B•• KS Scott Kennedy is an assistant professor in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures and an adjunct assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University. He is the author of The Business of Lobbying in China (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

Divining China’s Future Scott Kennedy

Wild Grass: Three Stories of Change in Modern China Ian Johnson New York: Pantheon, 2004

China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead Bruce Gilley New York: Columbia University Press, 2004 Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China Dali L. Yang Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004

After several months of draining fieldwork reading: “We hope the rest of your time in investigating state-society relations in vil- China goes well.” When my friend returned lages and towns across China, a friend of to his research institute in the north some mine headed for the thriving coastal city of weeks later, he found an envelope in his Xiamen for some much-needed rest. He mailbox containing the photograph of him walked down to the beach to feel the sand with the women. After puzzling for a mo- beneath his feet, put his toes in the water, ment over the picture, it dawned on him: and stare out at the horizon. However, his Big Brother has two sisters. They were peace and quiet was soon interrupted. Two watching his every move and wanted him young women, having spotted a conspicuous to keep that in mind as he contemplated the foreigner, came up to him with camera in remainder of his fieldwork on a sensitive hand and asked to have their picture taken political issue. with him. Having been approached with the Later, in recounting his experience to same request countless times before, he rose me, my friend said that he thought he had without uttering a word, smiled, and posed come face to face with the menacing core next to the two women until the shutter of the Chinese Communist regime. My clicked. With a wave, they were off, and he reaction to his story was to note all the com- went back to gazing out to sea. A few hours plexities of modern China: Security agents later, back at his hotel, he received a one- are not always behind the curtains. He line email from the women, the message was not roughed up or kicked out of the

Divining China’s Future 77 country. His research, which paints the state ness than those who employ a wide range of in a negative light, was being published, hues and tints. and he had since gone back to China several times without incident. Therefore, it was a The People’s Champions stretch to say that the activities of China’s Articles published in academic journals are state security apparatus are indicative of the often referred to as “literature.” Anyone who regime as a whole. My friend thought I was has leafed through a political science journal being naive. knows that label is pure conceit. But the Our different readings of this encounter term might justifiably be applied to the capture the essence of a debate among China writing of Ian Johnson, former Beijing cor- specialists about the “big story” coming out respondent for the Wall Street Journal. In be- of that country of 1.3 billion people. Every- tween reporting on multinational corporate one recognizes that the People’s Republic executives jetting to invest in the Magic of today differs dramatically from the China Middle Kingdom and the high summitry of of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), and Presidents Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin, even to an important extent, from the China Johnson found his true calling: investigat- of the Tiananmen spring of 1989. And ing the underbelly of China’s Reform era. China watchers of all stripes agree that the His book, Wild Grass: Three Stories of economic reforms initiated 25 years ago are Change in Modern China, is a sorrow-filled remaking society. Beyond this point, how- ethnography of Chinese politics viewed from ever, specialists differ. Some focus on conti- the perspective of ordinary people who, in nuity and point out that although China is their struggles to find justice, unwittingly changing, the country is still a dictatorship. crash into a system rigged against them. In Believing that market reforms and political a manner reminiscent of Franz Kafka, John- rigidity are incompatible, they discern a son’s interweaving of the personal stories political trajectory in which the regime is of China’s Mr. and Ms. K’s into the wider losing legitimacy and will either hang on social and political context gives their ac- through brute force and intimidation or per- counts broader meaning. ish under pressure from the economically In the first story, an amateur lawyer dispossessed or the newly economically em- organizes a class-action lawsuit and pro- powered. Other China specialists, reversing tests on behalf of several thousand over- the stress, contend that although China is taxed peasants who live near the western still formally authoritarian, the political sys- town of Yan’an, which, ironically, was the tem has evolved in complex ways that es- Communist Party’s base during the civil cape simple characterization. Observers of war. Getting nowhere locally, the lawyer the latter persuasion have no simple story appeals to the central government, only to tell, however, and believe it is too soon to be beaten senseless by public security to write the Chinese Communist Party’s goons; after a rump trial back in his home obituary. province he is sentenced to five years in a While summing up China’s present and labor camp. future as a simple moral tale—with all the The second case recounts the bitter ex- complexities counted as part of a “transi- periences of Beijing residents who have filed tion” from evil to good—has a certain ap- individual and joint suits against the mu- peal, the China story is more fittingly told nicipal authorities for expropriating their as a complex drama. To put this observation homes in traditional neighborhoods to make in other terms, observers who paint the way for modern office and apartment build- China of today with a palette of white and ings without due process or adequate com- black are less likely to capture a true like- pensation. Their pleas are simply turned

