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Empires and Communism: The Creation of an American Public Discourse on Decolonization in the Late 1!940s
by
Ananda Venkata Burra
Professor Karen Merrill, Advisor
A thesis submitted in partial hlfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Nighest Honors in History
WILLIAMS COLLEGE
Williamstown, Massachusetts
April 16'~~2007 Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Ambiguities and Contradictions 23
Chapter 2: Crises and ConJidence 45
Chapter 3: America and the 'Brown, Black and Yellow People of the World' 79
Epilogue: Cold Warriors and the Third World 105
Appendices 11 1
Bibliography 113 Acknowledgements
Writing this thesis has meant going down a long road, and I would not have been able to complete it without the help of so many people. Most of all, I want to thank Professor Karen Merrill for being the greatest thesis advisor anyone could ever hope for. She stood by my side and supported me hom the first moment I walked into her office looking for a thesis topic, to the day I handed it in. I would also like to thank Professor Chris Waters whose confidence in me and constant presence were extremely important for me to complete this thesis. His instruction in the History Honors Seminar was invaluable. In that regard I want to thank Professor Cheryl Hicks and all the students in the History honors program for their suggestions and criticisms throughout this experience. I would especially like to thank my fellow thesis students for providing a community without which writing this thesis would have been very difficult. That goes especially for Daniel J. Aiello '07 and the long days we spent on campus working on our respective theses.
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Neera and Sundar Burra, who believed, sacrificed, and were there for me throughout my time at Williams. I can never repay the gift they gave me in letting me come to Williams. I also dedicate this thesis to my brother, Arudra Venkata Burra, who was there for me when I most needed him.
I would like to thank Professor James McAllister and the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy for the grant that allowed me to work on this thesis over the summer of 2006. Introduction
atthe height of the Second World War in November 1943, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt met Winston Churchill in Cairo. The subject of discussion was French Indo-
China and the status of other colonial territories after the war. FDR reportedly chided
Churchill, the man who had stated that he had "not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," that he (Churchill) hacl "400 years of acquisitive instinct" in his blood and thus could not understand why any :nation
"might not want to acquire land if they [could] get it."' Roosevelt saw a "new period" of world history unfolding at the end of the Second World War; one that would see the end of colonial empire; that would give birth to a world of independent nation states; most importantly, a period of time when the United States would side with decolonization movements like those in India to bring about this changc2 Nothing demonstrated
America's anti-colonial credentials as much as FDR's insistence on including a clause against territorial aggrandizement in the Atlantic Charter he signed with Winston
' Churchill quote from Robert Blake and William Roger Louis, Churchill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 464. FDR quotes from "'Adjusting to a New Period in World History': Franklin Roosevelt and Eilropeari Colonialism," by Paul Orders in David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 63. Orders's chapter does a very good job of tracing FDR's motivations in framing his colonial policy. Michael Hunt also does a good job of detailing FDR's aversion to colonialism and support for decolonization. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 146, 52, 62. Churchill in the months leading up to America's entry into the Second World War.
Before 1945, America was one of the most vocal critics of colonial empires. Nominally a decolonized country itself, the United States was, by and large, outside the scramble for colonies that took place throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth cent~ries.~
Between 1945 and 1990, the centuries-old system of European colonial empires came to an end and a vast majority of the world's population became free of foreign d~mimation.~In the same period, the world was involved in the great ideological battle of the clentury: the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. America becarne the guarantor of European security and the bulwark against comm~nism.~If the pre-PMI world had been one of power blocs and spheres of influence during which much of the world lay outside America's sphere of influence, America was the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere after 1950, and had a level of influence in worlcl affairs unlike any it had ever experienced before. In the transition fiom World War
Two to the Cold War, roughly between 1945 and 1950, the decolonizing world emerged
on the American radar and, as the Cold War got underway, America's relationship to this
3 The followiiig books lay out some of the background for America's relationship with colonialism pre- WWII. E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970). Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Cabrie:l Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, 1 st ed. (New York: Morton, 1989). The history of decolonization has been written dozens of times, from Anthony Pagden's historical survey Peopltzs and Empir-es, to Boyce's more thorough and scholarly Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-,1997. David George Boyce, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires: A Short History ofEtrropean Migration, Exploration, and Conquest, fiom Greece to the Present (New York: Modem Library, 2001). The kiterature on America's emergence as a 'Great Power,' and then as a 'Super Power' is vast. Walter LaFeber's history of the Cold War is a good place to start. Walteii LaFeber, America, Rzissia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000,9th ed. (Boston: McCraw-Hill, 2002), Waitel; LaFeber, ed., The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents (New York: Wiley, 1971), Walter LaFeber, America in the Cold War: Tweizq Years of Revolz~tionsand Response, 1947-1967 (New York: Wiley, 1969). decolonizing world came to be framed in terms of the Cold War. Michael Hunt claims that a "combination of racial attitudes and revolutionary fears produced, in the latter half of the 1940s and through the 1950s, the low water mark for the American conimitm~entto decol~nization."~
In the forty years that ran from American intervention in the Korean \&Jar in 1950 to the collapse of communism in Europe in 1990, the United States intervened repeatedly,
both directly and indirectly, in the decolonizing world; most often to halt or slow down
decolonization movements, or to support authoritarian regimes. American troops,
intelligence services, monetary organizations and diplomatic corps participated in well
over a dozen overt and covert operations in Africa, Asia and South America during the
second half of the century in an attempt to shape the decolonizing world in a manner
suitable to American interests. 7 By the early 1950s, the concept of a 'Third PJorld' came
into popular circulation as "an arena of contestation between West and East, the so-called
First World and Second World.. .an arena, in the view of many pundits, acatlemics, and
geo-politicians, whose ultimate political orientation [could] well determine the outcome
of the Cold War." This thesis is fundamentally concerned with an American public
discourse about this 'Third World' that developed between the end of the Second 'World
War and the start of the open hostilities in the Korean War - roughly between 1945 and
1950.~In particular, this thesis will examine how major foreign policy commentators
6~untin Ryan and Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, 220. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making ofour Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11 1. Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss, eds., Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since I945 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001). I. The concept of the Third World is not an easy one to work around, especially given the quasi-pejorative historical, socio-economic and political connotations it came to take on both during the Cold War, and in its aftermath. Lately there has been a proliferation of studies looking into the 'vocabulary' of a Third World, particularly in articles printed in the Third World Quarterly. David Newsom does a particularly good job of writing for newspapers in the United States understood and reacted to developments in the d~ecolonizingworld, and how their view of the decolonizing world changed between
1945 and 1950 as the Cold War came to hold sway over global foreign policy. This thesis will argue that the late 1940s saw a shift in American discourse about interventions and decolonization, such that, by 1950, American views of the decolonizing world necessitated American intervention in that world.
To understand this shift, it is vital to understand America's pre-WWII relationship to colonialism. America's view of foreign policy in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was formed around the idea of foreign policy 'management'
- the belief that America's foreign policy must be structured so that it promoted world
stability and 'managed' America's external threats in a way that allowed the American
people to exist in the United States without having to concern themselves with the outside
world." This concept is an extremely important one to grasp because it is so
fundamentally different from traditional colonial visions of foreign policy. America's
view on foreign policy in the nineteenth century was inward looking, in that it stressed
the idea of foreign policy as a tool to promote internal stability and trade opportunities.
-- parsing the problems with using the term in a very recent study of U.S. -Third World relations. Neil MacFarlane defines the Third World in a way that sheds some light on the logic of using terms like it. He states that "perhaps the only real substance in what is, despite its inadequacies, quite a useful category lies in a sense of victimization by, and a desire for redress from, Europe and North America which has been, or is shared by elites in all of the regions" encompassing the 'Third World.' Other alternatives to 'Third World,' like the State Department's Less Developed Countries (L.D.C.s), or Emergent Nations, do not seem to be pairticularly less pejorative than the term Third World. I have chosen to use the term 'decolonizing; world' to refer to the area of the world I am looking at. This term is obviously problematic since some places I will examine were never officially colonized, and others were not decolonizing at the time. 'That being said, it is a functional term that, if properly qualified, can be useful in any such discussion. S. Neil MacFarlane, Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation (Baltimore, hlD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), Introduction, Note I. David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third Would (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 215 note 1. "~elvinGurtov, The United States against the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1974), 25. Richard J. Barneit, Roots of War, 1st ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1972), Chapter 9. Granted that it is impossible to make claims about the whole spectrum of American opinion of the early twentieth century, it is still reasonably clear that American foreign policy rhetoric was not primarily concerned with the idea of America's glory cln the world stage, or the idea of America competing for imperial gains against other colonial powers, but was rather framed in terms of America's internal self-interest. This self- conception of U.S. policy was thus rather distinct from that of other colonial powers. 11
American security in the nineteenth century was guaranteed for several reasons, the most important being its isolation from the great powers of Europe, and Britain's dominance of the seas.12 Without a significant oceanic navy of its own, America relied almost exclusively on British control over the ocean to actually enforce its predominance over the continent. America's relationship with Great Britain was thus one of co~istant ambiguity. The system of foreign policy 'management7 depended on Britain's role in the world and the ways in which it maintained order in the international sphere.I3 In
American eyes, the British Empire was the primary guarantor of international order since it had the largest and more diffuse empire and was extremely experienced in the art of brokering foreign policy between European states. Yet, while benefiting from Britain's
maritime supremacy (which formed Britain's colonial lifeline), the United States was
highly critical of colonial empires. America's wealth in the late 19~~century was based on
" Gurtov, The United States against the Third World, 25, Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the UnitedStates: The Great Debate, 1890-1920. l2 Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1983), Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Iflark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, I st American ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1999). l3 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in Anzerican Foreign Relations, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Blake and Louis, Churchill, William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986), W. W. Rostow, The Unitedstates in the WorldArena (New York: Harper, 1960). trade and there was widespread sentiment that colonial empires, with their systems of tariff protections and preferential trade agreements, created artificial bottlenecks in the global1 free trade world and thus fundamentally affected America's interests. l4 The great depression and the chaos of the interwar years further bolstered this distrust as comnnentators in the U.S. saw autarkic and protectionist trade regimes as one of the fundamental contributors to the world-wide crash.
A major contribution to twentieth century rhetoric on decolonization was made in the nineteenth century in the form of the Civil War. The North's victory, and the slow creation of an African-American political consciousness in the years after it, created an extre.mely important voice for decolonization in the first half of the twentieth century.
Between the 1920s and the mid-1940s' the NAACP and other major African-American organizations and newspapers provided staunch support to independence movements around the world. By the 1940s, African-American newspapers and commentators were amongst the most vocal opponents of colonial rule in the United States and tied their own fortuines in the civil rights struggle to the fortunes of colonized people around the world.
The discrimination against African-Americans within the United States was often referred to as America's 'internal' colony, and public rhetoric about decolonization and the rights olf subject peoples' around the world would be linked to internal race politics in the United States right up to the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. l5
-- 14 Gurtov, The United States against the Third World, LaFeber, ed., The Origins of the Cold War, 1941- 1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents, 77-8 1. Louis and Bull, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945. 15 It is important to acknowledge that there is no such thing as a single national discourse and that any attempt at laying out such a discourse is, at some level, essentializing the vast and contentious field of debate: in any society. For America in the mid-twentieth century, the public discourse embodied in important African-American run newspapers like the Chicago Defender (which was the largest circulation African American newspaper in the 1940s) gives us a good insight into a world of discourse that was very different from that promulgated by people like Walter Lippmann in the Washington Post. American attitudes towards the decolonizing world emerged fiom discourse:^ that were fundamentally non-colonial in nature; yet the rhetoric and actions that emerged after the war were suffused with Cold War anxieties, and were woefully similar to Eurlopean colonial ideas and practices. William Pietz provocatively suggests that it is possi'ble to draw a direct line between American discourses during the Cold War and classic
European colonial disco~rses.'~Westad makes the bold assertion that, "for the Third
World, the continuum of which the Cold War forms a part did not start in 1945, or even in 1917, but in 1878 - with the conference of Berlin that divided Africa between
European imperialist powers - or perhaps in 1415, when the Portuguese concperedl their first African ~olony.~''~
Traditionally, "historians, political scientists, and former government
officials.. .considered the clash between the Soviet Union and the United States of the mid- and late 1940s as essentially a struggle over the fate of Europe. Conseqisently, they
tended to slight, or even ignore, the non-Western ~orld."'~The last few years have seen
a few books come out that deal with the United States' role in the decoloniziag world in
the 1940s.'~Unfortunately, none of these works, with the partial exception of Odd Arne
Michael L. Krenn, The Ajpican American Voice in U.S. Foreign Policy since World War 11 (New York: Garland Pub., 1998), Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, eds., Race, Rhetoric, and the Postcolonial (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: B'lack Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). I6 William Pietz, "The "Post-Colonialism" Of Cold War Discourse," Social Text, no. 19/20 (15188): 55. 17 Westad, The Global Cold War: Third Worldlnterventions and the Making ofour Times, 396. l8 Hahn and Heiss, eds., Empire and Revolution: The UnitedStates and the Third Worldsince 1945, 8. Westad argues that while there has been a vast amount written on the topic of decolonizing world revolutions on the one hand and Superpower interventions on the other, there has not been much overlap in those two fields and that his work attempts to bridge that gap. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Tinzes, 7. l9 The following books are especially noteworthy in regard to this and provide the backbone to much of the policy related work I have done in my thesis. Olson and Worsham, eds., Race, Rhetoric, and the Postcolonial, Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi Ehernberger Hamilton, eds., The Handbook of Discoul-se Analysis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 200 1). Westad's The Global Cold War, have dealt with the issue of ideology and American public discourse during the Cold War. The history I wish to do - an examination of the evolution of discourse - is a relatively recent phenomenon.20 Michael Hunt's book,
Ideology alvld U.S. Foreign Policy, is an excellent, if slightly outdated, example of a book that does some of the theoretical work I do. The little work on American colonial discourse analysis that exists has tended to focus on America's very earliest encounter with empire with the Spanish-American war, or on America's reaction to the world in the
1960s and 1970s during the Vietnam War.
Edward Said, in his seminal book Orientalism, laid the groundwork for a field of study whose central concern is the ways in which 'the Orient,' 'the East,' etc were constructed in the European imagination in a way that allowed for a symbiotic relationship between European understandings of the 'Orient' and European colonial policy towards that very same 'Orient.' His works sparked a whole field of study whose primary concern was how 'culture' and 'oriental' visions of the non-European world helped to both fuel and reinforce European intervention and colonization around the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth cent~ries.~'Similarly Michael Hunt, in his book
Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, states that "an understanding of a nation's ideology
20 Schiffrin, l'annen & Hamilton's Handbook of Discourse Ananlysis is an extremely important resource in understanding discourse. Olson and Worsham's Race, Rhetoric and the Postcolonial is also a valuable resource when studying post-colonial discourse. Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1993). The field of cultural studies inaugurated by Said's work is one of the most vibrant fields of academic study today. Robert Young's Postcolonialisnz is a good theoretical work that explores the variety of meanings and interactions between 'colonial,' 'neo-colonial' and post-colonial.' Cooper's Colonialism in Question, Wiarda's Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy and Slater's Geopolitics and the Post-colonial are interesting works that link discourse to foreign policy. David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colorfial: Rethinking North-South Relations (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), Howard J. Wiarda, Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World? (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An H~storiculIntroduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). provides no certain insights into its behavior," but "ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in which policymakers deal with specific issues, and in which the attentive public understands those issues." If we think of foreign policy declarations
and practices as being a form of "public rhetoric" that "to be effective.. .must draw on values and concerns widely shared and easily understood by its audience;"' then these values and concerns amongst the American public regarding the decolonizing world are
vital to understanding how America came to take the international stance it did towards
those regions of the
Without access to the multiple media channels available to us today in a rapidly
globalizing mental universe, the average American in the late 1940s received news about
the rest of the world in primarily one form, the newspaper.23The gate-keepers of opinion
on the rest of the world within these newspapers were a relatively small1 group of
extremely influential foreign policy commentators whose job it was to distill the .world
outside the United States and deliver it to educated America. Thus, to understand how
these few men of immense personal influence framed the decolonizing world is to
understand - to a significant extent - the ways in which the decolonizing world was
formed in the American imagination in this period.
The late 1930s saw the high-water mark of newspaper readership in the United
With the Second World War and America's involvement in it, newspapers in the
22 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 15,16. 23 It is important to not slight the significance of both magazines and the radio at this point of time. Still, in terms of in-depth analysis of issues and mass circulation, the newspaper world of the 1940s still trumped both the magazine and radio world. This was to change precipitously over the two decades right after this. 24 It is almost impossible to get exact numbers for newspaper circulation in the late 1940s, especially circulation figures for individual newspapers. A useful statistic to illustrate the growth of the newspaper industry is that between 1914 and 1940 the Associated Press, the largest news agency in America, increased its subscription from a hundred member papers in 1914 to well over 1,400 papers in 1940. Moreover, "the aggregate daily circulation the country over increased from about 40,000,000 a.t the United States had a huge audience concerned about events around the world and turning to the print media to learn about them25.The end of the war allowed thousands of men to return to the United States. Amongst these thousands was a generation of newspaper reporters arid columnists who would go on to dominate the printed word all the way up to the 1970s. In a significant break from pre-war journalism, these newspapermen were afforded the opportunity to report on world events, and still be respected and read by a burgeoning domestic audience. Their experiences in Britain, Europe, Russia, the Middle
East i~ndthe Far East had a profound impact on their view of the world, and America's changing pliace in it. Along with members of the State Department, it was this generation of reporters who felt America's new role in the world most keenly.
The commentators who emerged at this moment in newspaper history were involved irt creating the foreign policy world for ordinary readers across the United
States and framing the great debates of the day for consumption by the country at large.
In a world that was suddenly attuned to the importance of international policy and followed each contour in the shifting landscape of international relations carefully, the commentators of the late 1940s provided a link between the closed door realpolitik of the
State Department and the larger public sphere. In sum, "the impact of the political-social- economic revolution of the New Deal years, the rise of modern scientific technology, the increasing linterdependence of economic groups at home, and the shrinking of the world
- -- -- beginn.ing of 1940 to over 52,000,000 in 1949." The average population of the country in 1945 was slightly over a 130m Edwin Emery and Michael C. Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 435. United. States Census courtesy of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission. htt~://~~~w.t~l.state.tx.us/reEabouttx/ce~~s~~s.html 25 Not much has been done in terms of newspaper history in the 1940s, though the following survey of the history are certainly useful. Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 710, 84. into one vast arena for power politics forced a new approach to the handling of news.
"Why" became important, along with the traditional "who did what.""26 Opinion columnists, as opposed to news columnists, were a product of the late 1940s. Their job was to filter the large quantities of information coming through the news and develop positions, philosophies and political arguments that could be then read and appropriated by the burgeoning newspaper audience. Commentators like Walter Lippmann 'sold' policy to the nation and modulated how it came to see the world outside the United
States. 27
The 1940s were also the heyday of syndication in the newspaper industry.
Reporters and commentators, who were technically employed by one or two ]newspapers, could have their columns sold to a nationwide syndicate that would then pass on their columns to newspapers throughout the country. This system meant that individual commentators, if syndicated with a big enough corporation, could have their columns read by millions of readers outside the readership of their primary new~~a.~ers.~~The process of syndication, the small number of commentators syndicated to the big syndicates like United Features and the New York Times Syndicate, and the generally monopolistic world of the newspaper industry (a holdover from the consolidation of the
1930s) meant that individual newspapermen wielded an immense amount of influence
'"uincy Howe, The News and How to Understand It in Spite of'the Newspapers, in Spite of the Magazines, in Spite of the Radio. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 43. "~oarnChomsky's Manujacturing Consent was titled after Walter Lippmann's famous claim in his 1922 book Public Opinion that the media was involved in the "manufacture of consent." Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 158. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, 1 st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). This system of syndication declined precipitously in the 1970s which, along with a general decline in newspaper readership, saw the steady decline of the newspaper as the primary source of news. Syndication continues to this day but many of the great syndicates like United Features are now primarily involved in cartoon and crossword syndication. amongst dignitaries, both at home and abroad. An interview with Walter Lippmann was a chance to have your thoughts transmitted to an audience that spanned America and the globe. In the course of the 1940s and 1950s, commentators like Walter Lippmann, Cyrus
Leo Sulzbe:rger, Joseph & Stewart Alsop etc gained a gravitas in Washington never before available to foreign policy commentators. They hobnobbed with Presidents, met
Kings and, in the case of Barnet Nover, married the President's daughter (Margaret
Truman).
