truth.

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(3b), which is the author’s rewrite of (3a), is similarly very loaded as it turns specific Palestinian official discourse into public domain discourse. But while the BBC grants Israel the discursive privilege of comment paragraphs like these, Palestine is denied such discursive ‘luxury’. The discursive policy of unattributed background comments is only available for the Israelis. According to the BBC’s overarching editorial values (BBC 2007b) of ‘accuracy, impartiality, balance and diversity of opinion’ they should be available to the Palestinians, too. Thus one should expect an unattributed version of (3a) to be also part of the BBC’s discursive patterns. In that case the BBC should make an evaluative paragraph like (3b) part of its discourse. One wonders whether the broadcaster will accept a comment like (3b) to balance those in favour of Israel: (3b) The Palestinian attacks are a response to Israeli military actions – not just attacks in Gaza – but raids, arrests and killings in the occupied West Bank as well. (Author’s rewrite of (3a)) The BBC’s choice of certain lexical items to describe the Palestinians at the discourse layers of background, comment and paraphrasing add some form of what Fairclough (1989: 92) calls ‘naturalization’ to the Israeli actions and bring them closer to the horizon of the Israeli official discourse. The Palestinians are mainly militants and the targets of the Israeli attacks are bomb-makers, or master bomb-makers, militant groups, etc. Occasionally the BBC seems at a loss about what lexical item to choose to describe the state of Corporal Gilad Shalit. Once he is kidnapped, another captured or seized. In at least one occasion he is referred to as a captive Israeli soldier: (4) The Israeli military says Mohammed Deif, a Hamas bomb-maker who has topped Israel’s most wanted list for over 10 years, was injured in the attack. (5) The Israelis say he is a master bomb-maker who has been behind numerous suicide bomb attacks in Israel. The way Mr Deif is designated in the restrictive clause in (4), though part of a paraphrase accrediting the Israeli military is apparently inserted by the writer to express a viewpoint. And the fact that master bomb-maker in (5) is not placed in single inverted commas could indicate that the broadcaster accepts the Israeli designation. The function of such over-lexicalization prevalent in the dominant layers of discourse, particularly paraphrasing and background is most ‘ideational’, indicating that the BBC content reflects the way it perceives the world of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict and the way it creates it in written discourse. There is occasionally a huge thematic discrepancy between the headline and the lead which traditionally are supposed to exhibit a coherent thematic structure providing the gist of the story: (6) Gaza air strike targets militant (Headline) (7) At least six people have been killed and 15 injured in an Israeli strike on a Gaza City house. (Lead) The lead (7), printed in a larger font, is a classic example of what Fowler (1991) calls transformation where the affected participants (those killed

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and injured) are given the subject or agent position in the passive sentence while the participants performing the action (Israelis) are part of the circumstance in the discourse. The reversal of the role of the participants in discourse is even clearer in the headline (6). The use of the noun combination Gaza air strike as the agent participant hides those launching the strike and the use of the politically loaded lexical item militant without inverted commas ‘naturalizes’ the ideology of the agent participant. There are few quotations in BBC stories (see Table 1) to support leads and in the story carrying the headline in (6) there is only one paraphrase in the 21-paragraph story to back it up: (8) According to Palestinian medical sources, the six dead included two women and two children. The paucity of full quotations is matched with the preponderance of partial quotes, but many of these lack balance as they are inserted to support one side: (9) However, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has ruled out any negotiations with the Hamas-led Palestinian government, calling the militant group a ‘terrorist bloody organization’. There is no single word in double inverted commas from the Palestinian side to counterbalance Olmert’s partial quote in the story. The BBC rewrites the same story fourteen hours later. The update carries a different headline and a different lead: (10) Deaths mount in attacks on Gaza (headline of update) (11) An Israeli air strike on the Gaza City home of a member of the Palestinian militant group Hamas has killed nine members of the same family. (Lead of update) The headline leaves the identity of the agent participant unknown and the only reference to the agent is ‘circumstantial’ wrapped in two prepositional phrases in attacks on Gaza. The lead has a 17-word noun phrase all belonging to the agent participant which though clearly identified An Israeli air strike the head noun air strike is modified (tempered) by three prepositional phrases and one of them includes an over-lexicalization where the affected participant the Palestinian militant group Hamas is classified negatively as a group with militant or aggressive ideology. Unlike CNN and other commercial networks, British licence-fee payers in effect subsidize the online service even for people outside Britain. Only very recently (BBC 2007a) has the BBC moved to slightly commercialize the service for users outside Britain with short commercials attached to some video items. So the service is still not under intense competitive conditions to maximize advertising revenues. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to attribute the discourse characteristics to purely economic conditions for the way the BBC covers the conflict. The discursive features outlined above show that as far as the broadcaster is concerned the Israelis and Palestinians cannot be treated equally due to the disparity in their social, economic, political, military and media conditions

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(Barkho, forthcoming). The discursive ‘inequality’ hides the ideological character of discourse and as Fairclough (1989: 92) says, ‘The apparent emptying of the ideological content of discourse is, paradoxically, a fundamental ideological effect.’ Richard Porter, Head of News, BBC World Service, attributes the choice of discursive patterns to ‘professional journalists trying to balance the very many demands they face at any one time.’ He goes on, ‘I don’t accept that our decision to use (or not use) quote marks, or our choice of tenses, can fairly be interpreted as the BBC accenting a particular point of view, or acting as an agency for those in power.’ The BBC is apparently not concerned with the lack of balance at the four discourse layers. Jerry Timmins, BBC Head of Region, Africa and Middle East, says, ‘You cannot balance every story internally. Balance comes over time.’ Regarding the patterns and elements within the four discourse layers, the BBC has a glossary of terminology (Israel and the Palestinians: Key terms 2006) on how to report the conflict. Only the Middle East region has such a glossary. Adam Curtis, BBC World Editor, News Interactive, says it is difficult to lay down rules for the way the four discourse layers should be used.

CNN The ten CNN stories (see appendix B) are composed of 215 paragraphs of which 150 indirectly report sources and 33 are direct quotations. The short paragraphs and sentences and the frequent use of paraphrasing and quoting give CNN discourse some affinity with conversational language whose ideological function, according to Fowler (1991: 57), ‘naturalizes the terms in which reality is represented’. The remaining 32 paragraphs provide background or comment, which is designed in a way to legitimate the Israeli actions and show that the Palestinians are to blame (see Table 1). There is nothing at the background or comment layers of discourse that attempts to explain the context of violence on the Palestinian side, while Israeli violent actions are amply clarified and more or less justified: (12) The attack comes in the midst of increased Israeli strikes designed to suppress rocket launches from Gaza. (12a) The military campaign is aimed at securing Cpl. Gilad Shalit’s release and ending Palestinian attacks against Israel. (13) The popular Resistance Committees and Hamas are designated terrorist organizations by the United States, the European Union and Israel. (14) Islamic Jihad is also considered a terrorist group by the United States. Paragraphs (12) and (12a) are a good example of how the broadcaster transforms Tel Aviv’s official discourse into matter of fact through the use of the simple present tense and the absence of attribution. The circumstance of the attack represented in the immediately following prepositional phrase and the reduced wh-clause in the passive in (12) is designed to give a positive context to the Israeli actions while the Palestinian actions are denied such treatment. (12) and (12a) transform the official Israeli discourse in (15) into CNN discourse by transferring the past tense came into a habit that looks ‘timeless’ through the use of

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the present tense comes and the present passive form is aimed as well as the removal of attribution: (15) The attack came hours after Palestinian militants launched four rockets from northern Gaza on Wednesday morning and hit the Israeli town of Sderot, killing one woman and wounding a man, Israeli police and medical sources said. The absence of agent participant or attribution in the reduced clauses Israeli strikes designed to and is aimed at in (12) and (12a) shows that the writer or the network shares the Israeli viewpoint of why the strikes are launched. The reduced clauses modify and qualify the main noun phrases Israeli strikes in (12) and The military campaign in (12a). Note the difference in meaning in (16) and (17) when the subject or agent participant (source) as well as the reporting verb is introduced by adding the emphasized bits to (12) and (12a): (16) The attack comes in the midst of increased Israeli strikes which Israel says are designed to suppress rocket launches from Gaza. (Author’s rewrite of (12)) (17) The military campaign, Israel says, is aimed at securing Cpl. Gilad Shalit’s release and ending Palestinian attacks against Israel. (Author’s rewrite of (12a)) Paragraphs (13) and (14) bring the affected participants to the initial or subject position of the sentence pushing the agent participants into the circumstance part. The transformation highlights that these groups fall under the category of ‘terrorists’ and that is the most important part the reader must know and the fact that they are only called so by certain countries is rather irrelevant. Bringing the agent participants to the beginning and introducing a reporting verb (e.g. ‘say’) and placing ‘terrorists’ inside inverted commas would drastically shift the focus of (13) and (14) as in (18) and (19): (18) The United States, the European Union and Israel say the popular Resistance Committees and Hamas are ‘terrorist’ organizations. (Author’s rewrite of (13)) (19) The United States says Islamic Jihad is also a ‘terrorist’ group. (Author’s rewrite of (14)) CNN pursues a distinctive discursive policy with regard to headlines. Attributed headlines are a characteristic of CNN headline discourse but without single or double inverted commas (20a and 20c). The headline may be followed by a smaller print size, but usually longer, secondary headline that gives a bit more information (20d). But (20) and (20a) at least put the Israeli strikes into what can be described as a ‘rational’ context by clearly expressing the cause that prompted Israel to launch them. The adjective deadly used twice in the same story to describe the launch of rockets by Palestinians and the loaded word terrorist in fact legitimate the Israeli action while the context prompting the Palestinians to fire crude missiles is not mentioned rendering their actions ‘irrational’. In (20b) the victims or objects of attack occupy the initial or thematic position in the headline while the perpetrators or agents are the circumstance of the prepositional phrase by Israeli sniper fire.

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(20) Israeli air strikes follow deadly rocket launch from Gaza (headline) (20a) Israel: Palestinian terrorist target hit in Gaza (headline) (20b) Palestinian girl, 12, killed by Israeli sniper fire (headline) (20c) Palestinians: Israelis kill 19 in Gaza (headline) (20d) Israel hits Gaza with new strikes (headline) At least 8 Palestinians dead, 16 wounded in Gaza attacks (secondary headline) While CNN deploys lexical items that make Palestinian actions rather unacceptable, e.g. deadly in (20) and (22) and terrorist in (20a), Israeli actions are not described negatively. For example, the killing of 18 Palestinians – mainly women and children (21) has no adjective to modify the noun phrase a barrage of artillery fire but the Israeli interpretation or context immediately follows Israel blamed the misfire on a ‘technical failure’ with the word misfire not placed between inverted commas indicating that CNN goes with the Israeli viewpoint. The only discursive layer available for the Palestinians to have their say is quoting as in (21a): (21) Israel was hit with a global backlash of harsh statements last week after a barrage of artillery fire into the northern Gaza town of Beit Hanoun resulted in the death of 18 Palestinians – mainly women and children. Israel blamed the misfire on a ‘technical failure’. (21a) ‘The occupation hasn’t stopped attacking Palestinians before or after Beit Hanoun, so we say resistance is a right of Palestinians,’ Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum told The Associated Press. (22) Israel earlier condemned the deadly Wednesday morning rocket strike on Sderot. Of course there are more samples in the CNN pieces that attempt to legitimate Israel’s official discourse. Besides reporting that the United States and Israel view these Palestinian groups as terrorists, the discourse at the four layers of writing describes the Palestinians as militants and occasionally as terrorists. Appellations like these give the impression that Palestinians in general are ‘aggressive’. CNN’s lexis is almost an echo of Israeli official discourse. Throughout Corporal Gilad Shalit is described as an abducted or kidnapped soldier and the Israeli army is given the official Israeli designation Israel Defense Forces or IDF. CNN’s discursive strategy, according to Caroline Faraj, Editor-in-Chief, CNN online, is not to describe people, but events and then leave it to the audiences to attach the label they want to the participants in the story. ‘This is not a place for us to put our own ideas or observations,’ she says. She sees little difference in the social assumptions of a headline or lead in which the agent is hidden or is part of the circumstance or clearly identified in its ‘normal’ subject position. Kevin Flower, CNN Bureau Chief, Jerusalem, believes the global reach of CNN makes it necessary to use terms that are ‘understandable’ to its English-speaking audiences particularly in America and is aware that many English words coined to express sensitive Arabic terminology are inaccurate. Both agree that it is extremely difficult to balance a story internally with regard to the four layers of discourse.

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Al-Jazeera The ten Al-Jazeera pieces (see appendix B) designated for analysis include 157 paragraphs of which 112 are paraphrases and 17 direct quotations (see Table 1). There are 28 paragraphs that provide context in the form of background and comment which, as we shall see, tilt towards the Palestinian side of the conflict. One major linguistic feature of Al-Jazeera’s paraphrasing and background layers of discourse is the active voice in which the Israelis by name or otherwise are normally specified as the agent participants: (23) Israeli tanks have killed at least 18 Palestinians in Gaza, including sleeping women and children … (24) … tank shells struck and demolished at least four houses in the attack. (25) Israeli troops shot dead four armed Palestinians and a civilian early on Wednesday … (26) Soldiers killed eight Palestinians in separate incidents in Gaza on Tuesday. The affected participants occupy their object position in the above paragraphs while in the BBC and CNN stories they normally are given the subject position with the agent participant either removed or part of the circumstance. Seldom is there an attempt by Al-Jazeera to hide the agency in the headline (27, 27a, 27b). Unlike the BBC headlines (6 and 10), the perpetrators of the act and the victims are clearly identified. Palestinian victims are positively modified by an adjective sleeping in (27) and the Israeli act negatively modified by deadly in (27b), the adjective CNN (20 and 22) uses twice to negatively describe a Palestinian act: (27) Israeli tank fire kills sleeping families (27a) Israel kills women at mosque (27b) Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks Al-Jazeera paraphrasing and quoting, mainly citing Palestinian eyewitnesses and officials, make the discourse the closest to conversation among the three networks. One striking feature of Al-Jazeera’s quotations is their immediacy, urgency and personalization. First pronoun, whether singular and plural, with their subject and object forms, dominate these quotations: (28) ‘We saw legs, we saw heads, we saw hands scattered …’ (29) ‘I saw people coming out […] I started screaming.’ (30) ‘We are going to fight …’ (31) ‘We are going to launch our rockets, our martyrs are going to sacrifice their life …’ The quotations are most probably aimed at Arabs, Muslims or Palestinian sympathizers who are well versed in English. That is at least what one can surmise from their inter-personalization; the quotations speak directly to readers in an obvious bid to rally their support and sympathy. There are fewer background paragraphs in Al-Jazeera than in the BBC and CNN (see Table 1). The broadcaster puts the violence on the part of

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Palestinians into context (33a and 33b), though it also tries not to overlook the Israeli interpretation of events (33c). The discursive feature of these background paragraphs, some of which border on comment, is the presence of source and reporting verb which the BBC and CNN overlook in their discursive practice: (32) Israeli troops completed their largest military operation in Gaza in a year on Tuesday after killing 60 fighters and civilians in a week-long incur- sion in the Beit Hanoun area that Israel said was designed to stop rocket attacks on Israeli cities. (33) Israel had pulled its forces out of Gaza last year after a 38-year occupation, however it has repeatedly raided the territory since one of its soldiers was captured there in June. (33a) Palestinian fighters say the launching of missiles into Israel is a response to continued Israeli army assaults against Palestinians in the occupied territories. (33b) Israel has bombed metal workshops in the past, alleging that they produce rockets fired at Israel. (33c) The assault is one of the biggest since Israel launched an offensive in Gaza to try to force the release of the captured soldier and halt the rocket fire. Al-Jazeera’s quotations and paraphrases shift the official Palestinian discourse into public language while, as we have seen, the BBC and CNN attempt the opposite. Compare, for example, the wh-clause in (32), which Al-Jazeera employs to identify the subject and reporting verb and distance itself from the official Israeli parlance, with (2) and (12) where the wh- clause is reduced to omit the subject and the reporting verb, transforming the discourse from background into comment or opinion. Al-Jazeera’s lexis likewise toes the Palestinian line by avoiding attempts by the BBC and CNN to over-lexicalize and recontextualize the Palestinian context. Words like militant, activist and terrorist do not surface in describ- ing Palestinian groups and their members or those who are killed or injured in the conflict with Israel. They are described as fighters or simply armed Palestinians and civilians. But it is worth noting that Al-Jazeera’s English online service refrains from using ‘emotional’ words like ‘martyr’ and its derivatives for the Palestinians who fall in fighting Israel at the three discourse layers of paraphrasing, background and comment. Here, Al-Jazeera departs from its reporting in Arabic where vocabulary with emotive and historical context is employed widely (Barkho 2006). However, such words still surface in Al-Jazeera quotations, which of course even the BBC and CNN cannot avoid if they opted to cite: (34) ‘Our martyrs are going to sacrifice their lives …’ (35) ‘All of us are martyrs in waiting.’ The choice of vocabulary and other language structures in Al-Jazeera ‘naturalizes’ the Palestinian side by bringing it to what the network sees as the horizon within which the understanding of the target discourse occurs.

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The ‘ideational and interpersonal functions’ particularly at the quoting and paraphrasing layers of discourse are geared towards a particular representation. Two important issues need clarification at this point. The first concerns the differences in language Al-Jazeera employs in its English and Arabic broadcasting. The second relates to whether the BBC and CNN are prepared to use a different terminology like Al-Jazeera when addressing audiences of different cultures and languages. On the one hand, Al-Jazeera, according to Mostefa Souag, Director of Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, ‘feels it is rooted in the soil of the Middle East and it respects the collective con- science in the Middle East culture’. On the other hand it acknowledges the fact that since its English services are directed at non-Arabs, it will need to approach them differently, Souag adds. The answer to the second point is more complicated. The Arabic online services of both the BBC and CNN do not seem to be prepared to switch their terminology to respond to the audiences’ cultural, religious, political, social or even linguistic inclinations. BBC Arabic, for example, has pio- neered the coinage of new lexical items in Arabic in its bid to render loaded words like ‘jihadists, militants, activists, Islamists, fundamentalists’ commonly used in western media into Arabic (Barkho 2006). Apparently neither the BBC nor CNN are ready to compromise the character of their Middle East reporting even at the level of terminology. BBC’s Richard Porter says he does not believe a broadcaster should try to respond to the terminology audiences like to hear or read. He goes on, ‘And just because Arab audiences expect it that way [Al-Jazeera’s way] doesn’t make it right, does it?’ Al-Jazeera is not a commercial network like CNN and cannot be described as a public service like the BBC. While advertising is steadily becoming a feature of the reporting of its various services, Al-Jazeera still relies heavily on the coffers of the royal family in Qatar without which it would fail to exist. So, like the BBC it may be difficult to cite the pursuit of financial gains for the manner in which Al-Jazeera covers the Palestinian issue. More likely it goes well with the attempt to exercise political clout and power by the tiny but economically vibrant oil- and gas-rich island, Qatar. Al-Jazeera English has a global audience to cater for but, according to Russel Merryman, Editor-in-Chief of Web and New Media at Al-Jazeera English, the network wants ‘to speak with authority about the Middle East’ and therefore what it tries to do is ‘to communicate to people the immediacy and some of the immediate context’ through ‘a subtle use of language’ following ‘in the best tradition of what Al-Jazeera has done in the last ten years’. The Al-Jazeera online editors, he says, are quite aware that different language structures produce different social assumptions; therefore ‘what we are trying to do is to do justice to that immediacy by writing headlines that are not passive’. Asked whether the network pursues a distinctive discursive strategy, he said, ‘It is the Al-Jazeera spirit, it is the mindset’ that ‘empowers our journalists to write in a more active way’. Gaven Morris, Head of Planning, Al-Jazeera English, puts it succinctly, ‘We need a story […] that is of interest to people […] outside the Anglo- American steer of thinking.’

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Social implications The presence of what is ostensibly viewed as background information particularly in BBC and CNN stories gives way to pass evaluative comments by publicly embracing one side of the conflict and vilifying the other. The BBC and to a larger extent CNN ‘enshrine’ Israeli actions as rational and legitimate through the use of ‘presumptuous’ words, phrases and grammatical structures, leaving those of its adversaries (the Palestinians) to be viewed as irrational. In Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s words (1999) the two networks recontextualize the context of the conflict particularly through what Fowler (1991) calls over-lexicalizations that depict actions of Israel’s foes as negative or discouraging. Al-Jazeera strives to rid itself of what it sees as the hegemonic ‘Anglo-Saxon’ discourse that normally equates anti-Western and anti- Israeli groups and states with ‘terrorism, militancy or extremism’. It strives to distance itself from the discursive practices and patterns prevalent in the BBC and CNN. Critical studies attempt to help us understand media texts by relating their linguistic characteristics, among others, to their social assumptions in a logical way. But this logic remains ‘intersubjective’ due to the different ways societies view each other. Here are two examples: A1. The results of democratic elections must be respected A2. Kadima won the elections in Israel A3. Therefore, a Kadima-formed government must be respected B1. The results of democratic elections must be respected B2. Hamas won the elections in Palestine B3. Therefore, a Hamas-formed government must be respected On a purely formal linguistic level both propositions are equal. Even on a generative connotative level there should be no differences between them. But the social assumptions and the social practices they generate are controversial, divergent and conflicting. The three networks construct a bifurcation of the conflict in which one side is represented as malign and the other as benign. Examples of malignant discourse are evident in the recontextualization and over-lexicalization dominant in the BBC and CNN stories when representing the Palestinians and to a lesser degree in Al-Jazeera when representing the Israelis. Examples of benign discourse are evident in the BBC and CNN stories when representing the Israelis and Al-Jazeera when representing the Palestinians. In the discursive patterns that the BBC and CNN follow the first proposition is sound and the second unsound. In Al-Jazeera’s discursive patterns both are sound. Future research There has been little written about Halliday’s textual metafunction of language, especially in relation to journalism. Regarding the hard news discourse, the four layers specified and analysed in this article still remain an area that needs much greater attention. Each layer of the hard news discourse deserves a special study in order to unpack it critically and see whether its discursive practices reflect the reporters’ and editors’ social environment or – as BBC’s Richard Porter argues – whether it is practical in

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BBC CNN Al-Jazeera Paraphrasing 142 150 112 Quoting 12 33 17 Background 32 25 22 Comment 9 7 6 Total 195 215 157

Table 1: The frequency of the four layers of hard news discourse in the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera.

the first place to use the discursive characteristics of news discourse as a tool to say that news media speak for an ideology or point of view or act ‘as an agency’ for those with power. As the paraphrase layer dominates discourse in the three networks (see table below), perhaps one way to unravel it is to follow Deacon et al.’s ‘use of anti-sources to frame pro-sources’ (1999: 171–72) which the authors brilliantly apply on the quoting layer. The other three layers deserve more attention to analyse their discourse critically. Media scholars are called upon to demonstrate how and why a layer is framed that way and what linguistic or thematic transformations are required to change it from one frame to another. Conclusion Investigating the textual function of hard news discourses reveals four important layers of the traditional inverted pyramid structure. The linguistic analysis has shown that different grammatical, lexical and semantic characteristics realize the discourses of these layers. The discursive features of each of these layers exhibit different social practices and assumptions ema- nating from the social fields they originate from. The BBC and CNN stories display a tendency to transform Israeli official discourses into public language, employing discursive characteristics that make them palatable to the public at large. Some of these discursive features have the capacity to transform the layer of paraphrase into evaluative comment. With regard to Palestine, the context is recontextualized and over-lexicalized via special terminology and grammar bordering on vilification. Al-Jazeera on the other hand pursues a different discursive strategy. The network’s terminology and grammar transform Palestinian official discourses into public language but with no discernible attempt to vilify the Israelis. The discursive traits and social practices of its English reporting, though different from the Arabic mother channel, are embedded in the culture and politics of the Middle East and the way Arabs and Muslims see them. Al-Jazeera is much more concerned with the discursive patterns responding to audience needs, a compromise the BBC and CNN are not willing to make. The marked differences between the BBC and CNN on the one hand and Al-Jazeera on the other lead to the construction of a bifurcation of the social world of the conflict realized in a bifurcation of discourse at the four discursive layers. This bifurcation is contradictory and antonymous and reconciliation of the social practices is probably not going to happen even if the networks merge or unify their divergent discursive policies.

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References Barkho, L. (2006), ‘The Arabic Al-Jazeera vs. Britain’s BBC and America’s CNN: Who Does Journalism Right’, American Communication Journal, 8: 1 (Fall). —— (forthcoming), ‘BBC’s discursive strategy and practice’, Journalism Studies, to be published in February 2008. BBC (2007a), Enhanced video for global users, 24 September. http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/6277422.stm BBC (2007b), Editorial Guidelines, 14 October. http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/ editorialguidelines/ Bell, A. (1991), The Language of the News Media, Oxford: Blackwell. Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999), Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Danemark, B., Ekström, M., Jakobsen, L. and Karlsson, J. (2002), Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences, London: Routledge. Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (1999), Researching Communication, a Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis, London: Arnold. Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) (2006), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd edn., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fairclough, N. (1989), Language and Power, London and New York: Longman. —— (1995), Media Discourse, London, New York, Sydney and Auckland: Arnold. —— (1998), ‘Political Discourse in the Media: An Analytical Framework’, in A. Bell and P. Carrett (eds), Approaches to Media Discourse, Oxford: Blackwell. —— (2000), ‘Discourse, Social Theory and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform, Journal of Sociolinguistics, 4: 2. —— (2003), Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, London: Routledge. Fairclough, N., Jessop, B. and Sayer, A. (2004), ‘Critical realism and Semiosis’, in J. Joseph and J.M. Roberts (eds), Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction, London: Routledge. Foucault, M. (1972), The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock. —— (1984), ‘The Order of Discourse’, in M. Shapiro (ed.), Language and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 108–38. Fowler, R. (1985), ‘Power’, in T. Van Dijk (ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis, vol. 4, London: Academic Press. Fowler, R. (1991), Language in the News, London and New York: Routledge. Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (eds) (1979), Language and Control, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Fowler, R. and Kress, G. (1979), ‘Critical Linguistics’ in R. Fowler et al. (eds), Language and Control, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Halliday, M.A.K. (1971), ‘Linguistic Structure and Literary Style; An Inquiry into Language of William Golding’s The Interiors’, in S. Chatman (ed.), Literary Style: A Symposium, New York and London: Oxford University Press. —— (1973), Explorations in the Functions of Language, London: Edward Arnold. —— (1970), ‘Language Structure and Language Function’, in J. Lyons (ed.), New Horizons in Linguistics, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978), Policing the Crisis, London: Macmillan.