78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2004/05 aside by the courts and their homes doomed Beijing. Another problem with the book is to be obliterated by the wrecking ball. that one gets the impression that protests The third story is of a middle-aged fe- almost always fail. Yet, as Dali Yang notes male practitioner of the spiritual exercise in Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, over 30 Falun Gong. Rejuvenated by Falun Gong’s percent of suits brought by citizens against daily rituals and syncretic belief system, the the Chinese state are successful. woman travels repeatedly to Beijing to The other puzzle is presented by the protest the regime’s crackdown on its adher- ambiguous meaning of the book’s subtitle: ents. She is arrested, returned to her coastal “Three Stories of Change in Modern China.” hometown, and ends up beaten to death. The ambiguity arises because the author re- Johnson, who won a Pulitzer Prize in 2001 peatedly highlights important elements of for his reporting on Falun Gong, recounts continuity with the past. The Chinese Com- her daughter’s frustrating attempts to find munist Party (CCP), he points out, still relies out from the authorities what happened to on old governance practices, such as having her mother. Her repeated requests for an individuals keep tabs on one another and us- honest death certificate and an official inves- ing the petition and appeals process as a way tigation are met with arrogance and deri- to release the buildup of popular pressure. sion: “Her efforts had been aimed at figur- As others have shown, despite the reputa- ing out the law and getting it to work for tion of the Chinese as compliant, they have her. Now she was being told that this was been protesting against injustice and re- illegal.” belling against authoritarian rulers for hun- These stories could be read as individual dreds of years.1 Moreover, in Johnson’s sto- tales of woe of ordinary citizens who are ries the protesters rarely win; as their de- faced with corrupt or inept local officials. mands grow, the state’s response hardens. But Johnson wants the reader to see how Hence, in the book’s most disheartening they are part of a wider pattern, the in- vignette, Johnson writes that the daughter evitable result of China’s political system. of the slain Falun Gong practitioner “has With local governments hurting for cash, come to realize what all people who want to Beijing has condoned the imposition of change China eventually learn: the current myriad taxes and levies on farmers. Mu- system is at a dead end, but its death is not nicipal officials in Beijing and elsewhere in sight.” have cozy relationships with developers and And yet the message of Wild Grass is profit handsomely when one-story Ming that China is changing in significant ways. dynasty homes are torn down to make way What Johnson’s stories reveal—although he for flashy office buildings and shopping does not spell this out—is that Chinese citi- malls. And it is the authorities in Beijing zens are making great strides in developing who have put the heat on local authorities the resources necessary to defend themselves to keep Falun Gong protesters out of the against the state: knowledge of substantive capital. issues and the law, a legal system that pro- The reader comes away from Wild Grass vides a path (however flawed) to challenge wondering just how representative these sto- authority, more independent and durable ries are. The officials one encounters in the social networks (such as those that bind to- book are almost without exception one-di- gether Falun Gong adherents or homeown- mensional, unsympathetic, and condescend- ers), and access to technology that facilitates ing bureaucrats and goons. In the Falun communication of people within China and Gong story, some local party cadres admit to with the outside world. These resources the idiocy of the crackdown, but these offi- have left many Chinese undeterred and more cials appear to be caught in a web woven by willing than ever to challenge authority, and

