The Electric Animal That Therefore I Am Not; Empathy, Animals and Androids in Philip K. Dicks “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep”

Author – Mart Beemster Student Number – 10347259

Supervisor – Joyce Goggin

MA Thesis Literary Studies, English University of Amsterdam 29 June 2018 1

Abstract

The question of what it means to be human is one that science fiction literature often poses, and, as is the case with speculative fiction, gives a multitude of answers to. In this thesis, I will look at Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep whilst focusing on the notions of posthuman as presented by Rosi Braidotti, N Katherine Hayles, and Donna Haraway. I will argue that the inclusion of a new Other, the android, presents humankind with beings who appear to encompass the ideals of Western Humanism, which in turn gives humankind the possibility to reflect on their own nature. Problematizing the binaries and hegemony seen in Western Humanism, I will claim that the introduction of the android is the final step towards a posthuman future in both philosophical and physical sense. To do so, I will discuss Deleuze’s notion of depth and surface to present the manner in which androids create their identity and how this is different from humans. Secondly, I will present the change that J. R. Isidore undergoes throughout the novel to show his change to posthuman. Finally, I examine the problematic binary division between rationality and empathy through the notion of “the Animal” and a discussion of Mercerism. What I will show is that the android functions as a catalysts for human identity towards what Foucault calls “the Death of Man” and a posthuman future.

Acknowledgement

The author of this thesis hereby indicates that he has read and agrees with the UvA guidelines on plagiarism and that this thesis has been written accordingly. This thesis is solely the work of the author. 2

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 3 Chapter 1 – “Identification, There Goes I” ...... 7 Chapter 2 – “To Him They’re all Alive, False Animals Included”...... 17 Chapter 3 “The Whole Experience of Empathy is a Swindle” ...... 27 Conclusion ...... 36 Works cited ...... 40

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Introduction

“When we can’t dream any longer, we die” Emma Goldman

This quote from Emma Goldman is perhaps the crux of human life. The capability to see beyond the present and to envision a future is what allows us, as a species and as an individual, to keep progressing. As humans are continuously reshaping their future, it is necessary to look at the way human nature changes with the technological advances which are ever more present in daily life. One way to look at the human condition is through literature, especially science fiction and speculative fiction. Engaging with the discussion on human nature, this thesis will discuss the creation of identity as the manner in which one understands themselves is central to the way we view others. Rather than dealing with the relation between humans, this thesis will look at that between the human and the non-human. As I hint at in the title, the human-non-human animal distinction is not new. Rephrasing the title from Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, this thesis uses the notions that are seen throughout philosophy to apply them to a more contemporary ‘Other’, namely the android. Here, and throughout this thesis, I use the notion of the Other as a philosophical subject, one disenfranchised by the ruling class. By presenting the android as an Other I do not wish to diminish the narratives of colonial or gendered Others. Rather, by showing the android as Other I will show that the Western hegemony is outdated. Importantly, I want to note that the android itself does not yet exist as a fully functional being. It is therefore that this thesis uses one of the more influential and more philosophical novels on androids, namely Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. The reason that androids are crucial for the evolving of human nature is due to the way empathy, rationality and identification have been described in connection to the human. Especially in Western thinking, binaries play a strong role in the creation of identity. This thesis will specifically focus on the Western ways of thinking, as many issues seen throughout the world like colonization and the discrimination based on gender and sex stem from these Western binary notions. While some of these binary oppositions may not be as apparent as they were during the Renaissance, their influences is still seen and felt in many ways. I here specifically note the Renaissance, as it was during the 4

14th to 17th century that a Western hegemony was established and many of the problematic notions of Humanism were born. An obvious example is gender, where the initial binary of female-male is better understood as a spectrum which in no way is fixed or static. These old ideas of binaries, however, carry many prejudices with it. For example, the idea that it was appropriate for a society to expect women to take care of the children while the men would work and be educated. Especially the ability for men to be educated caused another binary, one that coincides with the gender division. In connection to the persistent ideal of rationality present in the European Renaissance, the distinction between the rational male and the emotional female arose. This in turn denied women access to education and resulted in women being told they are overly ‘emotional’ when protesting for equal pay or the right to education. Another problematic binary is seen between humans and non-human animals. This is firstly seen through the often described ‘animals’ as a single cluster of species, with humans not being part of this. While, like many binary oppositions, this looks like a gross exaggeration it is important to understand the effects that come with it. Together with the ‘human’ – ‘all non-human animals’ distinction comes again the notion of rationality and empathy. As Derrida notes, claiming “'The Animal' in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate every living thing that is held not to be human” (31) which constitutes as an opposition to “man as rational animal, man as political animal, speaking animal” (31). We see here the main distinction created between humans, especially male humans, and non-human animals, namely that of rationality. A third problematic binary can be seen in the way the Western world views different cultures. As described in Edward Said’s book ‘Orientalism’ that “European culture was able to manage –and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (1868). Europe created an Other in ‘the Orient’ from which “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient” (1868), meaning that by the negative representation of Oriental countries the European culture claimed itself superior, which in turn strengthened the notion of Orientalism. It furthermore created a generic view of the Other, presenting all Asian countries and cultures as identical. This generic view of non-western cultures, and the previously described binaries of gender and “The Animal” brings about an important aspect when it comes to androids. An error often made while discussion the human condition in opposition to that of androids is the expectation that there is a singular way to be human. The 5 perspective, often rather white and rather male, lacks to see the diversity that exists in the human race. While it may seem contradicting that this thesis does discus a novel “filled with white men doing white men things”, as Nnedi Okorafor notes of Western science fiction in an interview with OkayAfrica, I do precisely that to point at these outdated binaries that remain present in more modern and contemporary cultural discourse. Dick, who used writing as a platform to pose philosophical questions, often played with precognitive notions on humanity. While presenting the reader with these tropes, the novel poses them as problematic and often shows a drastic change in the character's thoughts and manners throughout the story. It is this change in character that this thesis will pose as main component of the novel. To do so, I will go beyond the notion as often present in Western philosophy, and create an understanding of how Dick presents us with a way to question traditional Humanist thought and in turn presents us with a posthumanist philosophy through technology in general and the android in specific. In order to present this posthuman philosophy, I will initially discus the way androids create their sense of identity and the way this is different from humans. In doing so, I will show that androids have similar innate drives, in the Freudian sense, to keep them functioning, but in a different way from humans. This in turn causes a new, second mirror stage like event, in the development of humans in general. To show this second mirror stage, I will discuss the Nexus-6 androids from Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, starting with the character of Rachel Rosen, as her process of consciousness is exemplary for the creation of identity in the android and difference it has to humans. Throughout this thesis I will refer to “the android”, with which I indicate specifically the Nexus-6 androids, rather than falling into the same pitfall as Derrida describes with “The Animal” and using the android as singular, universal signifier. With that in mind, I will turn to J. R. Isidore, a so called ‘chickenhead’ who, through technology and interaction with the android Pris, changes what it means to be human. Thirdly, I will discuss the importance of the non-human animal, both electric and biological. Finally, I will look at the way the empathy boxes and religion function as a way to distort what we understand as empathy. Together, these arguments will create an understanding of our faulty manner of thinking in binaries. As said, this thesis does not wish to only point out faults in our current manner of thinking. Rather, being true to the posthumanist philosophy I use throughout, I will show that with the introduction of the android, humanity is presented with a new Other which allows them to review their outdated binaries and create a new sense of the 6

Self. Taking Foucault's notion of episteme, I will show that “The Android” gives rise to the Death of Man and creates a new manner of thinking that is seen in posthuman philosophy. 7

Chapter 1 – “Identification, There Goes I”

Starting off the discussion on posthuman identity, this chapter will focus on the creation of identity in androids and how it differs from the notions of human identity. Contrary to humans, who start from an infantile state and slowly work their way to adulthood, the androids in Dick’s novel have been programmed as adult humans. Furthermore, the Nexus-6 androids that I focus on in this thesis have been “impregnated with a false memory system” (Dick 110) which not only covers for their missing childhood, but also functions as a barrier for emotional experiences like those evoked through the Voight-Kampff test. This in turn gives androids the possibility to understand and to a certain extend feel emotion, despite these feelings being fabricated and maintained by false memories. At the same time, the android lacks empathetic functions creating a being that relies strongly on rationality. Looking at the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy, the android represents both the mind, as well as exemplifying the humanist ideal of the divide between the mind and body. With this in mind, we can see that the Nexus-6 androids become strongly comparable to humanist ideals, but remain distinctively non-human enough to show many of the flaws that are embedded in Western Humanist thinking. One of the issues with traditional Humanist thought is that it creates and relies on an idea of the universal person. As Johanna Greenblatt aptly explains in More Human Than Human;

Modernity's rational subject, associated with Enlightenment ideals and the Classical traditions they draw on, is one whose maleness, Westernness, and whiteness has historically been used as the measure against which disenfranchised groups, including women, people of colour, and the colonized, have fallen short, judged insufficiently rational and overly emotional. (42)