On the flip side, the presence of a strong syndication system meant that writers associated with a particular syndicate were constantly aware of what sold and what did not, as newspapers subscribed or unsubscribed from their columns. A syndicate's
"principal job [was] to line up and build up special writers, cartoonists, celebrities, and specialists and then sell their work as widely as possible."29 United Features and the New
York Herald Tribune ran what was widely considered to be the most influential editorial page in America, and the syndicated columnists associated with them had the status big- name Hollywood stars had with Hollywood studios: an ability to wield tremendous influence but also an understanding that their influence depended on their position within the syndicate and the marketability of their columns.
The newspaper world of the 1940s, and the role of syndication and the feature colunmist in it, is an under-studied field of history. It is thus hard to come up with exact figures for the readership enjoyed by individual columnists in this time period. I have chosen the commentators I have, both because of their association with mass-circulation
29 Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Thii-d World, 49.
12 dailies and syndicates, and because of the sustained attention they gave ito the decolonizing world and the issues emerging out of it.30
The Foreign Policy Pundits
Popularly described as the 'Dean' of American journalists, Walter Lippmann
(1889-1974) was placed 89 in The Atlantic's 2006 list of the hundred most important figures in American history, only one spot behind his contemporary Enrico Fenni, the developer of the atomic bomb.31 More than anyone else in his generation, Walter
Lippmann formed the way in which Americans read and thought about the rest of the world, and America's place in it.32 B~ the mid 1940s his column 'Today and
Tomorrow," written for the New York Herald Tribune, was syndicated and read by over ten million Americans. He earned more than any other commentator of his generation, and his thrice weekly column made him a superstar in the newspaper world. Lippmann's picture graced the cover of the September 27 1937 issue of Time magazine and, by the
30 Along with commentators and the columns, I use a wide variety of editorial cartoons throughout this thesis. These cartoons were distributed via the same syndication system used by editorial columnists. These cartoons give us a graphic representation of discourses that suffuse the written word, and thus form an important part in the creation of a public discourse in the United States. 31 The Atlantic Monthly Online, December 2006 http:ii'W~~tf'.theatlantic.cornidoci?OOh12/influentials 3' 3' Marquis William Childs and James Reston, eds., Walter Lippmann andHis Times, 1 st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), Ronald Steel, Walter Lippnzann and the American Century, 1 st ed. (Boston: Little Brown, l980), Anwar Hussain Syed, Walter Lippmann'.~Philosophy of International Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). "Walter Lippmann, American Journalist, Columnist, Political Commentator." The Cold Wai-, 1945-li991. 3 vols. Edited by Benjamin Frankel. Gale Research, 1992. "Walter Lippmann." St. James Encyclopedia of Popular Culture. 5 vols. St. James Press, 2000. "Walter Lippmann." Encyclopedia of World Biography, 2nd ed. 17 Vols. Gale Research, 1998. "Walter Lippmann."Dictionay ofA~nericunBiography, Supplement 9: 1971-1975. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. "Walter Lippmann." American Decades. Gale Research, 1998. Reproduced in Biogr-aphy Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. http://galenet.gaiegro~~p.com!ses~~let/BioRC late 1960s, his opinion on matters - both international and domestic - were watched with both anticipation and dread in the White House and State Department.
Lippmann graduated from Harvard University in 1910 after being a student of
George Santayana. After flirting with socialism briefly in college, Lippmann became a
strong supporter of Woodrow Wilson and was one of the people responsible for Wilson's
famous 'Fourteen He started a newspaper, saw it flounder during the
depression, and ended up working for the right-leaning New York Herald Tribune as a
left-leaning columnist in the mid-1930s. Up to the very end of his career, Lippmann
earned both success and admonition for the establishment-centric stance he took in much
of his; writing. He gained a reputation for being highly critical of individual figures and
large po1ic:y decisions in the administration but never actually critiquing specific and
immediate policy decisions. Up to the Vietnam War, Lippmann remained very much a
political insider and his opinions ran very much alongside those of what might be
described as a classic Cold War liberal. His first major departure from the administration
took place in his criticism of the Vietnam War and withering attacks on the Johnson
administration. Lippmann7snewfound status as a liberal star came along with the loss of
his administration contacts and meant the end of his writing career. During his four
decades of writing, Lippmann remained the center of the opinion columnist universe.
Every othe:r columnist of any note measured hidherself against Lippmann, and his
opinions were the launching pad for alternative views of American policy.
33 Amlbrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. President Woodrow Wilson and the discourse on self-determination that emerged out of his 'Fourteen- points' were extremely important in laying the basis for how people reacted to the Americas and the United States' involvement in them. Wilsonianism formed the core around which arguments about America's role in the world were to be framed before the Second World War and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Lippmann stood alone in the world of opinion columnists in that his columns were primarily intended to be reflections on the world situation in general and large political theory, rather than on specific events and their fall-out. This malces him the perfect focus of this thesis since he, more than any other commentator of the time, wrote
truly 'opinion' pieces that laid out ways in which American readers could look at and
understand the rapidly transforming post-war world. This thesis will use Lippmann as the
core from which to extrapolate and understand the wider discourse on decolonization in
the United States in the late 1940s.
Along with Walter Lippmann, the New York Herald Tribune counted on Stewart
and Joseph Alsop (1 914-1974 and 1910-1989) in its claim to having one of the best
editorial pages in the country in the late 1940s.~~Initially written by Joseph Alsop and
Robert Kintner, the Alsop column (titled "Matter of Fact" when Stewart joined Joseph)
boasted at least 200 newspaper subscribers in the late 1940s, and had an estimated
readership of about 25 million people. This made the Alsops perhaps the most widely
read foreign policy columnists in the United States in the 1940s.
Both Alsop brothers served in the Second World War, one with the army and the
other with the Office of Strategic Services. Joseph was the more hawkish of the twio and,
once they started collaborating, their column became one of the most forthright critics of
Soviet policy in the United States. Their doomsday predictions and outright aggr~ession
towards the Soviet Union and communism in general put them well to the right of
-
34 "Joseph Alsop, American Journalist, Political Commentator." The Cold War, 1945-1991. 3 vols. Edited by Benjamin Frankel. Gale Research, 1992. "Joseph and Stewart Alsop." American Decades. Gale Research, 1998. "Stewart Johonnot Oliver Alsop."Dictionary ofAmerican Biogr-aphy, Supplenzent 9: 1971-1975. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Fannington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. l~ttp:l/galenet.~alegroup.con~/servlet/BioRC someone like Lippmann and fit the New York Herald Tribune's politics closely. Thus, even though they had a readership that was perhaps larger than that enjoyed by
Lipprnann, their influence in terms of modulating a mainstream discourse was not quite at the same Moreover, the Alsop brothers were more Eurocentric than most, in an already very Eurocentric world. This made their commentary on the decolonizing world woefillly scattershot and makes their contribution to this thesis unfortunately limited.
Along with Lippmann and the Alsops, this thesis will focus on C.L. Sulzberger
(1912-1993); a member of one of America's foremost newspaper families whose uncle,
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, published the New York Times in the 1930s and 1940s.~~During the late 1930s, Sulzberger served as a Europe correspondent with the London Evening
Standard and, once Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, he honored a promise to his uncle and became the New York Times ' Balkan Bureau Chief. Like many other young reporters of the time, Sulzberger served all over Europe during the war and reported on German advances firom just behind the front line. His travels also took him to the Middle East where he became the New York Times ' Chief Foreign Correspondent and the head of its
Foreign Service. He was stationed in Paris for the rest of his life and traveled all over the world reporting on the start of the Cold War. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1951.
Sulzberger's place in this thesis is not straightforward. Unlike Lippmann and the
Alsop brothers, Sulzberger was primarily a correspondent between 1945 and 1950 and most of his stories about the Middle East (the part of the decolonizing world he examined
- 35 The Alsops' hawkish-ness and red-baiting earned them the nickname All-Slops. Several commentators referred to them as fear-mongers and sensationalists. 36 "Cyrus Leo Sulzberger," Contemporary Authors Online, Gale, 2007. "Cyrus Leo Sulzberger." The Scribner Encyclopedia of American Lives, Volume 3: 1991-1993. Charles Scribn,erlsSons, 200 1. Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Fannington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. httl)-alenet, galegi-oup.com/servlet/BioRC the most) were primarily news pieces and not opinion pieces. Yet Sulzberger, even in the days he was a reporter, wrote in a style that was editorial for a large part. As a very senior member of the New York Times' reporting staff, Sulzberger did not confine himself to merely hying to relay the news, so much as trying to interpret it. A subscriber to the
great-man view of foreign affairs, Sulzberger interviewed Kings, Prime Ministers and
diplomats all over the world and had an incredible insight into their deliberations. He
passed on these insights through five years of reports and a handful of long editorial
pieces in the New York Times. Like Lippmann, Sulzberger was gifted and cursed by his
position in the news establishment, and his articles and columns never strayed too far
from the official line. Yet, with the largest syndicate in the United States, the New York
Times and its chief foreign correspondent had an unparalleled reach in terms of the wider
American public.
While the four commentators mentioned above were extremely important in the
creation of a discourse about decolonization in the 1940s, there were a large: number of
other writers who made important contributions to that very same discourse. Suimner
Welles (1892-1961) was one of the most influential foreign policy figures in the
establishment of Franklin Delano Roosevelt before his removal from the State
Department on allegations of homosexuality in 1943.~~He served first as Assistant
Secretary of State to FDR, and then as Under Secretary of State where he was one of the
chief proponents of the United Nations and earned the dislike of the then Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull. His removal from the halls of power allowed him to devote his forced
37 "Sumner Welles." E~~cyclopediaof WorldBiography, 2nd ed. 17 Vols. Gale Research, 1998. "(Benjamin) Surnner Welles." Dictionary ofAmerican Biography, Supplement 7. 1961-1965. American Council of Learned Societies, 198 1. Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. htt~://galenet.galegso~~r,.conl/servlel/BioRC retirement to writing foreign policy commentary in a number of newspapers. His columns were almost uniformly sympathetic to the cause of decolonization, and he had great faith in the United Nations as a forum in which to deal with the issues arising out of decolonization. This placed him to the left of someone like Lippmann and far to the left of people like the Alsop brothers. His foreign policy idealism was especially striking because of' his long association with realpolitik and the machinations of the State
Departmenit.
Marquis W. Childs (1903-1990) became the first recipient of a Pulitzer Prize for commentary in 1963 and earned his reputation during a long career as a foreign affairs correspondient.3 8 He worked variously for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Saturday
Evening Post and the New Republic, but for the period I will look at, Childs wrote a political commentary column (often titled after his second book, Washington Calling) for the United Features syndicate and was thus subscribed to by dozens of newspapers around the United States. Like Sulzberger, Lippmann and the Alsop brothers, Childs built his reputation on being able to talk to the people who mattered, or at least the people in power. Less of a pragmatist than Lippmann but also less idealistic than Welles, Childs traveled far and wide and provided some very good commentary on the decolonizing world in the late 1940s. He was also the co-author of a collection of writings on Walter
Lippmann.
38 "Marquis Childs," Contemporary Authors Online, Gale, 2007. "Marquis WiUiam Childs." The Scribner Encyclopedia ofAmerican Lives, Volzrme 2: 1986-1990. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999. Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. httl,:!iaalenet. galegroup .com/sen~letiSioRC Clifton Daniel (1912-2000), like C. L. Sulzberger, was one of the New York
Times ' leading foreign policy reporters and commentators. 39 His career took him from war reporting in Europe with the Associated Press to the post of managing editor of the
New York Times in the 1960s. During the late 1940s Daniel served as the New York
Times ' chief correspondent in the Middle East and was soon transferred to Moscow as the
Times' chief Russia correspondent. He married President Truman's on1.y daughter,
Margaret Truman, in 1956, and his reports from Palestine, Iran and Egypt form an
important part of the discourse on the decolonizing world of this period.
Barnet Nover (1899-1973) was described in his obituary in the New York Tizvles as
a scholarly journalist and his many years of lecturing on international relations at the
University of Buffalo bore this out.40 Nover's foreign policy specialty was the Far East
and he acted as a commentator on Far East policy throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Along
with his foreign policy experience, Nover had an unusually close relationship with
Truman and was one of the few reporters to endorse him in 1948 against Dewey. Till
1947 Nover acted as an editorial writer to the Washington Post along with an
appointment with the Denver Post at the same time. He covered the opening San
Francisco session of the United Nations and his column provided one of the best insights
into the Far East, and American policy there, when compared to any contemporary
reporter.
39 "Clifton Daniel," Conten~pora~yAuthors Online, Gale, 2007. Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Thomson Gale. 2007. htty:/'~ale~~et.~alearour,.comiservlet/BioRC 40 "Barnet Nover, 74, Columnist, Dead," The New Yovk Times (1857-currentJile); Apr 17, 1973. Ernest Lindley (1899-1979), like Sumner Welles, served both as a newspaperman and as a State Department insider.41 His career, unlike Welles, started in the newspaper business where he wrote a column for The Washington Post and Newsweek through the
1930s and 1940s. His columns were widely syndicated and read and he earned his reputation reporting on the New Deal and FDR. He was invited into the Policy Planning
Staff of the State Department in the 1960s by Dean Rusk. While his primary focus remained domestic politics, Lindley reported widely on international affairs in the late
1940s.
Perhaps the one correspondent looked at in this thesis with the most sympathy for decolonization movements around the world; Foster Hailey (1899-1966) served as a reporter and columnist for the New York Times for over four decades and was termed an
'all-purpose' reporter.42 Surprisingly, Hailey remains something of a fascination for the author as there is almost nothing written about him, yet his writings provide one of the best glimpses into the world of a reporter who lived in the Middle and Far East for many years. Hailey went as far as to publish a book titled Half of One World in 1947 on the decolonization fight in South-East Asia, and quit the New York Times editorial board in
1948 because he disagreed with their policies regarding the Dutch-Indonesian crisis. His writings sit at the opposite pole to the writings of the Alsop Brothers on decolonization but, imfortunately, his jack-of-all-trades post on the New York Times meant that his coverage on issues of decolonization was not as complete as could be hoped.
4 i "Commentators, Author, Columnist Ernest K. Lindley Dies," The Washington Post (1974-ctlvrent,file); Jul2, 1979. 42 "Foster Hailey, Times Reporter And Editorial Writer, Dies at 67," New York Times (1857-cuvrentjile); Aug 1.4, 1966. This thesis is organized such that the first chapter examines how American commentators thought about America's relationship with the rest of the worlcl, and particularly Europe, in the immediate post-war period. From 1945 to the middle of 1946,
American commentators framed their discussions about the colonized world in terms of
America's European policy and the necessity for a European restoration after the rigors
of war. This was a period characterized by a contradiction: America's support for
decolonization and America's support for its imperial allies in Europe. From 1946 to late
1948, America and Europe faced a variety of foreign policy 'crises' that fundamentally
changed the way American commentators were able to relate to the world. The slecond
chapter of this thesis will examine how American commentators came to shift away from
supporting America's complete reliance on its European allies in its dealings with the
colonized world, while also framing America's relationship with the Soviet Union in a
way that was vital to the creation of the 'Cold War World.' With discourse about the
decolonizing world and the Cold War emerging in American newspapers in the late
1940s, my final chapter details the definitive emergence of the decolonizing world on
America's radar with the first wave of decolonization in the late 1940s, and the 'loss' of
the first non-European state to communism in the Chinese communist revolution. This
chapter will examine how the decolonizing world itself, and events instigated by
colonized people themselves, shaped America's views on the advisability of
decolonization and the role decolonizing peoples played in the global war against
communism. Thus, this thesis will map the rapidly evolving public discourse on foreign
policy that eventually led to an American Cold War discourse regarding decolonization in
the 1950s. This thesis is an attempt to explain how the decolonizing world came to
America's attention, and how American newspaper commentators' understandings of the decolonizing world were formed in the forge of the early Cold War. I am not interested in looki~igat America's reaction to specific countries and case studies (though I will have to do that at times), but rather at the creation of an idea; an understanding of an 'other' world that 1.ay outside the First and the Second Worlds and was thus open to intervention from both." Fundamentally, the question this thesis answers is this: Why was America's relationship to the decolonizing world at the end of the 1940s formed primarily in terms of its relationship with the Soviet Union and communism, and why did this translate into a wid.espread distrust amongst American commentators towards movements pushing for decolonization?
43 I will focus my studies on American attitudes towards former British and French colonial possessions in an attempt to tease out American discourse about areas of the world Americans generally did not have close contact with and consequently had little prior knowledge of. These were the areas of the world that truly 'emerged' on the American mental landscape in the 1940s. It would be impossible to do any study of this kind without acknowledging the long tradition of colonial discourse in the United States regarding colonization in the Americas. Michael Hunt's book does a very good job of laying out the long-term, and slowly evolving racial and cultural stereotypes that took hold in the United States through the nineteenth century. Since the 1823 declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, countries in the Americas were within the sphere of American intervention and discourses of intervention in these countries had had over a hundred years to mature by the time the Cold War came around. I will deal with some of these issues in chapter three with a discussion of the ways in which America used its own colonial history as a model for dealing with decolonization. Yet, while certainly informing discourse about other decolonizing world interventions, these countries were in many ways a case apart. For the most part, American foreign policy commentators of the 1940s made very clear distinctions between America's colonies and other colonies. This conscious attempt to divorce America's own colonial history from the 'Imperialist' epithet means that tying America's colonies to the larger idea of colonization in American discourse is hard to do. Chapter 1
Ambiguities and Contradictions
"When a nation rises as suddenly as we have risen in the world, it needs above all to measure its power.. .for it is easier to develop great power than it is to know how to use it well."'
%he end of the Second World War confronted the American public and government with a vast number of challenges. Most striking of these was the vastly changed structure of world power in the aftermath of the war. The war had led to the physical and econon~iccollapse of every single country in mainland Europe, and the two countries that abutted it, Britain and the U.S.S.R., were both drained from the exertions the war had demanded. The only belligerent in the war that had not suffered any significant damage at home was the United States, and war production there had brought an unprecedented economic boom in its wake. America's economic position was impregnable and even though the Red Army was in control of all of Easteni Europe, it was the United States that had the decisive strategic advantage. Joseph and Stewart Alsop distilled the prevailing mood in 1946 when they said that "it is time for Americans to understand the position of the United States in the world, our vast potential strength, and the degree to which other nations depend upon our strength as the hope of the future."*
Walter Lippmann proclaimed that "even more than the Soviet Union.. .the United States is the newest world power."3
I Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Los Angeles Times (1886-cur~entjle);Sep 12, 1945. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 13, 1946. Walter Lippmann, "The Rise of the United States," The Los Angeles Times (1886-currentfile); Sep 12, 1945. The primary task in the immediate post-war world was European rebuilding.
Europe's fortunes had changed dramatically during the war and American and European policy-makers and commentators focused their efforts on how to deal with the new structure of' European power. The largest industrial, population and cultural centers of the world lay in ruin after successive waves of air and ground attack, and the little industry that still survived had been converted to military purposes.4 A world-wide famine in the afternnath of the war was a real fear.5 With the deaths of millions during the war, almost every country in Europe faced a severe population ~runch.~Europe's problems in the post-war period were dire, but American commentators, while recognizing this fact, did not necessarily think this translated into any hndamental change in global power relations. This chapter will explore how commentators in the United States modulated their responses to the wider colonial world while simultaneouslly coming to the realization that the post-war world would not resemble pre-war power structures.
