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NEED FOR COGNITION IS MORE THAN “THEY THINK”: REPRESENTATION
AND STRUCTURE OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE SELF-CONCEPT
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Jefifrey Allen Feinstein, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1996
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Dr. John Cacioppo, Adviser Approved by
Dr. Richard Petty
Dr. Robert Arkin
Dr. Curt Haugtvedt Department of Psychology UMI Number; 9710561
UMI Microform 9710561 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 ABSTRACT
Need for cognition refers to the predisposition to engage in efifortfiii cognitive activity, to enjoy engaging in efifortfiii cognitive activity, and to seek out cognitive tasks.
Research on the need for cognition suggests that it is a stable personality variable, which loads on a single factor, and predicts behavior on cognitive tasks. Need for cognition has been conceptualized as a process variable which predicts interindividual variations in the way one acquires and processes information from the social world. The present study extended this corpus of research by examining the representation of need for cognition in the self-concept of individuals differing in need for cognition. In Study 1, need for cognition was conceptualized within the broader scope of personality description by examining the structure of need for cognition within the Big 5 Factor Structure. Studies
2, 3, and 4 further examined the need for cognition by examining if it satisfies the criteria of a self-schema (Study 2), influences information processing about the self as would a self-schema dimension (Study 3), and influences information processing in relatively more social contexts as self-schema have in prior research (Study 4). Results of these studies confirm that need for cognition is a distinct process variable which is not entirely accounted for by the Big Five personality descriptors, that individuals high in need for cognition are self-schematic on engaging in cognitive acts and consequently information processing of information related to cognitive endeavors is facilitated relative to individuals low in need for cognition, and individual differences in need for cognition have distinct personological outcomes which are limited to cognitive attributes, but not social and emotional attributes.
Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to John Cacioppo for whose advice, mentoring, and collaborative wisdom this project would not have been possible. I would also like to extend my sincerest thanks to members of my family, Amy Harasty, Anita Feinstein, and Mel Feinstein, whose loving support was necessary for me to complete this document and whose intellects were necessary to help further my thinking about need for cognition. Special thanks to Amy,
Anita, and Mel whose persistence and diligence were necessary in helping to code the behavioral listing data in Study 3. Thanks also to members of John Cacioppo’s
Neuroscience Research Group, in particular Kirsten Poehlmann, Dave Klein, and Wendi
Gardner; and members of Richard Petty’s Group for Attitudes and Persuasion, in particular Richard Petty, Monique Fleming, Joseph Priester, and John Downing, for providing helpful suggestions to my program of research on the personology of need for cognition. Thanks to David Lozano for providing technical expertise and programming skill in the development of the response time software used in Study 3, Oliver John for insightful comments on an earlier draft of Study 1, and Michael Browne for helpful guidance in the analyses of Study 1.
IV VITA
April 3, 1969 ...... Bom - New York City, New York
1991 ...... B.A. Psychology, State University of New York at BufiTalo 1994 ...... M.A. Psychology, The Ohio State University 1991 - 1992 ...... Research Associate, Social Neuroscience Lab, The Ohio State University 1992 - 1996 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University
PUBLICATIONS
1. B. N. Major, J. A. Feinstein, & J. Crocker, The attributional ambiguity of affirmative
diC(\on. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 15, 113-142. (1994).
2. J. T. Cacioppo, R. E. Petty, J. A. Feinstein, & W. Jarvis, Dispositional differences in
cognition motivation: The life and times of individuals differing in the need for
cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 197-253, (1996). FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Psychology
Minor Field: Quantitative Psychology
Minor Field: Psychobiology
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract...... ii
Acknowledgements ...... iv
V ita ...... V
Table of contents ...... vii
List of tables...... ix
List of figures...... x
Chapters;
1. Personology of need for cognition ...... 1
Study 1 ...... 5 M ethod ...... 11 Results...... 14 Discussion...... 34
2. Representation of cognitive acts in the self-concept as a function of need for cognition ...... 36
Pilot Studies ...... 37
Study 2 ...... 51
M ethod ...... 50 R esults...... 52 Discussion...... 61
Vll 3. Need for cognition and processing information; A self-schema approach ...... 64
Study 3 ...... 65
Method and Design ...... 69 Results...... 73 Discussion...... 93
Study 4 ...... 98
M ethod ...... 101 Results...... 104
Discussion and general discussion ...... 110
List of References ...... 121
Appendices
A: 18 item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984)... 129 B: Script for ambiguous target in experiment 4...... 130 C: List of 24 Questions used in experiment 4 ...... 132 D: Analyses of Study 4 data using 16 traits used in Studies 2 and 3.... 133 E: Questionnaires used in Studies 1 through 4 ...... 139
Study 1, Sample 1 questionnaires...... 140 Study 1, Sample 2 questionnaires...... 146 Study 2 questionnaires...... 153 Study 3 questionnaires...... 163 Study 4 questionnaires...... 168
vm LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Correlations between need for cognition, social desirability and the Big S and Chronbach alphas of these measures ...... 16
2. Hierarchical regression of independent effects of Intellect and Conscientiousness on need for cognition controlling the effects of social desirability in the combined sample ...... 18
3. Relationship between need for cognition and facets and clusters from Conscientiousness, Intellect, and Openness to Experience ...... 20
4. Big 5 factor structure resulting from orthogonal target rotation...... 25
5. Four factor solution of combined need for cognition. Intellect, and Conscientiousness item s ...... 31
6. Extent that trait adjectives are perceived as descriptive of a cognitively motivated individual and mean positivity of each trait in Pilot Study 1 ...... 40
7. Perceived descriptiveness of an “effortfiil processor” (Pilot Study 2) and Valence of these traits (Pilot Study 3 ) ...... 46
8. Endorsement and importance ratings by need for cognition in Study 2 .. 57
9. Means and standard deviations for need for cognition, prime, recall dimension and trait type main effects 85
IX LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Scree plots of need for cognition items (upper panel) and TDA Big 5 item s...... 23
2. Scree plot of eigenvalues when need for cognition items are factor analyzed with Intellect and Conscientiousness item s ...... 30
3. Endorsements as a function of need for cognition, trait valence, and trait cognitivity...... 75
4. Percentile residualized response time scores as a function of need for cognition ...... 79
5. Interaction between prime and type of behavior listed on the number of behaviors listed ...... 86
6. Number of behaviors listed as a function of need for cognition and wordtype ...... 88
7. Importance of communicating information about self and other in a getting acquainted scenario...... 106
8. Impressions of an ambiguous targ e t...... 107
9. Confidence in ratings of an ambiguous target ...... 109
10. Number of questions asked of other or conveyed of self in a getting acquainted scenario ...... I ll
11. Importance of conveying information about self (top panel) and learning information about other (bottom panel) in a getting acquainted scenario ...... 135
12. Confidence in judgments of targ e t ...... 137
X CHAPTER 1
PERSONOLOGY OF NEED FOR COGNITION
The intellectual is different from the ordinary man, but only in certain sections of
his personality, and even then not all the time.
George Orwell (1947)
Although not a personality psychologist, Orwell’s statement presents three interesting issues concerning personological differences in cognitive motivation. First, do those who tend to be cognitively motivated (i.e., intellectuals) manifest characteristics different from those who do not possess such motivation? Second, are these differences isolated to personality and behavioral dimensions specific to cogitation or do such individual differences cut across general personality structure? Third, what are the structural properties of cognitive activity within the self-concept of individuals differing in cognitive motivation which would predict its stability (or instability) over time? The first of these issues has been addressed by a long and productive line of research examining the behavioral manifestation of need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Just as an intellectual is “inclined toward abstract thinking about philosophical subjects” (American Heritage Dictionary,
1995), an individual who possesses the need for cognition is dispositionally motivated to
“seek, acquire, think about, and reflect back on information to make sense of stimuli, relationships, and events in their world” (Cacioppo, et al., 1996, p. 198). The second and third propositions are relevant to the personological structure of need for cognition and its consequential eflfects on information processing about the self and others. Put differently, do individual diflferences in cognitive motivation produce different representations of cognitive activity in the self-concept? Research examining need for cognition has only recently begun examining such self-concept differences which are likely to underlie individual diflferences in need for cognition (see Cacioppo et al., 1996). After a brief review of individual differences in need for cognition as an illustration of Orwell’s first point, individual differences in the personology of need for cognition are examined.
Specifically, Study 1 examines the structure of need for cognition within general trait taxonomies to illuminate the manifest attributes of individuals differing in need for cognition; Study 2 furthers our understanding of need for cognition by examining the structural representation of need for cognition in the self-concept; and Studies 3 and 4 examine how self-schemas of individuals differing in need for cognition influence information processing about the self and other. Personology o f Needfor Cognition
Watson, Clark, and Harkness (1994) noted that key aspects of the definition of a personality construct are that they are internal, organized, and shown by individuals over time and situations. Accordingly, the need for cognition scale (see Appendix A) measures individual differences in the inclination to engage in and enjoy effortfiil cognitive activity; it has been reliably measured across cultures and samples (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Domic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 1991; Pieters, Verplanken, & Modde, 1987), consistently loads on a single factor when individuals are asked to indicate both the direction and magnitude of their response (Cacioppo et al., 1996), accounts for significant variance in behavior beyond that explained by intellectual ability (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty,
Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), and can be linked to important life outcomes such as academic achievement (see review by Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Furthermore, the need for cognition is conceptualized as a process variable because it predicts interindividual variations in the way people process information about the world around them (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Although individuals differing in need for cognition possess generally equivalent cognitive ability with which they abstract meaning fi"om the social world, individuals differing in need for cognition are likely to implement these tools to a different extent. Compared to low need for cognition individuals, high need for cognition individuals are more likely to engage in effortful cognitive processing of stimuli, are more likely to seek out cognitively challenging stimuli, and are more likely to enjoy cognitively challenging tasks (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Cacioppo, Petty, &
Morris, 1983; Chaiken, 1987).
As a consequence of differentially utilizing their cognitive resources to translate incoming information, one can expect that individuals high and low in need for cognition differ on a variety of other dimensions, as well. Consistent with this reasoning, Cacioppo,
Petty, Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) found that high need for cognition individuals tend to gain mastery of information through deliberative processing; they tend to “have active and exploring minds, seek out information from their surrounding, and habitually spend time coping with predicaments in their daily lives” (p. 243). When faced with a persuasive message, for instance, individuals high in need for cognition base their attitudes on their efforts to understand the message and its implications, while individuals who score low in need for cognition are more likely to rely on peripheral characteristics which are typically irrelevant to the content of the message (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Haugtvedt,
Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). In a similar vein, when making decisions about the leadership of the country, individuals high in need for cognition engage in preelection information searches months earlier (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), collect more detailed information from more informative sources (Ahlering, 1987; Condra, 1992; Ferguson et al., 1985), and develop a richer body of political knowledge than do low need for cognition individuals (Cacioppo et al., 1986). Individuals low need for cognition, on the other hand, tend to forestall this process until demanded by the situation (i.e., election day). Accordingly, individuals high in need for cognition tend to be more agentic, at least regarding intellective topics and events, than individuals low in need for cognition.
Study 1
High and low need for cognition individuals differ in the personological consequences of their motivation to effortfiilly process information; but do the different motivational styles of high and low need for cognition individuals result in generally disparate trait profiles, or does need for cognition represent a facet of a person’s trait profile that is limited to conceptually similar personality dimensions? Cacioppo et al.
(1996) recently suggested that these issues could be addressed by relating need for cognition to a more general measure of personality organization such as the Big Five
Model of Personality Structure. The Big Five Trait Taxonomy represents a comprehensive hierarchical organization of personality description (Costa & McCrae,
1992; Goldberg, 1990) in which the “Big Five” represent five superordinate factors which are the most general dimensions on which personality can be described. Each factor subsumes the variance of subordinate personological factors (referred to as clusters or facets). Moreover, clusters which underlie a single superordinate factor are likely to covary as a result of their shared association with common superordinate factors (Watson,
Clark, and Harkness, 1994; Digman, 1990). Although the labels for these superordinate factors differ across researchers, the five factors are typically numbered one through five and are respectively titled: I) Surgency or Extraversion, II) Agreeableness, IH)
Conscientiousness or Dependability, IV) Emotional Stability or Neuroticism, and V) Openness to Experience or Intellect (Goldberg, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992; for reviews see Digman, 1990; John, 1990).
Consistent with the proposition that need for cognition differences tend to be isolated to dimensions directly related to behaviors motivated by the desire to think effortfiilly about issues (e.g., cognitive agency) and is relatively independent from social and emotional features of personality and behavior, Cacioppo et al. (1996) predicted that need for cognition differences would be obtained on the Intellect factor (V) which subsumes traits denoting curiosity and intellectuality; and on the Conscientiousness factor
(m) which subsumes traits denoting cognitive persistence and organization. Moreover, if need for cognition diflferences are isolated to dimensions of cognitive processing, diligence, organization, motivation, and ability, only clusters within Intellect and
Conscientiousness which are most related to cognitive dimensions of personality would be associated with need for cognition. The remaining clusters within Intellect and
Conscientiousness and the remaining superordinate factors (i.e., Surgency, Agreeableness,
Emotional stability) are predicted to be less strongly related to need for cognition.
Theory from the Big Five tradition is consistent with the predictions of Cacioppo et al. (1996). Conceptualizations of the Big 5 factors, for instance, suggest that the third and fifth factors have been equated with the manifest personality attributes that one would expect from individuals differing in need for cognition. For example, in a review of the
Big Five literature, Digman (1990) points out that although the five factor pattern is relatively robust, these superordinate factors have been conceptualized somewhat differently across researchers. The third factor (i.e., Conscientiousness) has also been conceptualized as the Will to Achieve (Digman, 1988) and Thinking Introversion
(Guilford, 1975); and the fifth factor (i.e.. Openness to Experience, Intellect) has been referred to as Inquiring Intellect (Fiske, 1949), Intelligence (Cattell, 1957), and
Intellectance (Hogan, 1986). These differering conceptualizations of the third and fifth superordinate factors leads one to infer that, by any label, these superordinate dimensions subsume attributes which would be expected to covary with need for cognition.
While the third and fifth factors have been conceptualized as being related to cognitive behaviors (John, 1990; Digman, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992), empirical research has also illustrated that these dimensions are associated with outcomes related to engaging in cognitive activity. For example, in a longitudinal study of the development of the fifth factor, Lanthier & Bates (1995) illustrated that cognitive stimulation in infancy and intellectual development throughout childhood both predicted teenagers’ Openness to
Experience. Consequently, the fifth factor covaries with measures of intellectual ability
(McCrae & Costa, 1985) and academic performance (John, Caspi, Robins, Moffit, and
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1994). Similarly, research on the third factor has demonstrated that
Conscientiousness covaries with intelligence (Costa & McCrae, 1992), academic performance (John et al., 1994), and the willingness to achieve in school independently from measures of intellectual ability (Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Wiggins,
Blackburn, & Hackman, 1969). Such relationships led McCrae & John (1992) to argue that “Open people are inquisitive. If they are also Conscientious, their curiosity may take the form of sustained and systematic study of a topic.” (p. 205). These manifest personality attributes are consistent with those expected of an individual high in need for cognition.
In addition to addressing the relationship between need for cognition and the Big 5 in Study 1, an additional goal of this study is to examine an issue surrounding the conceptual validity of the need for cognition scale. Using the original 34 item need for cognition scale, Cacioppo & Petty (1982) found that need for cognition lies on a single factor tapping the predisposition to engage in and enjoy efifortfiii information processing.
This finding has been replicated many times using disparate samples and cultures (e.g., undergraduates, mail survey, factor workers, university faculty, Dutch community sample; see Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Sadowsld, 1993; Perri & Wolfgang, 1988; Pieters,
Verplanken, & Modde, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Verplanken, Hazenberg, and Palenwan,
1992; and Domic, Ekehammar, and Laaksonen, 1991). These replication studies were based on various versions of the original need for cognition scale used by Cacioppo &
Petty (1982) on which items tap the extent o f agreement fi-om “extremely uncharacteristic of me” to “extremely characteristic of me” with several intermediate response options (see
Appendix A). Cacioppo & Petty (1982) designed this scale by selecting the 34 of 45 items which best discriminated between individuals known to differ in need for cognition, which loaded on a single factor, and which were internally consistent. These items were further refined by Cacioppo et al. (1984) by selecting the 18 items from the 34 item scale which loaded most on a single factor. However, Tanaka, Panter, & Winbome (1988) used a dichotomous true-false format on which subjects indicate absolute agreement or disagreement on the original pool of 45 need for cognition items. In their study, they concluded that need for cognition is a multidimensional construct subsuming three factors: cognitive complexity, cognitive confidence, and cognitive persistence. The structure of
Tanaka et al.’s (1988) 3 factor solution has not appeared to be particularly replicable, however (Cacioppo et al., 1996). It also remains an open question whether the differences in factor structure obtained by Tanaka et al. (1988) are the result of a previously unmeasured multidimensionality in the processes measured by the need for cognition scale, the result of distinct personality attributes to which need for cognition is an antecedent, or the result of the methodology implemented by Tanaka et al. (1988).
By scaling the need for cognition on an alternative metric of personality description such as the Big Five, which is considered a comprehensive taxonomy of personality description, the extent that need for cognition taps multiple features of personality can be assessed (John, 1990). If need for cognition covaries with two or more of the five factors, it would be of interest to determine if this shared variance is the result of the need for cognition scale items loading entirely on these superordinate factors in a factor analysis (suggesting potential multidimensionality in need for cognition), or if need for cognition maintains its own factor structure. The latter result would suggest that the psychological bases of need for cognition are not captured by the Big Five factors with which need for cognition covaries. Instead, this result would suggest that covariation between need for cognition and any of the factors would reflect phenotypic personality attributes resulting fl^om interindividual variations in cognitive motivation.
An ancillary goal of Study 1 is to extend our knowledge of the location of need for cognition within the landscape of personality constructs. In their review, Cacioppo et al.
(1996) observed that need for cognition was moderately related to situation specific measures of information processesing and unrelated to specific affective response and affective experience. These relationships were further tested in Study 1 by including measures which were not included in previous research on the need for cognition. First, the Concern for Future Consequences (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards,
1994) measures the tendency to consider long term implications of one’s actions relative to short term implications. Because need for cognition has been moderately associated with other measures of situation specific cognitive processing, it is likely that need for cognition would be moderately related to the concern for future consequences. Second, although need for cognition has been unrelated to specific measures of affect (e.g., anger) and affective experience (e.g., affect intensity), the relationship between need for cognition and general measures of affect has not been addressed. To examine these relationships, the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was included to relate need for cognition with general measures of positive and negative affect. In addition to these measures, two measures of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe,
1964; Paulhus, 1991) were included in Study 1 to further examine the extent that
10 individual diflferences in cognitive motivation are independent from the motivation to be perceived positively.
M ethod
A total of 151 undergraduates at the Ohio State University participated in one of two samples to partially satisfy an introductoiy psychology course requirement. Sixty-six individuals participated in Sample 1 and 85 individuals participated in Sample 2. All subjects participated in groups of approximately 20. The procedures and scales administered to each sample differed slightly and are described below.
Procedure
Participants in Sample 1 completed a packet of five self-report questionnaires after completing a survey for an unrelated study. The packet consisted of the 18 item Need for
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (MCS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), the Positive and Negative Aflfect Scale
(PANAS; Watson, et al., 1988), the unipolar version of Goldberg’s 100-item Trait
Descriptive Adjectives assessment of the Big 5 superordinate factors (TDA; Goldberg,
1990), and the Concern for Future Consequences Scale (CFCS, Strathman, et al., 1994).
The NCS was presented first, the MCS and PANAS were next (with their order counterbalanced across subjects), and the TDA and CFCS were last (with their order counterbalanced across subjects). Following their completion of these scales, participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.^
' These questionnaires, and all others, can be found in Appendix E. 11 The procedures to which individuals in Sample 2 were exposed differed in six ways from that used in Sample 1. First, in order to measure trait clusters underlying
Conscientiousness and Intellect, the TDA was revised to include 70 additional adjectives which tap these subordinate dimensions (Goldberg, 1992). Second, because individuals may not be familiar with the meaning of all of the traits in the TDA assessment (see Block,
1995), the response options were modified from Sample 1 so that subjects could skip an adjective when they were unsure of its meaning (see Block, 1995). Factor and cluster scores were obtained by computing the mean responses to the items within each factor or cluster completed by each subject. On average, 9.7 words were omitted per subject
(5.7%) and these omission rates did not differ significantly as a function of need for cognition (r=. 13, ns). Third, because Goldberg’s (1992) fifth factor measure focuses primarily on the intellective features of personality, Costa and McCrae’s (1992) Openness to experience measure of the fifth factor was included as a broader measure of the fifth factor. Fourth, because questionnaire order can influence self-report responses
(Schumann & Pressor, 1981), scales administered to Sample 2 were ordered using a
Pairwise Balanced Latin Square Design controlling for serial position and sequence effects. Fifth, Paulhus’ (1991) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) was included as an additional index of desirable responding.^ Sixth, to minimize the size of the
^ Because MCSD was highly correlated with the average BIDR score (r=.67, p<.001) and both BIDR subscales (impression management: r = .56, p <.001; self-deception: r = .59, p<.001), and MCSD had the advantage of being administered in both Sample 1 and Sample 2, only the MCSD results were used in analyses using social desirability. Results were virtually identical when the BIDR or its subscales were substituted for the MCS in the Sample 2 data. 12 questionnaire packet, the PANAS and CFCS were not administered to Sample 2.
Following their completion of the scales, subjects were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed
The NCS includes 18 items to which participants rated their agreement with self- descriptive statements concerning the intrinsic motivation to think on a scale ranging from
1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). The TDA assessment of the Big 5 includes an alphabetized list of trait adjectives with instructions to determine how accurately each term describes one’s personality on a scale ranging from 1
(extremely inaccurate) to 9 (extremely accurate) scale. Goldberg (1992; 1990) has demonstrated that responses to ratings of these traits load on five factors. The Openness to Experience scale has 48 statements on which subjects made self-descriptiveness ratings on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. The MCS includes 33 true/false dichotomous response items in which one response option is assumed to be a socially desirable response (e.g., “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable”).
On the BIDR, subjects rated their agreement or disagreement with 40 situations varying in their social desirability on a 1 (Not at all True) to 7 (Very True) scale. The PANAS assesses subjects’ positive and negative emotions on the day of the experiment. Response options on the PANAS are on a 5 point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all descriptive of me today) to 5 (extremely descriptive of me today). The CFCS is a 12 item scale which assesses individuals’ tendency to think about distal consequences of their actions instead of more proximal outcomes. Response options range from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic).
13 Adequate scale reliabilities have been found for all scales. Previous research with the NCS has demonstrated alphas typically above .85 (Cacioppo et. al., 1996) and test- retest reliabilities of .88 over one week (Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992) and .66 over 8 months (Verplanken, 1991). Research with the 100 item Big Five Assessment has demonstrated alphas ranging from .82 to .97 across all five factors (Goldberg, 1992, Study
4) and correlations with other measures of the Big 5 factors structure [e.g., Costa &
McCrae’s (1985) NEO-PI, ravg.= 71; Goldberg, 1992]. Goldberg (1990) reported internal consistencies for the Conscientiousness clusters ranging from .45 to .86 and for the Intellect clusters ranging from .52 to .84. Costa and McCrae (1992) reported scale reliabilities ranging from .58 to .80 on each of the 6 Openness facets and reported test- retest reliabilities of .86. The MCSD has also demonstrated satisfactory internal validity
(alphas ranged from .73 to .88 over four studies, Paulhus, 1991) and good test-retest reliability over 1 week (r=.84, Fisher, 1967) and over one month (r=.88, Crowne &
Marlowe, 1964). To insure adequate internal consistencies in the present study
Chronbach alphas were performed. These alphas are reported in the rightmost column of
Table 1 for the NCS, MCSD, and measures of the five superordinate factors, and in Table
3 for the clusters of Conscientiousness, and Intellect, and the facets of Openness to
Experience. These tables are discussed in depth below.
Results
Need for Cognition and The Big A Five. preliminary analysis was conducted to insure that need for cognition, social desirability, or traits descriptive adjectives scores did
14 not dififer as a function of sample. This analysis revealed no significant effects (F’s (1,149)
< 1.75, ps > . 18). In all analyses, data was combined across samples when possible.
Special note is made below when an analysis or result is confined to data obtained fi'om only one of the two samples.
It was predicted that need for cognition would be positively correlated with
Intellect and Conscientiousness, but uncorrelated with the remaining superfactors. These correlations are reported in Table 1. As expected, the need for cognition covaried with
Intellect (r=.49, p<.001) and Conscientiousness (r = .38, p<001). Openness to
Experience was also significantly correlated with need for cognition in Sample 2 (r = .42, p < .001). Need for cognition was also weakly, but significantly correlated with
Agreeableness (r= .17, p< .05) and Emotional stability (r= .18. p<.05), and uncorrelated with Surgency (r= -.02, ns).