As Greenblatt shows, due to the ‘universal’ white, Western, male ideal, other groups have become subjugated and oppressed by these same ‘universal’ men. Furthermore, the hierarchy that has been created by these universalistic ideals appears self-sustaining, as those at the top of the hierarchy can decide to which ideals one needs to adhere to be at the top. However, as I will argue throughout this thesis, the introduction of a new being disrupts the order and 8 creates new possibilities for humankind. This new being, the android, embodies the most important element of humanist ideas; rationality and the division of mind and body. As the android is more rational than the white, Western, male human, these humans in turn become “insufficiently rational and overly emotional” (42), to use Greenblatt’s words. However, rather than creating a new hierarchy which maintains rationality as its basis, the existence of the android can help humans understand the issues that occur with the way we currently look at identity from a hierarchical position. To understand how this can happen, I will discuss the difference in identity creation as seen with androids and humans. Taking Deleuze’s notions of the depth and surface as a starting point, I will initially apply these terms to the identity of the androids. As will be seen, the android starts at a point on the surface, rather than constantly having to struggle towards wholeness as humans do. To explain the creation of identity this chapter will initially focus on Rachel Rosen, a Nexus-6 android created by the Rosen Association, as she not only indicates the issue with rationality as an ideal, but also shows the issue with the gendered idea of humanist rationality. After that I will discuss the effects of this on human identity, and the possibility of change as presented by the bounty hunter Deckard. With an understanding of Android and human identity, its fluidity, and the dismantling of humanist ideals, this chapter shows that the hierarchy created by rationality is outdated, and that through the introduction of the android we can start to create a new, updated version of humankind, which will turn us towards the posthuman. Before discussing the effect androids have on human identity, I want to discuss the way their identity is created as it gives an essential insight in how we create our identity. Lacking parents, but rather having been built as fully functioning beings, androids never started in the depth, but rather were placed on the surface level and left there to survive. Different from humans, who through their drives emerge from the depths to the surface, androids are forced to maintain their drives in order not to fall into the endless pit that is the depths, and inevitably their demise. As Deleuze explains, “[e]verything starts out in the abyss” (188), but the drives give humans the possibility to crawl out of this depth. This is, however, only the case for humans, who are born infantile and without any prior knowledge or sense. Androids, on the other hand, do not grow or develop in the way humans do as they, essentially, exist. The androids specific to Dick’s novel were created as servants identical to humans, to such an extend that they see themselves as humans. This view is further enhanced in the Nexus-6 androids, which have been given false memories which present them with an 9 artificial idea of personhood. From Deleuze and his usage of Lacan’s notion of the Mirror stage, we can understand that identity is created in search of wholeness. Taking fractures of others’ identity, we create a mirror image which represents our Self by portraying the multitude of reflections from the Other. Due to the false memories, however, androids already have the wholeness that humans continuously search for. Yet, this wholeness is fractured at the moment that they realize that they are androids, rather than humans. As Deckard, a bounty hunter tasked to see if the Voight-Kampff empathy test still functions on these newer model androids, asks Eldon Rosen, executive at an android manufacturing business, “does she [Rachel Rosen] know [that she is an android]?” (51). To which Eldon casually replies “No. […] But I think towards the end she suspected” (51). It is at moments like these where the androids become aware of their identity as android that their slow descend towards the depths begins. As their initial self-image as human is shattered, the fractures in the surface cause the androids to start their unending identification process. They can, however, refrain from completely destroying their self and descending into the abyss in the same way that humans come out of it. Using the intrinsic Freudian drives, which are unconsciously utilized by humans to create their surface, the androids can maintain their surface. These drives, while functioning in an opposite manner, are the same drives that humans have. This is due to the fact that the androids are not only made as a direct mirror image of humans, but also because of the false, human, memories that force them into these drives. The first drive that we see in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep is the drive of preservation. This drive functions to create the will to maintain both the person as individual, as well as the species as a group. While this might seem like an abstract notion of survival, Deleuze explains that “[i]n depth the drives of preservation [in humans] do indeed have real objects and aims, but thanks to the powerlessness of the nursing child, they do not have at their disposal the means to be satisfied” (198). On the contrary, the drives of preservation within the android can be fulfilled, as androids are fully capable beings from the moment they come into existence as opposed to the powerless nursing child Deleuze describes. Initially, the drive of preservation is seen by the mere fact that the group of Nexus-6 androids have escaped Mars and taken refuge on Earth. While this may seem rather crude, it is nonetheless of direct significance, as their formation as a group implies a will to survive together. As humans unconsciously try to reach the surface, they have a ‘goal’, something to live for. As stated before, androids initially do not have this ‘goal’, however unconscious it may be. Due to this, it may appear that they thus 10 also have no reason to exist, other than the coincidence of already existing. What is seen in Dick’s novel however, is the awareness of their state as androids and thus their being different from humans, which in turn starts the drive of preservation. As the android now understands themselves to be distinguishable from humans they begin an unending stream of identification, which starts as their perfect mirror is shattered. In Deleuze’s writing, we can see that the Self always has the need for the Other to exist to create their identity, while simultaneously wanting the destruction of that other as they halt the creation of a perfect, unitary identity. The destructive properties of the drives are seen in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep when Rachael Rosen discovers that one of the androids is exactly the same model as her. The other android, named Pris, is to be ‘retired’, the official term used by bounty hunters meaning the killing of an android, by Deckard, to the dismay of Rachael. It should be understood that, while Rachel is built specifically with the order to stop bounty hunters from killing the androids, the feeling she has towards Pris is more than just a part of the code she is executing. As she is conflicted by the thought of ‘retiring’ Pris, Rachael asks Deckard if he understands what she feels towards Pris, to explain herself that it is “[i]dentification, there goes I” (164). This understanding of the self, as a reflection of the Other self, directly impacts the way she behaves. Knowing that the destruction of Pris might cause the destruction of herself, as the main reliable source of identification for androids comes from other androids, she tries to talk Deckard out of taking her along as she knows that without her Deckard has little chance of finding the androids. While, on the one hand, Pris endangers Rachael idea of the self as an independent self by being of the same model, on the other hand Pris is also needed for Rachael to create her identity as ‘not-Pris’. This duality is similarly seen in Deleuze’s writing, where there can be no ‘complete’ self, but there is rather a constant process of identification trying to create this self. It is seen that one is depend on their mirror image to create their own image, though there is a will to be independent, meaning this mirror image must be destroyed, yet that in turn destroys the self. With Rachael, this mirror image in the form of Pris is to be destroyed if she wants to be a whole self, but at the same time she needs Pris to be able to identify herself as ‘not-Pris’. According to Deleuze, the drives of preservation can be satisfied through the sexual drives, as this drive exists “together with them and substituting introjected and projected partial objects for objects that are out of reach” (198). The projected objects, however, are no 11 longer mere projection, but rather become within reach for the android who is already out of the depth. Yet the objects are still needed to maintain a stable identity. Again, this connection is seen in Dick’s novel. While the androids do not seem to have an intrinsic sexual instinct, they do understand how sexual desire and pleasure would keep them alive. Rachael, aware of her status as android and thus wanting to keep Pris alive, tries to charm Deckard into having sex with her. She does not do this out of love or empathy but rather as a rational solution to her problem, knowing that Deckard will forsake his mission to ‘retire’ all androids on the same day. Besides the difference in sexual drives, the most common understood difference between human and androids can be understood from this scene. Like most androids in science fiction, Dick’s androids are characterized by their lack of empathy. On the creation of Dick’s androids, playwright Edward Einhorn explains in an interview with publishing house tor.com that;

“[Dick] had read a Nazi journal in which an SS officer complained about not being able to sleep because the crying of the children in the concentration camps kept him awake. Instead of empathizing with the suffering of the children, the officer only saw them as a nuisance that disturbed his sleep. Dick started thinking of people who lacked any sort of empathy as androids.”

Making the connection between the lack of empathy and androids, it becomes clear how Dick viewed the androids in his novel, namely as beings incapable to have feelings for others. The androids do, however, have full rational thinking capacity, and what might be understood as an act of love for a human is rather a rationalized survival skill for an android. This becomes clear after Deckard and Rachael confess their love for each other, only to learn that Rachael is programmed to have sex with bounty hunters in order to dissuade them from their task. What this shows is that the sexual drive of Rachael is actually a desire to keep other androids alive. Returning to the creation of identity, we can understand that she does this in order to maintain the Other, in this case the other androids, so that she can preserve herself near the surface rather than falling to the depth. What we can understand from the usages of sexual desire, is that something which is seen as emotional can be used as something rational. This in turn causes the disintegration of the lines between the supposed binary opposition between emotion and rationality. We furthermore see that the idea of rationality, and in turn 12 emotionality, is distinctively based on our personal perception. Derrida, quoting what he calls “one of the greatest pre- or anti-Cartesian texts on the animal” (6) by De Montaigne, questions if “when I play with my cat, who knows if I am not a pastime to her more than she is to me?” (461 De Montaigne). Like De Montaigne’s notion of his cat we can only understand Rachel’s actions from our own perspective. Thus, while her action appears to be done out of love, the reader later learns that it is actually an action based on rationality. It is these seemingly mundane acts that distinguish the android from humans, but furthermore shows how the ideas embedded in our way of thinking are flawed and how we should be more actively adapting our patterns of thinking. While Rachel already blurs the lines between emotional and rational as an android, a closer look should be taken to her as a feminine android. While androids do not have a sex, they are gendered in the same way people are. This means that, due to social constructions that regard Rachel as female, she is seen as more emotional in accordance to Western thought patterns. As Western thinking is often based on hierarchical notions, having someone who is both more rational, being an android, as well as seen as overly emotional, being gendered as female, is disruptive of these preconceived notions. As Alice Reyner explains, "[b]ecause of technology, even the body is no longer a convincing site for unitary and singular identity" (134). With the introduction of elements beyond our biology, we have the possibility to stretch the limits nature imposed on us. It is crucial to understand that what is commonly understood as ‘biological’ always carries a trace of social constructions. The decision to put together certain biological signifiers with socially constructed signified such as gender and sex, for example the idea that having a penis equals being male, not only creates a binary notion which quickly turns towards hierarchical discrimination, it is also a false notion, as it is, especially with regards to modern technological advancements, biologically possible to have both a womb as well as a penis. Particularly seen with androids, the body is easier to manipulate and creates a platform for identity signifiers beyond the preconceived notion of Western thinking. Through the disruption of the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy Rachel shows the possibility of further changes in our general understanding of identity. These changes no longer adhere to preconceived notions of binary oppositions but rather exist on the fluid scale that exist in- between either ends, as well as opening up the possibility to go outside and beyond this scale completely. 13