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Hawthorn, J. (1992), A Concise Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory, London, New York, Melbourne and Auckland: Arnold. Hodge, B. (1979), ‘Newspapers and communities’, in R. Fowler et al. (eds.), Language and Control, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Israel and the Palestinians: Key terms (2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_ depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/6044090. stm. Retrieved 15 August, 2007. Kress, G. (1994), ‘Text and Grammar as Explanation’, in U. Meinhof and K. Richardson (eds), Text, Discourse and Context: Representations of Poverty in Britain, London and New York: Longman. Kress, G. and Hodge, R. (1979), Language as Ideology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Noaks, L. and Wincup, E. (2004), Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods, London: Sage. Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G. and Svartvik, J. (1985), A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language, Harlow: Longman. Sayer, A. (1995), Radical Political Economy, Oxford: Blackwell. —— (1997), ‘Critical Realism and the Limits to Social Science’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 27, pp. 473–88. Van Dijk, T.A. (1988), News Analysis: Case Studies of International and National News in the Press, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Appendix A The following list gives names and titles of the editors and executives that the author interviewed as well as the dates and locations of these interviews. 1. Russell Merryman, Editor-in-Chief, Web and New Media (Al-Jazeera English, Doha, June 2006) 2. Gaven Morris, Head of Planning (Al-Jazeera English, Doha, June 2006) 3. Mostefa Souag, Director, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies (Doha, 2006) 4. Caroline Faraj, Editor-in-Chief (CNN online, telephone interview, June 2006) 5. Kevin Flower, CNN Bureau Chief (Jerusalem, telephone interview, June 2006) 6. Jerry Timmins, BBC Head of Region, Africa and Middle East (London, May 2006) 7. Adam Curtis, BBC World Editor, News Interactive (London, May 2006) 8. Richard Porter, Head of News, BBC World Service (London, May 2006, plus e-mail exchange)

Appendix B The following are the Internet links to the articles used in the analysis. They were all last accessed in September 2007.

BBC 1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5171148.stm Now available at: http://www.venice-hotels-apartments.com/ article-213713-en.html 2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5171148.stm 3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6115830.stm 4. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6176156.stm

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5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6127250.stm 6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5247566.stm 7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5240746.stm 8. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5215608.stm 9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5209964.stm 10. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5153036.stm

CNN 1. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/15/mideast.rockets/index.html 2. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/03/israel.soldier/index.html 3. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/04/mideast/index.html 4. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/11/mideast/index.html 5. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/08/israel.gaza/index.html 6. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/03/mideast.violence/index.html 7. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/01/mideast.violence/ index.html?eref=edition world 8. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/10/23/gaza.violence/index.html 9. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/10/14/mideast/index.html 10. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/21/israel.gaza/index.html

Al-Jazeera 1. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24604 2. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/94D08027-0F99-46BD-B2EF- 44192178479E.htm 3. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27CE1930-8A37-4F11-B3B1- 6B19A4BB0AE7.htm 4. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38344 5. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38002 6. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38367 7. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C3769CC6-833A-4F9C-A5DB- 67B680119F4D.htm 8. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24420 9. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=35512 10. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38344

Suggested citation Barkho, L. (2007), ‘Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Middle East reporting’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 11–29, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.11/1

Contributor details Leon Barkho taught English and translation at Iraq’s Mosul University, before leaving for Reuters News Agency in 1991. He also spent three years covering for the Associated Press. His reports as a journalist appeared in major world newspapers. Since 2001, he has been working at Sweden’s Jönköping University. As an academic he has written several papers on both linguistics and translation. His most recent publications include Nordic Television at the Turn of the Century: An Overview

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of Broadcasters and Audiences (working paper); ‘The Arabic Al-Jazeera vs Britain’s BBC and America’s CNN – Who Does Journalism Right’ (American Communication Journal, 8: 1 (Fall), 2006); ‘Fundamentalism through Arab and Muslim Eyes: A Hermeneutic Interpretation’ (book chapter, forthcoming); and ‘BBC’s discursive strategy and practice’ (Journalism Studies, forthcoming). Contact: Department of Languages, Media Management and Transformation Centre, Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping University, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.31/1 The never-ending story: Palestine, Israel and The West Wing Philip Cass Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE

Abstract Keywords This article examines the way in which the popular American television series West Wing The West Wing represents the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the way in which Arabs Middle Eastern audiences responded to that depiction. This fictional and highly Islam idealized portrayal of the American presidency has frequently used ‘real’ story- Middle East lines that reflect contemporary political discourse to its primary domestic audi- orientalism ence. However, the programme is also shown outside the United States where its Abu Dhabi storylines – and the time of broadcast – may give an episode an entirely different Palestinians meaning. This article looks at audience responses to the episode ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ and the story arc that begins at the end of Season 5 and continues at the beginning of Season 6. This centres on an attempt to settle the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Placing The West Wing within a broad political and historical framework, the article uses the idea of American exceptionalism as the basis from which to argue that The West Wing presents ‘real’ as well as idealized American political stances and in that sense has to be read, in certain contexts, as contribut- ing to audience perceptions of the ‘real’ world. The article questions whether the asynchronous transmissions of the programme in the domestic US and Middle Eastern markets contribute to this perception. Using the responses of audiences of varying ages, education levels and origins, the article concludes that although it sometimes portrays Arabs negatively, it is usually well intentioned and makes genuine, if occasionally clumsy, attempts to portray Arabs in a favourable light. While episodes of The West Wing are the article’s main source, I have also drawn heavily on academic and non-academic articles to provide background to mainstream audience reaction and some of the issues – religious, political and historical – addressed by the series.

This article looks at audience reactions in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) to two specific parts of The West Wing. The first was the special episode that preceded Season 3 and which was the series’ response to the terrorist attacks on New York. The second was the story arc spanning Season 5 and 6, which tells of President Bartlett’s attempts to settle the Israeli–Palestinian question. The programmes were watched by a mix of Zayed University students, graduates, faculty and non-university employees. All the viewers were Muslim and most were women. While the majority were Emirati, two were American converts, several were from other Arab countries and one was of Palestinian descent. Some of the responses were hostile, others positive. Audience response appeared to be governed by age, political sophistication, education and exposure to outside ideas.

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1. Of more recent films, This examination of audience reaction began more or less as an acci- students who had dent with the screening of the ‘9/11 special’ ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. The seen it were very positive about Syriana, depth of student reaction to that episode prompted me to screen it to a dif- which was partly shot ferent audience and then to seek an audience reaction to the story arc in Dubai. centring on Israel and Palestine. When re-screening ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ 2. Shah. een’s stereotypi- and the Palestinian episodes I let the audience view the programmes on cal Arab is a their own and then sought detailed, written reactions, from which I have fabulously wealthy, sex mad barbarian quoted. with a penchant for The West Wing was originally available to Abu Dhabi audiences via the terrorism. satellite channel America Plus on the Saudi-owned Orbit platform. The 3. This has actually programme was shown with Arabic subtitles and appeared to be run happened in some intact, although one episode critical of Saudi Arabia appeared to have unexpected places. Alexander Siddiq been censored when shown. The West Wing was subsequently repeated on played ‘Dr Bashir’ Dubai One and each season was rapidly made available on video or DVD. the station doctor Anecdotal evidence, largely gathered through surveys of student media on Star Trek: Deep Space Nine. Siddiq usage by communication students at Zayed University, indicates that many later appeared in female students watch little English-language drama on television, dislike Syriana, an extremely subtitles and in any case have their viewing choices severely controlled sympathetic portrayal of the complexities by male relatives. Discussions of representations of Arabs by the western of politics and oil in media are one of the staples of communications classes, although these the Gulf. tend to focus on the cinema. That western media will portray Arabs negatively seems to be taken as a given, although some students praised older films like Lawrence of Arabia and Lion of the Desert/Omar Mukhtar.1 Although the hypothesis is untested, it may be that many students are actually far more familiar with western cinema than television, preferring to watch Arabic television. Shaheen’s pioneering work on the representation of Arabs on American television (Shaheen 1984: 4–54) is nearly a quarter of a century old, but his thesis that Arabs and other minorities are generally portrayed imper- fectly still holds.2 Arabs have continued to hold attention as television villains, especially at times of crisis. According to Gladstone-Sovell and Wilkerson (2002) 40 per cent of dramas aired during the 2001–02 television season in the United States referred to the attacks on New York in their storylines. At the end of The TV Arabs, Shaheen (1984: 126–34) suggests that with good will and understanding, it would be possible to produce more accurate and sympathetic images of Arabs on television.3 The West Wing’s portrayals of Arabs are not always positive, but they are not restricted to the hostile stereotypes listed by Shaheen. In fact, as I discuss later, the programme attempted to give a balanced, even positive portrayal in certain episodes. As we shall see, however, there are several questions about the ability of non-American domestic audiences to perceive this. The West Wing is a linear descendant of Frank Capra’s films about the perfectibility of the American political system by the good will and understanding of decent men and women. In such a world anybody should be capable of redemption, but The West Wing also attempts to portray reality and so not everybody can be saved. On the one hand, The West Wing is, in the words of The Economist, ‘essentially a fairy story about a benign ruler’ (The Economist 2002a). Others have ascribed its appeal to its reinforcement of faith in the American political system:

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it seems clear that the fundamental attraction of The West Wing for Americans is its promise that, despite our failings and lapses, our system is still [...] a lighthouse. Such an appeal to our better selves is both refreshing and chastening. (Rollins and O’Connor 2003: 13)

And yet it is debatable whether The West Wing really is such a liberal fan- tasy. The fictional President Bartlett’s behaviour is in fact closer to the realities of twenty-first-century global politics. Writing in her monumental study of the Versailles Conference, Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan depicts the United States as a country that has always believed that it is exceptional. She goes on to argue that such a fervent belief in its own system has led to an equally fervent belief in its special place in the world. This, she says, has its dangers:

American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the one eager to set the world to rights; the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message should be ignored. Faith in their own exceptionalism has sometimes led to a certain obtuseness on the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other nations rather than listen to them, a tendency to assume that American motives are pure where those of others are not. (MacMillan 2002: 22)

The West Wing is also convinced of American exceptionalism, of its goodness and of its ability to solve all the nation’s ills through an idealized process of rational debate, negotiation and good works. However, when the mythical president of The West Wing is threatened or cannot get his own way, he too turns his back with contempt – and then uses force to either coerce or punish those who oppose him. By showing a president who threatens to use force, The West Wing reflects not Hollywood myth, but the real world. The world of The West Wing and its fictional President Josiah Bartlett works safely within the established – and real – paradigm of American imperialist power. The programme reflects a world that has moved beyond the ‘end of history’ in which liberal democracy was supposed to have triumphed. Instead, in terms of global realpolitik, it has reverted to what Cooper (1997: 313) describes as the pre-1989 international order of ‘hegemony or balance’. Bartlett’s occasional references to the Pax Romana makes it clear that he sees the United States as fulfilling a hegemonic role. For a supposedly liberal president – and for an overtly liberal series – this presents a paradox, but these internal contradictions are never questioned. Never once do Bartlett or any of the other fictional characters seriously challenge the ‘real’ system. Perhaps they have taken Cooper’s position that:

We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative society. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who are still in the nineteenth-century world of every state for itself. (Cooper 1997: 322)

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4. Andrew Stuttaford Each country has its own myths and powerful nations seek to present (2003) begins a those myths to the world through culture or other projections of power. profile of actor Martin Sheen, who plays the The West Wing is clearly a cultural product designed to reinforce and fictional president, bolster the myth of the supremacy and superiority of the American with ‘If there is political establishment. To a non-American audience, the first and anyone more sanctimonious than major contradiction is that Bartlett is presented as ‘liberal’, an the West Wing’s Jed American code word for left wing. He certainly seems to be accepted as Bartlett.’ such by right-wing commentators in the United States (Leo 2002; 5. Fred McKissack Stuttaford 2003).4 By the standards of much of the rest of the world, (2000) presents a however, he is nothing of the sort (McKissack 2000).5 He is a pro- dissenting view from the American left: capitalist and considers that free enterprise is the best solution to every ‘Let’s drop the problem. The series’ creator, Aaron Sorkin, clearly conceived Jeb Bartlett pretence that this is as a liberal character and compared to George Bush Jnr, he is. If this somehow a pro-lefty, commie-lovin’ represents a state of ideological false consciousness on the part of roll-a-doobie.’ Sorkin, the writers who replaced him and, one must presume, many viewers, then we must accept it, at least within the parameters of the series. The West Wing represents an idealization of the American system, not a critique of it. Idealization would be fine if the programme concentrated wholly on domestic issues, but it does not. From time to time it stumbles into the arena of world politics and falls flat on its face. The programme often reflects an astonishing ignorance of the non-American world and a mocking, hostile attitude to it. One is forced to wonder whether the world is portrayed in this way because that is how The West Wing’s writers see it, how they think President Bartlett would see it, or how they think American viewers see it. But who are The West Wing’s viewers? Within the United States the programme was immensely popular, winning a number of Emmy awards and garnering a sizeable part of the market (The Economist 2002b). The programme continues to be shown outside the United States on terrestrial television and on satellite. It has been more successful in some markets than others, being praised by critics but ignored by audiences (The Economist 2003). Craciun (2004) argues that:

The West Wing […] has the obvious limit that it covers only the American political system. If [a television programme or film touches on] foreign policy issues it becomes substantially more interesting for the non-American viewer. Although very informative and insightful, The West Wing sheds little light on other [political systems] than the American one.

Aaron Sorkin has written that he did not intend The West Wing to mirror reality, but the way in which people see a programme may be quite different to what was intended, depending on local cultural and political conditions. A programme that was ‘fictional’ when it was transmitted to a domestic audience may be shown at a later date to an audience in another country where the fictional events may be perceived by another audience to have quite definite parallels with real events in their lives. The West Wing has aired its final episode in the United States, but it will continue to be shown in other countries for years to come, when its stories will have acquired entirely different levels of significance.

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A programme that was intended, or expected, to be received in a 6. An earlier version of particular way by a domestic audience some time in the past, will now be this article, given at the Arab-United received in a multitude of ways by a vastly fragmented international States Association for audience. That audience might not understand English properly or see the Communication programme with inadequate subtitles. That audience is also being asked to Education conference in Dubai in October understand – or guess at the meaning of – an entirely alien political or 2003 under the title social framework and to try to put the programme into what may well ‘Extremist Arabs, have become a historical framework. An international audience will have Exasperating Indians and English to have extremely good English comprehension (or be provided with Alcoholics: The West adequate subtitles) and comprehend the socio-political paradigm in which Wing vs the World’, a programme was framed and understand that the programme may have dealt at length with the programnme’s been commenting on events that happened several years ago. In short, often inaccurate they will have to be able to read an extremely complicated American depictions of other media discourse. If they cannot do this, the possibilities for misunderstand- countries and their inhabitants, ranging ing are enormous, especially if the audience thinks its culture, country or from the English to religion are being questioned. Indonesians. Episodes The West Wing’s depictions of most countries and people from outside dealing with international politics 6 the United States are usually unflattering. However, Arab countries and generally display Arabs have been given probably the widest range of character traits. They Sorkin’s ignorance of have been alternatively threatening, untrustworthy, neutral, honest and the world outside the United States. He respectable. The first Arab country to be depicted was Syria, followed by portrays everybody Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In each of these programmes, the country in ques- from the English to tion was shown to be opposed to US interests of standards of behaviour. In the Indians in an unflattering and the second and third episodes of the first series, Syria shoots down an ill-informed light. American aircraft carrying the president’s doctor.7 Bartlett is enraged and 7. ‘Post Hoc, Ergo calls for a massive reprisal: Propter Hoc’ and ‘A Proportional Let the word go forth, from this time and this place, gentlemen. You kill an Response’, The West Wing 1: II–III. American, any American, we don’t come back with a proportional response. We come back with total disaster. 8. McKissack (2000) uses this episode to (Sorkin 2002: 105)8 advance his theory that Bartlett is not left Bartlett is persuaded not to devastate Syria and unhappily settles for a lim- wing. ‘How freaking lefty is it to bomb the ited air strike on military targets. McKissack (2000) describes this as Syrians, anyway?’ he ‘another Hollywood production demonising an Arab nation’. asks. Later episodes deal with the rescue of an American pilot shot down in 9. ‘The Portland trip’, the no-fly zone in Iraq and a request by the Swiss government for a life- The West Wing, 2: VII. 9 saving operation to be performed on the son of the Iranian Ayatollah. 10. ‘Enemies Foreign and While these episodes reflect tensions that exist in the real world, they do Domestic’, The West not treat these countries in an overtly hostile manner. However, in the Wing, 3: XIX. episode ‘Enemies Domestic and Foreign’, The West Wing comments on a real incident in the Middle East.10 The character C.J. Craig reacts to a question about the death of 17 Saudi schoolgirls who were burned to death when religious police refused to let them leave a burning building because they were not wearing their abeyahs (BBC Online 2002):

Outraged? I’m barely surprised. This is a country where women aren’t allowed to drive a car. They’re not allowed to be in the company of any man other than a close relative. They’re required to adhere to a dress code that would make a Maryknoll nun look like Malibu Barbie. They beheaded

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11. ‘Enemies Foreign and 121 people last year for robbery, rape and drug trafficking, they have no free Domestic’, The West press, no elected government, no political parties. And the Royal family allows Wing, 3: XIX. To the best of my knowledge, the religious police to travel in groups of six carrying nightsticks and they Orbit censored this freely and publicly beat women, But ‘Brutus is an honourable man.’ Seventeen portion of the schoolgirls were forced to burn alive because they weren’t wearing the proper programme. Most 11 dialogue quotations clothing. Am I outraged? No […] That is Saudi Arabia, our partner in peace. in this article are from the unofficial West Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger (2005) argue that this blurring of the real Wing continuity guide found at and the fictional is part of Sorkin’s attempt to pin the blame for all prob- http://westwing.bewa lems with Arab countries on Islamic fundamentalism. However, while rne.com this episode explicitly referred to an incident in Saudi Arabia, most of the 12. ‘We killed Yamamoto’ fictional West Wing’s problems have been with the equally fictitious Gulf and ‘Posse Comitatus’, state of Qumar, which is depicted as having an American base and being, The West Wing, 3: XXI–XXII. on the surface, friendly to the United States. Why create a fictional country? I suggest that if a country is fictional, its leaders can be safely assas- 13. ‘Abdul Shareef’ is a most unlikely name sinated and its people bombed or invaded as required. In a cycle of stories for a Gulf Arab. One that begins at the end of Season 3 and reaches into Season 5, Bartlett and of my Arab colleagues his advisers decide to assassinate the Qumari Defence Minister, Abdul said that at best it sounded vaguely Shareef, who, it is revealed, is secretly backing terrorist organizations Egyptian. plotting against the United States. After some debate, President Bartlett 14. ‘We Killed decides to have Shareef assassinated on British territory in the Yamamoto’, The West Caribbean.12 The repercussions of this event, the cover-up and the Wing, 3: XXI. involvement of Israel are all designed to show the consequences of taking what Bartlett believes to be a reprehensible, but necessary stand. The underlying message of this story arc is that the Arabs simply cannot be trusted. America offers its friendship and its bases and the Arabs try to blow up the Golden Gate bridge. It is only in this episode that some of the moral certainty of The West Wing slips. Assassination is, at best, morally ambiguous. We see the presidential staff struggling with the question, but it is Admiral Fitzwallace who justifies what they are planning by citing the shooting down of the Japanese commander Admiral Yamamoto over Bougainville in 1943. Ultimately, it is the knowledge that such assassination has been carried out before that is used to justify the shooting of Abdul Shareef.13

Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘Can you tell when it’s peacetime and wartime any more?’ Leo McGarry: ‘No.’ Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘I don’t know who the world’s leading expert on war- fare is, but any list has got to include me and I can’t tell when it’s peacetime and wartime any more.’ Leo McGarry: ‘Look, international law has always recognized certain protected persons who you couldn’t attack. It’s been this way since the Romans.’ Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘In peacetime…’ Leo McGarry: ‘I don’t like where this conversation’s going.’ Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘We killed Yamamoto. We shot down his plane.’ Leo McGarry: ‘We declared war...’14

Moral ambiguity is always a useful dramatic device, but it does not really answer the really serious questions raised by this story arc. Why would the

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Qumari Defence Minister plot against the United States? And how much 15. The title of the effort has been expended by the United States to keep him in power until programme is drawn from the story of now? These are difficult questions, but The West Wing sidesteps such issues Ishmael (Ismail in and concentrates on matters that appear to be more easily resolvable. Arabic), the son of Nowhere was this more apparent than in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, the spe- Abraham by the slave woman Hagar, and 15 cial episode that appeared at the beginning of Season 3. ‘Isaac and Isaac, Abraham’s son Ishmael’ was the first programme to self-consciously deal, albeit indirectly, by Sarah. The story of with the horrifying and cowardly attacks on New York on September 11, the two sons has been used in the past as a 2001 and to educate viewers about the issues surrounding the events metaphor for the (Gladstone-Sovell and Wilkerson 2002). Arab-Israeli conflict. The programme was severely criticized by many parts of the American The story of Isaac and Ishmael/Ismail can be media, although it had its supporters as well. USA Today called it ‘A crash- found in Genesis, 16: ing and condescending bore’ (BBC Online 2001), while the New York Post I–XVI and 21: I–XX said it ‘came across as pretentious and pietistic hubris’ (Shales 2001). (The New American Bible 1971: 15–16, Time castigated the episode but admitted that it was important ‘that it was 20–21). The union of attempted at all’ (Poniewozik 2001). Abraham, Ismail and Outside the United States, the Sydney Morning Herald described it as Isaac and their descendants through ‘an encouraging example of American television running on the best of Islam is highlighted in intentions’ (Oliver 2001). That it was well intentioned is not in doubt. Sura 21, ‘Al Baqarah’ That it tried to deal honestly with the sensitive topic of how Muslims in (‘The Calf’) 16: CXXXIII (Yusuf Ali America are treated is obvious. Yet somehow the programme was gut- 1991). Some modern less, a well-intentioned but empty polemic made by well-meaning people Jewish scholars have appalled by, but too nice, to know how to react to, such a horrific event. contended that the Biblical text ‘does not ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ would have been more effective if it had tackled the seem to support the events of September 11 head on. Perhaps it would have been more honest notion of a necessary, if it had shown how honest and patriotic police, military and intelligence ongoing enmity’ between Arabs and officers had tried desperately to warn their superiors that something Jews (Zucker 1990). dreadful was about to happen, but had been ignored. Perhaps it might 16. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, have shown how ordinary Arabs, appalled by the attack, offered their sym- The West Wing, 3: I. pathy to westerners living in their countries. Or, perhaps, it was simply too 17. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, early and too painful to deal with the issue fully. The West Wing, 3: I. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ is so desperate to be even-handed that it does not know what to do with itself and flounders even as it gets under way. The episode begins with a security alert at the White House. Everybody is locked in and a group of visiting high-school students is taken to the base- ment cafeteria. Here the character Josh Lyman and other staff members lead the students through what is essentially a classroom lesson on terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. The episode’s intention is to teach, not entertain. While this impromptu civics class is going on, the security services are interrogating a Muslim White House staffer who has the same name as a wanted terrorist. The fictional chief of staff, Leo McGarry, sits in on the interrogation and is quite hostile. Josh tells the students that the security problems are due to extremists, but explains that he does not mean ordinary Muslims. He writes on the blackboard: ‘Islamic extremism is to Islam as ___ is to Christianity.’16 He fills in the space with the letters ‘KKK’, the initials of the Ku Klux Klan and says:

‘It’s the Klan gone medieval and global. It couldn’t have less to do with Islamic men and women of faith of whom there are millions and millions. Muslims defend this country in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, National Guard, Police and Fire Department.’17

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18. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, Later, a student asks staffer Sam Seabourne: The West Wing, 3: I. And what do you call a country where ‘What do you call a society that has to just live every day with the idea that Israeli tanks arrive at the pizza place you are eating in could blow up without any warning?’ 4 a.m. to blow up your ‘Israel,’ Sam answers.18 house? It was not a question anybody asked, or answered. Ultimately, the only answer that Josh, Sam and the others can offer the 19. Armstrong describes students is pluralism, the pious notion that people will stop being fanatics fundamentalism as if they are confronted with a variety of religious, political, ethical and ‘an embattled faith moral options. Alas, history has shown that it is precisely to such things (that) sees itself 19 fighting for survival in that religious fundamentalists are opposed. The attempt in ‘Isaac and a hostile world. This Ishmael’ to offer a rational, pluralistic, even-handed solution to the prob- effects and sometimes lem of global terrorism is what makes the episode so weak. As The West distorts vision.’ She argues that Australian commented: fundamentalism can sometimes be seen as This balanced, non-inflammatory approach to the terrorist attacks makes it a rational and even modernizing response a stillborn drama – preachy, self-important and pulling its punches so often to particular social that it’s hardly surprising the episode has…angered both left and right in and historical develop- the US. ments and that it does not necessarily lead to (Naglazas 2001) fanaticism and violence. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was shown with Arabic subtitles in the United Arab ‘Fundamentalist faith, be it Jewish, Christian Emirates on Orbit’s America Plus satellite channel early in 2003, eighteen or Muslim, fails […] if months after the attack on New York. By this time the war in Afghanistan it becomes a theology had been fought and the invasion of Iraq was on everybody’s minds. Thus, of rage or hatred’ (Armstrong 2001: ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ had lost the immediate significance it had when it was 322). However, as transmitted to a domestic US audience, but was now being seen in the Huntington notes, in United Arab Emirates against a background of even more troubled his discussion of the twentieth-century US–Arab relations. In the intervening period the attack had been endlessly Islamic resurgence: debated in the Arabic and English-language media in many countries. ‘[…] religions give Students from Zayed University were involved in these debates as well. In people identity by positing a basic mid 2003, Abu Dhabi Television hosted a live satellite debate between stu- distinction between dents of Zayed University and the Higher Colleges of Technology in Abu believers and non- Dhabi and James Zogby and Thomas Friedman in New York.20 believers, between a superior in-group and Critical thinking is one of the learning outcomes emphasized across a different and Zayed University’s curriculum and a number of staff in the university’s inferior out-group.’ seminar department decided that, with careful preparation, the episode This makes it easier to justify acts against could be shown to students as a stimulus for debate about global issues. non-believers The students involved were new to the university, mostly straight out of (Huntington 1996). school and with, in some cases, a limited command of English. The semi- 20. The debate was nar instructors discussed the episode with students before it was shown shown on Abu Dhabi and afterwards reinforced this by distributing a written outline of the TV as a follow-up to Friedman’s episode, a summary of its contents and an explanation of its intentions. programme ‘The The instructors explained to the class that it was an attempt to highlight the Roots of 9/11,’ which problems caused by stereotyping people because of their religion and race. was aired in the United States on the At this point there was only curiosity from the class, but as soon as the Discovery Channel on episode got under way, there was a discernable negative reaction from 26 March 2003. some students. This appeared to be caused by the debate about the nature of Islam begun by Josh. Students began to call out that Islam was being insulted and Arabs attacked. A handful of the most vociferous students

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left. Those students who stayed said that they understood and applauded the episode’s intentions. Clearly, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was well intended and tried to be sympathetic to ordinary Muslims caught up in larger events. It laboured the point that ordinary Muslims should not be equated with terrorists. However, in order to understand this, students would have to have watched the entire programme and listened carefully to the dialogue. Instead, it appears that the instant the subject of Islam was broached, some students felt they were being insulted and began the protest that led to the walkout. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was not screened to test the students’ reactions, but as part of their normal exposure to other ideas and discussions of global issues. However, the way the students reacted prompted a number of questions and led to the programme being evaluated by their instructors. It also led to the decision to seek a reaction to the Palestinian story arc when it was aired. Was the students’ reaction to ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ the result of religious over-sensitivity, a reaction to the crisis in Iraq and a general anti-American feeling, or because they were simply unwilling to believe that an American programme could attempt to be even-handed? Some time later, a small group of students asked to see the episode as part of a group project. These students were generally better academically and had a higher level of English. They reported positively on ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ and discussed the episode in a way that showed that they had understood its intentions. However, it was decided not to show the episode again. I believe that the reaction to the programme was affected by the students’ level of English, their willingness (or ability) to listen to another point of view and their exposure to western ideas. Reaction from Arabic and Muslim seminar staff was mixed. One female staff member, an American who had converted to Islam, said that she did not like the episode because of its slick presentation, use of stereotypes and what she called its ‘We know all about this’ attitude. Others felt the episode was fair, but that some students were too politically unsophisti- cated to grasp its intentions. A number of the seminar faculty watched the episode later without students present. They suggested that it contained a number of points that may have acted as triggers for the negative reaction of the students. These included:

• The use of the Hebrew ‘Ishmael’ instead of the Arabic ‘Ismail’. Sensitive Muslims would interpret this as a subtle indication of bias. • The use of the word ‘Islamics’, instead of Muslims. ‘Islamics’ is not a word they recognized. Islamists are Muslims with a particular political agenda. • They found the analogy with the Ku Klux Klan offensive. They pointed out that contrary to what Josh Lyman says, fundamentalist Christians do carry out murders in the United States on such targets as abortion clinics. • The use of the term ‘medieval’. They point out that organizations like Al-Qaeda are very much part of modernity. • The reference to women not being allowed to attend soccer matches in Afghanistan under the Taliban. They felt this trivialized more important questions about the denial to Afghani women of the right to education and work.

