Speaking of Looting: an Analysis of Racial Propaganda in National Television Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

The Howard Journal of Communications, 22:302–318, 2011 Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1064-6175 print=1096-4649 online DOI: 10.1080/10646175.2011.590404

Speaking of Looting: An Analysis of Racial Propaganda in National Television Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

KIRK A. JOHNSON Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, USA MARK K. DOLAN Meek School of Journalism and New Media, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, USA JOHN SONNETT Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, USA

Few analyses offer statistical support for claims that news broadcasts during Hurricane Katrina propagated racist ideologies. The authors conducted a content analysis of the first week of network and cable television broadcasts from New Orleans after the hurricane made landfall. Although many hurricane victims were low-income African Americans, news of looting and other activi- ties featured disproportionate numbers of Whites, particularly in speaking roles. In general, White journalists and sources were sympathetic toward African American victims but critical of their behavior when it did not conform to White middle-class norms. The authors believe such coverage reflects aversive racism, a subtle and conflicted form of contemporary racial animosity. Accordingly, their work revises Herman and Chomsky’s model of

This project was supported by a grant from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation and two fellowships from the University of Mississippi Office of Research and Sponsored Programs. We are grateful to undergraduate student research assistants Carlos Maury, Crystal Parker, and Shannon Shepherd; to graduate assistants Gregory Sims and Veronica Mitchell; and to LBJ Library archivist Allen Fisher. We also thank Kirsten Dellinger, Jeff Jackson, David L. Altheide, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on versions of this article. Address correspondence to Kirk A. Johnson, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Mississippi, P.O. Box 1854, University, MS 38677-1848. E-mail: kirkjohnson55@ gmail.com

302 Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 303

news production by considering the racial dimensions of propaganda.

KEYTERMS African Americans, Hurricane Katrina, Kerner commission, news, propaganda, television

In 1967, unprecedented civil disturbances rocked 23 American cities, causing 83 deaths and over $55 million in property damage (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 6). Thirty-eight years later, the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history decimated the Gulf coast, causing 1,800 deaths and $125 billion in damages (Graumann et al., 2005, p. 1). While com- parisons between the two events are inexact, both crises resulted in protrac- ted news coverage of low-income African Americans in desperate and life-altering circumstances. As analyses of news about Hurricane Katrina (e.g., M. J. Davis & French, 2008; Fry, 2006; Kellner, 2007; Scott, 2007; Shah, 2009; Stock, 2007; Thevenot, 2005–2006; Voorhees, Vick, & Perkins, 2007) began to appear, it became clear that elements of the 1967 coverage had persisted in 2005. To cite but one example, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968, p. 363), popularly known as the Kerner Commission, found that news of the 1967 unrest was racially inflammatory, such that the actual disorders were ‘‘less destructive’’ and ‘‘less widespread’’ than they were reported to be. Similarly, Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski (2006, p. 58) found that the media ‘‘greatly exaggerated’’ the incidence and severity of looting and other lawlessness after Katrina. Such flawed reporting was not supposed to recur. The Kerner Commission surmised that the mainstream (i.e., White-owned) media had done a poor job of reporting on the racial unrest of 1967 because journalists reported from a White middle-class perspective: ‘‘The media report and write from the standpoint of a white man’s world. The ills of the ghetto, the diffi- culties of life there, the Negro’s burning sense of grievance, are seldom con- veyed,’’ the Commission (1968, p. 203) concluded. Because this virtually all-White cohort of reporters and editors had little meaningful contact with urban Blacks, they had little appreciation for African Americans’ perspectives on the causes, consequences, context, and meaning of civil unrest. Today, despite movement toward employment parity, the news industry’s overall progress toward achieving racial and ethnic diversity remains limited. Minorities make up just 21.5% of the television news workforce in a nation where African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans comprise 34.5% of the population (Papper, 2007, p. 20). We reasoned that coverage of a national crisis involving low-income African Americans might reflect any problematic racial and social-class ideologies that persist in mainstream news. Accordingly, we studied the 304 K. A. Johnson et al. content of national television broadcasts of Katrina to identify aversive racism, a subtle form of contemporary racial animosity (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004, 2005). Our inspiration derived from the notion that, to the extent that aversive racism persists in the news, Katrina broadcasts represent what Herman and Chomsky (2001) might have termed racial propaganda.