As Rachel questions our Western vision of what rationality entails, the bounty hunter who falls in love with her shows the way our emotions modify our rational thought. In a similar way our own presuppositions change the way we discuss objects, as set out by Kant and the notion of the ‘ding an sich’, our rational choices are always, though perhaps unconsciously, formed in part by our emotions. A clear example of this is seen in political rhetoric in which rational ideals are presented through appeals to emotion and linguistic tricks. Classically formed from Ethos, Logos, and Pathos, the rational arguments are embedded in subconscious appeals to emotion. As Sam Leith notes, these “three musketeers of the persuasive art – can’t be altogether separated” (66), noting that an appeal to emotion, pathos, influences the rational argumentation, logos. As rationality is formed partly by emotions, Humanist binaries, which claim that the two can, and should be, separated, appear false, but so does the anti-humanist idea that rationality should no longer be adhered at all. The bounty hunter Deckard embodies this distinction, as his change from stoic, rational and macho to a more sympathetic figure does show. Deckard, whose name already prompts the similar sounding Descartes, strongly correlates in characteristics with the ideals of Cartesian humanism. In the beginning of the novel, Dick presents Deckard as the typical, almost cliché, male action hero. The first thing he says in the novel, “You set your Penfield to weak” (1), is him criticizing his wife and claiming that he knows what is best for her. However, as the novel continues, the way Deckard is presented to the reader changes, as he acknowledges that his wife was right and that he was “nothing but a crude cop with crude cop hands” (212). While his description of himself still remains bleak, the self-reflection that is seen, shows how he has changed. This change however, only originates from his interaction with the androids. Starting as a humanist rational subject, his relations with the androids show him gradually losing his sense of humanness which in turn poses the question of what humanity actually is. As Greenblatt explains in More Human than Human, “at least initially, in Androids, […] only dead synthetic humans can be physically definitely identified. Alive, their bodies are indistinguishable from humans” (45/6). However, Greenblatt does make a clear distinction, as she explains that “affect is what remains to define the human” (5). Further along in the text, Greenblatt explains the reason for reaffirming this statement. She says that in the novel “lack of affect implies lack of humanity itself, fundamentally contradicting humanity’s historical self framing by dominant social groups” (9). This fundamental contradiction Greenblatt discusses is, again, that of empathy or affect versus rationality. While Deckard, as a human 14 being, is supposedly empathetic, he increasingly tries to disdain from feeling emotions towards the androids he is to ‘retire’. The term ‘retire’, solely chosen because it sounds less shocking than kill, already affirms this idea of feeling compassion by substituting it for a less appalling notion. After 'retiring’ Luba Luft, Deckard notes that she “had seemed genuinely alive” (122) and that he is “capable of feeling empathy for at least specific, certain androids” (123). Deckard's attitude however, changes after the realization that he has to retire Pris, who is of a similar model as Rachael, the android he just confessed to that “if I could legally marry you, I would” (171). However, as Rachael reveals she works for an association in order to stop him from killing the other androids, Deckard is without emotion towards the androids, yet still scared for the possibility of also being incapable of killing Pris. Finally, Deckard decides that “if [he] can kill [Rachael], then [he] can kill the others” (173). This is not only a sign of him losing his empathy, his emotions towards Rachel, but is also reminiscent of the need for the destruction of the other to create the self as seen in Deleuze. This not only shows the similarity of how identity is created and constantly changing, but also how the androids changes the way Deckard behaves. The change that Deckard undergoes shows that, in order for a new episteme to start, there is a need for a drastic change in the understanding of the self rather than returning to notions that have always existed. In the novel, a switch in the dominant mode of thinking is seen through the changes that Deckard undergoes. The old, humanist, episteme is represented through the first conversation Deckard and his wife Iran have. As discussed, Humanism not only distinguished between mind and body, but also gendered these notions and presented women as ‘bodily’ and thus, as happens with binaries, incapable of objective thought. However, by continuously reaffirming these binaries, especially done by those at the top of the hierarchy to strengthen their position, change has become seemingly impossible. This affirmation is already seen in the first chapter of the novel when Deckard and Iran have a discussion on Deckard’s work. According to Iran, he is “a murderer hired by cops” (1), yet Deckard claims that he has “never killed a human being in [his] life”(1), to which Iran replies that he only killed “those poor andys” (1). The way this conversation is set up makes it clear that Deckard is portrayed as the typical macho sci-fi hero, but at the same time this trope is ridiculed by presenting him directly as “irritable” (1) and showing “outright hostility” (1), creating a caricature of this typical sci-fi analogy. Especially when contrasted with Iran, the Cartesian dichotomy is presented with Deckard and Iran and the typical gendered tropes that come with it. However, throughout the novel we do 15 see Deckard change and his stoic masculinity slowly melts as he falls in love with the android Rachel. Another instance where we see this change in Deckard is when he discusses his assignment with Phil Resch. Resch, who is also a bounty hunter, especially shows that the change to a posthuman episteme has to be undergone willingly, even if that happens unconsciously. Resch actively tries to maintain the ideals that developed from the mind-body dichotomy, especially when looking at the body as a sexual object. When the two bounty hunters discuss the possibility of having feeling for an android Deckard notices that he is “capable of feeling empathy for at least specific, certain androids” (124 Dick). This is not only a substantial change from the stoic persona he started out as, but it is distinctively different from Resch. According to Deckard ‘there’s nothing unnatural or unhuman about Phil Resch’s reactions’ when applying the Voight-Kampff test. Moreover, his reactions to Deckard seem typically human, in the humanistic sense. For example, when asked about feeling love towards an android, Resch replies that “[i]f it’s love towards a woman or android imitation, it’s sex” (124). This reply is clearly indicative of the typical dichotomy where the Other is reduced to a mere ‘body’ for the male to project his desires on. However, the fact that Resch here substitutes the ‘mind’ means that Deckard becomes the opposite. As Deckard realizes, “if Phil Resch had proved out android [he] could have killed him without feeling anything” (124). Deckard’s lack of empathy in the passage is not indicative for his maleness or the mind-body division, but rather shows that this dichotomy is changing as in the same passage Deckard shows empathy, as well as a lack thereof, with androids. It is this synthesis in thought, no longer based on an ‘either/or’ dichotomy, but depended on context and circumstance that is brought by the android. Finally, at the end of the novel, we see not only the break in Deckard old thought, but also the beginning of the new episteme where humans are no longer the central species but rather have an understanding of the world as a whole. Foucault already notes on how “man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (387). After the figurative death of man, we come to a new episteme where humans are no longer the centre of understanding. In the novel we see this changes, as Deckard finally understands that the “electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are” (211 Dick). It is this switch, from an uncaring, individualist notion of life towards an overarching notion of ‘being’ that signifies a new beginning, one that is created through the interaction between Deckard and the androids. 16

Looking at the novel as a whole, the shift from surface to depth and vice versa is seen in both android and human. As explained, the androids were created with rational understanding of the self as human. However, as they realize that they are not human, their perfect self is broken, and they descend towards the depth. As this happens, their drives stop them from completely falling in ‘the abyss’, but in doing so, it also changes the way they behave. In the novel, this becomes clear as Deckard is retiring the last three androids who escaped from Mars. Provoking the androids, he “let Roy Baty fire once” (195), and saying to Roy that “[he] lost [his] legal basis […] by firing on me” (195). The way Roy impulsively reacts here appears out of place, as it is contrary to what is expected from rational androids. It is however in line with the greater themes of the novel. The androids, starting from a place of rationality, gradually turn to a more simplistic state, driven more and more by impulse and the Freudian ‘id’. It should be understood that this may seem contradictory, as a being driven by their ‘id’ seems more connected to humans than to androids. Yet, we know that the androids thought of themselves as human before realizing they were androids which in turn made them more human than humans are in the rational, Humanistic sense. Understanding the difference between oneself and others, both human and non-human, is intrinsic for the survival of the self. As humans continue to create new forms of life, the question of identity constantly changes. Together with cross-breeding of animals, the creation of non-biological creature endangers the self-image of humans, as these new Others once again disrupt human identity. The creation of a self in contrast to androids as Other becomes increasingly difficult as androids are created as a direct mirror image of humans. What is seen in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep is this endless creation of identity, for both humans and androids alike. As the Rosen Association is continuously trying to create androids that are indistinguishable from humans, one can only wonder what the Nexus-7 type, the newest version of androids who are indistinguishable from humans whether they are alive or dead, would mean for the identification process of humans. When we look at the way identity is created, it is through a constant longing for unity, for a sense of ‘wholeness’. Yet, what happens when we find that wholeness? I have already quoted Emma Goldman, but the sentiment remains true; “When we can’t dream any longer, we die” (321). Likewise, Haraway notes that “Cyborg Feminists have to argue that ‘we’ do not want any more natural matrix of unity and that no construction is whole” (157 my italics). As the android presents us with a new view on ourselves, we must 17 understand that our notions on what ‘human’ entails also change and that we will continue to adapt to our circumstances. 18