Divining China’s Future 79 this is likely what gives Johnson hope that a the factors that supposedly spurred democ- new day is on the horizon. ratization elsewhere, such as economic de- velopment, will have the same effect in The Present as Prologue China. Hence, his claim that “the laws of Johnson’s travels left him sensing that the social science grind away in China as they rumblings of a “slow-motion revolution” do elsewhere, whether people like it or not.” would eventually shake the CCP from power, This suggests a level of consensus among but he humbly acknowledges the impossi- scholars about the sources of democratiza- bility of divining China’s political future tion that does not exist.3 with any certainty. China-correspondent- Gilley’s fervently displayed faith in the turned-Princeton-graduate-student Bruce benefits of democracy also will strike many Gilley, on the other hand, has no qualms as an inappropriate insertion of his personal about doing so. In China’s Democratic Future, values into the analysis. But a deeper prob- he boldly predicts that within the next ten lem with this book is that the author allows to fifteen years, there will be some sort of his preferences to cloud his political analy- crisis that will allow farsighted liberal lead- sis and judgment. He claims that China ers in the CCP to outmaneuver conservatives will democratize because it faces growing within the party, forcing it to give up its crises that the current ossified and corrupt monopoly on power and leaving a liberal regime is incapable of managing. In his democracy in its wake. To Gilley, all sig- teleological exercise to mine the present for nals—Chinese culture’s emphasis on ruler the future, he interprets the data in a light accountability, the country’s ongoing eco- that is most likely to yield a smooth transi- nomic development that is generating pro- tion to democracy. He bolsters his argument fessionals and entrepreneurs, international by citing developments—emerging inde- pressure, and the growing recognition by pendent media outlets that increase trans- mid-level cadres that democracy is China’s parency and civil society groups that partly only way to avoid a revolutionary political bear the burdens of managing social change, crisis—point in the direction of a demo- a growing coterie of lawyers and an evolving cratic future. legal system that help channel protest away Gilley walks the reader through the var- from the streets, the removal of corrupt offi- ious obstacles that may impede the transi- cials by energized local electorates, and ac- tion from authoritarianism and the steps tive local legislatures that check executive needed to ensure that China consolidates its authority—that could just as easily be seen new democracy.2 He points out the land as helping the CCP maintain control.4 The mines—mass violence, a conflict with Tai- Communist Party has condoned these devel- wan or some other nationalistic distraction, opments precisely because it hopes they will an economic downturn, military interven- lead to greater stability. And while Gilley tion into politics, and inappropriate consti- details Chinese intellectuals’ yearning for tutional design—and shows how they are democracy, he leaves unanswered the ques- likely to be defused. There are many people tion of whether ordinary Chinese citizens within China who are thinking about these share their (and his) hopes. The polling data potential crises, Gilley argues, as evidenced he cites indicate that popular support for by the debate among Chinese intellectuals the CCP rose from the 1980s to the 1990s, about democratization, and they will be but he dismisses these surveys as flawed. ready to act if the opportunity arises. Even assuming that Gilley is right and As provocative as China’s Democratic Fu- the CCP gives up its monopoly on power ture is, it is also highly problematic. Gilley’s within the next decade or so, his picture of confidence is partly rooted in the belief that the transition to democracy looks more like

80 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2004/05 wishful thinking than hard-headed analysis. Why did the leadership get religion and The political logic that would most likely put China squarely on the path toward be- guide various political factions is nowhere to coming a regulatory state? Yang’s answer: be seen. For example, Gilley expects that failure, weakness, and fear. The political during the transition period China’s parlia- logic of reform in the 1980s was to create as ment will reapportion seats to better reflect many winners as possible by widely distrib- the interests of populous inland provinces uting economic benefits, including to offi- and that a federal, as opposed to unitary, cials. While this strategy largely worked for system will be instituted. But if the Com- over a decade, by the 1990s declining state- munists voluntarily cede power, it is far owned enterprises were dragging the regime more likely that, taking a cue from Singa- down with them, and decentralization had pore and Japan, they will push through a inhibited Beijing’s ability to rein in maver- constitutional structure and election rules ick and corrupt officials. The Asian financial that will give them an advantage over other crisis of 1997–98 set off alarm bells at political parties. Since they will not want to Zhongnanhai, where the Communist Party yield authority to localities and since most has its headquarters, as economic meltdowns of the party’s current elite have strong ties toppled leaders across the region. to the coast, the chances of federalism and Thus motivated, the Chinese leadership reapportionment are slim. In short, China’s performed radical surgery. Thousands of of- Democratic Future presents an unlikely sce- ficials have been fired, most industrial min- nario, not an inevitable future.5 istries have been shuttered, and the military and government agencies have been forced Limited Government with Chinese Characteristics to give up their sideline businesses (the mil- One reason to be cautious in predicting an itary was compensated with higher bud- early demise for the CCP is that its leaders gets). The decentralization of the 1980s has are not a bunch of aging Brezhnevs sitting been reversed, and Beijing now has much around while the state atrophies. In his greater authority over tax collection, bank heavily documented study, Remaking the Chi- lending, investments, stock exchange list- nese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Poli- ings, safety and environmental standards, tics of Governance in China, University of drug certification, maritime safety, and cus- Chicago political scientist Dali Yang shows toms. National and local agencies have set China’s ruling elites to be smart and prag- up websites with detailed, real-time infor- matic rulers who will try just about any re- mation about their policies and regulations.6 form that might improve governance while There are sometimes response periods for buttressing their authority. In what is the draft rules and public hearings on national most comprehensive review of Chinese bu- and local regulations. Bidding on state con- reaucratic reform in any language to date, struction projects and the broader govern- Yang details a blizzard of laws and regula- ment procurement process has been made tions that have been adopted since the mid- more transparent and fair, in part through 1990s to achieve three goals: 1) shrink gov- the use of online auctions. Auditing and ernment and sell off its sideline businesses; anti-corruption offices have greater author- 2) improve economic regulation and make ity to root out malfeasance. And legisla- government more responsive to the needs of tures, especially local ones, now provide business; and 3) create a disciplined bureau- genuine oversight over executive agencies. cracy by expanding transparency and soci- Yang’s cataloging of these initiatives is ety’s access to the policymaking process, and invaluable, but just as Johnson and Gilley by holding bureaucrats accountable for their overstate the regime’s failings, Yang goes actions. too far in the other direction—seeing the