P,&e>,,&~s .",* L < I I _ ~~**,~"""CI_VI..L - - *
Winfried Georg Sebald, On the Natzrral History of Destruction, First U.S. edition ed. (New York: Random House, 2003). Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Centuty, 1st American ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1999), Chapter 7, Winfried Georg Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction, First U.S. ed. (New York: Random House, 2003), Chapter 3. 6~ fact that would eventually lead to the great colonial migratory movements that so fundamentally shaped the makeup of the current multicultural Europe Mazower, Dark Continent: Etrrope's Twentieth Century, Epilogue. Imperatives of Order and World Peace in 1945
One of the most important legacies of the Second World War was that it brought all the major military powers of the world together into the United Nations in a bid to bring stability to the world and avoid the possibility of fbrther hostilities. The TJnited
States, under FDR and his Under Secretary of State Surnner Welles, was the chief proponent of the new world body and American public opinion after the war was overwhelmingly in favor of some form of world governance. Sulzberger categorically stated that "both Britain and the United States are devoted to the idea of the UNO and both are ready to make concessions to keep it going."7 The primary concern, not only for
American commentators, but for most Western Europeans as well, was a cessation of hostilities and a return to pre-war systems of international organization and order. In the imagination of American commentators, a return to pre-war strategic systeins meant a return to security and a possible return to non-intervention. For Western Europe, recovery and a return to pre-war levels promised a rebirth of Europe as the center of world affairs, and as a major economic and political power. In many ways, the first years after the war marked a strong nostalgia with the past and an unwillingness to recognize and adapt to the new power dynamics of the post-war world.8
7 C. L. Sulzberger, "Russia Mixes Communism with Imperial Aims," New York Times (1857-Currentfile), Mar 24, 1946. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, Chapter 7. REBUILDlNC EUROPE
In September 1945, Sulzberger proclaimed that "the most important political development during the last ten years . . . has been the emergence of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as the greatest dynamic and diplomatic force on the vast Eurasian landmass which stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific ~ceans."~The U.S.S.R. had suffered incalculably during the war but had emerged from it as the unquestioned hegernonic power in Europe.'' The Red Army had almost single-handedly driven back the Nazi war machine and was in control of most of Eastern Europe. Around the world, people looked to the Soviet Union with more than a little awe and it became clear that it had emerged as a super-power. Initially, while great suspicion existed towards the Soviet
Union and communism in the West, there was also an acknowledgement of Soviet
C. L. Sulzberger, "World War I1 Lifts Russia to a New Pinnacle of Power," New York Times (1857- Cz~rrentfile),Sep 9, 1945. 'O R. J. Overy, Russia's War (New York: Penguin Books, 1998). achievements during the war, and commentators expected that the UN would be a forum in which to iron out differences.
It is important to note, especially in the light of subsequent developments in the
Cold War, that American commentators in the immediate post-war period of 1946 did not pay very much attention to the Soviet Union as an immediate threat to American security.
They were certainly worried by Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and saw Soviet advances in the Far East as a matter of concern; yet the central concern for most people was not the decolonizing world, but the colonial metropolises and the reestablishment of pre-war spheres of influence. Until about mid-1946, threat assessments made by Arnerica commentators continued to speak of Germany and Japan as possible aggressors, and the shadow of the Second World War loomed large over security discussions.
Fundamentally, American commentators like Lippmann believed that peace was possible since "the peace keeping fknction of the UNO [was] to see to it that the unsettled regions of the world do not become arenas of mortal conflict among the great powers."1'
Ldirrid C=*- I* .. *n nut "la)* 9 iiWY I&&"* .',,,-.?*',,*.,ck,,.."s&., ~C.V 54 *~.+~~*b*x=*~8o*,~s."~?."~,-,~'.#k7,,~& ,*>; AW.,, ,/% F *'MR. LfE JN THE U. N. CARDEi?rq
Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 1, 1946. In the first post-war years, Britain took the lead in opposing the Soviet Union, and many United States commentators and policymakers saw America's role being that of a mediator between the two parties.'2 For many commentators, the rivalry taking place
between Britain and the U.S.S.R. was but a new phase in a century long contest between
Russia and Britain. For Joseph Alsop in an article titled "Soviets Bite into Britain's Pie,"
"a grim and ugly power-politics contest between the British and the Soviets is in progress
throughout the Middle East. It is a contest in which the corruption of local officials, the
real aspirations of the people and the threat of superior force are the weapons.""
America's role in 1945 was seen as being that of an arbiter to make sure one side did not
swam? the other and that hostilities did not ensue. Walter Lippmann for one was a strong
proponent of this conception of post-war world politics. He proclaimed that "the Middle
East has been the question that has made Britain and Russia rivals for at least a hundred
and thirty years" and that, "in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia, the basic
conflict is between the Soviet Union and the British Empire."14
American commentators like Nover recognized early on that the vast systems of
imperial colonies linked to European powers were going to be a cause of international
instability. Internal unrest, a paucity of troops, wartime taxation and exploitation had all
eroded the basis for c~lonialism.'~The United States and Britain took over temporary
l2 A striking example of this comes from Barnet Nover. "It may be too early to talk of the isolation of Britain inside the ranks of the Big Three. That is a possibility which cannot be dismissed as a phantasm." Barnet Nover, "The Real Test," The Washington Post (1877-1 9-54), Jan 1, 1 946. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. 13 Joseph Alsop, "Soviets Bite into Britain's Pie," The Washington Post (1877-19-54),Jul28, 1946. Barnet Nover, "Russia and Britain," The Washington Post (1877-19-54),Feb 5, 1946. 14Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 29, 1946. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 29, 1945. IS Barnet Nover, "Course of Empire," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Dec 28, 1946. administration of colonies as they were liberated from the Germans, Italians or Japanese in the immediate aftermath of the war. Britain in particular found itself in an awkward position since it not only had to hold on to its own colonies, which were in some cases in open revolt, but also had to keep order in colonies that belonged to other colo~lialpowers.
American commentators watched Britain grappling with its colonial problems and expressed concern., but did not expect Britain to fail in its quest to maintain order in the
colonial world. The American people were weary after the exertions of the war and were unenthusiastic about further American interventions outside the Americas. An indication
of this attitude can be found in Lippmann's writings at the time about America's historical position as a regional rather than global power.'6 Many American
commentators still saw America as essentially being outside the nitty-gritty matters of
world affairs and clung to the hope that America could push international cooperation
and security, support Britain in the post-war world, while also not being an integral part
of post-war wrangling.
What commentators only slowly came to realize was that the sheer scale of death
and destsuction during the war in Europe meant that no European country ha.d the
economic or military means to hold on to its colonial properties on its own. The tide of
public revolt washing through the former empires dispelled any misconceptions amongst
European admiilistrators that they would be able to go back to the positions they had held
before the war without a fight. American commentators like Lippmann realized that
European prestige had been deeply hurt by the war in general and Axis successes in
j6 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 26, 1945 Walter Lippinann, .'Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Oct 30, 1945. parti~u1ar.l'~Sulzberger pointed out that France had a particular problem since many of its colonial governments, like the ones in Algeria and Indo-china, ended up cooperating with the Vichy regime.'' Similarly, Marquis Childs noted that the Dutch were in a desperate situation in their extremely profitable colonies in Indonesia because they had barely enough manpower to rebuild their own country, let alone suppress a nationalist uprising in another. He commented that, "because the Dutch have no forces, the responsibility for 'keeping order' [in Indonesia] has fallen on the ~ritish."'~Thus, across the board, American commentators in 1945 were coming to the conclusion that "the
British, the French, and the Dutch, separately and collectively, have not sufficient power and moral authority ... to bring about a constructive settlement unless in some way or other it is also underwritten by the United ~tates."~'The Second World War thus destroyed a deeply seated system of world governance that had existed since the mid- eighteenth century.
For anti-colonial leaders around the world, the end of the war signaled a moment of intense hope.2' Different factions in different countries had tried to use the war in different ways. Some, like Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China and the Congress Party in India, supported the Allies in the hopes of post-war concession^.^^ Others collaborated with
Axis commanders, especially in the Pacific, in the hopes that Japan's call for "Asia for the Asiatics" would translate into the end of colonial rule. American commentators were
17 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. l8 C. L. Sulzberger, "Indo-China Revolt Fateful to France," New York Times (1857-Ctrrrent.file), Dec 25, 1946. 19Marquis Childs, "Washington Calling," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 2, 1945. Marquis Childs, "Washington Calling," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 15, 1945. 20 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 2, 1946. 21 C. L. Sulzberger, "Russia Mixes Communism with Imperialist Aims," New York Times (1857-Current Jile), Mar 24, 1946. 22 Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), Chapter 12, 13. well aware of this trend and some, like Sumner Welles, were deeply sympathetic towards
it. Welles declared in 1945 that "the Eastern races are determined to end their subjugation to the West. They are demanding liberty and self-government." 23 Others, like Marquis
Childs, understood that "what is happening in Java and in French Indo-China is a flare-up
of the fire that has been burning fiercely since long before the war. This manifestation of
the passionate desire of yellow and brown peoples for independence is no new thing."24
Thus, commentators were faced with two distinct sets of concerns and sympathy. On the
one hand they appreciated that there was a deep-seated urge for change in much of the
world's population. On the other, they still hoped to salvage Europe and its global
mechanisms of stability.
Britain was the one country in Europe that had not had to endure invasion and
occupation, and was thus in a marginally better situation than some of its European
neighbors. With an empire on which the sun never set, Britain had maintained its place as
the richest and most influential power is Europe for much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Yet, at the end of the war, Britain was in a deep economic crisis for three
reasons. First, the war had not only depleted its working population on the battlefront, but
Hitler's blitz had disrupted a good part of British industry. Most of all, the rationing and
readjustments of the war years meant that Britain no longer had an economy that was
capable of competing in peace time. The war had cost Britain far more than it could
possibly afford and by 1945 it was deeply in debt to the United States, not only for capital
" Sumner Welles, "Asia for the Asiatics," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Oct 24, 1945. Commentators regularly referred to decolonizing peoples as the 'black, brown and yellow people' of the world. Barnet Nover, "Course of Empire," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Dec 28, 1946. " Marquis Childs, "Washington Calling," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Nov 2, 1945. Sumner Welles, "San Francisco," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 28, 1945. expenditures during lend-lease, but also for yearly operational expenses to keep its economy going. Without American economic assistance, Britain could not possibly maintain its economy in the immediate post-war world. This was especially the case since
Britain had decided to institute wide-ranging and unprecedented social reforms that gave
Britain its comprehensive welfare state in the aftermath of the war.25 The costs of this new social structure were immense and could only possibly survive as long as America allowed its trade deficit with the U.K. to persist.
Moreover, American commentators came to realize that, for the first time in
Britain's long imperial history, its colonies were no longer self-supporting entities that contributed to the greater glory of Britain. Britain had paid for the war by borrowing heavily from the crown colonies, and huge sums of money were owed to colonies like
India for war expenses.26The combination of costly internal revolt along with a lack of forces to put down such insurrections and the generally dismal economic situation in the colonies meant that, in the wake of the war, the empire had been transformed from a contributor to Britain, into a drain on dwindling British resources. Moreover, by allowing a trade deficit to continue, America commentators realized America was hnneling money thuough Britain to its colonies to support colonial rule.
America's economic interest in the colonies was almost exclusively secondary to its interest in Europe. American commentators saw the rapidly deteriorating situation in
Western Europe and were concerned about its possible impact on the world economy and international trading. Economists within and without the government were concerned that after the military production boom, rapid demobilization would bring unemployment and
25 Mazower, Dark Continent: Ezrrope's Twentieth Century, Chapter 6. alter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 15, 1945. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-l954), Oct 30, 1945. depression in its wake - much the way it had after the First World War. The central concern was with the issue of free trade. Commentators were concerned that floundering
European states would react to their problems by erecting trade barriers to American goods, capital and services, thus crippling American industrial Europe was
America's primary export destination and its economic weakness would inevitably affect the American economy.28Walter Lippmann perceived that a larger problem was on the horizon "because Great Britain [was] no longer strong enough to exercise its political authority without [American] support."29 He was particularly aware of the fact that
America was in a position unlike any it had ever encountered before; where its fiscal decisions could fundamentally change European economies. This new role of global protector of trade was something America had inherited from Great Britain which had been "its promoter, guardian, and regulator" in the nineteenth century.30
t4su,dd CM~I - \V rr& t w th"y $re- 'r*li "3, h. i t M1 Vn - - - '7 Bamet Nover, "Crucial Decision," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jul 9, 1946. "Walter LaFeber, ed., The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Docunzents (New York: Wiley, 197l), 77-8 1. 29 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 10, 1945. 30 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 26, 1945. In the end, Britain was given a large medium term loan and grant to help kick start its economy and manage its debts while it, in turn, had to remove the complex systems of imperial privilege with its Empire and open Empire trade up to foreign competition. This solution guaranteed that neither side, Britain or America, was truly happy with the result. The feeling in Britain was that its sacrifices during the war had been repaid by the Americans in the form of dissolution of empire and the loss of prestige.31 I[n America, many foreign policy idealists saw large quantities of American mone:y going to the colonies via Britain and complained that by supporting Britain, America was supporting an archaic system of colonial governance and was restricting the move towards world trade. 32 In the end, American commentators could not hold off reevaluating America's role in the world indefinitely. One particular area that brought the colonial world on to their radar was the Middle East. Most of North Africa and the Middle East were under the occupation of American and British troops and the area was relatively stable after the German surrender. American commentators realized that the primary Britislh straltegic concern in the Middle East in 1945 was as a corrlidor to the British Empire in the East; "the so-called life-line, which connects the British Isles with India and the Asiatic empire,"33 as Lippmann wrote. In this regard, the British had maintained naval superiority in the Mediterranean for over a century, and after the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Britain had taken over 31 LaFeber, ed., The Orgins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 A H~storiculProblem wrth lnterljretatzons ancl Docunzents, Restructuring the British Empire. 32~alterLippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 20, 1945. 33~alterLippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 29, 1946. Walter Llppmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The WashzrzgtonPost (1877-1954), Nov 15, 1945. Walter Ltppmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The WushrrzgtonPost (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. mandates for many key Middle Eastern states and converted them into de facto colonies.34 Even though the French were the other main Middle Eastern power and had also received a share of mandates after the first war, by 1945 American commentators realized that French power in the Middle East was guaranteed by the ~ritish.'~The Second World War had made it very clear to Britain that naval superiority in the Mediterranean was not a sufficient deterrent to international intervention in the Middle East as long as hostile air powers existed in the area. Joseph Alsop thus deduced that, to maintain its strategic balance in the area Britain needed to obtain rights to strategic air bases throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle ~ast.~~Since Britain was rapidly running out of resources with which to hold on to these regions and depended on America, American commentators had to perforce confront a post-war American role in the Middle East. Along with strategic concerns, American commentators like Sulzberger realized that the other major concern in the Middle East for the Allies was oil. By the early 1940s, exploration and digging had revealed that the Middle East contained much of the world's unexploited petroleum deposits.'' Postwar America was fully self-sufficient when it came to petroleum, and thus the economic importance of Middle Eastern oil was not of paramount concern. Rather, the war had demonstrated the vital importance of oil in 34 Jacob Abadi, Britain's Withdrawal,fron?the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic Imperatives (Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982), Chapter 3, Glen Balfour-Paul, The End ofEmpire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199I), Chapter 1. 35 Douglas Little, An?erican Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 20021, Introduction, David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), Chapter 5, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third WorldIntewentions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 3. 36 Joseph Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Aug 19, 1946. 37 C. L. Sulzberger, "Steady Soviet Pressure Expected in Near East," New York Times (1857-Current,file), Apr 7, 1946. modern mechanized warfare and Britain was beginning to get a major share of its oil from the Middle ~ast.~~Since Britain did not possess its own petroleum, Middle Eastern oil was vitally important to it, and since America wanted Britain to remain economically viable, American commentators realized it had a stake in maintaining the status quo in the region. Moreover, the United States Army and Navy were determined to build up a strategic reserve of petroleum in case war broke out again, and the Middle East was the obvious choice for where to get this oil from.39The question of colonial territories was thus important in this period as Anglo-American companies pumped millions of dollars into the region to start up wells and set up pipelines. Sulzberger stressed America's stake in the Middle East "where $100,000,000 already [had] been invested by oil companies."40 Since pipelines had to traverse several countries and oil concessions needed to be granted to American firms, the presence of friendly governments in these areas was extremely important in the eyes of many commentator^.^' Thus, most American commentators signed on to the argument that "the predominant power in the Middle East is Great ~ritain"~~and that America's interests in the region required Britain's continued presence there. This acceptance of British hegemony in the Mediterranean was an example of how American commentators relied on pre-war 3Y Waiter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. 39C. L. Sulzberger, "Iran Says Soviet Sends New Troops," New York Times (1857-Curventjile), Nov 9, 1945. 40 Ibid. 4 I Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 8, 1946. C. L. Sulzberger, "Steady Soviet Pressure Expected in Near East," New' York Times (18.57-Current file), Apr 7, 1946. 42Walter Lippinann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954)" Jan 29, 1946. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 15, 1945. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. spheres of influence to structure their views on the decolonizing world.43 Even if America had independent concerns in the region, for Walter Lippmann those concerns were to be modulated through Britain's policy - thus avoiding the need for a direct intervention. Ill* Oil Il%IUf>l llIE VlIl>lll F t XIRUI HUITU\ I(L4hF I.i\n u I bl ax b i?rbr il>Oc*rl%ruwl'b -r* i l ( 81 W 7 ^ If Middle Eastern strategic concerns were primarily British and only of secondary concern to American commentators, the question of the Pacific Islands after Japan's defeat was far closer to home. For once, America was in a position where it had complete and sole dominance over an area with no great power interference. While the occupation of Japan at the end of the war was a foregone conclusion, the status of the many small island chains in the Pacific Ocean was murkier. Most of these islands had been granted to Japan as mandates after the First World War and together they had formed the outer ring 43 It is important to point out that not all Americans were happy with Britain's position in the Middle East, even in 1945. From the perspective of American oil companies, British domination of the region meant that they were left in a subservient position to British interests in the area. William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), Chapter 8. of Japan's imperial defenses. When war seemed imminent between the United States and Japan, U.S. navy planners discounted any direct assault on the home islands because of this ring of bases around Asia. American and British positions in South East Asia were given up as lost because American planners believed that they were strategically un- defendable.44The fact that Japan had managed to conquer so much, so quickly and had managed to reach a strategic position where it could make an attack on the American homeland left an indelible scar on American military planners. After the war, Navy advocates pushed Washington to hold on to the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Carolines and other island chains in the Pacific as strategic naval posts for the defense of the United States. The Navy was also keen to hold on to islands like Iwo Jima and Okinawa near the Japanese mainland to maintain strategic striking forces over Japan and much of Eastern ~sia.~' The problem for American commentators at this juncture was not competing claims, (as was mentioned, no other great power had legitimate claims to these islands) but rather rested in the myth that America did not possess colonies and was thus not a colonial power.46 Despite the fact that it did actually possess colonial territories like Puerto Rico and the Philippines, America had always argued that it was an enlightened power and pointed to its grant of Philippine independence in 1946 as an example of its anti-colonialism. Thus, the discursive debate for America in the Pacific in 1945 was how 44 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 19991, R. J. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 1st American ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 45 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 5, 1946. 46 As mentioned before, FDR had in fact pushed Churchill to include references to the right of self- determination in the Atlantic Charter, and both sides had pledged that they would not seek any territorial aggrandizement. The Atlantic Charter in LaFeber, ed., The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents, 32. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 6, 1946. to reconcile its perceived security needs with its claim to anti-colonial principles. American commentators had used the Atlantic Charter to criticize colonial governments for their policies and had pitched America as the only truly anti-colonial power in the post-war world. Lippmann recognized that "it would not be honest to deny that our vital interests are in conflict with the plain words of the Atlantic Charter" and, in the face of this contradiction, argued that the Atlantic Charter was an exercise in generality and that U.S. foreign policy needed to focus on concrete circumstance^.