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An Assessment of Iran’s Posture: Causes and Consequences
Dr. Susan Khazaeli DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Report DRDC-RDDC-2020-R005 January 2020
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IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS
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Abstract
The following report sprang from work undertaken for the Chief of Force Development (CFD) in support of a classified Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC) project. The analysis herein provides a comprehensive overview of Iran, aiming to identify trends and forecast developments in Iran’s capabilities and posture that could have future military implications. Iran continues its efforts to undermine the defence and security interests of Western nations. Although areas of strategic and political interest convergence remain, Iran is unlikely to be interested in anything beyond limited tactical cooperation with the West and even then only when what its leadership regards as its vital strategic interests are at stake. Iran’s regional behaviour, in the Persian Gulf, in the Levant, and elsewhere, suggest that it is primarily interested in maintaining its freedom of action—keeping all opens open and all levers at hand—by pursing an asymmetrical national security strategy. While this is most apparent in Afghanistan and Syria, where Iran fills the vacuum left behind by the U.S. and others, other recent undertakings, such as Iran’s naval manoeuvres in the Red Sea and areas outside of its traditional zones, imply that Iran is seeking to aggrandize power and influence. Still, the leadership, comprised of aging revolutionaries and economic opportunists, is averse to risk, sensitive to change, capable of rationalism, and is therefore “deterrable.”
Significance to Defence and Security
This work supports CFD’s collaboration on a classified QCJWC project. It also contributes to a number of projects concerning both the Middle East region and missile proliferation underway within the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS).
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Résumé
Le rapport qui suit est le fruit de travaux réalisés pour le compte du Chef – Développement des forces (CDF) à l’appui d’un projet classifié de la Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC). L’analyse présentée dans ce rapport dresse un portrait complet de la situation en Iran, tout en cherchant à établir les tendances de ce pays, ainsi qu’à prévoir ses avancées en termes de capacités et de posture qui pourraient avoir des implications militaires futures. L’Iran poursuit ses efforts dans le but de nuire aux intérêts des pays occidentaux en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que l’Iran partage certains de nos intérêts stratégiques et politiques, il est probable qu’il ne veuille s’en tenir qu’à une coopération tactique limitée avec l’Occident; et même alors, il n’en serait ainsi que lorsque ses dirigeants jugeraient que les intérêts stratégiques fondamentaux du pays sont en jeu. Si l’on se fie à ses agissements dans le golfe Persique, au Levant et dans d’autres régions, il semble que l’Iran cherche surtout à protéger sa liberté d’action – gardant toutes ses ouvertures intactes et tous ses leviers à portée de main – en s’appuyant sur une stratégie de sécurité nationale asymétrique. Cela se voit surtout en Afghanistan et en Syrie, où l’Iran comble le vide laissé par les États-Unis et d’autres pays. Cependant, d’autres activités récentes – comme les manœuvres navales de l’Iran dans la mer Rouge et dans d’autres régions situées à l’extérieur de ses zones d’activités habituelles – semblent indiquer que l’Iran cherche à accroître sa puissance et son influence. Malgré tout, puisque les dirigeants de ce pays – pour la plupart des révolutionnaires vieillissants et des opportunistes économiques – sont peu enclins à prendre des risques, sont sensibles aux changements et sont capables de rationalisme, il y a peut-être moyen de les dissuader.
Importance pour la défense et la sécurité
Ces travaux ont été effectués pour appuyer une collaboration du CDF à un projet classifié de la QCJWC. Ils contribuent également à divers autres projets concernant le Moyen-Orient et la prolifération des missiles que mène actuellement l’État-major interarmées stratégique (EMIS).
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... i Significance to Defence and Security ...... i Résumé ...... ii Importance pour la défense et la sécurité ...... ii Table of Contents ...... iii List of Figures ...... v 1 Introduction ...... 1 2 Iran’s Historical Context ...... 2 2.1 Iran’s Worldview ...... 3 2.2 Enter the Last Shah ...... 6 2.3 The Infamous 1953 Coup ...... 8 2.4 The Origins of Mistrust ...... 12 2.5 Cue the Clerics ...... 13 3 Iran’s Domestic Context ...... 16 3.1 Factions ...... 18 3.1.1 Traditional Conservatives ...... 18 3.1.2 Reformists ...... 19 3.1.3 Pragmatic Conservatives ...... 19 3.1.4 Radicals (Also Known as Principalists) ...... 19 3.2 The Bonyads ...... 21 3.3 The Guards ...... 22 3.4 The Basij ...... 24 3.5 Implications for the Future ...... 25 4 Iran’s Regional Context ...... 28 4.1 In the Levant ...... 29 4.2 In the Persian Gulf ...... 31 4.3 Short-Term Implications ...... 33 4.4 Afghanistan ...... 34 4.5 Beyond the Middle East ...... 36 5 Iran’s Material Capabilities ...... 40 5.1 Conventional Military Power ...... 40 5.1.1 Land Forces ...... 41 5.1.2 Air Forces ...... 41 5.1.3 Naval Forces ...... 42 5.2 Rockets and Short-Range Missiles ...... 44 5.3 Cyber Capabilities ...... 46 6 Conclusion ...... 49
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6.1 Iran’s Strategic Goals ...... 50 References ...... 52 List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms ...... 64
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Map of Caspian littoral states. ...... 38 Figure 2: Daily transit volumes through world maritime choke points. ...... 43 Figure 3: Iran’s ballistic missiles. ...... 46
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1 Introduction
The following Scientific Report provides an assessment of Iran. The objective is to provide a strategic assessment of Iran’s posture, its causes, and the broad consequences for the future security environment. The paper here begins by setting the scene or the general context of Iran. It establishes the historical basis for Iran’s worldview and its attitude towards foreign powers, particularly the “West.” It briefly discusses what has changed and what has stayed the same since the 1979 revolution.
It then turns to take a closer look at Iran’s domestic politics. It presents the structure of government, different power players, and demonstrates how power is exercised and shared. It also focuses some attention on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran’s paramilitary organization, and its lesser known branch, the Basij. The next section evaluates Iran’s regional ambitions. It also explains Iran’s relationship with various regional actors, including other states as well as militant proxy groups, and delves into Iran’s enduring rivalry with Saudi Arabia.
The third section examines Iran’s military capabilities, such as conventional military power and investments in the air, land, and maritime domains, including its ballistic missile capabilities. It also assesses Iran’s burgeoning level of ambition in the cyber domain.
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2 Iran’s Historical Context
Iran’s strategic behaviour frustrates most observers. In the Western psyche, Iran is inextricably linked to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent embassy hostage crisis. Though Iran has hardly been overlooked, it is generally not well understood. Both public debates and written studies on Iranian behaviour tend to fall into two camps: Iranian leaders are thought to be motivated by ideology and religion or they can be norm-bound and rational. Nowhere was this dichotomy clearer than in the vast literatures on how to deal with a possible nuclear Iran.1 However, Iran’s foreign and defence policy objectives cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of Iran’s worldview, particularly if one recognizes that the 1979 revolution was partially motivated by the desire to end the capitulations that gave Western powers privileges. Simply put, states that feel that they have suffered wrongs will seek to settle old scores.2 This was clearly the case in Iran. For example, once the clerics seized power, the now supreme leader, Ali Khamenei warned, “we are not liberals like [Salvador] Allende and [Mohammad] Mossadegh, whom the CIA can snuff out.”3
1 See: Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs 91 (Jan/Feb. 2012); Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs (17 January 2012); Bret Stephens, “Iran Cannot Be Contained,” Commentary, (July/August 2010). Accessed at: www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/iran-cannot-becontained-15462; Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs 90 (January 2011); and Emanuele Ottolenghi, Under a Mushroom Cloud: Iran, Europe and the Bomb (London: Profile Books, 2009). For opposing perspectives, see: Kenneth M. Pollack, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran: The Devil in the Details,” Working paper of the Council on Foreign Relations (May 2010); Shahram Chubin, “Extended Deterrence and Iran,” Strategic Insights Vol. 8 No. 5 (December 2009); Robert D. Kaplan, “Living with a Nuclear Iran,” Atlantic (September 2010), Accessed at: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/living-with-a- nuclear-iran/8193; Robert Litwak, “Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea,” Survival Vol. 50 No. 1 (Feb/March 2008); Justin Logan, “The Bottom Line on Iran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive War versus Deterrence,” Policy Analysis 583 (4 December 2006); Jason Zaborski, “Deterring a nuclear Iran,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 28 No. 3 (2005); James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran gets the bomb: containment and its complications,” Foreign Affairs 89 (2010); Fareed Zakaria, “Deterring Iran is the best option,” Washington Post (14 March 2012); Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2007); Michael Eisenstadt, “Living with a nuclear Iran?” Survival Vol. 41 No. 3 (1999); Alex S. Wilner, “Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 31 No. 1 (2012); and Peter Jones, “Learning to Live with a Nuclear Iran,” The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 19 No. 2 (2012). 2 One can debate whether the idea of resistance to outside dominance is new to the Islamic Republic. Certainly, the practice of resistance predates 1979 if one considers the protests of the Tobacco Concessions at the start of the last century or the campaign to nationalize Iranian oil in the mid-century. 3 Warren Bass, “Regime Change, Circa 1953,” The New York Times, 10 August 2003. Accessed at: www.nytimes.com/2003/08/10/books/regime_change_circa_1953.html.
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2.1 Iran’s Worldview
European intrigue in Iran (then, Persia) began long before Operation TP-AJAX, the U.S. codename for the 1953 coup that deposed Mossadegh and supposedly “restored” the Shah.4 Throughout the nineteenth century, Persia was a playground in which the British and Russians competed for influence.5 Russia dominated the north, forcing it to give up land in the Caucasus (what is now, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), grant economic concessions, and extend extraterritoriality to Russian citizens, while the British had similar privileges in the south, where they monopolized the country’s commercial enterprises.6 This division of Persia into two spheres of influence was codified with the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. Thus when Persia turned to an American, Morgan Shuster, for expertise on federalism and finance in 1911, the Russians and the British balked at what they regarded as foreign intrusion on their possession.7
After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, however, Russian influence in Persia waned.8 The Bolsheviks, partly stirred by the spirit of communism, relinquished most of Russia’s rights in Persia and cancelled the debts owed to the former Tsarist regime.9 To prevent Russia from restoring influence in northern Persia at some point in the future, the British amped up their activities. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC), operational since 1909, particularly compelled them to do so.
By the outbreak of the First World War, Persia had become crucial to British naval supremacy. The Royal Navy (RN) had switched from coal to oil-burning ships after 1911, and so Persian oil became the lifeblood of the RN.10 During the war, the British stationed troops in the southwest province of Khuzestan near the Persian Gulf.11 Despite Persia’s declared neutrality, its northern Azerbaijan territories (i.e., Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, and West Azerbaijan) became a battleground between the Ottomans and the Russians. The Ottomans wanted to use Persia to cut off Russia’s access to energy around the Caspian Sea and to use it as a launch-pad to Afghanistan in order to threaten British holdings in India. The result was total economic devastation, widespread famine, and civil strife, as the lands were pillaged and the 4 Iran, as indigenous Iranians have always known it, was called Persia by westerners. In 1935, Reza Shah demanded that Persia be properly recognized as Iran, “land of the Aryans.” There is speculation that Reza Shah did so upon the recommendation of the Ambassador to Germany. Alternately, it is thought that Reza Shah wanted to remove his new Pahlavi dynasty from associations with the weak and ineffective Qajar dynasty that preceded him, and that a “new” name was one way to achieve that. One can find support for the latter explanation in Reza Shah’s reaction to Britain’s refusal to address Iran by its new name. Winston Churchill—in what now seems prescient—refused to acknowledge the name change, stating that it would, among other things, cause people to confuse Iran and Iraq. Standing his ground against its more powerful, quasi-colonizer, Reza Shah returned all correspondence mailed to Persia back to Britain. 5 James A. Bill, The Eagle, and the Lion: the tragedy of American-Iranian relations, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 16. 6 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: the conflict between Iran and America, (New York, NY: Random House, 2005), 14-15. 7 Nikki R. Keddie and Richard Yann, Roots of Revolution: an interpretive history of modern Iran, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 77. 8 Stephen Kinzer All the Shah’s Men: an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror, (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 39. 9 Kinzer, All the Shah’s men, 39. 10 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 24. 11 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 25.
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irrigation systems were destroyed. After the War, the British sought to turn Persia into a protectorate and the Russians briefly annexed the northern province of Gilan into a socialist republic.
Meanwhile, the population grew increasingly frustrated with the Qajar rulers, whose squandering of Persia’s national resources and weakness in the face of colonial powers had debased what was once a proud and powerful nation. The dire post-war environment created the conditions that allowed Reza Khan to seize power. On 21 February 1921, a coup d’état led by Reza Khan removed the Qajars.12 Four years later, the Majles (Parliament) installed Reza Khan as Shah, who assumed the pre-Islamic dynastical surname, Pahlavi. Reza Shah, the ardent nationalist and staunch militarist, was a powerful figure in Iranian politics until his forced abdication in 1941. His commitment to reducing foreign influence in the country, particularly British and Russia, and the twin pursuits of modernization and industrialization won him the support of some politically conscious Iranians. Reza Shah (and later his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) set out on a path of westernization, reducing the role of Islam in the public sphere and forming a secular Iran based on the Western model.13 Yet his methods for progress—not unlike those of his contemporaries such as Kemal Atatürk—accorded with those of fascism. To consolidate full control over the country, he often resorted to force and intimidation. Kenneth M. Pollack explains that,
As a military officer, it was natural for Reza Shah to favour [sic] a strong Army. However, his determination to minimize foreign intervention and his herculean efforts to unify the country after taking power convinced him that building up Iran’s military strength was critical if it were to remain a strong, centrally controlled nation-state.14
Because he was inclined towards force, Reza Shah lost some support. His popularity declined both with the mullahs (religious clerics) by ruling Western dress for men and by banning the chador (veil) for women and with the Allied powers by declaring Iran neutral during the Second World War in favour of closer ties with Germany.15
Reza Shah admired the rise of Nazi Germany, and in what would become a trend in Iranian external relations, he saw Germany as a third power that could help free Iran from British and Soviet influence.16 Just as he modelled some of his reforms on those of Atatürk, he also hoped to mimic the rapid industrialization of contemporary Germany in agrarian Iran.17 Cognizant that economic independence would be necessary for sovereignty, he developed a close economic partnership with the Nazi regime.18 He so encouraged German investment that by 1941 there were thousands of German advisors, businessmen and officials in Tehran alone.19 From 1939 to 1941, Germany accounted for about half of the country’s foreign trade.20
The Iranian public also held the Germans in higher regard than the British. The merchant class was particularly pro-German given its growing dependence on Germany for trade and industry. More 12 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 27. 13 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 40. 14 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 32-35. 15 Gene R. Garthwaite, The Persians, (Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005), 230-231. 16 Mark H. Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953, (Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1987), 7. 17 Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 42. 18 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 38. 19 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 18. 20 Keddie and Yann, Roots of Revolution, 110.
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generally, as an Aryan state, many Iranian elites believed that “their nation was a natural ally for Nazi Germany, given its obsession with race.”21 (This also explains public hostility toward the Allies over “the sudden rupture in trade links” when the British and the Soviets later occupied the country in 1941.22) These realities gave the British much reason for worry, particularly after the fall of France in the summer of 1940. Further, the very presence of German nationals threatened British commercial interests in the AIOC (later British Petroleum, BP).23
Despite Iran’s proclaimed neutrality at the onset of the war, the British feared that Reza Shah was about to form a military alliance with Hitler. It did not help that he openly criticized the British in speeches.24 When the Shah refused their request to post troops in Khuzestan, the situation appeared to be more ominous to the British. While the Shah justified his decision on the basis of neutrality, the British interpreted it as flagrant support for the Nazis.25 His refusals of British and Soviets demands that he expel German officials out of the country sealed his fate.26 However, the British and the Soviets exaggerated claims of pro-German sentiment in order to suit their aims. The real issue concerned not so much where lay Iran’s sympathies, but geography.
Just as it had entrapped Iran in the great Anglo-Russian competition of the last century, geography once again made it prime real estate during the Second World War. To be sure, the British continued to have the defence of India as well as their oil fields in mind. Yet, once the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, bringing Stalin on side with the Allies, Iran became strategically valuable for an additional reason: the recently completed Trans-Iranian Railway, which linked the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, was an obvious route for the transfer of British munitions and supplies. (Ironically, the British and the Russians had earlier tried to thwart the construction of the very railways on which they depended for the war effort since they worried rail would contribute to Iran’s autonomy. It was German firms that had helped finance the Trans-Iranian Railroad.27) On 25 August 1941, 60,000 British and Soviet forces jointly invaded and occupied Iran, exiling Reza Shah in favour of his twenty-two year old son.28 From late 1941 to the autumn of 1945, over one-quarter of the supplies from the West, including American Lend-Lease aid went through the Persian Corridor directly to the Soviet Union.29
21 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 37. 22 Louise L’Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 20. 23 Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 9. 24 Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 42. 25 Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 10. 26 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 38. 27 Keddie and Yann, Roots of Revolution, 99-110. 28 The conventional narrative today is that the British and the Americans “installed” the last Shah in 1953 after deposing Mossadegh. This is false and dangerously misleading. Iran had been a monarchy for over 2500 years until the 1979 revolution. Indeed, in 1953, Iran was a parliamentary monarchy with both a prime minister and king. After the 1953 coup, the Prime Minister Mossadegh was dismissed, placed under house arrest, and replaced by a figure considered friendlier to both the interests of the Anglo-Americans and the royal court. He was not replaced by the Shah, since that would suggest that he was head of state or otherwise exercised greater power than constitutionally afforded. 29 Geoffrey Kemp, Forever Enemies? America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 89.
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Thus British and Russian machinations and interventions in Iran have played a major role in shaping Iran’s view of foreign powers. More recent history, as will be discussed below, has also made it suspicious of foreign plots and subversion. 2.2 Enter the Last Shah
The young Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, found himself in a precarious but not extraordinary political situation, with foreign troops overrunning his entire country: the Soviets occupied much of the north and the British controlled the south, where their oil interests lay. Though Mohammad Reza Shah was determined to be more than a figurehead monarch, he lacked many of the fierce attributes his father possessed. Educated in Switzerland and later trained at military college, “visitors noted his intelligence and charm, but these qualities hardly sufficed.”30 Nonetheless, he regarded himself a soldier, and shared his father’s resentment of foreign interference, and as one might expect, he reserved particular contempt for the British.