Divining China’s Future 81 glass as two-thirds full, with the water level from the till or taking bribes, even millions, rising. Surely the central leadership is not justify a bullet to the back of the head? as corrupt or insensitive as presumed by Finally, the most important question to Johnson and Gilley, but in Yang’s telling, be asked is whether these reforms are work- they are all well-intentioned, rational, and ing. Yang makes a noble effort to search for committed to making the country a better clues, but the evidence is still too meager to place in which to live. Former president allow him to say anything definitive. Tax re- Jiang Zemin is portrayed as being aghast ceipts are up, but so are budget deficits. The at the extent of corruption, as is former official rate of nonperforming bank loans is premier Zhu Rongji. Even Li Peng, one of down, but this is partly due to accounting the real black hands following the country- gimmicks, not wiser lending. Yang points wide unrest that culminated in the events to signs of improvement on the corruption in Tiananmen Square, is recast as a reformer front, but other China specialists have found because of his stewardship of the National that corruption is on the rise.8 Yang repeat- People’s Congress. (In interviews I have edly admits that there is variation in the conducted, liberal insiders were critical of adoption and implementation of regulatory Li Peng.) So some skepticism seems to be reforms, yet he stresses that the general tra- in order, not least—as Johnson notes—be- jectory is more significant. But, to borrow cause of the many business and political an insight from statisticians, if there is wide perks enjoyed by the families of the top deviation from the mean, the variation de- leadership, who collectively constitute the serves attention. Since the regime is likely “princeling party.” Similarly, the leadership to be most endangered when governance is portrayed as fully unified and in posses- is ineffective and oppressive, we need the sion of significant resources for implement- clearest possible picture of just how deep ing its plans. That picture conflicts with and wide the reform measures actually are. the predominant view of independent ana- lysts that there are disagreements within Beyond the “Mandate of Mammon” the leadership and that bureaucratic con- At any given time, hundreds of protests flicts in Beijing, and between the center and wildcat strikes are taking place in Chi- and the localities, critically shape policy.7 na. In 2003, the country’s courts received al- If Yang is not persuasive on this point, it most 4 million petitions from ordinary citi- is because he pays inadequate attention to zens seeking redress of grievances.9 Protest the gap between elite preferences and policy is so common that the phrase “maintaining outcomes. stability” can only be a codeword for contin- In addition, while standards, authority, ued CCP rule. By any other measure, China and procedures are being clarified and rou- is obviously unstable.10 However, as the con- tinized to an extent, one can still see some tributors to the evenhanded State and Society of the old style of governance at work. in 21st Century China show, Beijing has a There is a campaign-like feel to these initia- variety of tools with which to weather the tives which suggests that once leaders’ at- storm. tention shifts, enforcement will wane. Bu- The central theme of this collection of reaucrats will not be service-oriented, and essays is the issue of legitimacy.11 And as auditors will be less diligent. On the other Oxford University’s Vivienne Shue explains, side of the coin, wherever Beijing focuses its the CCP’s legitimacy is not staked on simple spotlight, government officials tend to get economic performance (what contributor carried away. If Ian Johnson’s peasants are Harley Balzer of Georgetown University any indication, tax collectors are too aggres- calls the “Mandate of Mammon”). Societal sive. And squeamishness aside, does stealing confirmation of a regime’s right to rule can