^^ By denying the general applicability of a document like the Atlantic Charter, Lippmann tapped into a discourse that privileged immediate strategic concerns over ideological stances. By making a claim to islands in the Pacific, America was making a firndamental shift away from its traditional preoccupation with the Americas and was making a bid towards expanding its strategic b~undaries.~~This movement marks America's first claim to territories outside the continent since the end of the Spanish-American War. This fact was not lost on commentators who continually referenced America's colonial dominions from that war in their discussion about the Pacific ~slands.~~Yet, even with this new colonial claim, American commentators were not marking a position that was too far from earlier American conceptions of a strategic sphere of security. The strategic expansion of American interests to islands in the Pacific had first begun with its occupation of the Philippines. The claim to Japan's former mandates was thus an extension of existing ideas of security, and not a radical change in America's vision of its role in the world. Even though America was making claims outside it traditional 'sphere 47 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 2, 1946. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 6, 1946. 48 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 2, 1945. Ernest Lindley, "Colonial Demands," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 11, 1945 49 1will examine these issues in more depth in Chapter 3 of influence,' that claim did not jeopardize the status of any of its colonial allies in the region in the way later American interventions would.50 Between 1945 and 1947, most commentators in the United States focused on a policy of "Europe First" where American foreign policy would be structured to bolster those European states still in the Western sphere. This conception of foreign policy had two competing effects on American policy towards decolonization. On the one hand, many argued that the colonial empires should be dissolved because of the drain they were causing on European budgets. Some hoped that by breaking up empires, America would be able to do away with Empire tariff privileges and American business could move into lucrative new market^.^' On the other hand, many commentators argued that America needed to provide as much support as possible to Europe in its quest to hold on to its colonies since the colonies formed a vital and indissoluble part of the European economic structure and rapid decolonization would spell disaster, not only for European economies, but also for European morale, and by extension to any system for post-war stability.52 Moreover, they argued that the world in general was in desperate need of the rich raw materials held in colonial empires and the most efficient and secure way of obtaining them was through the colonial empires. America was faced with a dilemma because "in formulating its policies in the Far East [and elsewhere], the United States [could not] escape the fact that the principle colonial powers [were] also among the principle democracies, whose security and stability [were] important to [its] own security and to 50 Melvin Gurtov, The United States against the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1974), 3. il Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 7, 1946. Ernest Lindley, "Colonial Policy," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 17, 1945 52 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945 Barnet Nover, "Course of Empire," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Dec 28, 1946. the hope of peace in the world." Yet "the clamor for liberty [in the colonies] had taken on the tinge of religious fanaticism [and] many of the dependent peoples [were] fully aware that they are strongly supported by public opinion in Western democracies." 53 Yet, for all the appearance of genuine uncertainty, Ernest Lindley put it succinctly in January 1945 when he said that "only a handful of extremists [in the United States] would advocate that all of the subject peoples of that part of the world [the Far East] be granted complete independence immediately."54Fundamentally, as important as anti-colonialism was for some commentators, at the end of the day, their primary concern was with Europe. Yet, in 1945, America did not support imperial aims uncritically - people like Sumner Welles, Foster Hailey and C.L. Sulzberger were very concerned about the ways in which some imperial dominions like Algeria were administered. They were concerned that French mismanagement would lead to open revolt, and destabilize both North Africa and Europe. Lippmann expressed a suspicion of early European attempts to paint anti- colonialism as pro-communism when he stated that "we must be very careful not to identify that antiquated regime [colonialism] with our own, or be beguiled by the propaganda of those who describe anything that is anti-soviet as pro-democratic."55 American commentators thus walked a very careful line in 1945 and 1946: trying to support European reconstruction while also trying to maintain some sort of neutrality in 53 Ernest Lindley, "Atlantic Charter," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Dec 7, 1945 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 15, 1945. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 7, 1946. Surnner Welles, "San Francisco," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 28, 1945. Barnet Nover, "Colonial Problem," The Washiizgton Post (1877-1954), Oct 27, 1945. 54 Ernest Lindley, "Colonial Policy," The Washington Post (1877-1954)' Jan 17, 1945 55 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 28, 1946. C. L. Sulzberger, "Indo-China Revolt Fateful to France," New York Times (1857-CurrentJile), Dec 25, 1946. larger world affairs. Fundamentally, American commentators were trying to pin down which form of post-war world would be more beneficial for the United States - one of colonial powers, or one of independent states. Immediately after the war, America did not see itself as a player in the contest taking place between the U.S.S.R. and Britain, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Rather, by reflecting certain nostalgias for pre-war power politics, American discourse kept itself aloof from directly intervening in European affairs and respected the idea of British, French and Soviet spheres of influence. Lippmann was concerned that grandiose statements in support of self-determination by America would not only hurt the cause of 'orderly' decolonization, but would in fact lead to irreparable harm being done to America's western allies.56 For him, "the crux of the American difficulty is that in all the regions of the world where there is dangerous international disorder.. .the British interest is older, more direct, more deeply vested, than is the ~merican."~~Thus he imagined the United States intervening in colonial policy through the relevant imperial power present and not directly. Even Surnner Welles pointed to "the tendency.. .in the United States to regard the bilateral negotiations which spasmodically take place between one of the imperial governments and the representatives of the peoples who refuse to remain "subject races" as the exclusive affair of those participating in them." He too echoed Lippmann's argument that "the real problem is not how toughly we are prepared to talk against the Russians but what we are able to do for the Chinese, the British, and the '"alter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," l"he Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 25, 1945. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1 9.541, Apr 19, 1945. Barnet Nover, "Unfamiliar Role," The Washington Post (1877-19.541, Feb 7, 1946. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. 57 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 30, 1945. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washirzgton Post (1877-19.541, Nov 10, 1945. Western Europeans, whose internal weakness had created the problems."58 This demonstrated that, even in 1946, commentators were coming to the conclusion that instability in the decolonizing world was both a hction of nationalist sentiments in the colonies and a general inability amongst European states to exert the kind of control they had before the war. Yet the solution to this was seen as some form of financial support for Western Europe, while maintaining links to decolonization movements and formulating an anti-colonial line. It was not till late 1946 that America changed its stance from that of an arbiter, to a very clear participant, and laid down an immediate stake in the Middle East. Before that, the general consensus amongst commentators was that though something needed to be done to maintain order and stability in the Middle East, the British and French had both a longer history of interest in an area and a legal right to intervene.59Barnet Nover, a foreign policy hawk, was extremely forthright and stated that "the destruction or sudden dissolution of the [British] empire would be a heavy blow to the security of the United States, to democracy, and to the hope of obtaining an orderly world."60 Sulzberger, in an article titled 'Europe Distrusts Us, But Wants Our Help,' signaled perhaps the first strains of a change in policy in 1946. He remarked that "in Denmark one can hear not too infrequently that the United States is inheriting the methods and unpopularity of nineteenth-century ~ritain"~'This was precisely the role 58 Sumner Welles, "Deterioration in East," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 22, 1946. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 26, 1946. 59 Lippmann was a particularly strong advocate of this approach. Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 20, 1945. 60~arnetNover, "Colonial Problem," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Oct 27, 1945. Ernest Lindley, "Atlantic Charter," The Washington Post (1877-1954)' Dec 7, 1945 6 l C. L. Sulzberger, "Europe Distrusts Us, But Wants Our Help," New York Times (1857-CurrentPle), Jan 23, 1946. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 13, 1946. American commentators did not want to see themselves in, in the immediate aftermath of the war. Yet this feeling in Denmark was soon to be felt all over Europe, and eventually all over the decolonizing world. The days when American commentators could maintain credible ambiguity towards direct international intervention were to soon come to an end. Chapter 2 Crises and Conjidence onJanuary the I", 1947, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in their syndicated column "Matter of Fact," declared that 1947 would be "a year of decision".' For Sumner Welles "the American people [had] entered the Valley of Decision" in 1947 that, if properly used, could help the United States "save Western ci~ilization."~In comparison to the relative lull in foreign policy 'crises' in the period immediately after the Second World War, the period between 1946 and 1948 saw some of the most important upheavals in the structure and understanding of world power. If the last chapter examined the period from 1945 to mid 1946 as a period in which American commentators were struggling to come to terms with the changing structures of world power, and were trying to conceive of America's role in those new structures; this chapter will lay out how America's conception of itself, the rising power and prestige of the Soviet Union, the quickening pace of imperial degeneration and decolonization, and a whole range of international crises all came together to shape the public discourse on decolonization. For American commentators, this period necessitated a new approach to foreign policy. In 1946 Marquis Childs described the Pax Britannica that Britain had maintained as a brutal regime that, in the end, did what needed to be done - keep order. This was one of the contradictions and tensions in America's stance ' Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Wash~ngtonPost (1877-1954), Jan 1, 1947 Sumner Welles, "Valley of Decision," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 12, 1947. towards Europe and the decolonizing world - colonization was bad but disorder was worse. For Childs, "the present [American] government [was] undertaking a transition to new forms of cooperation with peoples formerly dependent."3 This chapter will explore how these new forms of 'cooperation7 between America and Western Europe on the one hand, and America and decolonizing peoples on the other, were conceptualized by American commentators between 1946 and 1949. This period is absolutely essential to understand the post-war world because it was in this short period of time that American commentators fundamentally changed America's discursive relationship with the rest of the world. The Iranian Crisis The Iranian crisis was the first instance after the Second World War in which America, colonial powers and the Soviet Union were all involved, and in contention for, a part of the non-European world. Iran was thus the first 'crisis' of the post-war colonial world and necessitated an American stance on colonial policy. Iran was not formally a colony of any one country and thus labeling it as part of the 'decolonizing world' can seem misleading. Yet despite the fact that it was notionally a soveresgn state, the Shah of Iran was dependent on the British for support, and Iran had been a British de facto protectorate after the end of the Ottoman Empire. It was one of the largest countries in the Middle East, had an operation oil industry, and, most importantly, was a land bridge between the Soviet Union and Britain's colonial lifelines in the Persian ~ulf.~Along with Turkey, Iran stood between the Soviet Union and free access to the southern oceans and 3 Marquis Childs, "Washington Calling," The Washingtorz Post (1877-1954), Jul 1, 1946. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns ofInj7elence (New York:Praeger, 1982). Chapter 1. the ability to satellite military power.' Iran became the first instance where Britain and the Soviet Union came into conflict over areas outside of Europe. The Soviet Union Iiad taken over security for the north of the country during the war and a strong secessionist movement had developed in the areas under its control that threatened the territorial integrity of the Iranian state. The end of the war meant that both Britain and the USSR were expected to withdraw their troops from Iran since it was supposedly a sovereign state, but the active or tacit support given to secessionist forces based around the city of Tabriz by Soviet forces became a bone of contention between Britain and the USSR, especially when the left-leaning Tudeh party made gains throughout the country. In terms of the American discourse on decolonization, the Iranian crisis was notable because it graphically demonstrated the two poles of American opinion on decolonization. Both sides of the dispute, Britain and the USSR, used the rhetoric of imperialism to discredit the other - the Soviet Union accused the British of propping up a puppet regime in the face of popular dissatisfaction, and the British accused the Soviet Union of sponsoring a communist revolution and arming troops with the aim of subverting Iran's independence. American co~nmentators who had tried to style America's role as being that of a mediator between the two parties, were faced with two sides that made extremely conipelling arguments. Britain, by stressing Russia's communist ambitions in Iran, tried to style itself as a protector of global peace and a bulwark against authoritarianism. By stressing the neo-colonial nature of the Iranian state, the Soviet Union tried to argue that it was the one trying to bring global stability by trying to help the victim of colonial aggression and oppression. Moreover. while most Barnet Nover, hawkish as usual, warned of Moscow's intentions in the south as early at December 1945, Bamet Nover, "What Russia Wants," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Dec 22, 1945. commentators trusted the Soviet Union less than Britain, most had very little sympathy for Britain's imperial ambitions and were skeptical of Britain's claims about the USSR. Since the Iranian crisis was a fixture in international policy circles from the very beginning of 1946 till the end of 1948, it gives us a very good example of a situation where America's response to the decolonizing world evolved over time. America's role in the first year of the crisis can be seen in much the same way as its response to other colonial possessions in the year since the end of the war. By and large, commentators like Lippmann believed that Iran was a problem that had plagued Anglo-Russian relations for generations, and that it was an issue that Britain should handle. Walter Lippmann believed that "we shall . . . misunderstand this enormous problem if we think of this contest as an exclusive choice between communism and democratic ~a~italism."~ America's role in Iran was initially seen as that of a mediator, albeit a mediator who had stronger sympathies with one side over the other. As the following cartoon demonstrates, American power was seen mostly in terms of America looking on, or intervening to keep the Soviet Union in check; not in terms of independent American interest in the region. 6 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 28, 1946. At the same time, more hawkish and more anti-communist commentators like Joseph and Stewart Alsop identified the Tudeh as Iran's communist party and were convinced that it was a Soviet front. This was the first reference to a communist 'fifth column' at work in a decolonizing state. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Apr 17, 1946. The Question of Italy's colonies7 Along with Iran, Italy's North African colonies brought Anglo-Soviet conflicts to America's attention in the period between 1946 and 1948, and contributed to America's reevaluation of its position in the world. In the wake of the Second World War, Axis powers had been stripped of their colonial possessions, and these had been invaded during the war and subsequently held by a combined force of American and British troops. Italy had made a few strategic colonial gains in the lead up to the war and, by the time war erupted, it controlled Ethiopia and a large swath of North Africa including Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (constituent parts of modern Libya). By 1947 a decision had to be taken on these colonies since demobilization in both Britain and the United States meant that neither could afford to maintain their forces in this area. American commentators realized that nationalist sentiments in both Libya and Ethiopia precluded any orderly transition back to European rule.8 The only precedent for the disposal of these colonies was the disposal of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War, and the grant of mandates to the various victorious powers. In the wake of the Second World War, this was precisely the model proposed for the Italian colonies by the allies. The main contenders for the right to the Italian colonies were Britain, France, Italy, and the Soviet ~nion.~Significantly, America was not a direct player in this C. L. Sulzberger was the New York Times ' foreign correspondent in the Middle East as questions of Italy's colonial possessions came up. His column in the NYT in 1946 ran almost daily reports on the progress of negotiations concerning Libya. Much of the discourse about this particular crisis came out of Sulzberger's reports on the region and I have confined myself to only citing direct quotations from his column. 8 C. L. Sulzberger, "Big Four Prepare to Face Problems of Italian Africa," New York Tinzes (1857-Current file), Apr 29, 1946. Strangely one of the only supporters of Italy's bid to its former colonies was Surnner Welles, a man who was generally extremely liberal and pro-decolonization. negotiation and was not interested in taking over mandates in North Africa. This matched America's policy on similar questions of colonial policy. According to Lippmann in 1946, "it [was] precisely because [the] United States [was] neither a totalitarian state nor a colonial power that it [could] hope to retain an influence in keeping the Asiatic peoples in good relations with the western wor~d."'~American commentators saw America as a mediator between decolonizing people and their colonizers in 1946, not as a guarantor of colonial privilege. In trying to maintain their distance from "colonial powers" (i.e. Britain) and "totalitarian states" (i.e. the Soviet Union), Lippmann tried to frame America as a 'third option' - a state that would be a perfect mediator in the dispute, and would hence not be implicated on either side of it. Britain's interest in North Africa was manifold. On the one hand Britain had realized that its strategic lifeline in the Mediterranean necessitated air bases throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Given the tensions brewing in Iran, Turkey, Greece and Palestine, British policy makers sought to reorient British strategic policy and establish bases in North and East Africa. In pursuit of this objective, Britain pointed to its handling of colonial possessions in Egypt and elsewhere as proof that it was a benevolent power which would do everything in its power for the people under its mandate." American commentators pointed out that another argument often brought to the table was that, during the liberation of North Africa from Axis control, Britain had promised the Senussi Tribe of Cyrenaica that it would never allow the Senussis to come under Italian control ever again. If this second argument was treated wit11 some skepticism by Sumner Welles, "Italian Colonies," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Sep 14, 1948. 10 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 7, 1946. 11 Jacob Abadi, Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic ltnperatives (Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982), Chapter 4. American comme~~tators,the first was still of vital importance if Britain was to ever resume her role as the guarantor of international stability. In 1947 the Soviet Union made a bid to become the mandating power over Libya, even though it had no traditional links to the area. This placed it in direct conflict with Britain since neither the Italian or French claims were taken seriously by the only 'neutral' power in the dispute - ~merica.'~Like Iran, the issue of North Africa in the American conscience was largely of a secondary nature to begin with. American interests in the region were primarily centered on strategic bases and access to strategic raw materials. Like Iran, North Africa was primarily seen as a colonial problem with overtones of Anglo-Soviet rivalry. C. L. Sulzberger quoted Britain's Foreign Secretary saying that the Soviet Union meant to cut the throat of the British Empire.13 For Walter Lippmann, "the present purpose of the Soviet Union is manifest: it is to break into the Mediterranean and dominate the eastern half of it. This would disrupt the British Empire by separating Great Britain from the Middle East, from Africa, and from Southern ~sia."'~This posed American commentators with a huge problem. The question of Italy's colonies placed the two European powers, Britain and the USSR, on diametrically opposite sides of the argument with very little space for compromise. Attitudes regarding Britain's claim were mixed in the United States with many commentators agreeing that Britain was the most responsible of the colonial powers, yet l2 Italian rule over its colonies had been unusually cruel even within the framework of colonialism and had brought widespread criticism in the United States with it. In the early days of the debate there were few commentators in the US who would openly back Italy's claim to its former colonies, especially after its aggression and defeat in the war. Most American commentators looked on French claims in the region as underhanded attempts to undercut Britain's position in North Africa. Moreover most American commentators thought French rule in its North African colonies was extremely brutal and counter- productive to global stability. l3 C. L. Sulzberger, "Big Four Prepare to Face Problems of Italian Africa," New York Times (1857-Current .file), Apr 29, 1946. l4 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 16, 1946. many commentators expressing a strong aversion towards any rehvn to colonial privilege. Lippmann argued vehemently in 1946 that "a united front in the Empire [of America and Britain] would not only be unattractive to most Americans but would be regarded by many thoughtful Americans as an unwise and ineffective policy."15 Thus American commentators felt a strong aversion to tying America's lot with Britain against the Soviet Union as late at mid-1946. The Never Ending Conflict: Israel and palestine16 One of the most important conflicts of the period (and today) went a long way towards undennining American confidence in British colonial policy. Arab-Israeli conflicts were well underway during the course of the Second World War and came to FDR's attention more than once during that period. Yet the conflict was seen as purely secondary to the larger European war during FDR's Presidency, and the question of the 15 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 7, 1946. '' Given the highly charged political climate in the Middle East today, to make any argument about the Israel-Palestine conflict is fraught with risks. To tease out decolonization discourse on the Arab-Israel crisis is not an easy task because it is possible to see the Israeli state as the first post-colonial colonial state in the Middle East; a state that was created as a literal colony through justification that drew heavily on the prevailing discourse of decolonization. The minority politics and political machinations of the various actors in this mess make any discussion fraught at best. The Jewish-Palestinian issue was one of the first examples of a 'paired-minority' conflict; a type of conflict that came to define many of the conflicts still is progress throughout the decolonizing world. Speculatively, it is possible to see a strong link between the colonial nature of a post-colonial state and the presence of paired minority conflicts like those in Kashmir, Darfur, Sri Lanka, East Timor etc. The story of Jewish immigration to the British mandate of Palestine is a long one that traces back to well before the Second World War and continues to shape Middle Eastern politics to this day. For the purposes of this discussion I will not dwell on the intricacies of the issue; a matter already dealt with in a veritable universe of works. Rather my concern will focus on how the Israel- Palestine conflict developed d~iringthe period 1945-1949 in the context of its impact on discourse on decolonization amongst American commentators; to do more than this would be to sidetrack the discussion and rehash much of what has already been analyzed to death. Most of my understanding and analysis of the Palestinian issue in this period comes from works by William Roger Louis and Douglas Little. William Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey, eds., The End of the Palestine Mandate, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986). Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). status of a Jewish state in Palestine was left hanging. Moreover, Palestine was firmly within the British sphere of influence and had been that way since the end of the First World War. Britain froze Jewish migration to the holy land in 1939 in response to rising Arab anger in the region. Clifton Daniel postulated that "because Britain's commercial and military position in the Middle East depends on political stability; Britain's paramount interest in Palestine is the restoration of peace."'7 Britain maintained its moratorium on Jewish immigration till the end of the war, by which point Truman had come to power and seemed to support the Israeli cause. In the wake of escalating violence in the mandate, American confidence in the British ability to control the situation on the ground was eroded. America had independent economic interests in the Middle East in the form of potential oil concessions and those might well have contributed to its precipitous drop in confidence in Britain. By 1947, Britain was becoming more and more annoyed at what it saw as American intervention in a region of the world it had no concern in. America's newfound confidence and assertiveness on the issue undermined British prestige in the region. In response to increasingly open statements of support to Israel from the White House, the British Foreign Secretary took the issue of Israel and Palestine to the UN to work out a solution to the conflict. At stake for both America and Britain were the competing claims of Israeli and Arab leaders in the region. Britain had tried to maintain a tight leash on the newly forniing state in its mandate because it was concerned that any sort of formal recognition of a division in the state would cause it irreparable harm with its Arab partners in the region. Lippmann hoped that "far from dividing Britain and America, the i 7 Clifton Daniel, "British Mid-East Policy Rests on Need For Bases," The Ne1.t' York Times (1 857-current file), Nov 28, 1948. Palestinian problem is an opportunity, which can be seized and used, to unite them on the strong foundation of their vital interest^."'^ But, by the time Britain took the matter to the UN, such a hope seemed unfounded; especially since commentators like Daniel and Sulzberger saw this appeal to the UN as a way for Britain to get back at the United States for its intervention in Britain's internal concerns. In the meantime, Truman administration officials were coming to the conclusion that it was British mismanagement of its mandate, and not Jewish immigration that had led to the escalating violence in the region. Truman himself was a very strong supporter of the Zionist movement and gave the emerging Israeli state its most vocal support. Truman's motives for this have been variously described as stemming from a need to gain the American Jewish vote in preparation for the hotly contested 1948 election, to straight-forward realpolitik concerns that stressed the suitability of the Jewish state as a non-communist, democratic and European state in the Middle East that could hold back the perceived communist tide in the region.19 Prior to Britain's referral of Israel to the UN, most commentators like Lippmann pointed to the Israel-Palestine crisis as yet another example of Britain's inability to hold on to its colonial possessions and manage the foreign policy crises arising from there. Lippmann believed that critics of British policy regarded "a policy based on the Arab League as a fatal misconception, destined to lead not to the safeguarding, but the destruction of British and American vital interest^."^' That being said, many commentators were also critical of Truman's support for Israel because they echoed '*Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jun 10, 1948. 19 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 14, 1949. Truman's motives were likely a combination of all these factors. 20 Walter Lippmann, "Middle Eastern Policy," The Los Angeles Times (1886-currentJile), June 4, 1948. Britain's concern that Truman was choosing the side of the Zionists aver that of America's closest ally.2' Sulzberger pointed out that "prior to the birth of Israel, United States policy had been crystallizing slowly into one of promoting friendly relationships with the Moslem states of the region. This had been done in order to protect and expand the United States petroleum development under private aegis and to prepare the way for obtaining air base rights and other strategic advantages."22 Thus, Israel-Palestine, like every other conflict in the early post-war period, demonstrated the ambiguity with which American commentators viewed colonial policy. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the National Security Statez3 While American commentators were trying to chart a course of policy that would leave America un-entangled in Anglo-Soviet rivalries, President Truman declared the Truman Doctrine for the provision of financial aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey on March 12th, 1947. The right wing government in Greece was fighting a civil war against a large number of dissidents at the time, some of whom were communist. Stalin and the Soviet Union had decided not to provide any form of support to the dissidents for fear that such support would be seen as an act of provocation by the allies (and especially by ~rnerica).~~Up to this point Greece had been part of a British sphere of influence, and the Greek government had received large quantities of British aid and - " Walter Lippmann, "Diplomacy in Palestine," The Los Angeles Times (1886-currentple), Apr 28, 1948. 22 C. L. Sulzberger, "Israel's Birth May Cause U.S. To Shift Middle East Policy," New York Times (1857- Current file), Jul 27, 1948. '3 This section is largely taken from Burra, Ananda V. "The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Creation of the CIA: Violence, Economics and the Apotheosis of the National Security State from 1946 to 1948"; 2006 [paper submitted to Prof. Arafaat Valiani for Sociology 327: Violence, Militancy and Collective Recovery, Williams College, Williamstown MA] " United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Answers Submitted by the Department of State to Questions Relating to S. 938, A Bill Providingjor Assistunce to Greece and Turkey, goth Congress, 1'' Session, 1947, Committee Print. several thousand British troops were stationed there. By late 1946, the British had come to the conclusion that they were no longer in a position to support either the Greek or the Turkish government (the Turks had their own dissident issues) either through financial means or through military intervention, and that they no longer had the resources to carry out this form of police work in the ~editerranean.~~The British Ambassador to the US duly passed on this information to the State ~e~artment.~~ Britain's admission of its inability to control events in the Mediterranean Ji~ndamentally changed the basis for world-wide stability. Until that moment British officials had jealously guarded their prerogative in colonial matters and had made it very clear that, while they expected America to support Britain, it would be Britain which would direct policy. There was a real fear in American policy-making circles that, in the words of the CIA in 1948, "while measures conducive to British recovery [would] contribute to eventual stabilization of the world situation, British oversees commitments [were] so extensive and important that there [was] a danger that their precipitate liquidation [would] create a power vacuum prejudicial to [the] security interests of the United Truman requested that Congress grant $400m in open aid that could go to Greece and Turkey to help them maintain their national sovereignty and remain in the Western ~~here.~"his turn of events was profoundly significant - primarily because Britain formally abdicated its role as a prime mover in global stability, but also because '' Bamet Nover, "Time Lag," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 4, 1947. 2b Charles Mee, The Marshall Plan: The Luurzching of the Pax Americana (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 78. " Central Intelligence Agency, Report qf the World Situation as it Related to the Security qf the United States, September 12, 1947. Obtained through Declass~fiedDoczrments Refirence Systern, Gale Group. http:i:galenet.ralegroup.colw 28 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Answers Submitted by the Department ofstate to Questions Relating to S. 938, A Bill Providing for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 8othCongress, 1'' Session, 1947, Committee Print. both Britain and Greece expected the United States to intervene as an active participant against communism (and, hence against the Soviet This is not to suggest that Britain's admission was unexpected for American commentators - Barnet Nover's column commenting on the news was titled "Time Lag," suggesting that the turn of events had been expected in some circles. That being said, a prediction about such a turn of events was one thing, the dramatic course of events that led to the Truman Doctrine was another. Reproduced wllh permission of the copyright owner Further reproducllon prohibited wllhoul permission For Walter Lippmann in March 1947, "the neutralization of Britain as a world power has, therefore, altered radically - much more radically than we can as yet appreciate, more radically than small measures on our part can possibly offset - the situation in the world to which our post-war diplomacy has been adapted."30 The Truman Doctrine stated that the United States undertook to assist any country, anywhere in the world, that was trying to guarantee a free society for its people and fight outside 29 United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the Foreign Assistance Act qf1948, 8oth Congress, 2ndSession, 1948, House Report 1585. 30 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 8, 1947. intervention in its internal affairs.31 However, the doctrine implicitly assumed that only communist states suppressed internal dissent and repressed a majority of their people. The European colonial empires were not covered under the doctrine. The aim of this particular grant of aid was "to assist the Greek [and Turkish] people, so that they [could] retain the opportunity to choose the form and composition of their government in accordance with the wish of the majority."32 If the Truman Doctrine can be seen as a declaration of post-World War Two and pre-Cold War strategic principles, the Marshall plan was its apotheosis. The brainchild of Secretary of State George Marshall, the Marshall Plan was a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War and was delivered a few months after the Tl-uman Doctrine. While not explicitly mentioned, the underlying aim of the Marshall Plan was to rebuild Europe as an economic force in the hope of making it a bulwark against the Soviet Union. "The US military aid program and, more importantly, the Atlantic Pact" were seen as tools "to encourage resistance to Soviet aggression7'.3ht its heart, the Marshall plan was based on the assumption that the fundamental cause of communism was internal discord and economic recession.34 The Soviet Union, as well as commentators and citizens across Europe and the United States, understood the role Marshall Plan moneys were to play in the defense against cornm~nism.~~The fear 3 1 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Answet,s Submitted by the Department ofstate to Questions Relating to S. 938, A Bill Providing,for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 801h Congress, lst Session, 1947, Committee Print, 7. 32 Ibid, 13. 3" Central Intelligence Agency, EJjTeects ofa U.S. Foreign Military Aid Program, 1949. Obtained through DeclassiJied Documents ReJl?retzce Systern, Gale Group. http:ligalenet.~ale~rou~.com/ '"ichard J. Bamet, Intewentiot~and Revolzrtion: The United States in the Third ClTorld, Rev. and updated ed. (New York: New American Library, 1980), 32,33. 35 The Following cartoon demonstrates this fact graphically. Editorial cartoons in practically every American newspaper of the period had similarly graphic representations of America's intentions for the ,'vfarshall Plan. amongst many American policy makers was that post-war Europe would continue down the steep slope of economic recession and that this recession would lead to widespread protests and a breakdown of order that would open the door to a communist takeover.36 The radicalization of the left in Europe at this time contributed to these fears. If Britain abdicated its role as a primary counterweight to the Soviet Union, American commentators saw the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as declarations of America's intention to pick up that baton. Along with the major changes taking place in America's foreign policy between 1946 and 1948, domestic security policy was also undergoing some fundamental changes.37On July 26th 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act on the advice of President Truman, which led to a wide-ranging reorganization of the American military e~tablishment.~~The act led to the dissolution of the Department of War and Department Galia Press-Barnathan, Organizing the World: The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2003), 172. 37 Leffler's A Preponderance of Power contains a very good and detailed analysis of the implications of the National Security revolution in the 1940s. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). 3X John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War 11, 1st ed. (New York: W. Morrow, 1986), Chapter 1. of the Navy and created the National Military Establishment (soon to be known as the Department of Defense) in their stead. 39 The National Security Act of 1947 also created the National Security Council to advise the President and Secretary of Defense on issues of national security, and institutionalized the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the larger military estab~ishment.~'By placing the Departments of War and the Navy under the aegis of the Department of Defense, the Truman administration gave a very clear message about what it saw the military's role to be in the post-war world. Much like the rhetoric around the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the reorganization of the military under the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council emphasized the primacy of American defense and security in any and all military decision^.^' By focusing on issues of national defense, the Department of Defense framed all conflicts in terms of threats to the integrity of the United States and the American way of life. All foreign policy decisions were framed within the umbrella of actions to preserve national security and were justified through that.42 39 United States House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearing on the National Security Act of 1947, 8othCongress, 1" Session, June 27, 1947, 73. 40 United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Report Submitted by Mr. Thornas of Utah on the Department of Common Defense (To Accompany S. 2044), 79thCongress, 2ndSession, 1946, S. Report 1328. 4' %id. 42 It was possible for policy makers to engineer this discursive move because of the latent and long-standing fear of communism in America; a fear that stemmed from a vision of the Soviet Union as an alternate modernity to American capitalism. Michael Hunt does a very good job of tracing back the roots of American communist fears. The Soviet Union presented a vision of a world that was at complete odds with the 'American way of life,' a discursive idea that had deep roots in American public life. With the collapse of fascism in the Second World War and a growing realization of the Soviet Union's role in the post-war world, any association between 'national security' and 'anti-communism' was easily made. Moreover, renaming the Department of War, the Department of Defense upped the stakes associated with America's intervention in the world. America's Department of War was no longer just intervening abroad to help its allies or keep international peace, it was intervening to defend itself and its way of life. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology und U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), Chapter 4. United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Report Submitted by Mr. Thomas of Utah on the Department of Common Defense (To Accompany S. 2044, 79thCongress, 2"d Session, 1946, S. Report 1328. In a series of wide ranging legislative acts, President Harry Truman's government fundamentally changed the rhetorical stance America took towards the rest of the world, and laid the foundations for what was to become the Cold War world. Specifically, the implementation off the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine signaled America's 'arrival' on the world stage, and marked a self-conscious acceptance by American officials of the role of a hegemonic power. "The United States [was] compelled to act because the collapse of Greece, Turkey, and Iran would precipitate unmanageable turmoil and disorder, conflict and violence in Europe and in ~sia."~~A first taste of a domino-theory view of the world was emerging as early as March 1947 when C. L. Sulzberger stated that "the United States' interest in Greece is not mere sentiment. Greece controls eastern Mediterranean strategy. Should Greece turn Communist, Turkey would be politically outflanked and could no longer resist a pressure that already is onerous. Without Turkey, Iran would go under."44 If the pre-Truman Doctrine world had been one of ambiguity, the post-Truman Doctrine world had no space for uncertain positions. For American commentators, America had taken a conscious decision to abandon its post-war attempt at being a neutral mediator. Within a relatively short period of time and a single diplomatic transmission from Britain to the United States, America's entire political and discursive system for dealing with the post-war world was undermined, and American commentators had to reinterpret and reframe their positions to justify and deal with international intervention. U.S. policy-makers considered Soviet policy to center around waging "political, economic, and psychological warfare against the United States 41 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washzngton Post (1877-19.541, Mar 11, 1947. [emnphasrs added] " C. L. Sulzberger, "Urgency of Greek Question Finally Impressed on U.S.," New York Tinws (1857- Czruvent file), Mar 5, 1947. and its allies, with a view to undermining their potential strength and increasing the relative strength of the USSR: in particular, to prevent or retard the recovery and coalition of Western Europe and the stabilization of the situation in the Near East and Far ~ast."~~Walter Lippmann lamented that America's problem in the world was not that it was not coming to some agreement with the Soviets, but rather that "there [was] no effective diplomatic contact between Moscow and ~ashington."~~The almost apocalyptic tone of commentary at this moment attests to how hidamentally this had changed the geo-political world for many commentators. The strategy of intervention laid out in the Marshall Plan was based on the notion that the United States could best intervene in the world throzigh European powers, and that ultimate security would be guaranteed by restructuring Europe: and re-instating the 'Spheres of Influence' that had marked foreign policy in the pre-war era. The Truman Doctrine, 011 the other hand, was conceived of in the shadow of Churchill's famous 'Iron 45 Central Intelligence Agency, Report oj'the World Situation as it Related to the Sectrrity of the United States, September 12, 1948. Obtained through Declassified Documents Reference System, Gale Group. littp:~iralenet.galearouv.cotn/ 46 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 14, 1946. Curtain' speech, and posited a system of intervention that aimed to intervene directly wherever a communist threat appeared, regardless of what colonial powers felt, and regardless of what sphere of influence was in question. Moreover, the means through which the Truman Doctrine understood intervention was targeted military and economic aid, as opposed to a more nebulous system of economic credits under the Marshall If it had become clear that America was now an active participant in the battle against communism and had embraced intervention, there was still a debate as to how that intervention was to be carried out - the Truman model or the Marshall model? The debate between proponents of each of these models in the public sphere was best articulated in the debate between Walter Lippmann and George Kennan. George Kennan's 'Mr. X' article in Foreign Ajfairs laid out the basis of the idea of containment in American foreign policy - a policy that called for 'containing' the Soviet Union and its influence within its borders.48 Kennan's argument was variously misunderstood and misrepresented by commentators, including Lippmann, but the public perception of containment came to fall very much along the lines of the Truman Doctrine - i.e. America could not allow the Soviet Union to take one step further and had a moral duty to hold the line. Lippmann wrote a series of articles titled "Cold War" which were explicitly in response to Kennan's article.49He argued that, "as a result [of the Truman Doctrine] we are now engaged in a world-wide diplomatic struggle of the utmost gravity. 47 Mee, The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana, Chapter 7. 48 Walter LaFeber, America in the Cold War: Twenp Years ofRevolutions andResponse, 1947-1967 (New York: Wiley, 1969), 35-49. " This series of articles was subsequently compiled in a book titled Cold War and Lippmann was responsible for making the term 'Cold War' widely accepted. He was also one of the main reasons for the public's skewed perception of Kennan's argument We must realize that it cannot be won and that it may lead to a catastrophic war unless the diplomatic campaign is planned on a correct appraisal of wliat it is essential to accomplish and of the power and influence we can muster in order to accomplish it."" Lippmann argued that America's plan to intervene indiscriminately in the world would give it an unlimited set of responsibilities that would undermine its effectiveness. He stressed that America needed to intervene when and where absolutely necessary but should otherwise rely on 'spheres of influence' and manage its foreign policy through the European powers.5' "We need to go beyond the so-called Truman doctrine, which challenges the Soviet Union generally without ever naming it or saying what we want."52 "Mr. Truman has for the first time in American history been making commitments which place upon the United States an ultimate responsibility for security of the whole region [the Middle East], and of the British position in that region. How immediate responsibility, which is British, and ultimate responsibility, which is also American, are to be shared and harmonized, no statesman on either side of the Atlantic yet knows."53 Lippmann summed it up when he stated that "intervention in the Middle East is one of the means to an end. It is a strategic operation to check and reduce Soviet military expansion. Its complement is a comprehensive political and economic operation to release Europe so that it may unite, and to help finance Europe so that it may recover," Lippmann wrote. 54 > 0 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Sep 7, 1946. 31 Walter Llppmann, "Today and Tomorrow: The Costs of Containment," The Washington Post (1877- 1954), Feb 10, 1948. 52 Walter Llppmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 25, 1947 5 i Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washzngton Post (1877-1954), Oct 8, 1946. 54 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Wash~ngtonPost (1 877-1954), Apr 1, 1947 The debate surrounding the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was not cut- and-dried in any sense. Lippmann and Kennan were in no way the only voices in this debate. C. L. Sulzberger published a comprehensive review of Lippmann's book in the New York Times in which he lashed out at Lippmann for providing an "incomplete analysis" of Kennan's argument, and for completely misunderstanding it.'' Barnet Nover, on the other hand, was very much in agreement with Lippmann and was exceedingly uneasy about the 'unlimited commitments' America was taking upon itself.56 This goes to show that, at least early on, there was no clear consensus amongst commentators about America's role in the world. The debates about America's position as a superpower were very much open in 1947, and in contrast to what they would become by the end of the 1940s. What is clear however is that every foreign policy commentator was cognizant of the fact that a fundamental change in world power politics was in the offing, and that America would have a pivotal role to play in any new world order. Thus, 194711948 was the period when it became abundantly clear to American policy-makers and commentators that Europe was not going to be able to rebuild to any comparable pre-war level, and that even Britain would run out of its credits by the end of the 1940s. Thus Europe would not be able to act as the prime mover in international politics. A large part of this shift came about because of the actions of the colonial powers in their dealings with the decolonizing world. The most striking example of this was Britain's admission that it could no longer manage its foreign policy concerns in the Mediterranean and needed the United States to step in to take care of the Greek issue. In 55 C. L. Sulzberger, "Mr. Lippmann Considers Cold Warfare - and its Cure," New Yovk Tiines (1857- Curi,ent$le), Nov 30, 1947. 56 Bamet Nover, "It's Up To Us," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 13, 1947. Barnet Nover, "Greece And Turkey," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 15, 1947. 1947 Walter Lippmann felt that "the collapse of the British attempt at postwar reconstruction is not inconceivable. It is even probable."57 This revelation marked the last moment when the United States was willing to rely solely on colonial powers to 'manage' its international security concerns. For states that did not make such a declaration (like France and the Netherlands), American opinion of their colonial policies was already at a low ebb with the Dutch bombing Indonesia to suppress Sukarno, and France's playing power games in North Africa and ~ndo-china.~~Moreover, American policy-makers and commentators were increasingly annoyed with Anglo-French bickering in Lebanon and Syria, and neither Clement Attlee of Britain nor General de Gaulle of France was discreet in their criticisms and reservations about American policy after 1947.59 oreo over, the Soviet Union was not inactive during this period and Walter Lippmann, as early as March 1946, warned that "there is every indication ...that the Soviet Union is mounting a diplomatic offensive for this spring which has as its objective to take the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Iraq . . . out of the British sphere of influence and to absorb [them] into the Soviet sphere."60 57 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow,'' The Washington Post (1877-19541, Feb 11, 1947. 