His ascent to throne also coincided with the American entry into the War, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the war progressed revealing the United States to be a formidable power, the young Shah looked upon it with the same optimism that his father had viewed Germany—that is, as a benign yet politically valuable state that could help safeguard Iran’s sovereignty against British and Soviet intrusion. The United States assessed the young Shah as “weak and inexperienced,” but otherwise paid Iran very little regard.31 American prodding did, however, result in the Tripartite Treaty in which the Soviets and the British recognized the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of Iran, and agreed to withdraw their troops from the country within six months of the hostilities’ end.32 Although the treaty did not assuage the Shah’s fears of Iran’s dismemberment, it did solidify his positive view of the Americans.
The Americans were not entirely altruistic. For one, they calculated that “such a statement would have wholesome effects on the entire Muslim world while offering hope to the peoples of small countries everywhere.”33 Second, and perhaps more significantly, there was concern that the long-established rivalry between the British and the Soviets over Iran would resurface and splinter the alliance. Indications of malign Soviet and British intentions came early. As the war drew to a close, it was clear that the British wanted to maintain their monopoly over Iranian oil while Soviet posturing in Iran was
30 James F. Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51: the diplomacy of neglect, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 2. 31 James F. Goode, The United States and Iran: In the Shadow of Musaddiq, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 14. 32 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 18. 33 Secretary of State Cordell Hull quoted in: Bruce R. Kuniholm, The origins of the cold war in the Near East: great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 143. Hull also wrote, “So far, we have rested our response to this appeal primarily upon our interest in winning the war. I wonder if we should not also begin, privately, to base our response upon our interest in winning the peace? The United States, alone, is in a position to build up Iran to the point at which it will stand in need of neither British nor Russian assistance to maintain order in its own house.” See: Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 19.
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foreboding of the first crisis of the Cold War.34 (For example, the Soviets refused Iranian troops entry into Azerbaijan in May 1942 to deal with a Kurdish rebellion.35) Still, it was not until the War ended and the Cold War began that the Americans determined that a strong and independent Iran would be the key to security in the Persian Gulf—a region not only home to the greater part of the world’s known oil reserves, but also of geostrategic significance.36 Thus, when Iranian communists, emboldened by the Soviet Union, tried to back the secession of two provinces in 1946, the U.S. took a firm stance and evacuated the Soviet conspirators. The episode taught the Americans that firm responses to the Soviet Union were a correct way of handling Soviet aggression (e.g., they responded similarly the following year in Greece) and that a communist takeover or a breakaway was something to be monitored. Nevertheless, it taught Iran another lesson.
Geography made Iran strategically valuable but also vulnerable.37 On the one hand, Iran was important for the defence of the west as gateway to the Middle East and the Mediterranean and for the defence of oil interests throughout the region. Indeed, Iran’s “Abadan refinery was the largest in the world and produced, in 1945, more oil than the other Arab States together.”38 On the other, it was attractive to the Soviets for all of the same reasons. Besides, whichever side controlled the Persian Gulf held the global balance of power. For the U.S., containment in the Middle East centred on Iran, though not necessarily on the Shah.39 The Shah, however, was so grateful to the United States for its intervention that he referred to the Azerbaijan Crisis as the “Stalingrad of the Western democracies” and as the “turn of the tides against Soviet aggression throughout the world.”40 In reality, Iran was not uniquely important to the Americans. It, alongside the other “Northern Tier” states (a term used to refer to Iran, Turkey and
34 It is not well known that the first conflict, the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, did not take place in Europe but in Iran. Encouraged by the diminished German threat, the Soviet Union looked to the north western provinces of Iran, which it had been occupying since 1941, as potential satellite states, and buffer zones in the inevitable war between communism and capitalism. In January 1946, Soviet-backed rebels declared the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People’s Republic. These came with a threat from Moscow to retaliate should Tehran attempt to attack the newly established governments. George Kennan, in his famous “Long Telegram,” predicted that Soviet expansionism would start in Iran. He wrote, “Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm.” See: Kennan, George, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Cold War Documents, (Washington), 3 February 1946, Accessed at: http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/02/documents/kennan/. 35 Kuniholm, The origins of the cold war in the Near East, 144. 36 The Americans had considerable oil interests in nearby Saudi Arabia, and determined an independent Iran to be in their strategic interest both in terms of containing communist ideology and in acting as a buffer zone. See: Kuniholm, The origins of the cold war in the Near East, 142-43, 160. 37 The constant of geography in Iran’s contemporary history has made it a playground for the Anglo-Russian rivalry, a convenient corridor for the Allies in the Second World War, and then a strategic barricade throughout the Cold War. 38 Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945–1962, (Leicester University Press, 1996), 3. 39 After the coup, the Americans would again see the Shah as a linchpin in their containment policy. 40 Samii Bill, World War II, 60 Years After: The Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran and Washington-Tehran Relations, Radio Free Europe, 6 May 2005, Accessed at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1058759.html.
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Greece), were all defence priorities for the United States.41 Worried that the entire Middle East would fall into the Soviet orbit, the Americans committed to making Iran sufficiently strong so as to withstand communist pressure, and moved onto doing the same to fortify other vulnerable non-aligned nations.42 Accordingly, it declared Iran eligible for 8.5 million United States dollars (USD) under Lend-Lease and sent advisory teams and missions to help train and strengthen the Iranian military and police forces. Because of the aforementioned instances of American assistance and charity, Iranian officials, rightly or wrongly, increasingly relied on America’s favour.43 Although Washington regarded it as a strategically vital area, Iran mostly faded largely into the background after the Soviet departure, as the United States turned its efforts to the task of rebuilding Europe. 2.3 The Infamous 1953 Coup
By the early 1950s, the Americans turned back to the Middle East, where the political climate had turned dangerously nationalistic, everywhere from Egypt to Iran. In Iran, the newly elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh declared his intention to nationalize the AIOC, which, at the time in 1951, was Britain’s “largest overseas investment.”44
To Iranians, the AIOC represented the last vestiges of British exploitation of the country. Though a new agreement negotiated between the AIOC and the Iranian government doubled the payments schedule, the agreement was hardly a victory.45 The company hired few natives and those who were hired were given low pay reflective of the regard attached to the job. Instead, the AIOC was staffed by “what was virtually an autonomous British community which had vastly increased its oil production by 1950.”46 When it became public that London had collected $79 million in taxes while Tehran had received less than $38 million in royalties, calls for the nationalization of the AIOC intensified.47
Not novel to Iranian politics, the idea for the nationalization of the oil industry had always been contentious. Reza Shah and a number of other officials had all tried—unsuccessfully—to renegotiate the British oil concession.48 In the fall of 1949, Mossadegh’s National Front party capitalized on the public’s growing dissatisfaction with British privileges and the monarch’s perceived obsequiousness. Socialists, nationalists, middle and lower classes, the bazaari (mercantile), and right-wing religious clerics all coalesced under the banner of the National Front. Fear of growing foreign influence coupled with a deep mistrust of the Shah’s areligious policies attracted the mullahs and the bazaari (who were often from the 41 Conversely, the British thought the opposite. For them, their continued relevance depended on the Middle East, and they were more than happy to let the US deal with Greece and Turkey which they considered “a very poor investment for the British taxpayer.” See: Klaus Larres, Churchill’s Cold War. The Politics of Personal Diplomacy, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 120. 42 Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 144. 43 Perhaps, wrongly. David Lesch writes that, “Though the shah and the various Iranian prime ministers of this period made repeated requests for US military and economic aid, Iran was not given a large aid package under the Truman Doctrine, as were Greece and Turkey.” See: David W. Lesch, (ed.) The Middle East and the United States: a historical and political reassessment, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 53. 44 Tore T. Petersen, The Middle East between the great powers: Anglo-American conflict and cooperation, 1952-7, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 19. 45 Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 32. 46 Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 3. 47 Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 33. 48 Reza Shah managed to instead extend the D’Arcy concession, which was to expire in 1960, for another sixty years. See: Mohammad Musaddiq, Musaddiq’s Memoirs, (JEBHE, National Movement of Iran, 1988), 286.
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same families) to Mossadegh’s coalition. Next to Mossadegh, the most important figure in the National Front happened to be Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, a well-known religious leader.49 While the Shah alienated the religious masses by attempting to model a secular Iran along Western lines like his father, Mossadegh espoused secularism without isolating the religious clerics and the citizens.50 He was able to synthesize Western ideas and values with traditional Iranian and Muslim ones; whereas the Shah was seen as forsaking his ethnicity, Mossadegh fused elements from both cultures. The religious segment of the population thus passionately rallied behind Mossadegh. Though only eight members of the National Front were actually elected to the Majles in what was the freest election in Iranian history, support for Mossadegh’s principal aim was nearly unanimous.51
Mossadegh was and still remains an important figure in Iranian politics. For many Iranians, he represented their nation’s one chance at democracy—a chance destroyed by Anglo-American machinations. How was a man of such privileged upbringing able to harness the confidence of the masses? What was so special about Mossadegh that made people convinced of his ability to lead a viable democracy in Iran? Mossadegh was born into an influential political family; his mother was a Qajar princess, and from birth, he had opportunities that few others enjoyed.52 He studied at L’École de Sciences Politiques and later earned his doctorate of law degree from the University of Geneva. His studies abroad exposed him to Western concepts of the rule of law, democracy, and liberty. Proclaiming that “monarchs should reign, not rule,”53 he opposed Reza Khan’s accession to the throne in 1925, and then made a long political career out of opposing the role of the monarchs and foreign companies.54
Mossadegh, the fervent nationalist, was a master of histrionics and dramatics. He would receive foreign dignitaries while in pyjamas and would burst into tears or collapse mid speech.55 He was also greatly influenced by his mother to whom he turned before making important political decisions. Historian Homa Katouzian describes how he would “quote from her wisdom—even in public debates and speeches.”56 Many of his detractors saw Mossadegh as the personification of his country’s deficiencies: fragile, xenophobic, and wobbly; still others regarded him as the populist purveyor of democratic values to Iran.57 While his peculiarities could not mask his intelligence or formidable oration skills, his rhetorical hyperboles restrained his policies. For instance, he declared that, “Rather than come to terms with the British, I will seal the oil wells with mud.”58 Such outbursts, which increased his domestic popularity, ultimately persuaded the Americans that Mossadegh could not be relied upon as their ally in the Middle East. His eccentricities contributed to his demise.
Mossadegh’s ideas worried the British, who were feeling the reverberations of losing India and Palestine and were concerned about further damage to British prestige. Post-war Britain was also running a trade
49 Kashani had a sizable following of radical mujtahids and was closely associated with the terrorist group Feda’iyan-i Islam (Devotees of Islam). See: Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the struggle for power in Iran, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 89. See also: Goode, The United States and Iran, 12. 50 Katouzian, Musaddiq and the struggle for power in Iran, 11. 51 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 53; Goode, The United States and Iran, 19. 52 Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 53. 53 Musaddiq, Musaddiq’s Memoirs, 305. 54 Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, 54. 55 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979), 105. 56 Katouzian, Musaddiq and the struggle for power in Iran, 2. 57 Goode, The United States and Iran, 12. 58 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 59.
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deficit and the AIOC was critical to its economic recovery.59 The British treasury collected $142 million in taxes and an additional $93 million in profits from the AIOC annually.60 When Mossadegh announced the nationalization of the AIOC, the British retaliated by shutting down the Abadan refinery, ordering an embargo on Iranian oil, and threatening to prosecute anyone who dared purchase the “stolen property.”61 The RN was sent to the Persian Gulf to ensure the blockade.
To preserve their influence, the British turned to the Americans for help in Iran. The Americans had no desire to become involved in such colonial entanglements at the time, and instead, much to the dismay of the British, encouraged them “to reopen negotiations with Iran immediately and not allow the two sides’ positions to become entrenched.”62 The British appealed to American fears of Soviet expansionism, arguing that without a hand in Iran, “there was no guarantee [that Iran] would act responsibly, while the dangers of Soviet penetration would increase.”63 There was some legitimate grounds for concern. After all, Iran sat on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Then there was the matter of the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty (1921), which gave Moscow the right of entry into Iran, and which the Soviets invoked during the Azerbaijan Crisis.64
Though it did not want a repeat of the events in 1946, the U.S. was not yet persuaded to side with the British.65 In fact, while it endeavoured to remain impartial in the dispute and attendant embargo, at least outwardly, the administration was sympathetic to the Iranian position. Accordingly, the State Department pressed London to make the terms more favourable to Tehran in order to bring about an end to the impasse.66 The British, suspecting that the Americans intended to replace them as the dominant foreign power in the Middle East, vowed, “Not [to] make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations has been an established British market.”67
Meanwhile in Iran, the economic impact of the British embargo had started to take a toll. After his address to the United Nations (UN) in the fall of 1951, Mossadegh travelled to Washington in order to
59 Petersen, The Middle East between the great powers, 19. 60 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 54. 61 Katouzian, Musaddiq and the struggle for power in Iran, 117. 62 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 55. To President Harry S. Truman and key officials like Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, the nationalization crisis was just the latest example of nationalism railing against colonialism. See also: Petersen, The Middle East between the great powers, 19–22. 63 Christopher J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: a political history of Anglo-American relations since 1945, (New York, NY: Longman, 1992), 75. 64 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 29. See also: Kuniholm, The origins of the cold war in the Near East, 315. 65 Indeed, there was a real divergence between Washington and London. When Acheson learned of British plans for a possible invasion of southern Iran, he quickly warned the British ambassador to Washington that the U.S. would not support military intervention. Aware that a British invasion would cause the Soviets to counter invade, Acheson revealed that, “the British were so obstructive and determined on a rule-or-ruin policy in Iran that we must strike out on an independent policy or run the risk of having Iran disappear behind the Iron Curtain.” See: Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 57, 145; and Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 33. The Americans so disagreed with British policies toward Iran that Truman and Acheson even considered taking independent action in Iran so as to prevent it from becoming Communist, but nothing ever materialized. See also: Petersen, The Middle East between the great powers, 20. 66 It should be mentioned that the Americans had signed a 50/50 profit sharing agrement with the Saudis around this time. This likely explains why the Americans counselled the British to follow suit, and likely why the Iranians wished the Americans to play a mediatory role in the dispute. 67 Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 4.
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convince Truman to agree to persuade American companies to break the embargo on Iranian oil.68 He thought—and not without reason—that American oil companies would pounce at the chance to advance in Iran, if permitted.69 What he undervalued, however, was the strategic importance of Anglo-American unity. Truman was unprepared to break with the British over such a sensitive and economically important issue, particularly after Churchill made it plain that continued British support in Korea meant isolating Mossadegh.70 An unabashed imperialist and a vocal exponent of British power, Churchill was certain that Mossadegh would be brought around with a little bit of gunboat diplomacy.71 Churchill urged the Americans to take a firm line against Mossadegh, whom he characterized as “an elderly lunatic bent on wrecking his country and handing it over to communism.”72 Thus while Truman administration remained critical of Britain’s intransigence toward Iran and worried that antiquated British world attitudes could turn Iran into an enemy of the West, it was unprepared to offer Mossadegh the kind of support he had been hankering for, or to publicly break with the British.
The primary objective of American policy was to broker a palatable solution to the Anglo-Iranian impasse and to avoid any course of action, which might risk permanently losing Iran to the Soviets. By the end of the year, the prospect of a negotiated settlement seemed remote. And a new American president had been elected. American efforts to maintain an ongoing dialogue between Tehran and London failed. For the Iranians, nationalization was critical, not least for autonomy but also to avenge years of British domination. Equally intractable, the British jettisoned negotiations with the declaration that “so long as Mossadegh was in power a satisfactory settlement was impossible.”73 There were a couple of reasons for this decision. First, a subversive campaign to discredit Mossadegh in the upcoming spring elections was already underway. The British had bought off tribal leaders in the south and in the army, politicians, mullahs, merchants, newspapers, statesmen, mob leaders, police, deputies, and newspapers.74 Second, they projected that the newly elected administration of Dwight Eisenhower would be more forthcoming with assistance than his predecessor, particularly if he were convinced that Mossadegh was a communist sympathizer.75 Unknown to him, the plot to oust Mossadegh was planned even before he assumed office.76
The machinations did not escape Mossadegh’s notice, who retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with Britain. Like the British, he also had hopes for the new president, and with the economic situation in Iran rapidly deteriorating, turned to him for succour. The embargo on Iranian oil had nearly bankrupted the country in 6 months: the rial dropped from 75 to the dollar to 130.77 Many Iranians, who initially 68 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 60. 69 Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946–51, 103. 70 Winston Churchill had returned as prime minister in October 1951. He took a tougher position on Iran than had his predecessor, Clement Attlee. His threat to abandon the U.S. in Korea is documented in: Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 60; and Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 145. 71 Roosevelt, Countercoup, 106. 72 Goode, The United States and Iran, 35. 73 Vanessa Martin, Anglo-Iranian Relations since 1800, (London: Routledge, 2005), 162. 74 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 61. 75 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “British Proposal to Organize a Coup d’état in Iran,” Top Secret. National Security Archive. 3 December 1952. Accessed at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=3914380-02-State-Department-Memorandum-of-Conversation. 76 State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, Byroade to Matthews, “Proposal to Organize a Coup d’état in Iran,” Top Secret, November 26, 1952. Accessed at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=3914379-01-State- Department-Memorandum-of-Conversation. 77 Roosevelt, Countercoup, 151.
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supported nationalization, had grown weary; they just wanted a settlement with the British and a return to normalcy. The economic impact of the embargo coupled with the clandestine plots underway created trouble for Mossadegh, whose loose coalition was beginning to unravel. Soon Ayatollah Kashani, who had been Mossadegh’s chief partner in the National Front movement, began leading the opposition among the mullahs.78 At the same time, the Tudeh (i.e., the Iranian communist party) emerged as a popular alternative, or at least appeared omnipresent to Eisenhower. Although the British had hired imposter Tudeh supporters in order to persuade the president to authorize the coup, it should be mentioned that Mossadegh himself, desperate to cling to power, warmed to the Tudeh.79 Suspicious that the British were out to sabotage his mandate (which they were), he gerrymandered the election, manipulated constitutional passages to altogether stop the elections, and declared martial law.80 Mossadegh thus became precisely what he claimed to most despise.