Chapter 2 – “To Him They’re all Alive, False Animals Included”

Continuing the discussion of the android as catalyst for the posthuman, this chapter will concentrate on the connection between the human and the non-human by focussing on the so-called ‘chickenhead’ J. R. Isidore. ‘Chickenhead’ is often used as a derogatory term to describe lesser intelligent humans who have “failed to pass the minimum mental faculties test” (15 Dick). The term, however, is not just an insult. From the outset one can see the term incorporates the idea of the non-human animal together with a Cartesian idea of the mind- body dichotomy. In order to explain the implications of this dichotomy, I will first look deeper into the term ‘chickenhead’ itself with regards to posthumanist theory. I will then discuss Isidore’s relations and interactions with his human colleagues, as well as the contrasting ways in which the androids, who take refuge in his apartment building, view him. Here I will endeavour to show that through these interactions, the androids initiate a new way of thinking with regards to identity, and this initiation in turn reveals Isidore as a proto- posthuman in line with posthumanist theory. Before proceeding with my analysis of the term ‘chickenhead’, I want to clarify my use of the term ‘posthuman’. The main distinction I draw is that between the posthuman as a living entity and posthumanism as a theoretical or philosophical approach. In presenting Isidore as a posthuman, he embodies the theoretical approach of posthumanism, rather than being the universal signifier of a posthuman. The reason I create this division is due to the manner in which posthumanism as a philosophy came to exist, namely as both a reaction on 16th century Humanist thought as well as 20th century anti-humanism. For example, a major flaw in humanist thinking was the ideal of the universal man, often represented by Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, and the implications it had to those who do not fit this ideal are still seen in many Western countries. Rather than falling into the same pitfall and presenting Isidore as the universal posthuman, this chapter will show that he embodies the possibilities presented by posthumanist thought. In my discussion of posthuman thought, I rely on Braidotti’s ideas as she describes them in The Posthuman. As she notes in the first chapter;

Posthumanism is the historical moment that marks the end of the opposition between Humanism and anti-humanism and traces a different discursive framework, looking more affirmatively towards new alternatives. (Braidotti 37) 19

Rather than maintaining the Humanism and anti-humanism binary, posthumanists seek to go beyond these notions and create a new space for critical thought without disregarding its historical origins. J. R. Isidore, as I will argue, goes through this historical transformation, from being accepted as a human being, through the anti-humanist idea of the Death of Man, to the posthuman subject. What I will show in this chapter is that through the relationships with his co-workers and boss, Isidore initially embodies the anti-humanist idea which in turn gives him the possibility to become posthuman after he meets the androids. As said, I do not want to impose a ‘universal truth’ regarding the posthuman, as universal truths do not exist to begin with, but even more so because there is no universal idea of what theorist or philosophers see as a posthuman. The notion of a posthuman that I take comes from N. Katharine Hayles who notes the following on the posthuman;

“If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality” (Hayles 5).

Besides the fact that I do not wish to portray Isidore, or any character for that matter, as a universal posthuman, Isidore lacks the qualities presented in both Hayles’ ‘posthuman dream’ version as well as her ‘nightmare’. Emphasising technology here, Isidore does not embody the technological advancements seen in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, as he does not embrace them any more than the other characters in the novel. Surely, he does utilize the empathy box and works for a company which repairs indistinguishable electric animals, but so do many others. While it may seem superfluous to present what I intend not to do, it is needed in order to understand what it is this chapter will do, namely showing that from a theoretical standpoint Isidore can be seen as the embodiment of posthumanism as a philosophical notion. Before explicitly going into the relationships that form Isidore, I will explain the notion and context of the term ‘chickenhead’, as through this term the establishment of Isidore as posthuman can already be seen. In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep the term is first 20 used to describe someone who “had failed to pass the minimum mental faculties test, which made [them] in popular parlance a chickenhead” (15). This is initially used as a description of Isidore, with the further remark that “there existed chickenheads infinitely stupider than Isidore, who could hold no jobs at all, who remained in custodial institutions” (15/16). Directly, the importance of rational thought and general intelligence is seen from this. Those that fail the intelligence test become non-human in both terminology as well as the fact that they are disregarded as active members of society. While Isidore might hold a job, he remains an outcast who lives alone in an abandoned building and has no further social life. Looking at the term ‘chickenhead’ itself, it is seen that it is more than just an insult for less intelligent people. Initially, the usage of an animal as an insult directly brings up a similar hierarchical structure as I have shown in the previous chapter with regards to gender. The animal, generalized through the usage of the definitive article to again create an ‘us versus them’ binary, is seen as subordinate to the human species. Using “a notion as ‘The Animal’” as Derrida similarly critiques in The Animal That Therefore I Am, would assume that “all nonhuman living things could be grouped within the common sense of this 'commonplace', the Animal” (34). Creating the commonplace of the animal not only turns ‘the animal’ into an Other, but also gives rise to portraying human Others as animals. As is seen in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, ‘chickenhead’ is explicitly applied to humans, which creates this distinctive hierarchy within the subgroup of humans, with those of lesser intelligence at the lower end. It should be noted here that this specific hierarchy is based on intelligence and cognitive function. This is reflected in the term ‘chickenhead’ itself as the chicken is often associated with stupidity, as reflected in for example the idiom ‘like a headless chicken’. This idiom, meaning to act aimless or without control, can be understood as the direct opposite of acting in a rational manner. To call someone a ‘chickenhead’ directly implies them being irrational non-humans. Furthermore, the binary notion the term ‘chickenhead’ carries shows “Humanism's restricted notion of what counts as the human” (16 Braidotti) and in turn allows for discrimination against those who do not fall under that notion. The derogatory manner in which ‘chickenheads’ are named creates a feeling of ‘otherness’ and implies a non-human aspect. While it may seem clear that the term denotes someone with the head, or rather mental capacity, of a chicken, the implications go beyond using irrationality and animalism as an insult. Not only does the term have a trace of Descartes’ mind-body dualism, using it to represent lesser intelligent humans exemplifies how “one becomes the privileged term and the 21 other its Suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart” (3 Grosz). Grosz further explains that “Descartes, in short, succeeded in linking the mind-body opposition to the foundations of knowledge itself, a link which places the mind in a position of hierarchical superiority over and above nature, including the nature of the body” (6). As the mind becomes the privileged in the dichotomy, those who are without it are seen as lesser being. What Grosz furthermore shows is how “the male/female opposition has been closely allied with the mind-body opposition” (14) which in turn has been used to justify “Patriarchal oppression [...] by connecting women much more closely than men to the body” (14), something previously discussed in connection to Rachel Rosen. When looking at Isidore, a different effect that stems from patriarchal oppression is also seen. As the aforementioned dualism favours the mind over the body and in turn the male over the female, it creates a problematic view of masculinity, one where the more devoid of emotions men are considered better. According to Ruberg, the “Cartesian mind-body dualism, with an outspoken preference for rationality, has included gendered connotations, whereby emotions and the body were associated with femininity and the mind and rationality with masculinity” (2). However, the opposite can be seen in Isidore. Rather than being the ‘rational male’, he is seen to be more in touch with his emotional, empathetic self. As Isidore picks up a cat to bring to the Van Ness Pet Hospital, we see two different manners of engagement which represent this opposition. On the one hand, the man who owns the cat Isidore notes that "the guy simply thrust the cat at me", devoid of any personal bond between the man and his pet. On the other hand, we see that Isidore directly establishes a certain affinity with the animal, despite thinking it is ‘fake’ or electrical. As Isidore and the cat get in the car, he asks the cat “Can you hang on until we reach the shop?” Isidore speaking to the cat already is indicative of a more emotional bond, regardless of the response or status of the cat. The difference in the way the two man handle this cat is reminiscent of the dichotomy seen throughout humanist thought, but the scene also poses a problem to this dichotomy. As I, as well as many scholars like Greenblatt who I quoted above, have previously noted, throughout history Western humanists have portrayed woman, people of colour, and other disenfranchised groups as inferior due to their “non-rational body”, while conversely men were told that being emotional was inherently un-masculine. This, in connection to the mind-body hierarchy and together with the prejudices on disenfranchised groups, created a toxic form of masculinity. This is, however, contradicted by Isidore who, as a key figure in the novel, is portrayed positively rather than being ridiculed like Deckard. 22