Because need for cognition was significantly correlated with social desirability (r =
.30, p< .001), correlations were computed between need for cognition and Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional stability. Intellect and Openness to Experience with socially desirable response strategies statistically controlled. This analysis revealed that only
Conscientiousness and Intellect were significantly associated with need for cognition after controlling for social desirability (rs = .29 and .46 respectively, ps < .001). In addition, the correlation between Openness to experience and need for cognition became larger when controlling social desirability (r = .48, p < .001), presumably because Openness to
15 Correlations between Need for Cognition, Social Desirability and the Big 5 and Chronbach alphas of these measures
Correlation with NC
Measure Raw r r with SD Chronbach ______partialed alpha
Need for Cognition .89 Marlowe Crowne Social .30*** .78 Desirability
Surgency -.02 -.06 .83 Agreeableness .17* .04 .89 Conscientiousness .38*** .29*** .87 Emotional Stability .18* .02 .87 Intellect 49*** .46*** .83
Openness to Experience .42*** .48*** .87
Note that all correlations but Openness to Experience were obtained from the combined data from sample 1 and sample 2. Openness to experience was included only in the sample 2 battery of questioimaires. * p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p < .001
Table 1: Correlations between Need for Cognition, Social Desirability and the Big 5 and Chronbach alphas of these measures
16 Experience was negatively correlated with social desirability (r = -. 18, p < .06). A complete listing of these correlations can be found in Table 1.
To examine the independent effects of Conscientiousness and Intellect on need for
cognition, several partial correlations were computed. As in the previous analysis, social desirability was statistically controlled. The results of this analysis, including correlations, partial correlations, R^s, and Betas are depicted in Table 2. This analysis revealed that need for cognition accounted for significant variance in Intellect with both social desirability and Conscientiousness partialled out of the model (r = .41, p < . 001; see Table
2, model 1). Similarly, need for cognition accounted for significant varience in
Conscientiousness beyond that of Intellect and social desirability (r = .19, p < .05; Table 2, model 2). Thus, consistent with expectations, need for cognition independently predicted
Intellect and Conscientiousness, even when social desirability was statistically controlled.
Need for Cognition did not predict any of the remaining factors. Interestingly, the for the model in which social desirability. Intellect, and Conscientiousness predicted need for cognition is only .31 suggesting that considerable variance in need for cognition is not accounted for by the Big 5 model. This latter result suggests that although need for cognition covaries with Conscientiousness and Intellect, need for cognition is not entirely subsumed by these descriptors. This issue will be addressed in more depth below.
Cluster and Facet Scores. It was also hypothesized that need for cognition would be related to those specific characteristics of Intellect and Conscientiousness that reflect characteristics of personality which are typical of individuals who are motivated to think
17 Hierarchical Regression of Independent Effects of Intellect and Conscientiousness on Need for Cognition controlling the effects of Social Desirability in the combined sample
Step in Entered into Model Partial Correlations Beta Probability of Regression of Predictors not in R^ & Beta Model______model______
Model I ; Effects o f Intellect on Needfor Cognition after partialling Conscientiousness and Social Desirability
1. Social Desirability III: r = .29, p < .001 ,09 .30 <001 V: r = .46, p < .001
2. Conscientiousness V; r = .41, p < .001 .17 .31 <.001
00 3. Intellect .31 .40 <001
Model 2: Effects of Conscientiousness on Needfor Cognition after partialling Intellect and Social Desirability
1. Social Desirability III: r = .29, p< .001 .09 .30 < 001 V: r = .46, p < .001
2. Intellect III: r = .19, p < .03 .28 .45 <.001
Table 2: Hierarchical Regression of Independent Effects of Intellect and Conscientiousness on Need for Cognition controlling the effects of Social Desirability in the combined sample about the world. This hypothesis was tested by examining the correlations between need for cognition and Conscientiousness and Intellect clusters (Goldberg, 1992) and Openness to Experience facets (Costa & McCrae, 1992). A complete listing of these correlations sorted by the magnitude of the correlation can be found in Table 3. As predicted, need for cognition was significantly and positively correlated with those clusters within
Conscientiousness that represented cognitive persistence, organization, and diligence, and was significantly and negatively correlated with those features that tapped cognitive lethargy, disorganization, and aimlessness. Need for cognition was uncorrelated with nonthoughtful characteristics such as conventional, punctual, and fiivolous. Furthermore, those features with acceptable reliabilities represented both thoughtful and nonthoughtful features of Conscientiousness (see Table 3, third column). Thus, differential internal consistency of responses cannot account for the pattern of results.
On the Intellect factor, need for cognition was significantly correlated with all of the clusters in Goldberg’s (1992) measure of the fifth factor, but the relationship between need for cognition and unsophisticated and unimaginative became nonsignificant when social desirability was statistically controlled (see Table 3). The fact that need for cognition was related to most of the intellect clusters is likely the result of Goldberg’s focus on the intellective features of the fifth superordinate factor. The openness measure of the fifth factor affords the advantage of tapping a broader range of features of the fifth factor in addition to features related to intellective information processing. Examination of the relationship between need for cognition and the facets of the Openness to Experience
19 Relationships between need for cognition and facets and clusters from Conscientiousness, Intellect, and Openness to experience in sample 2
asure rawr r with SD Chronbach partialed alpha iscientiousness Clusters Aimless -.46*** -.44*** .36 Logical .45*** .49*** .52 Negligent -.43*** -.39*** .67 EfGcient .43*** .35** .47 Disorganized -.42*** -.36*** .72 Persistent .39*** .39*** .51 Precise .36*** .33** .51 Forgetful -.36*** -.32** .73 Slothful -.36*** -.33** .42 Reckless -.33** -.25* .32 Indecisive -.29** -.20+ .14 Dependable .29** .21+ .84 Organized .28** .21+ .35 Dignified .25* .20+ .55 Thrifty .24* .20+ .23 Cautious .21* .15 .78 Decisive .21* .13 .52 Inconsistent -.17+ -.07 .33 Predictable .08 -.01 .58 Nonconforming -.07 .04 .39 Punctual .06 .04 .87 Frivolous -.05 -.07 -.03 Conventional .01 -.01 .39
Table 3 (continued on next page)
Table 3: Relationships between need for cognition and facets and clusters from Conscientiousness, Intellect, and Openness to experience in sample 2
20 Table 3 (continued)
Measure rawr r with SD Chronbach partialed alpha Intellect Cluster Intelligence .39*** .36** .84 Intellectuality 38*** .37** .60 Shallow -.37*** -.33** .43 Unintelligent -.33** -.28* .54 Creative .29** .27* .76 Depth .28** .30** .44 Insight .25* .23* .61 Curious .23* .25* .28 Imperceptive -.22* -.21+ -.06 Sophisticated .22* .16 .59 Unimaginative -.18* -15 .81
Openness to Experience facets Openness to Ideas .60*** .60*** .74 Openness to Actions .30** .28* .64 Openness to Fantasy .25* .34** .76 Openness to Aesthetics .20* .23* .74 Openness to Feelings .09 .19 .74
+ p < .10; * p < .05; **p<.01; *** p<.001
21 scale were consistent with expectations; need for cognition was most strongly related to
Openness to Ideas (r = .60, p < .001) and the correlations between need for cognition and the remaining facets is considerably smaller (rs < .31). Thus, comparing the need for cognition with a more inclusive measure of the fifth superordinate factor revealed that need for cognition primarily taps the intellective features of the fifth factor, and is less strongly related to the remaining features of the fifth factor (see also Berzonsky &
Sullivan, 1992; Sadowski & Cobum, 1995).
Multidimensiomlity o f Needfor Cognition? Two preliminary factor analyses were conducted to examine if the factor structure of the need for cognition scale and TDA inventory of the Big 5 replicated the factor structures obtained in previous research. An exploratory maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted on the Need for Cognition scale. As illustrated by the scree plot of eigenvalues in the upper panel of Figure 1, the need for cognition is clearly represented by a single factor with the first eigenvalue accounting for 81% of the variance and the second eigenvalue accounting for 11% of the variance.^
A similar analysis was conducted on responses to the TDA assessment of the Big 5 to examine whether it measured the five factors obtained in previous research.
Examination of the scree plot of eigenvalues in the bottom panel of Figure 1 reveals that 3 dominant factors emerged. However, to examine whether the five factor solution is a
^ The NCS was also factor analyzed with responses recoded to a dichotomous scale indicating agreement/disagreement as was presented to Tanaka et al.’s (1988) particiants (neutral responses were randomly coded as agree or disagree). Examination of the eigenvalues again revealed one factor (first five eigenvalues = 5.36, 1.00, .59, .52, .42).
22 Scree Plots of Factor Analysis on NCS items (upper panel) and Big 5 items (lower panel)
NCS
10 ♦
2 ♦ ♦ 0
-2 Eigenvalues
B ig 5
110 •
-■
■ ■ « 50 ♦
30 ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ■■
-10 . Eigenvalues
Figure 1 : Scree Plots of Need for Cognition items (upper panel) and TDA Big 5 items (lower panel)
23 reasonable characterization of these data, a target rotation (Browne, 1972; Browne,
1991; McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996) was conducted in which the factor loadings were rotated to the predicted five orthogonal factors obtained by Goldberg
(1990, 1992) and others. This analysis revealed a simple structure which is characteristic of the five factor model. The factor loadings can be found in Table 4 and illustrate that average magnitude of factor loadings on each factor are largest on items designed as indicators of the factor. Although the target rotation does not suggest that the five factor solution is the best solution, nor does it provide a strong test of the validity of the five factor solution relative to other solutions, the target rotation does indicate that the five factor solution obtained in previous studies is a reasonable depiction of the present data
(Browne, 1972).
A third exploratory factor analysis was conducted to examine the structure of need for cognition by factor analyzing it with the five factor assessment. This analysis provided another way of examining whether need for cognition items are subsumed by
Conscientiousness and Intellect factors, or if need for cognition represents an independent factor with manifest personality attributes which covary with Conscientiousness and
Intellect. To examine these issues, the 18 need for cognition items, the 10 most highly loading Conscientiousness items (from the target rotation; see Table 4), and the 10 most highly loading Intellect items were submitted to a maximum likelihood factor analysis with an oblique Harris-Kaiser rotation. Examination of the scree plot (see Figure 2) and factor
24 Big 5 Factor Structure Resulting from Orthogonal Target Rotation
I n m IV V
Extraverted -0.045 0.128 -0.084 -0.005 0.145 Talkative -0.541 -0.196 0.110 0.374 0.158 Assertive -0.398 -0.145 0.357 -0.074 0.312 Verbal -0.327 -0.137 0.026 0.322 0.352 Energetic -0.289 -0.319 0.346 -0.092 0.265 Bold -0.564 -0.032 0.127 -0.028 0.414 Active -0.155 -0.327 0.311 -0.131 0.297 Daring -0.328 0.049 -0.142 -0.008 0.293 Vigorous -0.239 0.123 -0.003 0.120 0.275 Unrestrained 0.018 0.292 -0.116 -0.214 -0.067 Introverted 0.374 0.303 -0.221 -0.093 0.168 Shy 0.837 0.051 -0.074 0.047 -0.009 Quiet 0.753 -0.045 0.055 -0.024 0.156 Reserved 0.420 0.012 0.151 -0.046 0.250 Untalkative 0.653 0.075 -0.089 -0.290 -0.113 Inhibited 0.323 0.342 -0.277 0.227 0.093 Withdrawn 0.535 0.397 -0.265 0.135 -0.103 Timid 0.671 0.159 -0.072 0.158 0.036 Bashful 0.676 -0.032 -0.029 0.169 0.048 Unadventerous 0.285 0.143 0.147 0.040 -0.378
Surgency 0.4216 0.1654 0.1501 0.1299 0.1966 (mean magnitude)
Kind 0.060 -0.641 0.319 0.081 0.390 Cooperative -0.133 -0.630 0.321 -0.025 0.299 Sympathetic 0.050 -0.478 0.138 0.255 0.166 Warm -0.165 -0.610 0.281 0.194 0.388 Trustful -0.216 -0.486 0.372 -0.046 0.089 Consider 0.030 -0.680 0.267 -0.017 0.285 Pleasant -0.124 -0.690 0.425 -0.087 0.379 Agreeable -0.016 -0.606 0.233 -0.133 0.305 Helpful -0.077 -0.649 0.364 0.064 0.330 Generous 0.066 -0.568 0.245 0.147 0.289
Table 4 (continued on next page)
Table 4: Big 5 Factor Structure Resulting from Orthogonal Target Rotation
25 Table 4 (continued)
I n m IV V Cold 0.157 0.490 -0.206 0.228 0.081 Unkind 0.149 0.708 -0.138 -0.107 -0.351 Unsympathetic 0.140 0.558 -0.189 -0.310 -0.279 Distrust 0.154 0.360 -0.318 0.071 -0.121 Harsh 0.045 0.556 -0.248 0.208 0.100 Demanding -0.063 0.175 0.049 0.291 0.258 Rude 0.130 0.523 -0.321 0.290 -0.100 Selfish 0.322 0.482 -0.269 0.348 -0.031 Uncooperative 0.251 0.712 -0.158 -0.161 -0.412 Uncharitable 0.388 0.606 -0.164 -0.124 -0.372
Agree 0.1368 0.5604 0.2513 0.1594 0.2513 (mean magnitude)
Organized 0.019 -0.398 0.850 -0.011 0.197 Systematic 0.071 -0.002 0.387 -0.123 0.199 Thorough -0.002 0.044 0.374 -0.016 0.163 Practical -0.066 -0.462 0.521 -0.017 0.168 Neat 0.043 -0.366 0.788 0.083 0.180 Efficient -0.039 -0.222 0.507 -0.105 0.324 Careful -0.018 -0.465 0.496 -0.061 0.337 Steady -0.157 -0.203 0.394 -0.199 0.210 Conscientious 0.148 -0.197 0.153 -0.011 0.228 Prompt 0.102 -0.123 0.417 0.029 0.262 Disorganized 0.077 0.178 -0.731 0.120 -0.126 Careless 0.070 0.407 -0.601 0.143 -0.116 Unsystematic 0.209 0.185 -0.380 -0.219 -0.137 Inefficient 0.074 0.329 -0.560 0.111 -0.176 Undependable 0.130 0.428 -0.264 -0.057 -0.445 Impractical 0.132 0.415 -0.503 0.021 -0.055 Negligent 0.019 0.311 -0.500 0.183 -0.041 Inconsistent 0.206 0.169 -0.552 0.179 -0.068
Table 4 (continued on next page)
26 Table 4 (continued)
D m IV
Haphazard 0.001 0.233 -0.461 0.072 0.116 Sloppy 0.056 0.279 -0.679 0.001 -0.104 Conscientiousness 0.08200 0.2708 0.5059 0.0881 0.1826 (mean magnitude)
Unenvious -0.131 -0.109 0.234 -0.565 -0.122 Unemotional 0.095 0.248 0.114 -0.545 -0.191 Relaxed -0.163 -0.237 0.248 -0.436 0.381 Imperterbable 0.187 0.282 -0.154 -0.142 0.026 Unexcitable 0.315 0.347 -0.015 -0.267 -0.374 Undemanding 0.11 0.048 -0.059 -0.257 -0.363 Anxious -0.039 0.074 -0.054 0.402 0.181 Moody 0.165 0.349 -0.428 0.604 -0.003 Temperamental 0.165 0.348 -0.254 0.485 0.100 Envious 0.278 0.353 -0.279 0.369 -0.170 Emotional 0.033 -0.172 -0.107 0.581 0.146 Irritable 0.24 0.339 -0.217 0.463 0.017 Fretful 0.247 0.117 -0.184 0.370 0.098 Jealous 0.295 0.357 -0.393 0.528 -0.191 Touchy 0.236 0.237 -0.293 0.503 0.020 Nervous 0.404 0.144 -0.311 0.526 -0.125 Insecure 0.577 0.307 -0.31 0.321 -0.261 Fearful 0.252 0.062 -0.245 0.568 -0.070 Self-pity 0.371 0.462 -0.447 0.530 -0.180 Highstrung -0.061 0.253 -0.205 0.329 0.073
Emotional Stability 0.2182 0.2423 0.2276 0.4396 0.1546 (mean magnitude)
Intellectual -0.082 -0.212 0.289 -0.078 0.495 Creative -0.296 -0.237 -0.151 0.052 0.583 Complex 0.168 0.019 0.093 0.151 0.401 Imaginative -0.258 -0.154 -0.142 0.086 0.573
Table 4 (continued on next page)
27 Table 4 (continued)
I n m IV V Bright -0.229 -0.250 0.272 -0.088 0.491 Philosophical 0.061 0.183 -0.139 -0.007 0.436 Artistic -0.151 -0.131 -0.181 0.057 0.468 Deep -0.107 -0.045 0.098 0.081 0.518 Innovative 0.020 0.002 -0.104 -0.162 0.375 Introspective 0.120 0.161 -0.053 -0.112 0.267 Unintellectual 0.179 0.372 -0.141 -0.014 -0.607 Unintelligent 0.179 0.367 -0.139 -0.021 -0.576 Unimaginative 0.412 0.327 0.149 -0.079 -0.605 Uncreative 0.377 0.337 0.062 -0.008 -0.554 Simple 0.262 -0.079 -0.067 -0.126 -0.157 Unsophisticated 0.227 0.296 -0.354 -0.112 -0.446 Unreflective 0.130 0.296 -0.194 -0.225 -0.286 Imperceptible 0.153 0.301 -0.158 0.037 -0.039 Uninquisitive 0.197 0.306 -0.156 -0.260 -0.438 Shallow 0.262 0.450 -0.279 0.186 -0.206
Intellect 0.1935 0.2263 0.1611 0.0971 0.4261 (mean magnitude)
28 loadings (see Table 5) reveal that four factors were obtained/ The factor loadings illustrate that all but one need for cognition item loaded on the first factor and that all
Conscientiousness items loaded on the second factor. These factors represent Cognitive
Motivation and Conscientiousness respectively. Intellect items fell within the first, third, and fourth factor; Intellect items indicating cognitive ability fell within the first factor.
Intellect items indicating cognitive creativity and innovativeness fell on the third factor, and Intellect items indicating the lack of cognitive ability fell on the fourth factor. In addition, the need for cognition factor and intellect-creativity factors were slightly correlated (r = .27), but the remaining factors were not intercorrelated (rs < .10).
Interestingly, the fact that items on the intellect factor fell on multiple factors is consistent with previous research. Several studies of the Big 5 have previously found an “unstable” sixth factor which represents a division between “fluid” intelligence and “crystallized” intelligence components of the fifth factor (Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981). The creativity and ability factors found in the present study are analogous to those illustrated by Digman and Takemoto-Chock (1981).
'* Interestingly, the plot illustrated two breaks in the scree line: one suggesting a two factor solution and one suggesting a four factor solution. The four factor solution was preferred over the two factor solution for two reasons: one statistical reason and conceptual reason. First, Gorsuch (1983) recommends a useful heuristic for determining the number of factors: “A clear plastic ruler is laid across the bottom portion of the roots to see where they form an approximately straight line. That point where the factors curve above the straight line formed by the smaller roots gives the number o f factors” (Gorsuch, 1983, p. 167). When this test is applied four factors are clearly evident. Second, Gorsuch (1983) reconunends that when making subjective scree plot judgments, it is important to consider if the factor solution makes theoretical sense. Examination of the factor loadings for the 2 factor solution revealed that the first factor included 16 of 18 need for cognition items, 2 intellect items, and 10 conscientiousness items. The second factor included 2 need for cognition items, and 8 Intellect items. Although this factor pattern is consistent with the notion that need for cognition lies on a single factor, the fact that need for cognition items are ordered almost exclusively within Conscientiousness, and not at all within intellect does not seem consistent with the correlational results of Study 1. 29 Scree plot of Eigenvalues when Need for Cognition items are factor analyzed with Intellect and Conscientiousness items
ou>
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Eigenvalues
Figure 2: Scree plot of Eigenvalues when Need for Cognition items are factor analyzed with Intellect and Conscientiousness Items Four factor solution of combined Need for Cognition, Intellect, and Conscientiousness Items
Intellect Intellect NFC Conscient Creativity Stupidity
NC13 0.64502 -0.05269 0.10590 0.05640 NCII 0.61830 0.00293 0.20015 0.18787 NC15 0.60932 -0.03224 -0.05289 0.04999 NCI 0.60586 0.16653 -0.07168 0.05749 NCIO 0.58482 -0.06409 0.00618 -0.10442 NC2 0.58134 0.19658 0.08179 0.01305 Intellectual 0.37154 0.10846 -0.03002 -0.34951 Bright 0.32024 0.08244 0.05346 -0.25812 NC6 0.29584 0.11838 -0.21509 -0.19948 NC18 0.22772 -0.11223 0.07101 -0.02673 NC17 -0.32256 -0.12799 -0.10403 0.12034 NC8 -0.40818 0.06130 0.00689 0.02006 NC9 -0.43778 -0.06787 -0.06330 -0.01933 NC16 -0.48881 -0.09306 -0.04096 -0.09906 NC7 -0.53328 -0.23216 0.00610 0.04766 NC3 -0.56314 -0.07913 -0.04811 -0.07795 NC12 -0.65950 0.08499 -0.14662 -0.09296 NC5 -0.66145 0.00852 0.11915 0.16849 NC4 -0.66949 0.01154 -0.01453 0.02763
Organized -0.04225 0.91788 0.00580 0.03603 Neat -0.07151 0.85274 -0.04203 0.00386 EfGcient 0.09586 0.57647 0.15020 0.00277 Practical 0.00446 0.42742 -0.10445 -0.23326 Inconsistent -0.12354 -0.43221 0.10635 0.01187 IneflBcient -0.13750 -0.45927 0.06457 0.12776 Impractical -0.01493 -0.47075 0.02473 0.10619 Careless -0.05621 -0.51799 0.04914 0.13136 Disorganized -0.16542 -0.68125 0.00954 -0.06886 Sloppy -0.04901 -0.69528 0.06206 -0.01853
Table 5 (continued on next page)
Table 5: Four factor solution of combined Need for Cognition, Intellect, and Conscientiousness Items
31 Table 5 (continued)
Intellect Intellect NFC Conscient. Creativity Stupidity
Creative 0.05117 -0.02269 0.87170 0.06513 Imaginative 0.01588 0.00945 0.80927 0.07902 Artistic 0.12083 -0.03291 0.73166 0.12930 NC14 0.43868 -0.17025 0.47269 0.11653 Deep 0.26553 0.07437 0.31869 0.09482 Unimaginative 0.09183 0.05716 -0.74517 0.25993 Uncreative 0.00356 -0.04124 -0.75886 0.03675
Unintelligent 0.08856 0.02365 0.05647 0.99528 Unintellecual -0.04867 0.00030 -0.04396 0.84610
32 In sum, the factor analysis revealed several features relevant to the personology of need for cognition. First, need for cognition is a genotypic process measure with consequences on personality attributes that can be mapped on the Big 5. Results were consistent with the notion that Intellect and Conscientiousness are broad personality descriptors but they do not subsume the processes which are measured by need for cognition (see Block, 1995). Second, this analysis shows convergent evidence that need for cognition is not a multidimensional construct; the need for cognition falls on a single factor which remains independent of the other dimensions when factor analyzed with measures from the comprehensive Big 5 taxonomy. It may be that personological differences in need for cognition represent consequences of interindividual variations in processing dispositions which are measured by need for cognition.
Ancillary Analyses: Needfor cognition, concern for future consequences, and affect
Recall that Sample 1 included measures of affect and concern for future consequences. Analyses of these data revealed that need for cognition was uncorrelated with negative affect (r = .07, ns), was slightly correlated with positive affect (r=.26, p<.05), and was slightly correlated with CFC (r= .29, p<.05). However, none of these relationships remained significant when controlling for socially desirable response strategies (rs < .13, ns). Thus, need for cognition is independent from affect. The lack of a relationship between need for cognition and concern for future consequences suggests that while individuals high in need for cognition are likely to think more extensively than individuals low in need for cognition, they are no more likely to think about distal
33 consequences of behavior than proximal consequences of behavior compared to individuals low in need for cognition.
Discussion
Study 1 shows support for Orwell’s second notion that individual differences in cognitive motivation are limited to domains of personality which are relevant to cogitation. Compared to low need for cognition individuals, high need for cognition individuals rate themselves as being more intellectual, more open to experience, and more conscientious. The differing motivational styles of individuals differing in need for cognition influence clusters and facets that tap cognitive dimensions; high need for cognition individuals tend to rate themselves as more thoughtful, insightful, curious, logical, persistent, and intellectually creative, and less aimless, unintelligent, and shallow.
Consistent with the notion that individuals high and low in need for cognition do not differ on social and emotional dimensions of personality (Cacioppo et al., 1996), need for cognition differences do not emerge within the Intellect or Conscientiousness dimensions that are not related to cognitive diligence, acuity, ability, precision or lethargy. Using the
Openness to Experience measure of the Big 5, need for cognition was associated with
Openness to Ideas, but the relationships between need for cognition and the remaining
Openness facets were small. Similarly, high and low need for cognition individuals do not differ in their self-reported Extraversion (Surgency), Agreeableness, or Emotional stability once social desirability is controlled.
34 These data also failed to replicate Tanaka et al.’s (1988) observation that need for cognition has 3 subscales measuring cognitive complexity, cognitive confidence, and cognitive persistence even when using a dichotomous response format. This lack of replication is consistent with previous research which has suggested that Tanaka’s 3 factors are not replicable across studies, correlate highly with scores on the entire 34 item need for cognition scale, and do not provide differential predictions or outcomes when associated with behavior and personality (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Watars & Zakrajsek,
1990; Neuberg & Newsome, 1993). The results of the present study instead suggest that cognitive complexity, cognitive confidence, and cognitive persistence are manifest personality attributes which are likely to be consequences of the processes inherent in interindividual variations in need for cognition.