It also did not help matters that Mossadegh pleaded that American financial aid was “essential if Iran were to stay out of the communist camp” and threatened to go to the Soviets if American aid was not forthcoming.81 That proved to be a foolish gambit, given that Eisenhower had been elected on promise to be tougher on communism.82 After Korea, the Americans had turned to strengthening the countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery, and that included Iran, which was then situated along the southern border of the Soviet Union. 2.4 The Origins of Mistrust
The immediate consequences of the coup are clear enough. From an Anglo-American perspective, the coup was an enormous success. It preserved Western control of Iran’s petroleum, and in doing so, denied the Soviets from competing for that resource. More significantly, it satisfied American interests in securing Iran’s friendship through an ever grateful Shah. The apparent success of the 1953 coup also set a standard for dealing with unsettling nationalist movements in other countries deemed important to U.S. strategic interest; for example, it was used as a model a year later in Guatemala.
The implications on the Iranian side are more varied. In the short-term, the coup gave the Shah the confidence to rule more firmly than before, not least because he interpreted the protests demanding his return as genuine displays of affection and not the performances of paid actors and goons. It also left him in awe of U.S. which he came to count as an ally, while re-confirming his view of the British as duplicitous. (Despite the fact that both the British and the Americans had plotted the coup, he reserved such disdain and suspicion of the British that in 1978 he bitterly remarked that “if you lift up Khomeini’s beard you will find Made in England written under his chin.”83) For the next 25 years, he worked to restore Iran to the glory of the Achaemenidian Empire. He wanted Iran to regain the place and esteem it held under Cyrus the Great. His plans left little room for the role of Islam—the dominant religion in a country with a well-document history against it—which after all had not existed in Cyrus’ days. He also acted as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf region by simultaneously building up the military and supressing—in particular “leftist”—opposition. Among non-royalist Iranians, his legitimacy 78 Roosevelt, Countercoup, 113. Although Kashani was an accomplice in the 1953 coup, he was also disgruntled that Mossadegh was a secularist. 79 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63; Keddie and Yann, Roots of Revolution, 121. 80 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 61; Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 136. 81 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 83. 82 Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, 59. 83 Anthony Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), x.
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was permanently soiled. He was never quite able to shake the perception that he had been installed by foreigners, even as he became more autonomous in the later stages of his tenure, such as when he attempted to control petroleum prices and to overturn the very consortium that the Americans helped put in place in 1953.
The long-term consequences are more palpable and enduring. Some Iranians, including Mossadegh, had believed that the United States, as the self-proclaimed champion of the Free World, would help rid Iran of British and Russian machinations. Those Iranians, who had pinned their hopes for progress, modernity, and democracy, on Mossadegh, U.S. complicity in the coup illustrated not just American hypocrisy but also that it was as insidious as Britain. It was ironic then that in 1979 Mossadegh, a secular democrat, was recalled by religious revolutionaries to defend the takeover of the U.S. Embassy. (The students who planned the takeover did so because they feared that the U.S. would co-opt the revolution to restore the Shah to the throne and that the U.S. needed to be punished for its role in 1953.84) At which point, the U.S. earned the well-known moniker, Shatan-e bozorg (Great Satan). The clerical establishment continues to use the legacy of the coup to justify its anti-American vitriol and policies. 2.5 Cue the Clerics
Even beyond the Iranian perspective, the 1979 revolution was a pivotal event, comparable if only in magnitude to the French and Russian revolutions. The Iranian (or Islamic as it is more commonly known) Revolution and its consequences caused a great deal of bewilderment and incredulity, and to some, fear and awe.85 It also had profound reverberations that are still felt throughout the region.86 This revolution was unlike the military coups or peasant rebellions typically characteristic of other Third World nations, where one tyrant replaces another without altering the nature of the regime. Rather, it resulted in a fundamental change to the state transforming the country from a monarchy to a theocracy based on the divine guidance of a band of religious clerics. Did 1979 mark a break with the past?
To some extent, it did. The revolution had a certain degree of popular support, spurred by discontent with the Shah’s economic policies and social reforms.87 The “winners” of the revolution came to power in 1979 with an agenda defined largely in opposition to the Shah, as well as by an awareness of what the Shah had done wrong. (The current government permits a degree of dissent precisely because it wants to be able to maintain this situational awareness.) He had been too secular and too enamoured with Western culture, he had forsaken his identity and religion, and he had modernized too quickly and liberalized too late. Above all, there was a sense that the Shah had sold out his country to the West, and so that the 84 Michael Slackman, “Hostage-Taker, Reformer, Pessimist: An Iranian Life,” New York Times, 29 April 2006. 85 Very few could have predicted that Iran, with billions of dollars in artillery and oil revenue, united armed forces, and a pervasive security apparatus known for its brutal efficiency, would have crumbled. Even the British Ambassador from 1974 to 1979, Sir Anthony Parsons, was no exception. He recalls, in his memoirs: “I still did not believe that there was a serious risk of the Shah being overthrown.” Parsons, The Pride and Fall, 67. 86 For instance, the view from Riyadh was that the revolution had been the inevitable consequence of a rapidly modernizing leader in collision with the dominant and highly revered religion. It led the Saudi king to abandon or otherwise reverse certain liberalization efforts already implemented. 87 Khomeini did not divulge his full intentions until after he consolidated power. Many Iranians, including some of the more secular and liberal revolutionaries that helped return him to Tehran, considered Khomeini a grandfatherly figure. See: Abolhassan Bani Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the U.S. (Macmillan Publishing, 1991). Bani-Sadr “handled” Khomeini in France. This was a misguided view shared also by some in the U.S. State Department, who thought that the “Ayatollah would make for a good ally.” William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, (W.W. Norton & Co, 1981).
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mobilization represented a fierce response to the exploitation of the country. Ruhollah Khomeini, the Grand Ayatollah who was subsequently anointed Supreme Leader, derided the Shah as little more than a puppet. He also gave impassionate speeches in which he boasted that “America cannot do a damn thing”—something that resonated with the public. The remark was first made in the context of the hostage crisis, allowing the new leadership to deliver the United States a very embarrassing and public comeuppance and to show that, in contrast to the Shah, it would not submit to the more powerful United States. (More practically, it helped hasten the Islamic republic.) This sort of belligerent behaviour and rhetoric has been one of the primary ways in which the clerical leadership differentiated, and continues to differentiate, itself from its predecessor.
In the days following the Revolution, Tehran shifted from a pro-western ally to becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an association of mostly other developing countries.88 Born at the height of the Cold War, the movement was a way for smaller countries to escape the pressure of taking sides in the struggle between the East and the West. The general tone of the movement was anti-colonial—something that befit Khomeini’s “Neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic” slogan. The ecclesiastical leadership shunned patronage. After all, the new leader who claimed to be divinely appointed could not very well approve the godless communists either. For revolutionary Iran, non-alignment was also strategic step towards establishing an independent foreign policy, which grew out of the awareness of a public sentiment that favoured assertiveness as well as national security needs that demanded increased self-reliance.
Iran turned to its immediate neighbourhood, hoping to improve ties with the Muslim world. But its radicalism had already turned off its neighbours, who were worried about the contagion effects of the Iranian revolution on their populations. (Such fears were overblown as the same Shi’a ideas that gave Khomeini the legitimacy to rule happened to be an anathema to Sunni ideas of authority.89) What was threatening to the Arab rulers, particularly the monarchies, was that Khomeini had just overthrown a monarchy. Even before Iran adopted exporting the revolution as an explicit foreign policy objective, the Saudis feared what might happen if their small Shi’a population in their oil-rich eastern province revolted. Iraq had the same concern about its Shi’a, prompting Saddam Hussein to launch a pre-emptive strike against what he perceived to be a weakened Iran.90 During the course of that war, Iraq received support from Brazil, France, China, Denmark, the United States, the Soviet Union, as well as numerous Arab, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Warsaw Pact countries while Iran was left to fend for itself.91
Foreign powers overwhelmingly sided with Iraq, providing it with a steady flow of munitions, missiles, and tanks, and stood silent even when Iraq attacked Iran with chemical weapons. The eight-year long War taught it a very valuable lesson: it could not depend on any outside power for security. 88 Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the US, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 89 It is helpful to think of the Sunni-Shi’a divide in a similar fashion as the Protestant-Catholicism divide. Though there remain important differences, including the fact that Shi’a, which is more similar to Catholicism in terms of practice, are the off-shoot. 90 This was not a miscalculation. Most of the senior military officers, who had not already fled, had been purged in firing squads in the days and weeks following the revolution, and Iran was, in fact, weakened. Saddam’s error was that once he invaded, he decided that toppling the new government was not enough but that he would hold onto territory. This roused the nationalist sentiment among Iranians and allowed the Islamists to consolidate their power. 91 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 97.
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Iran continues to emphasize sovereign foreign policy decision-making, even though the pressures of economic strain and military losses forced the Islamic Republic to abandon some of its revolutionary hubris. Following the death of Khomeini and certainly with the rise of power of the late President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who offered a sort of Islamic dictatorship “lite,” the country has steadily diversified economic relations without compromising its overall commitment to self-reliance.92 It is worth pointing out that the Islamic Republic shares a number of defence and security priorities with imperial Iran—defending the territorial sovereignty of Iran, safeguarding the Persian Gulf, maintaining access to the Caspian Sea, and striving for regional dominance. The Islamic Republic’s commitment to self-sufficiency is not fundamentally different from the Shah, who, too, wanted Iran to “stand on its own two feet.”
However, the Islamic Republic has followed a military strategy that is entirely novel among others in the Middle East. Given that it no longer relies on the U.S. to provide it with state-of-the-art military equipment and technology, as do pro-American countries in the region, or on any security alliances, Iran looked for alternatives to conventional power. It invested in two areas: asymmetric capabilities, which include non-regular forces (e.g., Hezbollah) and non-conventional capabilities—of which nuclear is the most obvious.93
92 Rafsanjani is worth mentioning because although he has passed, the form of politics that he represented carries on. See Section 3.1. 93 Iran’s nuclear program is not discussed in this SR, as the subject matter has been extensively covered.
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3 Iran’s Domestic Context
Iran became an Islamic Republic after the 1979 Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy.94 Conservative clerics (commonly known as mullahs, or derogatively referred to as akhoond in Iran) established a theocratic form of government based loosely on a Shi’a Islamic idea of velayat-e faqih (Persian: guardianship of the jurist).95 Accordingly, ultimate political authority is vested in a learned religious scholar, referred to as the Supreme Leader (rahbar-e mo’azzam, or simply, rahbar), who holds a life tenure. The Supreme Leader is accountable only to an elected body of 88 clerics, known as the Assembly of Experts (majles-e khobregan-e rahbari).
To casual observers, Iran seems to have a clear power structure. While, formally, the Supreme Leader—currently, the ailing, 79 year old, Ali Khamenei—holds the highest office, it would be inaccurate to characterize the state as a one-man regime today.96 There are multiple power players in Iran’s labyrinthine system of government. At the top sits Khamenei, to be sure. But not unlike other forms of government, his power is highly reliant on the abiding loyalty of a number of other actors. Thus, while his constitutional role is to carry out the responsibilities of the faqih (guardian jurist), in reality, he spends considerable effort to balance the interests of a range of domestic political actors, and to prevent any other actor or group from becoming so powerful or influential as to challenge his authority.97
There are several reasons for this. First, there is a discrepancy between the prescribed authority of political institutions, as laid out in the constitution, and the actual authority they exercise.98 Internal dynamics in Iran reveal that personalities are what count. In other words, “an office’s title is only as meaningful as the person who holds it.”99 Accordingly, Khamenei is not as fully in control as his predecessor. Because of this, he is also less dogmatic than Khomeini, and often less extreme than many of his supporters (e.g., the Basij, the principalists, some traditional conservatives, as will be identified below).
94 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini argued that, the imam—and not the king—should be the temporal, political, and religious leader of the community. The concept was not previously all encompassing, and held that jurists should have authority on religious and spiritual matters. See Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984), 34. 95 The velayat-e faqih was an innovation of Khomeini that held that a guardianship of religious jurists was needed to ensure that the policies of the state conform to Islamic tenets, and that in the jurists are the legitimate rulers charged with maintaining the community of believers in the absence of the 12th imam (Mahdi). For more on Khomeini’s “Islamic Government,” see Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1993). 96 This is a more accurate way to describe Iran under Khomeini than the current state of government. 97 Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). See also: Vali Nasr, “Meet the ‘Decider’ of Tehran. It’s Not the Hothead You Expect,” The Washington Post (9 December 2007). 98 Axel Tschentscher, “Iran – Constitution.” United Nations, Translation, last updated 29 May 2010. Accessed at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN-DPADM/UNPAN039337.pdf. 99 David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch and Frederic Wehrey, “Chapter Three: Formal Structures of the Islamic Republic,” In: Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010): 21.
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He has endeavoured to remain above the fray with respect to day-to-day affairs,100 but as Supreme Leader, he is committed to the idea of the velayat-e faqih and derives most of his support from the more conservative elements in the country.
Second, as the official country name suggests, the Islamic Republic is both theocratic and republican. On the one hand, Iran has a semblance of a functioning democracy. Universal suffrage exists, and presidential elections take place every four years. Iran has an elected parliament (Majles) as well as a cabinet. 101 It also has a fairly developed civil society. On the other hand, there are numerous constraints on the democratic elements. The constitution is designed to empower unelected, religious bodies, such as the Guardian Council (Shura-ye negahban-e ghanun-e asasi), to contest, undermine, or overrule decisions made by the president and the parliament and/or to impeach cabinet ministers. The Guardian Council, often in consultation with the Supreme Leader, is responsible for selecting candidates for office, disapproving those whose beliefs are deemed incompatible with revolutionary and Islamic values.102 And so, Iranians vote, but only for candidates that met the approval of the clergy. The relationship between republican and theocratic elements is tense.
The dualism also creates an untenable political environment in which power is continuously negotiated.103 The system of government in Iran is designed with various branches, such as the parliament, the presidency, the judiciary, the military, the paramilitary (i.e., the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), the intelligence and parallel intelligence services, the clerical establishment, the Friday prayer leaders, and a constellation of formal and informal foundations, councils, and business associations, including the powerful bonyads) holding overlapping jurisdictions in order to prevent a given body from becoming too powerful or influential. 104 This structure tends to give the branches of government a great deal of “negative power”—that is, the power to prevent certain initiatives or policy positions from coming to fruition, but little power to successfully initiate changes. 105 Former president Mohammad Khatami, elected on promises of liberal reform, was unable to carry out his programs, lamented that, “I must admit that after three years and a half in the presidency I am aware that the head of state does not have adequate authority to do his job.”106
Under this current system, the Supreme Leader has several mechanisms available to him through which to constrain, enable political players, and make the necessary concessions. The result is, in theory, a balanced system that preserves the status quo through various checks and balances. Some analysts have
100 A notable exception of this was his endorsement of Ahmadinejad as president. See: Karim Sadjadpour, “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 March 2008. Accessed at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/03/10/reading-khamenei-world-view-of-iran-s- most-powerful-leader/20v8. 101 With the exception of Baha’is, the Constitution provides that religious minorities, including Christians and Jews, are represented in the Majles. 102 In 2013, they blocked Rafsanjani from entering the presidential race. 103 Peter Jones, “Succession and the Supreme Leader in Iran,” Survival Vol. 53 No. 6 (Dec. 2011–Jan., 2012); Ali Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The politics of confrontation Adelphi Paper no. 393 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007); Buchta, Who Rules Iran?; and Nasr, “Meet the ‘Decider’ of Tehran.” 104 Nasr. “Meet the ‘Decider’ of Tehran.” 105 Thaler, Nader, Chubin, Green, Lynch and Wehrey, “Chapter Three: Formal Structures of the Islamic Republic,” 38. 106 Shahram Chubin, “Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics, and National Security.” Adelphi Paper No. 342. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002): 39.
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termed the design of this system “suspended equilibrium.”107 All things being equal, the strength of “suspended equilibrium” as an organizational tradition makes it difficult for significant changes to come about within the dynamics of power in the Iranian political landscape.
The Iranian system is thus geared to preserve the status quo, which inhibits the possibility of any drastic turn in policy. 108 This equilibrium will likely corrode in the future, as non-clerical elite groups expand their power and control over the state’s institutions and resources.
Who then is responsible for formulating international policy? Do Iran’s foreign and defence policies originate in the president’s office or the Supreme Leader’s? As mentioned in the previous section, Iran’s international policies have matured since the death of Khomeini. Although Iran remains suspicious of, and hostile towards, the West particularly in the Persian Gulf region, ideology has been mostly replaced by pragmatism and nuance. Today, Iran’s defence and foreign policies are not the edicts of one leader. They reflect the preferences of a number of factions that includes moderates and reformists alongside the militant revolutionaries, even though the last word rests with Khamenei.109 Indeed, power in Iran is shared among a small group of clerics and increasingly among their associates. As such, Iran’s international policy choices are sometimes unexpected and even confusing. The goal below is to provide insight into Iran’s political system and some key actors. 3.1 Factions
Regime stability is largely owed to the aforementioned political structure. Even so, politics in Iran is characterized by the presence of different clusters of individuals and groups—or factions—jockeying for patronage and influence against each other, and among themselves.
Iran specialists identify four broad factions: (1) the traditional conservatives, (2) the reformists, (3) the pragmatic conservatives, and (4) the radicals.110 Infighting between the factions has worsened in the past decade or so, particularly around the nuclear issue. Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh write, “Although Iran’s hard-line leadership has maintained a remarkable unity of purpose in the face of reformist challengers, it is badly fragmented over key foreign policy issues, including the importance of nuclear weapons.”111 However, it is important to note that factional affiliation is not necessarily indicative of how any one actor might respond to a given issue. Further, factions are fluid, and are in a constant state of negotiation on each issue; in other words, coalitions form and are then abandoned when the next issue comes along. Nonetheless, factions are described below.
3.1.1 Traditional Conservatives
The dominant and largest faction. They espouse a commitment to the core tenets of the Islamic revolution, which includes the promotion of self-sufficiency without dependence on outside actors and 107 Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System,” The Muslim World Vol 94, No 4 (October 2004): 495–524. 108 Kamrava and Hassan-Yari, “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System,” 495-524. 109 Sadjadpour, “Reading Khamenei.” 110 On the formal constitution of Iran’s political system as well as how power is informally exercised, see Jones, “Succession and the Supreme Leader in Iran.” 111 Writing in 2005, at the height of infighting, Takeyh and Pollack urged the U.S. to exploit the tumultuous internal environment. See: Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh, “Taking on Tehran,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005. Accessed at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2005-03-01/taking-tehran.