BACKGROUND

In Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Herman and Chomsky (2001) present a model of news production premised on the idea that power inequities influence story selection and marginalize dissenting voices. This so-called propaganda model contains several inter- locking elements, including journalists’ reliance on prominent sources and the shared ideology of anticommunism, that ‘‘fix the premises of discourse and interpretation’’ (E. Herman & Chomsky, 2001, pp. xi, 2). While Herman and Chomsky recognized that powerful interests determine news content, they do not explore the impact of race on news production, despite the many ways in which power in American society is racialized. Inasmuch as whiteness represents ‘‘conferred dominance’’ (McIntosh, 1988), we suggest that any model of the social forces that influence news production is incomplete if it fails to consider race. Thus, just as whiteness remains an important if unacknowledged element of most White Americans’ identity (Dyer, 2005), racial ideologies—beliefs that perpetuate racial dominance (Rowley & Chavous, 2003)—may constitute a relevant if unrecognized aspect of the propaganda model. One such racial ideology is aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004, 2005). Like most forms of racial animus, aversive racism manifests as per- sonal or institutional practices that privilege Whites over persons of color. But unlike blatant racial animosity, aversive racism is marked by subtlety and ambivalence. Aversive racists believe that many minority-group members are unable to conform to White middle-class norms, and they sympathize with minorities for their history of unfair treatment. Yet, aversive racists also suspect that minorities are unwilling to embrace conven- tional norms. Thus, these Whites feel fearful or even loathsome toward non-Whites, often unintentionally. Finally, despite their actions, which tend to perpetuate inequality, aversive racists claim to endorse egalitarianism, which allows them to maintain a nonracist self-image (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004, 2005). Given this description of aversive racism, we would have several expectations if the news reflected this racial ideology: (a) aversive racism would be present at the level of individuals (i.e., newsworkers) or institutions (e.g., in news routines), or both; (b) news organizations would engage in Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 305 discrimination yet claim to be nonracist; and (c) news broadcasts would show sympathy for persons of color while still privileging Whites. We examine these expectations below. Absent information about the specific news organizations involved in Katrina coverage, we suggest that the first condition—the presence of aversive racism individually or institutionally or both—applies to mainstream news generally. At the individual level, most journalists identify as liberals (Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2007)—a group typically associated with aversive racism (Waller, 2001). At the institutional level, Shoemaker and Reese (1996, pp. 213–214) argued that ideology is a ‘‘total structure’’ that subsumes an array of influences on content from both within and outside of media organizations. The precise linkages between individual intent and institutional product are unclear but argu- ably immaterial. As Herman (2000, p. 105) noted, ‘‘All we know is that the media and journalists often mislead in tandem.’’ Thus, it seems reason- able to assume that news broadcasts that reflect aversive racism may pro- liferate as institutional products regardless of the attitudes of individual journalists. The second condition—discrimination despite claims of being nonracist—is probably universal as well. Van Dijk (2009, pp, 199–200) noted an extensive literature on the impact of racism on a dozen aspects of news production, from hiring and news values to story selection and sentence syntax. He concluded that despite ‘‘considerable variation,’’ news organizations remain ‘‘part of the problem of racism, rather than its solution.’’ At the same time, newsworkers, adhering to practices said to ensure objectivity (Schudson, 2003), have claimed to be devoid of racial subjectivity. As one former president of NBC News put it, ‘‘Let me make this clear: Race is not a factor in who we cover or how we cover it’’ (Mankiewicz, 2005). This denial of racism in the face of evidence to the contrary satisfies the second aspect of aversive racist behavior. The third condition of aversive racist news coverage is racial ambivalence. If Katrina broadcasts evinced aversive racism, we would expect coverage that reflects both compassion for African Americans and the privileging of Whites and their perspectives. Specifically, we might find both the sympathetic airing of African Americans’ grievances and either an aversion for Blacks who deviate from White middle-class norms or a concomitant affinity for middle-class Whites. Compassion was an unmistakable element of Katrina broadcasts, which showed overwhelming sympathy for the Black community as a whole if not certain deviant elements within it. Unlike in 1967, when most reporters were critical of rioters, Katrina coverage was nearly universally sympathetic to the residents whose initial victimization by the storm was worsened by spectacu- lar government neglect. These dramatic scenes have been so etched into the national memory that they need no elaboration here. Our research interest is 306 K. A. Johnson et al. the more-hostile aspects of racial ambivalence: the privileging of Whites and of White middle-class norms. This focus is reflected in our hypotheses.