82 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2004/05 be derived from multiple sources. The three Kevin O’Brien reports that when a central most important sources in China, Shue ex- ministry leader with whom he was traveling plains, have been the right to determine the ordered a village cadre to release the latest validity of knowledge and the parameters election results, he said, “I’m your bosses’ of morality (Truth), a commitment to the bosses’ bosses’ boss, so turn over the re- betterment of society (Benevolence), and sults.” To which the village head replied, defense of the country’s international honor “Because you’re my bosses’ bosses’ bosses’ and security (Glory). A fourth source of boss, go to hell!” And protesters sometimes support—legal-electoral legitimacy—is, of find local allies, as when village chiefs or- course, increasingly relevant, though not ganize villagers to protest against taxes of the CCP’s choosing. levied by higher levels of government. Since different types of protests chal- Besides having varied tactics for playing lenge different sources of legitimacy, Beijing defense against the dissatisfied, the CCP has responded to resistance in a variety leadership is also playing offense. In addi- of ways. The Communist leadership felt tion to the bureaucratic reforms described threatened by Falun Gong because of the by Yang, the most important may be its ef- latter’s counterclaims to Beijing’s definition forts to co-opt the new business elite. As of Truth and its massive 1999 demonstra- George Washington University’s Bruce tion in Beijing, and, as a result, the leader- Dickson shows, the party has remade itself ship ordered a drastic crackdown. The same ideologically into an ally of business and is outcome has befallen the China Democratic recruiting entrepreneurs as members at such Party and others that have organized to a fast rate that peasants and workers are no challenge the CCP’s monopoly rule. By con- longer in the majority. Thirty percent of en- trast, workers and peasants protesting lost trepreneurs—meaning several million—are wages, inadequate pensions and social serv- now party members. Chinese Communists ices, unfair taxation, and expropriated land look more like Rockefeller Republicans have been met with a duel strategy: big every day. At the same time, the CCP has sticks against the organizers and some car- kept a lid on most business associations that rots as palliatives for the rest. Beijing has might be able to represent their members’ had to tread gingerly in response to nation- interests. While my own research shows alist critics—mostly university students and that businesspeople have been able to lobby intellectuals who chastise Beijing for being the Chinese government to shape national too soft on the United States, Japan, and economic policies even in industries where Taiwan—since stifling such expression runs associations are dormant, few have demand- the risk of making the government appear ed sweeping change.13 For the most part, to be an inadequate defender of China’s they are pushing for incremental reform to dignity. routinize their access and improve policy- As the contributors to this volume making. Entrepreneurs are not unswervingly demonstrate, it is necessary to see how divi- committed to the party, but neither are they sions within the state affect the nature and likely to lead a charge against it. consequences of political protest. Economic complaints are most often directed at local From One China to Many Chinas businesses and governments, allowing Bei- A colleague once remarked that because jing to avoid blame and play the role of out- China is so large one can safely say that X is side arbiter.12 On the other hand, when Bei- true and the opposite of X is also true. The jing tries to enforce compliance with re- conflicting views of China in the books re- forms, it can run into obstinate local offi- viewed here bring to mind the story of the cials. The University of California scholar blind men and the elephant, in which each