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21. As Roger Scruton • The name of the Muslim character, Rakeem Ali, is not a proper Arabic (2002: 128) puts it: name. They suggested that it might be a name derived from the ‘[…] the techniques and infrastructure on American ‘Black Muslim’ movement, the Nation of Islam. which Al Qa’eda • There are two references to the Holocaust that could be taken as equat- depends are the gifts ing Muslims with Nazis. of the new global institutions. It is Wall • They said the reference to the Hashashins was historically incorrect, Street and Zurich that simplistic and ignored the extremely complicated circumstances from produced the which the group emerged. They felt that Brutus’s murder of Caesar networks of 21 international finances would have been a far better example. that enables Osama bin Laden to conceal ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was clearly not written for our students, but intention- his wealth and to deploy it anywhere in ally or not, they are part of The West Wing’s international market. Because of the world. It is its inconsistencies and its insistence on choosing a particular, limited view- Western enterprise point, it failed to connect with some of the very people outside the United […] that produces the technology that bin States who needed to understand that, however clumsily, a sincere effort was Laden has exploited being made to show an America that rejected prejudice and violence. so effectively against The West Wing ended its fifth season with a series of stories showing us.’ President Bartlett bringing the Israeli and Palestinian leadership together 22. ‘Gaza’, The West Wing, for peace talks at Camp David. Despite the strenuous objections of his 5: XXI. chief of staff, Bartlett succeeds. This story arc continued at the beginning of Season 6. It was shown on Orbit after Yasser Arafat’s death, which gave it a strange atmosphere, since the Palestinian leader in The West Wing was clearly meant to be him. The story arc begins with a group of American politicians, including, for some reason, the character Admiral Fitzwallace and Donna Moss, Josh Lyman’s secretary, touring Gaza. A mine explodes and destroys one of their vehicles. Admiral Fitzwallace is killed and Donna is seriously injured. The Israelis surround Palestinian leader Chairman Farad’s compound, Josh flies to the American base in Germany to which Donna has been evacuated and President Bartlett decides that the only solution is to stop the Palestinians and Israelis fighting each other. It is clear from the beginning that as with ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, the scriptwriters had decided that they must be fair and even-handed. Having Donna along on the fact-finding mission allows her – the sweet, blonde, slightly goofy girl from the Mid-West – to ask questions and receive highly simplified answers about the situation in the Occupied Territories. Some examples:

Israeli soldier: ‘It’s an Israeli’s most sacred duty. Nothing I will ever do is more important…’ Donna: ‘Colin [the Irish photographer] says you have strong feelings about serving here.’ Israeli soldier: ‘Is no good. Gaza… 7500 settlers surrounded by 1.3 million Palestinians who do not wish them here and we in the middle.’ Donna: ‘In Israel there’s talk of giving up these settlements?’ Female settler: ‘God wants us in this place. It is our divine, moral obligation to be here.’ Her husband: ‘If we give in to the Arabs they’ll take more and more and we’ll all end up in Tel Aviv. And then they’ll take that.’22

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Much of what Donna learns is picked up from an Irish photographer sym- 23. ‘Memorial’, The West pathetic to the Palestinian cause. Donna is blown up shortly after she has Wing, 5: XXII. sex with him. 24. ‘NSF Thurmont’, The President Bartlett, driven by guilt over the death of Fitzwallace and West Wing, 6: I. Donna’s near-fatal injuries, decides to bring peace to the region. His chief of staff, Leo McGarry (played by the late John Spencer, who bore an uncanny resemblance to Donald Rumsfeld) strenuously opposes his efforts. The McGarry character has been portrayed earlier as pro-Israeli and was the one interrogating the Muslim suspect in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. Leo’s opposition, however, is shown as stemming as much from his fear that Bartlett will fail, as anything else. Screened in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, this story arc draws on a number of elements outside the immediately obvious one of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. In Donna’s injuries there are clear links with the case of Private Jessica Lynch, the American soldier captured by the Iraqis, subsequently rescued and then exploited by the Bush administration (Takacs 2005). In The West Wing story arc, the character of Donna is similarly used as an emotional prop to justify the hostile reactions of Josh and Leo. Bartlett’s new intelligence advisor, Kate Harper, takes a neutral, or even pro-Palestinian stance. However, she is constantly rebutted by Leo:

Leo: ‘This isn’t the UN. He’s not the Secretary General. He’s President of the United States, and our job is to make sure his priorities are clear. Today’s priority is not world peace.’23

The story arc continues at the beginning of Season 6, with Leo still argu- ing violently with Bartlett, demanding that he take action against the fictional terrorist group responsible for the mining of the convoy, the Sons of the Sword.

Leo: ‘Mr President, please, Congress, the Joint Chiefs, the American public, your own staff, EVERYONE disagrees with your assessment of this situation.’ Bartlett: ‘Killing Palestinians isn’t going to make us feel safer. They’ll kill more of us, then we’ll have to kill more of them. It’s Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun.’ Leo: ‘We can’t allow terrorists to murder our citizens…’ Bartlett: ‘Why would they do it? Why would Palestinians murder American government officials they never have before? They’re deliberately provoking us, Leo. They know we have to retaliate. They’ve studied us. They want us to over- react. This isn’t over-reacting. It’s the appropriate, balanced […]’ Bartlett: ‘Tell me how this ends, Leo. You want me to start something that will have serious repercussions on American foreign policy for decades, but you don’t know how it ends.’ Leo: ‘We don’t always KNOW how it ends. The Lincoln will be in position in a few hours and then you are going to have to give the go-ahead for the bombings.’ Bartlett: ‘Or what?’24

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25. As we shall see, at Bartlett manages to convince the Palestinians and Israelis to come to least one member of America and once they have landed safely he orders the US military to the Abu Dhabi audience who destroy a camp belonging to the faction that mined the convoy. Thus the watched this episode scriptwriters manage to present him as a peacemaker, but one who is pre- disagreed with me pared to blow people up to make them peaceful. This reflects what Haine completely on this point. (2003) calls: 26. As yet another indicator of the The specific and ambiguous American way of dealing with world problems omnipresence of [which] combines the privilege of power and the innocence of ideals […] [the] American television permanent ingredients of American exceptionalism. in a global culture, the audience watched the programmes on However, while the script shows Bartlett trying desperately to make the perfectly copied DVDs Israelis and Palestinians talk and even sacrifice his friendship with Leo, the from a beautifully presented boxed set images on the screen tell a different story. The depiction of the Palestinians bought for a few and Israelis at the peace talks is revealing. Both sides arrive on a Friday dollars in a Shanghai and on the Muslim holy day and the eve of the Jewish one, both delega- market. tions pray. The Jews, however, are seen sitting around a table, in the light, looking relaxed and civilized. The Palestinians are shown praying outside in the gathering dark, against a background of tangled undergrowth. The dichotomy could not be clearer. Here are the civilized Israelis, ready, however reluctantly, to talk and out there in the wild woods are the Palestinians, afraid to come in to the light.25 The light, of course, comes from President Bartlett. Bartlett succeeds in bringing the two sides together, but by then the focus of the story has switched to the clash between Bartlett and Leo, who has a heart attack while wandering, dis- traught after an argument with the President, in the woods around Camp David. With peace at hand the audience is free to ignore the Palestinians and Israelis and concentrate on Leo’s recovery and the run-up to the election that dominates the rest of the season. One can be quite cynical about the intentions of this four-part story and it can be shown to have all sorts of barely hidden resonances with contemporary events. However, when shown to different groups of people in Abu Dhabi, the response was far more positive than for ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ and certainly more positive than expected. One of the viewers had been in the original group of the Zayed University faculty who watched ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. Another is of Palestinian descent. Also included were another American convert to Islam, a Somali and a Yemeni woman. The audience was typical of the diverse population of Abu Dhabi.26 The response to the programme was quite positive. There were questions about where some of the ‘Palestinian’ actors really came from, but the general feeling was that an effort had been made to present both sides of the story. The fact that the Palestinian side was presented by the character Kate Harper was certainly noted. The audience was certainly more positive towards the way issues were presented than the group that watched ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. One of the viewers said that the depiction of the Muslims and Jews praying at sunset had not seemed divisive to her, but had shown how much the two religions had in common. The response to the Gaza story arc differed from that to the ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ episode largely, I think, because the audience was older, largely western-educated and more aware of political realities and knew how to

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read an American media discourse. This does not necessarily mean that they accepted the parameters of that discourse, but they were able to put it into context and draw their own, often oppositional, meaning from it. One must also admit the simple fact that when you have four episodes in which to deal with a complex situation, the results are invariably better than when you try to cram everything into the 44 minutes of script that American commercial networks allow. The Gaza cycle may therefore be described, however warily, as a more successful attempt to deal with international episodes than any of its previous episodes. Perhaps the most measured response came from the Palestinian viewer. It is worth quoting at length:

If I was asked to describe the four episodes of the fifth and sixth seasons of The West Wing in one word, that word would be ‘real’. Of course real in a sense that it was like it would appear to me on TV from watching the news. That does not in any way imply that it being ‘real’ means that the reality of the situations portrayed is good, just that it’s real and it happened, and it will keep on happening until someone comes to their senses. The sad part about all this is that the majority of Arabs, or people of the Middle East, believe in conspiracy theories and that the West is working in conjunction with Israel to get ‘us’. There is no conspiracy theory; there are only agendas, and no hidden ones. I think that the producers/writers made a great effort for these episodes to be balanced […] too balanced actually. I don’t think that the Palestinian and the Israeli parties would have been too easily fooled with ‘promises’ and ‘deals’ made with the American government. I also think that great effort was made to show the greatness of Judaism and Islam as religions. The scenes where the Palestinian government officials are performing the ‘Salla’ while the American president and his entourage were invited to celebrate the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath by the Israeli Prime Minister showed how similar everyone, and everything is. I thought that was great. As a Palestinian, I’m usually ashamed of how Arabs and specifically Palestinians are portrayed in western movies. I was not ashamed while watching the four episodes. I was pleased to see that there were two sides to the whole story, which makes it a lot easier for the next ‘Joe Blow’ on any of the streets of the US or Israel to understand that there are sane people on the other side who simply ask for the minimum of their rights to live.

References Armstrong, K. (2001), The Battle for God, New York: Ballantine Books. BBC Online (2001), ‘West Wing terror show criticised’, 4 October. —— (2002), ‘Saudi police “stopped” fire rescue’, 15 March. Cooper, R. (1997), ‘Is there a New World Order?’, in G. Mulgan (ed.), Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century, London: Fontana/Demos. Craciun, C. (2004), ‘Teaching Political Science at the Movies,’ paper presented to the EPSNET plenary conference, Prague. Fattah, M. (2006), Democratic Values in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Reiner.

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Fukuyama, F. (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin. Gans-Boriskin, R. and Tisinger, R. (2005), ‘The Bushlet Administration: Terrorism and War on The West Wing’, The Journal of American Culture, 28: 1. Gladstone-Sovell, T. and Wilkerson, W. (2002), ‘Inclusion, Education and Avoidance: The prime time response to September 11’, Harvard Symposium: Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism. Haine, J.-Y. (2003), ‘The Imperial moment: A European view’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16: 3. Holbert, R.L., Pillion, O., Tschida, D.A., Armfield, G.G., Kinder, K., Cherry, K.L. and Daulton, A.R. (2003), ‘The West Wing as endorsement of the US Presidency: Expanding the bounds of priming in political communication’, Journal of Communication, 53: 3. Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster. Jones, R. (2004), ‘Scripting a Tragedy: The Isaac and Ishmael episode of The West Wing as Parable’, in Popular Communication, 2: 1. Kayyali, R. (2006), The Arab Americans, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Leo, J. (2002), ‘Left Side Story’, US News and World Report, 7 October. MacMillan, Margaret (2002), The Peacemakers, London: John Murray. McKissack, F. (2000), ‘The West Wing is not a Wet Dream’, Progressive, May. Mulgan, G. (ed.) (1997), Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century, London: Fontana/Demos. Naglazas, M. (2001), ‘Lame Duck West Wing’, in The West Australian, 16 October. Oliver, R. (2001), ‘A contemplative time for The West Wing: Egos set aside as real life events hit home’, in The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October. Poniewozik, J. (2001), ‘West Wing: Terrorism 101’, Time, 4 October. Robie, D. (1998), ‘From Monicagate to Mahathir’, Wansolwara, 3: 4. Rollins, P. and O’Connor J. (eds) (2003), The West Wing: The American Presidency as Television Drama, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Sardar, Z. and Davies, M. (2003), Why Do People Hate America? Cambridge: Icon. Scruton, R. (2002), The West and the Rest, London: Continuum. Shaheen, J. (1984), The TV Arabs, Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press. Shafik, V. (1998), Arab Cinema, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. Shales, T. (2001), ‘The West Wing assumes the role of moral compass’, The New York Post, 5 October. Sheffield, R. (2000), ‘President Sheen and the politics of TV’, Rolling Stone, 7 December. Sorkin, A. (2002), The West Wing Script Book, New York: Newmarket Press. Stuttaford, A. (2003), ‘The President of the Left’, National Review, 24 March. Takacs, S. (2005), ‘Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity’, Feminist Media Studies, 5: 3. The Economist (2002a), ‘Unreality TV’, 6 July. —— (2002b), ‘You’ve got trouble’, 30 November. —— (2003), ‘The one where Pooh goes to Washington’, 5 April. The New American Bible (1971), Catholic Biblical Association of America/Thomas Nelson: Nashville.

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Wood, D. (2001), ‘Act II: Hollywood waves the flag – and is redeemed’, Christian Science Monitor, 21 December. Yusuf Ali, Abdullah (1991), The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, Brentwood, MD: Amana. Zucker, D.J. (1990), ‘Conflicting Conclusions: The hatred of Isaac and Ishmael’, Judaism, 39: 1.

Television programmes and films The West Wing A sample of episodes dealing with the Arab world and other international issues. ‘Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc’ (Season 1: episode II) Syria ‘A Proportional Response’ (1: II) Syria ‘The State Dinner’ (1: VII) Indonesia ‘Lord John Marbury’ (1: II) United Kingdom, India, Pakistan ‘The Portland Trip’ (2: VII) Iraq ‘Shibboleth’ (2: VIII) China ‘Galileo’ (2: IX) Russia ‘The War at Home’ (2: XIV) Colombia ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ (The ‘9/11 special’) ‘On the Day Before’ (3: IV) Israel ‘Gone Quiet’ (3: VI) North Korea ‘The Women of Qumar’ (3: VIII) Qumar, a fictional Arabian Gulf country ‘Hartsfield’s Landing’ (3: XIV) China/Taiwan ‘Enemies Foreign and Domestic’ (3: XIX) Saudi Arabia ‘We Killed Yamamoto’ (3: XXI) Qumar ‘Posse Comitataus’ (3: XXII) Qumar ‘20 Hours in America’ (4: I) Qumar ‘College Kids’ (4: II) Qumar ‘The Red Mass’ (4: III) Qumar ‘Debate camp’ (4: IV) Qumar ‘Swiss Diplomacy’ (4: IX) Iran/Switzerland ‘Twenty Five’ (4:XXIII) Qumar ‘7A WF83429’ (5: I) Qumar ‘Dogs of War’ (5: II) Qumar ‘Han’ (5: IV) North Korea ‘Battlefield Earth’ (5: X) Saudi Arabia ‘The Usual Suspects’ (5: XIII) Israel/Iran ‘Gaza’ (5: XXI) Palestine/Israel ‘Memorial’ (5: XXII) ‘NSF Thurmont’ (6: I) ‘The Birman Woods’ (6: II) ‘Third Day Story’ (6: III) ‘The Dover Test’ (6: VI)

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The American President Written by Aaron Sorkin, directed by Rob Reiner, starring Michael Douglas and Martin Sheen. Viewed now, this seems like a feeble pilot for The West Wing. The same characters are there, albeit with different names, and Martin Sheen plays the Leo McGarry role. Many ideas, incidents and some dialogue were recycled for the first season of the television series.

Websites http://westwing.bewarne.com This is the ultimate West Wing site, compiled by people who are truly fanatical about the show. http://www.televisionwithoutpity.com For unfettered discussion and vituperation about The West Wing and other cult programmes.

Suggested citation Cass, P. (2007), ‘The never-ending story: Palestine, Israel and The West Wing’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 31–46, doi: 10.1386/ jammr.1.1.31/1

Contributor details Philip Cass is Assistant Dean in the College of Communications and Media Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. A former journalist, he has worked in Australia, the Pacific, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. A specialist in Pacific media history, he has also published on the media in the Middle East and is interested in the connections between the two regions. Contact: Zayed University, P.O. Box 4783, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.47/1 Reverse glocalization? Marketing a Turkish cola in the shadow of a giant

Christine L. Ogan Indiana University Filiz Çiçek Indiana University Yesim Kaptan Indiana University

Abstract Keywords In the summer of 2003, a Turkish confectionery and cookie company glocalization launched a major television advertising campaign through the Young & identity Rubicam agency in Istanbul. The goal of the campaign was to compete aggres- gender sively with the market leaders, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, by adopting some of nationalism the strategies used by those colas in dominating the world’s soft-drink sales commodification and reversing those strategies to suit the Turkish consumers. This study com- advertising bines textual analysis of the primary television advertisements for Cola Turka Turkey along with interviews with two of the account managers for the campaign. The analysis is based on the concept of glocalization of the national, gender and sports themes of the campaign. In appealing to potential consumers of the soft drink, the advertisers exploit the local cultural stereotypes to convince the audience that those who adopt the product will achieve the American dream – to become Turkish. American actors, including Chevy Chase, are used in that effort as they try to live out that dream by adopting Turkish customs, eating Turkish foods and following Turkish soccer stars. Advertising agency executives denied they created anti-American themes, though one of the commercials suggests that if US soldiers drank Cola Turka, they would abandon their goal to win the war in Iraq. The authors argue that the commoditization of nation-making practices has wide implications and real-world effects on public opinion.

When the creative people at Young & Rubicam in Istanbul were visited by the representatives from Ülker, a Turkish confectionery and cookie company that produces a range of food products for domestic and international markets, with an idea for creating and marketing a cola to compete with Coke and Pepsi in the domestic market, the agency was concerned about how they would position this product. After all, Coke then controlled 70 per cent of the Turkish cola market, while Pepsi held 17 per cent, and all the other colas took up the remainder. Where could a new Turkish cola fit and how could it possibly compete, they wondered. The first problem they needed to address was what to call the new cola. Ülker already sold a soft drink called Çamlica, so Çamlica Cola was an option. Using the company’s name and labelling it Ülker Cola was also a

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1. Alaturka, meaning possibility. Focus group research that tested out the two names along with ‘the Turkish way’, is a the Cola of Turkey (which distinguished it from the American Coke and common phrase used in Turkish to show it Pepsi brands) appealed to most of the focus group members. That idea was is not the ‘western’ refashioned slightly to become Cola Turka.1 way (alafranga). So From there Young & Rubicam turned to the problem of positioning Cola Turka represented a the soft drink and settled on an approach of ‘positive nationalism’, Turkish-style cola that according to Yasemin Sümer, who was an account manager at the time. was not Coke or the After brainstorming advertising concepts every evening for two weeks, American cola. the group came up with a list of Turkish cultural stereotypes that carried 2. We chose not to a positive connotation. These traits were then turned into a set of humor- examine the many additional ous commercials that juxtaposed Cola Turka and its Turkish cultural commercials that roots against the United States and its cultural icons, Coke and Pepsi. merely contained And just as they thought coke that was associated with the American images of the Cola Turka can accompa- dream and youth culture, the advertising campaign was meant to be nied by a jingle or associated with the Turkish dream. ‘Those who drink Cola Turka will other very short aspire to be Turkish and they will also adopt Turkish cultural features,’ messages. said Eda Gökkan, who headed the Cola Turka account at Young & Rubicam. As Williamson (1978: 13) said, advertising campaigns are made so that people learn to ‘identify themselves with what they consume’ instead of what they produce. So in the campaign, which Sümer described as one that was ‘the antithesis of Coke’, the goal was to get consumers to identify themselves with drinking Cola Turka and becoming Turkish – rather than continuing to drink Coke or Pepsi and being like Americans. The advertising campaign, which featured a mix of American and Turkish actors, a blend of US and Turkish settings, and a combination of English and Turkish, rolled out on eleven channels at precisely 9 p.m. on 5 July 2003 – the same day that coincidentally eleven Turkish soldiers were captured by the American military in northern Iraq to the anger of the Turkish government. And though the campaign was never meant to be anti-American, and Ülker insisted on keeping political statements out of the text, Gökkan admitted that the ads were trying to sell Turkish imperialism.

Focus of the study The advertising campaign can be considered from several perspectives. Because many of the ads focus on or exploit national cultural stereotypes, we chose to examine the national and gender identity issues contained in the messages. Because the ads also played off Turkish culture and language against American culture and language, we simultaneously analysed their hybrid nature. The global/local nexus was at the heart of this study. To some extent the advertising professionals who created the television commercials for this campaign were aware of the images they created within the messages, but that awareness did not extend to any commercial’s entirety. The following is an analysis of the themes and content of the major Cola Turka television commercials from 2003–06 in the context of the stated goals of the two advertising agencies involved in their creation.2 It is based on textual analysis of the commercials themselves and also on the interviews conducted with two of the account managers most involved with their production.

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The first Cola Turka ads and their significance The first set of commercials to introduce the new cola were created in New York City and featured Chevy Chase and other American actors. The agency wanted to create a campaign that was the ‘antithesis of Coke’, said Sümer. The notion of ‘positive nationalism’ resulted in a series of ideas that incorporated a number of Turkish cultural stereotypes, ones that most all Turks would find endearing. In the reversal of cultural adoption of western things, the American actors were selected to play out their parts in aspiring to adopt Turkish culture – including the adoption of the new cola, a product that represented the best of this culture. Chevy Chase was selected because he was well known in Turkey as an American father figure from the series of films on vacation themes. The actor selected to portray his wife in the commercials resembled his wife in those films (and the agency specifically requested that she look like Beverly D’Angelo, the actress who played Chase’s wife in those films). David Brown was also featured in several of these ads. Each ad featured common Turkish cultural practices. The first two ads are framed like a feature-length film with a title and credits. The opening scene presented the image of the Statue of Liberty on the screen. The camera pans around it, presenting New York City with the bilingual title ‘New York’ta Bir Morning’ (‘One Morning in New York’). This could be the opening of a Hollywood movie, complete with a production credit on the top section of the screen, right above the Statue of Liberty’s head. We then move on to the scene where Chevy Chase first appears on the screen, and the credit ‘Starring Chevy Chase’ continues the movie format. Various camera cuts to images and people in New York’s Times Square, and Chase’s confused face indicates that there is a story unfolding here. The Turks waving Turkish flags as they drive by Chase in an American pick-up truck shouting ‘Ole ole ole, sampiyon Türkiye’ enhances the confusion and intrigue in the upcoming story. The yardimci (also starring) is David Brown, who is a part of the story. As the dialogue, moves back and forth between English and Turkish, subtitles flash on the screen when actors speak in English. In the next scene, Chevy Chase walks into a diner in the Times Square area and is greeted by David Brown, who asks about his ‘yenge’ (‘wife’). After a few sentences that use half Turkish and half English and make several references to a Turkish soccer team and one of its stars, Brown real- izes that the reason Chevy Chase has no idea what is going on is related to what he is drinking – coffee instead of Cola Turka. But this ad takes the story only so far as Chase never drinks the Cola and leaves in confusion as Brown tells him to ‘kiss çoluk çocuk’ and to ‘say hello to yenge’ (‘kiss his kids and family and say hello to his wife’). We are told that more of this story is to come at the end when the message on the screen states ‘To be devam edecek (continued)’. The second ad continues the story – or the sequel to the first film – when Chase drives up to his suburban home and walks in the door to find his wife making a popular Turkish main dish, stuffed peppers. When he asks what she is doing, she responds that she is making ‘biber dolmasi’ (‘the peppers’) for ‘kayinvalide and kayinpeder’ (‘his in-laws’) who are coming for dinner. Chase is now thoroughly confused. Later we see a scene of the family and grandparents at dinner. Everyone but Chase has a glass of Cola

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3. According to Yasar Turka in hand and is singing ‘Take me out to the ball game’ (a popular Özturk, a TRT news American baseball song). Upon sipping their Cola Turka the family break anchor who lived in 3 exile in Switzerland into a Turkish patriotic song. Only when Chase himself tries the drink after the 1980 coup does he get it as he smiles and joins in singing the Turkish song. Later the d’état in Turkey, Dag in-laws depart and the younger members of the family kiss the hands of Basini Duman Almis (the song Chase and the grandparents; water is thrown after the car as it departs, (both Turkish the family sing) is in cultural practices) and at the end Chevy Chase turns to face the camera as reality a Swedish folk a transformed man complete with the stereotypically Turkish moustache. tune. A scholar, who studied in Switzerland These and other commercials in the series reverse the usual approach after the establishment in media produced in developing countries. Instead of adopting behaviours of Turkish Republic in to become more western, the westerners are adopting behaviours and 1923, brought the song with him back using products produced in Turkey in order to become more Turkish, an to Turkey and wrote identity that most people in the commercial aspire to. Part of the jingle Turkish lyrics to it. If calls the Cola ‘the famous American dream’ and says that those who drink correct, this gives us yet another example it become ‘Turkified’. At the end of Chase’s moustached transformation for successful Turkish the singer tells us that once he became Turkified, there was no hybridization of a Americanness left in him. The short film ends by announcing this as ‘the foreign product, a song in this case, still mutlu end’ (‘happy ending’). In another commercial a man in a Turkish much like Cola Turka. bath is teaching David Brown to sing a variation on the jingle, ‘Let them come to Turkey. Let them see where Cola is. Let them drink Cola Turka. America’s dream. Let them drink Cola Turka.’ The Cola Turka advertising campaign attracted national and international attention for several months. Many observers misinterpreted the messages and the cola itself as being anti-American – largely because of the timing of its release and the disagreements that the Turkish government had with the United States over Turkey’s role in the Iraq war. Coincidentally, other Middle Eastern countries had also introduced colas to compete with Pepsi and Coke around the same time. Mecca Cola and Arab Cola were created to fight the American brands while Iran makes a soft drink called Zam Zam that is likened to holy water from Mecca. All of these soft drinks made claims at promoting their products to combat American imperialism and/or Zionism. Representatives from Young & Rubicam (where the account was initiated) and Alametifarika (where the account moved in January 2004 when the chief executive officer at Young & Rubicam left with fourteen others to form a new independent advertising agency) agreed that Cola Turka was not created to express either an anti-American or a pro-Muslim attitude. Because the Ülker company has Muslim roots (the owner is a devout Muslim) and the profits from the products are perceived to go to support Islamic causes, a percentage of the population always buys Ülker products and another percentage of the population will never buy Ülker products, said Sümer. For that reason the agency wanted to distance the campaign and Cola Turka from Islamic connections. Though the goal of the campaign may not have been distinctly anti-American or pro-Muslim, many viewers and our own analysis do not accept that the outcome achieved that goal.