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the protection from cultural toxicities (gharbzadegi).112 Adherents tend to include the lower socio-economic classes, lower-ranking clergy, and some merchants.
3.1.2 Reformists
Ascended in the late 1980s. They tend to favour an opening to the outside world without compromising the basic Islamic configuration of the state. They advocate for the easing of political and social controls, economic liberalization, and cultural exchange. The reformists reached the height of their power under Mohammad Khatami. Supporters include some prominent political actors (e.g., Mehdi Karroubi, a leader of the Green Movement who was arrested in 2011), students, and the intelligentsia.
Today’s moderates (that is the reformists and the pragmatic conservatives) were yesterday’s radicals.
3.1.3 Pragmatic Conservatives
Positioned between the aforementioned two factions. They tend to support economic modernization and transactions with the outside world, including the West, but oppose democratization. It is arguably the most opportunistic faction. Adherents broadly include merchants, students, urban middle classes, and some high-profile clergy (e.g., the late Rafsanjani, former Iranian president and a key player in the revolution, and current president, Hassan Rouhani).113
3.1.4 Radicals (Also Known as Principalists)
Rose to power in the period under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who, ironically given his puritanicalism, won votes in his first presidential bid for not being a member of the clergy. It is typically associated with the IRGC and Basij (particularly war veterans), as they seemingly climbed to mid-to-senior positions in 2005. Radicals preach economic fairness, and tend to appeal to poorer and provincial classes.
In short, the factions are distinguished, inter alia, by where they rank on a spectrum that ranges from open to negotiating to outright hostility with the outside world. In March 2016, Khamenei and Rafsanjani had a public spat over degree to which Iran ought to moderate its international posture.114 The Supreme Leader slammed Rafsanjani for suggesting the imprudence of conducting missile tests following negotiations on the nuclear program.115 This factionalized political environment may have implications for regime stability.
Dissatisfied factions or a collection of such groups have historically contributed to the defeat of both autocratic and democratic governments. Following the death of Khomeini, which happened to accord with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, factions began to form and to compete for the power to change the 112 Gharbzadegi was a word coined by Khomeini to mean intoxication by or on the West, literally, Westoxification. 113 Besides having gained notoriety for his business acumen and for amassing fortunes, he is remembered as “a pragmatist and centrist inclined toward economic liberalism and political authoritarianism.” See: Alan Cowell, “Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ex-President of Iran, Dies at 82,” The New York Times, 8 January 2017. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/world/middleeast/ayatollah-rafsanjani-dead.html. 114 Thomas Erdrink, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Backs Missile Program,” The New York Times, 30 March 2016. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/world/middleeast/iran-missile-program-ayatollah-ali- khamenei.html. 115 Rafsanjani’s outspokenness was interpreted as treasonous. It is perhaps why his family requested an investigation into his death.
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political, economic, and social direction. Rafsanjani was the first post-war president. A pragmatic conservative, Rafsanjani pursued liberalization in the spirit of the Beijing Consensus or the so-called China Model, establishing economic relations with China, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia, among others. During his tenure from 1989 to 1997, the economy was prioritized and key sectors were privatized. He shunned social welfare, and attempted—mostly unsuccessfully—to curtail the ultraconservative elements despite aligning himself with the hardliners earlier on. Directly involved in the creation of the Islamic Republic, he was one of the most important figures in the revolution, and remained so until his death. Thought to eschew religious piety for financial reward, he is held responsible by critics for widespread corruption, including the IRGC’s infiltration of key economic enterprises.116
While Rafsanjani had opened Iran for business to the outside, the openness did not extend to other areas. Rafsanjani had done little to reform clerical rule. He was succeeded by Khatami, who won the majority of rural and urban votes in 1997—in a surprise victory that signalled widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo. Though a clergyman, Khatami was the first to openly state that reforms were in order. He promised to lead political and cultural change, including social justice, increased individual freedom, political tolerance, decreased censorship, and greater rights for women.117
The stalwarts of the republic, such as those who see enmity with the West as part and parcel of the revolutionary identity and those veterans further hardened by the war, found his ideas threatening to the Islamic Republic.118 The limits of his power quickly became apparent. Although he instituted some change, his supporters were frustrated by the slow rate of change. This frustration erupted in student riots in 1999—something that strengthened the hard-liners’ resolve to clamp down on civil liberties. After this episode, he was effectively blocked from passing any further reforms and his opponents sought to limit acceptable discourse.
Khatami’s tenure was significant.119 For one, he rankled the conservative centre of power when he bid rapprochement with the United States. As president, he was not expected to touch foreign policy. That his overtures were rebuffed by Washington, however, vindicated his opponents of the correctness of Iran’s choice of enemy.120 Thus, the reform movement as well as his entreaties to the U.S. helped contribute to the rise of the radicals that swept to power in 2005 with the election of the hard-line Ahmadinejad. More importantly however, his tenure—which saw what was until then “unprecedented criticism and free expression”—created space for the development of a genuine civil society in Iran.121 The lesson of this for the clerical leadership was that change threatens the control of the country and the spirit of the revolution. Therefore, the leadership either avoids change unless compelled or allows for only incremental change. 116 Paul Klebnikov, “Millionaire Mullahs,” Forbes 21 July 2003. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0721/056.html#25cb72e81c49. 117 David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (Frank Cass Publishers, 2001): 80–83. 118 “IRGC Commanders’ Letter to Khatami,” Iran Data Portal, Princeton University, 9 July 1999. https://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/proclamations/icrg-letter/. The original in Persian can be found here: https://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/proclamations/icrg-letter/ICRG_Letter_Persian.pdf. 119 For an appraisal, see: Suzanne Maloney, “The Legacy of Reform in Iran, Sixteen Years Later,” Brookings Institute, (23 May 2013). Accessed at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/05/23/the-legacy-of-reform-in- iran-sixteen-years-later/. 120 His Dialogue of Civilizations was met with the “Axis of Evil” speech further helped ensure that the next president would be more compliant with the founding tenets of the Islamic Republic. 121 Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran, 142.
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The period after the death of the revolutionary leader exposed the strong presence of factions in Iranian politics. The impact of all of these factions and groups jockeying for power, influence, and wealth, combined with Khamenei’s need to maintain harmony, means that decision-making in Iran is a slow and cautious process.122 What this means practically is that there is often no consensus on many important issues. Consider even an important national security issue like the nuclear program: while the political establishment was united in the view that Iran is entitled to pursue and exploit nuclear technologies, it failed to reach an agreement on the question of weaponization.123 Such discord also characterized the internal environment in Iran during the course of international negotiations, as different groups and factions debated everything from whether Iran should be negotiating to what should be traded for cooperation. This situation should be watched closely, as the scope of the Supreme Leader’s power, the level of his influence, and that of different factional entities, could be key determinants of Iran’s future, including how it will interact with the external world. 3.2 The Bonyads
In addition to the factions, two other groups exert considerable influence: the Bonyads (Foundation in Persian) and the IRGC (which includes the Basij).124 They are state-approved, charitable trusts, which are answerable directly to the Supreme Leader.125 Though charitable foundations of the sort existed under the monarchy, these bonyads were formed mostly from the liquidation of the estate of Iran’s wealthiest families and the assets of foreign companies in the weeks that followed the revolution, and were then passed onto religious leaders. The idea for their creation has roots in Shi’a concepts of charity, which command pious Muslims to donate money to local mosques to help the disadvantaged. Although they are officially entrusted with redistributing wealth to the poor as well as with running other social welfare and reconstruction programs, the bonyads, which operate without any real oversight, have abandoned their social welfare functions for commercial activities.
The Bonyads built conglomerates out of the wealth and properties that were confiscated after the revolution, particularly after 1989. They hold significant stakes—an estimated 20% of Iran’s gross domestic product—and are widely thought to be involved in various black markets.126 Some of these, such as the sanctioned Bonyad-e Mostazafan or the Bonyad-e Ta’avon Sepah, are also controlled by members of the IRGC, and are sometimes used as covers for illegitimate activities or to circumvent
122 Mohsen Milani, political scientist and Iranian foreign policy analyst, predicts that any turns or changes in policy under Rouhani will likely take place slowly given the number of power players and factions and the dynamics that exist between them. See Mohsen Milani, “Rouhani’s Foreign Policy: How to Work with Iran’s Pragmatic New President,” Foreign Affairs 25 June 2013. 123 See Adam Entous, “U.S. Spies: Iran Split on Nuclear Program,” Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2011. Accessed at: www.online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703373404576148581167010572. 124 For more on the effects on Iranian decision-making and politics, see Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad, 13–16. 125 For a survey of the Bonyads, see: Suzanne Maloney, “Agents or Obstacles? Parastatal Foundations and Challenges for Iranian Development,” In Parvin Alizadeh (ed.) The Economy of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 145–76. 126 Before Iran embarked on negotiations with the P5+1, sanctions produced intense debates “over whether to move further toward developing nuclear weapons” according to a classified U.S. report quoted in open sourcesfshin Molavi, The Soul of Iran: A Nation’s Struggle for Freedom (New York, NY: Norton and Co. 2006).
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foreign sanctions related to the nuclear program.127 In the last 10–15 years, however, the IRGC and their associates have come to increasingly challenge the economic dominance of the bonyads. 3.3 The Guards
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami (hereafter shortened to Pasdaran, Persian for Guards), is a key player both in and out of Iran.128 The Pasdaran are an ideological parallel, elite military unit. It was formed on May 5, 1979 in order to help secure the newly constituted Islamic government.129 Today, it is one of the most influential entities in Iran. According to some estimates, the Pasdaran numbers some 125,000 men, a conservative figure that excludes reservists and the Basij.130
Because it was created as a counterbalance to the regular military (artesh), whose members were (perceived to be) secular and loyal to the monarchy, recruitment for the Pasdaran generally targeted the sans culotte—the radical and the poor. During the period of power consolidation from 1979 to 1989, the Pasdaran were proscribed specific responsibilities and roles that mostly pertained to defending the revolution. These included as guarding the state from external subversion or interference, responding to internal dissidence, maintaining order, and increasingly conducting military and covert operations.131 The first test of the Pasdaran’s loyalty came early, and though it did not have the accoutrements or organization that characterized the artesh, it proved highly effective at blunting Iraq’s attacks.132
What began as an ideologically driven militia soon underwent a transformation. First, it began to assume economic and monetary interests.133 Many Pasdaran commanders, who had served in the War, returned as war heroes with the expectation that they be treated as such, and were rewarded with lucrative contracts in reconstruction of the country. (This heroic and gallant image of the Pasdaran has unsurprisingly been preserved and propagated.) Second, Rafsanjani, who was then president, gave the Pasdaran a standard military structure, including ranks. His reforms, which included a start-up income for the Pasdaran,
127 “Bonyad Taavon Sepah,” Iran Watch, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1 January 2012. Accessed at: https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/bonyad-taavon-sepah. See also: Julian Borger and Robert Tait, “The financial power of the Revolutionary Guards,” The Guardian, 15 February 2010. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/15/financial-power-revolutionary-guard. 128 The IRGC is composed of Ground Resistance Forces, Navy, Aerospace Force, Quds Force (Special Operations), and the Basij. Please note that although the Basij are under the auspices of the IRGC, I have treated them in an earlier section since they play significant domestic role. 129 The IRGC is often likened to the Vietcong. However, it should be emphasized that the IRGC was set up after the Shah was deposed. Comparisons to the Vietcong and similar institutions with the goal of securing a regime change are not useful since the IRGC’s raison d’être is to prevent regime change. 130 Dieter Bednarz and Erich Follath, “Revolutionary Guards Keep Stranglehold on Iran,” Der Speigel, 16 February 2010. Accessed at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-regime-s-shadow-warriors- revolutionary-guards-keep-stranglehold-on-iran-a-677995.html. 131 The IRGC is also involved in Iran’s efforts to project power beyond Iran’s borders. The branch responsible for these activities is discussed below. 132 Despite having received the best training and equipment available, artesh was unprepared to respond to the attack, as many of its senior officers had either been killed off or had deserted. 133 Ali Ansari, “The Revolution Will Be Mercantilized,” The National Interest (January/February edition), 11 February 2010. Accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-revolution-will-be-mercantilized-3332.
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encouraged it to take on business ventures.134 Thus, the Rafsanjani period marked the start of the institution’s transformation into a business conglomerate.
Much to the chagrin of the more conservative forces in the country, it appeared as though the Pasdaran was more committed to protecting its considerable investments than the ideals of the revolution. This realization, which coincided with the landslide victory of the reformist Khatami, worried the Supreme Leader. Khamenei, who is said to lack the supposed charisma and the religious credentials of his predecessor, wanted to restore the raison d’être of the Pasdaran.135 The Pasdaran are the guardians of the revolution, after all. The institution was purged of reformist sympathizers and higher ranks were reserved for those committed to the faqih. Although the Pasdaran were never intended to have a political function, these changes revealed the Pasdaran’s growing role in Iranian politics, most notably on two occasions when it reprimanded Khatami for overstepping his office and when it intervened in support of the Ahmadinejad.136
The 2003 invasion of Iraq gave the Pasdaran, particularly its external branch the Quds force, another opportunity for aggrandizement as well as material growth.137 The Pasdaran—which now had a meaningful job to do in defeating the “West” in Iraq—was given considerable latitude. Under Ahmadinejad, members also came to occupy several cabinet posts and other high profile political positions.138 The period from 2005 onwards has thus seen the largest expansion of its economic, social, cultural, and political influence and interests.
The Pasdaran have thus undergone significant changes from an ideological militia to a more domestically engaged institution with vast economic and commercial interests, and diminishing checks on its power. While it still provides support and security for high-ranking officials in Iran, including for the Supreme Leader, the Pasdaran is no longer constituted by simple guards. The relationship between the Pasdaran and the Supreme Leader reflects the classic principal-agent problem in International Relations theory—that is, the Pasdaran have become increasingly opportunistic and instrumentalist often choosing to pursue their own interests over those of their principal. 139 The Supreme Leader is, in turn, increasingly sensitive to any rifts or dissent within the IRGC’s top leadership, even though the group remains, at least publicly, deferential to him. For example, members are prohibited from assembling or engaging in prolonged conversations on sensitive political matters.
According to some observers, Supreme Leader Khamenei is “hostage in the hands of his own praetorian guard.”140 Still, it should be noted that the Pasdaran—both in terms of its members and in terms of informal influence—is shaped by the same factional realities and pressures that permeate the rest of Iran’s 134 Adam Kredo. “Who’s the Boss? Expert: Iran’s military has trumped its religious apparatus,” The Washington Free Beacon, 23 April 2013. Accessed at: http://freebeacon.com/whos-the-boss-2/. 135 Nasr, “Meet the ‘Decider’ of Tehran.” 136 Abbas Milani. “Revolutionary Guards call the shots in Iranian election,” The Australian, 1 June 2013. Accessed at: www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/revolutionary-guards-call-the-shots-in-iranian-election/story-e6frg6so- 1226654780702. 137 The Quds brigade has been instrumental in developing Islamist militant groups abroad, particularly Hezbollah. 138 Partly in response to Khatami-era reforms, Khamenei called upon the Pasdaran to help ensure the electoral victory of his preferred presidential candidate, Ahmadinejad. In his first term, five of 21 cabinet posts went to the Pasdaran and 13 in his second. 139 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol 41, No 3 (Summer 1987), 335–370. 140 Kredo, “Who’s the Boss?”
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domestic politics, and it is by no means a monolithic entity. It is difficult to predict the preferences or the loyalty of the Pasdaran in the future. While it is reasonable to assume that it will seek to defend its commercial interests and investment portfolios, it is not at all clear whether in the future the Pasdaran will support a hard-line conservative direction or a less bellicose approach to international affairs. What is clear, however, is that while in the past individuals mattered, today, it is institutions that do. 3.4 The Basij
The Sazman-e Basij-e Mostaz’afin (Organization for the Mobilization for the Oppressed), shortened to Basij, are one of the five forces of the IRGC. The Basij was created as an independent volunteer militia—people’s militia—in 1980, and became integrated into the IRGC the following year. The goal at the outset was to recruit 50 percent of the population to the cause. Though it fell short of that target, the Basij is a massive organization of men and women who are steadfastly dedicated to the preservation of the revolution’s principles and the defence of the country. The state claims that the Basij is an NGO that reflects the “true will of the people.”141 But the Basij is neither comparable to an NGO nor militia. Given that there is no comparable equivalent and limited understanding of the Basij, the organization warrants a separate look from the rest of the IRGC. It is an auxiliary force or institution whose members are volunteers from typically lower socio-economic households, as the leftist connotations of the organization’s name might imply. Unlike the IRGC and the artesh, the Basij do not rely on conscripts.
The Basij rose to prominence in the Iran-Iraq War. Two million Basij fought against Iraq, mounting human wave attacks that slowed the Iraqi offensive with essentially no military training or force protection. That the group expanded after the war suggests that the Basij are not mere a militia. Indeed, few Basiji are armed or even fewer are involved in military or security functions. 142 Like many other post-revolutionary creation, the Basij was designed to preserve the faqih. Known for fierce loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the Basij has branches in nearly every city and town, as well as universities across the country. Members enjoy preferential treatment including priority consideration for employment or university placements and grants. Although, as mentioned recruits were previously the devout, today, being in the Basij does not mean that one is necessarily a supporter of the government though they might still be devout. 143
Today, the Basiji are responsible for maintaining internal security and upholding morality. Described by some Iranians as “street thugs,” the clerics have increasingly marshalled them to clamp down on dissidence and to patrol urban areas in order to promote “virtue.” Since 2009, the Basij has acquired political and economic influence, owing to the role it played in suppressing popular street protests following the disputed election of Ahmadinejad. This development has contributed to the further paramilitarization of Iran.
The Basij continues to recruit young women and men at various mosques and centres throughout the nation. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that there are 90,000 full-time
141 Saeid Golkar, Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015). 142 Golkar, Captive Society. 143 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 January 2018. Accessed at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/crisis-iran-what-now.
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members, 300,000 reservists, and an estimated 1 million volunteers who could be rallied when needed.144 According to the government’s official estimates, the Basij can mobilize over 20 million people. This is likely hubris, but the Basij’s powers and influence will likely grow should the government continue to rely on it to counter internal strife and civil disobedience.