35 CHAPTER 2
REPRESENTATION OF COGNITIVE ACTS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT AS A
FUNCTION OF NEED FOR COGNITION
If, as the results of Study 1 suggest, need for cognition has an organizing effect on
individuals’ personologies, cognitive activity may be a fundamental component in the self-
concept of individuals high, but not low, in need for cognition. That is, differences between individuals low and high in need for cognition may be evident in different self
schemas for cognitive activity. For example, Markus (1977) proposed that self-concept
dimensions, referred to as self-schemas, represent personally important dimensions of the self on which one perceives oneself extremely. She argued that self-schemas serve an important function in organizing self-knowledge and facilitating processing of schema relevant information relative to schema-irrelevant information. Because engaging in cognitive activity represents a central dimension of individuals high in need for cognition and need for cognition predicts the organization of individuals’ personological profiles, it is possible that individuals differing in need for cognition have different self-schemas, at least on cognitive dimensions (see Epstein, 1994 for a consistent view in which need for cognition is presented as an organizing component of the self-concept). Studies 2, 3, and
36 4 were therefore designed to assess self-schemas for cognitive acts in individuals differing in need for cognition.
Study 2 examined whether need for cognition satisfies Markus’ criterion for self schemas by examining if individuals high in need for cognition; (1) perceive themselves extremely on trait-listing measures of cognitive activity; and (2) perceive these traits as personally important to possess. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive activity, they should report themselves more extremely on traits which are relevant to cognitive activity and should report these traits as more important to possess compared to ratings of individuals low in need for cognition. No need for cognition differences should be obtained on traits which are irrelevant to cognitive acts. After confirming the extremity and importance of self ratings on cognitive acts, the functional consequences of self-schemas on information processing are assessed in two additional studies. Specifically, Studies 3 and 4 examine the notion that self-schemas play an organizing role in the self-concept of schematic individuals (Markus & Sentis, 1982) by examining the extent that responses towards stimuli related to cognitive acts are differentially facilitated for individuals high and low in need for cognition.
Pilot Studies
To test the self-concept representation of cognitive activity, a set of traits which denote engaging in cognitive behavior, a set of traits which denote not engaging in cognitive acts, and a set of control traits which were irrelevant to cognitive processing were developed in three pilot studies. In the first pilot study, consensual endorsements
37 were collected of traits which describe various attributes which would be likely to result
from the disposition to be cognitively motivated and the disposition to lack cognitive
motivation; these traits are termed cognizer traits and noncognizer traits, respectively.
An implication of this procedure is that in addition to examining the self-concept representation of cognitive acts, the pilot studies and Study 2 extend the validity of the need for cognition scale by illustrating that others’ perceptions of people differing in need for cognition are consonant with self-perceptions of individuals differing in need for cognition (Funder & West, 1993; Borkenau & Liebler, 1993).
Control traits were selected based on their meanings being irrelevant to cognitive processing in the second pilot study. The valence characteristics of the control traits were quantified in a third pilot study to examine the extent that the experimental and control traits had similar valence.
Pilot Stucfy I: Consensually Ascribed Traits
The first pilot study was designed to obtain consensual ratings of traits denoting cognitive acts. Forty undergraduate participants completed a survey of “Personality
Perception”. A questionnaire was developed from trait adjectives found in trait listing studies by Anderson (1968) and Goldberg (1990,1992). Additional traits were developed through a search for synonyms in Webster’s New World Thesaurus (1985). Because need for cognition refers to chronic differences in the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful activities, trait adjectives were selected if their definitions were related to effortful cognitive processing, inquisitiveness, cognitive ability, or information seeking. A set of
38 antonyms indicative of cognitive apathy, cognitive avoidance, cognitive lethargy, and
cognitive inability was obtained by similar procedures. The final trait listing scale used in the first pilot study included 163 trait adjectives; a complete listing of which can be found in Table 6.
For each trait adjective, participants were first asked to determine “the extent that each characteristic is typical of a cognitively oriented individual” on a scale ranging from 0
( “not at all descriptive of a cognitive person”) to 6 (“extremely descriptive of a cognitive person”). Participants then reported the valance of each trait on a scale ranging fi-om -3
(extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive), with the midpoint labeled neutral. Finally, participants completed the 18 item version of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo,
Petty, & Kao, 1984) and were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
Results
Table 6 includes the endorsement ratings and standard deviations and valence ratings and standard deviations for each of the 163 traits. The list is sorted by participants’ mean rating of the extent the trait described a cognitively oriented person, ranging fi-om traits perceived as least to most typical of a cognitively oriented individual.
The 30 words rated most typical of a cognitively oriented individual and 29 words rated least typical of a cognitively oriented individual were designated as cognizer traits and noncognizer traits respectively.*
® It was intended to select 30 cognizer and 30 noncognizer traits, but a typographical error in the Study 2 survey made it necessary to examine data from only 29 noncognizer traits. In addition, because “knowledgeable” and “knowing” are synonyms wiüi the same root, the trait that was rated 31st was substituted for “knowing” in the list o f cognizer traits. 39 Extent that Trait Adjectives are perceived as descriptive of a cognitively motivated individual and mean positivity of each trait in Pilot Study 1
Trait Descriptive' Standard Mean Standard Adjective ness Deviation Valence Deviation Unintelligent 0.78 .80 -2.30 .76 Unintellectual 0.97 .95 -2.00 .93 Thoughtless 1.08 1.10 -2.10 1.39 Unthoughtful 1.10 1.10 -2.25 .78 Couch Potato 1.20 1.26 -2.25 1.15 Unimaginative 1.23 .86 -1.88 1.18 Unsystematic 1.23 1.00 -1.48 1.22 Nonlnquisitive 1.25 .98 -1.58 1.06 Unobservant 1.25 1.08 -2.02 .83 Unwise 1.25 1.01 -1.85 1.03 Unaware 1.30 1.18 -2.07 .86 Uninformed 1.32 1.12 -1.65 1.37 Purposeless 1.48 1.32 -1.68 1.54 Unstudious 1.50 1.28 -1.80 .94 Unattentive 1.52 1.11 -1.92 .94 Uncultured 1.53 1.24 -2.13 .88 Unindustrious 1.56 1.19 -1.48 1.26 Uninspired 1.58 1.06 -1.60 1.15 Avoidant 1.60 1.48 -1.22 1.31 Unmethodical 1.60 1.28 -1.30 1.32 Simpleminded 1.63 1.39 -1.60 1.17 Absentminded 1.65 1.75 -1.48 1.26 Nonconformist 1.65 1.31 -1.87 .88 Immature 1.70 1.30 -2.25 .98 Inefficient 1.73 1.11 -1.95 1.08 Unsophisticated 1.73 1.28 -1.90 1.01 Foolish 1.75 1.08 -2.25 .87 Neglectful 1.75 1.28 -2.12 .76 Undecided 1.87 1.56 -1.53 1.18 Inexperienced 1.93 1.37 -1.53 1.06 Negligent 1.97 1.33 -2.05 .99 Foolhardy 2.00 1.13 -1.45 1.18
Table 6 (continued on next page)
Table 6: Extent that Trait Adjectives are perceived as descriptive of a cognitively motivated individual and mean positivity of each trait in Pilot Study 1 40 Table 6 (continued)
Trait Descriptive Standard Mean Standard Adjective ness Deviation Valence Deviation Inaccurate 2.00 1.01 -1.83 .90 Indecisive 2.00 1.30 -1.55 1.20 Narrowminded 2.03 1.69 -2.35 .80 Nondisceming 2.03 1.29 -1.20 1.24 Superstitious 2.07 1.38 -1.00 1.30 Forgetful 2.10 1.45 -1.55 1.15 Hasty 2.10 1.26 -1.00 1.30 Imitative 2.10 1.43 -0.90 1.43 Inconsistent 2.10 1.26 -1.50 1.13 Inattentive 2.13 1.24 -1.83 .87 Naive 2.13 1.47 -1.85 1.23 Indifferent 2.15 1.48 -1.13 1.36 Irrational 2.22 1.05 -1.45 1.34 Illogical 2.25 1.50 -1.73 1.30 Oblivious 2.27 1.36 -0.88 1.52 Nonchalant 2.28 1.30 -0.50 1.04 Wishy-Washy 2.28 1.41 -1.33 1.38 Resigned 2.48 1.15 -0.40 1.13 Distractable 2.50 1.32 -1.42 1.39 Fickle 2.50 1.47 -0.92 1.25 Distracted 2.53 1.41 -1.58 1.20 Listless 2.55 1.31 -0.83 1.24 Passive 2.58 1.34 -0.47 1.41 Puzzled 2.58 1.41 -1.13 1.45 Pensive 2.59 1.19 0.10 .90 Frivolous 2.60 1.03 -0.50 1.40 Injudious 2.65 1.08 -0.45 .99 Dependable 2.67 1.53 0.02 2.12 Rash 2.67 1.11 -0.43 1.34 Impulsive 2.75 1.30 -0.35 1.41 Nonconforming 2.75 1.56 -0.38 2.03 Conformist 2.77 1.49 -0.98 1.58 Apathetic 2.85 1.31 -0.10 1.80 Conforming 2.93 1.46 -0.70 1.67
Table 6 (continued on next page)
41 Table 6 (continued)
Trait Descriptive Standard Mean Standard Adjective ness Deviation Valence Deviation Subtle 2.95 1.13 0.45 1.04 Painstaking 3.00 1.26 0.55 1.38 Dreamy 3.05 1.50 0.08 1.37 Impressionable 3.10 1.46 -0.03 1.93 Astute 3.12 1.24 0.87 1.17 Judicious 3.20 1.04 0.70 111 Daydreaming 3.23 1.89 0.08 1.49 Obedient 3.28 1.13 0.60 1.95 Obliging 3.32 1.02 0.98 1.14 Discerning 3.40 1.30 0.15 1.27 Worldly 3.45 1.30 0.50 1.68 Prudent 3.48 1.13 0.88 1.14 Ingenious 3.50 1.24 0.57 1.89 Believing 3.52 1.55 1.10 1.58 Perplexed 3.52 1.26 -0.25 1.17 Deliberative 3.62 1.23 0.83 1.24 Literary 3.68 1.31 0.93 1.38 Scrutinizing 3.70 1.49 0.30 1.42 Enterprising 3.78 .97 1.56 1.10 Idealiistic 3.82 1.48 1.05 1.36 Critical 3.85 1.39 0.55 1.60 Persuasive 3.87 .94 1.33 1.07 Proficient 3.88 1.02 1.38 1.21 Definite 3.90 1.15 1.15 1.41 Experienced 3.93 1.07 2.00 .78 Meticulous 3.93 1.25 0.88 1.26 Cognizant 3.95 1.00 0.92 1.11 Convincing 3.95 1.20 1.50 1.20 Diligent 3.95 .99 1.45 1.13 Self-Critical 3.95 1.45 0.90 1.74 Objective 3.97 1.21 1.45 111 Opportunist 4.00 1.09 1.55 1.26 Clear Headed 4.02 1.05 2.03 1.19 Self-Assured 4.02 1.27 1.90 1.01
Table 6 (continued on next page)
42 Table 6 (continued)
Trait Descriptive- Standard Mean Standard Adjective ness Deviation Valence Deviation Sophisticated 4.02 1.23 1.88 1.09 Decisive 4.03 .97 1.41 1.14 Exacting 4.05 1.01 1.23 1.23 Systematic 4.07 1.10 0.83 1.20 Introspective 4.08 1.29 1.15 1.17 Sharpwitted 4.08 1.29 1.93 .97 Informed 4.15 1.05 1.20 1.70 Methodical 4.15 1.05 0.95 1.28 Rational 4.15 1.08 1.57 1.03 Sensible 4.15 1.12 2.00 .99 Perfectionistic 4.17 1.08 1.10 1.60 Self-sufBcient 4.18 1.06 1.63 1.31 Keen 4.20 .85 1.70 .82 Quick witted 4.20 1.24 1.82 .97 Well-read 4.20 1.09 1.40 1.50 Level 4.22 1.14 2.10 .96 Wise 4.23 1.07 2.08 .97 Alert 4.25 1.17 2.22 .86 Careful 4.30 1.07 1.88 1.18 Inventive 4.30 1.09 1.85 1.08 Precise 4.30 1.11 1.80 1.04 Self-confident 4.30 1.27 2.38 .70 Absorbed 4.33 1.33 0.10 1.53 Scientific 4.33 1.38 1.38 1.19 Sharp 4.33 .96 2.03 .83 Attentive 4.35 1.08 2.00 .96 Confident 4.35 1.29 2.27 .88 Serious 4.35 1.23 1.32 1.05 Insightful 4.40 1.17 1.62 1.13 Thoughtfiil 4.40 1.24 2.13 .85 Scholarly 4.42 1.38 1.58 1.28 Studious 4.42 1.15 1.53 1.26
Table 6 (continued on next page)
43 Table 6 (continued)
Trait Descriptive Standard Mean Standard Adjective ness Deviation Valence Deviation Brilliant 4.43 1.08 2.20 1.26 Questioning 4.45 1.47 1.25 1.30 Elaborative 4.46 1.12 1.54 1.05 Aware 4.48 1.15 1.95 .96 Clever 4.48 .96 2.25 .81 Inquiring 4.48 1.18 1.50 1.04 Inquisitive 4.50 1.20 1.55 1.06 Mindful 4.50 1.06 1.83 .90 Persistent 4.50 .88 1.65 1.00 Accurate 4.53 1.04 2.05 .96 Contemplative 4.55 1.22 0.98 1.21 Knowing 4.55 .81 1.90 .87 Brainy 4.57 1.22 1.55 1.22 Openminded 4.58 1.08 2.20 .91 Strongminded 4.58 1.11 2.00 1.06 Logical 4.60 .93 1.90 .98 Observant 4.60 1.22 1.88 1.02 Smart 4.63 1.05 2.15 .95 Knoweldgable 4.65 1.23 2.20 .82 Freethinking 4.72 1.26 1.75 1.21 Deep 4.73 1.04 1.60 .93 Pondering 4.73 1.13 1.32 1.10 Educated 4.75 .95 2.32 .83 Perceptive 4.75 .87 1.83 1.01 Thorough 4.75 .87 1.73 .91 Bright 4.80 1.07 2.42 .71 Philosophical 4.80 .94 1.30 1.36 Curious 4.83 1.01 1.60 1.24 Concentrating 4.93 .80 1.82 1.11 Analytical 5.30 .82 1.78 1.19 Cognitive 5.53 .85 1.67 1.27
44 Pilot Stucfy 2
For comparison purposes, 10 positively valenced traits and 10 negatively valenced traits were selected from a previous trait listing study based on thier being irrelevant to cognitive processing. Two pilot studies were designed to examine the extent that control traits had similar characteristics to the experimental traits; specifically, Study 2 was designed to determine whether the control adjectives were perceived as relevant to cognitive processing, and Study 3 was designed to examine the valence characteristics of the control traits relative to the cognizer and noncognizer experimental traits. A complete list of the 20 control adjectives can be found in Table 7.
In the second pilot study, 35 five participants read a description of a personality measure called “effortful processor.” The description was based on Cacioppo & Petty’s
(1982) definition of need for cognition. Specifically, participants read that;
“Individuals who score high on this scale tend to engage in a lot of effortful processing and are called effortful processors and people who score low on this scale are unlikely to engage in effortful processing and are called noneffortful processors.”
Participants then rated each of the 59 cognitive traits and 20 control traits (in random order) on a scale labeled 1 (“describes all noneffortful processors”) to 5 (“describes all effortful processors") with a midpoint of 3 (“can describe either an effortful or noneffortfiil processor”). Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 7. As expected, cognizer traits were perceived as more descriptive of effortful processors than were
45 Perceived Descriptiveness of an ‘EflFortfiil Processor” (Pilot Study 2) and Valence of the traits (Pilot Study 3)
Rating Standard Valence Standard (Pilot 2) Deviation (Pilot 3) Deviation Cognizer traits Accurate 3.82 .72 1.68 .89 Analytical 4.21 .77 1.36 .90 Aware 4.03 .83 1.32 .72 Brainy 4.24 .85 1.59 1.14 Bright 3.94 .89 2.23 .81 Brilliant 4.09 .75 2.77 .43 Clever 3.79 .64 1.64 .79 Cognitive 3.94 .85 1.50 1.19 Concentrating 4.25 .61 1.36 .95 Contemplative 4.21 .95 .59 1.05 Curious 4.62 .70 1.36 1.14 Deep 4.21 .77 1.55 1.18 Educated 4.03 .83 2.36 .58 Elaborative 4.26 .71 1.09 1.02 Freethinking 3.76 .85 1.68 .89 Inquiring 4.50 .66 1.59 .85 Inquisitive 4.47 .66 1.27 .70 Knowledgable 4.15 .78 2.18 .59 Logical 4.06 .81 1.73 .98 Mindful 3.74 .79 1.73 .77 Observant 4.29 .68 1.86 .64 Openminded 3.35 .81 2.45 .74 Perceptive 4.19 .72 1.77 .87 Persistent 3.91 .75 1.55 .86 Philosophical 4.35 .60 1.73 .94 Pondering 4.21 1.04 .64 1.14 Questioning 4.35 .73 .73 1.08 Smart 3.94 .89 2.41 .67 Strongminded 3.97 .83 1.64 1.05 Thorough 4.32 .64 1.73 .88
Table 7 (continued on next page)
Table 7: Perceived Descriptiveness of an ‘Effortful Processor” (Pilot Study 2) and Valence of the traits (Pilot Study 3)
46 Table 7 (continued)
Noncognizer Traits Rating Standard Valence Standard (PUot2) Deviation (Pilots) Deviation Absentminded 2.35 1.01 -1.09 .87 Avoidant 2.24 .82 -1.09 1.15 Couchpotato 2.18 .87 -1.36 1.00 Foolish 2.41 .86 -1.82 .59 Immature 2.62 .70 -2.00 1.11 InefiBcient 2.18 .80 -1.64 .95 Inexperienced 2.62 .55 -1.05 1.00 Neglectfiil 2.21 .81 -2.00 .76 Negligent 2.38 .82 -2.00 .93 Noninquiring 1.44 .56 -.86 .71 Simpleminded 1.91 .62 -.91 1.34 Thoughtless 2.03 .80 -2.00 1.27 Unattentive 2.06 .78 -1.36 .79 Unaware 1.94 .85 -1.05 .84 Uncultured 2.38 .65 -1.41 1.22 Undecided 2.35 .95 -.68 1.04 Unimaginative 2.24 1.02 -1.91 .92 Unindustrious 2.15 .96 -1.00 .87 Uninformed 2.18 .94 -1.23 .75 Uninspired 2.09 .71 -1.86 .89 Unintelligent 2.09 .71 -2.23 .81 Uninintellectual 2.06 .60 -2.18 .66 Unmethodical 2.09 .90 -.73 1.03 Unobservant 1.85 .82 -1.14 .77 Unsophisticated 2.53 .83 -1.27 1.03 Unstudious 2.03 .76 -1.36 .90 Unsystematic 1.97 .67 -1.14 1.17 Unthoughtful 1.91 .87 -2.09 .75 Unwise 2.18 .72 -1.82 .80
Table 7 (continued on next page)
47 Table 7 (continued)
Rating Standard Valence Standard (Pilot 2) Deviation (Pilot 3) Deviation ntrol Traits Bold 3.35 .85 3.35 .85 Considerate 3.03 .46 3.03 .46 Energetic 3.09 .45 3.09 .45 Forgiving 3.09 .38 3.09 .38 Generous 3.03 .63 3.03 .63 Helpful 3.12 .41 3.12 .41 Kind 3.09 .38 3.09 .38 Pious 3.06 .42 3.06 .42 Practical 3.65 .81 3.65 .81 Steady 3.26 .71 3.26 .71
Envious 2.91 .75 2.91 .75 Fretful 2.79 .77 2.79 .77 Hyperactive 2.82 .80 2.82 .80 Irritable 3.03 .80 3.03 .80 Jealous 3.03 .58 3.03 .58 Nervous 2.90 .69 2.90 .69 Rude 2.76 .55 2.76 .55 Shy 3.09 .51 3.09 .51 Sloppy 2.74 .67 2.74 .67 Talkative 2.85 .66 2.85 .66
48 positive control traits (t=15.10, p<.001) and noncognizer traits were perceived as more typical of nonefifortfui processors than were negative control traits ( t=12.51, p<.001).
An ancillary analysis of the absolute ratings were examined to determine if descriptiveness ratings were proximal to the neutral midpoint. Consistent with the notion that the control traits were perceived as relatively nondescriptive of cognitive processors or noncognitive processors, inspection of the means and confidence intervals revealed that the ratings of negative control traits did not diflfer fi-om the neutral midpoint (mean = 2.9,
95% Cl 2.78-3.04). The ratings of the positive control traits were slightly (but significantly) different fi-om the neutral midpoint (mean= 3.18; 95% Cl 3.07-3.28).
Pilot Study 3
The third pilot study assessed valence ratings of the control traits relative to the experimental traits (i.e., cognizer and noncognizer traits). Twenty-two undergraduate volunteers rated the valence of the experimental and control traits on a scale ranging fi-om
-3 (extremely negative meaning) to +3 (extremely positive meaning) with a neutral midpoint. Paired t-tests were conducted to test whether the reported valence of the positive control traits matched the reported valence of the cognizer traits and if the reported valence of the negative traits was equivalent to the reported valence of the noncognizer traits. These analysis revealed small, but significant differences in the reported valence of the experimental traits (i.e., cognizer and noncognizer traits) and the control traits. Specifically, scale ratings of positive traits were .21 scale points more positive than ratings of cognizer traits (t= 3.63, p<.05) and scale ratings of noncognizer
49 traits were .37 scale points more negative than ratings of control traits (t=4.18, p<.05).
Because these valence ratings differed, measures of trait valence were included in Study 2 so that these differences could be statistically controlled. The valence ratings data is presented in Table 7.
Study 2
In Study 2, endorsement and importance ratings of individuals of the traits obtained in the pilot studies were examined as a function of need for cognition. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts, they should rate cognizer characteristics according to Markus’ criteria: they should perceive themselves more extremely on cognizer traits than do individuals low in need for cognition, and they should perceive cognizer traits as more personally important to possess than do individuals low in need for cognition. Moreover, need for cognition differences should not emerge on ratings of the remaining traits which are irrelevant to intellectual attributes.
Alternative outcomes are also possible however. For example, McGuire &
Padawar-Singer (1976) argued that individuals constme their self-concepts as a function of the salience of a trait dimension within the individual’s own social group. Specifically, their postulate of personal distinctiveness suggests that one’s self-conceptions are a function of the distinctiveness of one’s own characteristics relative to the attributes of a comparison individual from the same social group. One implication of this body of research is that perceptions of one’s own cognizer and noncognizer characteristics may be differentially influenced if individuals differing in need for cognition select different role
50 models by virtue of their membership in a particular need for cognition cohort. For
example, if individuals low in need for cognition compare themselves to a familiar athlete,
perceptions of their own cognizer qualities may be relatively augmented. Similarly, if
individuals high in need for cognition compare themselves to a familiar scientist,
perceptions of their own cognizer qualities may relatively attenuated. As a result of using
different references points which differentially influence self-conceptions of those high and
low in need for cognition, it is possible that need for cognition would be uncorrelated or
even negatively correlated with endorsements of cognizer (or noncognizer) traits.
M ethod
Two samples of volunteers participated in Study 2 and each set completed a
slightly different set of procedures. One sample (N=44) participated in a ‘Tersonality
Study” during spring of 1995 and were administered 3 trait rating questionnaires. Each
questionnaire contained the list of 79 trait adjectives (see pilot studies). First, participants
indicated how accurately each trait described them on a scale ranging from 1 (“extremely
inaccurate of me”) to 9 (“extremely accurate of me”) with 5 a neutral midpoint; second,
subjects indicated how personally important it was for them to possess each trait on a
scale ranging from 0 (“not at all important to me”) to 4 (“extremely important to me”); third, subjects indicated the perceived valence of each trait on a scale ranging from -3
(“extremely negative word”) to +3 (“extremely positive word”) with a neutral midpoint.
Participants then completed the 18 item version of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo,
Petty, & Kao, 1984) embedded within 18 other filler items that were unrelated to
51 cognitive dimensions/ the 33 item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Inventory
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), and were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
The remaining participants (N=41) completed surveys as part of a larger study during the summer of 1995. The questionnaires described above were interspersed between social perception tasks. Each trait survey was divided into two shorter surveys and each shortened survey was presented following a short impression formation task.
The two self-descriptiveness questionnaires were presented after the first and second impression formation task respectively, the 33 item Marlowe-Crowne Inventory was presented after the third impression formation tasks, the two self-importance questionnaires were presented after the fourth and fifth impression formation task, and the two trait valence rating scales and the need for cognition scale (embedded within 18 irrelevant items) followed the sixth and final impression formation task. Following their completion of the scales and impression formation tasks, subjects were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
Results
A preliminary analysis was conducted to insure that responses were not influenced by quarter or paradigm. An analysis was conducted of computed scores on the need for cognition scale and social desirability scale, as well as of each trait endorsement rating, importance rating, and positivity rating for the 59 cognizer and noncognizer traits and 20 control traits. No time factor differences were found in need for cognition scale score or
® Filler items were obtained from the NEO extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism subscales which were are unrelated to need for cognition in previous research (Sadowski & Cobum, 1995; see also Study 1). These items were not analyzed further. 52 social desirability scale score. Of the remaining analyses on the trait rating data, 12 (of
237 analyses) achieved statistical significance (p<.05; endorsements of foolish, simpleminded, and shy; importance ratings of simpleminded and uncultured; and valence mh'ngs of inquiring, accurate, couch-potato, absentminded, undecided, unaware, and unobservant). By chance, one would expect 5% or 11.85 of the 237 tests to achieve statistical significance at alpha of .05. Thus, the time factor did not have an appreciable effect on responses.