Although Isidore's status as ‘chickenhead’ might make him non-human in the eyes of the other people in the novel, his general allowance of being empathetic towards others shows how the binary of rational and emotional is blurred, which in turn creates a posthuman ideal where the focus is on the possibility of humankind rather than maintaining old hierarchical notions. The reason I discuss the meaning of ‘chickenhead’ in connection to the posthuman has to do with the overarching element of identification that is seen throughout the novel and the way Dick plays with traditional roles. The emphasis of Humanism on the intellectual capacity of the individual, is seen in direct opposition of what Dick’s ‘chickenheads’ are. Using the signifiers often associated with stupidity, Dick gives rise to a way of thinking and discussing human nature that goes beyond the expected tropes stemming from humanist thought. Besides the implication of the term ‘chickenhead’, the interactions Isidore has with other characters shine a new light him as posthuman and can be reflective of human nature in a more general sense. As I stated before, the idea of a universal human nature is flawed and rather than claiming Isidore stands for all of humanity, my argument is that he shows the problem with this idea of universality and that through his interactions he shows how the androids are giving humans the possibility for a new way of understanding their nature and the creation of identity. As I will point out, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep shows two different ways of interaction and behaviour towards others. The first, seen with his human colleagues at the Van Ness Pet Hospital, shows the old, humanist ways embedded with hierarchical prejudices. The second is indicative of Isidore as a posthuman and arises with the introduction of the rogue androids into his life. When discussing the androids, it should be understood that I only mean the Nexus-6 androids that can bring forth this change, as other androids are not implemented with the memory buffer. By contrasting the way the humans and androids interact with Isidore, I will show not only that Isidore is the embodiment of posthuman theory but also that the androids are crucial to his development and in turn the development sought by posthumanist. To understand how the android causes the reflection of the human self, we must first look at the way Isidore is treated by humans. Initially, it is seen that despite his status as ‘chickenhead’ Isidore is still a functioning member of society, but also that he is simultaneously seen as an Other. In the second chapter, the reader is told about the “occasional peculiar entities [who] remained in the virtually abandoned suburbs’ and that 23

‘Isidore […] was one of these” (13 Dick). This already is an indicator that Isidore is already a ‘peculiar entity’, which the novel presents even before naming the ‘entity’. Furthermore, the novel portrays Isidore as a ‘one of these’, someone who matters little but happens to exist. Although this has little to do with his relationship to others, it is noteworthy as this description is given before he meets any of the Nexus-6 androids. What this shows is Isidore as a universally insignificant person. His initial lack of distinctive qualities shows him as a blank canvas, where the mirroring view of others create his identity. As I have discussed in depth in the previous chapter, the creation of identity happens through the constant recognition of the self in those around you. Looking at the humans around Isidore we see something rather different than when he is presented with the androids. For example, Isidore’s “gloomy, gothic boss Hannibal Sloat accepted him as human and this he appreciated” (15 Dick, my italics). The idea of acceptance here is crucial to the way Sloat sees Isidore. Rather than profoundly thinking that Isidore actually is human, Sloat accepts that Isidore is, biologically speaking, a human. This notion is strengthened when Isidore brings the non- electrical cat to the repair shop, as this is the moment when Sloat calls Isidore a ‘chickenhead’ for the first time. What this shows is that Sloat, who is fine with Isidore as long as he doesn’t do anything wrong, immediately wants to disassociate with him when he does make a mistake. When Isidore makes the mistake of bringing a living cat to the electrical repair shop, Sloat no longer wants to see Isidore as having a human identity as he does not want to identify with Isidore in an unfavourable manner. Isidore is clearly shocked by this, as “[n]ever before had [Sloat] used that term in front of Isidore” (67Dick), and he starts stumbling and tripping over his words, an indication of his nervosity seen throughout the novel. What this scene shows is not only the significance of the term ‘chickenhead’, but also the usage of it as an insult. While Isidore’s co-workers have always called him a ‘chickenhead’, Sloat does so for the first time. Not only does this enforce the term as derogatory, it furthermore takes away the human qualities of Isidore who is now, according to someone who has always accepted him as human, no longer a human, but a mere animalistic, unintelligent creature. Although it may appear as a step backward, this scene actually shows us the first step in Isidore becoming posthuman. Following Braidotti’s notions as explained previously in this chapter, the posthuman philosophy stems from both humanism as well as anti-humanist thought. The humanist idea of non-rational beings as Other has already been noted, but the change in Sloat's view of Isidore presents a central point in anti-humanist thought. The change from 24 accepted as human and thus a supposed rational subject, to a non-human Other that coincides with the idea of Foucault’s 'Death of Man'. As he notes, in a similar way that “Classical thought did [...] one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (387). Understanding the idea of the Death of Man not as a literal death, but rather as the end of the human as a knowing centralized subject, Isidore embodies this change as Sloat first sees him as a ‘knowing’ person, but denounces this idea by calling him a ‘chickenhead’. The term ‘chickenhead, as aptly discussed above, carries the notion of non-rationality, and thus the act of calling Isidore a ‘chickenhead’ causes the death, so to say, of him as a thinking subject. Furthermore, if we look back at Hayles notions of the posthuman as someone who embraces technological possibilities, we can see that Isidore is changed by Sloat forcing him to make a vidphone call after he had brought a living cat to an electrical repair hospital. Again, the embracing of technology is not something intrinsic to Isidore, but it is inherently posthuman and thus shows the change Isidore goes through. However, it is only when Isidore comes into contact with the android Pris that the embracing of technology manifests. After Sloat degradingly calls him a ‘chickenhead’, Isidore stutters and is incapable of finding the right words, yet when he returns to the apartment he speaks to Pris with “the new authority which he had so recently acquired via Mr Sloat's vidphone” (127 Dick). Not only do we see a significant change in Isidore, but more consequential, we see that this is gained through a technological apparatus. More importantly, it is again the android that is the actual catalyst in this change, as Isidore new authoritative manner only occurs when he speaks to Pris. While he stutters his way through the vidphone call, when he talks to Pris, his technologically enhanced new found self-flourishes. Although the reader can see the change Isidore is going through, Isidore himself does not notice it directly. When he meets the android Pris for the first time, he initially feels he has to defend his ‘humanness’. The first time Isidore notices that another person is in his apartment building, he is careful to ‘not let him know I'm a chickenhead’, his reason being that “if he finds out I'm a chickenhead he won't talk to me; that's always the way it is for some reason” (22 Dick). What we see here is another case of the traditional ‘othering’ stemming from the need of hierarchy in Humanist thought. When Isidore finds the courage to go to his new neighbour, he feels the need to assert his humanness by stating the following;

25

‘My name's J. R. Isidore and I work for the well-known animal vet Mr Hannibal Sloat; you've heard of him. I'm reputable; I have a job. I drive Mr Sloat's truck.’ (54 Dick)

Again, Isidore tries to show himself as a human, rather than a ‘chickenhead’. His emphasis on not being a ‘chickenhead’ is an indication of the above discussed othering, but equally so shows how rationality and intelligence are social constructions. By emphasizing he holds a job with a reputable boss, Isidore presents himself with the notions that society expects from him as human. As will be seen with the manner in which the android engage with him, Isidore’s expectance to be disregarded as someone unworthy of speaking to appears to be unnecessary, as the android “seemed more bewildered than anything else” (54 Dick). In their first conversation, Pris does not question the fact that Isidore lives in this abandoned building, an indicator of him as ‘chickenhead’ as only the “occasional peculiar entities remained in the virtually abandoned suburbs” (13 Dick), nor proclaims herself a ‘chickenhead’ who has come to live there. If the person occupying the building would have been a ‘chickenhead’, there is a significant chance that they would understand Isidore struggle and ease his nervosity. From the start, however, it appears as though the android does not care about Isidore being a ‘chickenhead’. Yet, Pris does call him a ‘chickenhead’ when the other androids have arrived, although she does not make any note on his mental capacity. What Pris calling him a ‘chickenhead’ when there are others around but not when she is alone shows is that the idea of ‘chickenheads’, and thus the emotional or rational limits as indicator of humanity, are fabrications embedded in societal structures. As Pris calls Isidore a ‘chickenhead’, we firstly see Irmgard tell Pris not to call him that. Secondly, none of the androids act on it. Rather, after Isidore finds out that they are androids and refuses to turn them in despite the possibility of receiving a large sum of money, he is praised as a human being. Especially by Pris who says; “‘You're a great man, Isidore […] you’re a credit to your race'” (143 Dick, my italics). Note here the usage of the word ‘race’. With this, Pris describes Isidore as a part of the whole human race, rather than singling him out as a non-human. Pris calling Isidore a ‘chickenhead’ in front of the other androids is clearly something she has picked up as part of human convention rather than it being something she personally feels. Later, she even compliments him by calling him “special”, the official term given to the people who fail the mental faculty test. While this term denotes a quality that is presented as negative, Pris uses it to compliment 26