Glocalization and hybridity The concept of ‘glocalization’ likely arose because companies selling products around the world found that the single advertising campaign for all markets did not work very effectively in certain cultures. The message

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(visual or textual) may not have carried the same meaning as intended. So to effectively market the global product – whether it was automobiles or tennis shoes, a process of adaptation occurred. The actual term ‘glocalization’ was developed by businessmen in Japan and was later described by Roland Robertson in an edited volume called Global Modernities (Ohmae 1990; Robertson 1995). As Maynard (2003: 60) describes it, ‘glocalization is sometimes reported to be a reaction to globalization, or a reinforcement of cultural identity at the local community level’. Robertson sees it as an ‘interpenetration’ of the global and the local. But the way the concept is generally applied relates to marketing a product produced by a multinational corporation by appealing to local cultural cues. So McDonald’s sells no pork in Saudi Arabia, a teriyaki McBurger in Japan, and Curry Pie in Hong Kong. And Ikea makes furniture smaller when it is sold in Japan and Hong Kong because people live in smaller spaces (Baker and Sterenberg 2002). And Google offers its search engine in China minus the availability of sites found offensive by the Chinese government. The company may also alter its advertising messages. For example, Nescafe uses local citizens in its ads in India but places the actors in international settings. Coca-Cola and Colgate-Palmolive issue a prototype ad with instructions for acceptable changes by the media in the local market (Milovanovic 1997: 72). But when we refer to glocalization for the Cola Turka ad campaign, the process is flipped. Though Ülker markets to a large number of countries, it is not a global company in the way that Nike or Coke or Pepsi are. And the vast majority of people in the world will never taste Cola Turka. Ülker only dreams about this level of distribution of its products. The advertising campaigns are aimed at Turks and use the New York/American setting and the combination of English and Turkish to pretend that Americans are dying to drink Cola Turka with aspirations of becoming cosmopolitan and cool (in Turkish cultural terms) by drinking this new beverage. The irony is that they are using a western vehicle (the Hollywood film) with American actors (Chevy Chase and David Brown, etc.) and an American product (a cola) to send that message to the Turks. The double articulation of Americans aspiring to be Turkish within their own geographic and cultural framework diminishes the value of the Cola Turka product some- what, because it suggests that Cola Turka, like the Hollywood film, the US setting and the product it copied can be reduced to mere imitation of the US original. And the Turkifying attempts simultaneously validate Coca- Cola and America at the very moment that they try to undermine both. Hence the simultaneous presentation of cola (kola is the actual Turkish spelling) and turka, (not even originally Turkish, rather coming from the French word a la torque). Thus, the translation is: I am an American product that pretends to be Turkish. Garcia Canclini (1997) named this process ‘cultural reconversion’, whereby local cultures adapt to global influences without being destroyed because tradition is rearticulated in the modern processes. Here the traditional cultural practices are played out through the use of the Hollywood film format with Hollywood icon Chevy Chase playing the lead actor, as if to legitimize the local campaign and the looking to the West. The advertising campaign associated with Cola Turka is glocalized but aims not to sell a

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global product within the context of a local market. Instead it aims to lend prestige to the product by associating it with the people and the cultural features of a global power. Kraidy (1999) points out that since all contemporary cultures are hybrid we need to accept that if we are to ‘understand the micro-politics of local/global interactions’. In his view, ‘hybridity is thus construed not as an in-between zone where global/local power relations are neutralized in the fuzziness of the mélange but as a zone of symbolic ferment where power relations are surreptitiously re-inscribed’ (Kraidy 1999: 460). This seems to be exactly what is occurring in the interpenetration of US (global) and Turkish (local) culture and the marketing of Cola Turka through these television commercials.

Gender issues in the glocalization process When asked why a female was never chosen for any of the Cola Turka ads, Eda Gökkan said, ‘We never looked for an actress. If the product were a detergent we would have used a woman. Those things that belong to everybody are represented by males […] It wouldn’t be that impressive […] It wouldn’t be that strong.’ Thus Young & Rubicam defined Cola Turka as masculine in gender. In the 28 different Cola Turka commercials we analysed, the lead characters were almost always male. Females appear as co-leads in two of them and a total of 10 women play in supporting roles (compared to 30 males). Two commercials that feature women in lead roles take place indoors in domestic settings, presenting women as grand- mothers, mothers, wives and daughters. Even then there are no single leading females: women are portrayed in a collective, family setting and they share the lead roles with other women. Moreover, the way in which the women are portrayed furthers the masculine identity of Cola Turka. In the first commercial, unlike her celebrity male counterpart, an unknown actress plays Chase’s wife. Going along with traditional patriarchal Turkish family values, she is portrayed indoors, as a wife and a mother, cooking for her family. Young & Rubicam executive Gökkan explains why: ‘Women are already adaptive – hence, the woman makes the dolma.’ The indoor setting, cooking, wife-mother-daughter image all goes along with the melodramatic film format as well, which is something with which Turks have long been familiar. They have seen similar domestic scenes in films in cinemas and on their TV screens. Using a familiar film format, Cola Turka taps into the collective film-culture knowledge, which is a lot easier than creating a brand new one. Turkish melodramas feature family, more specifically masculinity, in crises. It is the man’s wife and/or children who are the ones who keep the family unit intact through difficult times. At the end of the film, the male always returns home; the patriarchal unit is always restored; and the wife/mother and children always yield to the husband/father. Gökkan confirms this notion when she further explains why they used mostly men in these commercials: ‘The head of the family is always the man […] We need to reach men because they are more stubborn – less adaptive […] Men would not pay attention to a commercial with a woman as a chief character. The household is a different matter.’ Was the agency right?

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The answer is mostly no. To better understand this issue, we will need 4. See Geert Hofstede to examine the household shopping patterns of Turks and how that (1980), Culture’s Consequences, Beverly matches up with the target audience for Turkish television commercials. Hills, CA: Sage for a Milner and Collins’s study (1998) identifies Turkey as a ‘feminine’ detailed description of country when it comes to advertising. They use Hofstede’s4 definition of his classification of countries as collectivist feminine society, which identifies non-materialistic, family-oriented soci- or individualist. eties where gender roles are distinct as feminine as opposed to masculine countries, which are more materialistic and where there is more overlap in gender roles. More specifically, Milner and Collins argue that in masculine cultures, more men are used for voice-overs and lead characters. Women are shown mostly indoors and promote those products that are considered feminine such as beauty products, cooking and cleaning items. Men are shown doing outdoor activities and in power positions. However, Milner and Collins also write that gender representation in Turkish TV commercials is more egalitarian. Based on their comparative analysis of Turkish, American, Australian and Mexican commercials, they concluded that ‘in the context of television commercials in the feminine country of Turkey, there are few differences between gender while in masculine countries these differences are quite marked’. Their study shows that 70 per cent of the people in Turkish commercials are women, which means that Turks are used to seeing more female roles in television advertising than male. This leads the authors to find that ‘the lack of significant differences among the sex role portrayal variables does suggest that the dominant approach is rather egalitarian’ (Milner and Collins 1998: 22). They advise advertisers to avoid ‘masculine values such as employment/ productivity’ and to promote feminine values, such as relationships (Milner and Collins 1998: 24). If Milner and Collins’s findings still hold for current television advertising practices in Turkey, it raises an important question about the legitimacy of Young & Rubicam’s decision to define coke as a masculine product in a feminine country and their conclusion that men would not pay attention to female leads/role models. The agency might have considered the case of the United States, a masculine country, where both Coca- Cola and Pepsi-Cola featured Britney Spears and Cindy Crawford in their TV commercials, not only for their fame but because of their feminine attributes. Instead of invoking practices of the United States as the global power, they reverted to a local stereotype based on Turkish gender relationships from the past. And despite the large number of female celebrities, the agency chose to focus on soccer players as leads in several of their commercials. But Young & Rubicam would not have been all that much different in adopting gender stereotypes in the ad campaign as found by Uray and Burnaz (2003) in their study of 314 Turkish TV commercials. In that study the authors found that women appeared in the home and promoted body products while men appeared in automobile, food/drink products and outdoor advertising. Men were used for more voice-overs and more middle-aged men appeared as lead characters while most lead women characters were young. Furthermore, Uray and Burnaz’s study identified women as the ‘important traditional buying unit’ who ‘have been keeping their dominant gender in Turkish television advertisements for the past

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ten years’ (Uray and Burnaz 2003: 85). They write that the gender representation on Turkish TV commercials has changed considerably (Uray and Burnaz 2003). Because of the increase in well-educated working women in Turkey who consequently have increased buying power, along with helping to spread the influence of western consumer values, Turkey has experienced a change in consumption and shopping patterns. They point out that even though social pressure is still there to keep traditional gender roles, ‘the impact of the changes in the demographic legal and economic environment has been felt especially in the big cities’ (Uray and Burnaz 2003: 78). Also, the influence of western consumer values along with ‘the shift from traditional large families toward small nuclear-type families’ contributed considerably to the change in shopping patterns and gender roles in Turkey (Uray and Burnaz 2003: 78). At the same time, women have taken on more responsibility in the workplace and in society generally, and they have inevitably helped to effect a change in the role of men in Turkish society as well. Women are not only identified by Durakbasa and Cindoglu (2002) as the traditional buying unit in Turkey since the 1960s but also as the taste setters of the Turkish household in all classes in Turkish culture. The rise of the new malls around the country is one of major reasons for women of all classes taking part in what is now a more individualistic and materialistic Turkish culture. According to Durakbasa and Cindoglu, the new mall provides a safe place, a sort of outside–inside in place of the çarsi or bazaar which was traditionally a masculine domain in Ottoman times. The women can stroll and shop freely in the new mall, without having a man to accompany them as they would in the old days when going to the çarsi/bazaar and without worrying about being harassed. One of the main outlets of the globalized market is the mall because it functions as a place where both men and women consumers can make regular purchases. So the mall has increased the consumer base in Turkey. If the Cola Turka ad campaign aimed to tell the West that its citizens should adopt a Turkish identity, it is not a message that would likely appeal to most Americans. The message in the various commercials (under the umbrella of ‘positive nationalism’) is that Turks put women in their place – in the kitchen – and that men are the decision-makers in the family while women serve them. The ‘local’ that Americans should aspire to in the commercials does not represent the reality of the ‘local’ in fact. The local of today’s Turkey – at least the local of the urban centres – is a local that looks a lot more like America’s local. It is a site of emancipated Turkish women who make most consumer decisions for the household and who may well be combining work with family – as most Americans are. But the commercials presume otherwise. The commercials may be assuming that Americans, who dominate the world with their language and culture while ignoring the languages and cultures of other countries, really have a desire to return to a life that is more like that of the Turks (or the Turks in a romanticized past). Globalization has led them to this terrible state where they cannot appreciate family and neighbourhoods, but they can rediscover a simpler, more hospitable environment in an authentic Turkish folk culture. As with the notions of the role of women in Turkish society, other parts of this ‘folk’

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culture are disappearing too. Neighbourhoods in urban environments are no longer the sites of close relationships among the residents. And the hurried pace of modern life has found its way to almost every part of Turkey. Yet the commercials insist on romanticizing the Turkey that was by claiming it still exists today. Babcock claims that ‘we all romanticize the Other in at least two respects: as the poet Novalis said, “Everything turns romantic as soon as it is moved far away” […] and as the philosopher Ricoeur has said “[when it] is to be transported into another life”’ (Babcock 1982: 201–02). In this context, romanticized folk culture represents Turkey and everything Turkish in Cola Turka ads as a reaction to globalization/westernization while Turkey is becoming increasingly western. One of the Cola Turka commercials takes the viewer as far back as the country’s Turkic roots in Central Asia in the glorification of the Cameko-type moustache. The wearing of the moustache was a sign that Chevy Chase had at last become a Turk. The moustache was also used for the transformation of a European soccer player who plays for a Turkish team. Pierre van Hooijdonk, a Dutch player who helped the Istanbul team Fenerbahçe win a national title, appears with a moustache after drinking Cola Turka in one commercial. The creative staff at Alametifarika thought that the moustache motif would be humorous and endearing to consumers, but when they polled the audience on their preference for the player with or without the moustache, the audience preferred the clean-shaven look. The vote against the moustache was the first clue for the agency that the commercials were not successful with women and young adults. Subsequent focus group research showed that women and young people found the commercials overly ‘macho’ and not ‘too cool’. Alametifarika was not winning the cola wars with the macho Turka against the modern/ western original product Coca-Cola. Sümer in acknowledging the problem concluded: ‘We will have to lose the moustache’ in the effort to appeal to young people looking for the brand to be cool. In their newer commercials, the Alametifarika agency moved away from the moustache and shifted the image from macho masculinity to a more contemporary masculine image. In two of the new commercials, they feature a Turkish football player, Emre Belezoglu and an award-winning graphic designer Emrah Yücel. Both commercials glorify the achievements of two Turkish males: male voice-overs declare that Emre Belezoglu made the hundred-best-football-player list at the age of 20 and Yücel had became a world-class graphic designer in Hollywood with his own Beverly Hills company, Iconisis. Both commercials take place outdoors in the same cloud-filled sky on the same field where Belezoglu, by kicking a football, and Yücel, by throwing a giant pencil, break a symbolic barrier – a red wall that comes crashing down – and achieve individual, international (or global) and therefore glocal success and fame. In case the audience misses this message, a male voice tells us that each of these men were born in Turkey and achieved great global fame in their respective fields. Thus the advertising agency reverses the earlier theme of Turkifying foreign/American icons/celebrities, instead acknowledging and celebrating the achievements of two Turkish men’s national and masculine achievements. They reinforce this new theme when the male voice tells us, ‘Let the Turka inside emerge.’ By doing so, however, they also further ground Cola Turka as a masculine product.

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5. There is a decade- In setting the commercials outdoors and involving physical activity, long debate in the art they reinforce the typical portrayal of males in television commercials. As world related to the work and masculinity a graphic designer, Yücel would normally spend the majority of his time in of Jackson Pollack and an office behind a computer, but the agency chose not to feature him in Roy Lichtenstein. this way. Instead he is taken outside of his office and placed in a field full of Pollock was celebrated as being more mascu- pencils where he selects one that functions as a weapon. This renders him line than Lichtenstein, more masculine than he might be in his professional setting.5 The target of because he worked at Yücel’s pencil appears to be Umma Thurman, on the Kill Bill poster home in his office; hence he was (which Yücel designed). Although the pencil Yücel hurls ends up striking perceived as being the poster next to Thurman, even if for only a few seconds, the pencil domesticated and functions as a phallic object that has the potential to conquer Hollywood, feminine. as well one of Hollywood’s female icons. There are no commercials celebrating female achievements, Turkish or otherwise, in any of the series of Cola Turka advertisements to date. The global sport of soccer/football is an ideal choice for the branding of Cola Turka. Almost every culture uses sports as a key vehicle for marketing a variety of products. Cola Turka is no exception. As described earlier, the first commercials in the series that were shot in New York, a car full of Turks waving Turkish flags and shouting ‘Champion Turkey/Sampiyon Türkiye’ passes Chevy Chase in Times Square. The scene is meant to depict a national soccer victory. When Chase sits at the diner counter drinking his coffee, David Brown asks him about Besiktas, a popular Turkish soccer team and Sergen, one of its famous players. In the next commercial set in Chevy Chase’s home we have already noted that the grandparents sing a song that originates in the American baseball culture. A later series of soccer- focused commercials highlights Pierre van Hooijdonk. In Turkey, as in many countries, soccer is the sport of men and boys and an arena where women are excluded. The common stereotype is that women not only do not like the game, but they cannot understand it. So it was probably not unusual that women were not featured in the part of the advertising campaign that used a soccer theme. That might be considered especially odd since both account managers (Sümer and Gökkan) are women. But given that soccer is not associated with women – as players or as fans – it is not unusual that women were excluded from the ads that carried a soccer theme. That said, the game of soccer is a global game that according to Giulianotti and Robertson (2004: 545) includes 250 million direct participants, an additional 1.4 billion with an interest in the game and a global television audience of 33.4 billion (sic) for the World Cup finals. The authors argue that football ‘constitutes a vital site for the theorization and empirical exploration of the multidimensional and long-term process of globalization’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 546). And they further argue that globalization of the game is ‘marked culturally by processes of “glocalization”, whereby local cultures adapt and redefine any global cultural product to suit their particular needs, beliefs and customs’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 546). Robertson, who was the first to apply the term ‘glocalization’ to globalization theory, writes that the global game becomes the glocal game at international tournaments where ‘thousands of different supporter groups commingle, with each nation displaying distinctive kinds of dress, song, music and patterns of behaviour’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 547).

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The authors analyse various aspects of the game from a glocal perspective but the one of most interest to this article is the ‘transnational circulation of labour, information, capital and commodities that can underpin non-national forms of cultural particularity’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 549). It is this flow of labour that brought Pierre van Hooijdonk to the Istanbul team, Fenerbahçe. And the Alametifarika agency saw in him a way to sell Cola Turka. To the Turks soccer is a serious matter (Holland 2001: 37; also noted by Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 546) Holland says that as in Britain or in Latin America, each match is either a national battle or an identity issue (with a particular team). Bora and Erdogan (1993: 223) argue that the construction of Turkish ‘national’ identity and the beginning of the history of soccer in Turkey are simultaneous. And soccer can also be thought of as a commodity whose commodification is supported by the globalization process. Within this context, soccer and Cola Turka, both global commodities, are supplementary aspects of world capitalism. The explicit relationship between Coca-Cola and capitalism, or American imperialism, as the ultimate extension of capitalism, was adopted as part of the Cola Turka campaign perspective. Thus Cola Turka, or the Cola of Turkey, was the central concept of the commercials (Gökkan 2004). So it is fitting that van Hooijdonk is transformed into a Turk, much like Chevy Chase. But in the reversal of the usual glocalization process, the Dutch national player represents the Turkish culture and identity in the commercials. Aktay (1999) says that soccer players belong to their teams and represent a collective identity, not their individual identities. Therefore all Turkish players who play for European soccer teams are referred to as the representatives of Turkey in Europe (Futbolda Avrupa’daki Temsilcimiz). And the slogan for Cola Turka in the commercials featuring van Hooijdonk is ‘the only Turkish star in the European league’. Van Hooijdonk represents the local. Or as Sümer said, ‘We can’t go to the Cup but we can send someone, the Dutch (now also Turkish) player.’ The Turkish team was eliminated from the European Cup competition but this was a way for the country to participate. And van Hooijdonk represented the collective Turkish identity as a hybrid Turk/Dutch player when he played for the Dutch national team. Aktay (1999: 5) claims that ‘soccer is in the service of national, ethnic, gender and even religious identities’. With the transformation of a gavur (non-Muslim) to a Turk, the psychology of Turkish society is satisfied while we are shown that culture is a more important tie than kinship or biological heritage. The internalizing of Turkish culture is sufficient for becoming a Turk or feeling like a Turk. In this process a foreign soccer player becomes ‘one of us (bizden biri)’ in the ads. Though the ads that featured van Hooijdonk may have appealed to male consumers, women saw them as overly macho (Sümer 2004). Subsequent ads featured a young girl and her grandmother and a couple in a romantic mood in a New York apartment. It is not known how successful these ads were with the women who were put off by soccer-themed commercials, however. But in 2005 a second soccer star, Emre Belezoglu, a star player for Galatasaray team, was featured in the commercials described previously where the local hero made good globally.

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6. Eda Gökkan said that Conclusion Coke has now replaced the The trial rate of Cola Turka was 40 per cent within three months. Its mar- traditional yogurt ket share shot up to 23 per cent but eventually stabilized at 16 per cent by drink, Ayran, as the the end of the first year according to Sümer. The most recent advertise- accompaniment to the Turkish fast food, ments claim that Cola Turka has entered 65 per cent of Turkish house- lahmajun (a kind of holds, but make no claim to its share in the market. Resistance to trying the local pizza with product came mostly from loyal Coke fans and anti-Ülker consumers. The ground meat, spices, tomato and peppers). latter group was defined by Sümer as more intellectual or ‘white Turks’. The series of commercials for Cola Turka that were first created at Young & Rubicam and later by most of the same creative team at Alametifarika constituted a very clever approach to marketing an image and identity for a soft drink in a market dominated by the global king of soft drinks, Coca-Cola (and to a much lesser extent Pepsi-Cola). Just as Coke has for years capitalized on combining the global with the local in their ads,6 Cola Turka reverses this process. Cola Turka is a local product that is advertised as if it were a global product that everyone wants to drink because they will achieve what the whole world wants – the Turkish dream. That dream, however, is a dream that is rapidly passing. Turks have less time to spend in the traditional Turkish bath, have become members of a more individualistic society, live in a place where women do most of the shopping in urban malls and want an equal place in society, and where they have worked hard to adopt the American dream for themselves. So it is a fabrication to say that the Turkish dream is a future that can be acquired with a sip of Cola Turka. And as much as the advertising agency representatives deny that the commercials were anti-American, there are signs in several of them that ‘positive nationalism’ was also anti-American. That was particularly true of one of the commercials that took a distinct departure from all the rest. It was set in the Iraqi desert and featured an American soldier with tanks and planes surrounding him while military music played in the background. He is crawling across the desert on his stomach along with his comrades when he comes upon a red and white cooler in the sand. Upon opening it he finds Cola Turka inside, pops a can and drinks it. Immediately he begins to take off his weapons and backpack and throws them on the ground. Next he removes his flak jacket and helmet. Finally he walks away from the uniform and gun on the ground and across the screen flashes the message, ‘Yurtta suhl, Cihanda suhl’ (‘Peace at home; Peace in the world’ – a saying and a philosophy advocated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic). More generally, however, the whole Cola Turka promotion, beginning at a time when Turkish–US relations were at a near all-time low, created an environment for acting on the anti-American feelings. Or as Andrew Finkel, writing for the New York Times put it, ‘But while Turka is neither Islamic nor anti-American per se, there is no doubt that anti-Americanism has helped create its market niche’ (Finkel 2003: B01). He goes on to say that the current prime minister of Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) was elected in part because of ‘a growing sense of disillusionment with the culture cultivated by the elite’ in the country (Finkel 2003: B01). That elite constituted a group that wholeheartedly bought into a worship of US society and its values. So as Finkel points out, it is also ironic that both the prime minister and his party along with Cola Turka’s

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producers and ad creation team exploit the disillusionment by using the same elite’s skills (Finkel 2003). We could look upon the Cola Turka campaign and the gender and nationalism issues that define it as simply an interesting case. But there are wider theoretical and real-world implications of the advertisements we analyse here. First, this is not the only situation where commercial products have been used to identify a nation. Anthropologists and media scholars have been considering ways to understand and narrate the constantly changing definition of nationalism and the role of media in the nation-making process. Several scholars have focused on media and, in particular, advertising, in explaining the relationship between mass-mediated commercial cultures and national identity. (Askew and Wilk 2002; Abu-Lughod 2005; Foster 2002). In Materializing the Nation, Robert Foster provides important insights into the relationship between nationalism, consumption and media through his ethnographic research in Papua New Guinea. Pointing to the ways foreign imports are used in the service of domestic agendas, Foster (2002: 13) shows how mass consumption and advertising campaigns promote a new nation state and have fostered a sense of nationhood among the disparate populations brought together arbitrarily. He emphasizes the instru- mental role of commodity consumption in nation-making in several settings and historical periods. Lila Abu-Lughod uses the same argument about the importance of advertising in nation-making with her reference to another scholar’s work. ‘Arvin Rajagopol’s reflection on the “sentimental education of the Indian consumer” suggests that Indian television commercials that follow motor scooters or cigarettes across varied urban landscapes are attempting to bring fragmented social groups into (a Hinduized) national unity’ (Abu-Lughod 2005: 194). So we see that the connection between national identity formation and consumption is not unique to Turkey or the Cola Turka campaign. By analysing commercials that play on national themes and promote national identity in different societies, we may better understand the role of mass media in facilitating nation-building and global culture in the current era. Anti-American sentiment has also been played out in other media products recently. At $10 million, the Turkish cinema produced the most expensive film ever made in the country, Valley of the Wolves – Iraq. Unlike the totally fictional portrayal of the Turkish family or the American soldier in the Cola Turka commercials, this film combined facts with fiction in portraying the US soldiers as the enemy and their commander Sam William Marshall, portrayed by Billy Zane, as a sociopathic killer (Arsu 2006). The factual parts of the film include the hooding of the Turkish soldiers taken for insurgents in Iraq, the portrayal of the inmates at Abu Ghraib prison, and acts of violence by US marines against Iraqis. The film highlights the rise of a cultural divide between the United States and Turkey that has lately also been played out in the Armenian genocide vote in the US Congress and the concerns over the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) acts of terrorism being enacted in Turkey by Kurds who have come across the borders from Iraq. Our analysis is also supported by public opinion. In the most recent surveys conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007), opinions about a range of subjects were collected in Turkey and 46 other nations. When compared with polls conducted in previous years, favourable views of the

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United States have shown a near steady decline from a high of 52 per cent in 2000 to a low of 9 per cent in 2007. A slightly higher favourability rating was given to the American people (13 per cent), while a more positive rating was given to US movies, music and television (22 per cent) in the 2007 poll. These negative views of the United States and of Americans most surely derive from opposition to the war in Iraq and its consequences for Turkey’s security and economic well-being. But when advertising capital- izes on these feelings, the message that buying Cola Turka will help bring an end to the war and allow Turks to act on their anti-American feelings through the purchase of a soft drink, the concept of national identity becomes conflated with consumerism. The more favourable opinion of US media expressed in the poll is also reflected in the use of American actors as stars in the narratives of the commercials for Cola Turka. This analysis demonstrates that advertising may have a wider impact than just promoting higher levels of consumerism in the viewing public. It may well extend to the defining of nationhood in the global market.