Basiji were deployed to deal with the uprisings that began taking place across the country in late 2017.145 The uprising started in Mashhad and spread to over 70 towns and cities, including Arak, Bandar Abbas, Hamedan, Isfahan, Kashan, Kerman, Rasht, Shiraz, Tehran, Qazvin, and Yazd.146 Though these differed in terms of purpose, participants, and causes, they posed the fiercest domestic challenge to the government since the 2009 presidential election protests. While it is uncertain whether the protests will result in real change, it seems that the state’s security apparatus is ever more prepared for sudden nation-wide protests. Unlike 2009, the latest clashes between the government’s forces and protestors have resulted in minimal bloodshed, which may indicate that the leadership is reticent to use brute force unless absolutely necessary.147 3.5 Implications for the Future
What is the future impact of Iran’s factional political environment, civil unrest and public dissatisfaction, and an increasingly powerful military force? Questions to consider are how might the leadership respond if the protests turn into a revolutionary movement and threaten to overthrow the government? Even if the current protests flame out or are snuffed out, such shows against the government and its policies will likely reoccur in the short-term unless some solution is found to Iran’s internal turmoil particularly questions of economic mismanagement. Some of the public’s grievances concern the IRGC’s economic and financial activities, as well as state funding of Hezbollah and other proxy groups.148 Should Khamenei follow in the footsteps of Bashar al-Assad of Syria and order the use of violent force against Iran’s civilian population, there will be military implications for the region. Given that the government has so much invested in its internal security apparatuses, a violent response to any significant or sustained protest or revolt seems probable. However, it should be noted that, in contrast to Syria, the Iranian leadership is cognizant of the public’s grievances as well as the perils of disregarding them. In other words, not only does Iran tolerate a level of dissent that allows its leaders to take the pulse of the population, it also prefers to make concessions (however trivial) than to use brute force. Accordingly,
144 Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance Force,” United States Institute of Peace, 2010. Accessed at: www.iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. 145 Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran.” 146 “Protests have engulfed several cities in Iran,” The Economist, 2 January 2018. Accessed at: https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21733398-clerics-are-struggling-control-widespread- unrest-protests-have-engulfed. 147 Farzin Nadimi, “Murmurs of a Second Cultural Revolution,” Policy Watch 2848, The Washington Institute, 21 August 2017. Accessed at: www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/murmurs-of-a-second-cultural- revolution. 148 Eric Lob and Nader Habibi, “There’s a battle in Iran over the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps business empire,” Washington Post, 5 January 2017. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2017/01/05/theres-a-battle-in-iran-over-the-islamic-revolutionary-guards-corps-business- empire/?utm_term=.3d744eaec457.
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how best to mollify disgruntled groups is something that government-funded think tanks in Iran study closely.149
Another concern is that the IRGC might take advantage of any instability, particularly after the death of the supreme leader.150 Currently, a core group of IRGC commanders (known as the Command Network) exercise influence over Iran’s senior officials, including the Supreme Leader, and shape Iran’s foreign policy on important global security issues, including the nuclear program, terrorism, and the conflict in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.151 It also wields considerable influence over the country’s politics, economics, and society owing to vast involvement in strategic business sectors, including the media and communications.152 The Pasdaran have considerable holdings in agriculture, construction, mining, property, transportation, the energy sector, and defence procurement and production.
The extent of the IRGC’s economic interests is not fully known, but it is believed it controls anywhere from 25 to 60 percent of the country’s wealth.153 According to former IRGC member, Mohsen Sazegara, states that the IRGC “controls more than 100 different businesses” in export, petroleum, and communications industries.154 In this way, the IRGC is not much different from the Pakistani or even Chinese military.155 Because of how powerful the Pasdaran have become, there should be a high degree of concern that they might stage a coup, appoint a puppet, or otherwise supplant the theocrats as the dominant political force in the country. While it is possible that a successor will be named before Khamenei passes, it should be pointed out that continuity is less likely than change considering that many of the revolution’s veterans (i.e., those committed to the spirit of the revolution), such as Rafsanjani, are no longer on the scene. A more probable scenario is that the Pasdaran will groom the next leader, and some indications point that their preferred choice would be a hardliner, or at least, someone who does not
149 Iran has a number of think tanks affiliated with different state ministries, such as the Center for Strategic Research. For example, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) publishes studies and reports on a wide range of foreign policy issues (mostly in Farsi) and runs an English-language journal, Iranian Journal of International Affairs. 150 Arshad Mohammed, “Clinton: Iran moving toward military dictatorship,” Reuters, 15 February 2010. Accessed at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/clinton-iran-moving-toward-military-dictatorship- idUSTRE61E1FR20100215?type=politicsNews. 151 Will Fulton, “IRGC Command Network: Formal Structures and Informal Influence,” American Enterprise Institute, 10 October 2012. Accessed at: www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-irgc-command-network-october-10- 2012. 152 Akbar Ganji, “Revolutionary Pragmatists: Why Iran’s Military Won’t Spoil Détente with the US,” Foreign Affairs. 10 November 2013. Accessed at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140253/akbar-ganji/revolutionary- pragmatists?sp_mid=44364296&sp_rid=c3VzYW4ua2hhemFlbGlAZ21haWwuY29tS0 153 Eric Lob and Nader Habibi, “There’s a battle in Iran over the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps business empire,” Washington Post, 5 January 2017. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2017/01/05/theres-a-battle-in-iran-over-the-islamic-revolutionary-guards-corps-business- empire/?utm_term=.3d744eaec457. See also: Jacob L. Shapiro, “A Theory about Iran,” Geopolitical Futures, 12 February 2018. Accessed at: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/a-theory-about-iran/. 154 Dieter Bednarz and Erich Follath, “Revolutionary Guards Keep Stranglehold on Iran,” Der Speigel, 16 February 2010. Accessed at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-regime-s-shadow-warriors- revolutionary-guards-keep-stranglehold-on-iran-a-677995.html. 155 The former operates Pakistan’s largest construction conglomerate, and is involved in many other profit-generating activities.
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limit their political and economic enterprises.156 Barring significant domestic political changes that resolve factional divisions, power competitions, and economic disparities, a future power struggle is likely in Iran’s future.
156 Enmity with the West and sanctions are after all their bread and butter. Although the hatred of the West or the U.S. more specifically may be sincere, it should be noted that enemies are often needed to justify military’s spending, and that continuing the rivalry may be beneficial to those who have become quite rich by circumventing the sanction regime through black markets.
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4 Iran’s Regional Context
Ever since Iran proclaimed itself an Islamic Republic, there has been a tendency to reduce all of its actions to religious ideology. Although religion undoubtedly still plays a considerable role, particularly as a useful device in justifying state policies, the fervour that characterized the revolutionary state is mostly gone. A number of events have forced Iran to moderate its worldview: first, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War, the leaders realized that Persian nationalism was just as strong as (if not stronger than) piety and that dragging out the war whilst appealing to nationalist sentiment could help them consolidate their grip on power; second, the death of Khomeini, who was such an extreme ideologue almost certainly meant that any successor would be less so; third, the Soviet Union collapsed, creating a buffer on Iran’s northern border.
The Iran-Iraq War had also reminded the clerical leadership that it could count on a few in the region as Muslim brethren—something that the Shah seemed to recognize when he sought to cultivate relations with the region’s only other non-Arab country, Israel.157 (Israel, unwilling to accept the break-up, continued to arm Iran throughout most of the devastating war. It is often forgotten that the Iranians conducted the first pre-emptive strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities at Osirak before the Israelis stepped in to finish the job the following year.) Iran welcomed the opportunity to renew its historic relations with newly independent countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus—strategically important areas for Iran, but ones that the literature has paid scant attention. Indeed, it is curious that Iran has warmest relations with Christian Armenia, a condition owing to their common interest in limiting the influence of Turkey. Thus, by 1990, Iran had almost entirely abandoned exporting the Islamic revolution as a policy goal. Instead, it replaced revolutionary ideas and religious goals with a hard-nosed and pragmatic foreign and security policy without abandoning its rhetoric. A point of clarification is required. Iran has also ceased trying to replace the Arab monarchies with an Iranian-style government, principally because it had no success due to the limits of Shi’sm on Sunni populations. While it no longer seeks to actively spread the revolution, it does, however, continue to incite Arab populations to act out against those governments (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel) that it regards as Western vassals. This sort of political warfare constitutes Iran’s main strategy for resisting and defeating American influence in the region. 158
157 Israel felt the same way. Iran had been a key ally since Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s adopted the periphery doctrine of befriending non-Arab enemies of its enemies. The two were so close that shortly before the revolution they were cooperating on developing a missile that could carry a nuclear warhead. There are several very good works on Iran and Israel’s alliance. For example, Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); John Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, (Lexington Books, 2002). 158 It is worth noting that for some the hatred of Israel is real, and not limited at countering American influence. This was certainly true for Khomeini, whose first order of business was expelling Israeli diplomats and turning that embassy over to members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Although Israel represents a strategically valuable enemy (i.e., it allows Iran to feign concern for Palestinians who have been neglected by neighbouring states, to win over Arabs and developing populations elsewhere, and to impose costs on America’s most favoured country—and one with the most advanced technology and sophisticated weaponry—in the region), it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the enmity is strategic or ideological. Regardless, given that the government orchestrates an annual Quds Day to give expression to its opposition to Israel’s existence and its supposed concern for the Palestinians, Israel is likely to remain a declared enemy.
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4.1 In the Levant
Iran supports groups and factions in various conflicts in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah (Arabic: Party of God) in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, in order to inflict costs on its regional foes, Israel and Saudi Arabia. For instance, Iran’s support of Hezbollah, a radical Shiite militia group based in Lebanon, began in the 1980s.159 In fact, Iran sent Pasdaran to help found the militia in 1985 following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and members of its extraterritorial Quds (Arabic: Jerusalem) Force continue to provide it with arms, logistics, personnel, and training. Given that Iran was embroiled in a war at the time—a conflict that highlighted its isolation—why did it devote scarce and badly needed resources to a third-party conflict? More recently, a Hamas leader claimed that Iran is its “largest backer financially and militarily.”160 The political costs of Iran’s abiding commitment to these groups and factions are increasingly surpassing the enormous financial costs. The Iranian public disproves of its government’s spending in foreign countries, particularly when ordinary citizens are struggling under the weight of inflation, unemployment, and sanctions.161 Why does Iran continue to support such groups despite the massive economic and political costs?
The reasons are both ideological and strategic. Khomeini took power in Iran with the dream of spreading the Islamic Revolution throughout the whole of the Muslim world, and exporting the Islamic Revolution became an explicit goal of the revolutionary state—though it died with Khomeini as the limitations of clerical authority on Sunni populations became apparent. (Iran’s reach was more practically circumscribed by the Iraqi onslaught). Another facet of Iran’s revolutionary ideology—one often shadowed by its Islamist articulations—was its anti-colonial socialism. Consider, for example, that the release all black American hostages at the start of the embassy takeover was a way of signalling its anti-imperialism whilst taking a shot at the U.S. for its treatment of black citizens. Or, how many post-revolutionary institutions have “oppression” in their names, or that streets were renamed in honour of icons like Mahatma Gandhi. Thus, when clerical admirers of Khomeini’s revolution conceived of an entity like Hezbollah that would work to rid Lebanon of foreign influence, the revolutionaries could hardly refuse.162
Given the anti-imperial origins of the revolution, it is rather ironic—an irony usually lost on Iranians—the extent to which the idea of Persian exceptionalism influences Iran. Some of Iran’s leaders, not unlike some of their American counterparts, believe that Iran, by virtue of its ancient past and superior culture vis-à-vis its neighbours, is the natural leader of the Middle East. Peter Jones writes,
[T]he Iranians could teach the Chinese a thing or two about Middle Kingdom thinking. The Iranians are, justifiably, very proud of their history and culture. Their worldview flows from a
159 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. 160 Joshua Davidovich, “Iranians target Tehran’s support for Palestinians amid massive protests,” The Times of Israel, 31 December 2017. Accessed at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranians-target-tehrans-support-for- palestinians-amid-massive-protests/. 161 In the most recent nation-wide protests, Iranians took to the streets chanting “Not Gaza, Not Lebanon, I Give My Life for Iran.” This was not the first time the slogan was chanted. It was also a popular chant in the mass uprisings in 2009. See: Jeffrey Goldberg, “Neither Gaza, Nor Lebanon, I Give My Life to Iran!” The Atlantic. 18 September 2009. Accessed at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/09/-neither-gaza-nor-lebanon-i-give-my-life- to-iran/26842/. 162 It also purported to want to establish an Iranian-inspired Islamic Republic, although Hezbollah, not wanting to alienate non-Shia Lebanese, has since moved away from this objective.
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sense of being the center of everything (a feeling many Americans share) due to their thousands of years of history. Iran’s history also teaches them, not unfairly, that the outside world is usually a source of danger.163
Iran’s worldview is shaped by both its sense of its own rightful place in the world and, as discussed in Chapter Two, its historical memory of foreign humiliations. Until recently, Iran felt perpetually targeted for a U.S. attack with the presence of American military bases in nearly every neighbouring country.164 The risk assessment has changed because of the American public’s war-weariness after Afghanistan and Iraq, and because of the rise of so-called Islamic State—an entity that some high-level Iranians believe to be the creation of the Americans.165 Iran’s leaders, nonetheless, believe that the U.S. plots the undoing of the Islamic Republic and is inclined to attribute domestic instability in the country to some underhanded American tactic.
In order to counter U.S. influence and to force it to retreat from the Middle East, Iran continues to provide considerable support to militant proxy groups with which it shares common interests, or enemies. Iran finances, equips, and trains Hezbollah, which—though autonomous—does not take meaningful action without, at the very least, the tacit approval of Tehran. In 2006, Iran armed Hezbollah in the bloody 34-day war against Israel. Iran and Syria were the primarily suppliers of Hezbollah’s enormous stockpile of missiles—of which 3,000 have dropped on Israel.166 That Hezbollah nearly prevailed over the most conventionally powerful state in the region should be seen as a serious sign of Iran’s asymmetrical capabilities.167 Though it typically denies involvement, Iran took credit for helping Hezbollah win over Israel.
The IRGC also provides valuable training in intelligence, rocket launching, guerrilla warfare, antitank warfare, explosives, engineering, and communications to Hezbollah fighters. Iran’s support of Hezbollah is unlikely to change, given that the sponsorship gives Iran a foot in the Levant and allows it to maintain a check on Israeli—and by extension, American—power. Iran’s arms transfers to such actors are also likely to continue, and in pace with arms transfers to Iran’s rivals. This should be monitored. Consideration should also be given to the high degree of disciplined guerrilla training provided to Hezbollah and other proxy fighters.
Indeed, Iran’s involvement with militant groups throughout the region continued, and steadily increased since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The removal of Saddam Hussein from Iraq and the Ba’athists and the emergence of Shi’a Iraqi political and militant actors provided Iran with unprecedented influence in Iraq. The rise of the Islamic State has also given it grounds to ratchet up its military activities 163 Jones, How to Negotiate with Iran. 164 This is likely how China now feels. See: John Reed, “Surrounded: How the U.S. is Encircling China with Military Bases,” Foreign Policy, 20 August 2013. Accessed at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/surrounded- how-the-u-s-is-encircling-china-with-military-bases/. 165 See Chapter Four in: Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva, “Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018). Accessed at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1772/RAND_RR1772.pdf. 166 Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel Jr. “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel With Its Training, Tactics and Weapons,” New York Times. 7 August 2006. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html. 167 “Nasrallah wins the war,” The Economist 17 August 2006. Accessed at: http://www.economist.com/node/7796790.
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in Iraq. Iran provides support to these groups as part of a broad political warfare strategy that augments its influence in the region while diminishing that of the United States and its allies.
Beyond Iraq, Iran provides substantial support to help maintain the Bashar al-Assad government in power in Syria. It maintains what it terms as “military advisors” on the ground, including senior IRGC commanders, who help train and advise pro-government militia and even plan operations in the country. Its support of such groups presents significant challenges to Western interests. Whereas Iran exploits religious (as well as ethnic, for example the Kurds) cleavages in Iraq and elsewhere, its support of Assad—a secular leader in the region—seems irregular until one recalls that Syria’s assistance in the Iran- Iraq War.168 Syria is Iran’s only reliable ally, and Iran will likely spare no effort at upholding Assad (even if Iran’s leaders do not entirely approve of Assad’s methods).169 4.2 In the Persian Gulf
The longstanding rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been intensifying in recent years.170 Although relations between Tehran and Riyadh were not especially warm under the Shah, they were cordial and, in instances where there was a convergence of interest, even productive. The two have had an acrimonious relationship since the Khomeini government came into power in 1979, decrying the region’s monarchies as un-Islamic. (His last will and testament contained particularly vile remarks about the Saudi king.) Given that the royal family in Saudi Arabia derives legitimacy from a mutual support pact with Wahhabi clerics, the charge was serious. The revolution in Iran thus posed a clear threat to the Saudi royal family, which much like the Pahlavis had cozied up to the United States and had embarked on Westernization (albeit on a far more controlled level). However, unlike Iran that had had monarchy for over 2500 years, Saudi Arabia had no monarchical tradition to protect it.
Khomeini was intent on continuing his revolution and had targeted Saudi Arabia.171 Iran began to agitate the small Shi’a minority in eastern Saudi Arabia, home to the country’s oil reserves. When Islamic radicals seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Khomeini’s reproaches were held responsible.172 Even though those responsible for the incident regarded the Shi’a, who worship Ali, as the worst kind of heretics, Saudi Arabia saw Iran as its greatest threat. One of the actions that it took was to double down on Wahhabism in order to counter Shi’ism. It also jettisoned modernization and liberalization plans and promoted instead an even more fundamentalist version of Wahhabism throughout the country.
Under King Faisal, Saudi Arabia had enacted some liberal reforms. Women, who are not legally permitted to occupy public spaces without male chaperones, could not only have jobs and careers but also appeared on television programs unveiled. Such developments were opposed by the Wahhabi ulama (Arabic: body of scholars, learned ones), who found them immoral. Although Faisal had been cautious not to undertake changes too quickly lest he disrupt the traditional society (and had presciently warned
168 Syria provided it with significant backing and blocked Iraq’s pipeline access to the Mediterranean. 169 For various perspectives on Iran’s foreign policy, see: Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (eds.), Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World, (London: Routledge, 2013). 170 Further work on the subject of the Iran-Saudi rivalry and its implications for the region and beyond will follow in another paper. Interested parties can contact the author for more information. 171 The idea of a velayat has a limited appeal in the Sunni world since it runs counter to the Sunni idea of authority. 172 Mordechai Abir. Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Persian Gulf Crisis (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 21.