Isidore, turning it into something positive. When Irmgard says that she thinks they will not “find any other human being who'll take us in and help us” (143 Dick) she wants to say that “Mr Isidore is -” (143) but is unable to find the correct wording. Pris here finishes Irmgard sentences and calls Isidore Special (143). What Pris does here is a complete reversal of the term ‘special’ as it is understood traditionally by humans. Rather than having it mean ‘someone of lesser intelligence’ it has now become ‘someone who I greatly respect’. This change correlates with the change seen in Isidore becoming posthuman. Through the actions of the androids the term special changes meaning, no longer being an insult. As discussed with Rachel, identity is created by the relationships with those around you, which has now fully changed for Isidore indicating identity and social structure are changeable when outdated constructions are no longer adhered. A final mention should be made concerning the way that Isidore sees others around him. For him, the animals, humans included, all possess the same intrinsic properties. As seen above, he initially does not realize that Pris is an android. Rather, he treats her as he would treat anyone. Furthermore, as his colleague Milt notes, “To him they're all alive, false animals included” (67 Dick). While Milt says this seen before Isidore actively undergoes the change to posthuman, it is already an indication of what is to come. In saying this, Milt hints at Isidore not engaging with, or perhaps directly refusing, the binary between ‘fake’ and ‘real’ animals. We see this in a more general sense as well when Milt notes that “the fakes are beginning to be darn near real” (67 Dick). A general change in perspective is happening, started by the inclusion of ‘fake’, electric animals and androids. While the distinction between ‘chickenhead’ and human still stands, the general change in perspective shows not only the rise of the posthuman where biology and technology begin to overlap but also the ending of the previous persistent binaries and in time the dismantling of the ‘chickenhead’/human binary as well as others. To conclude, I argue that, with the change in Isidore a gateway is opened towards a new future for humanity. In a similar way as seen with Rachel Rosen, Isidore’s identity is created through his interactions with those around him. Even before the reader learns his name, he is shown as a subhuman with little significance. Enforced by the terminology of ‘chickenhead’, Dick creates a more palpable version of a long existing division seen in humanist thought. This binary in turn enforces other previously held ideas on masculinity and human nature in general. However, when Isidore is presented with a new way of thinking, as 27 presented through the Nexus-6 androids, which is not based on human preconceptions, he in turn becomes the embodiment of posthuman theory. Near the end, even Isidore himself comments on the change the androids have brought him. As he is getting Pris’ old TV, he notes that “because of Pris and Roy and Irmgard I get to watch what will probably be the most important piece of news to be released in many years” (177). In saying so, he finally feels part of something more than a synthetic religion based on a shared fake experience through the empathy boxes. At the end of the novel, the reader sees Isidore leaving his apartment after the three androids have been killed. Rather than this being the end of the posthuman, this shows how posthuman is not a fixed process but rather a manner of being that is continuously changing and improving. Isidore actively seeks this change, for example when he says that he is “going to l-l-live deeper in town where there's m-m-more people” (197). While his stutter is reminiscent of the old way, his decisiveness in moving and more general active stance show the hybrid, new, posthuman Isidore.

28

Chapter 3 “The Whole Experience of Empathy is a Swindle”

In the Previous chapter I have discussed how rationality is no longer an innate ‘human’ quality but rather that it is influenced by, and works together with, emotions and personal background. However, if we look at androids in science fiction we find that they are portrayed as mechanical humans devoid of emotion or empathy which, when following the Humanist dichotomy, would mean that androids are purely rational. This would also entail that, when following rational thinking, one would come to a logical and universal view of the world. However, due to the influence of non-rational qualities it is impossible to present phenomena as universally true. In this chapter I will discuss two instances which will show that rationality cannot function by itself but rather that it is influenced by non-rational elements like emotion and social expectations. Rather than arguing that we must do away with rationality, I present these two instances to show that what actually differentiates humans is that we can combine the two ends of the spectrum without being blindly led by one or the other. In order to do so, I will first look at the moment Isidore finds a presumably living spider and two androids start performing an experiment on it. Secondly, I will discuss how the Nexus-6 androids argue over the best way to deal with Isidore and Deckard as they try to shelter themselves from the bounty hunter. Besides these two instances, I will discuss Mercerism, a religion that spread on earth after World War Terminus, and its connection to humanist and posthumanist ideals. What I will show with these examples is that rationally is not a clear cut, uninfluenceable, or objective quality but is greatly influenced by multiple factors which show that it is impossible to speak of objective or universal truths. The first scene I will discuss concerns Isidore and the spider. However, before discussing this scene itself, I wish to clarify a crucial difference between human and non- human animals in both the novel as well as the theoretical approaches I am using throughout this thesis. If we look at traditional Humanist thought, we see that humans have distinguished themselves from animals by being capable of rational thought. Rather than adapting to the environment, by which I mean the general surrounding where one lives rather than solely the weather, human beings have started to adapt the environment to them. Clothes are a seemingly mundane, but nonetheless noticeable example of this adaptation. Suiting the type and amount of clothes to the environment, it became possible for humans to live anywhere on the planet, whereas other animals have, through evolution, adapted their body, often furs or 29 shells, to their habitat. To a certain extent, we can understand our clothes as our fur, though the adaptability it brings with it is innately human. Rather than excelling in one climate, like the freezing Arctic or the scorching Sahara, humans can adapt quickly to their surroundings and live throughout global climates. It is occurrences like these that created the dichotomy between humans and other animals. The ability to adapt to the environment became something rational and thus all other animals became non-rational. There is, of course, certain evolutionary adaptation seen in humans as well, for example our opposable thumbs, which enhance our possibilities with technology, but these adaptations are minor in comparison to how technology has been used to alter the environment. Humankind has, through the use of technology, overcome certain disabilities, or made the world more accessible to people with disabilities. For example, Merleau-Ponty's famous example of the cane of a blind person functions as a way of recognizing the world around them. On this, Margrit Shildrick notes that the cane becomes an “extension of [their] self-embodiment [which] shows that the lived body is not identical to with the material entity bounded by the skin” (15). What this shows is how technological objects or beings, as I claim with the android, create and influence that which we understand as the Self. While the cane is not a perfect substitute, it grants the blind person the possibility to perform tasks which they would otherwise not be able to do. As I have discussed previously, it is technology that brings forth the posthuman, yet, the posthuman is more than just a human with technology. As seen with Isidore, as well as Hayles’ notions of her dream and nightmare posthuman, it is not simply having a piece of technology that makes us posthuman, but rather the change in ethics and philosophy that comes with this technology. This change in ethics can be seen strongest in connection to the way we treat others. The Voight-Kampff test in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, for example, utilizes the innate reaction of humans on animal cruelty in order to distinguish them from androids. In the novel, non-human animals are mostly extinct, but have become more important to the identity of humans. As most of the living creatures have died after World War Terminus, owning an actual living animal has become a status symbol which is reinforced by the possibility to buy near exact electronic replicas of any animal. Rather than the need to be dominant over other animals, these animals are now being used to assert ones statues in comparison to other humans. There are, however, difficulties regarding the non-human animal and the relation to the human. Looking at electrical animals, we have already seen the issue of them being indistinguishable from real with the cat Isidore brought to the repair workshop, which in turn 30 is linked to the androids and humans being identical until performing the Voight-Kampff test or a bone-marrow test. What we see here is the first important distinction between human, androids and non-human animals. This contrast occurs with the possibility of expressing emotion and the ability to communicate in a broader sense. When two people talk to each other, we expect that a certain set of words have a certain meaning and that what we try to convey is also understood by the person we talk to. This, however, is not always the case, as is for example explained in Lacan’s The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious where two children arrive at a train station and, dependent on which of the two children one would believe, the station in question is in either called Ladies or Gentleman while neither of the children see the possibility for the two signifiers responding to toilets. While human errors like these are often taken into account with regards to semiotics and the linguistic sign, the deliberate disruption of these signs can cause error. This is seen in the novel, for example, with Phil Resch, who Dick cleverly portrays as possibly being an android, although the reader is never actually told the truth. As he undergoes the Voight-Kampff test, the novel shows that Deckard questions the response Resch gives, but eventually shrugs it off by noting that “there’s nothing unnatural or unhuman about Phil Resch’s reactions; it’s me” (123). Deckard questioning the reactions indicated a fallacy in not only the test, but also show how the signifiers presented by Resch are possibly misinterpreted by Deckard. The misinterpretation of signs is an even greater issue when it comes to other animals, as many of their ways of communication are non-verbal, and even verbal instances like barking or meowing are impossible to fully be comprehended by humans. The problem with understanding non-verbal communication will be further discussed when looking at the scene where Isidore finds the spider. The difficulty of fully grasping animalistic communication is likewise seen throughout the aforementioned The Animal That Therefore I Am. I again would like to point to his quote of De Montaigne, which I quoted in my first chapter. De Montaigne notes that “When I am playing with my cat, who knowes whether she have more sport in dallying with me than I have in gaming with her?” (331 De Montaigne). While I have previously used this quote in connection to the perspective of Rachel Rosen, De Montaigne, as further extrapolated by Derrida, also questions the validity of our perception of ‘the animal’. Going against Humanist tradition, ‘our’ perception of the cat is merely our perception, meaning that it is possibly different for other people, but also that it is based around social constructions and arbitrary signs rather than non-existing universal truths. 31