References Abu-Lughod, L. (2005), Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Aktay, Y. (1999), ‘Formanin Rengi Sermayenin Rengine Karisirsa: Futbol Dünyasinin Metalasmasinda Son Durumlar ve Sponsorluk’, http://www. angelfire.com/art/yasinaktay/Makaleler/Formanin_Rengi_Sermayenin_Rengi ne_Karisirsa.htm Accessed April 2005. Arsu, S. (2006), ‘U.S. Officer is Villain in Turkish Movie Hit’, International Herald Tribune, 15 February, p. 4. Askew, K. and Wilk, R. (2002), The Anthropology of Media, Malden, MA: Blackwell Press. Babcock, B. (1982), ‘Ritual Undress and the Comedy of Self and Other: Banderlier’s The Delight Makers’, in J. Ruby (ed.), A Crack in the Mirror, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 87–203. Baker, M. and Sterenberg, G. (2002), ‘International Branding: Resolving the Global-Local Dilemma’, Market Leader: The Journal of the Marketing Society, 19 (Winter), pp. 1–9. Bora, T. and Erdogan, N. (1993) ‘Dur Tarih, Vur Turkiye’, in R. Horak, W. Reiter and T. Bora eds), Futbol ve Kultur: Takimlar, Taraftarlar, Endustri, Efsaneler, Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. Canclini, N. (1997), ‘Hybrid Cultures and Communicative Strategies’, Media Development, 54: 1, pp. 22–29. Durakbasa, A. and Cindoglu, D. (2002), ‘Encounters at the Counter: Gender and the Shopping Experience’, in D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber (eds), Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey, London: I.B. Tauris & Co., pp. 73–89. Finkel, A. (2003), ‘Made in Turkey: Mix soda, a star, nationalism and stir’, The New York Times, 10 August, p. B01. Foster, R.J. (2002), Materializing the Nation: Commodities, Consumption and Media in Papua New Guinea, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Giulianotti, R. and Robertson, R. (2004), ‘The Globalization of Football: A Study in the Glocalization of the “Serious life”’, The British Journal of Sociology, 55: 4, pp. 545–68.

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Gökkan, Eda (2004), personal interview, July, Young & Rubicam, Istanbul. Hofstede, Geert (1980), Culture’s Consequences, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Holland, B. (2001), ‘Bir Futbol ülkesi Disardan Bakis. Evet. . . Maalesef’ in T. Bora, (ed.) Takimdan Ayri Duz Kosu. Istanbul: Iletisim, pp. 37–45. Kraidy, M. (1999), ‘The Global, the Local and the Hybrid: A Native Ethnography of Glocalization’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 16, pp. 456–76. Maynard, M. (2003), ‘From Global to Glocal: How Gillette’s SensorExcel Accommodates to Japan’, Keio Communication Review, 25, pp. 57–75. Milovanovic, G. (1997), ‘Marketing Dimensions of Global Advertising’, Facta Universitatis, 1: 5, pp. 71–78. Milner, L.M. and Collins, J.M. (1998), ‘Sex Role Portrayals in Turkish Television Advertisement: An Examination in an International Context’, Journal of Euromarketing, 7: 1, pp. 1–28. Ohmae, K. (1990), The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, New York: Harper Business. Pew Research Center (2007), Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey, 27 June, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf Accessed 9 October 2007. Robertson, R. (1995), ‘Glocalization: Time-Space Homogeneity-Heterogeneity’, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds), Global Modernities, London: Sage, pp. 27–44. Sümer, Y. (2004), personal interview, July, Alametifarika, Istanbul, Turkey. Uray, N. and Burnaz, S. (2003), ‘An Analysis of the portrayal of gender roles in Turkish television advertisements’, Sex Roles: A Journal of Research, 48: 1/2, pp. 77–88. Williamson, J. (1978), Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising, London: Marion Boyars.

Suggested citation Ogan, C.L., Çiçek, F. and Kaptan, Y. (2007), ‘Reverse glocalization? Marketing a Turkish cola in the shadow of a giant’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 47–62, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.47/1

Contributor details Christine Ogan is Professor of Journalism and Informatics at Indiana University where she teaches courses in international communication and social informatics. She conducts research on Turkish migrants in western Europe and their uses of traditional and new media, and on gender and IT higher education. She is the author of Communication and Identity in the Diaspora: Turkish Migrants in Amsterdam and their Use of Media and numerous articles in communication journals. Contact: 970 E. 7th St., School of Journalism, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408. E-mail: [email protected]

Yesim Kaptan is a doctoral candidate at Indiana University with double majors in Communication and Culture and Folklore and Ethnomusicology. She also holds an MA in Folklore from Indiana and degrees in Political Science and Public Administration from the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. She is currently teaching advertising and consumer culture and her research interests are anthropology of media, advertising, consumerism, globalization and nationalism

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in contemporary Turkey. Contact: 970 E. 7th St., School of Journalism, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408. E-mail: [email protected]

Filiz Çiçek is a doctoral candidate in Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University where she received her master’s degree in Fine Arts and a faculty member in the women’s studies department at DePauw University. Contact: 970 E. 7th St., School of Journalism, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408. E-mail: [email protected]

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Andrew Piner Independent Scholar, UK

Abstract Keywords This article examines US mainstream press coverage given to the aftermath of the Camp David Camp David negotiations in July 2000, offering a critical perspective on the events critical theory and reactions to the failed summit. In doing so the article is able to identify and negotiations highlight the detrimental effects of inaccurate reporting of the Israeli–Palestinian Palestine conflict in the US press. It demonstrates how this misrepresentation of failure at Israel Camp David has contributed to the ever-decreasing prospects for a just and Israeli–Palestinian viable solution to the conflict. This important snapshot of the long-standing conflict Israeli–Palestinian conflict, it argues, accurately encapsulates the flawed nature of media many dominant ‘truths’ of the debate over the conflict. Consequently it can provide occupied territories a critical lens through which to draw broader conclusions about the issues that Oslo accords continue to impede and undermine the prospects for balanced negotiations and peace process peace in the region. The conclusions reached through the analysis of mainstream US press reactions to the Camp David summit are subsequently contextualized through an exploration of the largely neglected issue of water sharing in the Palestinian Territories. The celebrated water-sharing agreements in the Oslo period are shown to have failed to bring about any meaningful change from the discriminatory water-distribution policies pursued by Israel in the occupied territories between 1967 and 1993. The article thus demonstrates how US mainstream press reactions to the failed Camp David summit simply reinforced the misleading impression of Israeli cooperation and compromise which masks a historically grounded policy of domination over the Palestinians. It concludes that only an approach grounded in critical theory, emphasizing different conceptions of security in the region, can offer its people a brighter and more peaceful future.

Explanations for and coverage of what happened at the Camp David negotiations in 2000 have been subject to greatly differing accounts. Due to the verbal, rather than written nature of the negotiations in July 2000, apportioning the blame for failure has often been a highly subjective exercise. However, with the benefit of hindsight and the growing number of works detailing the ‘generous offer’ proposed at Camp David, it is possible to paint an accurate picture. More importantly, an accurate assessment of the deal offered at Camp David can be directly compared with the discourse that has dominated newspaper editorials in the United States. Such a comparative analysis is a crucial component for helping to discard some of the ‘myths’ that continue to exacerbate the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and shape the United States’ role in Israel/Palestine.

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1. For a representative This article will begin, therefore, by highlighting dominant strands of sample of this thought about the Camp David summit and subsequent events within growing literature see: Wolfsfeld, Media newspaper editorials in the United States. This will provide the foundation and Political Conflict, by which to construct my critique, which will contrast these dominant especially chapters 3, discourses with a more balanced and detailed assessment of the then Israeli 5 and 6; Bennett, W. Lance and Paletz, Prime Minister, Ehud Barak’s offer. It is important, furthermore, to contex- David L. (eds), Taken tualize the summit in the background of Barak’s premiership and the entire by Storm. The Media, peace process. A critical examination of the Oslo process, primarily using Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the evidence of ‘cooperation’ on water resources, will highlight how Camp Gulf War (Chicago, David encapsulates a continuation of the Israeli policy of domination under University of Chicago, the guise of cooperation and compromise. The juxtaposition of dominant 1994); Chomsky, N., Herman, E.S., United States press narrative and critical analysis of the Oslo ‘peace process’ – Manufacturing encapsulated by the Camp David summit – demonstrates that dominant Consent. The Political opinions in the newspapers denote a significant gap between myth and Economy of the Mass Media. Second Edition reality concerning the nature of the conflict. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002). The United States media The news media provides its readers/viewers/listeners with a window into issues and events taking place in the world. Like any window, however, it only provides its audience with a limited perspective and interpretation of events. These media ‘frames’ are, according to W.A. Gamson, ‘a central organising idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 31). In the United States, and indeed in any country, the framing of an issue by the news media is an extremely powerful way of defining relevant ‘truths’. Warren P. Strobel has argued, with some force, that ‘[…] CNN […] can be an awesomely powerful, even frightening, tool […] even in a democratic society’ (Strobel 1997: 6). A burgeoning literature attesting to the potential importance of the media, in all its forms, to issues such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, presents a strong reason for investigating its possible impact on the prospects for peace in the Middle East.1 According to Iyengar and Simon, ‘research has shown that individuals habitually refer to issues or events “in the news” when diagnosing current social and political ills’ (Iyengar and Simon 1994: 169). The ability of the mainstream media to put certain issues ‘on the agenda’, whilst marginalizing or ignoring other perspectives, offers a powerful case for taking seriously the potential impact of dominant frames about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The importance of dominant media frames in shaping public opinion is not absolute. However, it does suggest that the media has a potentially important role to play in creating dominant terms of reference about particular issues. The newspaper media will be the central object of reference in this article. Although it is only one aspect of the modern media, the printed word and photographs ‘continue to have a distinct impact of their own, notwithstanding the growing dominance of television and the emergence of CNN and its brethren’ (Strobel 1997: 15). I intend to use the work of Chomsky and Herman as a precedent to focus on articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post. In their important work on the mass media, Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and Herman set out to look at the United States mass media as a whole. They quickly illustrate that the mass media is increasingly subject to a centralizing process, with the result that at present ‘two dozen firms control nearly the entirety of media experienced by most

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US citizens’ (Herman and Chomsky 2002: xiii). Also, with the ‘reduction of 2. Edward Said has resources devoted to journalism’ in the modern age (Herman and Chomsky undoubtedly been the most prominent 2002: xiii), large international newspapers like the New York Times and the of those who draw Washington Post arguably play a major part in constructing dominant media attention to the frames for international affairs such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. tendency of the ‘West’ to misrepresent and Seemingly as a result of these factors, the authors repeatedly use the stereotype ‘the Washington Post and the New York Times as their main source for analysis. Orient’. See: Said, The US mass media is a particularly interesting case study as it is located Edward W.1978, 1994, 1997. within, and partly representative of, a well-documented tendency for cultural stereotyping of Islam by the West.2 While all media framing ‘tells the 3. The contention I make about the US story’ in a particular way, it is my contention here that the dominant and media here is not unyielding stance of the US mass media towards a particular framing of the an absolute claim. failure at Camp David has constituted an obstacle to a US approach that Resistance to the pro-Israeli lobby 3 could promote a just and lasting solution in Israel/Palestine. It is crucial, does exist, just as however, to recognize that the representation of the Camp David failure in challenges to the the American press is only one aspect, albeit an important one, of the per- dominant media frame exist. It is ception and presentation of the Middle East in America. simply my contention that certain Creating the myth of Camp David discourses in the United States enjoy Adopting the narrative offered by President Clinton and Prime Minister wider acceptance and Barak, the United States press was quick to confirm that Yasir Arafat legitimacy than other was guilty of not ‘taking the extra steps’ necessary for peace with Israel. A discourses. New York Times editorial published only the morning after the summit ended, assured its readers that ‘The larger burden lies with Mr Arafat’, and that ‘If there is ever to be a durable peace, Mr Arafat must reconsider his unyielding approach to Jerusalem’ (New York Times Editorial Desk 2000). The Washington Post editorial on the same day offered similar analysis, lamenting Mr Arafat’s ‘inflexibility’ and unwillingness to compromise (Washington Post Editorial 2000a). On the issue of Jerusalem the editors explained that, in order to ‘appreciate the magnitude of this tragedy, one has to first appreciate the scope of the proposed Israeli compromise on Jerusalem – the issue over which the talks foundered’ (Washington Post Editorial 2000a). This strongly suggested a ‘compromise’ of far-reaching and unprecedented concessions by the Israeli side. As the stability of the region disintegrated in the months following the summit, culminating in the September outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, newspaper editorials habitually looked back on the Camp David summit seeking to explain what had gone wrong. As Seth Ackerman (2001) has pointed out, the Washington Post on 11 October 2000 editorialized that the peace process had rested on two premises: ‘first, that Israel would be prepared to relinquish control over Palestinian land and lives; and, second, that the Palestinian leadership would be willing to attain its independence alone’. However, for Washington Post editors, ‘The deep compromises Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered at the Camp David summit proved the first assumption correct’, while the new intifada of September 2000 ‘proved’ that ‘The second premise […] has now been shattered’ (Washington Post Editorial 2000b). Ackerman proposes that Barak’s generosity (and Arafat’s ingratitude) was encapsulated in a Washington Post headline on 9 October that read, ‘Barak’s Open Hand Now a Clenched Fist’ (Ackerman 2001: 68). For the article’s author, ‘even in the view of the most dovish Israelis, Barak

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4. See, for example, made Arafat a good deal at the US-brokered Camp David talks in July, and Hass (2001) and Arafat has repaid a serious effort at negotiations with attacks on Israeli Ibish (2001). positions’ (Ackerman 2001: 68). New York Times regular columnists Thomas Friedman (chief diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times) and William Safire regularly assured their readers that Arafat was to blame for the rejection of Barak’s ‘generous’ offer at Camp David and for the subsequent slide into violence in the Middle East. On 27 July 2000, Safire was unequivocal in his explanation of the failure to reach agreement at Camp David. In a column entitled ‘Why is Arafat Smiling?’, Safire maintained that Arafat was smiling ‘because [he] gave up nothing’, while ‘Israel’s leader, prodded by a US president, made concessions that broke pledges Barak made in his election campaign a year ago’ (Safire 2000). Thus, Safire concluded, ‘You have to sympathise with Barak […] He offered Arafat virtually all of the West Bank, and was scorned […]’ (Safire 2000). Thomas Friedman has frequently offered his interpretation of the disintegrating situation between Israel and the Palestinians. For example, on 13 October 2000, he stated that ‘Mr Clinton pointedly, deliberately and rightly stated that the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had offered unprecedented compromises at the summit’ (Friedman 2000). Such praise for the efforts of Barak was complemented by the familiar formula of contrast with the ingratitude of the Palestinians: ‘But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to acknowledge is that today’s Israeli prime minister was offering them a dignified exit’ (Friedman 2000). Friedman repeatedly emphasized this view, using such phrases as ‘offer[ing] Palestinians the unthinkable’ (Friedman 2001a), and ‘historic compromise proposal’ (Friedman 2001b). Washington Post columnists Richard Cohen and Charles Krauthammer offered similar analysis. In reflecting on the Camp David summit, Cohen complained that ‘With Arafat, it is hardly clear that he even wants peace. After all, he rejected a dream offer […] that would have given him almost everything short of the conversion of the Jews to Islam’ (Cohen 2001). Krauthammer is less sparing of Arafat, displaying hostility even towards Barak, who ‘is down to his last chip’, having ‘given away […] all his other bargaining chips […] at Camp David in a fit of shocking preemptive concessions’ (Krauthammer 2000). The ‘generosity’ in the Camp David talks, for Krauthammer, bordered on stupidity as Barak ‘[refuted] for all time the Jews’ reputation for shrewd bargaining’ (Krauthammer 2000). Other Washington Post columnists have also been firm in their conclusions. For example, Lally Weymouth stated that ‘an intransigent Arafat turned down a deal’, while ‘a courageous Barak risked everything for a peace agreement’ (Weymouth 2000). Despite the overwhelming number of editorial columns supporting the ‘generous offer’ narrative of Camp David, the counter-narrative refuting these claims has found some expression in US newspapers. Perhaps the best example of this ‘revisionist’ viewpoint is found in Deborah Sontag’s special report for the New York Times, on 26 July 2001 entitled ‘Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why it Failed’. Indeed, one-off opinion columns in the Washington Post and New York Times by critics such as Amira Hass and Hussein Ibish testify to variations on the dominant themes found in the US press.4 In spite of the isolated nature of ‘revisionist’ articles in the press,

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Ackerman highlights the existence of heated debate questioning the impar- 5. For example, tiality of the US press. For Ackerman, ‘while the American press is per- Ackerman testifies to angry letters, formal ceived abroad as being unambiguously sympathetic to Israel, the most complaints, cancelled visible form of media criticism in the United States takes the opposite view – subscriptions and that the US press is constantly propagandising for the Palestinian cause’ even alleged sale of CNN stock by (Ackerman 2001: 70–71). Widespread pro-Palestinian coverage, however, American Jews to is unlikely in an environment where a strong pro-Israeli lobby exerts con- protest against siderable pressure on media companies, which criticize Israel.5 coverage of Israel/Palestine Nevertheless, it is clear that the narrative holding the Palestinians (although this was (and especially Arafat) to blame for the failure at Camp David has taken later denied by CNN). a firm hold. Writing for the Washington Post a year after the summit, Lee See Ackerman (2001). Hockstader provided a neat summary of the dominant American discourse about Camp David: ‘It may be too little too late to change any minds, but 6. The most difficult issues to resolve in the the Palestinians have begun making an impassioned case that they are Israeli–Palestinian not to blame for the collapse of the US-mediated peace talks last year at conflict include the Camp David and the subsequent descent into 10 months of violence’ status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian (Hockstader 2001). As the title of this article suggests (‘A Different Take refugee problem and on Camp David Collapse: Palestinian Disputes Conventional Wisdom on the ‘right of return’, Breakdown of US-Led Peace Talks’), a whole year had passed of almost borders and settlements. unchallenged ‘conventional wisdom’ in the American press. I must therefore turn a critical eye on this ‘conventional wisdom’ with a 7. There are ample historical accounts of detailed account of the Camp David proposals and the difficulties that the difficulties surrounded it. experienced by both peoples during the Oslo years, which ‘The brilliant offer Israel never made’ largely use standard After a problematic interim period of seven years, final status negotiations accounts of settlement were undertaken at Camp David. The logic of the Oslo ‘peace process’ – to expansion, the deteriorating enact confidence-building measures between Israel and the Palestinians economic situation while putting off the most difficult issues that represented the major obsta- of Palestinians, and cles to peace6 – had not enjoyed the success that was hoped for when Arafat difficulty of movement between Palestinian and Rabin famously shook hands on the White House lawn in 1993. towns and cities to Throughout the interim period militant Palestinians continued to attack illustrate their point. Israeli settlements. For its part, Israel pursued its expansion of illegal settle- See, for example, Shlaim (2000: ments in the West Bank and Gaza, reneged on promises to redeploy out of 546–95); Giacaman Palestinian towns and villages, enacted curfews and border closures in the and Lonning (1998). occupied territories often making everyday life for Palestinians difficult and miserable.7 Barak’s personal record since becoming Israel’s Prime Minister in 1999 also left doubts over his ability to find a just resolution to the conflict. From the very beginning his words to the Israeli electorate did not promise a generous peace:

The time for [making] peace has come. Not peace from a position of weakness but peace in strength and security […] We will move quickly toward a sepa- ration from the Palestinians by drawing four lines in the sand: once and for all a unified Jerusalem, under our sovereignty, as the eternal capital of Israel; in no case will we withdraw to the 1967 borders; no foreign army on the west bank of the Jordan; most of the settlement dwellers in Judea-Samaria to be housed in settlement units under our sovereignty. (Enderlin 2002: 112)

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8. Resolutions 194 These pledges to the Israeli people, made on 17 May 1999, aptly demon- (General Assembly), strated that the ‘minimum demands’ of the Israelis directly contradicted the 242 and 338 8 (Security Council) long-held Palestinian ‘minimum demand’ of peace based on UN resolutions. stipulated a full Israeli Moreover, Barak’s questionable priorities built an atmosphere of mistrust withdrawal from the and indignation amongst the Palestinians. For example, the head of the territories illegally occupied in 1967, Israeli delegation to the Palestinians, Oded Eran, raised concerns over and a just solution Barak’s prioritization of peace with Syria over peace with the Palestinians: to the Palestinian ‘Frankly, I didn’t like this idea of according priority to Syria […] I told him refugee problem. [Barak] it was the Palestinian problem that was at the centre of the 9. For example Israeli–Arab conflict’ (Enderlin 2002: 135). For Deborah Sontag, Barak’s see Enderlin (2002: 231–32). Enderlin ‘peacemaker’ credentials were belied by his choice of the settlers’ representa- describes an incident tives, the ultra right-wing National Religious Party (NRP), in his coalition where the Palestinian (Sontag 2001). Having been offered the housing ministry, the NRP quickly delegation received a proposal twice in the moved to expand the settlement enterprise in the occupied territories. same evening. Once Additional delays in addressing core Palestinian concerns such as the imple- directly from the mentation of the 1998 Wye Agreement (which Barak chose to renegotiate), Israelis and again as a ‘suggestion’ from again suggested quite the opposite of the early reassuring signs that the the US mediators. Palestinians were looking for (Agha and Malley 2001). Thus, it was in this atmosphere of mutual distrust and disillusionment that the Camp David summit was convened. Eyewitness accounts of the summit strongly suggest that even the intimate setting of the President’s private retreat in Maryland was not enough to dissipate the atmosphere between the two most important negotiators, Arafat and Barak. Charles Enderlin recounted that, ‘To avoid having the Palestinians transform Israeli positions into a firm commitment, his [Barak’s] proposals will be submitted to the Palestinians through American mediation. He himself will not have any face-to-face meetings with Arafat, who might seize on some minor verbal discrepancy and have it influence the talks’ (Enderlin 2002: 178). Cold personal relations between Arafat and Barak invited further commentary by Enderlin, who described a meal at the summit in which Barak was seated between Arafat and Clinton’s daughter, Chelsea: ‘During the two hours that the meal lasts, he [Barak] does not once turn toward the head of the PLO’ (Enderlin 2002: 214). For Robert Malley, who was present at the summit, Barak’s unconventional tactics at Camp David proved confusing and often misleading. Selby maintains that there was no direct negotiation between Arafat and Barak, ‘with most of the ideas being confusingly passed on by American mediators’ (Selby 2003a: 185). Therefore, ‘it was often unclear to the Palestinians whether they were being handed US or Israeli proposals’ (Selby 2003a: 185). In some cases it is clear that Israeli proposals were actually being suggested as US plans fostering mistrust amongst the Palestinian delegation.9 Furthermore, Barak was unwilling to reveal his final position on any issue unless the ‘endgame’ was in sight. As a consequence, ‘each Israeli position was cast as unmovable’, only to be continually ‘reassessed’ as the talks progressed (Agha and Malley 2001). Bottom lines, which turned out to be false bottoms, and a lack of personal contact between the negotiators caused confusion, tension and ambiguity. Thus Malley and Agha conclude that ‘The final and largely unnoticed consequence of Barak’s approach is that, strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer’ (Agha and Malley 2001). A close look at individual Israeli proposals during the summit further corroborates the absence of a ‘golden’ Israeli offer in any form.