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the Shah that it would behove him to do the same), liberalization continued under his successor until the 1979 revolution forced him to reverse course.
Saudi Arabia also needed to ensure that Iran would not supplant it as the leader of the Muslim world. In order to confer further religious legitimacy to the monarchy and dispel any charges of secularism, the Saudi king proclaimed himself the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” in 1982. The Saudis now looked outwards. In an effort to curtail Iran’s growing power and influence, they began promoting and financing Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world by building thousands of madrassas (Arabic: religious schools) in Pakistan and by supporting Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan.
The two countries are now engaged in several proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. These conflicts have broken down along the Sunni-Shi’a divide—something that Saudi-Iranian competition reified. The ongoing ideological and regional rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran worsens sectarian tensions in the region. Both countries are driven by a desire to be the most influential actor in the Muslim world. As tensions escalate, the prospect of actual war between Iran and Saudi is likely to increase. This situation is likely to eclipse other defence and security problems in the region in the future.
Several factors make this outcome likely. The first is that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman has taken a confrontational approach towards Iran. 173 Seen by his detractors as reckless and ruthless in the pursuit of power, the prince has intensified the military campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen. (Iran’s leaders think little of him. The foreign minister called Salman a “juvenile royal stooge.”) Nevertheless, he seems to be well regarded by the current U.S. administration. The second is improving relations with the U.S.174 The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. declined after 911. Since then, the Saudis have felt that their concerns—the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the so-called Iran deal, to name a couple—have been ignored by Washington. However, the sense that they had lost their privileged relationship had tempered the Saudis. The Trump administration’s efforts to restore U.S.-Saudi relations may undo the restraint.
The Saudis have led an aggressive aerial campaign to drive the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels from the capital, Sanaa, and the North. This has been strategically unwise, as it has left Yemen’s south largely in the hands of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Meanwhile, Iran’s investment in Yemen has been comparatively small. 175 Iran’s primary objective in Yemen is to keep the Saudis entangled. Iran supplies Houthi rebels in Yemen with short-range missiles. This past November, the U.S. accused Iran of
173 The crown prince, also known as MBS, was named heir apparent in June 2017. See: Bill Law, “The Most Dangerous Man in the World?” Independent. 8 January 2016. Accessed at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-most-dangerous-man-in-the-world-a6803191.html. 174 There are apparent personal relations animating this move. For example, see: Alex Emmons, Ryan Grim, Clayton Swisher, “Saudi Crown Prince Boasted that Jared Kushner was ‘in his pocket’,” The Intercept, 21 March 2018. Accessed at: https://theintercept.com/2018/03/21/jared-kushner-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman/. 175 This should not be surprising given the lack of real historic or cultural ties between the two.
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supplying Houthi rebels with the missile that launched into Saudi Arabia in July 2017.176 In turn, it seems that the Saudis bombed Iran’s embassy in Sanaa.177
In Syria, the Saudis and the Iranians have been on opposite sides since the uprisings against Assad began in 2011. The Saudis sided with the rebels. Iran, on the other hand, has spared no expense to keep Assad’s rule from collapse. Iran claims that its military presence in Syria—as in Yemen—is to provide advisory assistance. Unlike Yemen, the stakes for Iran in Syria are high. Syria counts as Iran’s only Middle East ally since the 1979 revolution. In addition to financial support and military equipment, Iran has also sent its top IRGC commanders to offer training and advice. Backed by Russian air power, Assad’s position—and by extension, Iran’s—in Syria is strong.
The retreat of the Islamic State from eastern Syria, which was the result of a coalition between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces on the one end and the Iranian-backed militias and Russian air power on the other, has strengthened Assad. However, it has cleared the way for new conflicts, particularly if one pays attention to the trend towards greater autonomy by the Kurds. 4.3 Short-Term Implications
A danger—and the one with the most military implications for Canada and its NATO allies—is the risk of a Turkish offensive into Syria’s northwest where Turkey (as part of a loose agreement with Iran and Russia) is deployed. Tensions between Syria and Turkey came to head when Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet in 2012. The U.S. has lent its support to Kurdish fighters, who have taken arms against the Islamic State even though another NATO ally, Turkey, considers them terrorists.178 As projected, in October 2019, Turkish military launched an offensive campaign against Syrian Kurdish-led forces, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, and in so doing raised concerns among NATO countries about the unity, values, and composition of the Alliance. Turkey wants to establish an approximately 30 km-wide buffer zone along its border with Syria to monitor the activities of Kurdish militias. A fragile ceasefire has been since been signed. Nonetheless, given that the concerns and conditions that brought about the conflict remain unchanged, there is reason to expect another, possibly larger, clash in the future.
Turkey, together with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, continue to funnel military support, intelligence, and financial aid to support rebels against Assad. At the same time, the Saudis are supporting two Sunni Islamist groups, Ahrar al-Shams and Jaysh al-Islam, in Syria against what they view as Iranian-backed fighters.
Besides Lebanon, where Iran exerts considerable control over Hezbollah, Syria is of critical value to Iran’s strategic interests. According to one Iranian official, “If we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.”179 176 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran warns it would increase missile range if threatened by Europe”, Reuters, 25 November 2017. Accessed at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-europe/iran-warns-it-would- increase-missile-range-if-threatened-by-europe-idUSKBN1DQ007. 177 Thomas Erdrink and Kareem Fahim, “Iran Accuses Saudi Arabia of Attacking Embassy in Yemen,” New York Times, 7 January 2016. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia- yemen.html. 178 Hannah Grabenstein and Meredith Lee, “Why is Turkey attacking northwest Syria?,” PBS News, 3 February 2018. Accessed at: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-is-turkey-attacking-northwest-syria. 179 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, 30 September 2013. Accessed at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander.
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Iran has suffered casualties including high ranking Quds officers in the Syrian war. In 2013, Iran accused Israel of targeting the general, who was travelling along the Syrian-Lebanon border.180 More recently, Israel shot down an Iranian drone that had entered its airspace near Syria.181 It is unclear why Iran had violated Israeli airspace. This was also the first time that the Israelis directly targeted Iranian forces. Until then, Israel mainly targeted weapon envoys headed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, this recent episode demonstrates that the risk of escalation is high. The involvement of so many different actors in Syria, each with their own competing interests, shows the combustibility of the conflict. Given these flashpoints, it seems that the risk of escalation that draws in several regional actors is high. 4.4 Afghanistan
Like the U.S. and its partners, Iran wants a stable Afghanistan that is free of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other radicalized Sunni groups. The former two are Iran’s ideological enemies, not least because of their ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Also like the West, Iran worries that it faces a terrorist threat from an unstable Afghanistan. Afghanistan has not only proven to be a breeding ground for anti-Western terrorists, but also for anti-Iranian ones. It is most concerned with the rise of Jundallah, a group that Iran considers a terrorist organization.182 Jundallah is responsible for acts of terrorism, including a number of deadly attacks in Zahedan in southeast Iran. It also believes that the Sunni extremist group is aided and abetted by two of its regional adversaries, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as by the United States.
Following the September 11 attacks, Iran provided the U.S. with valuable intelligence, targeting information, and even personnel assistance.183 In particular, it rounded up those al Qaeda operatives who fled to Iran and handed them over to American interrogators.184 Iran then sought to further deepen cooperation with the U.S., but was rebuffed by the administration of then President George W. Bush—ostensibly because Iran’s overtures coincided with public revelations about its surreptitious nuclear activities. In 2009, Iran extended another offer to assist with counter-narcotics, border security, and development and reconstruction.185 Though some of Iran’s interests in Afghanistan align with those of the West (i.e., the U.S. and its allies),186 Iran’s policies toward Afghanistan are generally tied to its strategic competition with the U.S.
180 Gabe Fisher, “Israel’s Strike on Syria last month killed top Iranian general,” Times of Israel. 24 February 2013. Accessed at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-iranian-general-said-target-of-israeli-strike-in-syria/. 181 Isabel Kershner, “Israel downs Iranian drone, later loses F-16 jet during strike in Syria,” The Star, 10 February 2018. Accessed at: https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/02/10/israel-shoots-down-iranian-drone-launches- large-scale-attack-in-syria-that-sees-f-16-crash.html. 182 Jundallah is a Sunni extremist group based in southeastern Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan. The group claims to be fighting for Sunni rights. 183 Interview with Hillary Mann Leverett. “U.S. Should Seek Comprehensive Accord with Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 February 2009. Accessed at: https://www.cfr.org/interview/us-should-seek-comprehensive-accord-iran. 184 “Iran Gave U.S. Help on Al Qaeda after 9/11.” CBS News. 7 October 2008. Accessed at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-gave-us-help-on-al-qaeda-after-9-11/. 185 Counter-narcotics is officially an important area for the Iranian government. Iran is the main conduit for Afghan opiate. While Iran wants to reduce the rampant drug use in the country, it is widely thought that the IRGC benefits from collecting dues from traffickers. 186 Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown,” RAND Corporation, 2014. Accessed at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR616/RAND_RR616.pdf.
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Despite initially being in support of an invasion that helped rid Afghanistan of the troublesome Taliban, Iran came to oppose the continued presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.187 The period of tactical cooperation between Iran and the West was short-lived soon after the Taliban was toppled. Then Iran worked towards achieving a withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, investing in asymmetrical capabilities to disrupt U.S. and allied operations. Iran shares its eastern border with Afghanistan, and feared that a prolonged U.S. presence could at some point be turned against it. Iran also felt that the occupation of Afghanistan, particularly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, completed its encirclement by forces and countries hostile to it. (Iran is surrounded by about 40 U.S. military bases.)
Besides, Afghanistan is a country with which Iran has a cultural, historical, and linguistic affinity. Dari, the Afghan dialect of Persian, is one the country’s official languages, and the one used by most of the elite, and Herat, the so-called “Little Iran,” was part of Persia until 1857.188 Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara population represent another nexus. Thus, Iran seeks to strengthen its relationship with and buttress the status of Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun groups (particularly the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, etc.). Afghanistan offers Iran an opportunity to cultivate the strategic depth that it otherwise lacks. The reader should be reminded that Iran is not only in a neighbourhood with countries and military installations that dislike it but it also has no reliable allies or real conventional power.
That Iran wants a dominant role in the Muslim world means that it strives to limit U.S. and other anti-Iranian influence in Afghanistan. It funnels weapons and materials to support insurgencies by its declared enemy, the Taliban, who, in turn, target and kill NATO and allied troops.189 Though the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission ended in December 2014, Iran continues to undermine the succeeding NATO-led Operation Resolute Support, which provides training, advice, and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. Part of the reason for this is that Iran neither trusts nor understands why the U.S. and its allies endorsed the emergence of a political arrangement that shares power with the Taliban. To Tehran, the apparent reversal in Washington’s policy vis-à-vis the Taliban made such little sense that it raised suspicions in Tehran. This was a catalyst of sorts for Iran’s decision to start supporting the Taliban. It wants to indebt the group to Tehran and shift loyalty away from its traditional patrons, the Saudis and Pakistanis.190 Still, it should be emphasized that Iran does not want to empower the Taliban too much, even as it—or more specifically, the Mashhad based Fourth Corps of the IRGC—continues to supply and finance Taliban insurgents.191 This is a case of the enemy of my enemy is sometimes my friend and often just my customer.
Iran’s Janus-faced strategy is part of its broader asymmetric national security strategy, which includes double-dealings, arms transfers to proxy actors or militias, and non-conventional weapons. It serves two aims: on the one hand, helping the Afghan government enables it demonstrate its potential usefulness to the West while at the same time nurturing a positive relationship with Afghans; whereas on the other, 187 Stephen Carter. “Iran’s interests in Afghanistan and their implications for NATO,” International Journal (Autumn 2010): 977–984. 188 Mohsen Milani. “Iran and Afghanistan.” The Iran Primer, USIP. Accessed at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/Iran%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf. 189 “Gates Warns Iran Over Afghan ‘Double Game’,” CBS News, 8 March 2010. Accessed at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gates-warns-iran-over-afghan-double-game/. For more recent reports, see: Mark Sappenfield, “Is Iran Meddling in Afghanistan?” The Christian Science Monitor, 8 August 2007. Accessed at: https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0808/p06s01-wosc.html. 190 This is probably why the Russians are also playing the Taliban. 191 As mentioned earlier, the IRGC exists as a quasi-independent militia – cum-business conglomerate with a heavy hand in the black market.
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assisting the insurgencies lets Iran signal its capacity to be massively destructive to allied interests while also giving it leverage in any future negotiation. Iranian activities are therefore not only designed to undermine American influence but also to give it a bargaining chip. Iran would likely abandon any form of support for the Taliban and similar groups in exchange for incentives from the West. That said, Iran’s double-dealings in Afghanistan have burned it in the past. During the last Afghan civil war, Iran supported the government in Kabul but hedged against its friend by also backing rival actors.192 It was surprised then when that government collapsed and Afghanistan disintegrated into civil war.
Iran is determined not to miscalculate in Afghanistan again.193 It heavily invests in Afghanistan in terms of both reconstruction aid and trade ties. It understands soft power as well as that development is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for stability. However, it directs the bulk of the investment flows toward the northwest parts of the country. Herat, in the west, is the principal recipient of Iranian money, not just because that is where Afghanistan’s Persian-speaking Tajik population is concentrated but equally because Iran is determined not to let Herat fall to the Pakistani and Saudi-backed Wahhabis or Pashtuns as it did in 1995.194 The strategic intent here is to have a buffer against the Taliban and Pakistani and Saudi machinations, should the situation in Afghanistan degenerate, as Iran believes it might, into another civil war.195 If this should happen, we should anticipate it to become a regional proxy war that pits Iran against Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. For all of these reasons, Afghanistan is of immense strategic and increasingly of economic value to Iran. At its core, Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan aims to plan for all contingencies and outcomes. 4.5 Beyond the Middle East
The Caucasus and Central Asia are second only to the Middle East in terms of importance to Iran’s strategic interests. While the West was Iran’s main consumer in the pre-1979 period, U.S. and Western European sanctions have forced Iran to look for new markets in Asia and the Caucasus. Its efforts to diversify the destination of its exports were fruitful, as Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have been reliable recipients of Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemical products.
The Caspian Sea is another area of strategic and commercial importance to Iran. Like the Persian Gulf, the Caspian is of historical importance, connecting Iran to its neighbours in the South Caucasus and
192 The government was formed mostly by the Northern Alliance, which included Iranian-backed Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Shiites but which refused to share power with the Pashtuns. An ethnic Tajik, the Northern Alliance was founded by Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda suicide bombers two days before the 9/11 attacks. He is remembered by supporters as a strong political and military leader, who fought both the Soviet Red Army and later the Taliban. On Iran’s hedging strategy, see: Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown,” RAND Corporation, 2014. Accessed at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR616/RAND_RR616.pdf. 193 Carlotta Gall, “In Afghanistan, U.S. Exits, and Iran Comes In,” New York Times. 5 August 2017. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html. 194 Milani. “Iran and Afghanistan.” 195 Amid reports that the Taliban has regained strength, Iran may be right to have such an assessment. According to the BBC, the Islamic States is also active in parts of Afghanistan, particularly in the eastern part of the country near the Pakistan border. See: Shoaib Sharifi and Louise Adamou, “Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds,” BBC News, 31 January 2018. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42863116.
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Central Asia (see Figure 1).196 Previously jointly shared by the Soviets and the Iranians, the dissolution of the USSR made it necessary to establish boundaries for the three new littoral states in addition to Russia and Iran.197 The Caspian Sea is divided between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia based on a Russian formula of Modified Median Line (MML). Division according to MML allocates the Caspian Sea on the basis of coastline. It means that Russia and Azerbaijan have about 20 percent, Kazakhstan has about 30 percent, Turkmenistan has about 17 percent, and Iran has about 13 percent.198 Iran, which gets the smallest proportion of the Caspian seabed under MML, is not pleased with the current arrangement, and advocates for an equitable division or common control.
All five countries have reportedly reached an agreement that resolves most outstanding issues related to the Caspian Sea, but its legal status remains unknown.199 The status of the Caspian Sea may be a potential point of conflict in the future, due to competing military and geopolitical interests chiefly related to the access and future transport (i.e., pipelines) of natural resources, as well as legal questions that emanate from recognition as lake or sea.200 Given that the Caspian littoral region possesses vast natural gas and oil reserves as well as critical pipelines, it is important to watch for any source of political conflict or instability among or within those states.
196 Iran shares significant cultural and historical ties with Caucasus states especially Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan, as well as Persian-speaking Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the east. The South Caucasus was part of Persia until they were ceded to Russia under the terms of the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai. 197 Eric D. Moore, Russia-Iran Relations Since the End of the Cold War, (London, UK: Routledge, 2014): 53–57. 198 Michael Lelyveld, “Iran: New Flexibility On Caspian Sea Division Signaled,” RadioFreeEurope. 24 July 2002. Accessed at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1100355.html. 199 Bruce Pannier, “Russia Says Caspian Legal Status Resolved, Agreement Ready for Signing,” RadioFreeEurope, 7 December 2017. Accessed at: https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-caspian-status-resolved-russia- says/28903729.html. 200 Suha Bolukbasi, “The controversy over the Caspian Sea mineral resources: Conflicting perceptions, clashing interests,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1998): 397–414.
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Figure 1: Map of Caspian littoral states.
Like the other four littoral states, Iran maintains a naval force in the Caspian Sea. Iran was previously unnerved by Russia’s naval build-up, which included assault ships, corvettes, and gunboats.201 In 2012, Iran sent a destroyer Jamaran-2 there and conducted minelaying exercises.202 However, improved relations between the two have seemingly eased some of Iran’s concerns about Russian intentions. Whether Iran increases its naval presence in the Caspian will largely depend on the context of Russo-Iranian relations. Iran maintains a defensive posture in the Caspian Sea, ready to respond to any threats.203 This seems unlikely to change. Where Iran’s maritime presence might increase in the future is in the Red Sea.