Correlational Analysis Across Traits Endorsement scores and importance scores were computed for each of the trait types (cognizer, noncognizer, positive control, and negative control) by averaging each participants ratings for traits within each trait type.
Because the pilot studies revealed that cognizer traits were rated slightly less positively than positive control traits and noncognizer traits were rated slightly more negatively than negative control traits, all analyses were conducted with and without reported trait valence entered as a covariate.’ In addition, because need for cognition was significantly correlated with social desirability (r=.37, p<.OI), social desirability scores were also statistically controlled.
Analyses were first conducted on the relationship between need for cognition and the endorsement of the 4 trait types. Need for cognition was significantly and positively correlated with endorsement of cognizer traits (larger numbers indicate more extreme self-
’ The results of the pilot study were replicated in Study 2. Examination of the valence of cognitive and control traits revealed small, but significant differences between valence ratings of cognizer and positive control traits (mean = 1.87 and 1.99 respectively, t(8I)= -2.42, p<.01). Similarly, small but significant differences were obtained in the reported valence of tlie noncognizer and negative control words (mean= -1.99 and -1.27 respectively; t(83)=11.81, p<.001). 53 descriptiveness endorsements; r=.65, p< 001) and this correlation persisted when social desirability was statistically controlled (r=.62, p<.001), and when social desirability and trait valence ratings were statistically controlled (r=.59, p<.001). Need for cognition was significantly and negatively correlated with endorsements of noncognizer traits (r=-.36, p<.001) and this correlation remained significant when social desirability was statistically controlled (r=-.25, p<.05), but was only marginal when both social desirability and trait valence ratings were statistically controlled (r=-.22, p<.06). Finally, analysis of the control traits revealed that need for cognition was significantly correlated with endorsements of positive control words (r=.21, p<.05) and marginally correlated with endorsements of negative control words (r=- 25, p<.10); both of these correlations became nonsignificant when social desirability and both social desirability and trait valence were statistically controlled (rs < .10, ns).
A similar analysis which was conducted on the self-perceived importance of possessing each trait revealed that need for cognition predicted the importance of being a cognizer (r=.45, p<.001), and that this correlation persisted when social desirability was statistically controlled (r=.39, p<.OI) and when social desirability and trait valence were statistically controlled (r=.31, p<.01). Need for cognition was also correlated with the importance of being a noncognizer (r==- 23, p<.05), but this correlation became nonsignificant when social desirability was statistically controlled (r=-.17, p=.14), and when both social desirability and trait valence were statistically controlled (n=-. 13, ns).
Finally, need for cognition was correlated with the importance of possessing a positive
54 control trait (r=.20, p<.05), but was not correlated with the importance of possessing a negative control trait (r=-.07, ns). These correlations were both nonsignificant when social desirability and when both social desirability and trait valence were statistically controlled (rs < .13 ns).
In sum, analysis of endorsement rates of traits reflecting engaging in cognitive activity were more likely to be endorsed by those who score high than low in need for cognition. Moreover, in combination with the results of the pilot studies, these data suggest that individuals high in the need for cognition perceive themselves as others perceive them— as high cognizers. Individuals low in need for cognition are more likely to perceive themselves as noncognizers, and less likely to perceive themselves as cognizers.
Control traits, however, did not differentiate individuals differing in need for cognition once social desirability was statistically controlled. The importance ratings illustrate that individuals high in need for cognition perceive cognizer traits as more important to possess than individuals low in need for cognition, even when controlling for potential sources of bias. However, when sources of bias were statistically controlled, no need for cognition differences were obtained in importance ratings of noncognizer or control traits
As a whole, these findings are consistent with the notion that high need for cognition individuals fi-ame their self-concepts as a function of “self as cognizer” and not along other dimensions compared to individuals low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Ancillary Analyses: Needfor cogtUtion correlated with ratings o f specific words
55 Correlations were computed between need for cognition and endorsement and importance ratings for each trait item in Study 2. Raw correlations, partial correlations
(controlling for valence and social desirability), mean endorsement ratings and mean importance ratings are reported in Table 8. These tables include the statistics for cognizer traits, noncognizer traits, and control traits respectively.
Individuals high in the need for cognition provided significantly more extreme endorsements than individuals low in the need for cognition on 28 of 30 (93%, p<.001) * cognizer traits, and 23 (77%, p Individuals low in need for cognition rated themselves more extremely on 16 of the 29 (55%, p=.23) noncognizer traits, and only 9 (31%, p= .96) of these relationships remained significant when controlling for trait valence and social desirability. Significant or marginally significant need for cognition differences were obtained for self-descriptiveness ratings on 8 of the 20 (40%, p=.75) control traits, but only 2 (10%, p > .99) of these relationships remained when controlling for trait valence and social desirability. Individuals high in need for cognition rated 29 o f30 (97%, p<.001) cognizer traits as personally important to possess compared to individuals low in need for cognition, and 21 (70%, p < .01) of these relationships persisted when controlling for social desirability and trait valence. Individuals low in need for cognition felt 18 o f29 (62%, p < .07) ® Probability levels were computed with the binomial distribution. The resulting probabilty level value indicates the probability that N events would occur compared to the null hypothesis that no event would occur. Thus, probabilities of less than .05, indicates that N events would be expected by chance less than 5% of the time (Hays, 1988). 56 Endorsement and Importance Ratings by Need for Cognition in Study 2 Endorsements Importance Trait r MeaiiLNc MeaPHNc r MeapLNc Meat Cognizer Traits Accurate .21* 6.04 6.47 .11 2.70 2.97 Analytical .45*** 5.89 7.27 1.96 3.00 Aware .28** 6.43 7.27 .26** 2.78 3.28 Brainy .28** 4.48 5.27 .21* 1.79 2.27 Bright .27** 6.61 7.43 .29** 2.56 3.38 Brilliant .31** 5.37 6.40 .31** 2.43 3.23 Clever .14 6.56 7.13 .19* 2.67 3.17 Cognitive .32** 6.19 7.13 .20* 2.33 2.97 Concentrating .47*** 5.56 6.97 .22* 2.56 3.03 Contemplative .31** 5.71 6.83 .41*** 1.52 2.66 Curious .37*** 7.36 8.07 .46*** 2.52 3.55 Deep .43*** 5.89 7.23 .31** 2.04 2.72 Educated .20* 7.14 7.63 .33*** 3.37 3.83 Elaborative .49*** 5.14 7.20 .18+ 2.04 2.48 Freethinking .46*** 6.43 7.80 .42*** 2.81 3.55 Inquiring .26* 6.82 7.33 .29** 2.41 3.03 Inquisitve .37*** 6.54 7.5 .33** 2.19 3.00 Knowledgable .25* 6.61 7.20 34*** 2.88 3.52 Logical .35*** 6.43 7.50 .24** 2.44 3.10 Mindful .36*** 6.32 7.20 .22* 2.77 3.28 Observant .14 7.29 7.7 .25** 2.85 3.41 Open-Minded .29** 6.71 7.47 45*** 3.11 3.69 Perceptive .18* 6.64 7.33 .35*** 2.78 3.20 Persistent .25* 6.5 7.23 .33*** 2.56 3.10 Table 8 (continued on next page) Table 8: Endorsement and Importance Ratings by Need for Cognition in Study 2 57 Table 8 (continued) Endorsements Importance Trait r McaPLNc MeanuNc r MeanLNc Meai Cognizer treats (cant) Philosophical .37** 5.07 6.60 .32** 1.89 2.90 Pondering .20* 6.39 6.60 .22* 1.85 2.34 Questioning .37*** 6.64 7.43 .36*** 2.41 3.03 Smart .32** 6.21 7.20 .25* 2.58 3.31 Strong-Minded .42*** 6.18 8.00 .34*** 2.48 3.31 Thorough .36*** 6.15 7.13 .25* 2.59 3.21 Noncognizer traits Uninspired -.13 3.68 2.73 .02 .46 .30 Avoidant -.13 4.93 4.67 -.26* 1.07 .57 Neglectful -.07 4.14 3.57 -.12 .39 .20 Unstudious -.22* 4.21 3.47 -.14 .32 .17 Negligent -.06 3.59 3.21 -.19* .48 .17 Couch Potato -.33* 4.89 3.66 -.23* .56 .17 Foolish -.23* 4.33 3.45 -.16+ .41 .28 Absentminded .13 4.26 4.45 -.19* .30 .17 Undecided -.34*** 5.74 4.07 -.16+ .41 .17 Unaware -.24* 3.56 2.70 -.13 .26 .10 Unindustrious -.39*** 4.00 2.70 -.26** .56 .07 Unmethodical -.11 3.81 2.33 -.08 .52 .43 Simpleminded 3.46 2.13 -.22* .64 .27 Unsystematic .04 3.46 3.63 -.17+ .43 .23 Noninquiring -.41*** 3.39 2.20 -.26* .43 .13 Unattentive -.27** 3.36 2.67 -.19* .25 .07 Inefficient -.25* 3.32 2.37 -.12 .37 .14 Unsophisticated -.11 3.29 3.07 -.27** .41 .14 Uncultured -.22* 3.25 2.40 .04 .26 .34 Immature -.05 3.25 3.03 -.14 .48 .24 Uninformed -.17+ 3.21 2.67 -.23* .48 .07 Unwise -.09 3.18 2.77 -.24* .44 .17 Table 8 (continued on next page) 58 Table 8 (continued) Endorsements Importance Trait r MeantNc MeauHNc r MeantNc MeanHNc Noncognizer treats (cont) Unimaginative -.16+ 3.11 2.07 -.19* .22 .00 Unobservant -.16+ 2.89 2.33 -.09 .37 .17 Unintellectual -.25* 2.89 2.17 -09 .22 .17 Thoughtless -.10 2.61 2.30 -.16+ .33 .17 UnthoughtfUI -.13 2.36 2.13 -.20* .30 .07 Unintelligent -.32** 2.32 1.80 -.25** .26 .03 Inexperienced -.05 3.48 3.53 -.10 .39 .30 Positive Control Bold .13 5.93 6.47 .23* 2.19 2.66 Considerate .16+ 7.46 7.77 .17+ 3.26 3.55 Generous .11 7.21 7.57 .24* 3.00 3.34 Forgiving .03 6.64 6.90 .17+ 3.19 3.48 Pious -.06 5.14 4.83 .03 1.22 1.03 Kind .18* 7.46 7.77 .09 3.32 3.33 Energetic .22** 6.29 6.83 .09 2.89 2.97 Steady -.02 6.14 6.07 .03 2.29 2.27 Helpful .34*** 7.04 7.83 .12 3.29 3.37 Practical -.05 6.64 6.67 .06 2.71 2.87 Negative Control Talkative .23* 5.96 6.63 .12 1.89 2.13 Fretful -.08 5.39 4.63 .07 .46 .50 Envious -.26** 4.96 3.87 -.27** .61 .30 Nervous -.26** 5.32 3.60 -.15+ .82 .50 Rude .03 2.68 2.70 .05 .14 .27 Sloppy -.01 4.07 3.87 -.11 .41 .17 Hyperactive .07 4.96 5.03 -.01 1.04 1.03 Shy -.27** 5.79 4.60 -.01 .67 .86 Irritable .03 5.50 5.73 -.14 .59 .31 Jealous -.06 5.00 5.10 -.02 .63 .55 59 noncognizer traits were important to possess compared to individuals high in need for cognition, but only 5 (17%, p > .99) of these relationships persisted when controlling for trait valence and social desirability. The importance of possessing 6 o f20 (30%, p=.94) control traits discriminated need for cognition, but only one (5%, p > .99) of these relationships remained marginally significant when controlling for trait valence and social desirability. Thus, cognizer traits differentiated individuals high versus low in need for cognition when examined on a stimulus by stimulus basis, but the remaining traits were less effective at differentiating individuals high versus low in need for cognition. Ancillary Analysis: Magnitude of Self-descriptiveness Ratings The analysis reported above focused on relative need for cognition differences in importance and valence ratings of the traits. The absolute magnitude of the endorsement and importance ratings were examined to illustrate ratings relative to the midpoint. In other words, do individuals high or low in need for cognition rate themselves as possessing or not possessing a given trait relative to a neutral response? This result is only suggestive however, because absolute scale ratings can reflect any one of several distinct psychological processes (Cacioppo & Bemtson, 1994; Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968; Schuman & Pressor, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). Recall that the self-endorsement rating scale ranged fi-om 1 to 9 with a midpoint of 5 in which scale points fi-om 1-4 denote degrees of agreement to “does not accurately describe me” and responses fi-om 6-9 denote degrees of agreement to “accurately describes me”. Analysis of the endorsement rates illustrates that in self-endorsement 60 responses to cognizer words, individuals high and low in need for cognition (based on tertiary split) perceived themselves significantly more positively than the midpoint (mean. HNc = 7.2; 95% Cl = 6.96 - 7.41; meanLNc=6.2, 95%CI=5.97-6.5). Similarly, individuals highand low need for cognition rated themselves below the midpoint on characteristics which are descriptive of noncognizers (mean hn c = 2.89; 95% Cl =2.55 - 3.24; mean lnc = 3.6; 95% Cl = 3.30 - 3.80). Of course, the need for cognition scores of college students low in this dimension may still be middling in need for cognition in a normative sense by virtue of the tendency for those who pursue higher education to possess some level of cognitive motivation (Spotts, 1994). Thus, it remains for future research to determine whether the relative schematicity of individuals low in need for cognition observed in this research generalizes to the population at large. More importantly here, individuals differing in need for cognition in this study differed in the relative extent that they are cognizers and noncognizers even though both report in an absolute sense being cognizers and deny being noncognizers. Discussion Study 2 revealed that individuals high in need for cognition were more likely to perceive themselves as possessing traits indicative of the predisposition to engage in cognitive activity. A set of 30 traits reflecting engaging in cognitive tasks were obtained from a pilot sample. These consensually validated traits were rated as self-descriptive and as personally important to possess by individuals known to be dispositionally high in cognitive motivation. These relationships persisted even when potential sources of bias 61 were statistically controlled. An additional set of 29 noncognizer traits were selected which were rated as least indicative of an individual with the motivation to engage in cognitive tasks. The results were mixed in terms of these traits differentiating individuals low in need for cognition from individuals high in need for cognition. Although individuals low in need for cognition were more likely to endorse these traits than were individuals high in need for cognition, these results did not generalize to the importance of being a noncognizer when sources of response bias were statistically control. While responses to traits denoting cognitive attributes, whether they be cognizer or noncognizer attributes, differentiated need for cognition, responses to control traits which were irrelevant to cognitive activity did not differentiate need for cognition when sources of bias were statistically controlled. Therefore, the endorsement and importance results cannot be accounted for by differences in the valence of the traits because (1) need for cognition was correlated with cognizer and noncognizer traits and not positive and negative control traits; and (2) these results persisted when statistically controlling trait valence and socially desirable response strategies. These results add further support to the notion that individual differences in need for cognition are limited to intellective domains and do not predict responses to traits which are irrelevant to intellection. The present study also extended the validity of the need for cognition scale by having individuals respond to consensually validated descriptors o f need for cognition. Specifically, individuals high in need for cognition described themselves similarly to individuals who were asked to describe those who were high in need for cognition. This 62 feature of Study 2 adds some insight into the personolcgy of need for cognition and validity of the need for cognition scale by suggesting that self-perceptions of individuals differing in need for cognition are consonant with the perceptions that others have of individuals differing in need for cognition. Furthermore, these relative differences between individuals high and low in need for cognition was obtained in a sample of college students. Even though students who are relatively low in need for cognition in a college sample are likely to be more middling in need for cognition in the general population, they still differed from college students who were high in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Spotts, 1994). An interesting ancillary issue apparent from Studies 1 and 2 concerns the relationship between need for cognition and social desirability. Although past research using the need for cognition has illustrated both measures to be only slightly related (r,vgor 5 studies = .10, p < .01; Cacioppo et al., 1996), Study 1 and Study 2 each obtained a substantial relationship between social desirability and need for cognition (rs = .30 and .37 respectively, p’s <001). One potential explanation for the increased relationship between need for cognition and social desirability was the proximity of the two scales within a single questionnaire packet. In addition to further testing the representation of cognitive acts in the self-concept. Study 3 also investigated the relationship between need for cognition and social desirability by emphasizing anonymity and administering both scales in different testing sessions as is more traditionally done in research testing the need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 63 CHAPTERS NEED FOR COGNITION AND PROCESSING INFORMATION: A SELF-SCHEMA APPROACH Studies 1 and 2 illustrate that the need for cognition possess qualities on the intellective dimension which are similar to qualities demonstrated by other self-schema dimensions. Recall that Study 1 demonstrated that need for cognition predicts the taxonomic structure of personality, and Study 2 illustrated that compared to individuals low in need for cognition, individuals high in need for cognition perceived themselves extremely on the cognizer dimension and perceived cognizer traits as personally important to possess. These findings are consistent with Markus’ (1977) and Andersen & Cyranowski’s (1994) assertion that self-schemas are personally important dimensions which organize information in the self-concept. However, Markus (1977) also argued that self-schemas, “organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual’s social experience” (p. 64) Whether need for cognition predicts the processing of self-related information is addressed in Studies 3 and 4. According to Markus (1977), self-schemas tend to develop on personally important dimensions which subsequently become central to an individuals’ notion of self. As a result, individuals’ self-schemas are developed through fi’equent experience with the 64 dimension, resulting in the schematic becoming an “expert” in that domain. As a consequence of repeated experience on a personally important dimension, schematics organize their self-concept according to the self-schema. Based on this logic, Markus (1977) predicted that because self-schemas facilitate and guide information processing, schematics should respond more quickly and have a better memory for schema-relevant information than schema-irrelevant information. These processing qualities of self schemas were illustrated in a classic study by Markus (1977) in which individuals who were schematic on independence, schematic on dependence, or aschematic on the dependence-independence dimension completed several self-descriptiveness tasks. On a timed task, Markus (1977) found that schematics responded more quickly to schema- consistent traits, but not to schema irrelevant traits. On a second dependent measure, schematics provided recalled more behavioral justification for ratings of schema-relevant traits than for schema-irrelevant traits. Study 3 The results of Studies 1 and 2 were extended in Study 3 by examining the processing advantages conveyed to individuals high relative to low in need for cognition by virtue of possessing a self-schema on cognitive acts. Individuals high in need for cognition have vast experience with cognitive endeavors, perceive themselves extremely on these dimensions, and perceive these dimensions as important to possess. If they are schematic on cognitive acts, they should also manifest processing advantages toward self relevant information on the cognitive dimension. In particular. Study 3 examined the 65 relative eflSciency of responding to schema-consistent material, recall of schema-consistent information, and memory of schema-consistent behavioral histories. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts, their perception and memory should be facilitated similarly to what has been found in research by Markus (Markus, 1977; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Fong & Markus, 1982). Individuals who do not possess a disposition to be cognitively motivated (i.e., individuals low and middling in need for cognition) perceive themselves relatively less extremely on cognitive dimensions, and feel less strongly that attributes which are germane to engaging in cognitive acts are important trait to possess. These individuals are therefore aschematic on cognitive activity. Consequently, these individuals should not show the same response facilitation that are enjoyed by those who are schematic on cognitive acts. Three separate dependent measures were included to test whether the disposition to be cognitively motivated facilitates information processing on the cognitive dimension for individuals high in need for cognition. First, individuals dififering in need for cognition were presented with cognizer, noncognizer, and control traits (see Study 2) and were instructed to respond as quickly as possible in timed “me” or “not me” judgments. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts, their response latencies should be facilitated towards cognizer traits relative to individuals who are aschematic on cognitive acts (i.e., low or middling need for cognition individuals). The second dependent measure indexed individuals’ spontaneous recall of schema relevant and irrelevant stimuli which were presented in the response time task described 66 above. Markus (1977; Markus & Sentis, 1982) argued that by virtue of the facilitation of information processing conveyed to schematics, schematics will display better free recall of schema relevant traits than schema irrelevant traits. For example, Markus, Crane, & Saladi (1978, cited in Markus & Sentis, 1982) reported that following the completion of a sex-role trait-listing (Bern, 1974), masculine schematics had better recall of masculine traits, feminine schematics had better recall of feminine traits, and aschematic individuals (i.e., androgynous) showed no differential recall of either type of trait. In a consistent vein, work on self-reference memory illustrated that information that is perceived as relevant to the self is better recalled than information that is construed along other dimensions (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Thus, if individuals who are high in need for cognition are schematic for intellectance and if self-schematics structure schema relevant information more efficiently, individuals high in need for cognition should manifest improved free recall of cognizer traits relative to individuals mid or low in need for cognition, and no individidual differences should be found on the remaining recall indices which are unrelated to cognitive activity. Finally, Markus (1977) argued that because self-schemas structure information stored about the sel^ individuals who possess a self-schema should frame and organize past memories in reference to the schema. To address this issue in Study 3, participants were provided with a subset of the cognizer, noncognizer, and control traits and were asked to elaborate upon their self-ratings by indicating behaviors they have commited in the past which illustrate they possess or do not possess each characteristic. These 67 behavioral listings were then coded to determine if the recalled behaviors denote engaging in cognitive activity, not engaging in cognitive activity, nondiagnostic cognitive behavior (referred to as “cognitive-other”), or behavior irrelevant to cognitive activity. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts, they should be more likely to frame and recall past memories based on engaging in cognitive acts then would individuals low or middling in need for cognition. Moreover, individuals high in need for cognition should be more likely to frame behavioral histories of control traits in terms of engaging in cognitive acts. Although it is possible that aschematics will recall more cognitive behaviors in explaining their ratings towards cognizer or noncognizer traits, it is less likely that aschematics will spontaneously list such behaviors to traits which are irrelevant to cognitive processing. As an alternative to individuals high in need for cognition manifesting chronically accessible self-schema on cognitive acts, it is also possible that the "cognizer-self ' functions as one of several equally important self-concepts possessed by individuals high and low in need for cognition, but that these self-concepts are manifest within different contexts. For example, Markus & Kunda (1986, see also Markus & Nurius, 1986) argued that individuals possess a variety of different self-conceptions. Each self conception is likely to guide behavior and perception when the self-dimension is made contextually salient. If individuals high in need for cognition have a lower threshold for priming the cognizer self-conception, they are more likely to rate themselves more extemely within situations which only slightly motivate effortful cognitive processing. In 68 contrast, individuals low in need for cognition may have a higher threshold for stimulating the cognizer self and as a result may not manifest the cognizer self unless more potent motivators of cognitive activity are present (e.g., personal involvement; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Cacioppo et al., 1996; see also Cacioppo, Uchino, Crites, Snydersmith, Smith, Bemtson, & Lang, 1992). To test this alternative notion, half of the participants were primed to think of themselves as cognitively motivated (cognitive motivation prime) and the remainder of the subjects were primed to think of themselves as lucky (control prime). As a result, half of the individuals low in need for cognition were explicitly asked to think of themselves as possessing cognitive motivation. If engaging in cognitive acts functions as one of several self-conceptions which functions only when contextually salient (and not a self-schema), then individuals differences in information processing should be attenuated when cognitive motivation is explicitly primed. However, if interindividual variations in need for cognition reflect stable differences in self-schemata, additive effects between personological and situational precursors of cognitive motivation should be obtained. Method and Design Ninety-six undergraduates participated as part of their introductory psychology course requirement. All participants completed the 18-item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984) on the first day of class. Need for cognition scores were computed and subjected to a quartile split. Participants were contacted later in the quarter and were designated high in need for cognition (top 25%), middling in need for cognition 69 (middling 50%) and low in need for cognition (bottom 25%). An alternative conceptualization of the need for cognition scores is that the those who scored in the top 25% on the need for cognition scale were designated as schematic on cognitive activity and the remaining participants were designated as cognitive activity aschematics. Personological vs. situational differences in the manifestation of need for cognition were examined by instructing half of the subjects to think about themselves as thoughtful (cognitive prime) and the remainder of the subjects were asked to think of themselves as lucky (noncognitive prime). Procedure Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study of the psychometrics of different memory measures. They were informed that there are a variety of different ways to record memories about oneself, and that the experiment was designed to assess their personal memories in a variety of ways to compare the validity of each memory test. These different memory tasks are described below. The phrase in parentheses represents the title provided to the subject as part of the cover story. Priming Cognitive Motivation (“Situation Memory Survey”)The priming task was based on a task developed by Woike (1995) in which self-schemas were primed. In the cognitive prime condition, half of the subjects were asked to spend 7 minutes thinking about an instance in which they “had to think a lot about a problem, task, issue, or concept in order to accomplish a goal”. Subjects were then asked to reexperience the situation by writing about the behavior. The remainder of the subjects completed a “cognitive 70 irrelevant” priming task in which they were asked to “think about a recent incident in which luck helped you to accomplish a goal.” Subjects were given 7 minutes to write about the problem. Those who finished early were asked to convey a second experience. All subjects were asked to finish up after 7 minutes of conveying their experiences and were stopped after 8 minutes if they had not completed describing their behavior. Response time task (“Gut reaction recall task”). This task was modeled after Markus (1977) in which schematic difterences in the speed of responding to schema relevant and schema irrelevant traits were assessed. Participants were informed that the research examined individuals’ first impressions or their gut reaction recall memory about themselves. They were instructed that a series of adjectives would be presented on a computer monitor and that they should report their first impression by pressing a computer key indicating if the word described them or did not describe them. After completing 10 practice trials, the 79 trait adjectives used in Study 2 were presented in a fi’ame in the center of a computer monitor for 1 second and participants were given unlimited time to respond “Me” or “Not me” by pressing either the FI or F12 key (counterbalanced across subjects) with their dominant hand. In the 3 second pause between trials, participants rested their dominant hand on a pad marked immediately behind the space bar and equidistant fi’om FI and F12. Standard speed-accuracy tradeoff instructions were implemented as recommended by Fazio (1990). Spontaneous Recall (“Self-reference recall survey")- Participants were then asked to complete the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability scale as a filler task between 71 the response measure and a spontaneous recall measure. This scale was also used to Anther assess the relationship between need for cognition and social desirability when the scales were temporally separated. Following the filler task, participants were asked to recall as many adjectives as they could from the “gut reaction recall task.” Participants were instructed to recall any of the 89 words (experimental traits plus practice words) that were presented in the response latency task. They were informed to take as much time as they needed to recall as many words as they could.^ Past Behavioral Recall (“Specific Behavioral Recall Task") . The behavioral recall task was also modeled after research by Markus (1977) in which she examined schema differences in spontaneous recall of past behavior. This test examined the extent to which individuals differing in need for cognition spontaneously recalled previous behaviors relevant to cognitive behavior. Participants were given a 16 page booklet with a cover page containing instructions. Each page of the booklet had a trait word at the top and asked if the adjective described them or did not describe them. The next line stated “This adjective does or does not describe me because in the past I:” (italics in original). The remainder of each page was left empty for them to write their behaviors justifying their possessing or not possessing each trait. Instructions listed on the first page of the booklet were based on those provided by Markus (1977): ® Need for cognition was correlated with the amount of time working on the recall task (r=.24, p<.05). 