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A variety of accounts have emerged in recent years detailing what exactly was offered to the Palestinians at Camp David. The main issues discussed included territory and borders, settlements, security, refugees and the status of Jerusalem. They shall be considered in turn. On close inspection, the territorial concessions made at Camp David do not appear to be remarkably generous. The story told in the American press often refers to ‘more than 90 per cent of the West Bank for a Palestinian state’ (Friedman 2000), along with direct territorial swaps allowing Israel to ‘retain five percent of the West Bank, on which about 80 percent of Jewish settlers lived’ (Friedman 2001c). According to Slater (2001), Barak’s initial position agreed to a demilitarized Palestinian state in Gaza and on 82–88 per cent of the West Bank. Further discussions improved this offer to roughly 92 per cent of the West Bank ‘though it is not clear whether Barak approved this change’ (Slater 2001: 182). However, even this accepted figure of 92 per cent has been called into question by Pressman (2003). To be sure, the land offer at Camp David ‘was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank […] [which] […] omits the area known as No Man’s Land (50 sq. km near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 sq. km) and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 sq. km)’ (Pressman 2003: 17). Thus, an Israeli offer of 92 per cent translated into only 86 per cent of the Palestinian definition of the West Bank. If 92 per cent sounds substantive, as it clearly did in the editorial pages of the mainstream American press, one only need to take a cursory glance at the map of the proposed Palestinian ‘state’ offered at Camp David to see the inherent bad faith. Figure 1 clearly shows the West Bank carved up into three non-contiguous Bantustan-style blocks, surrounded by Israeli troops and settlements, and with no access to its own international borders. Furthermore, David Clark of The Guardian has highlighted that the suggested territorial swaps

that were supposed to compensate the Palestinians for the loss of prime agricul- tural land [and access to most of the precious water aquifiers in the West Bank] in the West Bank merely added insult to injury. The only territory offered to Palestinian negotiators consisted of stretches of desert adjacent to the Gaza Strip [the Halutza Sand Region] that Israel currently uses for toxic waste dumping. (Clark 2002)

Therefore, not only were the proposed territorial swaps of unequal qualitative value, but, by all accounts, Barak never offered swaps of equal quanti- tative value either. One proposal suggested that 9 per cent of land annexed by Israel for settlements would be compensated with only 1 per cent of land from Israel (Enderlin 2002: 232). With regard to the settlements themselves, Barak’s annexation proposals included the area between the settlements in anticipation of natural growth which, as Tanya Reinhart highlights, contained countless Palestinian villages and ‘approximately 120,000 Palestinian residents’ (Reinhart 2002: 33). On the sensitive issue of the Jordan Valley, the New York Times and the Washington Post were particularly misleading. Rather than having ‘surren- dered the Jordan Valley […] that buffers Israel from the Arab tank armies to the east’ (although given Israel’s overwhelming military superiority in the

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10. The suggested terms region and the backing of the world’s only superpower the ‘threat from the for the future of the east’ is more rhetorical than real) (Krauthammer 2000), Barak insisted on Jordan Valley are 10 illustrated in Enderlin numerous measures, intent on securing Israeli interests. Barak proposed a (2002: 248). ‘re-evaluation’ of the Jordan Valley problem after six to twelve years. However, the historical record of Israel during the Oslo years deemed this re-evaluation improbable. Israel had consistently cited ‘vital security concerns’ for reneging on many of the promises made during the interim period. At Camp David, Barak asked for trust in the good intentions of Israel of which, for the Palestinians, there was little historical precedent. In return for this trust Barak was unwilling to afford any trust in the intentions of the Palestinians. On the refugee issue, Arafat would later say that there was no ‘serious discussion’ at Camp David (Sontag 2001). Of what was discussed, it is clear that Barak refused to accept Israel’s moral or historical responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. In an interview with Benny Morris after Camp David, Barak maintained that, ‘We cannot allow even one refugee back on the basis of the “right of return”, and we cannot accept historical responsibility for the creation of the problem’ (Morris 2002). This opinion reflects a long-standing concern in Israeli politics. According to Benvenisti, successive Israeli governments have claimed that an admission of responsibility for the refugee problem would legitimize a ‘right of return’ under which Israel would be overwhelmed with demands that ‘would threaten the Jewish nature of the Jewish state’ (Benvenisti 2000: 324). The myth that the refugee problem was created by the Arab armies ‘who ordered the Palestinians to leave their homes to clear the way for a victorious campaign’ (Benvenisti 2000: 324), although substantially discredited by existing Israeli literature, is a central belief that Barak was unable to overcome at Camp David. Although full implementation of the ‘right of return’ is unre- alistic, it has rightly been argued that a genuine Israeli admission of moral responsibility for the injustice to the Palestinians would greatly improve the chances of reconciliation (Benvenisti 2000: 329). However, the family reunification scheme proposed at Camp David, allowing some 10,000 refugees back to their homes, was offered not as a Palestinian ‘right’ but as an Israeli gesture. Barak’s proposal that the refugees be compensated by money paid by the international community, simply confirmed Israel’s reluctance to accept responsibility. By the end of the summit the ‘generous’ offer consisted of an unspecified ‘satisfactory solution’ to the refugee problem, suggested by Clinton, not Barak (Enderlin 2002: 232). On Jerusalem, reports from the Camp David summit have proved unclear. Undoubtedly, Barak did come closer to Palestinian demands than any previous Israeli leader. However, editorial columns in the American press have fostered a substantial misunderstanding about the nature of Barak’s proposal. The overall impression made by editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post is that the proposed Palestinian state would have sovereignty or ‘control’ over Arab East Jerusalem. Closer inspections of the proposal’s details suggest something altogether less generous. First, as Seth Ackerman correctly highlights, ‘none of [the] accounts reminded readers that East Jerusalem is among the occupied territories from which Israel was required to withdraw under UN Resolution 242, the resolution officially governing the Oslo process and therefore the Camp David talks’ (Ackerman 2001: 68). Thus, he continues, ‘any parts of East Jerusalem

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that would remain under Israeli sovereignty in a final settlement would rep- 11. Pressman lists all the resent Palestinian concessions, not the other way around’ (Ackerman outlying areas that would have been 2001: 68). Though clearly a contemptible offer, it was the Palestinians who under full Palestinian received the blame for turning down Israel’s ‘concessions’. sovereignty. See Barak’s Jerusalem proposal was fractured and convoluted, offering a mix- Pressman (2003: 18). ture of full sovereignty in some areas but only ‘functional autonomy’ in oth- 12. In fact, during the ers. Furthermore, large blocs of land in East Jerusalem would remain under Oslo period, Israel repeatedly made the Israeli sovereignty. According to Pressman only the outlying areas of Old City ‘off-limits’ to Jerusalem, such as Abu Dis, Al-Asawiyah and Samir Amis, would be Palestinian afforded full Palestinian sovereignty.11 On the other hand, the core Arab non-residents in the neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem – al-Shaykh Jarrah, al-Suwwanah, al-Tur, name of security. Salah-al-Din Street, Bab al-Amud (Damascus Gate), Ra’s al-Amud, and 13. See, for example New York Times Editorial Silwan would be under Palestinian ‘functional autonomy’ but remain under Desk (2000). Israeli sovereignty. ‘Functional autonomy’, as the interim years of Oslo had 14. It is plausible to proved, was not the same as sovereignty. For example, Israeli sovereign con- assume (as Arafat did trol over the West Bank and Gaza had enabled them to enact repeated border at Camp David) that closures and restrictive travel arrangements making everyday life extremely Arafat did not have the authority from difficult for the Palestinians. Many of the residents in the functionally the Muslim world to autonomous Palestinian areas of Jerusalem would have to pass through give permanent sover- Israel to reach Palestine. In a similar vein, access for Palestinians to the Old eignty of the Haram al-Sharif to Israel – an City and the holy places in Jerusalem would be dependent on Israel, as it had action which would 12 been since the war of 1967. be opposed by the The proposed status of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount is also mis- Muslim world. represented in the dominant US media narrative. Barak’s offer to give the new state of Palestine ‘control’ over the Muslim holy sites in the Old City, duly reported by the editorial desks of the New York Times and Washington Post,13 was again misleading. Satisfaction for either side on the issue of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount will never be easy to find, given that it is a site of great importance to both Judaism and Islam.14 However, the contention that ‘custodianship’ for the Palestinians but sovereignty to Israel was a ‘generous concession’ clearly understates the fundamental disparity between sovereignty and ‘custodianship’. Every formula conceived at Camp David was stymied by the underlying dogma that Israel would have ultimate sovereignty over the land. In the final analysis, the specifics of the Camp David proposal, combined with Israel’s historical approach to the ‘peace process’, give reasonable cause to doubt the intention of generosity with which the American media credits the Israeli government. However, it is not possible to explain these events in isolation from the broader structures and relations of politics and political economy. Analysis of the Oslo ‘peace process’ and the historical dynamics of the Israeli–Palestinian relationship will offer crucial insights into the events at Camp David. A broader contextual frame will show the conflict as a product, ‘whose roots are in patterns of capitalist development and patterns of state formation and state-society relations’, rather than the product of cultural norms, values and ideas (Selby 2003a: 8).

‘Dressing up domination as cooperation’ For Hanieh ‘the Israelis came to Camp David not in search of a language of dialogue with a neighbour and partner but to cement the gains from the 1967 War, to restructure and legalize the occupation’ (Hanieh 2001: 87).

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15. This argument is There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the Oslo ‘peace process’ was made in Selby designed to achieve exactly that. Selby refers to this policy as ‘Dressing up (2003b: 130). domination as cooperation’ (Selby 2003b). In his meticulously researched thesis on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Selby convincingly contends that water sharing and cooperation in the Holy Land offers a revealing insight into the ‘peace process’. This insight highlights continuity in Israel’s approach to managing the occupied territories before and after 1993. Thus, Selby shows that the ‘peace process’ simply repackaged the occupation giving it formal legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. The evidence presented by Selby stressing the continuities rather than changes in Israeli water policies between the ‘pre-Oslo’ and ‘Oslo’ periods is indeed illuminating. For an understanding of the position of the Oslo peace process it is important to have an appreciation of the situation from 1967. After the occupation of 1967, Israel gained overall control of West Bank water resources while the Palestinians simply became implementers of Israeli policy. Israeli domination of these water resources had the direct result of unequal distribution between Palestinian and Israeli population centres. For example, by 1995 one Israeli estimate held that ‘the average West Bank settler was in receipt of twelve times as much water as the average Palestinian’, while ‘peripheral and high-lying houses would go without piped supplies for a period of three or more months each summer’ (Selby 2003b: 131). Similarly, the cost of piped supplies throughout the region was based on equally discriminatory policies, where ‘Palestinians would be charged much more for a cubic metre of water than Israelis’ (Selby 2003b: 128). The alleged change in Israeli–Palestinian water relations began during the Oslo peace process in the form of the Oslo II Agreement in September 1995. The proposed joint management system, stipulated in the rhetoric of the agreement, was initially considered a ‘major breakthrough’. However, Selby highlights little change for the Palestinians and marked continuity in Israeli policy. What then, did the proposed joint management system do to improve this ‘apartheid-style’ distribution of the regions water resources? The short answer for Selby is ‘very little’. First, ‘given that most local water supply and infrastructural management within the West Bank was already being undertaken by Palestinians […] the seeming novelty of Oslo II’s co-ordinated management system was largely illusory’ (Selby 2003a: 107). Moreover, rather than granting the Palestinians control over the West Bank’s water supplies, Oslo II only granted them responsi- bilities in the management of local water supplies, leaving overall control in the hands of Israel. Thus, as Selby concludes, the agreement ‘merely formalized a supply management system which had been in operation for years’ (Selby 2003a: 107). In terms of water supply itself the Oslo II agreement stipulated that the Palestinians would solely be in charge of systems that did not supply Israelis, while Israel would be in charge of all other systems. With the infrastructural integration of the years of occupation already in place, however, and as most supply networks were linked to at least one Israeli settlement, Israel remained in sole control of almost all of the supply lines and all of the deep wells that had been drilled since the 1980s.15

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On water prices, Oslo II promised that ‘in the case of purchase of one 16. Quoted in Selby side from the other, the purchaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by (2003a: 108). the supplier, including the cost of production at the source and the con- 17. Edward Said offers veyance all the way to the point of delivery’.16 While this sounds fair on extensive commentary on first impression, it quickly becomes apparent, Selby argues, that with the the fall in living Israelis in control of the entire water network in the West Bank they would standards and the always be the suppliers and the Palestinians always the purchasers. Thus, gradual destruction of the Palestinian as the agreement only applied to transactions between supplier and economy during purchaser, Israeli settlers were free to continue to buy water at highly sub- the Oslo years. sidized rates while Palestinians were forced to buy water at the ‘full real See, for example, Said (2002). cost’, ‘legitimising a discriminatory pricing policy that had existed well before 1995’ (Selby 2003a: 108). Perhaps the most revealing note to make about the Oslo II agreement is illustrated by Norman Finkelstein. For Finkelstein,

the textual claim that Oslo II preserves the territorial ‘integrity’ of the West Bank and Gaza as a ‘single territorial unit’, is mockingly belied by the map’s [green] and [pink] blotches denoting relative degrees of Palestinian control awash in a sea of white denoting total Israeli sovereignty. (Finkelstein 2003: 173)

The contrast between the generous rhetoric of the text and the ungener- ous nature of the reality is a particularly stark indication of the inherently flawed logic of a ‘peace process’ that consolidates domination. Similar examples of the legitimization of Israeli occupation under Oslo can be found in several quarters. For example, despite the millions of dollars promised by the international community under Oslo for economic regeneration in the occupied territories, Palestinian standards of living fell dramatically during the 1990s.17 Economic agreements such as the Paris Protocol were heavily biased in favour of Israel. As a result, crucial issues were ignored such as the return of ‘Palestinian resources such as water […] or land illegally expropriated by Israel, between 60 and 70 percent of the West Bank and at least 60 percent of the Gaza Strip’ (Murphy 1995: 36). Clear evidence of unequal dynamics of the process is readily found in Article XII of the 1994 Cairo Agreement. In this article, the Palestinian National Authority:

accepted that it will bear financial responsibility for claims made against Israel, and will actually defend past Israeli actions in the event of a claim reaching the courts. Nowhere is Israel committed to paying any compensa- tion, to individuals or the population as a whole, for taxes illegally levied and used to destroy property or expropriate resources. (Murphy 1995: 38)

Furthermore, Article VII of the same agreement made provisions upholding military orders and laws that preceded the Declaration of Principles, which effectively allowed Israel to obstruct Palestinian economic development through closures and curfews in spite of the pledges made in the Paris Protocol.

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18. For a representative One of the major advantages of the Oslo peace process for Israel was that example of these it largely relieved her of the rapidly escalating cost of occupation, whilst main- arguments see Morris (2001: chapter 12). taining all the strategic advantages that the occupied territories offered. In the context of the first intifada the cost of the occupation had become a heavy 19. Under the terms of the deal, all outstand- burden for the Israeli government. In the international press, sympathy for ing debts were taken the Palestinians was contrasted with condemnation for heavy-handed Israeli on by the Palestinian suppression. Non-payment of water rates and taxation in the territories was Authority, security and policing of the creating financial arrears, which Israel was responsible for. Violence and Palestinian unrest in the territories was also putting pressure on the settlement drive, population was which had lost a lot of its previous appeal.18 The Oslo peace process at once ensured by Arafat’s internationally enabled the Israeli government to pass the more burdensome tasks of occupa- subsidized security tion onto the new Palestinian Authority,19 whilst Israel retained powers of forces on behalf of strategic value such as water resources, borders and air space. Israel, and costly economic powers Though not a comprehensive analysis of the Oslo period (which would be such as health, too extensive for this short work), the preceding section highlights a number education, investment of important trends in the Israeli–Palestinian dynamic. Most importantly, and so forth came under the jurisdiction the ‘peace process’ was characterized by patterns of cosmetic agreements of the Palestinian between unequal parties, which served to legitimize the continued domina- Authority. tion of one people over another. In this context it is easy to see how the ‘generous offer’ at Camp David simply attempted to further this policy of domination, portraying unviable territorial cantonization in occupied land as ‘concessions’. In addition it cloaked the permanent annexation of illegally captured water resources in the West Bank in the guise of ‘equal territorial swaps’, under which the Palestinians would receive vastly inferior desert land. The chasm that exists between myth and reality in the Palestinian conflict, neatly encapsulated in the Camp David summit and its coverage in the mainstream US press, is thus, to my mind, a huge obstacle to any viable possibilities for coexistence in the region. A more accurate understanding of the true nature of the conflict is a necessary first step in order to deconstruct the accepted ‘truths’ and begin to build a new vision of the region. Support for a different use of American pressure and influence in the Holy Land is an essential prerequisite for a solution based on the needs of the region’s people, rather than state-centric, zero-sum policies, which continue to create winners and losers and ultimately undermine real security. A different ‘frame’ for the conflict is urgently needed, especially within the United States, if Israeli policy in the Middle East is to meet with the necessary incentive to find a better solution for its Palestinian neighbours.

Conclusion … we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world – a world in which persons, objects, and actions have no inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is not inherent, then it must be created – imposed on action, events, or things through human action. But action is necessarily situated in a specific place and time. The meaning imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated. Moreover, because action in situations is inevitably structured by groups that dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent advantage in determining the meaning derived from action in situations. (Wolfsfeld 1997: 32) Davis, D.K.

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The ‘meanings’ and ‘truths’ that have been attached to the Israeli– Palestinian conflict in the media are often contradictory and often invite outrage from the opposing ‘camp’. By providing a critical lens for some of the dominant ‘truths’ about the conflict, representatively encapsulated in the debate over the Camp David summit, I have shown that significant aspects of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are being misrepresented in the influential arena of the American press. This misrepresentation has had, and continues to have, a detrimental effect on the prospects for a just resolution that offers both security and peace for the region. As well as provoking a lack of accountability in political circles, inaccurate press coverage and an unequal power balance encourages a lack of incentive on both sides to find a viable solution. The unequal character of the ‘peace process’ has been candidly highlighted by Shimon Peres, who noted that Israel was ‘in some ways […] negotiating with [itself]’ (Murphy 1995: 35). In this article I have highlighted how the dominant press narrative in the United States has provided an Israeli policy of ‘dressing up domination as cooperation’ with a powerful and legitimizing voice in a country that has a potentially transformative role to play in the conflict. Promoting a lasting peace based on justice and reconciliation requires the long-term support of an impartial United States in order to survive. Misleading narratives that dominate the mainstream US press about the conflict certainly constitute a significant obstacle to impartiality or accountability in US political involvement. Widespread insecurity in the Middle East demands an end to inaccurate and one-sided interpretation. If a solution is ever to be found in this war-torn area, one of the first steps must be a willingness from all sides to critically question their own ‘truths’ and to acknowledge that peace and security can never be meaningfully achieved at the expense of others. The future of this region is paramount to security in the whole of the Middle East and indeed the wider world. Exposure to more critical and honest accounts regarding the potential impact of allowing this struggle to continue will create a growing incentive for a just solution. Greater attempts to raise the profile of the tragic effects of the conflict on individual Palestinians might enable people to see that peace should not only be sought as a means of security but as a moral goal that is beneficial for all of humanity. Misrepresentation and deceitful interpretation of the conflict, especially in the United States, might then make way for accounts that promote justice and reconciliation in the region.

References Ackerman, Seth (2001), ‘The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the US media’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 30: 2 (Winter), pp. 61–74. Agha, Hussein and Malley, Robert (2001), ‘Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors’, New York Review of Books, 38: 13 (9 August). Benvenisti, Meron (2000), Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948 (trans. Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta), Berkeley: University of California Press. Clark, David (2002), ‘The brilliant offer Israel never made’, The Guardian, 10 April 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,681625,00.html Accessed on 16 July 2004.

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Cohen, Richard (2001), ‘Arafat on His Own’, The Washington Post, 29 May. Enderlin, Charles (2002), Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East 1995–2002 (trans. Susan Fairfield), New York: Other Press. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2003), Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, 2nd edn., London: Verso. Friedman, Thomas (2000), ‘Foreign Affairs: Arafat’s War’, New York Times, 13 October. —— (2001a), ‘Foreign Affairs: The Best of Enemies’, New York Times, 16 February. —— (2001b), ‘Foreign Affairs: It Only Gets Worse’, New York Times, 22 May. —— (2001c), ‘Foreign Affairs: Civil Peace Requires Civil War’, New York Times, 7 August. Giacaman, George and Lonning, Dag Jorund (eds) (1998), After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems, London: Pluto Press. Hanieh, Akram (2001), ‘The Camp David Papers’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 30: 2 (Winter), pp. 75–97. Hass, Amira (2001), ‘Separate and Unequal on the West Bank’, New York Times, 2 September. Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (2002), Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, 2nd edn., New York: Pantheon. Hockstader, Lee (2001), ‘A Different Take on Camp David Collapse: Palestinian Disputes Conventional Wisdom on Breakdown of US-Led Peace Talks’, The Washington Post, 24 July. Ibish, Hussein (2001), ‘Israel’s Wrong Turn’, The Washington Post, 10 March. Iyengar, Shanto and Simon, Adam (1994), ‘News coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing’, in W. Lance Bennet and David L. Paletz (eds), Taken by Storm: Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, Chicago: University of Chicago, p. 328. Krauthammer, Charles (2000), ‘Barak’s Last Chip’, The Washington Post, 15 September. Morris, Benny (2001), Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, New York: Vintage Books. —— (2002), ‘Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)’, New York Review of Books, 49: 10 (13 June). http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/15501 Accessed on 3 June 2004. Murphy, Emma (1995), ‘Stacking the Deck: The Economics of the Israeli–PLO Accords’, Middle East Report, 194/195 (May–August), pp. 35–38. New York Times Editorial Desk (2000), ‘Failure at Camp David’, New York Times, 26 July. Pressman, Jeremy (2003), ‘Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba’, International Security, 28: 2 (Fall). Reinhart, Tanya (2002), Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, New York: Seven Stories Press. Safire, William (2000), ‘Why is Arafat Smiling?’, New York Times, 27 July. Said, Edward W. (1978), Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, London: Penguin. —— (1994), Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage. —— (1997), Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, rev. edn., London: Vintage.

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—— (2002), The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After, 2nd edn., London: Granta Books. Selby, Jan (2003a), Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, London: I.B.Tauris. —— (2003b), ‘Dressing up domination as cooperation: the case of Israeli– Palestinian water relations’, Review of International Studies, 29, pp. 121–38. Shlaim, Avi (2000), The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, London: Penguin. Slater, Jerome (2001), What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process’, Political Science Quarterly, 116: 2, pp. 171–99. Sontag, Deborah (2001), ‘And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why it Failed’, New York Times, 26 July. Strobel, Warren P. (1997), Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington Post Editorial (2000a), ‘Camp David Breakdown’, Washington Post, 26 July. —— (2000b), ‘No Peace, No Process’, Washington Post, 11 October. Weymouth, Lally (2000), ‘Waiting for Arafat’, Washington Post, 28 July. Wolfsfeld, Gadi (1997), Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Suggested citation Piner, A. (2007), “The US media, Camp David and the Oslo ‘peace process’”, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 63–77, doi: 10.1386/ jammr.1.1.63/1

Contributor details Andrew J. Piner currently works as a teacher in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He has worked extensively on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and was formerly a senior researcher at the London-based Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies. He has also been involved in social development work in the Arab world. He has a Master’s degree in Critical Security Studies from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth and a BA Honours degree in History from the University of Durham, England. The views and opinions represented in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any current or former employer. Contact: The Grove Cottage, Albert Rd South, Malvern, Worcestershire, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.79/1 What is a blatte? Migration and ethnic identity in contemporary Sweden

Corina Lacatus University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Abstract Keywords Contemporary Sweden is experiencing an interesting sociocultural phenomenon migration of redefinition of national identity as a result of the rise of awareness of the everyday diaspora reality of discrimination and segregation of first- and second-generation immigrants ethnic identity from the Middle East, North Africa and Africa. blatte My article examines the formation and manifestations of a new kind of collective mass media consciousness of immigrants living in Sweden called blatte identity, defined by ethnic cultural expression markers constructed by opposition to the nationalistic ideals of an ethnically pure Arab world Swedish identity. More specifically, my article examines the construction and affir- Islam mation of a special kind of blatte identity, called a thought sultan (tankesultan). literature Briefly, a tankesuktan is a Swede of Arabic descent, proud of his Muslim back- Sweden ground, and actively engaging in resisting the assimilative forces within Swedish society. The concept was coined by the author Jonas Hassen Khemiri in his debut novel entitled An Eye Red (Ett Öga Rött) published in 2003. My argument discusses the trajectory of the concept from the artistic and literary realm into public discourse through the help of mass media, as well as the relation to other terms in the official and public discourse, such as immigrant, black skull (svartskalle), or ethnic Swede (svenne). From being an individual marker of ethnic belonging to the community of Arabic-speaking, Muslim immigrants to Sweden, a thought sultan (tankesultan) is used as a common denominator for some of the members of the immigrant community living in Sweden who like to consider their marginal social status and their everyday life marked by ethnic and religious discrimination. An instance of such use can be found in the magazine Gringo that is distributed for free in Sweden’s large urban areas, which made use of this concept as a categorizational tool of ethnic otherness for blattar, or immigrants, alongside other stereotyping concepts and images circulating in the public discourse of contemporary Sweden.

In contemporary Sweden, more and more intellectual voices react against an old-fashioned way of dividing the world in easily measured nationalistic dichotomies, such as us versus them or Swedes versus the immigrant other that leads to segregation and the deliberate effacing of sociocultural nuances, variations and complexities. Regardless of the people one talks to, from women living in semi-segregation in the immigrant suburb of Malmvägen in Sollentuna to a successful writer nominated for the Augustpriset, Jonas Hassen Khemiri, one encounters the same subsided anger and stubborn resistance to categorization. Legal terminology that organizes people as foreign or Swedish based on their background, while concepts that circulate in contemporary public discourse, such as blatte and its variants, are

1. Språknämnden at experienced as oppressive, discriminatory and, very importantly, as effective http://www. ways to invalidate one’s personal identity and individuality. spraknamnden.se. This article discusses the concept of blatte and traces its semantic trajectory in various media, from its earlier everyday use as a discriminatory term referring to Eastern European immigrants, to the more general meaning acquired in the past ten years’ mass media, referring to a larger number of immigrant minorities living in Sweden, such as South American, Eastern European, African and Middle Eastern. The focus of this analysis is to identify the religious and cultural aspects of the blatte category that are related to both the Arab world and Islam, in order to understand the complex processes of identity negotiation at work in contemporary Sweden. Muslims represent one of the groups encompassed by the semantic scope of blatte, sometimes referred to as thought sultans. In both the mass media and literature today, sociocultural characteristics attributed to Muslim blattar are extrapolated to such a degree that they become general feats of the Swede with non-Swedish ancestry, of the other.

Blatte and its semantic scope The term blatte is used interchangeably with black skull (svartskalle), and immigrant (invandrare/immigrant). These terms have been in public use since after World War Two and their meaning has been negotiated time and time again. Immigrant and invandrare have been the preferred concepts for official designation of people that have moved to Sweden and their offspring, while black skull is a derogatory term initially referring to Eastern European labour immigrants to Sweden, whose distinctive physical feat was their dark hair colour. In the past ten years, blatte has become more popular and together with black skull has become a household term, whose meaning is linked with a new sociocultural phenomenon initiated in the mid-1990s, namely the affirmation of immigrant identity grounded in ethnic pride. For the first time, representations of immigrants as the negative, inferior and marginal counterpart to ethnic Swedes are contested by self-representations of black skulls as complex, multidimensional and proud of their diverse ethnic heritage. On the one hand, blatte is used as a conceptual marker of social and cultural otherness and becomes an instrument of ethnic segregation; on the other hand, blatte is a perennialist identity marker for people who identify with characteristics associated with this concept. The term blatte is one of the most controversial and problematic concepts used actively in everyday speech and public discourse in Sweden. It is both a term of philosophical interrogation and of open debate in the Swedish mass media in the past couple of years. In the online dictionary at the Swedish Language Council,1 blatte (blattar pl.) is defined as a derogatory term used in the past in reference to African people and presently about foreigners and immigrants to Sweden:

Bakgrunden till skällsordet blatte är mycket osäker. Kanske hänger det ihop med ett verb blattra ‘pladdra, prata strunt’. Det verkar däremot osannolikt att det skulle hänga ihop med italienska blatta ‘kackerlacka’. Det kan beläggas åtminstone 1967, fast det kan gott vara äldre. Det finns med i Gibsons Svensk slangordbok från 1969, både i betydelsen ‘pajas’ och i betydelsen ‘neger’.

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Som skällsord om invandrare eller utlänning kan det beläggas i skrift från 1986. Det anses mycket grovt. [The origin of the pejorative term blatte is uncertain. It could be related to the verb blattra, which means ‘babble, prattle’. It seems highly unlikely that it would be etymologically related to the Italian blatta, which means cockroach. It can be dated back to 1967, but may be much older than that. Gibson’s Swedish Slang Dictionary, published in 1969, records two meanings: ‘clown’ and ‘nigger, Negro’. It can be dated back to 1986 as a derogatory term used in written texts for immigrant or foreigner. It is considered to be very offensive.]

In metaphorical terms, blatte encapsulates the crisis of Swedish nationalism driven by a mono-ethnic ideology, at the encounter with migration from specific parts of the world, such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Africa and South America. Although the concept does not have a clearly defined referent, there is a noticeable tendency to draw a distinction between its users in the spirit of the perennialist school of thought – if people who think of themselves as ‘blattar’ use the word to refer to themselves or other people they recognize as peers, the word loses its derogatory connotation and gains an aura of resistance to discrimination, segregation and the authority of legal official categorization. It is usually characteristic of both young immigrants who have lived most of their lives in Sweden, and their children born in Sweden. But any other immigrant who can prove to be worthy of the epithet can use it self-referentially. Nevertheless, there are heritage or non-heritage Swedes who could never be considered blattar, since they are rarely the object of ethnic discrimination, such as people moving to Sweden from the other Scandinavian and West European countries, North America or East Asia. The word blatte is not considered to be a perfect synonym for invandrare. The definitional arguments of blatte as an ethnic category presented above are clearly linked to a specific locality, by accommodating people that are immigrants and/or by living in the immigrant suburbs. Additionally, blatte ethnic identity is also linked to questions of class, since blattar have a working-class background, and the discourse of race, since the ethnic group has to bear the distinctive marks of a non-Nordic skin, eye and hair colour (non-Caucasian, blue eyes and blond hair). Blatte is also an epithet of choice, a self-proclaimed state of mind and action on the part of people who feel discriminated against, oftentimes flaunted with pride as an act of social resistance and defiance.