Iran has been deploying naval forces to the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Eden since 2011.204 This enables Iran to have a maritime route to transport weapons and supplies to proxy groups in the Levant, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and to pro-Bashar fighters in Syria.205 This, of course, has the consequence of augmenting Iran’s land activities in the Levant. It also helps ensure the protection of its vessels and goods
201 In 2017, Russia used its corvettes in the Caspian Sea to fire missiles at targets in Syria. The act implicitly carried a message for Iran, and others, as well. 202 Christopher Harmer, Iranian Naval and Maritime Strategy, Middle East Security Report 12, Institute for the Study of War, (June 2013), 16. 203 “Iran Navy holds military drills in Caspian Sea,” Press TV. 3 July 2017. Accessed at: http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/07/03/527281/Iran-Navy-Caspian-Sea. 204 James Fargher, “This Presence will Continue Forever: An Assessment of Iranian Naval Capabilities in the Red Sea,” Center for International Maritime Security. 5 April 2017. Accessed at: http://cimsec.org/presence-continue- forever-assessment-iranian-naval-capabilities-red-sea/31593. 205 “Eastern Africa: A Battleground for Israel and Iran,” Stratfor, 29 October 2012. Accessed at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-africa-battleground-israel-and-iran.
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from Somali pirates. Iran’s anti-piracy efforts have been welcomed by a number of East African states, but its presence in the waters have unnerved others, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.206
These activities appear to be part of a broader Iranian trend to project naval power beyond the Persian Gulf. Iran has been increasingly deploying forces beyond the Persian Gulf for over a decade. The Iranian Navy recently sailed ships into the Mediterranean Sea, demonstrating its lengthening reach. It also maintains a presence around the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, which effectively allows it to have leverage over another strategic chokepoint and to traffic arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Although the probability of Iran attempting to close the Bab el Mandeb is low, for the same reason that it is unlikely to close Hormuz—it fears retaliation from more powerful navies. It also lacks power to control shipping lanes. 207
206 “Iran Making Naval Moves Into Red Sea,” Tower Magazine. 20 January 2015. Accessed at: http://www.thetower.org/1519-iran-making-naval-moves-into-red-sea/. 207 “Eastern Africa: A Battleground for Israel and Iran,” Stratfor, 29 October 2012. Accessed at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-africa-battleground-israel-and-iran.
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5 Iran’s Material Capabilities
This section examines Iran’s conventional and non-conventional military capabilities. It presents Iran’s military capabilities, such as conventional military power and investments in the air, land, and maritime domains. It then discusses Iran’s missile and rocket capabilities. It also considers Iran’s interest in the cyber domain.
Despite the sanctions and its relatively smaller military budget, Iran enjoys certain strategic military advantages, as discussed in the previous section. Iran has been clever at exploiting sectarian divisions and weaknesses in neighbouring Arab countries. Another significant advantage is Iran’s use of foreign fighters in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.208 In addition to having boots and military “advisors” on the ground, Iran equips, trains, and likely pays the salaries for militia in Iraq and Syria as well as the equipment Assad needs to maintain power in Syria. These expenses are likely uncaptured by the aforementioned estimates of Iran’s military spending. 5.1 Conventional Military Power
Iran’s regular military totals about 523,000 personnel: 350,000 in the Army, 18,000 in the Navy, and 30,000 in the Air Force.209 In addition, there are an estimated 40,000 paramilitary forces in the Basij, and some 125,000 in the Pasdaran.210 Although precise figures on Iran’s military expenditures are unknown, the World Bank estimates that, in 2016, the amount was approximately 2.975% of its gross domestic product (GDP).211 According to claims by one IRGC commander, Iran’s military budget is 7 billion (USD).212
Iran spends considerably less than many of its neighbours such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, and Pakistan. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s military expenditures account for approximately 9.85% of its GDP. Part of the reason for the relatively higher spending of some of Iran’s neighbours is the volume of expensive military hardware they import.
Although sanctions have meant that Iran has been unable to acquire or upgrade much of its inventory, Iran continues to invest in the environments: land, maritime, and air. It is capable of producing a limited number of parts and equipment, such as missile patrol boats and miniature submarines. Iran has the technical knowledge to build sophisticated equipment including surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems indigenously, but lacks the industrial wherewithal and the expedient decision-making required to do. As mentioned earlier, decisions on arms procurement—like most other decisions in Iran—are subject to
208 Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran.” 209 Anthony H. Cordesman, Alexander Wilner,Michael Gibbs, and Scott Modell, US-Iranian Competition: The Gulf Military Balance – I, The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, 26 January. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). 210 Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran.” 211 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure (% of GDP), United Nations, The World Bank, Accessed at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?view=chart. 212 “What Is Iran’s Military Budget According To IRGC?,” Radio Farda, 17 January 2018. Accessed at: https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-budget-irgc/28980550.html.
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factional wrangling. As a result, it remains reliant on external parts to upgrade much of what was acquired under the Shah.
5.1.1 Land Forces
Iran is primarily a land power. It retains a large regular army of about 350,000 personnel. This figure excludes those in the paramilitary land force, the IRGC Army, which was stood up as a counterbalance to the artesh (i.e., the military) after the revolution. It can also mobilize the Basij militia whose numbers are estimated to be anywhere in the hundreds of thousands to several millions. (The Basij were used as fodder in human wave attacks throughout the Iran-Iraq War.)
The ground forces, or the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) consists of four armoured divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions, four light infantry divisions, six artillery groups, two elite Special Forces, one airborne brigade, three or four commando brigades, and unspecified numbers of aviation units and other infantry brigades. 213 Although Iran’s ground forces are amply equipped to pose a threat to regional actors, the quantity of its equipment is seriously limited by quality. Much of the army’s equipment is dated by today’s standards.214 The U.S. has been quite effective at blocking the transfer of advanced arms to Iran.
This has motivated Iranian behaviour in two ways. First, it has encouraged Iran to offset weaknesses in its conventional capabilities by investing in an asymmetric warfare capacity both to defend and deter against attacks but also to expand its regional influence. Second, it has led Iran to establish a domestic arms industry. It manufactures small arms, support weapons for infantry, battle tanks, among other equipment. Arms transfers to proxy groups and allies have helped to sustain this nascent industry, while at the same time, have advanced many of Iran’s strategic interests. For instance, Iranian improvised explosive devices were found in Iraq during the American occupation. It also smuggles arms to Egypt, Gaza, and Sudan.215
Iran’s army chiefly exists to defend the country—and in the case of the IRGC Army—to protect the government.216 However, it is possible that this might change in the future. While it presently exercises influence in the region by building up its asymmetrical capabilities, Iran could quickly become the dominant land power in the region if it injects funding into modernizing its ground forces.
5.1.2 Air Forces
Under the Shah, Iran had one of the world’s most powerful air forces. But it has not purchased any major new combat aircraft in several decades. Most of its fighter jets are old American F-5 Freedom Fighters, F-4 Phantom IIs, and F-14 Tomcats, and some transport aircraft like the C-130 Hercules. A modernization
213 Kyle Mizokami, “While the World Fears Iran’s Missiles, What about Its Army?” The National Interest, 25 June 2017. Accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/while-the-world-fears-irans-missiles-what- about-its-army-21295. 214 Anthony H. Cordesman, Alexander Wilner,Michael Gibbs, and Scott Modell, US-Iranian Competition: The Gulf Military Balance – I, The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, 26 January. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013): 10. 215 Anthony H. Cordesman, Alexander Wilner,Michael Gibbs, and Scott Modell, US-Iranian Competition: The Gulf Military Balance – I, The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, 26 January. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013): 107-108. 216 The IRGC Army is not to be confused with the IRGC Quds Force, which deploys into Iraq and Syria.
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project slated for the F-4s is currently on pause, due to financial problems.217 The others are aging French or Russian made systems. Iran’s most recent acquisition of any strategic significance is the Russian S-300 SAM system.218 In other words, Iran’s air power remains quite limited.219
Iran’s air defences have been vastly improved since the mid-2000s—a corollary to the invasions of two of its neighbours, Afghanistan and Iraq. American combat aircraft and cruise missiles frequently used Iran’s air space during the conflicts and were often undetected. That coupled with Israeli and American threats to use force against its nuclear program convinced Iran to fortify its air defences. It first turned to Russia to obtain the S-300 missile system in 2007, but these were not delivered until late 2015.220 Around this time, Iran, despite possessing radar systems based on obsolete Russian and Chinese models, began to exaggerate its capabilities and probably enhance its deterrent value. For instance, in 2008, Iran published doctored images of its missile tests designed to inflate its capabilities.221 Iran continues to work on developing counter-stealth air defences, but has ceased the attendant hype. It recently announced the testing of the domestically-built Bavar-373 long-range air defence system, and although the system is designed to detect and destroy foreign reconnaissance aircraft, Iranian officials did not belabour the point, as they might have in the past.222 Why then the change in posture? One possible reason is that Iran no longer feels as vulnerable to an external attack as it did prior to 2003 largely due to the fact that Western powers are preoccupied with different challenges in the region.
5.1.3 Naval Forces
Iran has a modest, but assertive naval force. Like its air force, most of its naval fleets are aged or nearly obsolete. However, Iran is ambitious. It wants to maintain control and the ability to exert power in its littorals, waterways, and seas. This includes the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea, where Iran recently added a new warship, equipped with radars and surface-to-surface missiles, to its existing fleet, and more recently the Red Sea.223 Iran’s ambition is hardly a new development. Under the Shah, Iran was the gendarme of the Persian Gulf. Then, as now, Iran did not take kindly to the military presence of non-Gulf actors in the Persian Gulf. In 1972, the Shah stated that, “We would not want to see
217 Babak Taghvaee, “Syrian War Exposes Limits of Iran’s Air Power,” The Globe Post, 5 August 2017. Accessed at: https://www.theglobepost.com/2017/08/05/syrian-war-iran-air-power/. 218 Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran.” 219 David Axe, “Iran’s Air Force Flies American-Made F-14 Tomcats,” National Interest, 5 March 2018. Accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/irans-air-force-flies-american-made-f-14-tomcats-24750. See also: Kyle Mizokami, “Could Iran’s Air Force Take on America in a War?” National Interest, 12 October 2017. Accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-irans-air-force-take-america-war-22708. 220 Russia, under intense pressure from the U.S., cancelled the contract. Iran, in turn, sued which forced Russia to either pay a hefty sum or deliver the system, and Russia eventually delivered the goods. See: Behnam Taleblu. “Understanding Iran’s Deployment of the S-300 System,” Foundation for the Defence of Democracies. 1 September 2016. Accessed at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/behnam-ben-taleblu-understanding-irans- deployment-of-the-s-300-system/; Christopher Harmer, “The Strategic Impact of the S-300 in Iran,” The American Enterprise Institute, August 2016. Accessed at: https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/08/Harmer_Strategic_Impact_S-300_Iran.pdf. 221 “Iran ‘faked missile test image’,” BBC News. 10 July 2008. Accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7500917.stm. 222 “Iran’s air defense system operational by March 2018: Cmdr.,” 3 September 2017. Press TV. Accessed at: http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/09/03/533862/Iran-Farzad-Esmaili. 223 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Navy Adds New Warship to Caspian Sea Fleet,” Middle East Institute, 5 December 2017. Accessed at: http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iranian-navy-adds-new-warship-caspian-sea-fleet.
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any foreign presence in the [Gulf], England, the United States, or China—our policy hasn’t changed.”224 Indeed, it has not (although it may be amusing to know that the Islamic Republic preferred to adopt a different nomenclature for the gendarme role than the Shah).225 Iran’s custodian role in the Persian Gulf continues. One should certainly expect that Iran’s interest in preserving its role in the Persian Gulf would endure into the future.
Figure 2: Daily transit volumes through world maritime choke points.
Another continuity is Iran’s claims over, and ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, which is 21 miles wide at its narrowest point and connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Iran’s claims to control of one of the world’s most important chokepoints is a major strategic advantage. The possibility of an Iranian closure of the straits remains a significant concern due to the effects that a blockade would have global energy and on regional stability (see Figure 1). 226 This capacity constitutes part of Iran’s defence and deterrent policy. When threatened with military force, Iran threatens to respond by cutting off the world’s oil supply. In 1984, Iraq attacked Iranian oil tankers in Kharg Island in the northern part of the Persian Gulf in a bid to bait Iran into closing the strait and thereby bring about a response by the major powers. Iran did not close the strait as Saddam had anticipated (perhaps because the U.S. repeatedly signalled a willingness to deploy in response to a closure), limiting its attacks to Iraqi shipping. Iran’s threats to close Hormuz are therefore not entirely credible. Such an act would almost certainly precipitate a military response, which is likely why Iran has never acted on its threat. Iran need only recall Operation Praying Mantis, in which the U.S. Navy nearly destroyed Iran’s warships, to realize that any disruption to global oil shipping would be potentially suicidal. (This is precisely what the U.S.-led flotilla of frigates and destroyers was sent to demonstrate to Iran at the height of tensions over the Strait in 2012.227) Future threats are likely to cause less angst, not least because oil producers, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have established pipelines that avoid the Strait altogether. While Iran ceased its aggressive 224 Marvine Howe, “Shah of Iran Warns Outsiders against Gulf Military Positions.” New York Times Archives, 17 January 1972, page 3. 225 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (London, UK: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 152. 226 “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” United States Energy Information Administration. Accessed at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC. 227 “Iran: Flotilla Of Warships Sent Through Strait of Hormuz Heightens Tensions,” Huffington Post. 23 January 2012. Accessed at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/01/23/iran-flotilla-of-warships_n_1222734.html?ref=uk.
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naval behaviour in August 2017, it has resumed this posture as its relationship with the U.S. deteriorated.228 One should expect flashes of increased hostility and belligerence from Iran whenever it is provoked or in a weakened position.
Although Iran has increased investments in both of its maritime forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), it is heavily reliant on asymmetric warfare (e.g., swarming tactics) to compensate for the quantitative and qualitative inferiority of its fleets.229 Iran has seven frigates, 32 fast-attack green-water missiles, five minelayers, sea miners, and mine countermeasures vessels.230 It has mostly targeted investment in small craft, such as offshore patrol boats, designed primarily to operate in the Strait of Hormuz, and in support the application of swarming. Similarly, of its 29 submarines, only four or five are thought to be capable of operating beyond the Persian Gulf. Iran’s lack of anti-aircraft capabilities leaves its naval forces vulnerable to air strikes.231 It is therefore unlikely to risk its existing fleets by stationing them too close to Saudi or American airbases, or by behaving provocatively outside of its territorial waters. Thus, Iran’s capabilities have a long way to go before they match its level of ambition. 5.2 Rockets and Short-Range Missiles
Iran’s artillery rockets and missiles serve a variety of strategic objectives. Iran’s pursuit of strategic missiles was prompted by its sense of vulnerability to air attack, particularly during Iraq’s bombings of its cities in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran retaliated with Scud missiles, acquired from North Korea.232 Since then, Iran has invested in building a missile force to offset weaknesses in its air defence system. It remains one of Iran’s most important defence priorities.
Its missile program has been a longstanding area of concern. However, discussion of the issue was shelved by global powers during the course of the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.233 Its exclusion from the agenda and the resultant (but since effectively terminated by virtue of the withdrawal of a major signatory, the U.S. and the reinstatement of economic sanctions) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is contentious due to the fact that long-range ballistic missiles could be used to carry nuclear warheads. Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, sometimes under the auspices of its space program, as the JCPOA did not limit Iran’s missile testing. Based on the data compiled by the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Iran Missile and Space Launch 228 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Reduced Naval Harassment in the Gulf Is Temporary and Tactical,” The Washington Institute, 7 March 2018. Accessed at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-reduced-naval- harassment-in-the-gulf-is-temporary-and-tactical. 229 The former controls Iran’s blue-water capabilities, whereas the latter is mostly limited to the surveillance and defence of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. 230 “Chapter 7: The Middle East and North Africa” in The Military Balance 2016 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 328. 231 James Fargher, “This Presence will Continue Forever: An Assessment of Iranian Naval Capabilities in the Red Sea,” Center for International Maritime Security. 5 April 2017. Accessed at: http://cimsec.org/presence-continue- forever-assessment-iranian-naval-capabilities-red-sea/31593. 232 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” CNS Occasional Papers #2. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999. Accessed at: https://www.nonproliferation.org/2-a-history-of-ballistic-missile-development-in-the-dprk/. 233 The negotiations took place between Iran and the P5+1 (also called EU3+3), which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on July 14, 2015. P5+1 refer to the Permanent 5 countries that comprise the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany.
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Vehicle (SLV) Launch Database over a nearly 30-year period, it would seem that Iran has actually moved away from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) towards short-range missiles since the conclusion of the deal, however.234 Although short-range missiles could ostensibly be used to carry a nuclear warhead, they are more commonly used for conventional purposes since they do not meaningfully increase the payload. (Iran routinely uses shorter-range ballistic missiles against regional enemies, particularly non-state actors like the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK). 235) Considering how destabilizing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been to both regional and international security, this is a positive development. Iran’s missile program is thus, at present, a regional—and not an international—threat.
Further, while Iran already possesses long-range missiles that are capable of hitting any target in the region and booster systems that could potentially enable it to strike at Europe or North America, it has yet to test a missile that is capable of reaching the North American continent.236 Iran has limited the range of its missiles to 2,000 kilometres.237 The Deputy Commander of the IRGC, BGen Hossein Salami, claimed that the limit did not reflect technological constraints but a strategic doctrine.238 Based on current trends, Iran appears to be following a deterrent strategy. This also sets its missile program apart from North Korea’s, as Kim Jung-un seemed singularly committed to ICBM development since he took over in 2011.239
Nonetheless, Iran’s rocket and missile capabilities are continually improving. Iran has also ratcheted up efforts in order to increase the quantity of its missiles and improve their quality (e.g., accuracy, lethality). It is also important to note that its current known range and precision is sufficiently advanced to pose a threat to most Western strategic interests and allies in the Middle East. For example, Iran’s ballistic and precision-guided missiles have the range to target Israel, a number of European NATO allies, as well as U.S. and allied militaries operating in the region (see Figure 3).