With this in mind, I want to bring to attention the first scene that will be discussed from Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. In this scene, we are presented with two androids standing around a spider, casually pulling of the spider’s leg as an experiment to see how many it needs to be able to walk. After Isidore shows the spider to the androids, they ask him “why’s it need so many legs?” and “Why couldn’t it get by on four? Cut four off and see” (179). From here, however, perspective comes into play and changes the result of the experiment. In this scene there are two notions connected to perspective that have been previously been discussed but are presented even clearer. Firstly, the scene presents us with a recollection of the binary difference between the android and the human. Secondly, it shows the problem with this binary by showing the fallacy in it. As Josh Toth explains in Do Androids Eat Electric Sheep?, with regards to the novel, “the very worst thing a human can do is harm, or feel nothing at the idea of harming, an animal” (65). As the androids initially are indistinguishable from humans, the way they act around animals is an indicator that they are androids, hence the Voight-Kampff test. Furthermore, to directly contrast this, “caring for an animal is the best and perhaps only sign of one’s Humanity” (Toth 65). This, as already seen with Isidore and the cat, creates a problematic dichotomy as those who qualify as ‘non- human’ can still have this indicator of humanity. During the scene with the spider, we see the androids care more for their ‘experiment’ than for the spider’s wellbeing, while Isidore tries to save this creature independent of whether it is electric or living. While the androids seem to only care for themselves, care for others is eventually seen in multiple characters in the novel. Initially, Roy and Irmgard staying together and returning to Pris, shows that the androids care for each other, as Roy heartily notes that “If [Isidore] was an android […] he’d turn us in about ten tomorrow morning” (143 Dick). We can see here that androids are generally seen as uncaring of others, even of other androids. However, as the group of rogue androids do try and stick together they care for the livelihood of the other Nexus-6 androids. While we cannot be certain of the reason, true compassion or a means of survival, the androids acknowledge themselves that other androids do not care for them while this group does share a special bond. Yet, we see the opposite when it comes to the way the androids act around the spider. While Irmgard is “impulsively opening her purse [and] produced a pair of clean, sharp cuticle scissors, […] a weird terror struck at J. R. Isidore” (179). The uncaring manner the androids act around the spider is directly opposite to Isidore, whose terror not only shows his humanity but also the empathic relation he feels to the living creature. The second aspect seen in this 32 scene is the problem of expecting to know the thing ‘an sich’. I have already noted on the issues of describing abstract objects ‘as they are’ previously, but the same can be said for living creatures. As many deconstructionists have argued, due to the relation between signifier and signified being fully arbitrary, we can never fully grasp what another person precisely means through language. In the case of the spider, this becomes even more problematic as we can neither explain the spider ‘an sich’, nor do we have a comprehendible language to properly describe what is happening to the spider. The androids, however, do come to a certain conclusion which are most aptly describes as that the spider “won’t go. But he can” (183 Dick). What we see in this scene is that, as Derrida describes it, “the animal is deprived of language. Or, more precise, of response” (32 my italics). Derrida explains throughout his work how it is humans that present what the ‘animals’ wish to say and how that is problematic. As seen, he notes that the main issue is that the animal is always represented through the language of humans. This starts with the naming of ‘the animal’ as if they were a singular, common group. This notion restricts the possibility of differences, as well as once again creating a dichotomy between ‘human’ and ‘animal’. What is seen in the novel however is that this dichotomy is destroyed by android as we can understand them as ‘nonhuman living things’, while at the same time being direct duplicates of humans. Although one may argue that androids are little more than an electrical circuit, these “electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are” (211 Dick). A second aspect that is seen in the afore mentioned scene is the idea of religion and its contrast with rational thought. Throughout this scene a television shows a talk show hosted by Buster Friendly on Mercerism, the religion that has ‘granted’ the people who remained on earth the capability to have shared empathetic connections. In Thinking Outside the Empathy Box, Clay Morton aptly explains the situation of “those humans who have not immigrated to Mars, are united in a cult of empathy most clearly represented by the religion Mercerism” (Morton 30). This ‘cult’, Morton continues, is in direct opposition to the androids who, “no matter how gifted as to intellectual capacity, could make no sense out of the fusion which took place routinely among the followers of Mercerism” (26 Dick). From this quote, as well as the notion of ‘empathy boxes’ throughout the novel, we can see a contradiction with regards to empathy, the one thing that should distinguish humans from androids. Rather than empathy being innately human, it is gained through technological and religious features. Using psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim’s writing on infantile autism, Morton notes that the 33 androids in the novel are “tragic shells of human life who must suffer the torment of being alive without ever actually living a meaningfully human life” (32). What can be understood from this is two notions on what it means to be human. Firstly, as Morton notes, sympathy for androids is similarly “sympathy for those who are damaged in ways that do indeed disqualify them from humanity” (32). This would concern both Isidore, as well as the androids, as they are both seen as inhuman despite having certain distinctive human qualities. Secondly, it shows the importance of empathy as a human characteristic. As it appears, a meaningful life can only be lived by those who do not suffer this lack of empathy, which seems to indicate that only empathy should be considered as beneficial for all creatures. However, as I have noted throughout this thesis, it is not the idea that we replace the humanist hierarchy by creating a new and equally problematic one, but rather that the android shows how identity is fluid rather than linear. By exaggerating the inhumanity of the androids as well as showing them as more human by lacking empathy and being purely ration respectively, the novel questions what it means to be human. As Morton later in his essay notes, “the clear divide that Bettelheim saw between the autistic other and the normal, fully-human person began to be erased, as human behaviour came to be seen as existing on a continuum rather than falling into neat dichotomies” (34). The change seen in the attitude Morton describes, however, focussed specifically on cases of Asperger’s and other forms of autism. Yet, understanding that “in this “new” form of autism, deficiencies are often seen to coincide with remarkable abilities” (33 Morton), we can extrapolate and incorporate what that would mean for other human beings. Instead of portraying people without empathy as androids, or those without rationality as subhuman, we can in turn understand and celebrate the posthuman with all their differences but without hierarchical implications. Looking at Mercerism more closely, it becomes clear that the main aspects of the religion are the empathy boxes and the idea of a shared emotion. These boxes can be dialled to a certain frequency which in turn ‘delivers’ a certain emotion or feeling to the person dialling. These ‘moods’, as they are referred to, presents someone with an emotion they otherwise would not experience. In the same way the blind persons cane ‘becomes’ their sight, so does the empathy box ‘become’ their feeling. The boxes are, so to say, prosthetics for the mind. This may seem striking, as our notions of prosthetics often go no further than the body, due to the Cartesian dualism of mind and body where the prosthetic ‘replaces’ a part of the body. However, recent technologies have changed these notions showing that the 34 prosthetic is more than covering a lack. In Modernism, Technology, and the Body, Tim Armstrong notes two different types of prosthetics, namely the positive and negative. “A ‘negative’ prosthesis”, he notes, “involves the replacing of a bodily part, covering a lack. […] A ‘positive’ prosthesis involves a more utopian version of technology, in which human capacities are extrapolated” (78). If we look at the empathy boxes in the novel, we see that they actually embody both the positive and negative prosthesis. We should be, however, weary of using the term prosthetic lightly, as these empathy boxes are not constantly implemented on the human body, or in their mind for that matter. Yet, many of our technologies fall into the categories that Armstrong presents, whether placed upon the body or not. As Haraway says in A Manifest for Cyborgs, we are “theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs” (150). Throughout Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep technology, machine, and organism are intertwined, often utilized without a sense of wonder as these “modern machine are quintessentially microelectronic devices; they are everywhere and they are invisible” (153 Haraway). While the empathy boxes are not literally invisible, they do not call attention to themselves but rather sit still in a corner waiting to be used by humans. Yet, these boxes have become intrinsically connected to humans, to such an extent that a life without them becomes unimaginable. In the first chapter of the novel the reader is already shown this. As Deckard and Iran argue over the setting of the Penfield Mood Organ, Deckard tries to resolve this by proposing to “dial by schedule” (2 Dick). Iran later notes how she “was in a 382 mood” because she “had just dialled it” (3 Dick). Having a schedule for your emotions as well as only feeling the emotion you have just dialled and referring to it by number rather than name creates these mood organs as both a negative and positive prosthetic. It functions as covering a lack, as seen with Iran who needs to dial in order to feel an emotion, as well as becoming an extrapolation of human emotions as it grants access to feelings otherwise not felt. However, these fabricated emotions present us with a larger analogy of empathy and its authenticity. In the previously mentioned scene, we see Deckard questioning if he should dial “for a thalamic suppressant […] or a thalamic stimulant” (2 Dick). Rather than actually having these emotions, he needs to think about which would suit him before dialling it. While the androids in the novel are presented to have no empathy but perhaps for themselves, here we actually see that it is the humans who can only feel emotion through the technological supplement of the empathy box. We have already seen that Nexus-6 androids like Rachel Rosen have been implemented with false memories 35 which act as a buffer for possible emotions, but here we also get the notion that humans are implemented with false emotions, questioning the validity of empathy and in turn showing how rationality is influenced by it. Furthermore, as argued by Jill Galvan, “what passes for "empathy" among humans derives far more from a cultural construction than from any categorical essence” (415). For example, the Voight-Kampff test, as well as the above explained empathy boxes, represent the accepted versions of empathy, the socially constructed norm. As Galvan continues, “Dick's human characters naively pride themselves on their empathic unity and derogate technological constructs as inherently secondary to biological one” (418). Yet, the empathy felt by humans is constructed and moulded into something palpable and easily attainable rather than the exceptional feat the humans propose it is. If we look back at the scene with the spider, we see that Irmgard mentions something intriguing on this specific sort of empathy. She says that Mercerism is “a way of proving that humans can do something we can’t do” (183 Dick), namely feeling empathy. Without this cultish religion, the androids “just have your word that you feel this empathy business” (183 Dick). As the empathy boxes provide a quick fix for human empathy, amplified as a group feeling by Mercerism, the empathy humans feel is no longer an innate human experience, but has become something palpable through technology and in turn rational thought. Galvan furthermore points out the usage of different technologies, like the TV set and Buster Friendly, which both function to keep humanity together as a group. For Isidore, the television acts “as a surrogate for human interaction”, while Iran is “Hooked up to her empathy box” (417/8). Finally, Galvan note that “the human has already, in fact, become the posthuman” (418). While using the notion of posthuman as a technological embedded biological human rather than a philosophical one, the statement still holds. Through the inclusion of technology in everyday life, a transformation is made in ways of thinking and cultural expectations. The implication of everyday technology stands in direct contrast with the androids, as the former is widely accepted in the novel while the latter is to be ‘retired’ by the bounty hunters. It is therefore that we can see how it is actually the android that is needed to accomplish this final push towards the posthuman. As the technological devices we currently utilize are far from human, these become enfolded within humanity, making us posthumans without posthuman theory. However, when we are presented with the android, we will start to realize that there is more than these binaries that are so rigidly adhered to in Western civilization. 36