Jonas Hassen Khemiri: blattar and hip-hop-style thought sultans In the August 2003 episode of the classic Program 1 summer radio programme entitled Summer Talk (Sommarprat), the young author Jonas Hassen Khemiri builds his radiophonic autobiographical monologue around music. Hip-hop songs, in English and in Swedish, punctuate events in his life, enhancing their meaning and celebrating their real- life heroes. Also, hip-hop’s articulation of everyday life is the driving force of Khemiri’s debut novel, An Eye Red (Ett öga rött), in which Khemiri lets rhythm and literary prose interweave to create an experimental and

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2. Dalanda is a female original narrative, showing unprecedented linguistic artistry in Swedish character that exerts literature. Khemiri continues and enriches their ideological legacy and a powerful influence over Halim in the creates a rich novelistic universe in which immigrant experiences beginning of the are mingled with adolescent rebelliousness, emotional and hormonal novel. She encourages confusion, linguistic playfulness and, very importantly, racism and ethnic the main character to define himself as discrimination. an Arab and value Khemiri’s debut novel builds around the blatte concept and constructs Arabic cultural and a fictional semantic scope for it. The main character, teenage Halim, for- religious traditions over the Swedish. mulates a blatte ontology according to which everything in the world is either Swedish or non-Swedish, or rather svenne or blatte. He defines these types with the help of categories inspired by stereotypes about immigrants that are commonplace in contemporary public discourse. And the perfect illustration of this dichotomous world is the identity he constructs for himself as a special kind of blatte, namely the thought sultan. Khemiri’s rhetorical strategy is founded on the construction of a gallery of characters that refuse to become perfect illustrations of the stereotyped reality Halim creates for them. The driving force of the narrative is the main character’s unfulfilled desire to be the perfect representation of the thought-sultan identity he constructed for himself. Narrative unreliability stems precisely from the incongruity between Halim’s need to live up to his ideal of blatte identity and the ontological rigidity of the stereotypes he uses to construct the identity. An Eye Red (Ett öga rött) is a novel about identity. The narrative written in the first person centres on Halim’s multiple attempts to give structure to the diverse world around him and also define a unique category for himself. He reduces people to two major groups, blattar and Swedes, and places himself in the former category as a special kind of non-heritage Swede, namely the thought sultan. Identity formation is a dynamic process of othering (Lacan 1975), of simultaneously distancing from oneself and mirroring into reality and people outside of oneself. Jacques Lacan illustrates identity construction through the metaphor of the broken mirror. At a very early age, the infant experiences a sense of his/her own body as distant, as the other, when he/she sees its reflection in the mirror for the first time. The self is a collage of experiences reflected by pieces of a mirror and arranged in a coherent entity by imagination. Halim’s fictional self is constructed by attempts to position himself in relation to other characters in the narrative. Most of the characters are constructed schematically to illustrate the twofold world order defined by Halim. The dominant figures, however, Dalanda2, his father Otman and deceased mother, and his fleeting love interest, Malin, are too complex to fit Halim’s rigid ethnically based dichotomous reality. According to Halim, a teenage blatte’s identity is articulated primarily by ethnicity and unusual public behaviour justified by a penchant for hip-hop culture. Three different types can be identified in the blatte category – the gangsta, the good guy, and the thought sultan, or the revolutionary blatte. Moreover, while the svenne category might be rather limited despite its social dominance and alleged superiority over the immigrants, the blatte category is large enough to encompass almost everything non-Swedish, whether non-heritage or simply foreign:

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I dag har jag filosoferat fram en teori om svennarna och svartskallarna på skolan: [...] Blattarna på skolan är inte så många men kommer ändå i två versioner. Nummer ett är den vanliga blatten: knasaren, snikaren, snattaren, ligisten. Som exempel kan man ta Sebastian och Angelo. I Skäris bästa exem- plet är Alonzo för det var han som lärde Juan hur vi skulle handla 50-örestuggummin på Gottoken efter ha lagt Snicker och Raiders i jackäm- nen. Det är tack vare han jag vet hur man hittar civilsnutar i folksamlingar och förstärker soft air guns till riktiga vapen. Blattesort nummer två är duk- tighetskillen som pluggar prov och använder finord och aldrig plankar tun- nelbanan eller taggish. Som exempel vi har tvillingarna Fuad och Fadi plus alla andra iranier som smörar lärare och vill bli tandläkare och ingenjörer. Dom tror dom får respekt men egentligen alla lärare skrattar åt dom för man fattar dom är vilsna. Men i dag jag har filosoferat fram det finns också en tredje blattesort som står helt fri och är den som svennarna hatar mest: revolutionsblatten, tankesultanen. Den som ser igenom alla lögner och som aldrig låter sig luras. Ungefär som al-Kindi som knäckte alla koder och skrev flera tusen grymma böcker om astronomi och filosofi men också om musik och matte. Förra termi- nen jag var nog mest knasaren men från nu jag svär jag ska bli tankesultan. (Khemiri 2003: 38)

[Today I’ve philosophized on a theory about Swedes and black skulls at school: [...] The blattar at school are not that many but can still be found in two versions. Number one if the normal blatte: the crook, hood, thug, gangsta. For instance, Sebastian and Angelo. The best example in Skäris is Alonzo cuz he was the one who taught Juan how to buy 50-cent chewing gum at Gottoken after putting Snickers and Raiders up his sleeve. Thanks to him I know now how to spot police in plain clothes in a crowd and how to upgrade soft air guns to real guns. Blatte type number two is intelligent guy that studies for tests and uses nice words, never sneaks onto the subway trains without paying and never writes tags. For instance the twins Fuad and Fadi plus all the other Iranians that butter up teachers and want to become dentists and engineers. They think that they get respect but the teachers really laugh at them cuz they get that they’re really lost. But today I’ve philosophized on a new kind of blatte, who stands free and is the one Swedes hate the most: the revolution blatte, the thought sultan. He sees through all lies and never lets anybody fool them. Almost like al-Kindi who hacked all kinds of codes and wrote several thousands awesome books on astronomy and philosophy but also on music and math. Last quarter I was more the gansta type but I swear that from now on I’ll turn more into a thought sultan.]

The first blatte type is the gangsta, the person who does not fear to manifest publicly his status as ethnic other through violent, illegal behaviour. Most likely inspired by the American gangsta’ hip-hop, or at least by its representations in the mass media and films, Halim’s gangsta is the teenager who steals Snickers bars cool-headedly while paying the price of a chewing gum, is able to spot a policeman in a large crowd and can handle guns skilfully. The second kind of blatte is the socially proper Persian good kid, the lost blatte, who never misses school because he wants to become a dentist

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or an engineer, never writes graffiti, nor is able to realize that the teachers despise him in spite of his hard work. And there is also a third kind of blatte, the thought sultan or the revolutionary blatte, who represents the epitome of blatte wisdom by being able to discern truth from lies in a world dominated by Swedes (svennar) and to identify the multiple everyday manifestations of the universal anti-blatte conspiracy. And Halim envisions himself as belonging to the third category. Halim is trapped in a dichotomous view of the world as divided into us and them, svenne Swedes and blattar, characterized by stereotypes and clichés, and cannot seem to escape it. By organizing the world around him according to this duality, Halim reinforces ethnic differences between the two groups, ultimately reaffirming discrimination and racism. A blatte is a dark-haired masculine man, who takes pride in his foreign heritage, enjoys a hip-hop lifestyle, and can code switch between standard Swedish and Swedish with a thick foreign accent whenever appropriate. On the other hand, a Swede is a person from a wealthy family, who dresses well even when trying to pass for a hip-hop fan, speaks standard Swedish and is opinionated about literature and music:

Man kan säga det finns tre sorters svennar. Först det är lyxsvennarna som spelar maffia fast på svennevis. Dom har märken som är dyra fast ändå dom har små loggor och syns mindre än dyra blattemärken. (Svartskallar spelar rika mera ärliga.) [...] Ändå lyxsvennarna är ganska få för nästan alla i skolan hör till lodis- gänget som går klädda i tattartrasor med söndriga skinnjackor och jeansen maxat håliga. Ofta dom har total oreda i håren och ibland tjejerna har långa sammetskjolar och rutade strumpor. Om man vill bli en av dom man måste säga ryssar gör bästa poesin och lyssna på Bob Hund istället for Snoop Doggy Dogg. [...] Tredje svennesorten är dansklassarna fast egentligen man ser dom inte ofta på skolan för jämt dom hänger uppe i balettsalen och tränar träjning. Danstjejerna är pyttesmala och har knutfrisyr och killarna är kanske fyra- fem stycken per klass och ger alltid leenden på skolfotot som riktiga bögar. Alla dansklassare går med tårna utåt och ryggen rak som värsta bräda. (Khemiri 2003: 37)

[We can say that there are three different kinds of Swedes. First come the luxury Swedes who act like mafiosi, only in a Swedish way. They have expensive brand clothes, but their logos are small compared to the blatte brands and you can barely see them. (Black skulls act like rich people in a more real way.) [...] But there aren’t that many luxury Swedes cuz most people at school are in the bums’ gang that walk around wearing Tatar-style rags with torn leather jackets and jeans with huge holes. Oftentimes their hair is all messy and sometimes girls have lace skirts and checkered socks. If you want to be one of them you have to say that Russians write the best poetry and listen to Bob Hund instead of Snoop Doggy Dogg. [...] The third kind of Swede is in the dance classes though you don’t really see them at school so much cuz they hang out in the ballet studio and practise their practice. The dance girls are super tiny and wear their hair in a bun and the guys are like four or five in each class and always smile in the school

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photo like real gays. All in the dance class walk with their toes outward and their backs straight like timber.]

Halim’s view of the blattar is formed through the reversal of the Swedish/blatte dichotomy and the power relations at work in contemporary Sweden’s everyday reality. He constructs an imaginary world where blattar are more powerful than svennar and manifest their dominance in subversive ways. His fictional reality is composed of essentialist interactions among blattar and svennar might, enhancing Halim’s blatte identity:

Aldrig jag kommer äta sur strömming med sillnubbe på Skansen eller dansa smågrodor i träskor runt töntigaste midsommarstång. Aldrig jag kommer låta politikerna förbjuda buffalos eller spänniströjor eller höja hårvaxpriser. När Dalanda berättade jag trodde henne, men ändå jag visste inte tecknen var så här tydliga. (Khemiri 2003: 56)

[I will never eat fermented Baltic herring with aquavit at Skansen or dance the little frogs’ dance while wearing wooden clogs around the the dummest midsummer may pole. I will never let politicians ban buffalo shoes and stretchy sweaters or raise the price of hairwax. When Dalanda told me about this, I believed her, but I still didn’t know the signs were so evident.]

Halim strives to become a free thinker and to make a leap of faith from being a gangsta blatte to becoming a thought sultan, but is not aware of his unchanging and bounded ontological status. A thought sultan is merely another type of blatte, an intellectual and free thinker, whose main acquired skill is the ability to discern anti-blatte conspiracies organized by Swedes. As a non-heritage Swede, or a blatte, he is a cultural and linguistic hybrid. The meaning of the concept of a thought sultan is determined by one’s Arabic ethnicity and Muslim religious beliefs; the second word of the compound, ‘sultan’, implies the existence of a certain authority or power exerted over a group of people of the same Muslim confession. The word tanke, or thought, gives the prototypical thought sultan a reflective quality, similar to the one of a philosopher of religion. In Halim’s words, however, the concept acquires a new meaning contextualized in contemporary Sweden, designating an immigrant with intellectual preoccupations and an uncanny ability to identify manifestations of assimilationist subversiveness in the political, public and personal spheres dominated by Swedes. The kind of power Halim attributes to a thought sultan is exercised subver- sively in the name of the anti-Swedish revolution rather than the religion of the Koran, and confers this special kind of blatte a higher status among its non-heritage Swedish peers due to his critical cunning. Yet this semantic distance from the word’s connotative and denotative meanings becomes a very efficient stylistic device, meant to induce the reader’s mistrust of the main character as a reliable narrator. In other words, thought sultan is a higher position in the blatte ontology, and Halim strives to occupy it. Its etymological make-up is inspired by Arabic culture, while its referential scope is imaginary, modified by Halim’s own fictitious understanding of it. The concept’s newly acquired meaning is

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significant for the understanding of Halim’s psychological disposition throughout the novel – it is the embodiment of his need to dominate and control an entirely diasporic world he constructs from indistinct memories of early childhood in Morocco and fragments of conversation with his father. Halim creates a world much like a diasporic collage, as the expression of his need to ground himself in a world outside of Sweden that feels familiar and welcoming. Moreover, the entire narrative is the representation of Halim’s struggle to combine the two worlds he likes to inhabit, namely contemporary Sweden and an imaginary diasporic land of thought sultans. To Halim, hip-hop culture represents the only acceptable kind of social behaviour, since it is grounded in a sense of rebelliousness and resistance to all forms of authority, attempting to sublimate anger and frustration in scratching, dancing, rapping and graffiti writing. And the most appealing reality to Halim is tagging, which is a simplified form of graffiti writing, mostly as a manifestation of his feelings of alienation and frustration with ethnic discrimination by Swedes. In the greater process of shaping an identity built on ethnicity and a sense of belonging to a community, Halim’s writing of his own name on walls around the city acts as a kind of symbolic self-affirmation, a visual manifestation of the only power he can exert over other people, and a metaphorical projection of his desired thought-sultan identity:

Jag lovade från nu fittorna kommer ångra dom försöker göra om Halim till en puckellös kamel och nu det är totalkrig för släktingar till Hannibal och Saladin ger sig ALDRIG. Innan jag gick tillbaka till klassen jag attackerade två toaletter nära slöjdsalen, kryssade alla keffa tags och fyllde varje kakel med svarta stjärnor och månar. (Khemiri 2003: 22)

[I promised that starting now those cunts will regret trying to turn Halim into a humpless camel and now we’re at war cuz Hannibal’s and Saladin’s relatives NEVER give up. Before I went back to the classroom I attacked two bathrooms by the crafts’ room, drew all over the bad tags and filled every single tile with black stars and moons.]

In the spirit of hip-hop, Halim portrays himself as a typical oversexualized man, enjoying the company of women on a physical level. In Halim’s mind, sexuality is regarded as an ethnic marker for men of Arabic descent, differentiating them from the much more feminine svennar. As an established thought sultan living in the ivory tower located in old Baghdad, Halim gets the attention and interest of numerous women due exclusively to his unusually refined intelligence:

Jag satt där på geografin och kände mig som gammal arabisk vetenskaps- man med fez och snabelskor som bodde i torn (kanske gamla Bagdad). Jag hade kikare som räckte hela vägen till Europa och rykte som gjorde att andra lärda tittade på mitt torn med blandad hat och nyfikenhet. Dessutom jag var värsta kosmonovan och hade massa gussar som ville komma till mitt torn för att röka shisha och sen baza bara för jag var så grymmish klokish. (Såklart dom skulle få fetdiss för Marit är min enda.) (Khemiri 2003: 109)

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[I was sitting in geography class feeling like an old Arabic scientist with fez 3. ‘Gringo väljer att kalla and snail-like shoes who lives in a tower (maybe in old Baghdad). I had det miljonsvenska eftersom det är en binoculars that saw all the way to Europe and smoked so much that all the svenska som pratas i other wise men looked at my tower with a mix of hatred and curiosity. miljonprogramsområ- Moreover, I was the best Cosmonova and lots of girls wanted to come to my den i Sverige.’ tower to smoke shisha and later just fuck cuz I was so phat smart. (Of course, I would diss them big time, cuz Marit is the only one for me.)]

Yet another time, Halim compensates unsatisfactory reality with an imagined world where he would be the object of everybody’s envy and the centre of women’s attention – instead of being a rebellious and aggressive teenager, with no girlfriend and very few friends, he thinks of himself as a classical Arabic scholar with a rapper’s sex appeal.

Gringo: thought sultans in the written press Jonas Hassen Khemiri’s fictional definition of blattar as well as his conceptual construction, the thought sultan, entered contemporary Sweden’s public sphere through his very popular debut novel. Moreover, the mass media popularized the terms in numerous reviews of the book or bio- graphical articles about the author. There is one newspaper, however, that continues An Eye Red’s ideological agenda of problematizing the dichotomy us/them or blattar/Swedes and draws heavily from the same Swedish hip- hop tradition. The magazine Gringo, whose chief editor Adami, turned the duality svenne/blatte into a successful business idea. It is a series of articles published monthly in the free daily newspaper Metro and collected four times a year in a separate magazine called Gringo Grande. The magazine is written in what the editors call ‘One Million Project Swedish’ (miljonsvenska), a term that refers to the government housing project from the late 1960s, thus anchoring their journalism into a tradition of spatial and ideological resistance to authority. Their linguistic choice is justified simply and unproblematically in a 7 November article by Nivette Dawod: ‘Gringo has made the deliberate choice of calling it ‘million’ Swedish, since it is the kind of Swedish spoken in the ‘million programme’ areas in Sweden.’3 Gringo continues the Latin Kings’ and Jonas Hassen Khemiri’s agendas of resistance to discrimination in a journalistic format. Ultimately, the ideological goal of the editorial board is to shape its readers’ critical thinking, demystify the word blatte, and symbolically redefine the power imbalance it connotes:

Vart ordet blatte kommer ifrån ursprungligen vet vi inte. Den hetaste teorin är att det kommer från franskan och betyder kackerlacka. En annan är att blatte kommer från blading som är ett bladätande kryp. Oavsett ordets ursprung föddes det inte av kärlek från början. När allt fler avvek från den blonda mallen behövdes ett nedvärderande begrepp för att markera att vitt är bäst. Gringos mål är att ifrågasätta den hierarkin. Vi menar att vitt är lika bra som svart och alla andra färger med för den delen. Vårt sätt har varit att avdramatisera och lyfta upp blatte för att jämna ut nivåskillnaden. Genom att inte använda ordet går vi annars med på att det är sämre och reproducerar på så sätt maktobalansen. Det senaste året har vi sett en högkonjunktur för användningen av ordet blatte. En liten T-shirt trend för märket ‘Blattelicious’.

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Rekryteringbolaget ‘Blatteförmedlingen’. Prisutdelningen ‘Blatte de lux’. Och sist men inte minst ‘blattesvenska’. Ordet har tagit sitt första steg i att inte vara lika känsligt och bli allt mer rumsrent. Allt fler blattar tar till sig epitetet med stolthet. Samtidigt finns det fortfarande många som blir sårade när någon kallar dem för blatte. Och de ska respekteras. Är du osäker på om du vågar använda ordet eller inte så fråga. Med tiden hoppas jag att ordet blatte försvinner. Det kommer hända när vi slutar dela upp oss och alla ser varandra som svenskar. (Adami 2006)

[We do not know the origin of the word blatte. The hottest theory is that the word comes from French and means ‘cockroach’. Another theory is that blatte comes from blading, which is a kind of leaf beet. Regardless of the origin, the word was definitely not born out of love. More and more people started breaking the patter of blond hair, and the need for a new word surfaced, indicating the fact that being white is the best. Gringo’s goal is to question this hierarchy. We believe that white is just as good as black, or any other skin colour for that matter. Our strategy has been to normalize and elevate blatte in order to level out the hierarchical difference. If we don’t use the word, we acknowledge that that it is worse, thus reinforcing the power imbalance. This past year, the use of the word blatte has been particularly profitable. A fashion trend with t-shirts featuring logos for a company named ‘Blattelicious’. A recruitment company called ‘The Blatte Agency’. Or the ‘Blatte de Luxe’ award. And last but not least, ‘blatte Swedish’. The term has moved toward desensitization and political correctness. More and more blattar embrace the epithet proudly. There are still quite a few people who feel offended when somebody calls them blattar. And that should be taken in consideration. Are you unsure whether you should dare to use the word or not, please write to us. We are hoping that the word blatte is going to disappear in time. But that will only happen when we stop dividing ourselves and everybody starts considering himself/herself a Swede.]

Gringo turns Halim’s blatte ontology from fictional ideology into a journalistic representation of everyday stereotypes circulating in contemporary Sweden’s public sphere. In the first issue of the magazine Gringo Grande of July 2005, Mayrem Can writes a psychometric test meant to determine which stereotype category one belongs to. According to him, stereotypes are the best way to measure the evolution of prejudice in a society:

Stereotyperna i samhället behövs fett mycket, utan dem skulle det bli himla svårt att hålla reda på alla fördomar, till exempel. Vilken stereotyp är du? J-Lo, Bling-bling eller kanske en Tankesultan? (Can 2005)

[Stereotypes are a social necessity. If they didn’t exist, it would be awfully difficult to keep track of many things around us, including prejudice. What’s your stereotype? J-Lo? Bling bling, or perhaps the Thought Sultan?]

If one selects more ‘A’ answers, thus fitting the description of a self- absorbed rocker with an intellectual side, who likes to use his/her free time

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for thinking and philosophizing and has Noam Chomsky as a role model, one is a thought sultan. Can recontextualizes Khemiri’s term, focusing more on the thought sultan’s intellectual preoccupations rather than Halim’s religious or cultural references to the Arab world and Muslims:

A. Tankesultanen (tjej/kille) Du tänker och tänker, så att du tänker på vad du tänkte att du skulle tänka. Du tänker på precis allt och ser ner på alla som inte tänker, som dig, dåra. Du har rufsig frisyr, basker, liten skäggodling, glasögon med feta bågar, slitna manchesterbyxor, grön militärinspirerad jacka och anser dig vara en intellek- tuell snubbinna/snubbe. Du vägrar erkänna att din bara existens är synonym med ‘pretto’.

[A. The thought sultan You think and think, so that you end up thinking about what you think that you should be thinking. You think about everything and look down on people who don’t think like you. Just fools. Your hair’s lank and a little dishevelled; you wear a beret, glasses with thick black frames, worn-out pants, and a green military-style coat. You call yourself an intellectual.]

This is an interesting example of semantic renegotiation occurring in the public sphere – characteristics initially identified as typically Muslim or Arabic become general feats of the blatte, of the non-Swedish other in general. The concept blatte appears overdetermined and saturated, despite the semantic ambiguity of its referent in real life. In more abstract terms, blatte is a sociocultural metaphor that stands for a current sociocultural reality in Sweden; it also stands for a raised awareness of both the prevalence of the us/them dichotomy in our understanding of the world around us and the necessity to resist and combat ethnic discrimination and segregation. Blatte encapsulates several ethnic markers of sociocultural otherness. Its referent is overdetermined by numerous definitions that attempt to delimit a fixed space of signification, a sociocultural context that would make all blattar visible, identifiable and more easily categorized in the greater national discourse of Swedish identity. To a self-identified blatte, visibility created with the help of official categories or everyday labels is not only a personal offence, but also the reaffirmation of the power imbalance represented by the dichotomy of us/them.

References Adami, Zaniar (2006), ‘Miljonsvenska är framtiden’, Gringo, 7 November. Appadurai, Arjun (1996), Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis and London: University of Minneapolis Press. Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel (1988), Race, nation, classe: Les identité ambiguës, Paris: Éditions La Découverte. Bammer, Angelika (ed.) (1994), Displacements. Cultural Identities in Question, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Bendix, Regina (2000), ‘Heredity, Hybridity and Heritage from One Fin de Siècle to the Next’, in Pertti J. Anttonen, Anna-Leena Siikala, Stein R. Mathisen and Leif

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Magnusson (eds), A Festschrift for Barbro Klein, Botkyrka, Sweden: Multicultural Centre. Bhabha, Homi (1994), The Location of Culture, London: Routledge. Can, Mayrem (2005), ‘Vilken stereotyp är du?’, Gringo Grande, 1 (June). Césaire, Aimé (1972), Discourse on Colonialism, New York and London: Monthly Review Press. Chambers, Iain (1994), Migrancy, Culture, Identity, London and New York: Routledge. Cosgrove, Denis and Domosh, Mona (1993), ‘Author and Authority’, in James Duncan and David Ley (eds), Place/Culture/Representation, London and New York: Routledge. Cresswell, Tim (1996), In Place/Out of Place, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. Cross, Brian (1993), It’s Not About a Salary: Rap, Race, and Resistance in Los Angeles, London: Verso. Cross, Malcolm and Keith, Michael (eds) (1993), Racism, the City and the State, London: Routledge. Daun, Åke (1989), Svensk mentalitet: Ett jämförande perspective, Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren. Dawod, Nivette (2006), ‘Vem äger ditt språk?’, Gringo, 7 November. Derrida, Jacques (1985), The Ear of the Other, New York: Schocken Books. —— (1995), Points... Interviews 1974–1994 (ed. Elisabeth Weber)ed, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Doggelito, Dogge and Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt (2004), Förortsslang, Stockholm: Norstedts. Donald, James and Rattanasi, Ali (1992), ‘Race’, Culture & Difference, Newbury Park, CA, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications. Duncan, James and Ley, David (eds) (1993), Place/ Culture/Representation, London and New York: Routledge. Ekström, Simon and Gerholm, Lena (2006), Orienten i Sverige: Samtida möten och gränssnitt, Lund: Studentlitteratur. Eliot, T. S. (1948), Notes towards the Definition of Culture,London: Faber and Faber Limited. Frans, Joe (ed.) (1988), Välkommen i princip, Borås, Sweden: Periskopet. Fraurud, Kari and Hyltenstam, Kenneth (eds) (2001), Multilingualism in Global and Local Perspectives: Selected Papers From the 8th Nordic Conference on Bilingualism, 1–3 November, Stockholm/Rinkeby: Stockholm University, Centre for Research on Bilingualism and Rinkeby Institute of Multilingual Research. Frith, Simon (ed.) (2003), Popular Music: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies, vols 2 and 4, New York: Routledge. Gröndahl, Satu (2002), Litteraturens gränsland: Invandrar-och minoritetslitteratur i nordiskt perspektiv, Uppsala: Centrum för multietnisk forskning, Uppsala University. Hall, Stuart (1993), ‘Cultural Identity and Diasporas’, in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, New York: Columbia University Press. Hall, Stuart and du Gay, Paul (eds) (1996), Questions of Cultural Identity, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage Publications. Hall, Stuart and Whannel, Paddy (1964), The Popular Arts, London: Hutchinson Educational.

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Johansson, Alf W. (ed.) (2001), Vad är Sverige? Röster om svensk nationell identitet, Stockholm: Prisma. Jonsson, Rickard (2007), Blatte betyder kompis: Om maskulinitet och språk i en högstadieskola, Stockholm: Ordfront. Kamali, Masoud (1997), Distorted Integration: Clientization of Immigrants in Sweden, Multiethnic Papers 41, Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Centre for Multi-ethnic Research. Keith, Michael and Pile, Steve (1993), Place and the Politics of Identity, London and New York: Routledge. Khemiri, Jonas Hassen (2003), Ett öga rött, Stockholm: Norstedts. King, Bruce (1996), New National and Post-colonial Literatures, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt (2001), Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt, “Från Ekenssnack till Rinkebysvenska” Pedagogiska magasinet. Lärarförbundets tidskrift för utbildning, forskning och debatt, April 2nd. pages 8–14. Krekow, Sebastian (1999), Hiphop-lexikon, Berlin: Lexikon Imprint Verlag. Kitwana, Bakari (2002), The Hip-Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African American Culture, New York: Basic Civitas Books. Lacan, Jacques The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 1 (Jacques-Alain Miller, ed.) 1975 New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company Leyens, Jacques-Philippe, Yzerbyt, Vincent and Schadron, Georges (1994), Stereotypes and Social Cognition, London; Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage Publications. Lovell, Nadia (ed.) (1998), Locality and Belonging, London and New York: Routledge. Phillips-Martinsson, Jean (1991), Swedes as Others See Them, Lund: Studentlitteratur. Rojas, Mauricio (2005), Sweden after the Swedish model: From Tutorial State to Enabling State, Stockholm: Timbro. Romero, Madeleine (2005), ‘Blatte – en etnicitet? om ungdomars med utländsk bakgrund syn på sin etnicitet,’ Masters Thesis, Lunds Universitet. Pile, Steve and Keith, Michael (eds) (1997), Geographies of Resistance, London and New York: Routledge. Rahn, Janice (2002), Painting Without Permission Hip-Hop Graffiti Subculture, Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey. Sernhede, Ove (2002), Alienation is my nation: hiphop och unga mäns utanförskap i Det nya Sverige, Stockholm: Ordfront. Shields, Rob (1992), Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity, London and New York: Routledge. Sibley, David (1992), ‘Outsiders in Society and Space’, in Kay Anderson and Fay Gale (eds), Inventing Places: Studies in Cultural Geography, Sydney: Longman Cheshire. —— (1995), Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West, London and New York: Routledge. Strage, Fredrik (2001), Mikrofonkåt, Stockholm: Atlas. Tigervall, Carina (2005), Folkhemsk film med ‘invandraren’ i rollen som den sympatiske Andre, Doctoral Dissertation Umeå, Sweden: Umeå University. Wenger, Alejandro Leiva (2000), Va’ ska jag med hiphop len?, 2000: 6 Stockholm: Journal Arena.