Divining China’s Future 83 man in turn describes the elephant accord- been relatively successful at suppressing ing to whichever part of the beast he is or redirecting potential opponents and at grasping. Some might suggest that a possi- bringing new social forces into its fold. ble explanation for this disagreement is ana- The Communist Party’s legitimacy is not lysts’ contrasting ability to be unbiased and unchallenged, but as Vivienne Shue re- neutral. Hence, some people see one clear minds us, the legitimacy of most states is picture (either the CCP is unreformable and regularly a subject of contention. My sense bound to be replaced, or the CCP is earnestly is that in ten years analysts will still be de- taking every measure possible to reform it- bating how it is that the CCP has defied ex- self), while other observers see a more com- pectations to remain in power. A key source plex scene. Another possibility, raised by of discontent are the three transitions under- those who see a more menacing CCP, is that way: from a planned to a market economy, some of those who paint a more positive or from agriculture to industry and services, nuanced picture do so because they know and from rural to urban. But if wise poli- Big Brother’s little sisters are watching and cies are adopted, the economy has the po- do not want to lose their access to the tential to continue to grow rapidly enough country.14 to provide significant opportunity for a Even if there is some truth to these wide swath of the population and make it claims—and my sense is that there is less through this transitional period.16 The party here than some fear—an essential reason for will also continue to play its other cards, in- disagreements among analysts is the wide cluding trying to persuade the public that variation in economic, social, and political China is on the right track and that the CCP circumstances that exist simultaneously is the best train conductor available. And of across contemporary China. Struggling coal course, there will still be a place for Big miners, exploited peasants, laid-off steel- Brother and his sisters to keep resentment workers, latch-key kids, Muslim Uighurs, from boiling over into revolution. Falun Gong adherents, and Marxist stal- But an equally important lesson that warts share the same land as venture capital- emerges from recent research is that the sta- ists, Netizens, software programmers, home- tus quo is not static. Even if the Commu- owners, ambulance-chasing lawyers, punk nists are still in power in a decade, they rockers, spoiled brats, and avant-garde will not be the same Communists of Mao’s artists. Stand on any street corner in Bei- day or even the present day. The face of jing, and within minutes watch all of these society will undergo a transformation as a people pass by. Some regions and industries more independent and educated generation are blossoming, while others are suffering emerges. As a consequence, the nature of under the double whammy of a postcommu- state-society relations will also likely evolve. nist hangover and the invading forces of If you find continuity in one place, then just globalization. Traveling from coastal Shang- look in another place to see change percolat- hai to inland Guizhou feels literally like a ing up. In short, we will continue to go to trip back in time.15 Some elements of the China and find stories to tell, some we can- Chinese state, as Dali Yang tells us, have not yet imagine.• adopted sophisticated and transparent meth- ods of regulation, while others adhere to Notes draconian tactics. Variation is not a subplot 1. See Elizabeth J. Perry, Challenging the Man- in China; it is the main story. date of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China Looking ahead, we have to admit that (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). despite the daily headlines of protests and 2. Others have made a similar prediction, but perhaps one’s own desires, the CCP has so far they have not carried the discussion much beyond

84 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2004/05 outlining the transition. See, for example, Arthur 10. To the extent instability involves positive Waldron, “China’s Coming Constitutional Chal- change, it is not necessarily bad. See H. Lyman lenges,” Orbis, vol. 39 (winter 1995), pp. 19–35; and Miller, “How Do We Know If China Is Unstable?” in “The Chinese Sickness,” Commentary (July/August Is China Unstable? ed. David Shambaugh (Armonk, 2003), pp. 36–43. NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 18–25. 3. For an excellent critique of the democrati- 11. For an excellent work that examines protest zation scholarship, see Gerardo L. Munck, “The in China but gives less attention to legitimacy, see Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, eds., Chinese Soci- Studies,” World Politics, vol. 54 (October 2001), ety: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 2nd ed. (New pp. 119–44. York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 4. The lawyer Gordon Chang agrees that the 12. There is, however, wide regional variation in Communist regime cannot endure, but he famously the demands and targets of workers. Along the well- predicted that chaos and violence are much more developed coast, workers are primarily upset with likely to follow in the wake of regime change than their companies or local governments. By contrast, in democracy. See Gordon S. Chang, The Coming Collapse northeastern China, where large state-owned enter- of China (New York: Random House, 2001). prises once dominated the economy, protests have 5. For a balanced assessment, see Richard been more intense, with workers’ ire directed ulti- Baum, “China After Deng: Ten Scenarios in Search mately at the national leadership. See William Hurst, of Reality,” China Quarterly, vol. 145 (March 1996), “Understanding Contentious Collective Action by pp. 153–75. Chinese Laid-Off Workers: The Importance of Re- 6. Although the Chinese-language sites are more gional Political Economy,” Studies in Comparative In- complete, the English-language website of the Min- ternational Development, vol. 39 (summer 2004), istry of Commerce (english.mofcom.gov.cn) is a use- pp. 94–120. ful example. 13. See Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying 7. See Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Law- in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, making in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and forthcoming). Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); 14. For a recent version of this charge, see Perry and Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Link, “China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier,” New Politics of Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- York Review of Books, April 11, 2002, pp. 67–70. sity Press, 2001). 15. On how Guizhou is faring with reforms, see 8. Andrew Wedeman, “Anticorruption Cam- Daniel B. Wright, The Promise of the Revolution: Stories paigns and the Intensification of Corruption in Chi- of Fulfillment and Struggle in China’s Hinterland (Lan- na,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 42 ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). (February 2005), pp. 90–113; and Melanie Manion, 16. On China’s growth potential, see Arthur Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Kroeber, “Growth: How Long Can It Last?” China Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Economic Quarterly, vol. 8 (Fourth Quarter, 2004), Harvard University Press, 2004). pp. 35–40. 9. Kathy Chen, “Chinese Protests Grow More Frequent, Violent,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2004.

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