As much of Western civilization's emphasis has been on intelligence and, with the empirical turn, on rationality, singling out this one attribute as flawed seems a contradiction to my claims. However, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep does present us with a moment where the reliance on intellect alone is questioned. This in turn shows that the posthuman should utilize a multitude of the aforementioned attributes. Interestingly, the mistake of relying solely on their intelligence is made by the group of rogue androids whom, up until now, have always seemed to be superior to humans. As the group is taking a vote on what to do with Isidore and their plan in general, an argument breaks out as Irmgard say “I’ll tell you what we trust that fouls us up, Roy; it’s our goddamned superior intellect” (144). As the androids constantly distinguish themselves from humans by their intellect, it is the fact that they rely solely on their intellect which they presume will cause their downfall. Again, we see that singling out one specific quality, and creating a hierarchy based on that, inevitably leads to the demise of those adhering to it. Moreover, Pris notes that pretending to be human is “what killed all of [the other androids]” (144), insinuating that they should use their superior android intellect to survive. What Pris says here implies that in order to survive as androids, they should return to what they do best, which is utilizing their intelligence in order to survive. When we compare this idea to posthuman theory and to humanity, we can understand that we are in similar crisis. On the one hand, we have praised our rational thinking capacity and how that makes us human, on the other hand maintaining a rigid ideal what the perfect rational human entails created many of the institutionalized discrimination seen throughout western society. By looking at the way both androids and humans act around animals, including the indirect confrontation through technology, we see that the distinction between rationality and empathy is slowly fading as one becomes entwined with the other. The false sense of empathy, created by the mood organs, blurs what we can understand as human, while the rationality and intelligence of the androids is eventually what causes their destruction. 37

Conclusion

Looking at the history of science fiction, it has a rich background in questioning human interconnection with technology. From the first publishing of Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein to contemporary Afro-Futurist novels like Nnedi Okorafor’s Binti, science fiction searches for what is beyond our current possibilities. Looking at the historical time in which Philip K. Dick wrote Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, we see similar dystopian versions of the future on earth. Other writers, like Ira Levin, Ursula Le Guinn and Anthony Burgess likewise wrote dystopian fiction which caused the genre to become a trend. Often embedded with current issues on gender, race, or even mundane aspects of life, these novels showed a ‘what if’ followed by the many devastating possibilities of nuclear war, global warming, and imperial capitalism. Following the tradition set out by classics like Orwell’s 1948 and Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep features a strong critique on the way human society is maintained. Dick’s future society, while embedded with technology and futuristic equipment remained one of binary notions and typical Western tropes. However, these are shown in a rather devastating manner. World War Terminus, for example, a reflection of the atomic arms race during the Cold War, shows how the binary opposition between Capitalism and Communism led to the eventual destruction of most of the Earth. Yet the question remains, especially when looking at the political aspect of binaries, how this could be changed. For Deckard, and the other inhabitant of a destroyed earth the might be little hope, but perhaps Dick’s novel can lead us to the ‘gestalt switch’ we need. Despite the novel being published in 1968, the issues remain ever present, but the answer is slowly becoming reality. With a substantial increase in technology throughout the world, “[t]hose subjects who were historically considered aberrant and our future lives becoming increasingly hybrid show we have always been and are continuously transforming into posthumans” (MacCormack 1, my italics). As MacCormack notes here, the posthuman, both technological and ethical, has always been emerging and a posthuman future is inevitable. Before we come to this future beyond binaries, however, a final step has to happen. When we look at Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, it becomes apparent that it is the Other that will eventually make us posthuman. As Western scholars and politicians have constantly (mis)used their rationality as a means of suppressing minorities, the realization that humans 38 are neither the most rational creatures nor that it should function as a way to claim superiority, will bring humanity closer to nature and in turn to itself. What is mostly seen throughout the novel is that there is no such thing as a universal human, or android for that matter. Based on their surrounding and accidental circumstances, humans and androids alike continuously fluctuate between two ends of a dichotomy, as well as completely outside of it. Rather than reading this as an inevitable dystopia for humankind, technological advancements present us with the possibility to grow and change the course of our nature. It was humans who caused World War Terminus, but it was the androids that gave life to Isidore, and brought back humanity to Deckard. However, we can see that the notions we previously used on what it means to be human have been shattered in order to make way for the next step. As Zupançiç notes, “(emancipatory) politics begins with ‘loss of identity,’ and there is nothing deplorable in this loss” (36). Without the dominant identity understanding the problems that the hierarchy causes, it becomes challenging to change the hierarchy without assimilating into the manners of the dominant identity. However, posthumanism seeks not the de destruction of the dominant, nor the assimilation of the subordinate. Rather, it seeks to destroy the boundaries that exist between in. These boundaries, created by and held in place through the constant reaffirmation of the binaries, are not only seen between two binary oppositions, but have crafted a sphere around humanity, stopping its progress and strengthening its divide. Yet, as we have seen in the novel, the android comes from outside this sphere but with a connection to what is inside, and functions as a catalyst which in turn will cause a change in general thought, resulting in the death of the humanist man and opens the way for the posthuman. While deliberately using a novel from the 1960’s to take a philosophical turn on the human condition in literature, I want to make a note on contemporary instances of fiction which incorporate these non-western and non-binary notions. The first is Afro-Futurism, which, here specifically concerning Nnedi Okorafor, possess the question “what if a Nigerian- American wrote science fiction?” (Okorafor). As science fiction is full of ‘what if’ questions, and “is one of the most effective forms of political writing” (Okorafor), creating new and inclusive narratives is crucial. Yet, the novels that are considered as ‘classic’ and influence young writers come from “Western-rooted science fiction, which is mostly white and male” (Okorafor). For Okorafor, and other Afro-Futurist artist, the lack of representation and the continuous repetition of the ‘alien invader’ trope failed to reflected them in writing. Although 39 science fiction posed as a genre that speaks of the future, this future was always a very Western one. However, Afro-Futurism presents us with a future imagined from a new perspective, one that science fiction greatly needs. Secondly, a new form of speculative storytelling under the something-punk umbrella has come to existence. This relatively new coined term, Solarpunk, presents a far less dystopian version of the future, but neither does it give us a false sense of utopia. As the Andrew Dincher note in the foreword to the Solarpunk anthology Sunvault, the genre “examines the possibility of a future in which currently emerging movements in society and culture [...] coalesce to create a more optimistic future in a more just world” (7) without creating a Waldenesque version of the world. The combination of acknowledging the issues that exist in science fiction as well as presenting an optimistic, though not unproblematic, version of the world is precisely the type of fiction that utilizes the loss of the boundaries as explained by Zupançiç. Much like the technology of the vid-screen that helped Isidore towards his posthuman self, Afro-Futurist and Solarpunk present us possibilities of what lies beyond the coming ‘gestalt switch’. Both these genre show something often forgotten in contemporary science fiction but what is seen in posthuman philosophy. The constant bombardment of dystopian and generally discouraging stories we get that concern technology create an inevitable view of technology as something inherently negative. This can be seen in for example Black Mirror, a show which presents itself as offering a reflection upon human nature, but does little more than terrorize its viewers. Rather, we should look for the possibilities represented through for example Black Panther’s Wakanda nation, where nature, humans, and technology live in harmony with each other. It should be clearly understood that this thesis is not a plea against any form of rational thinking and that every decision we make should be founded only in emotions. Rather, what I have shown is that there is no such thing as a purely rational creature, and that thus the dichotomy that persist in Western Humanist thought should be revisited and opened up to a broader discourse. Throughout Dick’s novel we see this constant questioning of empathy and rationality, often to a point that the character’s status as android or human is blurred, as for example seen with Phil Resch. Furthermore, as it is clear that identity is fluid and constantly and unconsciously changes, we should not search to become the perfect version of a human being. I have already referred to Hayles nightmare version of the posthuman multiple times, as well as noting on Haraway’s Cyborg Feminist which refuses the idea of wholeness but rather searches for a continues matrix of identity. As Haraway says, “we require regeneration, 40 not rebirth” (181), indicating that the human species should not completely start over, but create a new version of humankind with the history known to us. This regeneration, I propose, is unable without new technologies like the android, both fictional and physical. While technology can bring us both closer as a species, it also presents us with unlimited possibilities as an individual. However, we are quick to fall back into our binary notions, as for example seen with the Turing Test, which creates a setting that explicitly denotes the binary between human and machine. As Lyotard notes, “technology wasn’t invented by us humans. Rather the other way around” (132). With this, we can see that it is not simply the usage of technology, but rather the way we deal with it that is crucial for our identity as 'human'. This goes for both mundane things, like computer games or otters who have pet rocks, as well as prosthetics and tools. Although one can see non-human animals using, for example, rocks to open nuts, the fact that humans shaped these rock to be more beneficial is intrinsically human. Our ever increasing usage of technology shapes the way we are and is crucial to the development of our species. While Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep might not give us a direct solution, it implores us to critically re-establish our previously contrived notion of the Cartesian dualism and, in an age where technological advancements are expanding exponentially, it is up to us ignite the regeneration Haraway speaks of, to go beyond the binary and create the posthuman, one that is on the constant lookout for improvement without grandeurs of immortality. 41

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