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—— (2006), ‘Blattesvenskan står för spåkglädje’, Dagens Nyheter, 27 April, Stockholm. Westin, Charles (1999), Mångfald, integration, rasism och andra ord: Ett lexikon över begrepp inom IMER – Internationell Migration och Etniska Relationer, Stockholm: Socialstyrelsen and CEIFO.

Suggested citation Lacatus, C. (2007), ‘What is a blatte? Migration and ethnic identity in contemporary Sweden’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 79–92, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.79/1

Contributor detail Corina Lacatus teaches at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and is a research affiliate with The Center for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations at Stockholm University. She graduated from Bucharest University (Romania) with a BA in Arabic and Scandinavian and from University of California, Los Angeles with a doctoral thesis discussing ethnicity and cultural expression in contemporary Sweden. She is interested in the issues of migration to Western Europe and its representations, the Middle East, and the interplay between cultural history, literature, the arts and the law. Contact: Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2090 Foreign Languages Building, 707 S. Mathews Avenue, Urbana, Illinois 61801 USA, Research Affiliate, The Centre for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Stockholm University

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Book Reviews

New Media and the New Middle East, Philip Seib (ed.), (2007) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 284 pp., Hardcover, ISBNs: 1403979731, 978-1403979735, Price: £42.50. Reviewed by Olivia Allison

Is the media a weapon ‘lying in the street’, as Richard Clutterbuck once wrote, or a tool for democratization in the Middle East? Put more simply, do media stimulate change, positive or negative, in the Middle East? Media studies have been attempting to answer these difficult questions in the Middle East for years, particularly after the emergence of pan-Arab satellite TV channels. (Indeed, media scholars have attempted to answer this difficult question globally for decades.) This valuable edited volume’s title, New Media and the New Middle East, obliquely references US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement that the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war may represent the birth pangs of a ‘new Middle East’. Positioning the media as the potential agent for creating this new Middle East, this volume provides articles addressing numerous aspects of new media development in the Middle East, ranging from country- and situation-specific issues to timely contributions to academic debates. Topics include Al-Jazeera’s public diplomacy as an international actor, women’s blogs in Kuwait, pan-Arab TV stations’ talk shows, Israeli and Palestinian use of the Internet, and Middle Eastern press freedom. Three primary themes emerge from this volume, which deserve further explanation: credibility, the role of Al-Jazeera, and political agitation/ resistance.

Roots of credibility One word of significant concern to this volume’s authors is ‘credibility’, which appears first in the Preface and continues as a theme throughout many of the subsequent chapters. In much of the book, the concept is not defined, despite its potentially contentious meaning, but the best definition of the topic comes from Mohammed El-Nawawy, who quotes Dominic Infante’s definition of source credibility: ‘a set of attitudes toward a source that influence how receivers behave toward the source’, based on expertness and trustworthiness (p. 126). Most other references to press freedom in the Middle East hinge on Arabness: Philip Seib and Sahar Khamis, respectively, assert that media credibility in the Middle East, particularly for Al-Jazeera, is based on its quality as ‘by Arabs for Arabs’ (pp. xiii, 41). Shahira Fahmy and Thomas J. Johnson assert that there are links between individuals’ most-used news medium and its credibility, as well as the possibility of a link

between media credibility and perceptions of press freedom in the Middle East (pp. 85–86). It is here that ‘expertness’ and ‘trustworthiness’ are useful: people do not turn to Al-Jazeera simply because it is Arab. Seib argues that domestic news organizations in the Middle East, most of which are also Arab, have less credibility than pan-Arab stations because they are seen as subject to more political pressures (p. 3). Al-Jazeera may be more credible for its viewers than CNN because it is Arab, but Al-Jazeera may also be more credible than national outlets because of its perceived press freedom. (This may not always be true, however: Samar al-Roomi argues that for domestic issues, domestic news outlets are viewed as more trustworthy in Kuwait (p. 144).) Issues of credibility in the Middle East deserve further research, both for those studying US or European public diplomacy but also because it may prove instructive about why audiences tune in to various outlets. For instance, Mohammed El-Nawawy’s explanation of US-run Radio Sawa’s and Al Hurra TV’s failure as stemming from a lack of credibility (although the music on Radio Sawa is popular) is a useful summary of problems with these stations. Credibility of other US messages on local pan-Arab stations, however, is not addressed in any public diplomacy studies in this volume, and would be a useful area for future research.

Evaluating or excluding Al-Jazeera Any evaluation of the change-making role of new media in the Middle East is likely to include a significant examination of Al-Jazeera, and this volume is no exception. The articles specifically examining Al-Jazeera go beyond the usual discussions of influence on the station or its freedom, however. Two chapters examine at various levels whether over-reliance on Al- Jazeera is distorting opinions of Middle Eastern media. Shahira Fahmy and Thomas J. Johnson’s chapter asks whether regular reliance on Al-Jazeera’s TV and online programming affects audience perceptions of Middle Eastern press freedom. This article, although aimed at a self-selecting group (responses to a survey on the Al-Jazeera website), provides an interesting statistical analysis, ultimately finding that after controlling for variables like political activity and age/education, reliance on Al-Jazeera did not significantly alter comments on regional press freedom (p. 93). Mark Lynch’s article evaluating pan-Arab TV (Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya) talk shows criticizes previous over-reliance on Faisal al-Qassem’s The Opposite Direction, branching out to evaluate four talk shows’ coverage of Middle Eastern development in early 2004. Lynch’s analysis ultimately finds that the various types of debate (from audience call-in programmes to almost-staged debates) constitute a range of discussions beyond Jon Alterman’s ‘professional wrestling’ formulation. In content, too, the range of opinions stretches beyond simple hostility ‘to the American project, [extending] also to the perspective of the Arab regimes eager to stifle reform’ (p. 116). Two other chapters examine Al-Jazeera’s public diplomacy and ability to build bridges between supposedly warring civilizations. As noted above, Sahar Khamis attempts to posit Al-Jazeera English’s unique position in a ‘dialogue between civilizations’ (p. 49), where Al-Jazeera cannot because of language, education and technological barriers. However, she leaves

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unanswered the question of whether Al-Jazeera English will have credibility in either the Arab or English-speaking world. Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa establish Al-Jazeera as an international actor that has engaged in effective public diplomacy. Their analysis of the difference between transnational corporations (TNCs) and international media is a useful addition to the literature on TNCs in international affairs. Similarly, their assertion that Al-Jazeera is an international actor because other international actors treat it as one (pp. 53–60) is a topic that should be explored further in a study of international institutions. It is not clear what, barring diplomatic crises, define Al-Jazeera as a significant international actor. For instance, if Al-Jazeera no longer provokes widespread controversy on the diplomatic scene, as it did initially, does that mean it drops out of its role as an international actor? All of these chapters together reinforce perceptions of Al-Jazeera’s influence on the Middle Eastern sphere, but leave unanswered whether that influence is stimulating change at the political level, particularly as diplomatic rows resulting from Al-Jazeera appear to occur far less frequently now. It appears sufficient based on these arguments, however, to say that with no other media outlet having the credibility (or at least audience), Al-Jazeera’s impact will remain important.

Success of political agitation In response to the unanswered question of whether the media constitute a tool or a weapon, several chapters attempt to classify existing new media trends as promoting resistance, political agitation or militant goals. Five chapters address this topic. Ibrahim Saleh’s chapter frames pan-Arab communication as a source of a rise of pan-Arab identity, with counter-hegemonic implications (p. 33). Despite this counter-hegemonic nature, however, Saleh argues that pan-Arab media outlets have failed to produce a media image of Arabs that lacks idealism and also challenges western ideas of Arabs (pp. 34–35). Although this chapter offers a potential theoretical framework for assessing the racism and counter-hegemonic influences of pan-Arab media, Saleh’s chapter lacks concrete examples of pan-Arab media’s counter- hegemonic outcomes. In addition, the influence of economic deprivation (particularly regarding employment) on Arab identity and self-perceptions, which is discussed briefly in the chapter, deserves further treatment. Several other chapters focus on blogging and Internet media as potential forms of resistance. Samar al-Roomi analyses Kuwaiti women’s blogs, ultimately concluding that although the blogs analysed rarely discussed politics, they could still be useful as political discussion with more peer leadership and female political role models (pp. 152–53). After Yehiel Limor describes the Israeli new media sphere, Chanan Naveh hypothesizes that online interaction may add a new dimension to the global political sphere, as evidenced in the second intifada’s ‘Palestinian–Israeli web war’. Naveh found that various types of actors (national, individuals and virtual communities) did use the Internet for conflict-related activities, creating a propaganda war parallel to the real one (pp. 175–76). Similarly, Orayb Aref Najjar argues that Palestinian use of new media has expanded Palestinians’ reach to the international community by providing

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journalistic competition (within the framework of Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘field theory’) over who has the right to tell the Palestinian story. So far, Najjar argues, Palestinian media has flourished through the experimentation that has occurred in the loosening of tight Israeli controls during various conflicts (p. 206). Although Najjar attempts to argue that Palestinians are contesting the images of Palestinians previously propagated by western and Israeli sources, it would be useful to establish whether Palestinians’ self-representations have been successful in contesting previous negative coverage. In particular, what inhibits Palestinians’ more positive self-representations from reaching international audiences – institutional difficulties, political difficulties or other factors? Last, Maura Conway asserts in her chapter that information was power in the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war and in the greater world of ‘Islamist’ groups, comparing Al-Qaeda’s and Hezbollah’s new media successes, particularly on the Internet. Conway focuses on the use of the Internet for what amounts to essentially propaganda purposes: claiming responsibility for attacks, justifying jihad, and other similar uses. Ultimately, she argues that US attempts to ban or silence such propaganda outlets ultimately increase their popularity and harm US political interests (pp. 151–52), handing victory to these groups. In some ways, Conway’s argument is similar to that of emerging military writing on the reinvention of ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Rupert Smith, for example, in his recent book The Utility of Force, argues that although Hezbollah technically lost the military conflict with Israel, its propaganda campaign was so much more successful that Hezbollah’s long-term gains constituted a victory. Both Conway’s and Smith’s arguments are difficult to apply universally to other countries, however: It is precisely Hezbollah’s perceived victimhood in the aftermath of heavy-handed Israeli strikes that makes their narrative successful. The United States and Israel simply would not be able to use this narrative successfully in the same way because their credibility as ‘victims’ may not be sufficient. Therefore, the policy value of these arguments is difficult to establish: although it may be true that US bans on militant material hands victory to militant groups by increasing their notoriety, what effective responses can a government take to be seen as ‘doing something’ against terrorism? Some scholars argue that the sites are more useful for intelligence services than they are harmful to security, but nonetheless, such stances may be difficult to sell to a militarized public. Overall, these chapters are useful for establishing basics in how media have operated in conflict and resistance situations in the past – or simply for data on the current status of new media usage – but they lack strong analysis on whether national or resistance groups’ new media usage have actually changed the outcome of any resistance or conflict. In particular, it would be useful to prove whether this new-media propaganda increases recruits, positive publicity, sympathizers or funding. Such unanswered questions are related to the overarching question of whether media can stimulate, or are stimulating, change in the Middle East, which this volume answers with a resounding ‘maybe’. Several authors posit the media as a potential source for change, particularly Ahmed El Gody, who argues that Middle Eastern governments’ crack- downs on the Internet signal their fear of ‘Internet technology’s power to change the status quo’ (p. 232). El Gody’s assertion is, however, more of an idealistic statement than a hypothesis or proven fact.

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Thus, the overall tone of the book is one asserting a possibility that media might stimulate change, but there are no strong arguments in this volume of instances in which media have significantly contributed to a political change. Media’s role in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, for instance, is not examined (but should be). Similarly, how do pan-Arab or Egyptian media cover the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and what effect does this coverage have? It is not necessary to examine these specific situations, but providing a concrete example of when media have stimulated change, or have been unable to stimulate change for other reasons, would be necessary to prove that new media can indeed create or stimulate change. Similarly, in order to understand whether and how new media can stimulate change, future books would be well advised to consider contemporary demographic and economic issues. A few of the questions that could be examined include: how does the difference between younger and older viewers’ perceptions of credibility and possible political action affect new media’s ability to stimulate change? How long will the ‘boom’ of new media last if media outlets are unable to attract enough advertising revenue to be sustainable? Is the lack of revenue due to economic difficulty or political pressures, and how might that change in the event of democratization? What political impact do the debates on economic reform (such as those mentioned in Lynch’s chapter) have on policy formulation, if any? How does the existence of new media change traditional media functioning? Is there an increase of communications students in the Middle East in the post-Al-Jazeera era, and what implications might that have on press freedom? This volume’s main contribution is a useful examination of the current types of dialogue, discussion, identity formation and technical capabilities occurring in Middle Eastern media. Thus, this volume makes an important step in establishing the current state of Middle Eastern new media and advances some arguments concerning this media’s credibility and use in resistance and conflict situations, thereby paving the way for future books to examine more in-depth these issues of change. In order to understand whether media are helping in the birth of a ‘new Middle East’ (to use Rice’s terminology but not her ideology, as this volume does), it is necessary to first examine its role in the current one.

Contributor details Olivia Allison is the co-author of Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks (Praeger 2007) after researching political and media responses to suicide bombings in Europe, the U.S., the Middle East and Africa. Since writing that book, she has received an M.A. from King’s College London in International Peace and Security, focusing on international law and politics in 2007. Some of her ongoing freelance and think-tank research projects include counterterrorism, media/communication and terrorism, and the private military/security industry.

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Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin, Risto Kunelius, Elizabeth Eide, Oliver Hahn and Roland Schroeder (eds.), (2007) Germany: Projektverlag, 218 pp., (pbk), ISBN: 978-3-89733-167-9, Price: £35 Reviewed by Shabana Syed

‘The media in Europe has perhaps yet to become accustomed to the large and growing Muslim presence on the continent and finds it even more difficult to be understanding of Muslim beliefs in the current confusion about Islam and terrorism. The right to blasphemy is not one of the rights of the press, however free it may consider itself to be, and the extensive reproduction of blasphemous material cannot be seen as anything but a deliberate affront’ (Dawn (a Pakistani newspaper), 4 February 2006. ‘The West thinks that the anger is superficial and intentional and the Muslims think of the controversy as a conspiracy theory’ (Al-Lewaa al-Islami (an Egyptian newspaper published by Al-Azar), 2 February 2006. ‘If they (Muslims living in France) are that horrified by western values of freedom and laicity, why doesn’t it occur to them that they could move to Saudi Arabia’ (Le Figaro (a French newspaper), 7 February 2006. ‘To a newspaper the natural way to show solidarity with Jyllands-Posten’s refusal to follow such a restriction on freedom of speech would be as many newspapers luckily have done; print the cartoons’ (Jyllands-Posten (a Danish newspaper), Ralf Pittelkow, 10 February 2006). The Cartoons controversy initiated in Denmark became an international debate about some of the core values that the western democracies claimed to live by and values they believed the Muslim world lacked: freedom of speech. It was a sensational key defining issue that suddenly erupted and polarized the world into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation, and also gave rise to the phantom threat of ‘the clash of civilizations’ prophecy as described fifteen years ago by Samuel Huntington. Violent demonstrations in Muslim countries led to the setting on fire of foreign embassies and the boycotting of Danish goods, clashes on the streets led to deaths and jail sentences. The latest publication on this subject Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin attempts not to make sense, but to explain and record the reactions of fourteen countries, their governments and the media’s reaction to the publishing of the cartoons, fused with the underlying belief that their ‘freedom of speech was under attack’ and the impending ‘clash of civilizations’ was taking place. This book represents the results of a worldwide cooperation of scholars and research groups analysing an incident and a debate in international media that led to extremely controversial opinions, statements and fundamental views. The fourteen countries studied were: Denmark, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, China, Russia, the United States, Sweden and Finland.

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Risto Kunelius and Elizabeth Eide in the chapter ‘Mohammed Cartoons, Journalism, Free Speech and Globalisation’ explain how the idea for the book was provoked by ‘The Economist editorial, ‘“I disagree with what you say even if you are threatened with death, I will not defend very strongly your right to say it”. That with apologies Voltaire seems to have been the initial pathetic response of some western newspapers of several cartoons of Muhammad first published in a Danish newspaper in September’ (The Economist, editorial, 11 February 2006) According to Kunelius and Eide, the cartoons issue which transformed into a global event was a great opportunity to analyse and compare how the news media explicitly discussed one of its key values of legitimating – that is, events don’t happen, rather they are constructed and framed by the media. The media’s role is constructing realities, and this was no more evident than in the case of the ‘caricature or cartoon controversy’. The most common theme that continued to preoccupy the research, and appeared as a common thread in the reports from most of the fourteen countries studied was the notion of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and ‘to what cost (to) freedom of speech’ can that be? The study revealed that although many western journalists felt that they had to defend free speech and many referred to the ‘the clash of cultures’, they were cautious not to open up the ‘clash’ discourse too widely. In the book this was more evident in the editorials from western countries, where journalists pride themselves in the belief that journalism and journalists are objective. However, this is not the case with eastern countries where journalists had no hesitation to discuss what was obvious to them, most of the initial editorials pointed to a conspiracy theory and to the belief that it was the inevitable clash of civilizations that is bound to occur as the West does not understand Islam and the East. As Kunelius and Eide explain it: ‘Orientalism and its counter-discourse were clearly at play’, that is the West saw the reaction to the cartoons as ‘irrational’ while the ‘East’ believed it was ‘western insensitivity and fundamentalist secularism’. In the area of broadcast news the reality was very different in the West; the clash was exaggerated through the types of images projected on TV news coverage. Therefore even if the print editorials from western countries hinted at the clash of cultures syndrome, the TV coverage confirmed it through broadcasting stark images of violent demonstrations and giving a lot of air time to extremists and their actions. Kunelius and Eide explain this phenomenon: ‘Journalism reflects both a surrender and resistance to the “Huntington syndrome”. But instead of merely saying this is a question of both attitudes being present in journalism, we can suggest how they coexist in the structure of journalist discourse. On an explicit, rational and argumentative level journalism struggles against the image of cultural clash. However, on a more explicit, routine and descriptive level journalism appears to base its news criteria and choice of images on a logic that enforces and reproduces the imagined clash of civilizations.’ In the early chapters the notion of press freedom is mentioned and the authors make it clear that they are aware of how media is tied to governments and interest groups. However, throughout the book they present us

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with enough facts and findings so we can make up our own minds about subjects like press freedom. This is never more evident than the chapter on Germany by Oliver Hahn, Desiree Gloede and Roland Schroeder who describe the background against which the editorials were written and which paper said what. However, it is only in the references page that we find the interest groups behind two of the biggest newspapers in Germany, throwing the whole issue of freedom of the press out of the window. For example the editorials in two of the biggest German newspapers, Die Welt and Bild belong to the publishing house, Axel Springer AG, which is the only independent media company to have five preambles that serve as the fundamentals for publishing activities that every journalist working for this company has to sign and accept. Among these preambles is ‘to promote reconciliation of Jews and Germans and support the vital rights of the State of Israel’. Therefore the view that the cartoons controversy should be seen in the context of ‘the clash of civilizations’ was first trig- gered off by the Bild newspaper in Germany. While one opinionated article published in Die Welt written by German feminist Alice Schwarzer in 2006 considers the cartoons controversy to be a red herring to take off the media agenda the debate about Iran’s alleged nuclear armament. Britain was a typical example of how the political climate of a country can cloud a thorough analysis of the ‘real story’, how politics can influence and shape social ideas and, in the process, journalists. The United Kingdom under Blair was a country that was dealing with the ‘biggest threat to peace from “Islamo-fascists” and “Islamic Extremists”’. After 9/11 the government had introduced a series of measures aimed mainly at Muslims, detainment of suspects was up to 30 days without charge, police stop-and-search statistics against Muslims had increased drastically, and every day there was one story or another demonizing Muslims. However, this reality described is not quite highlighted in the chapter ‘The UK: A Very British Response’ by Angela Phillips and David Lee, but they do highlight an important point on how news coverage of the cartoons controversy lacked a thorough analysis and instead it had focused on sensationalist footage of violent demonstrations and ‘jihadists’ rather than examining the motives of the editors at Jyllands-Posten, or the fact that the paper had a close affiliation to the Danish government, the fact that Muslims in Denmark had been under pressure for some time and the fact that the current Danish government was not friendly to ‘foreigners’. Even though the British papers did not print the cartoons, according to the study, the media moved fast, aligned closely to the existing government policies. The focus from freedom of the press moved very quickly to tighter government controls, for example the Daily Telegraph was quick to point to the failure of the government to condemn the demonstrators and to the failure of the police to take action against the demonstrators. The Guardian, known for its independent reporting, added fuel to the fire by shifting its focus to the Islamic fringe groups, giving coverage to radical leaders like Anjam Choudary, seen as a key ally of the exiled leader of the radical Islamic group ‘Al Muhajiroun’ and spokesperson for ‘Al Guraba’ (a fringe radical group which was one of the first groups to hold demonstrations in London). Studies showed that Choudary was mentioned

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18 times in the newspapers, while Al Muhajiroun, which is a small fringe radical group, was mentioned 18 times. Moderate Muslim organizations like the Muslim Council of Britain were mentioned only 6 times, while Sir Iqbal Sacraine, chair of the council, was quoted only once. Just before the cartoon controversy broke, the Incitement to Religious Hatred Bill had been opposed by all newspapers and had been defeated in the House of Commons. However all this changed after the cartoons furore: the Glorification of Terrorism clause of the Terrorism Bill which makes it illegal to praise or celebrate terrorism was passed at the end of February. Elizabeth Eide in the chapter: ‘Pakistan: Critique, Anger and Understanding’, examines the reactions to the cartoons in Pakistan, which were strong and violent while most of the editorials pointed to a western conspiracy. Most journalists believed that it was a deliberate strategy, as this editorial under the heading ‘The Clash of the Civilisations Continues’ explains: ‘Freedom of expression does not imply freedom from morals, values and regulations but stands for the protection and respect of religious and social values. Every enlightened Jew and Christian scholar and journalist is well aware of Muslim sentiments and beliefs regarding Prophet Mohammed. In this context the publication of cartoons and their defence on the pretext of freedom of expression appears to be a well thought out strategy (Nawa-e- Waqt, 8 February 2006) The research highlights the contrast in approaches in the West and the East. It clearly highlights how the western media vehemently defended their right to free speech, and also what was blatantly left out of the western media discourse was blatantly exposed in countries like Pakistan and Egypt. Western countries were accused of double standards for jailing historian David Irving for denying the authenticity of the Holocaust, Qazi Mustafa Kamil from Nawa-e-Waqt called the western defence of freedom of expression ‘false’ by referring to David Irving’s lack of freedom to express his views (28 February 2006). Others pointed out Jyllands-Posten’s racism by the fact that the paper refused to print cartoons of Jesus Christ, but did not hesitate when it came to insulting billions of Muslims. Pakistan, more than any other country during the cartoon crisis, revealed the extent to which the media is tied to ‘governments, religions and markets’. Elizabeth Eide begins her report on Pakistan by giving a description of the state of affairs in the country. Post-9/11 Pakistani society was under heavy pressure, and Musharraf had been under increasing criticism for aligning too closely with Bush’s war on terror. The US invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq had led to increasing public resentment against the West, in particular the United States. Pakistan to some extent had become a recruiting ground for jihadists to fight against US occupation of Afghanistan. The cartoons ignited a ferocious outcry against western imperialism and this was used by various sections of the society to further their cause. The fundamentalist forces that had gained popularity after the US invasion of Afghanistan encouraged the demonstrations and ‘street power’ to gather support for their cause; while Musharraf, who had lost quite a lot of public support and was seen as Bush’s puppet, also came under attack from the moderate camp who accused him of using heavy-handed measures to quell dissent and justify his military rule.

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Reports from Egypt are not surprising as the Egyptian media is tightly controlled essentially by the government. However, in the chapter by Ibrahim Saleh on ‘Egypt: Coverage of Professional Disparities and Religious Disruptions’ we see a society used to conflict but eager to avoid it: ‘Mob reaction doesn’t deal with the Muslim rights to respond to the western blasphemy but rather maximizes its negative effect’ (Al Fagr (a private newspaper), 2 February 2006); ‘We should avoid repeating this controversy with real dialogue and mutual understanding’ (Akhbar Al-Alyoum (a government-owned newspaper), 11 March 2006). The Working Papers in International Journalism are a series of publications and reports from research groups and projects relevant for the international research community. This publication on Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy is highlights how to some extent the media dealt with the cartoons controversy and how that dealing was based on definitions and negotiations related to the political and cultural arenas in which journalists operate. As mentioned earlier the study was true to its objective, not to give opinions but to report findings after researching focused materials, mainly newspapers and magazines. Even though one can argue that newspapers and magazines are more conservative in approach and that other media were needed to get an overall picture, the authors did go one step further and gave a short political and social background to every country mentioned. Thus we get a general not a thorough picture against which the cartoons controversy unfolded. However, what also gently unfolds as the book unveils the situation in each country is how political and social ideas shape journalism and, in the case of the cartoons, how social ideas about Islam and Muslims were reported in the wider media at a time when Muslims were and are perceived as some form of threat. The authors of the book state: ‘The cartoon discussion provided a particularly interesting case for looking at how the “journalistic field is related to the political field” in different countries.’ As most of the print media attempts to be objective and conservative in especially its editorials, we can still see glimpses of the strategy and allegiances of the editors or journalists. The book is an important study that allows readers to study facts and figures on how the Mohammed cartoons controversy was handled in each country and leaves them to make up their own conclusions as well as encouraging researchers to take up further themes of essential enquiry on a key defining issue which unwittingly united the world even for a short space of time in a global debate.

Contributor details Shabana Syed is the editor of Islam Magazine, a political and current affairs magazine, that looks at global issues from a Muslim’s perspective. She has worked in the Middle East for a few years with various television channels as a journalist and producer. Shabana is undertaking a PhD programme on ‘Muslim groups in the West and the use of the Media’. Her research interests include political communication, Islamic orientated communication and disporic media in Europe.

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