5 8 C. L. Sulzberger, "Indo-China Revolt Fateful to France," New 170rk Times (1857-C'urrent,file),Dec 25, 1946. Barnet Nover was especially hawkish about Sukarno and his ambitions. Barnet Nover, "Strife in Java," The Wasliington Post (1877-1954), Ju126, 1947. " David D. Newsom, The Irnperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). 60 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 14, 1946. , TRE FOUR FR&X#OD(S COWL TO lh'#6CESI& - -"--- 1 The UN, Palestine, Italian North Africa and Iran The United Nations' first few years were spent discussing three vital issues in the Middle East and North Africa, and many American commentators looked to the UN as a forum through which American, British, French and Soviet interests could be resolved in a last ditch attempt to prevent a looming Soviet-American conflict. The Italian colonial issue was, along with the Iranian crisis, one of the first challenges brought before the newly formed United Nations where several actors placed their hats in the ring for a piece of the North African pie. The apathy and skepticism about the United Nations that is fashionable in the United States today is a far cry from the intense optimism most commentators held for the new body and even American policy-makers trusted the two matters of Italian North Africa and Iran to the UN in its first years. As late as May 1948, Walter Lippmann was convinced that "it [was] much too early to write off the United Nations as a failure in palestine."" In the wake of the submission of the problem to the UN, Palestine was seen as one of the UN's most important challenges. There was a real concern among many commentators that the Palestinian issue would prove to be " Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), May 18, 1948 unsolvable for the UN and would result in a serious setback for the world body. Lippmann believed that "only by carrying [a resolution] through [could] the authority of the United Nations be ~indicated."~' -<% cs\* -*, *, ,+ Nations hom being vestigial was for America to intervene directly. American commentators in reviewing the status of the North African and Iranian disputes in the United Nations were faced with a dilemma in that, on the one hand, most of them were strongly in support of the United Nations (Sumner Welles was one of the most important draftsmen of the idea of the UN). On the other hand, the Truman Doctrine and a rising paranoia about communism in the wake of communist takeovers in Czechoslovakia and Hungary meant that few were happy with the idea of the Soviet Union getting any concessions on these issues. Britain's precipitous referral of the Palestinian issue to the UN put America in an awkward position since it supported the idea of the UN but did not want to internationalize the matter even more. In the end two of the three disputes in 62 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Wushington Post (1877-19.541, Jun 10, 1948. 6 8 question were settled outside the UN (North Africa and Iran) and one was settled in the UN (Palestine). By 1949 Walter Lippmann's prediction - that "the strategic importance of the Italian colonies [was] so great . . . that the simple solution of awarding the colonies to one power or another will not be practicable" - was borne Libya became independent under a right leaning king so as to deflect both British and Soviet ambitions in the area.64 The UTN narrowly passed a resolution formally dividing the mandate of Palestine into an Arab and an Israeli part - and the fighting did not stop. 65 By the end of 1948 the Soviet Union was persuaded to withdraw from northern Iran in return for oil concessions. The semi-autonomous Soviet republics set up in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal were soon crushed by the Shah's forces, and Soviet oil concessions were revoked. The failure or insignificance of the UN in these three disputes went a long way towards tarnishing the UN's reputation for many American commentators. Moreover, the large number of Soviet satellite states and recently decolonized British colonies that joined the UN post 1947 significantly changed its makeup and made the body much less likely to pass American sponsored resolutions. America was frustrated in its hopes of attracting the support of decolonized nations for several reasons. America's provision of Marshall Aid to Europe was seen in many quarters as a subsidy for Europe to hold on to its empire. Many former colonial subjects distrusted America because of its support for a pre-war status quo and ambivalence towards decolonization 63 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jul 6, 1946. 64 C. L. Sulzberger, "Big 4 Agree In Part On Italian Colonies," New York Times (1857-Curvent,file),Sep 3, 1948. " Some of Truman's advisor's described him as the mid-wife in the birth of the Israeli state because of his vital support in its creation. Little, Atnerican Ot*ientalism:The Unitedstates and the Middle East since 1945, 87. in the early post-war period.66 Soviet propaganda in the United Nations was very successful in portraying the United States as a member of the old imperialist club and thus helped to ensure that, at least in terms of public propaganda, leaders of decolonized or decolonizing nations often lumped the United States with Britain, France and the other imperial powers.67 Russia intervened minimally in states outside its immediate sphere of influence, but Soviet policy makers produced a large quantity of rhetoric on the issue of decolonization and anti-imperialism to project an image of active involvement in world affairs. C. L. Sulzberger picked up on this rhetoric and was prompted to make the remarkable comment that "ideologically, Moscow has always strongly favored the full independence of all colonial peoples in overseas empires."68 America's estrangement from new members of the UN meant that it could no longer count on having a clear majority in UN votes; further souring opinion towards the body amongst American commentators.69 " Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making qf'Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 3. 67 Foster Hailey argued that it was the west's reluctance to take nationalist movements seriously that pushed them towards the Soviet Union. Foster Hailey, "Asia Looks to Us, Not to Russia," The New York Times (1857-currentJile), Apr 13, 1947. C. L. Sulzberger, "lndo-China Revolt Fateful to France," New York Times (1857-Currentfile), Dec 25, 1946. The Soviet Union continued its public relations campaign throughout the 1950s and 1960s with regard to the decolonizing world. A good indicator of this trend was the fact that Soviet publishing houses kept up a constant stream of reprints of Lenin's The Right of'Nations to Self-Determination and On the National Liberation Movement available, and shipped them around the decolonizing world. Rubinstein's Moscow's Third World Strategy and Laidi's The Third World and the Soviet Union are extremely good analyses of Soviet Strategy with regard to the decolonizing world. That being said, further analysis of these issues is extremely important since both these works were written before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Westad states that his primary motivation for writing The Global Cold War was the lack of work done on Cold War- Decolonization relations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Zaki Laidi, The Third World and the Soviet Union (London: Zed Books, 1988), Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 6y The growing voice of decolonizing movements within the UN was most manifest in the 1960s when leaders of decolonized countries would use the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council as pulpits to deliver anti-colonial rhetoric. Unfortunately, the strident tone many of these leaders adopted further alienated countries like the United States from the world body. Proponents of decolonization were in a TflE 6'Oi.l) K.&P(.OPS<)\i ff 1'Hh I ?If M3 h~rlO\s v.3, I.W? r~#,*,.<,>?<7 .--"".-&, ".,". ....",. .,,b".,- -,.*-.,-. .-.* ,411- ww"*d. .~.... . AWWX-UJ nn ocriciirws opria nv,,siyll r:irrylt wwdr-m innunnrnl xdnail wtersak Lippmann summed up the concern on the mind of most commentators in February 1947 when he declared that "the liquidation of the British Empire, which is one of the great historic events of our age, will involve this country most especially and most profoundly."70 Even though he made this statement before the Truman Doctrine was announced, Lippmann tapped into a larger concern amongst American commentators for the systems of strategic control that America had relied on in the aftermath of the war. America's disillusionment with Britain and the rest of Europe and, moreover, the global recognition of Europe's decline meant that the traditional watchdogs of global policy were no longer to be trusted by American commentators. The fact that the Soviet Union was intervening, or was seen to be intervening, in the decolonizing world meant that America could either step into the shoes vacated by Britain, or it could withdraw behind its borders and allow the Soviet Union and Western Europe to fight it out for the decolonizing world. catch-22; if they used the world body to try and push decolonization, the very countries who they were addressing would pay even less attention to the UN. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World, Chapter 13. 70 Walter Lippmaim, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 13, 1947. In the wake of the British decision to approach the United States about intervening in the Mediterranean, the United States and not Britain came to lead negotiations on all issues of Great Power politics. Lippmann pointed to the dispatch of the U.S.S. Missouri to Turkey in 1947 as an attempt to "establish the fact that the United States has great interests of its own in the Mediterranean, and that the settlement in the Mediterranean is not to be decided by Great Britain and the Soviet Union alone."71 Lippmann in his customarily glib manner stated in his January 2, 1947 column that "the United States ought to be the proponent and sponsor of a new order of things in the Middle ~ast."~~Later that month, he noted that "in the contest with the Soviet Union and with communism, only power can check power, only influence can check influence;" hence only the United States could take on the Soviet Ultimately, as the Iranian, Italian and Palestinian issues demonstrated, America reacted to the global shift in power by placing itself squarely in conflicts all around the decolonizing world and embraced the ideological basis of the Truman Doctrine. How America was going to deal with this momentous change was one of the key concerns voiced by commentators on foreign policy. Lippmann, in March 1947, stated that America's new policy should be based on an "an insistence that [America wished] to be recognized as an independent power in the Mediterranean and not to be committed, entangled, and discounted as an auxiliary power."74 Lippmann, in using this language, tapped into a long lineage of American concerns about being 'entangled' in Europe. These concerns traced themselves to both World Wars and America's role as a " Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19.541, Mar 9, 1946. 72 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541,Jan 2, 1947. 73 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541,Jan 25, 1947 '"alter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 9, 1946. "committed" but "auxiliary" power in those conflicts. By making this statement in the same month as the Truman Doctrine was announced, Lippmann signaled a new unwillingness amongst American commentators to rely on Europe in modulating conflict - a newfound determination to take charge of the situation independently of those powers, much in the way Britain had structured its own relationship with Europe throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. When contrasted to America's self-assumed role of mediator between Britain and the Soviet Union in the early days of the Iranian crisis, this new policy shows the fundamental about-turn in America's role in the world. Walter Lippmann proclaimed as early as February 1947 that "it is . . . certain that there has devolved upon the United States the role which Britain filled in the Nineteenth Century - that of bearing a heavy and leading, as Secretary Marshall put it, 'responsibility for world peace and security."'75 By the end of 1948, there was a general consensus amongst the commentators I have looked at that America needed to take on Britain's erstwhile Pax Britannica and control conflict around the world via a new Pax Americana. That new Pax Americana necessitated direct intervention in the decolonizing world - often at the expense of decolonizing movements. Finally, the second half of 1948 and 1949 saw a change in Europe that was to have a lasting impact on how the Cold War was to be fought and how the decolonizing world related to it. June 1948 marked the start of the Berlin Blockade: a systematic plan by the Soviet-controlled East German Administration to starve West Berlin by cutting it off from the rest of West Germany. In response to this move by the Soviets, Truman organized the Berlin Airlift that managed to keep West Berlin supplied till the blockade 75 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 25, 1947. 73 was called off in May 1949. On the other side of the Atlantic, President Truman initiated America's first peacetime draft in the aftermath of the war.76 In this atmosphere of rising tensions, America took the lead in laying the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By tying the major western European states together in a military alliance, NATO inaugurated a new phase of trans- Atlantic cooperation. The upshot of this military cooperation was that America was placed in a position where its military commitments were intimately tied to the foreign policies of its European allies. These allies were committed to the fight against communism, but also had commitments and concerns around the world in their various empires. For the first time since the war, America gained a legitimate avenue through which to shape imperial troop movements and deployments.77On the flip side, America's allies gained the ability to influence American policy towards their colonies by using the threat of leaving NATO as a bargaining chip in discussions. Apart from this backbiting, NATO represented an extremely important benchmark because it signalled a comprehensive abandonment of the UN as a forum for discussion of Soviet-U.S. tensions.78 Commentators like Lippmann were cautiously optimistic about the growth of such a pan-Western alliance but were concerned about its scope and America's ability to honor its commitments to the countries in the pact. A central concern for all -- 76 C. L. Sulzberger, "World Wonders About Moscow's Next move," New York Times (1857-Cz~rretitfile), May 16, 1948. Walter LaFeber, America, Rzissia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000,9th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). 77 This was the primary bone of contention between America and France with regard to French commitments in Algeria. American policy makers were able to criticize French internal imperial policy because two-thirds of France's Rhine divisions were based in Algeria and not protecting against a Soviet invasion in the early 1960s. Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Sliort History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Translated by Jane Marie Todd, 2001j, Chapter 8, 9, Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001 j. 78 Walter Lippmann, "Strategy Reconsidered," The Los Angeles Times (1886-current,file);Apr 7, 1948. commentators was Russia's overwhelming advantage in terms of ground forces on the European frontier and the fragility of America's nuclear deterrent; a deterrent that was to become even more fragile by the end of 19.50.~~ At the same time as America and Western Europe were strengthening their bonds, the first signs of a united Western Europe also began to appear. The Council of Europe, a precursor to today's European Union, came into being with the signing of the Treaty of London on May 5, 1949. In a move that was to foreshadow the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957, the creation of the Council of Europe marked a shift towards European unity and integration, and a slow move away from Empire. This move was particularly important for Britain because it marked her formal entrance into the European community after centuries of isolation.80As Walter Lippmann commented in 1948, "the British dilemma [of whether or not to join Europe] is also an American dilemma. For if Britain's entrance into a European Federation means the breaking up of the British Commonwealth and Empire, what is to become of the non-European parts of the Commonwealth and ~m~ire?"~'Moreover, the creation of the Council of Europe marked the first instance in which Europe tried to assert its identity as an independent player in the post-war world - a stand that was to only come to real fruition in the wake of Cold War and the gradual dismemberment of the Cold War model. 79 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 3,1949. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Centuly, I st American ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1999). '' Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Aug 19, 1948 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Apr 26, 1948. "We are at the end of a period" - Shifts in confidences2 The period between 1947 and 1949 saw many shifts in American policy, and in its conception of the world. Perhaps the most important of these shifts was a shift in confidence. The Second World War did more than just demonstrate America's overwhelming industrial potential and reach. It convinced American policy makers that America had the ability to stretch out and exercise control around the world in a way it had never been able to before. The period from 1946 to 1949 marked the gradual disintegration of American confidence in Europe and systems of international order as embodied by the UN, and it led to a simultaneous burgeoning in American self- confidence. In the midst of recalcitrant (and sometimes ungrateful) European leaders, the obvious collapse of the old imperial system of power, rising discontent around the world, and the birth of the Soviet Union as a direct threat, America slowly assumed the role of guarantor of international order. """ E:UR(IPE LOOKS AT AIMERICA'SNLW P:OKE:IC;N I'tl1,ICY iVr~tvtk fit?~t,c (INS7 Ctttrtntjilrl, Mat 10, 1917, PtaQucst N~\toricalNcwspnpei., The Xc~r\oth 7 trr~cs(1851 - 21103) PS 12 . -- EUROPE LOOKS AT AMEN~CAT-NEWFOREIGN PO~CY %WRU<%Wre'%, n soartola raaaar %'elf. 8434 X- ntai& to nrmt*S Iht-me from fnrd&n MtB hnemstfrirz We've YI'b Udtrd Set- IbLw an mk d ~n Medrtaraaem &la john Bat& md nor urrfm ns gat ". . . which began about two years ago.. ." Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Los Angeles Times (1866-czrvrent file), Mar 19, 1948. Lippmann made one of his most remarkable statements at the end of 1947 when he said: We cannot but feel how vast are the things we are called upon to do, and how human, all too human, are we who have to attempt them. Never before has so much been expected of any people who were not directly and immediately threatened - that consciously, deliberately, voluntarily, and in open debate, they should decide to use their power, their resources and their influence for the security, the pacification, and the rehabilitation of the whole world.83 The creation of the Cold War world, and America's position on one side of it, laid down one of the most important planks in creating a discourse about intervention in the decolonizing world. C. L. Sulzberger made perhaps the first stab at the concept of three worlds in conflict when he stated in September 1948 that "the late Wendell Willkie's 'One World' dream is at this moment hrther from reality than at any time since he coined the phrase. Instead two hostile worlds are gradually sucking up the unwilling, neutral peripheral mas~es."'~Moreover, America's self-conscious adoption of Britain's nineteenth century role meant that, both rhetorically and in terms of actual security policy, America was set to intervene and 'manage' the decolonizing world as an independent player. As Walter Lippmann put it early on in the debate; "Since this is a problem of power, we cannot delegate it to our friends, partners, and allies, but must deal 83 walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Dec 25, 1947. It is perhaps instructive to compare this passage to Churchill's famous 'Finest Hour' speech in terms of emotional import. "If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."" ht~:i/~v~mv.wi1~stonch~irchill.or~!i4~~a~es/i1~dex.ch?~~a~eid=418 84 C, L. Sulzberger, "Somber World Scene Faces Paris," New York Times (18.57-Currentfile), Sep 19, 1948. Sulzberger referred to Willkie's 1943 book titled One World that expressed a hope for post-war intemational peace-keeping and the cessation of international conflict. with it ourselves. We alone are strong enough to deal with the problem; let us pray that we shall be wise enough."85 85 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Sep 7, 1946. Chapter 3 America and the 'Brown, Black and Yellow People of the Forld' 3fthe last two chapters explored how America's relationship to the decolonizing world was shaped via Europe, this chapter will lay out how the process of decolonization and decolonized people themselves, shaped America's view on colonialism. While this discussion has focused so far on British and French colonial possessions, and America's changing relationship with them, it is impossible to ignore that America had a colonial empire of its own during the period under reference. While discourse relating to that empire was not necessarily connected to discourse on other colonial empires, there was certainly some cross-fertilization since references to America's empire litter the discourse on the decolonizing world. There are broadly three ways in which America's empire intruded into decolonization discourse - the status of the Philippines, McArthur's administration of post-war Japan, and the status of Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska. ' America formally ended its colonial rule over the Philippines in 1946 (though a strong America presence remained on the islands for decades to come). At a time when nationalist movements were beginning to vocalize their grievances on issues of imperialism, American commentators pointed to the Philippines as the perfect example of ' Ivan Musicant's The Ba~zanaWars gives a good overv~ewof America's interventions around the Americas from the Spanish-Amencan War to the 1980s. Ivan Mus~cant,The Banatla Wal-s A History of United States Mll~tan,Interventron in Latzr? A~nerriafrom the Spanrrh-Anzerrcan War to the Invasrorz of Pananza (New York. Macmillan, 1990) a state that a colonial power had taken control of, and had then passed on to its newly 'civilized' natives. 2 The transition to native mle there was cited by American commentators as the epitome of good colonial governance. Since 1946 was the same year that Britain was trying to ease its way out of the Indian subcontinent, several commentators like Lippmann and Nover pointed to the Philippines as a perfect model for Britain to emulate. Marquis Childs quoted Tmman in stating that "colonial peoples throughout the world were moving towards independence [and]. . .it was America's duty to give them guidance and help.. . It is our role. It is our obligation in the Far East [and] the Middle ~ast."~Filipinos had proven themselves to be competent and responsible natives in that they maintained close contacts with their former colonial masters. In the early post-war years, America could look to the Philippines and argue that it was possible to have a free and acceptable government of native peoples, as long they were carehlly trained in the art of government by their colonial masters. UT* k e a_- +. "",rn-=aY *IU_ LUI - I sj ,& ,& b - - 2 Barnet Nover, "Power Politics," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 20, 1947. 3 Marquis Childs, "Washington Galling," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 4, 1947. Even someone as liberal and pro-nationalism as Foster Hailey believed in the importance of educating the natives in Western democracy to make them fit to rule themselves. Foster Hailey, "Asia Looks to Us, Not to Russia," The New York Times (1857-currentJile), Apr 13, 1947. Like the Philippines, Japan served America with an example that colonial powers around the world should emulate. For commentators, America's administration of Japan showed that even so-called 'advanced' natives like the Japanese needed a firm hand and American guidance to truly achieve their potential. Japan, with a culture that was recognized as legitimately ancient and complex by most Americans, was an example of how American systems of governance, democracy and freedoms could be exported to people with vastly different systems of civil ~ociety.~In the context of the 1940s, America's conquest of Japan, a former great power, consecrated the country as the new moral and political watchdog for the Pacific, if not for the world. Finally, American concerns with the status of Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska were important rhetorical points made in the discourse of general decolonization. The discourse mobilized in these three cases was extremely important in formulating a 'realist' view of decolonization; to go along with a certain 'idealist' anti-colonial stance. Walter Lippmann in particular argued that since America had fundamentally different priorities in all three of these territories, it was ludicrous for it to apply one blanket policy to all of them. Similarly, America had no right to require colonial powers to apply one blanket policy of gradual decolonization to all their colonies since the situation in each individual case was unique and needed to be treated that way. Implicitly Lippmann argued that while freedom and self-determination as ideals were all well and good, they could not and should not be used while making foreign policy decisions since not all Andrew Gordon, The Modern Hrstnry ofJapan Fronl Tokugn>vaT~rnes to the Present (New York Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 13, Michael Schaller, AIteredSta~e~The Unzted States and Japan srnce the O~czrpatron(New York Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1, John Swenson-Wright. Unequal Allres7 Unrted States Security andAlhat7ce Polzcv tonai d Japan, 1945-1960 (Stanford, CA. Stanford Uilivers~tyPress, 2005), Chapter 2, 3. people were ready for them, and sometimes strategic concerns were more important than idealistic visions of a completely decolonized world.5 Essentially, the American presence in these three territories served as a reminder that all colonialism was not bad, and that some forms of imperial conquest were all right, if they were for the greater good of both sides of the relationship. For commentators like Marquis Childs in 1947, "it [was] time to stop talking about 'imperialism' as though Gunga Din was still carrying gin slings to the complacent British raj [and] it [was] time to think of our responsibility in this new ~orld."