72 “If you state a word describes you, provide specific behaviors that you have done that illustrate you possess this characteristic. List the first kinds of behaviors that come to your mind. Do not worry about how other people might interpret a particular behavior; use your own firame of reference. List as many or as few behaviors that come to mind. Remember to use specific behaviors that you have done in the past.” “If you state a word does not describe you, provide specific behaviors that you have done that illustrate you do not possess this characteristic.. . . “ Each of the 16 pages contained a different trait adjective; 4 cognizer traits, 4 noncognizer traits, 4 positive control traits, and 4 negative control traits. Cognizer and nognizer traits were selected as a result of being among the best discriminating between high and low need for cognition based on mean response in Study 2. Control traits were selected based on their valence scores (in Study 2) being most similar to those of the 4 cognizer traits and the 4 noncognizer traits^®. Each of the 16 traits were presented in random order for each participant. After completing the behavioral memory task, subjects were thanked, debriefed and dismissed. Results Response Time Task- Endorsement Rates Because a different number of words were in each within subjects condition, percentages were computed by dividing the number of “me” responses by the total number of words present in each word type condition. These percentages were subjected to a 3 (need for cognition: low, middling, high) x 2 (prime: cognitive vs. luck) x 2 (trait The 16 traits used were follows. The number in the parenthesis indicates the average valence ratings for the traits in each category. Cognizer traits (\M )\ concentrating, elaborative, freethinking, and strong-minded; Noncognizer traits (-.86): undecided, unindustrious, simpleminded, and noninquiring; Positive control traits (1.53); bold, practical, energetic, and steady;Negative control traits (-1.08) 73 cognitivity; cognizer/noncognizer traits vs. control) x 2 (valence; positive vs. negative) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the final two factors. This analysis revealed a three way interaction between need for cognition, trait valence, and trait cognitivity (F(2,90)=3.35, p<.05). This 3-way interaction is graphed in Figure 3. Analysis of the cognitive trait (cognizer or noncognizer) x control trait (positive or negative valence) interaction with need for cognition was conducted at each level of trait valence. Examination of endorsement rates of cognizer vs. positive traits by need for cognition revealed a need for cognition main effect (F(2,93) = 8.60, p<.001) which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction (F(2,93)= 8.03, p<.001). Examination of the means and confidence intervals (see top panel of Figure 3) illustrated that, as expected, this interaction resulted from individuals high in need for cognition endorsing more cognizer traits than positive traits (p<.05), individuals low in need for cognition endorsing more positive than cognizer traits (p<05), and no significant difference in endorsement of individuals middling in need for cognition. Further examination of these means as a function of need for cognition illustrated that endorsements of positive traits were unaffected by one’s need for cognition score, but endorsement of cognizer traits was determined by one’s need for cognition score (p < .05). Analysis of endorsement rates of noncognizer vs. negative control traits revealed a general tendency for all subjects to endorse more negative traits than noncognizer traits (F(l,93)= 118.79, p<.001), and a tendency for individuals low in need for cognition to endorse more negative traits than individuals high in need for cognition (F(2,93) = 8.02, 74 Endorsements of Cognizer and Positive Traits by NC Cognizer 0.85 - □ Positive 0.8 0.75 -- 0.65 -- LNC MNC HNC Endorsements of Noncognizer and Negative traits by NC 0.9 j 0.8 -- 0.7 - ■ Noncognizer 0.6 -- □ Negative 0.5 -- 0.4 -- 0.3 - 0.2 - 0.1 - 0 - LNC MNC HNC Figure 3; Endorsements as a function of Need for Cognition, trait valence, and trait cognitivity. 75 p< 001). No interaction was obtained between need for cognition and the likelihood of endorsing a noncognizer vs. negative trait. The results of this analysis can be found in the bottom panel of Figure 3. The cross-over interaction between endoreseraents of cognizer and positive traits as a function of need for cognition (see top panel of Figure 3) indicates that cognizer traits are a component of the self-concept o f individuals high in need for cognition beyond what is accounted for by valence alone. The fact that endorsements of noncognizer traits vs negative traits did not interact with need for cognition suggests that noncognizer traits did not differentiate need for cognition. These results provide a conceptual replication and extension of Study 2 in that cognizer traits were associated with need for cognition. This conceptual replication was obtained even though Study 2 used a paper and pencil format in which participants indicated the extent of self-descriptiveness and had unlimited time to register responses, whereas Study 3 used a dichtomous response format in which individuals were instructed to respond as quickly as possible. Response Time Task- Response Latencies A residualized regression procedure was conducted on the response latency data to statistically control two potential sources of biases. These residuals represent the variance in response time not accounted for by the predictors (i.e., sources of bias) which were entered into the regression. Two predictors were entered into the regression equation. First, to control for the tendency for the different word types to be of different lengths". " Mean word length: cognizer = 9 letters; noncognizer = 10.75; positive control = 7.2; and negative control = 7.0. There was a significant tendency for cognitive traits (cognizer & noncognizer) to be longer 76 wordsize was included as a predictor (see Fazio, 1990). Second, Study 2 and its pilot studies revealed valence difference between each of the trait types. Valence ratings which were collected in Study 2 were therefore also used as predictors in the regression procedure.*^ In addition to conducting the residualized regression procedure, a within subject percentile transformation was performed on the residualized response latency to correct for outliers and skews which are inherent in response latency data (see Fazio, 1990; Runyon & Haber, 1988). Percentile corrected, residualized response times were subjected to a 3 (need for cognition) x 2 (prime: cognitive vs. luck) x 2 (trait cognitivity: cognizer/noncognizer vs. control) X 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors*^. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for need for cognition (F(2,90)=l 1.11, p<.001) suggesting that individuals low in need for cognition responded more quickly than individuals high in need for cognition, and a significant main effect for valence (F(l,90)=32.13, p<.001) suggesting that responses were faster towards negatively valenced than towards positively valenced traits. More importantly, this than control traits (F (1,75) = 20.22, p <001) and negative traits to be longer than positive traits (F(l,75) = 5.1, p<.05). A third factor which we would have liked to covaiy was word frequency. Cognizer (i.e., contemplative) and noncognizer (e.g., uiunethodical) traits are likely to be less common than the control traits (e g., kind, shy). However, the only available comprehensive ftequency listing is from 1963 (Kucera & Francis, 1982; originally reported by Francis & Kucera, 1967). The present data was collected in 1995 and word usages are likely to have changed considerably in these years. These frequency values were therefore not trusted as an effective operationalization of 1995 word frequencies and were not included in the analyses. An exploratory analysis with the Kucera & Francis (1982) frequencies as a response latencj' covariate yielded results that were virtually identical to those conducted without the 1963 word frequencies covaried. Response type C‘me” vs. “not me”) was not used as a factor because some individuals did not respond “me” to some trait-types, therefore resulting in missing data when “me” vs. “not me” was included in the model. 77 analysis revealed a general trait cognitivity main effect suggesting that individuals took longer to respond towards any trait with meanings relevant to cognitive processing (i.e., cognizer or noncognizer) than towards traits which were irrelevant to cognitive processing (F(l,90)=4.92, p<.05). Consistent with the notion that individuals dififering in need for cognition differ more on cognitive dimensions than other dimensions, analysis of response times revealed a significant need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction ^(2,90)= 11.01, p < .001). This interaction did not depend on whether individuals were responding towards a cognizer or noncognizer trait (i.e., as indicated by the nonsignificant need for cognition x trait cognitivity x valence interaction; F < 1). No significant prime effects were obtained in response times. The need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction is depicted in Figure 4 and is discussed in greater depth below. To test the notion that response times were facilitated for schematics towards schema-relevant material, a planned contrast testing if schematics (i.e., individuals high in need for cognition) differed fi"om aschematics (i.e., individuals not high in need for cognition). This analysis revealed that individuals high in need for cognition responded more quickly than did individuals low or middling in need for cognition on cognitive traits (t= -3.5, p<.001), and the direction of the effect was reversed for response latencies 78 Percentile Residualized RT 0.54 T 0,52 1 0.5 - 2 0.48 - ■ Control I □ Experimental *o 0.46 - 0.44 I 0.42 -- Low Figure 4 ; Percentile Residualized Response Times scores as a function of Need for cognition towards control traits (t= + 3.7, p< .001) However, responses by individuals high in need for cognition towards cognizer traits were only marginally faster than were responses by individuals middling in need for cognition (t=l .7, p=. 10). A further examination of the simple effects at each level of need for cognition revealed that responses of individuals low in need for cognition were significantly faster towards control traits than cognitive traits ®1,31) = 35.68, p<001), individuals middling in need for cognition did not respond differently towards cognitive and control traits (F<1), and individuals high in need for cognition tended to respond faster towards cognizer traits, but this effect was not significant (F(l,31)=2.38, p=.13). These data provide support for the notion that schematics (i.e., individuals high in need for cognition) responded more quickly than aschematics on cognizer, but not control traits. Although there was a general tendency for all subjects to respond more quickly towards the control traits than the cognitive traits, this tendency was reversed for individuals high in need for cognition. These results are consistent with the notion that individuals are more likely to fi-ame their self-concept on the cognitive dimension. Although it was promising that responses by individuals high in need for cognition responded more quickly to cognizer traits and more slowly to control traits, an alternative possibility is that because of the percentile procedure to control outliers, responses towards control words were not independent &om responses towards cognizer words and thus, response times towards cognitive and control words were statistically constrained to be the reciprocal of one another. To examine this possibility, the raw residualized response latencies were analyzed in the same design. Analysis of these scores revealed the same trait cognitivity main effect (F(l,90)= 15.67, p < .01) which was qualified by a need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction (F(l,90)= 5.58, p<.01). In this analysis, platmed comparisons between responses of individuals high in need for cognition and individuals middling and low in need for cognition revealed that responses towards cognitive traits (i.e., cognizer & noncognizer) differentiated marginally between need for cognition (t= -1.87, p<.07), but responses towards control traits did not (t= - .952, p= .34). Thus, when the raw residualized response times were analyzed, and responses towards cognitive and control traits were independent, responses towards cognitive traits differentiated need for cognition, but responses towards control traits did not. 80 Spontaneous Recall o f Traits: Accurate Recall Recall that following a brief filler task, participants were asked to recall as many of the traits presented during the response time task as they could. Responses were considered accurate if the recalled trait was exactly correct or a form of the actual trait (i.e., elaborative vs. elaborating). Analyses were conducted separately with need for cognition and prime predicting recall of traits. Need for cognition was a significant predictor of recall of cognizer traits (r=.35, p<.OOI) and recall of positive control traits (^.21, p<.01). Individuals high in need for cognition were marginally more likely to recall practice words than were individuals low in need for cognition (r= . 14, p<. 10). Need for cognition was uncorrelated with recall of noncognizer or negative control traits. These results indicate that individuals higher in need for cognition had a greater tendency to recall cognizer traits than did individuals low in need for cognition. Alternatively, because need for cognition was also significantly correlated with recall of positive control traits, individuals high in need for cognition might have possessed a greater tendency to recall positively valenced traits independent of the cognitive implications of the traits. To examine which of these explanations account for the results, partial correlations were computed using a hierarchical regression procedure with need for cognition as the dependent measure and recall of positive traits and recall of cognizer traits as predictors. This analysis revealed that recall of cognizer traits was correlated with need for cognition when partialling the eflFect of a positivity bias in recall (r=.31, p<.01). 81 When the order of the two recall indices was reversed, recall of positive traits no longer predicted need for cognition (i^.l3, ns). Thus, a general positivity bias in recall does not appear to account for the higher recall of cognizer traits by individuals high in need for cognition. A similar analysis in which recall was correlated with prime condition revealed that prime condition predicted the likelihood of recalling a cognizer trait (r= .19, p<05). Prime also predicted the recall of negative control traits, but this effect was only marginally significant (r=.15, p<07). This result indicates that the situational manipulation of cognitive motivation, namely instructing individuals to think of themselves as cognitive motivated, was effective in producing the facilitation of recall on the cognitive domain. The effect of the cognitive prime did not lead to a general increase in recall, but was largely limited to recall of traits relevant to engaging in cognitive endeavors. Because both prime and need for cognition were correlated with the tendency to recall a cognizer trait, partial correlations were computed within a hierarchical regression procedure in which need for cognition and prime predicted recall of cognizer traits. This analysis revealed that need for cognition predicted recall of cognizer traits when prime condition was statistically controlled (r=.35, p<.001). The relationship between prime and recall of cognizer traits was unaffected when controlling for need for cognition (r= . 19, p=.05). This result suggests that the role of personality (i.e., need for cognition) and situation (i.e., prime) were additive as each factor accounted for independent variance in predicting recall of traits denoting intellectance. 82 Most subjects incorrectly recalled traits which were not part of the response time task. Based on their dictionary definitions, all traits which were inaccurately recalled were categorized as relevant to possessing attributes related to engaging in cognitive tasks, possessing attributes related to the avoidance of cognitive tasks, or possessing attributes irrelevant to cognitive processing. This analysis revealed that neither need for cognition nor prime condition predicted errors of commission for any of the trait categories (all rs< .10). Recall o f Behavioral Histories Recall that participants were asked to provide behaviors which illustrated that they possess or do not possess each of 16 traits: 4 of each trait type. Behavioral justification data was coded as a behavior indicating motivation to approach cognitive task (e.g., “I always want to learn something new because I love new information and facts”), a behavior indicating apathy or avoidance of cognitive tasks (e.g., “I am not very inquisitive or care to be”), a behavior which is inherently cognitive in nature but nondiagnostic of cognitive motivation or lack of cognitive motivation (referred to as “cognitive other”; e.g., “I get good grades”), and a behavior which is entirely irrelevant to cognitive tasks (e.g., “I got into a fight with my boyfnend”). Data were coded by two independent coders to reflect the number of behaviors listed and the category which most describes each behavior listing. Inter-rater reliability was acceptable (percentage agreement = 78%). Inconsistencies were resolved by a third coder who selected what they felt to be the most accurate coding for each inconsistent coding. In only 3 cases (of 340 trials) did the third 83 coder select a “compromise” code which was indicated by neither of the two original coders. These data were subjected to a 3 (need for cognition) x 2 (prime) x 4 (type of behavior listing; cognitive motivation, cognitive avoidance, cognitive-other, and cognitive irrelevant) x 4 (wordtype: cognizer, noncognizer, positive control, and negative control) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for prime (F(l,83) = 7.48, p< .01), and a marginally significant main effect for need for cognition (F(2,83) = 2.63, p < .08). The means and standard deviations for these main effects can be found in Table 9. The prime main effect resulted from the tendency for cognitive prime individuals to list more behaviors than luck primed individuals. The need for cognition main effect resulted from the tendency for individuals low in need for cognition to list marginally more behaviors than individuals middling in need for cognition with those high in need for cognition falling between these two groups. In addition, there was a trait type main effect (F(3,249) = 7.68, H-Fep,;ion= .99, p < .001) and a recall type main effect (F(3,249)=232.12, H-Fep,uon= 756, p < .001) which were qualified by a wordtype by recall type interaction (F(9,747) = 117.91, H-Fep,iion = .990, p<001). The need for cognition, prime, wordtype, recall type, and wordtype main effects are described in depth in Table 9. The prime and need for cognition main effects were qualified by higher order interactions which are discussed below. Prime interacted with recall type (F(3,249) = 7.39, p < 05) and no other factor. This interaction is depicted in Figure 5 and is the result of cognitively primed individuals 84 Means and Standard Deviations for Need for Cognition, Prime, Recall dimension, and Trait Type Main Effects Need for Cognition Mean SD LNC 25.90, 8.8 MNC 22.00, 6.6 HNC 23.00, 6.07 Prime Mean SD Cognitive 25.57, 7.38 Luck 21.64b 6.75 Type o f Behavioral Listing Mean SD Cognitive Motivation 4.71b 2.68 Cognitive Avoidance 1.23c 1.65 Cognitive Other 4.79b 2.43 Cognitive Irrelevant 12.84, 5.35 Trait Type Mean SD Cognizer Traits 5.56c 1.93 Noncognizer Traits 5.95b 2.05 Positive Control 6.36, 2.61 Negative Control 5.60c 2.00 Note that subscripts denote significant differences Table 9: Means and Standard Deviations for Need for Cognition, Prime, Wordtype, and Trait Type Main Effects 85 Type of Behavior Listing x Prime 16 ■Cognitive Prime 14 □ Luck Prime "S 12 3 K 10 I 8 00 o \ Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Irrelevant Motivation Avoidance Other Type of Behavior Listed Figure 5: Interaction between prime and type o f behavior listed on the number of behaviors listed listing marginally more cognitive motivation behaviors than luck primed individuals (F(l,87)= 3.67, p<.06), a significant tendency for cognitively primed individuals to list more irrelevant behaviors than luck primed individuals (F(l,87) = 4.58, p<.05), and no significant differences in listing cognitive avoidance or cognitive other behaviors. There was also a need for cognition interaction with recall type (T(6,249) = 5.28, H-Fep,iion = .75572, p<.001), which was further qualified by a need for cognition x wordtype x recall type interaction. (F(18,747) = 1.63, H-Fep,non = .72, p = .05). The significant three way interaction between need for cognition, recall type, and wordtype was examined by analyzing the wordtype by need for cognition interaction for each type of behavior listing (i.e., cognitive motivation listing, cognitive avoidance/apathy listing, cognitive other listing, and irrelevant listing). The resulting 3 (need for cognition) x 2 (trait valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (trait cognitivity: cognizer/noncognizer vs. control) simple effects interactions were tested separately at each level of behavioral listing type. The results of each of these analyses can be found in four panels of Figure 6 and are described in depth below. The first panel of Figure 6 illustrates the results of the 3 way simple effect interaction for the number of behaviors listed which indicated cognitive motivation or the general approach towards cognitive tasks. Analysis of these recall rates revealed that individuals high in need for cognition listed more such behaviors than did individuals low or middling in need for cognition independent of whether the trait was a cognizer. 87 Cognitive Approach Behavioral Listings 7 T 6 -- 5 -- 4 -- ■ LNC □ MNC ■ HNC Cognizer Noncognizer Positive Negative Trait Trait Trait Trait Cognitive Apathy (or Avoidance) Behavioral Listings 7 -r 6 -- 5 - ■ LNC 4 -- □ MNC ■ HNC 3 - 2 1 -- Cognizer Noncognizer Positive Negative Trait Trait Trait Trait Figure 6 (continued on next page) Figure 6; Number of Behaviors listed as a function of Need for Cognition and Wordtype 88 Figure 6 (continued) Cognitive Other (Nondiagnostic) Behavioral Listings 7 j 6 - 5 -- 4 - ■ LNC □ MNC 3 ■ HNC 2 1 0 tlr i Cognizer Noncognizer Positive Negative Trait Trait Trait Trait Cognitive Irrelevant Behavioral Listings ■ LNC 7 □ MNC ■ HNC Hh Cognizer Noncognizer Positive Negative Trait Trait Trait Trait 89 noncognizer, or control trait (F(2,86)=5.09, p<.01). Importantly, no interaction was obtained between need for cognition and trait cognitivity and valence (F(2,86) = 1.48, p=.23) suggesting that individuals high in need for cognition listed more behaviors indicating cognitive motivation than did individuals low in need for cognition for cognizer traits, noncognizer traits, and also for control traits. The fact that individuals high in need for cognition used behaviors indicating cognitive motivation to justify their possessing all traits is consistent with the notion that individuals high in need for cognition tend to use the motivation to engage in cognitive acts as an organizational tool in their self-concept. The second panel of Figure 6 illustrates recall of behaviors indicating the lack of cognitive motivation. Analysis of the 3 way simple effect interaction on these behavioral listings revealed that individuals low in need for cognition had a greater tendency to list more cognitive avoidance behaviors than individuals high in need for cognition (F(2,86)= 5.31, p<.01), which was qualified by an interaction between need for cognition and trait cognitivity ÇF(2,86)=4.09, p<.05). Individuals low in need for cognition listed more behaviors denoting the lack of cognitive motivation to cognitive traits (i.e., cognizer and noncognizer; F(2,90)= 4.92, p<01) independent of the valence of these traits (F<1). i However, analysis of the control traits revealed no need for cognition main effect (F(2,88) = 1.11, p= .33) or interaction with trait valence (F(2,88)= 1.82, p=. 17). These results indicate that individuals low in need for cognition listed more behaviors indicating the avoidance of cognitive tasks than did other subjects, but they only did so in response to 90 cognizer and noncognizer traits; they did not list cognitive avoidance behaviors in response to control traits. Analysis of the recall of behaviors which were relevant to cognitive tasks, but were nondiagnostic of cognitive motivation or avoidance (i.e., cognitive-other listings) revealed no significant main effects or interactions involving need for cognition. These data are illustrated in the third panel of Figure 6. Finally, analysis of participants’ recall of behaviors which were irrelevant to cognitive processing revealed that individuals low need for cognition were more likely to list a behavior which was irrelevant to cognitive processing than were individuals high need for cognition (F(2,86)=4.92, p<.05). Need for cognition did not interact with any other factor. These results are indicated in the fourth and final panel of Figure 6. To summarize, the need for cognition effects on the behavioral listing data, individuals high in need for cognition were more likely to spontaneously list behaviors indicating engaging in cognitive activity to all traits regardless of the traits’ cognitive connotations. Interestingly, a general predisposition to respond more by individuals high in need for cognition cannot account for these differences because individuals high in need listed the same or fewer behaviors for each of the other behavior listing types (i.e., cognitive avoidance, cognitive other, irrelevant). These results provide support for the notion that individuals high in need for cognition behave as schematics on engaging in cognitive acts; that is, they construe their past behavior in terms of engaging in cognitive activity, even when the experimental stimulus does not require that they do so. 91 In contrast, individuals low in need for cognition were less likely to list a behavior indicating cognitive motivation compared to individuals high in need for cognition. They were also more likely to list behaviors which indicated apathy and avoidance of cognitive endeavors, at least in response to a cognitive stimulus. The fact that individuals low in need for cognition listed more irrelevant behaviors and fewer cognitive motivation behaviors indicates that individuals low in need for cognition used a variety of dimensions other than cognitive activity to frame their self-concept. In addition, the fact that individuals low in need for cognition listed more behaviors overall than did individuals high in need for cognition suggests that the observed differences did not simply reflect the fact that individuals high in need for cognition listed more behaviors generally, but rather they listed more behaviors indicating the motivation to engage in cognitive acts. (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1996). However, in addition to personality factors measured by the need for cognition predicting recall of past behaviors, the situational prime manipulation was effective at increasing individuals’ recall; those that received the cognitive motivation prime listed more behaviors overall and listed more cognitive motivation behaviors and irrelevant behaviors than did those who received the luck prime. This result suggests that the prime manipulation was effective in making behaviors indicating the approach of cognitive tasks more accessible to those who received the cognitive motivation prime. The fact that need for cognition and prime did not interact in the recall of behavioral histories data suggest 92 that both person and situation accounted for independent and additive components of recall. Discussion The results of Study 3 are consistent with the notion that individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts. Compared to individuals low in need for cognition, individuals high in need for cognition spontaneously recalled more of the cognizer traits than remaining traits. Moreover, individuals high in need for cognition tended to list behaviors in reference to cognitive motivation for traits relevant to cognitive processing and traits irrelevant to cognitive processing (i.e., control traits). Individuals low or middling in need for cognition were less likely to list cognitive behaviors, but were more likely to list other types of behaviors. These results are consistent with the notion that individuals high in need for cognition behave like schematics; they frame their behaviors in terms of engaging in cognitive activity. Individuals middling and low in need for cognition did not show evidence of framing their behaviors in terms cognitive acts; instead, individuals low in need for cognition tended to list behaviors relevant to alternative personality dimensions which are irrelevant to cognitive processing. The response latency data are also consistent with the notion that individuals possessing cognitive motivation are schematic on cognitive acts. Cognizer and noncognizer traits differentiated need for cognition such that despite the general tendency to respond slower to cognitive traits than control traits, responses of individuals high in 93 need for cognition were facilitated towards these cognitive traits compared to responses of individuals who were not high in need for cognition. Importantly, differential trait valence alone cannot account for the effects obtained in Study 3. The response times were analyzed controlling for trait valence, the spontaneous recall results were obtained controlling for responses to valenced traits, and the traits used in the framing of behavior history task were equated in valence. Not only do these data shed light on the personology of individuals high in need for cognition, but several features of Study 3 are illustrative of the personology of individuals low in need for cognition. Previous research has suggested that individuals low in need for cognition are noncognizers; they are less likely to engage in effortful processing unless demanded by the situation, they do not enjoy effortful processing, and they do not seek out cognitive endeavors (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Indeed, Study 3 illustrates that individuals low in need for cognition are less likely to behave as do cognizers: they tended to recall behaviors which are irrelevant to cognitive processing indicating that they frame their self-concepts on dimensions other than intellectance, they tended to recall behaviors indicating cognitive avoidance or apathy, they tended to recall fewer cognizer traits than did individuals high in need for cognition, and their responses were not facilitated towards cognitive traits compared to control traits. These results indicate that individuals low in need for cognition are less likely than individuals high in need for cognition to be cognizers. In addition, these results also show that individuals low in need for cognition are not entirely avoidant of cognitive challenges when making 94 self-relevant behavioral justifications; individuals low in need for cognition listed more behaviors