Consequences an Assessment of Iran's Posture
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CANUNCLASSIFIED AnAssessmentofIran’sPosture:Causesand Consequences Dr.SusanKhazaeli DRDC –CentreforOperationalResearchandAnalysis DefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanada ScientificReport DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 January2020 CANUNCLASSIFIED CANUNCLASSIFIED IMPORTANTINFORMATIVESTATEMENTS ThisdocumentwasreviewedforControlledGoodsbyDefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanada(DRDC)usingtheScheduleto theDefenceProductionAct. Disclaimer:ThispublicationwaspreparedbyDefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanadaanagencyoftheDepartmentof NationalDefence.Theinformationcontainedinthispublicationhasbeenderivedanddeterminedthroughbestpracticeand adherencetothehigheststandardsofresponsibleconductofscientificresearch.Thisinformationisintendedfortheuseofthe DepartmentofNationalDefence,theCanadianArmedForces(“Canada”)andPublicSafetypartnersand,aspermitted,maybe sharedwithacademia,industry,Canada’sallies,andthepublic(“ThirdParties”).Anyuseby,oranyrelianceonordecisionsmade basedonthispublicationbyThirdParties,aredoneattheirownriskandresponsibility.Canadadoesnotassumeanyliabilityfor anydamagesorlosseswhichmayarisefromanyuseof,orrelianceon,thepublication. Endorsementstatement:Thispublicationhasbeenpeer-reviewedandpublishedbytheEditorialOfficeofDefenceResearchand DevelopmentCanada,anagencyoftheDepartmentofNationalDefenceofCanada.Inquiriescanbesentto: [email protected]. Templateinuse:EOPublishingAppforSR-RD-ECEng2018-12-19_v1(newdisclaimer).dotm © HerMajestytheQueeninRightofCanada(DepartmentofNationalDefence),2020 © SaMajestélaReineendroitduCanada(MinistèredelaDéfensenationale),2020 CANUNCLASSIFIED Abstract ThefollowingreportsprangfromworkundertakenfortheChiefofForceDevelopment(CFD)insupport ofaclassifiedQuinquepartiteCombinedJointWarfareConference(QCJWC)project.Theanalysisherein providesacomprehensiveoverviewofIran,aimingtoidentifytrendsandforecastdevelopmentsinIran’s capabilities and posture that could have future military implications. Iran continues its efforts to underminethedefenceandsecurityinterestsofWesternnations.Althoughareasofstrategicandpolitical interest convergence remain, Iran is unlikely to be interested in anything beyond limited tactical cooperation with the West and even then only when what its leadership regards as its vital strategic interestsareatstake.Iran’sregionalbehaviour,inthePersianGulf,intheLevant,andelsewhere,suggest thatitisprimarilyinterestedinmaintainingitsfreedomofaction—keepingallopensopenandalllevers at hand—by pursing an asymmetrical national security strategy. While this is most apparent in Afghanistan and Syria, where Iran fills the vacuum left behind by the U.S. and others, other recent undertakings,suchasIran’snavalmanoeuvresintheRedSeaandareasoutsideofitstraditionalzones, implythatIranisseeking toaggrandizepower andinfluence. Still,the leadership,comprisedofaging revolutionariesandeconomicopportunists,isaversetorisk,sensitivetochange,capableofrationalism, andistherefore“deterrable.” SignificancetoDefenceandSecurity ThisworksupportsCFD’scollaborationonaclassifiedQCJWCproject.Italsocontributestoanumber of projects concerning both the Middle East region and missile proliferation underway within the StrategicJointStaff(SJS). DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 i Résumé LerapportquisuitestlefruitdetravauxréaliséspourlecompteduChef–Développementdesforces (CDF) à l’appui d’un projet classifié de la Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC).L’analyseprésentéedanscerapportdresseunportraitcompletdelasituationenIran,touten cherchantàétablirlestendancesdecepays,ainsiqu’àprévoirsesavancéesentermesdecapacitésetde posturequipourraientavoirdesimplicationsmilitairesfutures.L’Iranpoursuitseseffortsdanslebutde nuire aux intérêts des pays occidentaux en matière dedéfense et de sécurité. Bien que l’Iran partage certains de nos intérêts stratégiques et politiques, il est probable qu’il ne veuille s’en tenir qu’à une coopérationtactiquelimitéeavecl’Occident;etmêmealors,iln’enseraitainsiquelorsquesesdirigeants jugeraientquelesintérêtsstratégiquesfondamentauxdupayssontenjeu.Sil’onsefieàsesagissements danslegolfePersique,auLevantetdansd’autresrégions,ilsemblequel’Irancherchesurtoutàprotéger sa liberté d’action – gardant toutes ses ouvertures intactes et tous ses leviers à portée de main – en s’appuyantsurunestratégiedesécuriténationaleasymétrique.CelasevoitsurtoutenAfghanistaneten Syrie,où l’Irancomble levidelaisséparlesÉtats-Unisetd’autrespays.Cependant,d’autres activités récentes–commelesmanœuvresnavalesdel’IrandanslamerRougeetdansd’autresrégionssituéesà l’extérieur de ses zones d’activités habituelles – semblent indiquer que l’Iran cherche à accroître sa puissance et son influence. Malgré tout, puisque les dirigeants de ce pays – pour la plupart des révolutionnairesvieillissantsetdesopportunisteséconomiques–sontpeuenclinsàprendredesrisques, sontsensiblesauxchangementsetsontcapablesderationalisme,ilyapeut-êtremoyendelesdissuader. Importancepourladéfenseetlasécurité CestravauxontétéeffectuéspourappuyerunecollaborationduCDFàunprojetclassifiédelaQCJWC. Ils contribuent également à divers autres projets concernant le Moyen-Orient et la prolifération des missilesquemèneactuellementl’État-majorinterarméesstratégique(EMIS). ii DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 TableofContents Abstract ................................ ... i SignificancetoDefenceandSecurity......................... i Résumé ................................ ... ii Importancepourladéfenseetlasécurité ....................... ii TableofContents............................... iii ListofFigures ................................ v 1 Introduction ................................ 1 2 Iran’sHistoricalContext............................ 2 2.1 Iran’sWorldview ............................ 3 2.2 EntertheLastShah ........................... 6 2.3 TheInfamous1953Coup ......................... 8 2.4 TheOriginsofMistrust ......................... 12 2.5 CuetheClerics ............................ 13 3 Iran’sDomesticContext........................... 16 3.1 Factions............................... 18 3.1.1 TraditionalConservatives ..................... 18 3.1.2 Reformists........................... 19 3.1.3 PragmaticConservatives...................... 19 3.1.4 Radicals(AlsoKnownasPrincipalists) ................ 19 3.2 TheBonyads............................. 21 3.3 TheGuards ............................. 22 3.4 TheBasij .............................. 24 3.5 ImplicationsfortheFuture........................ 25 4 Iran’sRegionalContext ........................... 28 4.1 IntheLevant............................. 29 4.2 InthePersianGulf........................... 31 4.3 Short-TermImplications ........................ 33 4.4 Afghanistan ............................. 34 4.5 BeyondtheMiddleEast......................... 36 5 Iran’sMaterialCapabilities.......................... 40 5.1 ConventionalMilitaryPower....................... 40 5.1.1 LandForces .......................... 41 5.1.2 AirForces ........................... 41 5.1.3 NavalForces .......................... 42 5.2 RocketsandShort-RangeMissiles..................... 44 5.3 CyberCapabilities........................... 46 6 Conclusion................................ 49 DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 iii 6.1 Iran’sStrategicGoals.......................... 50 References ................................ 52 ListofSymbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms.................. 64 iv DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 ListofFigures Figure1: MapofCaspianlittoralstates........................ 38 Figure2: Dailytransitvolumesthroughworldmaritimechokepoints. .......... 43 Figure3: Iran’sballisticmissiles. ......................... 46 DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 v Thispageintentionallyleftblank. vi DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 1 Introduction ThefollowingScientificReportprovidesanassessmentofIran.Theobjectiveistoprovideastrategic assessmentofIran’sposture,itscauses,andthebroadconsequencesforthefuturesecurityenvironment. ThepaperherebeginsbysettingthesceneorthegeneralcontextofIran.Itestablishesthehistoricalbasis forIran’sworldviewanditsattitudetowardsforeignpowers,particularlythe“West.”Itbrieflydiscusses whathaschangedandwhathasstayedthesamesincethe1979revolution. It then turns to take acloser look at Iran’s domestic politics. It presents the structure of government, different power players, and demonstrates how power is exercised and shared. It also focuses some attention on the Islamic RevolutionaryGuards Corps (IRGC), Iran’s paramilitary organization, and its lesser known branch, the Basij. The next section evaluates Iran’s regional ambitions. It also explains Iran’srelationshipwithvariousregionalactors,includingotherstatesaswellasmilitantproxygroups, anddelvesintoIran’senduringrivalrywithSaudiArabia. The third section examines Iran’s military capabilities, such as conventional military power and investments in the air, land, and maritime domains, including its ballistic missile capabilities. It also assessesIran’sburgeoninglevelofambitioninthecyberdomain. DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 1 2 Iran’sHistoricalContext Iran’sstrategicbehaviourfrustratesmostobservers.IntheWesternpsyche,Iranisinextricablylinkedto the 1979Islamic Revolution and the subsequent embassy hostagecrisis.Though Iran has hardly been overlooked, it is generally not well understood. Both public debates and written studies on Iranian behaviour tend to fall into two camps: Iranian leaders are thought to be motivated by ideology and religionortheycanbenorm-boundandrational.Nowherewasthisdichotomyclearerthaninthevast literatures on how to deal with a possible nuclear Iran.1 However,