~In the end, commentators like Lippmann could not equate the situation in these three territories to colonialism. Colonialism in a certain American liberal mindset was associated with Kind Leopold's atrocities in the Congo and the Dutch bombing of Java. If imperial power was framed in such a way, "the American republic could not, without a revolutionary transformation of all that is essentially American, become the heir and the successor to the British imperial power."7 Its role, for commentators, would have to be fundamentally different - as a guardian and a tutor for emerging nations; a role that still allowed for intervention in those states; a role the United States felt it had played in the Philippines, and was in the process of playing in Puerto ~ico.~Foster Hailey stated that "there is no iron curtain between the United States and most of Asia, only the barrier of distance and the lack of funds to buy American newspapers, books and periodicals or to send students to the United States for study."9 Bizarre statements like this demonstrated that, even for someone as sympathetic to Gurtov does a good job of detailing this general belief in American policy. Melvin Gurtov, TI7e United States against the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1974), 4-7. 6 Marquis Childs, "Washington Calling," The Washington Post (1 877-1 954), Jan 30, 1947. Foster Hailey, "Asia Looks to Us, Not to Russia," The New York Times (1857-current file), Apr 13, 1947. 7 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Apr 26, 1948. 8 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, i987), Chapter 3. Foster Hailey, "Asia Looks to Us, Not to Russia," The New York Times (1857-currentjile), Apr 13, 1947. decolonization as Foster Hailey, the barriers to truly appreciating the turmoil in the decolonizing world were great. From the liberal to conservative side of the debate, every commentator stressed the importance of educating the natives and introducing them to American culture as a way to woo them away from communism. Rather than appreciating the legitimate concerns many decolonizing leaders had with America's role in the world and the developing Cold War, commentators assumed that the root of communism or non-alignment was a lack of understanding or intelligence. The First Wave of I9ecolonization By the middle of 1949, Foster Hailey stated that it seemed "uncontradictable [that] the main theatre of operations of the cold war [had] shifted from Europe to the Far East. The stake [was] one-half of the peoples of the ~orld.'"~The period from 1948 to the end of 1949 marked what can be described as the last active hardening of policy in the United States regarding the Cold War before hostilities actually came to a head in the Korean War. Between 1947 and 1948, India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma (Myanmar) all gained their independence from Britain as the result of more or less orderly transitions to native rule. Sukarno in the Dutch East Indies declared the independent nation of Indonesia on August the 17th, 1945. 11 Most American lo Foster Hailey, "Sweep of Communists Stirs Asia's Millions," The New Yovk Times (1857-currentfile), May 15, 1949. I' Surnner Welles wrote an extremely heartfelt editorial on the occasion of the signing of a Dutch- Indonesian treaty in 1946. He described it as "setting a standard that cannot be ignored by other imperial powers." He was not alone in having great hopes for the Indonesia treaty. Foster Hailey of the New York Times was posted in Asia at the time and had similarly high hopes. Dutch forces were to start bombing Indonesian villages soon after the accord and did not leave the country for several years. Indonesia did not actually see the last of the Dutch until well into 1949. Sumner Welles, "New State in Asia," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Nov 27, 1946. commentators were in favor of Britain's withdrawal from India, but the subsequent bloodshed that resulted from the partition of British India led many commentators to question just how far even 'politically experienced' colonized people could be trusted to run their own affairs in a manner similar to the colonial powers they were replacing. l2 RaprMucad with pormos~onof the copyright mna' runher roprcdildmn gxohibitad wllhal panlssrwl In this environment, leaders of major anti-colonial movements found their public statements coming under increased scrutiny by American commentators obsessed with communist aims in the decolonizing world. In South Asia, the movements in question were openly bourgeois and harbored no little antagonism for communist parties in their respective countries.13 In the late 1940s, most South Asian leaders were seen as reliable Foster Hailey, "Pact Signed in Indonesia Sets Democratic Pattern," The New York Times (1857-currentjile), Mar 30, 1947. Barnet Nover, "Strife in Java," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jul26, 1947. '* Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jun 7, 1947 Clifton Daniel, "Enigma of the Desert, the Arab," The New York Times (1857-currentfile), Oct 12, 1947. l3 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1 954), Jun 7, 1947 partners who would not upset the apple-cart and sever links with the western world.14 It was not till a few years later, and the shift to state socialism in many recently decolonized South Asian states like India, that American commentators started to get concerned about communism there. l5 These anti-colonial movements were often seen as possible partners in a post-colonial world, while more radical actors like Sukarno were frowned upon for disrupting the stability of South-East Asia, and for deploying a rhetoric that drew heavily from Marxist ideology. Yet there was always a concern "that native nationalists in Indonesia, Indo-China and Burma, perhaps even in India and Pakistan will. . .turn increasingly to Moscow, rather than to London and Washington, for guidance and support. And in the Middle East, neither in Egypt, Iraq, or Syria are the governing classes, upon whom London has depended, secure against a rising discontent." l6 Since nationalists could not be trusted to remain allied with America, their public statements were a subject of scrutiny. In many ways, nationalist leaders across the world were trapped in walking a very thin line between anti-imperial rhetoric that American's associated with the Soviet Union, and a more conciliatory rhetoric that would not antagonize the United States, but would not play as well at home. With rising tensions in Europe and in a decolonizing world that most commentators had, at best, a cursory knowledge of, most voices in America started to associate all proto-socialist movements with communism, and speak of them as 14 Lippmann traveled to India and wrote glowing reports about Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, and his pro-West leanings. '' Pa~dR. Brass, The Politics qf'lndia since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapter 8. I h Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954),Jun 17, 1947 Some, like Foster Hailey, bucked this trend and continued to insist that Asian nationalist movements were not fi~ndamentallycommunists or a threat to the United States well into 1947. His voice was alone for the most part in the rising sense of paranoia. Foster Hailey, "Pact Signed in Indonesia Sets Democratic Pattern," The New York Times (1857-cun-er?t,fi/ej, Mar 30, 1947. communist agents. This was summer up in 1947, when Walter Lipplnann stated that "the formation of American foreign policy in the critical areas of the world.. .depends in the first instance upon our relations with the Soviet union."17 This is an extremely important point since equating decolonization with communism was to become a familiar trope in U.S. rhetoric about decolonization movements around the world between 1950 and 1980 - especially regarding parts of Africa and Latin America. l8 Moreover, the escalating tension between America and Russia led to concerns about communist ambitions in the decolonizing world. Walter Lippmann made the claim that the Soviet Union was offering itself as an alternative, not in developed Europe, but in "Eastern Europe and in Asia" where people lived "under primitive governments in a state of dire poverty with massive illiteracy and ~u~erstition."'~The "political condition of the Middle East," for example, was "too primitive for the formation in this generation of a peaceable confederation of Arab states."20 This argument about 'primitivism' was a direct quotation of nineteenth century European arguments for colonization. It invoked a justification for neo-colonial paternalism towards the decolonizing world as well as a vision of the decolonizing world as a place of 'primitive' ideals and institutions that could prove to be a threat to the West. Lippmann argued that "it is very difficult to establish free institutions among people who have never known the struggle for constitutional freedom.. .The traditions and habits of our freedom were not suddenly adopted.. .they were evo~ved."~'In other words, a rapid shift to a decolonized world was both a stupid 17 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Jan 25, 1947. l8 S. Neil MacFarlane, Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea ofNational Liberation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). l9 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Feb 28, 1946. 20 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Jun 4, 1948. [emphasis added] 21 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Feb 28, 1946. strategic decision, but was also counter-productive for the people getting decolonized since they did not have the capability to handle freedom without western tutelage. Soviet claims on the decolonizing world were often taken seriously because commentators were coming to the conclusion that, "amidst the destitution, illiteracy, despotism, corruption and cruelty to which the masses of Asia are accustomed, it [was] by no means obvious that Soviet communism is judged as western men judge it. There in the backwardness of Asia, which has never known freedom, communism is a much more formidable antagonist than it is in Europe and the west."22 Colonial leaders were thus not to blame for their attraction to communism since they could not know better, given the kind of government they had had. By making statements like this, coinmentators were able to de-legitimize communism in the decolonizing world and make a backhanded critique of western colonial powers that had not had the 'anti-colonial' legacy America had inherited.23 '"alter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954j, Jun 17, 1947 Foster Hailey took a very different view hom the mainstream in his articles for the New York Times. Foster Hailey, "Asia Looks to Us, Not to Russia," The Nmr Yorlc Times (1857-currentJile), Apr 13, 1947. " By the 1950s, 'Development Theory' became an important part of the American lexicon of the decolonizing world. The World Bank was founded on the 27'h of December, 1945 with the signing of the Bretton-Woods Agreement. Along with the CIA, USAID and the State Department; the World Bank was to play an important role in trying to 'manage' the decolonizing world. Implicit in development theory was the assumption that colonial powers had exploited and mismanaged their colonies, and thus those colonies were antagonistic to the 'West.' Similar to the idea of European rebuilding, development theory in the decolonizing world during the Cold War was focused on trying to provide economic growth as an incentive to turn away from Socialisln and Communism. Unlike in Europe, the means through which this economic growth was to be instituted was decided almost exclusively by American institutions. This reflected a larger distrust of the ability of the 'native mind' to make rational decisions. Hunt, Ideolom and US. Foreign Policy, 159-70. Shifting Geographical Focus While ideological issues and debates are obviously important in any study of foreign policy and especially discourse on foreign policy, it is also important to stress that foreign policy and reporting on foreign policy depends to a large degree on the arenas in which foreign policy activity is taking place. Thus the emergence of the decolonizing world on America's foreign policy radar is not something that is only the result of ideological shifts but is also a function of a series of shifting foreign policy events that directed peoples' attention to different parts of the decolonizing world with differing results. American policy-makers and commentators focused on different parts of the world as colonial powers started to loosen (or tighten) their grip over particular areas and turned to the United States for help. Thus American interest in the immediate post-war period was focused almost exclusively on the question of European reconstruction as this was the issue of the moment and took up the foreign policy headlines. During this period of American interest in Europe, colonial powers like Britain and France were frantically trying to recompose their colonial empires in the Middle East and Far East using moneys provided by the American government. It was only when Britain accepted its inability to act in the Middle East, that the United States entered the region as an interested power.24 By the time American commentators were primarily concerned with issues in the Middle East (specifically Palestine, Iran and Turkey), Britain was in the process of reconfigwing its lifelines of Empire to focus on North and East Africa. American commentators like " Jacob Abadi, Britain's WithdrawalJi-om the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic Imperatives (Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982) Introduction, Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States aizd the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2002) Chapter 2. the Alsops realized in mid-1947 that "Africa [was] the center around which the new British imperial pattern [was] crystallizing."'5 This shift was forced by Britain's inability to be the prime mover in the Middle East and was seen as a way to salvage some of its colonial passages.'6 he question of Italian North Africa was thus brought to the fore in the American consciousness when France and Britain realized that they were no longer able to control events with the Soviet Union in this region. The last such shift of this sort in the 1940s took place when American attention started to shift to the Far East in 1948 and 1949 as first Indonesia, and then China, became centers of concern. This shifting of focus is most obviously manifested in the individual travels of the commentators I have looked at. Almost every single foreign policy commentator in the United States started the post-war period reporting on or in Europe. By 1947 most commentators had made at least one trip to the Middle East. By 1948 most had moved on and were on tours through South and East Asia and were reporting on issues in Indonesia and newly independent India. The field and tenor of a correspondent's reports were strongly influenced by their physical location and this constant shift in focus is emblematic of a constant shift in which parts of the world were available to American audiences, and thus which parts of the world were allowed to enter public discourse on decolonization and define it. The last such shift in focus took place in 1949 with the communist victory in the long-running Chinese civil war and the creation of the world's largest communist state. 2'1 Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The IVarl~mngtonPo~t (1877-1954), Apr 14, 1947 26 C L Sulzberger, "Br~tamHolds to Near East Despite Her Empire Changes," New] York Tunes (1857- Curreut$le), Oct 20, 1947 Clifton Damel, "Attlee Aldes Scan East Afrlca Bases," The N~IZYork Tzmes (1857-current file), Oct 8, 1946 Chinese Civil War Like the Americas, China had seen a sustained American interest and presence for several decades, and American discourse regarding it is complicated by a whole host of other forces outside the scope of my investigations. China, more than even Japan, introduced the United States into the imperial club in ~sia.~~China was never formally colonized by Europe and it existed in a very particular balance of semi-autonomy. Its history in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was very distinct and the way in which the Communist Party took control of it meant that its path to 'decolonization' was highly atypical. Moreover, like Japan, post-war China came under an American sphere of influence and thus was not a clear example of a country decolonizing from European control. The Chinese situation was made even more complicated because the war was not fought between Chinese and European armies, but was rather a battle between competing Chinese factions (albeit one in which one side was heavily supported by the Americans). China's entry into this story of decolonization comes about because of the impact of the final defeat of nationalist forces on American public opinion. America had almost unreservedly supported Chinese Nationalist (Guomindang) forces in the face of rising domestic discontent, both during, and after, the war. In the mean time, Chinese Communist forces under Mao Zedong slowly made gains throughout the country and, by the end of 1948, were in virtual control of most of it. In January 1949, Communists forces entered Beijing, and by April 1949 they had taken control of Nanjing, signaling the final abandonment of any Nationalist attempts to keep control of Mainland China. The Truman administration continued to funnel huge quantities of economic and military aid to Guomindang forces right up to the point they were defeated and had to leave Mainland 27 Gurtov, The United States against the Third World, 126-40. China for Taiwan. For American commentators, the late 1940s had seen the slow disintegration of Na-tionalist forces, but no substantive reevaluation of policy towards them. Their final defeat thus brought home both the 'loss' of the world's largest population to communism as well as the abject failure of five years of American policy with regards to Poor Chi-nd tfocleL%Shirt --el * Ih. chkr* xm iai-%r~*2*r~mir* mrpll-."x luhl,~r).".~"uhluhluhl8RI~18-r~ The Chinese Revolution turned America's eyes firmly to the Far East and away froin the Middle East. There was a general feeling amongst commentators that while they had been focusing their attentions on what now seemed like relatively unimportant matters in the Middle East, America had let the largest prize of the Cold War out of its grip. Despite the fact that Communist forces in China acted very much independently of 28 A veritable cottage-industry of explanations for the 'loss' of China sprouted throughout 1949 - especially after the release of the White Paper on China by the State Department. Walter Lippmann, "But Why Did the U.S. Bet on a Sure Loser?," The Los Angeles Times (1886-current ,file), Sep 6, 1949. Scott L. Bills, Empire and Cold War: The Roots of US-Third World Antagonisni, 1945-47: 1st ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), Chapter 7, David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: Tlze United States, Decolonization, and the Third World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), Chapter 4. Soviet forces and instruction^,^^ there was a near consensus that China had been lost because the Soviet Union had trumped the United States in Eastern Asia. Lippmann asked the question on the minds of many commentators: "Why, at the zenith of American power and prestige, was the American influence in China paralyzed and why did the American interest flounder so quickly, and why is the nation which we have championed tttrned against The central question on all minds was this: why did China become communist when America had exerted every effort imaginable to prevent that? Why had the Chinese chosen the way they had when it was manvest that the logical choice would have been to ally with the United Rcp-odumil iv~thno?nlsr;ion of tho cuoytiatit ovirn F~rthor'~produC11~ prOtlB4cd wllhout pern,ls: or China's entrance into the communist world significantly increased the cordon of states America was concerned about. Specifically, Korea, India, Thailand (then Siam), French Indo-China (Vietnam), the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), and Japan became centers of concern for American commentators. A tinge of panic crept into Sulzberger's The tension between Chinese and Soviet Comm~~nistsduring the Chinese Revolution is something that has only come to be studied recently. '' Walter Lippmann, "But Why Did the U.S. Bet on a Sure Loser?," The Los Angeies Times (1886-current file), Sep 6, 1949. [emphasis added] '' Gurtov, The Unitedstates against the Third World, 126-30. reporting on the issue when he stated that "both.. 'Russian and.. .Communist influences have not only expanded up to the borders of Macao and Hong Kong, but are moving on unchecked to the south. Moscow's aspirations there are meeting with tremendous success.''32 American concerns in the region, which had previously focused on questions of colonial policy, shifted to the Cold War, and every step taken by the governments in any of these states became an important marker in the battle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Most immediately, commentators looked on decolonization movements in South and East Asia with perceptively less sympathy. The overriding discourse of the Cold War and the need to hold back the march of communism meant that other concerns, likc colonial brutality, took a back seat in foreign policy circles. Even someone as liberal as Foster Hailey was severely shaken by the communist victory and raised concerns about the future of communism in ~sia.~~The status of someone like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam was especially important here because the Chinese revolution marked the rise of his communist credentials over his anti-colonial credentials in the eyes of American commentators. His declaration of Vietnamese independence from French rule had drawn directly, and self-consciously, from the American Declaration of ~ndependence.~~In 1947 Foster Hailey claimed that "there is no conclusive evidence now that Ho Chi Minh has any direct link with ~oscow."~~By 1949 he had carefully modulated his tone, and stated that "since the Japanese surrender, Ho disavows any 32 C L. Sulzberger, "Russla Contmues To Play Her Double Game," New York Times (I857-Cztvrentjile), Oct 30, 1949 z3 Foster I-Iailey, "Sweep of Communists Stlrs Asla's Mllllons," TIze New Yovk Tmes (1857-cz~l-rentfile), May 15, 1949 34 Stanley Kamow, V~etrlalnA Hrsfo~(New York Viking Press, 1983). Chapter 4. 35 Foster Halley, "Asla Looks to Us, Not to Russla," The New Yol-k Trnzes (I857-~zrrr,enf~fiIe),Apr 17. 1947 [emphasis added] Moscow ties but he is a long-time friend of Mao and Chu and other Chinese leadcr:~."'~ In other words, the Chinese Revolution raised the stakes in East Asia, and sparked a reinterpretation of movements and leaders throughout the region. There was a widespread concern amongst commentators that "even those Asiatics who fear Chinese domination and who are more inclined by their heads to the West and democracy than to the East and communism must take pride secretly in the elimination of the long-held major influence of the white man in This reflected a larger conviction in the inability of 'Asiatic' people to take rational decisions. If decolonizing people chose communism over the west, it was because of a misplaced sense of pride in ending European domination. This led Walter Lippmann to point out in 1949 that "there are many who think that Western power in Asia will be replaced promptly and inevitably by the Soviet power."38 The loss of China evoked both paranoia that Asia would soon be lost, as well as a determination to hold the line against the communists. By late 1949 Foster Hailey came out with statements like: "The Red Star casts its gleam over all Asia. The Communists have taken full advantage of the nationalism that war stimulated.. .and are a menace to peace and stability where half of the world's two billion people live."39 For Stewart Alsop returning to Washington after a journey around Asia "it [was] perfectly clear that, 36 Foster Hailey, "Sweep of Communists Stirs Asia's Millions," The New York Times (1857-citvrentjZe), May 15, 1949. [emphasis added] Foster Hailey, "The Old Era is Gone in the Far East," The New York Times (1857-czrvrent file), Feb 9, 1947. It is conceivable that Foster Hailey underwent this change in the face of increased red-baiting and communist paranoia in the United States at this moment. The House Committee on Un-American Activities held its first hearing during this period. 37 Foster Hailey, "Sweep of Communists Stirs Asia's Millions," The New York Times (1857-curvent,file), May 15,1949. 38 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washirzgtorz Post (1877-1954), Jan 25, 1949. " Foster Hailey, "Crucial Stage At Hand In Far East Struggle," The New York Times (1857-currer1t.file), Aug 15, 1949. if southeast Asia [was] allowed to go the way of China, an unthinkable war [was] virtually inevitable."" The decolonizing world did not have a choice in the matter by the time China became communist - in the discourse surrounding decolonization American commentators framed the debate about decolonization as one between America and the Soviet Union. The reluctance of decolonizing people to choose to side with the United States and what was 'good' for them reflected on their own faulty logic and misplaced ~entiment.~' Gt%urilrt Csrlna l - 1Zu Fiat :'-..',,>2* 5 *-,>- **cz.r-. rv*** <'xr,.<>,. +>, b>,. S,&+ ?VQ~'< S**'"=*s >.*.m.:,. 'k.".,X> \,,,>, &:*a$'9 "1 * Cartoon in the News Bvllllt Qid CoI~nlYocor1.l Snccefia EZakec Him Ambitious R-8-x *.* *- r.w n+e WPVlis C rr l uI rynr*u w pr**".^l .rru a wi*\.r The Ungrateful Native and the Myth of Voluntary Communists The immediate strategic ramifications of communist victory in China were relatively clear and American commentators spent a significant amount of time worrying 40 Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-19541, Aug 22, 1949. 41 Gurtov, The United States agarnst the Third World, 127. 95 about them. Yet what is perhaps even more important for our discussion about discourses on decolonization is the effect the communist victory had in crystalyzing the ways in which American commentators saw the decolonizing world and the people who inhabited it. There are broadly two main discourses that this event manifested for American commentators that are in some sense mutually contradictory - the idea of the ungrateful/unworthy native and the belief that it was impossible for anyone to choose to be communist. The first of these two discursive ideas was, in some sense, the last step in the creation of an American imperial ideology about the decolonizing world. The idea of the ungratehl native had been a staple of European imperial ideologies for at least two hundred years and tied directly into the idea of a White Man's ~urden.