than did individuals high in need for cognition on the behavioral justification task. Despite these results towards cognizer traits, responses to traits denoting cognitive lethargy and avoidance did not effectively consistently differentiate need for cognition in Study 2 or 3. These mixed results using the noncognizer traits may have resulted from the noncognizer traits being selected based on their lack of relevance to cognizers (i.e., atypical of individuals high in need for cognition). As a result, noncognizer traits may be more informative of the traits that individuals high in need for cognition do not possess than about the traits that individuals low in need for cognition do possess. Alternatively, the fact that noncognizer traits did not effectively differentiate individuals low in need for cognition fi"om individuals high in need for cognition may be the result of the restricted range in cognitive motivation which is inherent in student populations (Spotts, 1994). As a result, individuals who are relatively low in need for cognition in a college sample, may actually be more middling in need for cognition in a randomly selected community sample. Perhaps noncognizer traits would more effectively discriminate individuals high and low in need for cognition in a community sample. Despite this restriction in range, however, individuals low in need for cognition reported being relatively less cognizers than individuals high in need for cognition. Results relevant to the prime manipulation also add insight into the personology of need for cognition. Cacioppo et al. (1996) reasoned that personological and situational 95 precursors of cognitive motivation can each account for independent variance in behavior. They reasoned that at intermediate levels of situational demand (e.g., personal relevance) both need for cognition and situational demand are additive in accounting for increases in the extent of cognitive behavior. They further reasoned that need for cognition differences are likely to be eliminated when situational demands for cognitive motivation are very low (i.e., floor effect) or very high (i.e., ceiling effect). The results of Study 3 are consistent with the additive effects of person and situation in predicting consequences of cognitive motivation. For example, the spontaneous recall data illustrated that both need for cognition and prime both independently predicted recall of cognizer traits, and the behavdoral listing data illustrated significant effects for prime and need for cognition, but no interactions between these two variables. In sum, need for cognition and prime did not interact in any analysis. Consistent with Cacioppo et al. (1996), the present study illustrated that prime and need for cognition had additive effects on behavior stemming fi’om cognitive motivation. An ancillary issue raised in Studies 1 and 2 was that the correlation between need for cognition and social desirability was considerably larger than what had been found in previous research (see metaanalysis by Cacioppo et al., 1996). In constrast to the temporal and spatial proximity of the two scales in Study 1 and 2, the need for cognition and social desirability scales were temporally seperated by several weeks in Study 3. Under these conditions, the relationship was small in magnitude and nonsignificant (r= .16, p = .07) and is commenserate with the correlation found in previous studies (Lvg=.10, 96 p<-01; Cacioppo et al., 1996). Several features of the present studies can account for the relationship beween need for cognition and social desirability in these studies. One possibility is that interindividual variations in need for cognition are conceptually and empirically distinct from socially desirable responding, and that the relationships obtained in Study 1 and 2 were more likely the result of augmented correlations towards responses on scales which are proximal in a questionniare packet (e.g., via response sets; see Schumaim & Pressor, 1981). Alternatively, completing the face valid need for cognition scale in an academic setting followed by a face valid measure of social desirability may have sensitized individuals to respond more positively, particularly those high in social desirability. When the scales were temporally seperated in Study 3 however, responses on one scale were less likely to sensitize responses on the other scale. Yet a third possibility for the reduced correlation in Study 3 (and other studies which administered need for cognition and social desirability in different sessions) is the result of the relative test-retest reliability of the scales. For example, the correlation of Scale A immediately followed by Scale A should be close to one. However, if the two Scale A administrations were administered two weeks apart, this correlation is likely to be reduced somewhat. The same attenuated relationship would be expected between correlated individual differences scales administered in two different points in time. Whatever the reason for the complex association between need for cognition and social desirability (proximity of scales, sensitizing desirability of responses, or test-retest reliability), controlling social desirability in Studies 1-3 and subsequently controlling these sources of potential error variance 97 across scales, the relationship between need for cognition and the experimental stimuli remained (and were only trivially influenced). Study 4 On the whole. Study 3 illustrated that individuals high in need for cognition are more likely to process self-relevant information in reference to their personal self-schemas concerning information processing. Study 4 examined the proposition that self-schemas influence the processing of social information that is not directly tied to an individual’s own self-concept, but is instead relevant to someone else. Specifically, the fourth study examined the processing implications of interindividual variations in cognitive motivation in a relatively more social context. Markus & Sentis (1982) argued that self-schemas function as a filter through which information about the social world is stored, interpreted and processed. For example, self-schema help direct individuals’ attention to important features of the social world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Body weight schematics, for instance, are more likely to be interested in others’ eating habits by virtue of the schematic using weight as an organizing component of their own self-concept (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). Markus & Sentis (1982) suggested that because self-schemas guide and organize one’s knowledge about themselves and the social world, individuals often seek out information about others that is relevant to their self-schema in order to gain personally important knowledge about others. For example, Fong & Markus (1982) found that when forming impressions of others, introversion schematics were most interested in learning information about others’ 98 introverted behaviors, and extroversion schematics were most interested in learning about others’ extroverted behaviors. Aschematics fell between introverts and extroverts on these measures. Fong & Markus (1982) further argued that because self-schemas represent dimensions on which a person perceives themself as “an expert”, schematics should be more confident about assessments of ambiguous targets made on the schema dimension than on other dimensions. Indeed, although ratings of an introvert-extrovert ambiguous target did not differ as a function of the perceivers’ self-schemas, schematics were more confident of judgments on the introversion-extroversion dimension than were aschematics. Importantly, the notion that schematics perceive themselves as experts on the schema dimension should influence self-perceived accuracy because these subjects are making subjective judgments in the absence of objective criteria on a familiar dimension. Thus, the key question in the present study is whether the self-schemas of individuals high in need for cognition make them more confident in their subjective judgments of an ambiguous target on intellectance relative to other dimensions and relative to individuals low in need for cognition. Previous research on the need for cognition is consistent with the notion that individuals high in need for cognition would be more confident in their judgments resulting from engaging in cognitive activity. As a function of engaging in more effortful processing when faced with a cognitive challenge, individuals high in need for cognition tend to have greater recall of information, more knowledge about information, and more 99 success on cognitive challenges (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Cacioppo et al., 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993; Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). As a consequence of gaining more information from cognitive tasks and receiving positive feedback on the products of their reasoning, individuals high in need for cognition tend to be confident in their judgments especially on subjective dimensions where there is no incontrovertible feedback regarding accuracy (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). A conceptual replication of Fong & Markus (1982) was conducted to determine whether individuals high in need for cognition manifest their cognitive self-schema in a getting acquianted scenario. Individuals scoring high, middling, and low in need for cognition were asked to indicate which information would be important to learn about a new acquiantence to form an impression. They were also asked to indicate which information they would most like to convey about themselves to the acquaintance. After hearing an audiotape of an ambiguous target, they were asked to rate the person on a variety of schema relevant and schema irrelevant dimensions, and to rate their confidence in their impressions. Finally, they were asked to select a subset of items from a list of questions differing in the extent they tap the cognitive dimension about which they would most like to learn of others and about which they would most like others to convey to others about themselves. If individuals high in need for cognition are schematic on cognitive acts, they should; wish to obtain more information about others on the cognitive dimension, wish to convey such cognitive information about the self, be more confident in 1 0 0 impressions on cognitive dimensions, and select more questions relevant to cognitive endeavors than questions irrelevant to cognitive endeavors. Studies 2 and 3 used a list of cognizer and noncognizer traits which were descriptive of individuals di&ring in need (or cognition. Because Study 4 examined what information individuals wanted to learn of others’ general personality, a more comprehensive set of personality descriptors which tapped multiple features of personality was required. Therefore, traits were selected from the Goldberg’s Trait Descriptive Adjectives assessment of the Big 5 which was used in Study 1. If self-schemas determine the information that one perceives as important to leam, individuals high in need for cognition should rate Intellect attributes as more important to leam about others, they should rate Intellect items as more important to convey about self, and they should be more confident in their assessments of Intellect than in any other superfactor. Although need for cognition was correlated with Conscientiousness in Study 1, this correlation was due to Conscientiousness items that reflected cognitive activities (e.g., logical, aimless, precise; see Table 3). The subset of Conscientiousness traits used in Study 4 were selected that were highly loaded on Conscientiousness, but were not necessarily related to cognitive behavior. Therefore, no relationship between Conscientiousness and need for cognition is expected. Method Subjects 101 Eighty-six individuals participated to satisfy part of their introductory psychology course requirement. All participants completed the 18 item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984) on the first day of class, data were subjected to a tertiary split, and an equal proportion of individuals high, middling, and low in need for cognition were contacted later in the quarter to participate. Surveys Participants completed four trait listing surveys each of which contained the same set of trait adjectives. Trait adjectives were selected fi'om Goldberg’s (1992) Trait Descriptive Adjectives measure of the Big Five. Cluster titles fi’om the trait clusters with the 8 highest loadings on each superfactor were selected (i.e., 4 highest positive loading on each factor and 4 highest negative loading on each factor).Because emotional stability has only two positively loading trait clusters in the 1992 inventory, the 4 highest loading positive traits and 4 highest loading negative traits were selected fi’om the Emotional Stability subscale of Goldberg’s 100 Trait Descriptive Adjective scale (1990). In addition, the 4 cognizer traits, 4 noncognizer traits, 4 positive control triats and 4 negative control traits which were used in the behavioral justification task in Study 3 were used resulting in a total pool of 56 traits. Surgency traits'. Sociable, Optimistic, Quiet, Reserved, Spirited, Shy, Playful, and Withdrawn; Agreeableness traits: Friendly, Sympathetic, Argumentative, Lenient, Overcritical, Cooperative, Conceited, and Bossy, Conscientiousness traits: Dependable, Organized, Negligent, Forgetful, Inconsistent, Efficient, Reckless, and On time; Emotional stability traits: Touchy, Moody, Unexcitable, Fretful, Relaxed, Unemotional, Jealous, and Unenvious;Intellect traits: Depth, Creative, Shallow, Imperceptive, Intelligent, Intellectual, Unimaginative, and Stupid. Traits tapping individual differences in the cognitive self-concept and trait indicators of the Big 5 were analyzed separately. Results using the Big 5 were preferred because the 16 cognizer, noncognizer, and control traits were selected for their relevance to cognitive motivation only. In contrast, the Big 5 provide 102 AU trait surveys included the üst of 56 traits presented in the same random order. The first survey asked subjects to indicate the importance of learning information about others when meeting an acquaintance on a five point scale ranging fi'om 0 (not at all important to know about another) to 4 (very important to know about another). The second survey assessed the importance of conveying information about the self when meeting a new acquaintance on a five point scale ranging fi'om 0 (not at aU important to convey about self) to 4 (very important to convey about self). Following the second survey, an interview was played on a cassette tape in which a target answered 9 questions. The script fi'om this interview can be found in Appendix B. Three of the questions concerned behaviors indicating engaging in cognitive activity (e.g., “Are you a good concentrator?”), three of the questions indicated avoiding cognitive activity (e.g., “Do you avoid situations where problem solving abilities might be needed?”), and three of the questions were irrelevant to information processing (e.g., “How much does the following statement describe you, ‘I tend to be irritable’?”). Responses to the 6 cognitive-relevant questions were ambiguous on the cognitive dimension. These ambiguous responses were adapted fi'om the Study 3 behavioral listings in which both coders rated the behaviors as indicative of both cognitive motivation and cognitive avoidance. Responses fi'om the 3 noncognitive questions were adapted a comprehensive description of personality. Because the task in Study 4 was explictly related to meeting new acquaintences and the Big5 has been referred to as the “psychology of the stranger” (McAdams, 1992), the Big S items were more appropriate for testing the relevant hypotheses in Study 4. Results from the Big S trait indicators are reported in the results section, and analyses of the 16 traits from Study 2 are reported in Appendix D for further inspection. 103 from the Study 3 behavioral listings which were coded by both coders as irrelevant to cognitive processing. Participants then rated the target person on each of the 56 traits on a scale ranging from 0 (does not describe the person on the tape) to 4 (very descriptive of the person on the tape), and subjects also rated how confident they were of their judgments on a scale ranging from 0-20% sure (labeled, “I have no idea”) to 80-100% sure (labeled, “I am absolutely sure”). Following the trait scales, subjects were given a list of 24 questions (see Appendix C); 6 of the questions were cognizer questions and 6 of the questions were noncognizer questions. These 12 questions were obtained from the 34 item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and the Tolerance for Mental Effort Survey (Domic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 1991) which was based on the original Need for Cognition scale. Items were selected that were not part of the 18 item need for cognition scale which subjects had completed earlier in the quarter. The remaining control questions were obtained from Costa & McCrae’s (1992) measures of Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Extraversion which were found to be unrelated to need for cognition in previous research (Sadowski & Cobum, 1995). Participants were asked to select the 12 questions that they would most like to leam of another person. Finally, they were asked to select the 12 questions that they would most like to have asked of them if another person was trying to form an impression. Participants were then thanked, debriefed, and dismissed. Results 104 Leam information about others and self. The rated importance of learning information about others was subjected to a 3 (need for cognition) x 5 (big 5 dimensions) x 2 (information about other vs. information about self) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the final 2 factors. The 3- way need for cognition x Big 5 dimension x question to self or other interaction did not reach significance (F < 1) suggesting that in an impression formation task, individuals diflfering in need for cognition want to leam the same information about others that they would like to convey about themselves. In addition, this analysis revealed a significant interaction between need for cognition and Big 5 dimension (F(8, 280) = 5.8, HFepsiion = .983, p<. .001). Inspection of Figure 7 indicates that individuals high in need for cognition reported information about Factors 1 through 4 (Surgency, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Emotional stability) equally or less important to leam than did individuals low or middling in need for cognition whereas individuals high in need for cognition rated information germane to Intellect as more important to possess than did individuals low or middling in need for cognition. Impression o f Target and Confidence in Impression Impression ratings and confidence ratings were subjects to a 3 (need for cognition) X 5 (Big 5 dimension) analysis of variance. Analysis of participant’s impressions of the target for each of the 5 factors revealed no significant need for cognition effects or interactions (see Figure 8). However, despite their perceiving individuals similarly, the significant need for cognition by Big 5 dimension interaction (F(8,316)= 2.67, HFepsiion = 105 Importance of Communicating Information About Self and Other in a getting acquainted scenario 2.8 j 2.6 I 2.4 _ aI 2.2 + . □ MNC * !" 1.8 1.6 IkUjlililIII IV Big 5 Dimension Figure 7: Importance of communicating information about self and other in a getting acquainted scenario Impression of Ambiguous Target 2.8 2.6 + S ’ 2.4 □ MNC 1 ' 2 1.8 - | l . 6 - 1.4 - 1.2 lSurgency l Agreeableness n n Conscientiousness n Emotional n Stability Intellect Big 5 Dimension Figure 8; Impression of an ambiguous target 1.0, p<-01) revealed that individuals high in need for cognition were more confident than others about impressions on the Intellect superfactor, but were equally or less confident than others on the remaining superfactors. This interaction is graphed in Figure 9. The fact that individuals high in need for cognition are more confident on schema-relevant dimensions, but not on schema-irrelevant dimensions, is consistent with Markus & Sentis’(1982; Fong & Markus, 1982) assertion that individuals who are schematic on a dimension perceive themselves as experts on that dimension, but the expertise of the schematic does not influence dimensions which are irrelevant to the self-schema. Questions to ask o f self and other Recall that after hearing the taped interview, participants were asked to select questions that they would like to ask of another and that they would like another to ask of them in a getting acquainted scenario; 6 questions relating to engaging in cognitive activity, 6 questions relating to avoiding cognitive activity, and 12 questions relating to dimensions which are irrelevant to cognitive processing. A preliminary analysis comparing individuals’ selection of engaging in cognitive activity versus avoiding cognitive activity revealed that individuals did not differentially select either type of question as a function of need for cognition (F<1). These values were combined resulting in 12 questions which were relevant to cognitive activity, and 12 questions which were irrelevant to cognitive pursuits. These data was subjected to a 3 (need for cognition) x 2 (question dimension) x 2 (leam of other vs. convey of self) analysis of variance. This analysis revealed the predicted need for cognition x question type interaction (F(2,83)=l 1.66, p<.001) which 108 Confidence in Rating of Ambiguous Target: Big 5 3 .5 u> I ' + □ MNC S 3 2.5 = 1.5 ISurgency H Agreeableness i Conscientiousness u Emotional n Stability n Intellect Big 5 Dimension Figure 9; Confidence in ratings of an ambiguous target did not interact with the self vs. other factor (T<1). Inspection of this interaction (see Figure 10) reveals that individuals high in need for cognition selected more cognitive questions, and individuals low in need for cognition selected fewer cognitive questions, and individuals middling in need for cognition fell between individuals high and low in need for cognition. Discussion and General Discussion Study 4 revealed that compared to those low in need for cognition, individuals high in need for cognition are more interested in learning about the intellective features of others’ personality and communicating the intellective features of their own personality. Furthermore, just as schematics have vast experience with the schema dimension and thus perceive themselves as experts in that dimension; individuals high in need for cognition are more confident when making ratings about others’ intellect than are individuals who are not high in need for cognition. Importantly, the results summarized above were apparent on the intellect factor, but individuals high in need for cognition responded equally or less extremely than individuals middling or low in need for cognition on the remaining superordinate dimensions. In sum. Study 4 shows evidence that need for cognition functions in the processing of information about others in a relatively social context. When getting to know someone new, or when making judgments about a potential acquaintance, individuals high in need for cognition will seek out cognitive information and be more confident about these judgments than individuals who are low in need for cognition. 1 1 0 Questions selected to ask of other or convey of self in a getting acquainted scenario □ MNC Cognitive Irrelevant Type of Question Figure 10: Number of questions asked of other or conveyed of self in a getting acquainted scenario The personology o f needfor cognition Study 4 extends the results of Studies I, 2, and 3; and in combination, these studies provide a coherent picture of the self-concept of individuals high in need for cognition. Study 1 illustrated that issues germane to intellectance predict need for cognition. Study 2 illustrated that individuals high in need for cognition manifest the structural characteristics of self-schema on these dimensions, but not other dimensions; they perceive attributes related to engaging in cognitive acts as important to possess, and they perceive themselves extremely on these characteristics. Study 3 illustrated that cognitive acts function as an organizational tool in the self-concept of individuals high in need for cognition and that processing of self-relevant information related to cognitive acts is consequently facilitated. Study 4 extended these results by illustrating that individuals high in need for cognition process information about others through glasses which are colored by their cognitive self-schema. As a whole, these studies provide a coherent picture of individuals high in need for cognition, such individuals perceive themselves as cognizers and process information about themselves and others differently on the cognizer dimension compared to other dimensions. These studies also illustrate several features of individuals low in need for cognition. Study 1 demonstrates that individuals low in need for cognition perceive themselves similarly to individuals high in need for cognition in all personality dimensions except those that are directly germane to cognitive processing and intellection. When individual differences in self-perceived cognitive attributes were examined in Study 2, 1 1 2 individuals low in need for cognition perceived themselves less extremely on the cognizer items and more extremely on the noncognizer items than individuals high in need for cognition. They did not, however, perceive themselves as noncognizers in an absolute sense. Behavioral evidence from Study 3 is consistent with individuals not being chronic noncognizers in that individuals low in need for cognition listed more behaviors than individuals high in need for cognition on the behavior listing task. The present study also raised some interesting issues about the personology of individuals low in need for cognition which would be of interest in future research. It would be of interest to specify the traits with which low need for cognition individuals are likely to frame their noncognizer dispositions. In the present study, noncognizer traits were operationalized as those that are not descriptive of individuals high in need for cognition (Pilot Study 1). The fact that noncognizer traits were associated with low need for cognition in the relative sense, but not the absolute sense suggests that the noncognizer traits used in Study 2 may not be the optimal characterization of the noncognizer predispositions of individuals low in need for cognition. It could be, for instance, that individuals low in need for cognition perceive themselves as noncognizers, but do not veiw these dispositions as negatively as the noncognizer traits which were used in the present research. For example. Study 2 (see Table 8) demonstrated that individuals low in need for cognition were more likely to describe themselves as “unindustrious” than individuals high in need for cognition, but individuals low in need for cognition were not particularly likely to perceive themselves as unindustrious relative to the neutral baseling. 