234 “The CNS Iran Missile and SLV Launch Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2 August 2017. Accessed at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-iran-missile-and-slv-launch-database/.. On the subject of ICBMs, see: Shea Cotton and Jessica C. Varnum, “No, Iran Is Not Pursuing an ICBM (Yet),” Nuclear Threat Imitative, 2 August 2017. Accessed at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/no-iran-is-no-pursuing-an-icbm. 235 Based in France, the MEK is an Iranian militant organization generally loathed by Iranians both inside and outside of Iran for a variety of reasons, including support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. The MEK, much like neo-conservative groups in the U.S., advocates for the overthrow of the current Iranian government and due to the fact that many MEK members had joined forces with the clerics in plotting the overthrow of the Shah, it bills itself as the government-in-exile. Until recently, Western countries like Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. designated it a terrorist entity. While it has been delisted for political reasons, as the political front of the MEK, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), first alerted the U.S. about Iran’s illicit nuclear activities in the early 2000s, other countries, notably Iran, still deem it a terrorist organization while most scholars see it as a cult that is unrepresentative of Iranian. See: Jeremiah Goulka, Lydia Hansell, Elizabeth Wilke, and Larson, Judith, The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum, (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2009). 236 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, December 2014), vii. 237 Kelsey Davenport, “Iran’s Leader Sets Missile Range Limit,” Arms Control Association, December 2017. Accessed at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-12/news/iran%E2%80%99s-leader-sets-missile-range-limit. 238 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran warns it would increase missile range if threatened by Europe,” Reuters, 25 November 2017. Accessed at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-europe/iran-warns-it-would- increase-missile-range-if-threatened-by-europe-idUSKBN1DQ007. 239 North Korea and Iran are commonly believed to be working together on the nuclear program. It is possible then that both countries are seeking a deterrent.
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Figure 3: Iran’s ballistic missiles.240
5.3 Cyber Capabilities
Iran has increased its offensive cyber capabilities. It conducts cyber espionage in the region and targets Israeli state websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Besides government websites, Iran has developed the capability to target industry and critical infrastructure.241 It also draws on its growing capabilities to provide support to the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) and to the Assad government.242 This growth in the cyber domain has been encouraged by Iran’s own experience as a target of cyber operations.243 Iran’s nuclear program was a target of repeated U.S. and Israeli cyberattacks. This motivated Iran to ratchet up efforts to gather information on control systems in both countries.
240 “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Accessed at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/. 241 Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, Tim Conway. “Analysis of the recent reports of attacks on US infrastructure by Iranian Actors,” Defence Use Case (DUC) #4, SANS Industrial Control Systems, 5 January 2016. Accessed at: https://ics.sans.org/media/SANSICS_DUC4_Analysis_of_Attacks_on_US_Infrastructure_V1.1.pdf. See also: Nicole Perlroth and Quentin Hardy, “Bank Hacking was the Work of Iranians, Officials Say,” New York Times, 8 January 2013. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/technology/online-banking-attacks-were-work-of- iran-us-officials-say.html. 242 Trey Heer and Laura K. Bate, “The Iranian Cyberthreat is Real,” Foreign Policy, 26 July 2017. Accessed at: www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/26/the-iranian-cyberthreat-is-real. 243 Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Cyber Threat: Conclusion and Prescriptions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 January 2018. Accessed at: www.carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/04/iran-s- cyber-threat-conclusion-and-prescriptions-pub-75143.
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Iran has invested in both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. Two events—the Stuxnet virus in 2010 and the post-election protests in 2009—demonstrated to decision-makers of the necessity of an effective cyber defence system. Stuxnet is a sophisticated computer virus that was created by Israeli and American intelligence in order to target and destroy nuclear centrifuges in Iran.244 It successfully caused Iran’s centrifuges to malfunction, slowing its progress. With respect to defensive cyber strategies, Iran has worked to guard against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and sensitive information by developing indigenous products, creating cyber police, and exercising close control and surveillance. 245 For domestic reasons, it has also established strong control over the internet, including social media. This prevents cyberspace from being used to foment a “velvet revolution” or any subversive or nationalist movement that could imperil the government.246
Since Stuxnet, Iran has invested in offensive cyber capabilities and has carried out similarly sophisticated attacks against ambitious targets.247 Its progress has been rapid. In early 2013, Iran was considered a “third tier” country in terms of cyber capabilities. An INSS report writes, “Over the course of 2013, Iran became one of the most active players in the international cyber arena. Iran’s progress can be attributed to a combination of two elements: a certain easing of the restraints on offensive activity in cyberspace by Iranian decision makers, and a qualitative leap by the Iranian cyber warfare system.”248 In other words, it has leapfrogged many other states in this domain.249 Iran boasts that it is the fourth cyber power in the world.250 Today, Iran is capable of inflicting considerable damage in cyberspace.251 This is not necessarily indicative of Iran’s intent. Iran scaled back its cyber activities targeting the U.S. during the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA. Although Iran has decreased its disruptive activities against European countries and the U.S. since then, it seems that its behaviour is tied to its threat perceptions or political motivations.
Cyber operations that distort information or spread disinformation are increasingly likely to trigger crises in the future. One need only to think of the events surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election to appreciate how such operations could be used to aggravate pre-existing tensions. Given the limited
244 Josh Fruhlinger, “What is Stuxnet, who created it and how does it work?,” CSO, 22 August 2017. Accessed at: https://www.csoonline.com/article/3218104/malware/what-is-stuxnet-who-created-it-and-how-does-it-work.html. 245 Anderson and Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Cyber Threat: Conclusion and Prescriptions.” 246 Iran believes that the US was responsible for the revolutions that took place in certain former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine. 247 “Seven Iranians Working for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Entities Charged for Conducting Coordinated Campaign of Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sector,” The United States Department of Justice, 24 March 2016. Accessed at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard- corps-affiliated-entities-charged. See also: Jay Solomon, “U.S. Detects Flurry of Iranian Hacking,” The Wall Street Journal, 4 November 2015. Accessed at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-detects-flurry-of-iranian-hacking- 1446684754. 248 Gabi Siboni and Sami Kronenfeld, “Developments in Iranian Cyber Warfare, 2013-2014,” INSS Insight, No. 536. 3 April 2014. Accessed at: www.inss.org.il/publication/developments-in-iranian-cyber-warfare-2013-2014/. 249 Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 4 January 2018. Accessed at: www.carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/04/iran-s- cyber-threat-espionage-sabotage-and-revenge-pub-75134. 250 “What Is Iran’s Military Budget According To IRGC?,” Radio Farda, 17 January 2018. Accessed at: https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-budget-irgc/28980550.html. 251 Morgan Chalfant, “Experts say US should expect more Iranian cyberattacks,” The Hill, 5 January 2018. Accessed at: www.thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/367605-experts-say-us-should-expect-more-iranian- cyberattacks.
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capacity to assign attribution for offensive cyberattacks, Iran (and other countries) might be emboldened by the perceived shield of plausible deniability and may contemplate taking more aggressive or hostile actions against adversaries than it might otherwise. This, of course, makes any counter-response politically difficult. Further, as demonstrated by its support of the SEA, Iran is working to expand and enhance the cyber capabilities of its allies. It may look to create a network of warfighting hackers—or proxies, as it has done elsewhere. In any case, its defensive and offensive cyber concepts seem to suggest that Iran is seeking to establish military superiority in the cyber domain.
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6 Conclusion
Iran’s approach to strategy, diplomacy, and the use of force is not the product of Islamic precepts but primarily realpolitik ones. Yet, at the height of tensions between Iran and the West over the latter’s nuclear activities, it was not uncommon to hear that Iran was spurred by an Islamic messianic fervour to develop nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them to herald the apocalypse.252 Despite Shi’im’s reverence for martyrdom, which the leadership glamorized during the course of the Iran-Iraq War to persuade school-aged children to use their bodies to clear the battlefield, Iran cannot be regarded a suicidal nation any more than Japan can. Such assessments are dangerous, politically-motivated, and should be avoided particularly because they overlook significant evidence of Iran’s pragmatism and caution. After all, it was those traits that forced Iran to finally participate in good faith negotiations with the EU3 plus 3 nations (i.e., France, Germany, the UK, China, Russia, and the United States) to address global concerns about its uranium enrichment activities.253
The recent decision by the U.S. to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA will be remembered as another example of American or foreign untrustworthiness. But in the short-term, it will likely be used by Iran’s leadership, particularly the traditional conservatives and the principalists, to justify a return to open hostilities towards the United States. Iran may look to inflict costs on the United States and its allies elsewhere, possibly through the use of its proxies in the region. It may also have implications for Iran’s unhurried but steady reform movement, since those responsible for the nuclear agreement represent the more moderate elements within the country.
In addition to the misperception concerning Iran’s rationality, there is a tendency to caricaturize individuals and its institutions monolithically—which is to say that it is generally assumed that Khamenei is the most extreme voice in the country (he is not, though he often appears to embody this persona to maintain his own seat) or that he is the most important (he is not; Rafsanjani, an icon in his own right, was not deferential to him and refused to follow protocol and kowtow to him in public), or that institutions like the Pasdaran or the Basij are monolithic (they are not; oftentimes they have more in common with the protestors than the clerical establishment). Increasingly, it is institutions and not personalities that matter more in Iran.
252 Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Fly and Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Stephens, “Iran Cannot Be Contained,” Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” and Ottolenghi, Under a Mushroom Cloud. 253 In July 2015, the P5+1 plus Germany and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, also referred to as the Iran deal). Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium enriched uranium, to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and to provide International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regular access to all facilities. It also avowed not to construct any new heavy water nuclear reactors nor to enrich uranium beyond 3.67% for a period of 15 years. In return, the P5+1 agreed to unfreeze Iran’s assets and lift sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear activities. Because the agreement put into place meaningful verifications, it achieves the objective of ensuring that Iran does not become a “break out” nuclear power and is, from an arms control perspective, effective. However, there is continued criticism, which is mostly focused on the fact that the narrow scope of the agreement left out other Iranian “nefarious” activities, such as its ballistic missile program. For the full text of the JCPOA, see: US State Department. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 15 July 2015. Accessed at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf.
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Regime survival is at the heart of all of Iran’s decisions (accumulating wealth is a close second). Survival for Iran’s leadership means two things: protecting itself from its population whose list of grievances has grown longer in recent years, and defending itself from an outside world that wants to bring about its demise. The biggest existential threat lives online, however. It takes the form of social media like Twitter and malicious codes like Stuxnet. Thus, the cyber domain will likely be where Iran expends considerable resources in the future.
Underlying survival are notions of resistance and self-sufficiency.254 In the future, and perhaps sooner than the 15-year cessation to which it had agreed under the now defunct JCPOA, Iran is highly likely to renew its nuclear enrichment activities. It will not want to appear to have been deterred or thwarted by the United States. In order to save face as well as for reasons related to its history, nationalism, pride, and interest in survival, Iran will likely seek to a degree of nuclear latency—that is, the capability to develop nuclear weapons without actually doing so (again like Japan, South Korea)—but, for the same set of reasons, will be unlikely to declare or test them.255 In the meantime, we should expect that Iran’s ballistic missile and rocket programs will continue and improve. 6.1 Iran’s Strategic Goals · Avoidance of conventional conflict while advancing its interests via proxy agents and (mis)information operations. · Continued investment in asymmetrical abilities and guerilla tactics. · Prioritization of soft power over hard. Consider that Iran takes pride in the moral high ground, frequently pointing out that it has never been the aggressor in modern history. This posture, however, may change, especially since its interventions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have eroded Iran’s image.256 · Deterrence of an external attack. It is likely that Iran will restart its nuclear activities. · Preserving the Islamic Republic (i.e., regime survival). This includes investments in the cyber domain (e.g., strict control over the use of social media) to prevent gharbzadegi or a possible velvet/coloured revolution. · To prevent an attack or covert actions, which it has increasingly feared given its perceived sense of encirclement after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the presence of U.S. troops in all countries bordering it (with the exception of Turkmenistan), Iran will continue to invest in unconventional warfare forces, including in rocket and missile technology.
254 One can debate whether the idea of resistance to outside dominance is new to the Islamic Republic. Certainly, the practice of resistance predates 1979 if one considers the protests of the Tobacco Concessions at the start of the last century or the campaign to nationalize Iranian oil in the mid-century. 255 For the role of psychology and emotion, including pride, see Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective Volume 2. (Stanford, Stanford University Press 2010), 42-75. See also: Jennifer Knepper, “Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy Vol 27 No 5 (2008): 451–468. 256 Michael Eisenstadt, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change, MES Monographs No. 7 (Marine Corps University: November 2015).
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· A commitment to disambiguation and dissimulation, including psychological warfare. A tradition that goes as far back as the Persian-Greco Wars. · Iran is highly risk averse. However, it is ambitious and its interest in undermining the West interests, particularly in the region, may lead it to take military actions that invite the use of force or to push out beyond its traditional sphere of influence (e.g., naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea). · Iran represents a possible military challenge to Canada and its allies. Given Iran’s enduring hostility towards the West, particularly the U.S. and that the absence of indications of such sentiments abating among Iran’s political elites, Iran will likely continue its efforts to undermine the defence and security interests of Western nations whenever able and wherever possible. The magnitude and gravity of the implications of Iran’s geostrategic behaviour will increase over the 20-plus-year horizon, especially should Iran continue its investments in lethal and non-kinetic weapons, or should it funnel or trade these with other actors. · Iran’s regional behaviour, in the Persian Gulf, in the Levant, and elsewhere, however, suggest that it is primarily interested in maintaining its freedom of action and its existing partnerships. Although recent undertakings, such as Iran’s naval manoeuvres in the Red Sea and other areas outside of its traditional zones, seem to imply that Iran is seeking to aggrandize power and influence, the Iranian leadership is more interested in maintaining the status quo than pursuing any revisionist ambition. While Iran will exploit opportunities to increase power when such opportunities present themselves, particularly if such exploitation comes at the expense of its enemies, the clerical establishment, comprised of aging revolutionaries and economic opportunists, is averse to both risk and change, and therefore “deterrable.”
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List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms
AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula BP British Petroleum CFD Chief Force Development DDoS distributed denial of service DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada GDP gross domestic product ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGCN Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy IRIA Islamic Republic of Iran Army IRIN Islamic Republic of Iran Navy JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MEK Mujahedeen-e Khalq MML Modified Median Line NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization QCJWC Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference SAM surface-to-air missiles SDF Syrian Democratic Forces SEA Syrian Electronic Army SJS Strategic Joint Staff SLV Space Launch Vehicle UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations USD United States Dollar
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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA *Security markings for the title, authors, abstract and keywords must be entered when the document is sensitive 1. ORIGINATOR (Name and address of the organization preparing the document. 2a. SECURITY MARKING A DRDC Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, is entered (Overall security marking of the document including in Section 8.) special supplemental markings if applicable.) DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis CAN UNCLASSIFIED Defence Research and Development Canada Carling Campus, 60 Moodie Drive, Building 7S.2 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2 2b. CONTROLLED GOODS Canada NON-CONTROLLED GOODS DMC A
3. TITLE (The document title and sub-title as indicated on the title page.) An Assessment of Iran’s Posture: Causes and Consequences
4. AUTHORS (Last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used) Khazaeli, S.
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION 6a. NO. OF PAGES 6b. NO. OF REFS (Month and year of publication of document.) (Total pages, including (Total references cited.) Annexes, excluding DCD, covering and verso pages.) January 2020 70 168
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8. SPONSORING CENTRE (The name and address of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development.) DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Defence Research and Development Canada Carling Campus, 60 Moodie Drive, Building 7S.2 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2 Canada 9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable 9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under research and development project or grant number under which which the document was written.) the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) 00ab
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11a. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.) Public Release
11b. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.) 12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.) Iran; political warfare; military capabilities; cyber capabilities; Middle East; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
13. ABSTRACT (When available in the document, the French version of the abstract must be included here.) The following report sprang from work undertaken for the Chief of Force Development (CFD) in support of a classified Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC) project. The analysis herein provides a comprehensive overview of Iran, aiming to identify trends and forecast developments in Iran’s capabilities and posture that could have future military implications. Iran continues its efforts to undermine the defence and security interests of Western nations. Although areas of strategic and political interest convergence remain, Iran is unlikely to be interested in anything beyond limited tactical cooperation with the West and even then only when what its leadership regards as its vital strategic interests are at stake. Iran’s regional behaviour, in the Persian Gulf, in the Levant, and elsewhere, suggest that it is primarily interested in maintaining its freedom of action—keeping all opens open and all levers at hand—by pursing an asymmetrical national security strategy. While this is most apparent in Afghanistan and Syria, where Iran fills the vacuum left behind by the U.S. and others, other recent undertakings, such as Iran’s naval manoeuvres in the Red Sea and areas outside of its traditional zones, imply that Iran is seeking to aggrandize power and influence. Still, the leadership, comprised of aging revolutionaries and economic opportunists, is averse to risk, sensitive to change, capable of rationalism, and is therefore “deterrable.”
Le rapport qui suit est le fruit de travaux réalisés pour le compte du Chef – Développement des forces (CDF) à l’appui d’un projet classifié de la Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC). L’analyse présentée dans ce rapport dresse un portrait complet de la situation en Iran, tout en cherchant à établir les tendances de ce pays, ainsi qu’à prévoir ses avancées en termes de capacités et de posture qui pourraient avoir des implications militaires futures. L’Iran poursuit ses efforts dans le but de nuire aux intérêts des pays occidentaux en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que l’Iran partage certains de nos intérêts stratégiques et politiques, il est probable qu’il ne veuille s’en tenir qu’à une coopération tactique limitée avec l’Occident; et même alors, il n’en serait ainsi que lorsque ses dirigeants jugeraient que les intérêts stratégiques fondamentaux du pays sont en jeu. Si l’on se fie à ses agissements dans le golfe Persique, au Levant et dans d’autres régions, il semble que l’Iran cherche surtout à protéger sa liberté d’action – gardant toutes ses ouvertures intactes et tous ses leviers à portée de main – en s’appuyant sur une stratégie de sécurité nationale asymétrique. Cela se voit surtout en Afghanistan et en Syrie, où l’Iran comble le vide laissé par les États-Unis et d’autres pays. Cependant, d’autres activités récentes – comme les manœuvres navales de l’Iran dans la mer Rouge et dans d’autres régions situées à l’extérieur de ses zones d’activités habituelles – semblent indiquer que l’Iran cherche à accroître sa puissance et son influence. Malgré tout, puisque les dirigeants de ce pays – pour la plupart des révolutionnaires vieillissants et des opportunistes économiques – sont peu enclins à prendre des risques, sont sensibles aux changements et sont capables de rationalisme, il y a peut-être moyen de les dissuader.