~~America's experience in China was to form a concrete basis for this very same thesis regarding the leaders and people of decolonizing nations.43 In January 1949, Lippmann argued that America could not "shape and direct the course of events in Asia;" merely influence them to some degree.44 By the end of 1949 Lippmann himself had come to a far more interventionist point of view. "Experience in China, where the United States poured in more than $3 billion worth of supplies without stopping the commaxnists seems to have convinced nearly everyone that Asia is not to be held by military force backing either 42 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 43 This is not to suggest that such a discourse had never existed in the United States before this period. In fact it was a staple of much of American discourse regarding its dependencies in both the Atlantic and the Pacific and to some extent in Latin America. Michael Hunt lays out the long lineage of these discursive tools of empire very well in Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. 44 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 12, 1949. corsupt national regimes or colonial administration^."^^ The argument went that local leaders were clearly not up to the task of standing up to Communist pressure and developing a free society even with the abundant resources of the United States behind them. In some sense this discourse was very similar to the discourse in America about the role European nations were to play in holding back communism in their colonies in the early post-war period. What differentiated these two cases was that, on the one hand America was unsure of European resolve because of the hardships of the war. On the other hand America was concerned about the racial resolve of the 'brown, black and yellow' people of the world to take decisions that were 'good' for them. Walter Lippmann echoed this concern as far back as March 1948 when he stated that, with regard to the Middle East, America's strategic objectives would be best served by making "secure those selected positions from which [it] could not be dislodged and not relying on "the shifting sands of Oriental courts, chieftains, and politician^."^^ Lippmann deployed a language that was taken verbatim from 'Orientalist' visions of the decolonizing world to point to the instability and unreliability of non-European actors. For Lippmann, Orientals did not make clear distinctions between 'courts,' 'chieftains,' and 'politicians.' That perceived lack of insight, along with the instability of the "shifting sands" of the Orient made it unsuitable for democracy, and unsuitable as an American partner. The only position America could maintain in the region with any sense of certainty was one founded on American terms, and based on American strength. American efforts to "'contain' communism by subsidizing anti-communists all around 45 Foster Hailey, "Crucial Stage At Hand In Far East Struggle," The New Yovk Times (1857-current,file), Aug 15, 1949. 46 Walter Lipprnann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Mar 23,1948. the vast periphery of the Soviet Union" were no longer fruitful in Lippmann's eyes by the end of 1949, and commentators like Stewart Alsop derided local actors like the French- instated King of Indo-China, Bao Dai, as "Our Portly Hope," reflecting the widespread distaste amongst commentators for the many colonial proxies in power throughout the Far In the end, this discourse about the irresponsibility of native peoples marked the last stage in the movement from European moderated involvement to direct involvement by American proxies, intelligence services and troops. By the end of the 1940s American commentators no longer considered any other international players to be equal to the task of holding off communism and set the stage for direct intervention - most dramatically in Korea and the Korean War. Lippmann, as early as September 1948, stated that America had a duty to continue the task it had inherited with the Monroe Doctrine: a declaration of American intention "to end the expansion of alien empire over the two American continents." For Lippmann, the time had come for America to go beyond the Monroe Doctrine and "declare [its] intention to use [its] influence to bring to an end the unnatural and intolerable expansion of alien empire" around the Along with these colonial visions of duty, the communist victory in China also helped create the idea of the oppressed Third World citizen who was deprived of hislher right to freedom by communist tyranny.49 The military nature of the communist victory in China meant that American commentators could latch onto that as the primary reason behind communist control in China, and posit that no decolonizing native could ever 47 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), IDec 24, 1949 Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jun 17,1949. This particular example probably also reflected American distaste for French policy. 48 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Sep 2, 1948. 49 Gurtov, The Unitedstates against the Third World, 140. choose communism willingly.50 At the most, loyalty to communism reflected a cultural baggage unique to the decolonizing world that made "communism in the Lenin-Stalin form . . . far less revolutionary and alien in Asia than it is in ~uro~e."~'In one stroke this discourse allowed American policy makers and commentators to de-legitimize any and all left-leaning movements in the decolonizing world, no matter what their mass support appeared to be. Thus the "wily Indo-Chinese Communist leader, Ho Chi-mimh" was in "control77of the legitimate government of Indo-China and "the world catastrophe of the communization of all southeast Asia" had become "downright probable."52 Support for a communist or socialist movement was seen as a further indication of the irresponsibility of the native who did not know what was good for himdher. 50 Walter L~ppmann,"Today and Tomorrow Truman, Stalln. and Marx," The Wclshmngton Post (1877- 19541, Jan 6, 1949. 5' Walter L~ppmann,"Europe and Asla D~ffer111 Resistance to Reds," The Los Angeles Tunes (1886-cuvvelzt filej, Dec 2 1, 1949. 92 Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The WashzngtonPost (1877-1954), Jun 17, 1949 Additionally for American commentators, the only opposition to communism in the decolonizing world came not "from the instincts and traditions of the masses," but rather resided with "a westernized elite" who understood the stakes at hand.53 This was an argument that, like 'The White Man's Burden,' was taken almost verbatim from traditional European visions of colonization. Franz Fanon, the Martiniquan thinker who became the prophet for decolonization movements in the 1960s and 1970s, pointed to just this tendency in European decolonization. In his famous book, The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon argued that decolonization could not be complete until the westernized elite of a post-colonial state were removed along with the colonial power, since they too were products of colonization, and did not represent a truly decolonized state.54 By coming to the conclusion that the only natives who truly understood the threat to their state were the ones who were westernized elites, American commentators in the 1940s created the discursive basis for a rejection of non-European democracy, and decades of American support for authoritarian and undemocratic states. Moreover, American intervention could still be seen in the light of its long association with anti-imperialism since America was only stepping in to help the natives deal with issues they did not have a clear understanding of. Thus, as late as 1949, Lippmann could still argue that America's "position in Asia restted] on a great tradition, unique in modern history. We have been, and still are, the only world power which has refused to become the imperial ruler of subject peoples."55 53 Walter Lippmann, "Europe and Asia Differ in Resistance to Reds," The Los Angeles Times (1886-current file), Dec 2 1, 1949. 54 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), Concerning Violence. 5s Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-1954), Jan 12, 1949. Either way, these two discursive ideas came to be self-supporting in a symbiotic relationship, and between them guaranteed that there was literally no way for a decolonizing movement to be socialist and still be deemed legitimate. As Stewart Alsop stated in his column "what has happened in China more and more appears as only a major element in a much larger pattern. The pattern has two strands - the Kremlin's drive to capture all of Asia, and the drive of the Asiatic peoples to gain their own independence."j6 The end of 1949 marked this convergence in discourse: the rise of communism on the one hand, and the proliferation of decolonization movements on the other. Fundamentally, for American commentators, "the masses of the people" could not tell the difference between communism and non-communism and thus could not be trusted to take rational decisions in the mould of the Western powers.57 This had the dual effect of de-legitimizing movements and legitimizing direct American intervention in the country in the cause of anti-communism. Lippmann summed up America's new understanding of global power politics when he stated: "we have done well . . . where we have used American military and economic power . . . to redress the balance of power, to prohibit aggression, to help others to help them~elves."~~ A discursive hierarchy of trust developed between 1945 and 1950 that formed the core of an American discourse on decolonization. At one end of the spectrum, America, then Great Britain, and then other Western European powers like France and West Germany represented the 'Free World' and could be counted on in the fight against communism. At the other end of the spectrum, communist parties around the world and 56 Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," The Washington Post (1877-1 954), Jul 11, 1949. 57 Walter Lippmann, "Europe and Asia Differ in Resistance to Reds," The Los Angeles Times (1886-current file), Dec 2 1, 1949. 58 Walter Lippmann, "We Can Help Other Nations, but We Fail as Imperialists," The Los Angeles Times (1886-current file), Apr 22, 1949. the Soviet Union itself represented the 'Communist World' that was determined to undermined freedom around the world. In the middle of these two extremes sat the decolonizing world - divided between 'the people' and 'the elite.' American discourse on decolonization and its relationship to the decolonizing world came to be formed pvi~zcipallywithin this framework, making the decolonizing world a 'Third World' open to intervention from either side. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon. The news of the blast was made public a few months later. The National Security Council's classified directive NSC 68 was formulated on April 14, 1950. It laid out an extremely aggressive vision of America's role in the world and was to be the blueprint for America's Cold War diplomacy. 59 he Korean War commenced in June 1950 and marked America's first intervention in the world outside Europe since the end of the Second World War. The Soviet nuclear test "changed everything'' in terms of American visions of world order. A Soviet nuclear weapon ushered in the Cold War world of Mutually 59 Ernest R. May, A~nericanCold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: Bedford Books ofSt. Martin's Press, 1993). Assured Destruction and undermined the basis for European strategic balance. By 1956 the term 'Third World' was already in use in its French incarnation, 'Tiers M~nde.'~'The emergence of MAD and the tactical impasse in Europe meant that the United States and the Soviet Union were forced to carry on their conflict outside Europe - in the newly imagined 'Third World.' American policy, as laid out in NSC 68, depended on a very aggressive stance towards communism and precluded the possibility for any kind of agreement or de-escalation in the conflict between America and the Soviet ~nion.~'Once America actually took direct action against communism in the decolonizing world with the Korean War, the terms of the debate were changed forever - there was no longer any question of whether America was going to intervene, or even how it was going to frame that intervention; America was going to, and did, intervene directly in the decolonizing world and justified that intervention in terms of the Cold War. Commentators in the United States were no longer in a position of trying to formulate an American position on the decolonizing world and its European allies; they were involved in analyzing America's actual intervention in the world outside its borders - moreover in places with which America had no traditional ties, The intellectual and discursive work that needed to be done to carry out such an intervention, within five years of the end of the greatest bloodletting the world had ever endured, was immense. This thesis has attempted to understand that work. The creation of a 'Third World' in the American consciousness obviously did not stop with the start of the Korean War, and is a project in progress to this day. What did hO O.xfor*d English Dictionary Online, s.v. "Third World," http:/idictionary.oed.comicgi/entryi5025121 7?single=l &query-type=word&queryword=third+worid&first =I &max-to-show=] 0 (accessed Nov 12,2006). ''Ernest May's book on NSC 68 is a very valuable resource to understand the start of the Cold War. May, American Cold War Strategy: Inter~retingNSC 68. distinguish the late 1940s was its liminal status in the development of an American consciousness about the decolonizing world before it actually intervened in it. The period between 1945 and 1950 was, quite literally, the calm before open hostilities erupted in the Cold War. It is perhaps one of the great ironies (or tragedies) of history that the moment that saw the emergence of dozens of nations from colonial rule was also the moment best suited for a new system of international conflict that deployed much of this world in that conflict. The last three chapters map America's realization of its role in the world. During the five years that ran from the end of the Second World War to the start of the Korean War, American commentators developed a theoretical framework in which to understand and deal with the new power structures America was confronted with. The events of 194711948, Britain's acceptance of its inability to direct post-war diplomacy, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the rising stature of the Soviet Union meant that America placed itself in a position that was in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. In creating a western alliance against communism, America redrew world diplomatic relations purely in terms of communism and anti-communism. The relative positions of the United States, its European allies, the Soviet Union and the decolonizing world by the end of the 1940s made the Cold War and Cold War interventions inevitable. The discourse on the decolonizing world in America by late 1949 provided the intellectual and moral basis for these interventions. The reverberations of the decisions and discursive stances taken by the United States, the Soviet Union, European powers and the leaders of decolonizing movements in the late 1940s are felt to this day. Epilogue Cold Warriors and the Third World anretrospect, the twentieth century appears to be a relatively short period of world history that encompassed within it an incredible revolution in terms of power, ideas and geo-political structures. 'America's century' saw the map of the world change more radically than probably any comparable period in world history. If America emerged into a position of power unlike any it had ever experienced before, the landscape of empowered voices around the world expanded dramatically, and unleashed forces that had had centuries to build up under colonial rule. If the twentieth century is remembered for anything, it should be remembered for this fundamental change in the ways in which power, race, national identity and freedom were conceptualized. America, as a state and as a people, was thus faced with the dual challenge of understanding its new place in the world and the place of millions of newly decolonized people in that world. When Walter Lippmann signaled that it was time for America to move beyond the Monroe Doctrine and its traditional adherence to the Americas, he was making a claim whose import even he might not have appreciated.' The Monroe Doctrine had been a vital block in an American self-conception of what I wish to call 'islandhood;' a paradigm for thinking about America's strategic imperatives that stressed its separation ' Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post (1877-195#), Sep 2, 1948. from, and non-involvement in Europe, and hence, its non-involvement in traditional c~lonialism.~Britain too is an island, and its 'islandhood' came to be expressed as a very particular relationship with European power struggles and, more recently, with European integration. Britain managed its 'islandhood' in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by stepping out and trying to build an idea of British-ness that was hndamentally tied up with non-European empire. America, at the end of the nineteenth century, had broken its strict isolationism with the Spanish-American War, yet it extended its 'sphere of influence' primarily to the contiguous Americas and the islands associated with them. This was still an idea of 'islandhood' in that it did not involve satteliting power into other 'spheres of influence.' In terms of foreign policy, America had used just this feature of its foreign policy to distinguish itself against Britain. The two World Wars changed a lot about America's relationship to Europe, and generated a huge amount of anxiety because of that. Since both wars created these anxieties, it is important to note that America was able to step out of intervention after the first war,' but not after the ~econd.~This thesis has looked at what happened in the arena of American public discussion after the Second World War that fundamentally changed America's relationship to itself and with the rest of the world. Most important for me is the relationship between America and the decolonizing world, and the place of imperial ideology in that relationship. America, at the start of the Second World War, possessed a diplomatic presence tailor-made for its position as a hegemonic power in the Americas, 2 This idea can be seen as one facet of the larger theoretical idea of American 'exceptionalism.' Melvin Gurtov, The United States against the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1974), The Ideology of National Interest. 3 Most graphically in the American Congress's rejection of the League of Nations. "ichael Hunt describes this shift as being a manifestation of "great-cycle theory;" a historical myth that claimed that America's inability to build an international order after the First World War had led directly to the Second. This theory was much in vogue amongst interventionists in the 1940s. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 150-53. but completely unsuitable for a world power. By the end of the 1940s, both in terms of actual strategic commitments and in terms of discursive self-conceptions, America inherited Britain's mantle. In a remarkably short period of time, Britain self-consciously turned in on itself and tried to create a conception of itself as 'Little Britain,' while America self-consciously took on the role of a global power and inheritor of imperial responsibilities. It would not be too impetuous to claim that the late 1940s and early 1950s saw Britain and America exchange conceptions of 'islandhood.' By the mid-1950s, American commentators spoke of America's responsibility in the world, and the role of American power in creating a better, more stable, and more prosperous world. Fundamental to this conception of America was the belief that this role had been thrust on America. Much like early British discourse on colonialism in India, this conception of global American power was framed as 'power by accident;' a role in the world that America had not asked for, but had a duty to fulfill - especially in a world 'menaced' by communism. This was a non-colonial vision of colonial power because it was based on the idea that America had not willingly wished to inherit colonial power. Odd Arne Westad argues vehemently against seeing America's role (or the Soviet Union's role for that matter) in the decolonizing world as solely self-serving during the Cold War. He argues that both American and Soviet policy makers and observers truly believed that their interventions were in the best interests of the countries and peoples they were intervening in. "Different fiom the European expansion that started in the early modern period, Moscow's and Washington's objectives were not exploitation or subjugation, but control and improvement."5 A strong protestant ethic undergirds a large Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold R'ar Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge Uiliversity Press, 2005), 5. part of American interventions in the decolonizing world; interventions were truly meant to heZp decolonizing people. Some of the most abiding forms of these interventions are also the ones that draw from this idea of service most directly. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and StateIDefense Department provisions of military and technical aid are some of the best examples of this idea. Yet the actual mechanics and outcomes of these interventions left a trail of blood, poverty and strife across the second half of the century and led, in a very real way, to the highly charged international situation at the start of the twenty-first century. This is not to suggest in any way that America was the only power to intervene in the decolonizing world through the second half of the century (after all, decolonization from Europe was a process that did not come to a close until well into the 1970s); or even that it was always the most important party in the collapse and suppression of freedom in the newly decolonized world (national leaders, local interests and the long history of colonial violence were all important factors in this downward spiral); but rather that without the Cold War and the adoption of the decolonizing world as its primary arena, the course of post-colonial history could have been very difficult. In the end, the litany of interventions is long, and incredibly painful. It includes interventions in Angola and Zambia, Guatemala and Korea. From the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo to Iran-Contra, American interventions in the decolonizing world are remembered with bitterness the world over. The irony of America's interventions in the decolonizing world to create a 'manageable' world order would thus be almost comical if their consequences were not so gruesome. The legacies of colonial rule were drastic and traumatic enough, in and of themselves; the contest of the world's two superpowers in decolonizing regions of the world did not help the task of creating a peaceful and 'manageable' world. The most iconic, and oft quoted, example of the genealogies interventions created, is the link between American finding for the Afghan Mujahideen, via Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, against the Soviet Union in the 1980s' and the need for the 'War on Terror' undertaken by the United States in the new century. In the end, to understand America's relationship with the 'Third World' during the Cold War is to understand how American power is felt around the world today. To understand how America related to the decolonizing world during the Cold War, we need to understand how that world was created in the American imagination in the years right after the Second World War. Appendices Appendix A: Events between 1945 and 1950 Year Events 1945 January Yalta Conference April Roosevelt dies; Truman becomes President; UN created May V-E Day August Use of the atomic bomb; V-J Day, War ends 1946 March Churchill delivers 'Iron Curtain' Speech November Republican Party takes control of U.S. Congress 1947 January General Marshall become Secretary of State March Truman Doctrine is elucidated June-July Marshall Plan announced July National Security Act creates DoD, CIA; Kennan's 'Mr. X' article 1948 Jan-Feb Communist coups in Hungary and Czechoslovakia July Berlin Blockade begins November Truman wins an unexpected second term as President 1949 March Dean Acheson becomes Secretary of State April PJATO created; Chinese communists take Beijing May Berlin Blockade ends September Truman announces Soviet atomic bomb test 1950 April NSC 68 published June Start of the Korean War Appendix B: Timeline of Decolonization from 1945 - 1965 Year 1946 Philippines given independence by the United States Britain relinquishes mandate in Transjordan India and Pakistan get independence from Britain Burma and Ceylon get independence from Britain Britain withdraws from Palestine mandate Laos gets independence from France Dutch finally leave Indonesia after bitter struggle with Sukarno Libya becomes an independent kingdom Cambodia gets independence from France Vietnamese independence recognized, in principle, by France Algerian war of independence starts against France Sudan gains independence from Britain and Egypt Tunisia and Morocco gain independence from France Ghana is the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence from Britain Malaya gains independence from Britain Guinea gets independence from France Britain withdraws from Iraq Nigeria and Somalia get independence from Britain Benin, Burkino Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Central African Republic and Madagascar get independence from France. Belgian Congo gets independence Tanganyika, Sierra Leone, Kuwait and Cameroon gain independence from Britain. South Africa declared independence. Uganda, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago gain independence from Britain End of Algerian war of independence Belgians leave Rwanda and Burundi Kenya gains independence from Britain Northern Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi and Malta gain independence from Britain. Bibliogsap hy Primary Sources: Newspapers (From 1940 to 1955): New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New York Herald Tribune, Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago Defender, Hartford Courant, Christian Science Monitor. Government Documents: "United States Goverlunent Organization Manual." edited by United States Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.: Division of the Federal Register National Archives Establishment 1942- 1952. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 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