113 If this disposition were framed differently, for example as “laid back,” individuals low in need for cognition may have rated themselves more extremely on the noncognizer dimension and rated these traits as important to possess. Alternatively, the fact that noncognizer traits were not absolutely endorsed by individuals low in need for cognition may be the result of the sample characteristics of participants in the present set of studies. One would expect that low need for cognition college students in the present study were likely to possess some intermediate level of cognitive motivation by virtue of their choosing to pursue higher education. As a result, college students in the present study who are low in need for cognition may be relatively middling in need for cognition when compared to the general population. Thus, noncognizer traits may be more indicative of those who are considered low in need for cognition in a normative sense in community samples. A further implication of individuals differing in need for cognition possessing different self-schemas for cognitive processing is on person-situation interactions in precursors to cognitive behavior. For example, if individuals score extremely high on the need for cognition scale, they are likely to be schematic on cognitive acts. As a result, it would take a particularly strong situational factor to induce individuals extremely high in need for cognition to not engage in effortful cognitive processing. Similarly, although the present study did not directly test this notion, individuals who score extremely low in need for cognition may be schematic on not engaging in cognitive challenges. As a result, it may take a particularly strong situational motivator of cognitive activity to induce 114 individuals who are extremely low in need for cognition to engage in cognitive processing (Cacioppo et al., 1983). An implication of this logic is that situational moderators of cognitive motivation are likely to be most effective at intermediate levels of need for cognition. Furthermore, a curvilinear relationship exists such that situational inducements to think (not think) need to become increasingly more potent as need for cognition scores become increasingly smaller (larger). This notion is consistent with the argument by Cacioppo et al (1996) which was reviewed earlier that need for cognition differences in behavior are most likely at intermediate levels of situational motivation. Need for cognition differences in behavior are attenuated when situational motivation is extremely high (i.e., ceiling effect) or extremely low (i.e., floor effect). This study also raises some issues concerning the self-serving biases which may function to facilitate the perseverance of the cognitive self-concept. Self-serving biases are particularly likely on personally important dimensions (Tesser, 1988), and Study 2 illustrated that intellectance is a personally important dimension for those high in need for cognition. Need for cognition shares only a small relationship with GPA (r= .17, p<001; Cacioppo et al., 1996). An implication of this small relationship is that one who is cognitively motivated may be a poor performer in academic settings. Therefore, it would be of interest to examine the self-serving biases which may be part of the lives of individuals who are high in need for cognition, but whose self-concept is often threatened by virtue of substandard intellectual ability. For instance, individuals high in need for cognition may be more likely to make external attributions for failure on academic tasks 115 than individuals low in need for cognition, but may be equally likely as individuals low in need for cognition to make these self-serving attributions on nonintellective tasks (see Miller & Ross, 1975). In a similar vein, individuals high in need for cognition, by virtue of the importance they place on cognitive tasks, may be more likely to make downward social comparisons on cognitive tasks relative to noncognitive tasks (see Wood, 1989). Investigations of such issues would be highly informative in the investigation of need for cognition. Implications fo r persuasion research It has long been known that individuals differing in need for cognition have the predisposition to process persuasive messages differently as a function of their motivational styles (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Chaiken, 1987). The present study raises the possibility, that self-schemas for cognitive activity will further influence persuasion differences between individuals high and low in need for cognition. For example, controlling for the different cognitive processes of individuals differing in need for cognition, different types of persuasive messages may appeal to individuals high and low in need for cognition. Cacioppo, Petty, & Sidera (1982), for example, found that self schemas influenced the type of argument to which individuals are susceptible. Specifically, in a study of religious and legalistic schematics, Cacioppo et al. (1982) illustrated that schema-relevant proattitudinal arguments were perceived as more persuasive than schema- irrelevant arguments. An implication of this result is that by virtue of their self-schema for cognitive acts, individuals high in need for cognition would find a proattitudinal argument 116 that appealed to facts and information processing more persuasive (controlling for elaboration likelihood). In contrast, individuals low in need for cognition may find such an argument less persuasive than one that contains arguments which did not appeal to facts and information processing (e.g., outcome rather than reason based appeals). The needfor cognition and personality theory This set of studies also provides some insight into the conceptualization of need for cognition and the validity of the need for cognition scale. Cacioppo & Petty (1982; see review by Cacioppo et al., 1996) originally proposed the need for cognition scale as a measure of individual differences in the extent of information processing. The present set of studies shows firm support for this assumption. Study 1 illustrated that need for cognition shares phenotypic markers with descriptive dimensions of personality. Despite this covariation, the need for cognition is not subsumed by these broad and inclusive models of personality description; the Big 5 only accounts for 31% of the variance in need for cognition, and need for cognition is independent fi-om Big 5 the in a factor analysis. Similarly, the results of Studies 2, 3, and 4 illustrate that need for cognition not only predicts the extent of effortful cognitive processing, but also influences the interpretative glasses with which individuals view the social world, the information people value in forming inferences about others, and the way individuals store information about themselves and others. A further implication of the independence between differing processing dispositions as a function of need for cognition and the phenotypic description of the Big 5 117 is that the broad Big 5 taxonomy is unlikely to be a redundant marker of the differing motivational styles underlying need for cognition as has been suggested in the Big 5 literature (McCrae & John, 1992). This assertion can be tested directly by examining the extent that Intellect and Conscientiousness predict outcomes which are known to occur as a function of need for cognition. For example, individuals who are high in Conscientiousness and Intellect are more inquisitive (McCrae and John, 1992) and are therefore likely to consider the quality of the arguments in a persuasive message more than individuals who do not possess these attributes . However, consistent with the notion that Intellect and Conscientiousness do not account for the processes measured by need for cognition, need for cognition should account for considerable variance in elaboration of persuasive messages above and beyond what is accounted for by Conscientiousness and Intellect alone (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Block, 1995). Finally, these studies also contribute to the self-schema literature. Most previous research on self-schemas has been on personality dimensions germane to social features of personality such as independence-dependence (Markus, 1977), body weight (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987), self-consciousness (Nasby, 1989), extraversion-introversion (Fong & Markus, 1982), sexuality (Andersen & Cyranowski, 1994), and sex roles (Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). The present study was perhaps the first to examine self-schemas on intellective features of personality (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 118 In sum, George Orwell made three propositions relevant to the personology of need for cognition; (1) cognitively motivated individuals have different personologies than those without such motivation, (2) these differences are isolated to personality and behavioral dimensions specific to cogitation, and (3) these differences are relatively unstable across situations. The first two propositions have received empirical support here and elsewhere. Orwell’s first notion was demonstrated in the present study by illustrating distinct need for cognition differences in manifest personality and information processing. Orwell’s second notion was illustrated by the finding that individual differences in need for cognition are limited to intellective domains. Study 1 and 4 demonstrated that need for cognition differences in personality description and information processing were limited to attributes related to Intellect (Study 1 & 4) and Conscientiousness (Study 1) and within these domains, need for cognition was most associated with attributes related to cognitive persistence, lethargy, motivation, ability, and enjoyment; and was independent from social and emotional features of personality (Study 1). Study 2 and 3 demonstrated that cognizer and noncognizer dimensions differentiated need for cognition and control dimensions did not. In his third proposition, Orwell suggested that need for cognition differences would not be manifest across time and situations. Although the present study did not directly test this notion, the present research suggests that need for cognition is a self-schema dimension. 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Psvchological Bulletin. 106. 231-248. 128 Appendix A: 18 item Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) place a ”1" on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) place a "5" on the line. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements; 1 2 3 4 5 extremely somewhat uncertain somewhat extremely imcharacteristic uncharacteristic characteristic characteristic 1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something. 6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours. 7. I only think as hard as I have to. 8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones. 9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me too much. 13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 14. The notion o f thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought. 16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot o f mental effort. 17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. 18. 1 usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not effect me personally. 129 Appendix B: Script for Ambiguous Target in Experiment 4 Q: How much do you watch educational television shows? A: Well, sometimes I watch educational shows, like I watch the evening news when 1 am home at 6:30, but I am not always home at that time. Q: Are you easily persuaded? A: It depends, when I am really thinking about something, it takes a lot to persuade me, but other times, like if I don’t really care or when I’m really tired or something, I can probably be convinced o f just about anything. Q: What are your hobbies? A: I like hanging out with Mends, and I like to go the mall— shopping. When I was younger, I played a lot of basketball with my older brother and I still go over to Larkins with some of my giQ' Mends and shoot around with them. I guess those are my biggest hobbies. Q: Do you avoid situations where problem solving abilities might be needed? A: Well, sometimes I avoid problems, like when my Mend Jenny has a problem, I usually avoid talking to her because she can be a pain in the neck like when she has a problem with her boyMend or school or anything like that. Q: How much does the following statement describe you, “I tend to be irritable ”? A: Well, in the mornings, I guess sometimes 1 am irritable, so usually when wake up. I’m not really with it until I have breakfast. But, before I eat breakfast though, so for example, it someone comes up to me and talks to me, I really feel like I could scream. But after I eat breakfast. I’m usually pretty O.K. Q: Are you a good concentrator? A: Usually I can concentrate pretty well, but there are a lot o f times when there are a lot o f things going on that it is hard for me to concentrate on just one thing. Q: Do you ever feel insecure about your decisions? 130 A: In college, I feel like I’m making a whole lot o f decisions all the time. 1 think most o f them are pretty good though, but 1 do occasionally have serious doubts about whether I've made the right decision. Q; How much do you like to show ofl? A: Well, 1 guess I try to sometimes sort o f show ofii; or try to entertain my friends 1 guess. But 1 think most of the time, 1 try to be one of the gang and not really try to rock the boat much. Q: How much do you prefer to figure out the solutions to problems? A; Well, sometimes 1 think a lot about a problem, but 1 also like to do other things too. For example, 1 might sit some days and do my homework until 1 am finished, but o f course other times 1 go out with friends, like to High Street or just sit around the lounge on my floor to hang out 131 Appendix C; List of 24 Questions used in Experiment 4 Q l. To what extent is curiosity the driving force behind your actions? Q2. Are you attraaed to bright colors and flashy styles? Q3. Would you rather let things happen rather than try to figure out why they happen? Q4. How much to you succeed in solving difficult problems that you set out to solve? Q5. Do you sometimes act cynically? Q6. Do you lack any confidence in your problem solving abilities? Q7. Is it OK to look at the answers in the back of the book instead of figuring out the answer on your own? Q8. How difficult is it for you to reason quickly under time pressure? Q9. How often do you commit an altruistic deed? QIO. How much do you have a tendency to blame yourself when something goes wrong? Q l 1. How much does this statement describe you, “I sometimes eat myself sick”? QI2. How often do you lose your temper? QI3. Do you tend to act very assertive, sometimes to the point of being forceful? Q14. How often do you jiunp for joy? Q15. Is it amusing to think about what your future holds? Q16. Do you prefer to be alone? Q17. Do you like to figure things out by yourself? Q18. How much do you like to figure out the strengths and weaknesses your own reasoning? Q19. If you don’t like people, you let them know it? Q20. Do you prefer work that you know you can do well instead of new challenges that stretch your abilities? Q21. How much pride do you take in the products of your reasoning? Q22. How difficult is it for you to think in new and unfamiliar situations? Q23. Do you think most people you deal with are honest and trustworthy? Q24. How easily are you frightened? 132 Appendix D: Analyses of Study 4 data using 16 traits used in Studies 2 and 3 Recall that in Study 4, individuals were asked to indicate: (1) what information they would want to learn about a new acquaintance; (2) what information they would like to convey about themselves to a new acquaintance; (3) their ratings of an ambiguous target on these dimensions; and (4) how confident they were of their ratings. Individuals were presented with two sets of trait items: one set were the top loading items on Goldberg’s (1990; 1992) Trait Descriptive Adjectives assessment of the Big Five personality structure (see Study 1), and the second set were 16 items used in Studies 2 and 3 which were pretested to be descriptive of cognizers, descriptive of noncognizers, positive control, and negative control. While the results of the Big 5 assessments are presented in the results section of Study 4, the results of the 16 cognizer, noncognizer, and control traits are presented below. Leam information about others and self. Responses were first subjected to a 3 (need for cognition) x 2 (trait cognitivity: cognizer/noncognizer vs. control) x 2 (trait valence; positive vs negative) x 2 (questions of other vs. questions to self) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the final 3 factors. This analysis revealed a main effect for trait valence (F(l,70) = 35.37, p<001) indicating that individuals thought it was more important to communicate positive information (mean = 2.22) than negative information (mean = 1.83) and a main effect for trait cognitivity (F(l,70) = 48.32, p<.001) indicating that individuals were more interested 133 in communicating control (i.e., cognitive irrelevant) information (mean = 2.20) than cognitive information (mean = 1.86). Importantly, the trait cognitivity main effect was qualified by a significant need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction (F(2,70)=3.4, p<.05) which was further qualified by a significant need for cognition by trait cognitivity by question of other or self three-way interaction (F ( 2,70) = 4.70, p <05). Because individuals responded differently to whether they were communicating one’s own traits to others or learning about other’s traits, responses fi’om these two dependent measures were analyzed separately. The analysis of how important individuals felt it would be to communicate their own traits to a new acquaintance revealed a trait cognitivity main effect (F ( 1,70) = 8.55, p < .01) which was qualified by a need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction (F ( 2, 70) = 3.34, p < .05). This interaction, which is depicted in the top panel of Figure 11 indicates that individuals felt it less important to convey self-relevant cognitive information than control information, but the importance of conveying self-relevant information about self increased with increasing levels of need for cognition. When differences in importance ratings were examined at each level of need for cognition, no significant effects emerged. Examination of the importance of learning information about others also revealed a trait cognitivity main effect (F(l,71) = 56.64, p<.001) which was qualified by a significant need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction (F(2,71) = 3.41, p < .05). This interaction, which is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 11, was the result of all 134 The importance of communicating information about oneself □ MNC Cognitive Irrelevant Information Information (Cognizer & (Positive Control & Noncognizer) Negative Control) Importance of learning information about others □ MNC Cognitive Irrelevant Information Information (Cognizer & (Positive Control & Noncognizer) Negative Control) Figure 11 ; Importance of conveying information about self (top panel) and learning information about others (bottom panel) in getting acquainted scenario 135 individuals caring less about others’ cognitive attributes than they do about other dimensions, but individuals high in need for cognition were still most interested in learning cognitive information about others to other subjects (see Figure 11). Examination of the separate need for cognition simple main effect revealed differences as a function of need for cognition. In combination, these results illustrate that individuals high in need for cognition are more prone than others to communicate that they possess cognitive characteristics and are more interested in learning cognitive characteristics about others, independent of the valence of the cognitive traits. In addition, all individuals were more interested in learning about others irrelevant traits compared to cognitive traits, but individuals high in need for cognition were still more interested than the remaining individuals in learning cognitive information about others. Impression o f Target and Confidence in Impression Impression ratings and confidence ratings were subjects to a 3 (need for cognition) X 2 (trait cognitivity: cognizer/noncognizer vs. control) x 2 (trait valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (questions of other vs. questions to self) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the final 3 factors. No significant need for cognition effects were obtained in ratings of the ambiguous target. However, analysis of the confidence in these ratings revealed a significant main effect for trait cognitivity (F(l,69) = 8.58, p < .01) which was qualified by a marginally significant need for cognition by trait cognitivity interaction (F (2,69) = 2.57, p < .10). This interaction is depicted in Figure 12 and indicates individuals 136 Confidence In Judgment of Target ■ LNC □ MNC ■ HNC Cognitive Irrelevant Type of Information Figure 12: Confidence in Judgment of Target low and middling did not feel difierentially confident in ratings on the cognitive and irrelevant dimensions. However, individuals high in need for cognition were significantly more confident in their ratings on the cognitive dimension than on cognitive irrelevant dimension (F(l,23) = 15.27, p< .001). When the need for cognition main effect was examined at each level of trait cognitivity, no significant simple effects for need for cognition were obtained, however. This result is consistent with the self-schema argument and is consistent with the results obtained using the Big 5 items in Study 4, and by Fong & Markus (1982). Just as individuals who are self-schematic on a given dimension perceive themselves as a “social expert” on the schema dimension, individuals high in need for cognition were more confident in ratings on the cognitive dimension than other dimensions. However, the nonsignificant simple main effect for need for cognition revealed that individuals high in need for cognition were no more confident than were individuals low or middling in need for cognition. 138 Appendix E; Questionnaires used in Studies 1 through 4 The questionnaires from Studies 1-4 are on the following pages. Please note that in cases where the same questionnaire was presented in two different studies or samples, a copy of the questionnaire appears in the scales for the earlier of the two studies and not the later. 139 Study 1, Sample 1 Questionnaires For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) place a"!" on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like >’ou) place a "5" on the line. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements: 1 2 3 4 5 extremely somewhat uncertain somewhat extremely uncharacteristic uncharacteristic characteristic characteristic 1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance 1 will have to think in depth ^ u t something. 6. I find satis&ction in deliberating hard for long hours. 7. 1 only think as hard as 1 have to. 8. 1 prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones. 9. 1 like tasks that require little thought once Fve learned them. 10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 11. 1 really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me too much. 13. 1 prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that 1 must solve. 14. The notion o f thinking abstractly is aRiealing to me. 15. 1 would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought 16. 1 feel relief rather than satis&ction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort 17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; 1 dont care how or why it wodcs. 18. 1 usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not efiect me personally. 140 MC Reaction Inventory Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. Indicate your response by circling either T (true) or F (false). Circle One 1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates...... 1. T F 2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble...... 2. T F 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged...... 3. T F 4. I have never intensely disliked anybody. 4. T F 5. On occasion I have had doubts about ray ability to succeed in life...... 5. T F 6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way 6. T F 7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. . . 7. T F 8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant...... 8. T F 9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure that I was not seen, I would probably do it...... 9. T F 10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability...... 10. T F 11. I like to gossip at times...... 11. T F 12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even thought I knew they were right...... 12. T F 13. No matter who I'm talking to. I'm always a good listener...... 13. T F 14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something 14. T F 15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone...... 15. T F 16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake 16. T F 17. I always try to practice what I preach...... 17. T F 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people...... 18. T F 141 C ir c le One 19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget...... 19. T F 20. When 1 don't know something, I don't at all mind admitting it 20. T F 21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable...... 21. T F 22. At times I really have insisted on having things my own way...... 22. T F 23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things 23. T F 24. I would never thing of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings...... 24. T F 25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. . 25. T F 26. r have never been irked when people express ideas very different from my own...... 26. T F 27. I have make a long trip without checking the safety of my car 27. T F 28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others 28. T F 29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off 29. T F 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me 30. T F 31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause 31. T F 32. I sometimes thing when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved 32. T F 33. I have never deliberately said something to hurt someone else's feelings...... 33. T F 142 PANAS This scale consists ofaniunber of words that descibedifinatnt feelings and emotions. Read each item and Ihem mark the qiprapriate answo' in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way TODAY. Use the following scale to record your answers. 2 4 verysBghilyornot a little m odcntely quiteabit extremely at all . interested . irritable . distressed . alert . excited ashamed . upMt inspired . *in»g . nervous . guihy . detemdned . scared . attentive . hostile Jittery enthusiastic . active . proud afiaid 143 How accunteiy can you describe younelf? Please use this list o f common human traits to desctihe yourself as accurately as possible. Describe yourselfas you see youTselfat the present time, not as you wish to be in the Amue. Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared wiA other persons you know o f the same sex and of roughly your same age. Before acfa trait, please write a number indicating how accurately that trait describes you using the following rating scale. h ia ca m te Accurate FMwmelv Vav Quite Sliriitlv Nother Sliehtlv Ouiie VsC l Exuemeh I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ------Active Extiaveited _____ Negligent _____ Trustful Agreeabk ------Fearfol _____ Nervous _____ Unadventerous Anxious ------Fretful _____ Organized _____ Uncharitable Artistic ------Generous _____ Philosophical _____ Uncooperative " Assertive Haphazard _____ Pleasant Uncreative Bashful ------Harsh _____ Practical _____ Undemanding Bold ------Helpful _____ Prompt _____ Undependable Bright — I 1 ■ lOgh Strung _____ Quiet _____ Unemotional Careful ------Imaginative _____ Relaxed _____ Unenvious Careless ------Imperccptive _____ Reserved _____ Unexcitable Cold ------Imperturbable _____ Rude _____ Unimaginative Complex ------■ , Impractical _____ Self-pitying _____ Uninquisitive Conscientious ------— I.— Inconsistent _____ Selfish _____ Uniniellectual Considerate ------Ineffidem _____ Shallow _____ Unintelligent Cooperative ------— Inhibited _____ Shy _____ Unkind Creative ------Innovative _____ Simple _____ Unreflective Daring ------Insecure ------S lo w _____ Unrestrained Deep ------Intellectual _____ Steady Unsophisticaied Dematxhng ------Introspective _____ Sympathetic _____ Unsympathetic ------Disorganized Introverted _____ Systematic Unsystematic Distrustfiil ------Irritable _____ Talkative _____ UntaOcathe ------Efficiem Jealous _____ Temperamental Verbal Emotional ------Kind Thorough Vigorous Energetic Moody - - Timid _____ Warm Envious ------Meat ------Touchy Withdrawn 144 CFCS For each o f the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic o f you (not at all like you) place a ”1" on the line to the left of the statement If the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) place a "5" on the line. You should use the following scale as you rate each o f the statements; 1 2 3 4 5 extremely somewhat uncertain somewhat extremely uncharacteristic uncharacteristic characteristic characteristic 1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my d^r to day behavior. 2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for many years. 3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the fiiture will take care of itself. 4. My behavior is oidy influenced by the immediate 0.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes o f my actions. 5. My convenience is a big âctor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve my future outcomes. 7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative outcome will not occur for many years. 8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences than a behavior with less important immediate consequences. 9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will be resolved before they reach crises levels. 10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at a later time. 11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figurii^ that I will take care of future problems that may occur at a later date. 12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior that has distant outcomes. 145 Study 1, Sample 2 Questionnaires How accuiately can you describe yourself? P le a s e use this Kst of comnxn human tn its to describe yourself as accunteiy as possible. Describe youiselfas you see younelfat the present time, not as you wish to be in the fiiture. Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other persons you Imow o f the same sex and o f rowÿtly your same age. Befeie each trait, please write a number indicatnig how accurately diattnit describes you using the following rating scale. Ifyou an uusun o fthe meanmg efa word, then ptean lean it biank and goon tothe next one. Iiuccnrate Accurate Extremely Very Q u Je SUahtiy Neither Slighib QuiU Vssi. Esuonclv 1 2 3 4______5______6______7 8 9 Absent-Minded Conventional Erratic Active Cooperative Exacting Agreeable Cosmopolitan Extravagant Aim less Creative Extravened Analytical Cultured Fastidious Anxious Curious Fearful Artistic Daring Firm Assertive Decisive Foolhardy Bashful Deep Foiesighted Bold Deliberate Forgetfid Bright Demanding Formal Careful Dependable Fretful Careless Dignified Frivolous Cautious Disorganized Generous Cold Distrustful Haphazard Complex Dull Harsh Concise Economical HelpAil Conscientious E fiideot High Strung Considerate Emotional Ignorant Consistent Energetic Imaginative Conremplatise Envious Imperccptive 146 Inaccurate Accurate p»wwn>lv Vm- Oulie Slifh* Neitfiff Slichtiv Qwle VSO. EvtnnneK 1 23456789 If you arc unsure of the uK««»«t of a word, then please leave it blank and go on to the next one. Impeituitaable Orderly Simple Impractical Organized Sloppy Inconsinem Pneepiive Skxhfiil ludodsive krlbclionistic Smart Indnsirioos Persistent Sophisticated Inefiidem Philosophical Steady Inhibned Pleasant Sympathetic Innovative Practical Svstematic Inquisitive Precise Talkative Insecure Predictable Temperamental Insightful Prompt Tenacious Intellectual Punctual Thorough Im dligem Purposeful Thrifty Introspecth-e Quiet Timid Introverted Rash Touchy Inventive Rebellious Traditional Irritable Redcless Tm stfiil Jealous Refined Unadventerous Kind Relaxed Unambitious Lazv Reliable Uncharitable Logical Reserved Unoonsciemious Mannerly Responsible Unoom-entional Meditative Rutk Uncooperative Meticulous Scatterbrained Uncreative Moody Self-pitying Undemanding Neat Sclfdisciplinod Undependable N egligent Selfish Unemotional Nervous Shallow Unenvious Nonconforming Shy Unexcitable 147 Inaccurate Accurate Ëausi^ Quite Sliahtlv Neither Slightlv Quite Very Extremely 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 If yon are unaure of the n»f"«"z of a word, then plea* leave it blank and go on to the neat one. Unimaginaiive Umeflective Verbal Uninquisilive Unreliable Vigorous Uniniellectual Unrestrained Wann Unintelligent Unsophisticaied Wishx-uushx Unkind Un^iinpaibeuc Withdrawn Unoiaeivam Unsyseniatic Woridh- Unpndictabie Unialkative 148 NEO-PIR-V- Fonn S Please read each o f the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your own experiences, beliefs and attitudes. It is important for you to realize that there are no ''right” or “wrong” answers to these questions. People are digèrent and we are interestedhow in yo u feel. Please respond with the amount that you agree or disagree according to the following S point scale. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree I bdieve we should look to our rdigious authorities for decisions on moral issues. I have an active Antasy life. I try to keep all my thoughts directed along realistic lines and avoid flights of &ncy. I think that if people don’t know what thqr believe in by the time they are 25, there's something wrong with them. Certain kinds of music have an endless fltscination for me. I follow the same route when I go someplace. I have a lot o f imellectual curiosity. I have a wide range of intellectual interests. How I feel about things is important to me. I rarely experience strong emotions. Watching ballet or modem dance bores me. I enjoy working on mind-twister* type puzzles. As a child I rarely ergoyed games o f make believe. I seldom pay much attention to my feelings o f the moment. I sometimes lose interest when people talk about very abstract, theoretical matters. 1 often try new and foreign foods. On a vacation, I prefer going back to a tried and true spot I seldom notice the moods or feelings that different environments produce. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them. I am sometimes completely absorbed in music I am listening to. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human condition. Once I find the right way to do something, I stick to it. I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings. 149 1 2 3 4 5 StroBgiy Disagree Ncotnl Agree Strongly Disagree Agree I don't like to waste n y time daydreaming. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas. I believe that the new morality of pennisriveness is no morality at alL Old things- like certain scents or the names of distant places- can evoke strong moods in me. I eiQoy solving problems or puzzles. Aesthetic and artistic concerns aren't very important to me. Without strong emotions, life would be uninteresting to me. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than open-mindedness. I ergoy reading poetry that emphasizes &dir%s and images more than story lines. I prefer to spend my time in âmiliar surroundings. Tm pretty set in my ways. I enjoy concentrating on a &ntasy or daydream and explorir% all its possibilities, letting it grow and devdop. I think it's interesting to learn and develop new hobbies. I have a very active imaginatiott. Poetry has little or no effect on me. I consider myself broad minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world. I find philosophical arguments boring. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be valid for them. I find h easy to empathize- to feel myself what others are feeling. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature. Sometimes I make changes around the house just to try something differem. I would have difficulty just letting my mind wander without control or guidance. If I feel my mind starting to drift offiinto daydreams, I usually get busy and start concentrating on some work or activity instead. Sometimes Wien I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement. 150 BIDR Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to mdicate how much you agree with it 1 4 Net at all Somewhat V ery True Tnie True Not Somewhat Veo- Trae True True 1. My first impressions ofpeopleusualfy turn out to 2 3 5 6 be right. 2. h would be hard fiir me to break any of my bad 2 3 5 6 habits. 3. 1 don't care to know what other people really think 2 3 5 6 of me. 4. 1 have not always been honest widi myself. 2 3 5 6 S. 1 always know why I like things. 2 3 5 6 6. When my emodons are aroused, it biases my 2 3 5 6 thinking. 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can 2 3 5 6 seldom change my opinion. 8. I am not a safe driver when 1 exceed the speed limit 2 3 5 6 9. I am fiilly in control of my own fate. 2 3 5 6 10. It's hard ferme to shut offa disturbing thought. 2 3 5 6 11. I never r^ret my decisions. 2 3 5 6 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't 2 3 5 6 make up my mind soon enough. 13. The reason 1 vote is because my vote can make a 2 3 5 6 difference. 14. My parents were not always feir when diey 2 3 5 6 punished me. 15. I am a completely rational person. 2 3 5 6 16. I rarely appreciate criticisfiL 2 3 5 6 17. lam very confident in my judgments. 2 3 5 6 18. I have sometimes doubted my sexual abilities. 2 3 5 6 151 Not Somewhat Ven- Troc True True 19. it's all right with me if some people happen to 2 3 5 6 dislike me. 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the 2 3 5 6 things I do. 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 2 3 5 6 22. I never cover iq> my mistakes. 2 3 5 6 23. There have been occasions when1 have taken 2 3 5 6 advantage of someone. 24. I never swear. 2 3 5 6 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and 2 3 5 6 forget. 26. I always obey laws, evm tfrm unlikely to get 2 3 5 6 caught. 27. 1 have said something bad about a fiiend behind 2 3 5 6 his or her back. 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid 2 3 5 6 listening. 29. I have received too mudi diange from a 2 3 5 6 salesperson without telling him or her. 30. If I return from traveling abroad, I would declare 2 3 5 6 everything at customs even though doing so would cost me extra money. 31. When I was young, I sometimes stole things. 2 3 5 6 32. 1 have never dropped litter in the street 2 3 5 6 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 2 3 5 6 34. 1 never read sexy books or magazines. 2 3 5 6 35. 1 have done things that I don't tell other people 2 3 5 6 about. 36. I have never taken tibings that don't belong to me. 2 3 5 6 37. I have taken sick-leave fiom work or sdiool even 2 3 5 6 thought I wasn't really sick. 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merdiandise wifoout reporting it 39. 1 have pretty awful habits. 2 3 40. I don't gossip about other people's business. 2 3 152 Study 2 Questionnaires Social Ptfapaan Survey Haw ■ocunttiy OB you dcacfibe yaandf? PieiK use liiisiifiafcanaianliumntiaitt to dochbeyounelfasaocufateiy as possible. Oetetibe younelf as you saey«untlfasibepnsaittBnc.iKitasyDuwùhiDbeintheiûtiiR. Describe youiselfas you are gmetally or typically, as oeoveiadwidiedierpeneBS you iuKwofibe same sex and ofieugWy your same age. Please atcle the numbcrmdicatmg hour accunsely that tiait describes you usaag the faUwwngiatiBg scale. Inaccumely describes me. Accumely describes me EncaKiy Veqr Qmie SUgbdy Ndlber Sbgbdy Qene Vei> Exuemeh 1. Uomspimd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 Bold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 3. Inquiring I 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 4. Brilliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 S. Avoidant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 6. Qaboniive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7. Immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8. Unieselleciual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9. Biaaiy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. Qwestioumg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11. Comsidemte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 12. Neglectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 13. Purposeful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 14. Unstudious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 15. Perceptive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 16. Inexperienced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 17. Unwise I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 18. Unsystematic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 19. Logical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20. Negligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 21. Sloppy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 q 22. Philosophical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 23. Smart 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 24. Couch-potato 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 153 fauoeunttiy dwribti me. Accaivciy dncnbes me Exncndy May Quue Slighlh Netiher SligWh Ome Ven Exucmcl) 25. Uhthomfrfiil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 26. Opm-mmdmd I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 27. Fooitth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 28. Cancmang 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 29. Dm p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30. HypmcDW 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 31. Ibcuiniwd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 32. Acenme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 33. loquitibve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 34. OWnmnt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 35. Mindfiil I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 36. Gmrans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 37. Biigfat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 38. Copubve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 39. FngiviDg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40. Curioiis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 41. Abtajuiunded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 42. Shy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 43. IMeddHi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 44. Uhjwne 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 45. CoMemplative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 46. Awate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 47. Utttephistieited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 48. Unoifbnned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 49. Tbougbtios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 50. Snong4iuoded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 51. UninduRnous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 52. Fiout 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 53. Clever 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 54. Iniable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 154 inecoimely describes me. Aecuntdy descnbes me Ememek Ven Quae Sli(bih Ncütar Sbfhliv Ouic Ven E.\imncl> 55. Fwdûdong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 56. Kind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 g q 57. Anaiytieil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 51. Joien 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 59. TaUomc 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 60. Fvafnl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 61. Envioas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 62. Nwoos I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 63. Unobierwt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 64. SinpInÉidid I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 65. Pmdehng l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 66. Enegmc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 67. Uhradwdical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 68. ImefRcimt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 69 Steady 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 70. Fc t û m » 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 71. thofougb l 2 3 4 S 6 7 9 72. Educated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 73. He#dW 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 74. NaninquinRg I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 75. KnwdedmWe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 76. Pnctical I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 77 Unenemive l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 78. UiumeUigem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 79. Rude I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 80. UomiagiBanve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 155 Socàü Perapiica Survey Hew ûi|MrtMt if it dut yea poncM ikoe traia? People diflfcrm what oaiu dial lie ini)omnit 10 them. Beiow is a list of adjectives. Please indicate bow peticBally important it is to you that you possets this trait. Retiember that there ate no nghi or wrong answera; singly iodicaie the how personally important each trait IS to you How ittiportaiit it it for you to posse» this trait? NotataU Almiebit Somewhat Very Important to Extremely onportant to me important to me important to me me Important to me 0 1 2 3 4 Circle one Circle one 1. Uninspiied 0 1 2 3 4 21. Sloppy 0 12 3 4 2. Bold 0 1 2 3 4 22. Philosophical 0 12 3 4 3. Inquiring 0 1 2 3 4 23. Smart 0 12 3 4 4. Brilliant 0 1 2 3 4 24. Couch-potato 0 12 3 4 S. Avoidant 0 1 2 3 4 25. Untboughhil 0 12 3 4 6. Elaborative 0 1 2 3 4 26. Open-minded 0 12 3 4 7. Immature 0 1 2 3 4 27. Foolish 0 12 3 4 8. linimellectiial 0 1 2 3 4 28. Concaaratng 0 12 3 4 9. Brainy 0 1 2 3 4 29. Deep 0 12 3 4 10 Questioning 0 1 2 3 4 30. Hyperactive 0 12 3 4 11. Considerate 0 1. 2 3 4 31. Uncultured 0 12 3 4 12. Neglectful Q I 2 3 4 32. Accurate 0 12 3 4 13. Purposeful a I 2 3 4 33. Inquisitive 0 12 3 4 14. Unstudious 0 I 2 3 4 34. Observant 0 12 3 4 IS. Perceptive 0 1 2 3 4 35. MiodAil 0 12 3 4 16. Inexpcficnced 0 I 2 3 4 36. Generous 0 12 3 4 17. Unwise 0 1 2 3 4 37. Bii^ 0 12 3 4 18. Unsystematic 0 1 2 3 4 38. Cognitive 0 1 2 3 4 19. Logical 0 1 2 3 4 39. Forgiving 0 12 3 4 20. Negligent 0 1 2 3 4 40. Curious 0 12 3 4 156 Haw iaporuat b it foryov to potsca thb tnit? Not at all A little bit Somewhat Very Important to Extremely me 0 I 2 3 4 Choose One Choose One 41. Absentmindad 0 2 3 4 61. Envious 0 1 2 3 4 42. Shy 0 2 3 4 62. Nervous 0 I 2 3 4 43. Undecided 0 2 3 4 63. Unobservant 0 I 2 3 4 44. Unaware 0 2 3 4 64. SimpfentiDded 0 I 2 3 4 45. Comeraplanve 0 2 3 4 65. Pondsfgg 0 1 2 3 46. Aware 0 2 3 4 66. Energetic 0 1 2 3 4 47. Unsophisticated 0 2 3 4 67. Unmethodical 0 1 : 3 4 48. Uninibnned 0 2 3 4 68. Ineffidem 0 1 2 3 4 49. Thoughtless 0 2 3 4 69. Steady 0 1 2 4 50. Smng-mmded 0 2 3 4 70. Persismt 0 1 2 3 4 51. Uhindustrious 0 2 3 4 71. Thorough 0 L 2 3 4 52 Pious b 2 3 4 72. Educated 0 i 2 3 4 53. Clever 0 2 3 4 73. Helpfiil c 1 2 3 4 54. Irritable 0 2 3 4 74. Noninquiring 0 1 2 3 4 55. Freechinking 0 2 3 4 75. Knowledgeable 0 1 2 3 4 56. Kmd 0 2 3 4 76. Practical 0 1 2 3 4 57. Analytical 0 2 3 4 77. Uhattmtive 0 1 2 3 4 58. Jealous 0 2 3 4 78. UnimeUigoit 0 1 2 3 4 59. Talkative 0 2 3 4 79. Rude 0 I 2 3 4 60. Frctfiil G 2 3 4 80. Unimaginative 0 1 2 3 4 157 Social Petcc|ician Sunny How do you tel abais tae vratris? Difienm words haw dtftentmeaningt te difieras people. Below is a bit of adjectives. Please arcie the number ^;i4ir^gh«Mfpn«irti*«riwgwivBtii*«iaMiingafdiewanli«toynu Remember that there are no nght cr wrong answers, simply ndicare the positivity ornegativiiy of the words meenmg to you. Adjeedvo is Ncfadve A^ecdvo is Poeiiivc Earemdy Sorrrewhat Ahttle Neither Abnk SouKwhat Ewreesely fart bit 1. Iteupind 3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 2. Bold -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 3. inqniimg -3 -2 0 +l +2 +3 4. Btilham -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 5. Avoidn -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 6. Elaborative -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 7. Immature 3 -2 0 +l +2 +3 8. Unintellectual 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 9. Braâiy . 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 10. Questioning 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 II. Considerate -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 12. Neglect&l •3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 13. Purposeful -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 14. Unstudious -3 -2 0 +I +2 +3 15. Perceptive •3 -2 0 +I +2 +3 16. Inexperiencad -3 -2 0 +I +2 +3 17. Unwise -3 -2 0 +I +2 +3 18. Unsystematic -3 •2 0 +I +2 +3 19. Logical -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 20. Nqiigem 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 21. Sloppy 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 22. Philosophical 3 •2 0 +1 +2 +3 23. Smart 3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 24. Coucfa*potato -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 158 Adjeoivt is Ncfttivc Adjective is Positive Extremeiy Sooewfaai Aliok Neither Alinle Somewhat Esnemelj bit bit 25. UmhowghAd 3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 26. Opsn«minded 3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 27. Foolish -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 28. CoBcentntmg 3 -2 -1 0 +I +2 +3 29. Desp -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 30. Hypenedve -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 31. Uncultured -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 32. A e c u m -3 -2 -I 0 +l +2 +3 33. Inquisitive -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 34. Observant -3 -2 •1 0 +1 +2 +3 35. Mindfiil -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 36. Generous -3 •2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 37. Bright -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 38. Cognitive -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 39. Forgiving -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 40. Curious -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 41. Absentminded -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 42. Shy -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 43. Undecided -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 44, Unaware -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 45. Comemplative -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 46. Aware -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 47. Unsophisticated -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 48. Uninfbimed -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 49. Thoughtless -3 -2 -1 0 +! +2 +3 50. Strong-minded -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 51. Unuidustrious -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 52. Pious -3 -2 -1 0 +I +2 +3 53. Clever •3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 54. Irritable -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 159 A 160 Social Atmude Survey For each o f the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statementis characteristic o f you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic o f you(not at all like you) placea 1 on the line to the led o f the statemem. If the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) placea 5 on the line. You should use the following scaleas you rate each of the statements; 1 2 3 4 5 extremely somewhat uncertain somewhat extremely uncharacteristic uncharacteristic characteristic characteristic 1 . 1 like most ofthe people that I meet. 2 . When I eat my ftvorhe foods, I tend to eat too much. 3 . The idea o f reding on thouÿu to make my way to the top appeals to me. 4 . 1 only think as hard as I have to. 5 . 1 like to be where the action is. 6 . 1 oAen crave exchemenL 7 . 1 have no difficulty resisting temptation. 8 . 1 like going to sporting evenu. 9 . 1 bdieve that most people are wdWntentioned. 10 . 1 prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. II.I avoid scary movies. _ 12.1 usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. _ 13 .1 would prefer a task that is imellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought. _ 14 .1 love the excttemem of roller coasters. _ IS . I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. _ 16 .1 prefer complex to simple problems. _ 17 . 1 find satisfection in deliberating hard for long houn. _ IS . I fed rdiefrather than satisfimtioa after completh^ a task that required a lot of mental efibrt. _ 19 .1 like to have the responsibility of handling a rituation that requires a lot of thinking. _ 20. Thinking is not my idea of fim. _2I. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me too much. 1 6 1 _ 22.1 Cke tasks that require littie thought once I've learned them. _ 23 . It's enough for me that something gets the job done; 1 don't care how or why it works. _ 24.1 laugh easily. _2S . I would not erijoy a vacation in Las V^as. _ 26.1 try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something. _ 27.1 prefer to think hbout smaB dmiy pngects to long-term ones. _ 28.1 have sometimes done things for kicks. _ 29.1 would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. _ 30. The notion of thinkit% abstractly is appealing to me. _31 .1 rarely overindulge in anything. _ 32.1 shy away from large crowds. _ 33 .1 keep a cool head in emergencies. _ 34 .1 sometimes 6il to assert myself as much as I should. . 3S. I like bright colors. _36.1 have trouble resisting cravings. 1 6 2 Study 3 Questionnaires Situation Memon’ Sunw Think about a recent incident in which you had to think a lot about a problem, task, issue, or concept in order to accomplish a goal. Focus on problems or issues that you solved by thinking about the problem or inoblems that could not have been overcome had you not thought d^ply about the situation. Spend the next few minutes writing about the problem and how you overcame it by thinking. Write about what the proUem was, why you were motivamd to think about the problem, your solution to the inoMem, and how you felt by thinking about the ixoUem. If you Snish early think about a second issue that you overcame by thinking deeply. Please write your examples on a lined sheet of loose-leaf paper that the experimenter gives you. The experimenter will comact you when time is up. 163 Situation Menton Sun-ev’ (in Luck Prime Condition) Think about a recent incident in which ludt helped you to accomplish a goal. Focus on problems that you could not have solved unless you were luclqr. Spend tte next 7 minutes writing about the problem and how luck helped you to overcome it Write about what the problem was, and how luck helped you to solve the problent and how you felt after your luck>- break- If you finish early, think about a second instance in which luck helped you to overcome a problem. Please write your examples on a lined sheet of loose-leaf paper that the experimenter gives you. The experimenter will contact you when time is up. 164 Self'Reference Survey Past research has shown that when given a surprise recall task, individuals have an improved memory for information abom which they described themselves. Please try to remember adjectives that were presented on the computer. We realize that this can be a difficult task, but please try yourbest to remember as many of the adjectives from the **Gut Reaction Task” that you can. Write the words that you can remember below. 165 specific Behavioral Recall Task During the computer portion of the experiment, you reported possessing some characteristics and you reported not possessing other characteristics. In this phase of the experiment, you will be getting some of the same adjectives that you received in the computer part of the study. ^ a in respond about whether that adjective describes you or does not describe you. In tiiis respect, this task is exactly like the first task. However, if you state that this word describes you, provide specific behaviors that you have done that illustrate that you possess Âis characteristic. List the first kinds of behaviors that come to your mind. Do not worry about how other people might interpret a particular behavior; use your own frame of reference. List as many or as few behaviors that come to mind. Remember to use specific behaviors that you have done in the past. If you feel that the word does not describe you, provide specific behaviors that you have done that illustrate that you do not possess the characteristic. List the first kinds of behaviors that come to your mind. Do not worry about how other people might interpret a particular behavior; use your own frame of reference. List as many or as few behaviors that come to mind. Remember to use specific behaviors that you have not done in the past. If you do not have any questions, you may begin this portion of the study on the next page. 166 Practical Describes Me Does not Describe Me This adjective does or does not describe me because in the past I: (list specific behaviors below) (This page is representative of the pages included in the behavioral listing task. Sixteen pages were provided to each subject for each of the 16 traits. Each page included one trait at the top and room for behavioral listings on the bottom) 167 Study 4 Questionnaires Survey 1 How important is it for you to know about each o f these characteristics? On the next few pages is a list o f adjectives. Imagine that you are meeting a new acquaintance. Please indicate the extmt that you would like to know if a persm does or does not possess each quality. In other words, would it be inpoitant for you to know that a person wasnice? Would it be important for you to know if a person wasdominating? etc. You may begin wdiaiever you are ready. 168 How imponant is it for you to know about each o f these charaaeiistics in a person'’ Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely Inqwrtant Important Important Important Imponant Friendly 0 1 2 Depth 0 1 2 Dependable 0 I 2 Creative 0 1 2 Sociable 0 I 2 Unindustrious 0 1 2 Shallow 0 I 2 Imperceptive 0 1 2 Intelligent 0 I 2 Elaborative 0 1 2 Sympathetic 0 I 2 Simpieminded 0 I 2 Optimistic 0 1 2 Touchy 0 I 2 Moody 0 1 2 Organized 0 1 2 Negligent 0 1 2 Practical 0 1 2 Quiet 0 1 2 Unexcitable 0 I 2 169 How imponant is it for you to know about each o f these charaaeiistics in a person"' Not at all Slightly Moderatdy Very Extremely Important Importam Important Imponant Important Reserved 0 Argumentative 0 Lenient 0 I 2 Oveiciitical 0 1 2 Irritable 0 Cooperative 0 Unmethodical 0 1 2 Steady 0 I 2 Spirited 0 I 2 Strong-Minded 0 I 2 Concentrating 0 I 2 Fretful 0 1 2 Forgetful 0 1 2 Sloppy 0 Conceited 0 Bossy 0 ImeHectual 0 Relaxed 0 Hyperactive 0 Forgiving 0 170 How imponant is it for you to know about each of these characteristics in a person? Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely Imponant Imponam Imponam Important Imponant Kind 0 Shy 0 2 Inconsistent 0 2 Unemotional 0 2 Jealous 0 2 Effidem 0 2 Rude 0 2 Playful 0 2 Unenvious 0 2 Reckless 0 2 On time 0 2 Withdrawn 0 2 Unimaginative 0 2 Undecided 0 2 Stupid 0 2 Philosophical 0 2 171 Survey 2 How important is it for you to convey to others these characteristics about yourself? On the next few pages is a list of adjectives. Imagine that you are meeting a new acquaintance. Please indicate the extent that you would like to infonn that person you possess or do not possess each quality. If the word indicates a trait you have, indicate how important it is that others know you possess that trait If the word indicates a trait you do not have, please indicate how important it is that others know you do not possess that trait. For example, if you are nice, indicate how important it is that others know you are nice; if you are not dominating indicate how important it is that others know you are not dominating; etc. You may begin whenever you are ready. 172 How imponam is it for you convey to others these charaaeiistics about yourseir Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely Important Imponam Importam Importam Imponant Friendly 0 1 2 Depth 0 I 2 Dependable 0 1 2 Creative 0 1 2 Sociable 0 1 2 Unindustrious 0 1 2 Shallow 0 1 2 Imperceptive 0 1 2 Intelligent 0 1 2 Elaborative 0 1 2 Sympathaic 0 I 2 Simpieminded 0 1 2 Optimistic 0 I 2 Touchy 0 I 2 Moody 0 I 2 Organized 0 I 2 Negligent 0 1 2 Praaical 0 1 2 3 Quiet 0 1 2 3 Unexcitable 0 1 2 3 173 How important is it for you convey to others these characteristics about younelP Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely Importam Importam Importam Important Important Reserved 0 I 2 Argumentative 0 1 2 Leniem 0 I 2 Overcritical 0 1 2 Irritable 0 1 2 Cooperative 0 1 2 Unmethodical 0 I 2 Steady 0 1 2 Spirited 0 1 2 Strong-Minded 0 1 2 Concentrating 0 1 2 Fretfiil 0 I 2 Forgetful 0 I 2 Sloppy 0 1 2 Conceited 0 I 2 Bossy 0 I 2 Intellectual 0 1 2 Relaxed 0 1 2 3 Hyperactive 0 1 2 3 Forgiving 0 1 2 3 174 How imponant is it Tor you convey to ottaen these charaaeristics about youneir Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely Important Imponam Important Important Imponant Kind 0 Shy 0 2 Inconsistem 0 2 Unemotional 0 2 Jealous 0 2 Effidem 0 2 Rude 0 2 Playful 0 2 Unenvious 0 2 Reckless 0 2 On time 0 2 Wthdrawn 0 2 Unimaginative 0 2 Undedded 0 Stupid 0 Philosophical 0 175 STOP!!! and wait for the experimenter Survey 3 The experimenter will play a taped interview. Please rate the woman on the cassette tape. Rate how much you feel that the woman possesses each of the traits and how confident you are of your judgment If you made a rating of the woman, and you are completely sure that your rating is correct, you would marie yourself as 80-100% confident If you had no idea and guessed at the rating of the woman, you would mark yourself as 0-20% confident if you were somewhere in-between, mark yourself in one of the intermediate categories. 176 PIcêsc rale hotv niiicli each of lliesc odjcclitcs dcsciibci (he pcison on (he I#;* How Confidenl are you o f your rating? 11-20% 20-40% 40-ti0% 60-110% 011-111(1% Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Much Extremely Sure Sure Sure Sure Sure (IkMMUat inurmOh»! Friendly U 1 2 3 4 0-211% 20-40% 40-60% 60-1103; 00-100% Depth Ü 1 2 3 4 11-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60110% 00-100% Dependable II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Creaiiic II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 211-411% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Sociable II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% fiO-00% 00-100% -J Uniiiduilrioui II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1(01% Shallow W 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Impcrceptivc 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Intelligent 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60 00% 00-1101% Elaborative II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% fdl-00% 00-1101% Sympalhclic 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% fiO-00% 00-1101% Simpieminded . . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Optimiilic 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-003; 00-1101% Touchy 0 1 2 3 4 • 0-20% 2041% 40-fi0% 60-003; on- 1 tor/. Moody II 1 2 3 4 0 20% 20-40% 40-60% 6o-oir; Klt-|tHI'!-„ ricasc tilc how much each of i Ik s c adjcclitcs dcKribct lltc person on the Itpe. Mow Confident are you o f your rating? 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% fdl-110% 60-ltNI% Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Much Ealremely Sure Sure Sure Siue Sure Organircd — II 1 2 ) 4 0 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60 60% 60-100% Negligent .... U 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-1161% Practical ___ 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-100% Quiet .... 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-100% Uneacilable . . . . 1 1 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-100% -J 0-20% 20-40% 00 Resencd — 0 1 2 3 4 40-60% 60-60% 60-1161% Argumentalivc — 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-4(1% 40-60% 60-60% 60-1161% Lenient .... 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-100% Overcritical 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-1161% Irritable 0 1 2 3 - 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 4)0-60% 60-1161% Cooperative 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 6tl-6tt% 60-1161% Uimielhodical 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-60% 60-1161% Steady 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40 6044 60 6044 60-1161% Spirited 0 1 2 3 4 . 0-20% 20-40% 4tt-f>0% 60-60% 60-|tm% Sirong-Mindcd . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% Nthlf". KO-HtO"'„ PIcuc iMc how much coch of llicsc adjccliio dcicribcs llic person on Ihc Impc Ilow CcnfidcM are you ofyour rating^ 020% 20-40% 40-MI% 60-g0% 00-1101% Not at all Sliglith Moderately Very Much Extremely Sure Sure Sure Sure Sure tri»f».mi Conccntraliiig II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-g0% 00-1101% Frcrlwl 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-R0*/. 00-1101% Forgdlul 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60*/. 60 00% 00-1101% Slopp) 0 1 2 3 4 0 20% 20-40% 40-60*/. frO-OO*/. 00-1101% Conceited 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Boisy II 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% vO 00-1101% Intelkelual 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Relaxed 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Hyperactive 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Forgiving 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00 ltWI% Kind 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Shy 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-1101% Inconsistent 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40MI% 60 00% 00-1101% Unemotional 0 1 2 3 4 ■ 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% «I-0OV. 00-100% Jealous 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-MI*/. 60-00% 00-100" i, ricisc latc how much each of Ihcsc adjcciitcs dcuiibcs ihe pcfton on iho i#pe How ConndcM MO )-ou o f )0W iMint? 0-20% 20-40% 40-00% 60-00% 00-100% Not ml mil Slightly Model mtely Vci)' Much Esiremcly Sure Sure Sure Sure Sm t IlkKtMMMl |IWm4lk«t Eflicicnl 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Rude . .. . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% fiO-0O% 00-100% PImful 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% ftO-00% 00-100% l/ncn«io«ii 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Reckless 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-MI% 60-00% 00-100% 00 o On lime 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% WiÜMkiwn . . 0 1 2 3 4 0-2ink 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Uninwginaliso . . . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Undecided 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Stupid . . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-00% 00-100% Philosophic!! . . 0 1 2 3 4 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% (41-00% 00-100% Survey 4&5 On a sheet in front of you is a list of 24 questions. Read over the list of questions. On the next 2 pages, you will be asked: (1) to select 12 questions from the list of 24 that you would most like to ask of another person. (2) to select 12 questions from the list of 24 that you would most like to have another person ask you. Read the instructions carefully on each of these response sheets. You may begin. 181 If you were to conduct an interview, what questions would you ask?Using the sheet of 24 questions, indicate which 12 hems you would most like to ask of another person. Select the 12 questions you would be most interested in knowing about. 182 If yen were being interviewed, what would yon like to be asked? Using the sheet of 24 questions, indicate which 12 herns you would most like be asked by another person? Select the 12 questions you would be most imerested in answering to others. 183