HYPOTHESES

We expected to find support for two hypotheses that relate to who speaks in television broadcasts. The first addresses Katrina coverage as a whole; the second addresses coverage of looting.

H1: Despite the overwhelming presence of African Americans in New Orleans after the hurricane, Katrina broadcasts feature disproportionate numbers of Whites in speaking roles.

The Kerner Commission (1968, p. 203) found that news coverage of the 1967 disorders was racialized: ‘‘Slights and indignities are part of the Negro’s daily life, and many of them come from ...the ‘white press’—a press that repeatedly, if unconsciously, reflects the biases, the paternalism, the indiffer- ence of white America.’’ The Commission did not address the fact that most journalists are middle-class (Fussell, 1983). But by extension, the logic that the news reflected journalists’ racial identity suggests that coverage mirrored a middle-class perspective as well. Likewise, if Katrina news reflected aversive racism, we would expect stories about African Americans to feature abundant numbers of Whites and to be reported from a White middle-class perspective. Moreover, we would expect many of these Whites to have speaking roles. Speakers in broadcast news are subject to an institutional selection process that equates to what Davis (1985, p. 47) calls a hierarchy of access that echoes the strati- fication of power in the larger society, which of course privileges Whites.

H2: News reports are critical of African American looters without allowing them to explain their actions.

The Kerner Commission (1968, pp. 201–202) found that newsworkers often misread African Americans’ actions because behaviors were interpreted out of context. For example, reporters implied that the urban unrest of 1967 represented the threat of racial violence directed against Whites—an assumption consistent with Whites’ longstanding fear of Black retaliation for racist treatment (Wiethoff, 2006)—whereas the actual motivation was frustration and rage caused by systematic denial of opportunity. Likewise, if Katrina news reflected aversive racism, coverage of looting by Blacks might be (mis)informed by commentary from Whites, including assumptions about African Americans’ alleged penchant for rulebreaking and impulsiveness (Fredrickson, 2002; Liebow, 1967=2003), rather than by explanations from Blacks themselves. Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 307

METHOD

We studied the first five days of post-landfall Katrina-related broadcasts (August 29, 2005 to September 2, 2005), on five evening news programs recorded by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive: ABC World News with Charles Gibson; CBS Evening News with Bob Schieffer; CNN Newsnight with Aaron Brown; FOX Report with Shepherd Smith; and NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams. We analyzed scenes from New Orleans rather than other storm-damaged areas because its population (67% African American) and poverty level (28.9%, over twice the national average; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006) reflect our interest in depictions of low-income Blacks, who dominated coverage in 1967. We examined segments (i.e., compilations of several stories and sidebars presented back-to-back and lasting 10 minutes or more) on the assumption that such concentrated coverage would likely attract large audiences. The unit of analysis was a scene, an uninterrupted portion of videotape from one editing cut to the next. Scenes were determined by continuous visual image rather than by continuous audio source, which sometimes overlapped multiple scenes (as with a reporter’s voice over).1 We logged the scenes by 1-sec increments. Using Microsoft Excel, each scene was coded by source, date, and dur- ation. Next, we coded each scene by four main categories (in all caps) and a number of mutually exclusive subcategories (in italics). We coded the prin- cipal VISUAL image in each scene as reporting (interviews, studio shots, and other news operations); safety (including people evacuating by their own means or being rescued by others); landscape (property only); graphics (maps, network logos, etc.); looting (people taking items from inside and around stores); policing (by law-enforcement officers or National Guard troops); corpses (whether in or out of hospitals); or other disorder (disruption or violence not falling under other categories). The race=ethnicity of the ACTORS in the scene was coded as Black (Blacks only); White (Whites only); both (Blacks and Whites); other (Latinos, Asians, etc.); unknown;ornone. We used the same designations for persons SPEAKING in the scene. Finally, each speaker’s ROLE was coded as news anchor; reporter; official (government officials or employees); law=rescue (law enforcement or rescue personnel); expert (engineers, physicians, etc.); NGO (spokespersons for relief agencies and other nongovernmental organizations.); resident; other;or none. When it became clear that few scenes contained other than Black or White speakers, speakers of unknown race=ethnicity, or no speakers, we combined the categories of other, unknown, and none under SPEAKING and ROLE codes into other. After training, two student assistants and the third author (J.S.) coded a subsample of the data. They discussed discrepancies and revised coding 308 K. A. Johnson et al. categories accordingly. The students then coded all scenes and flagged scenes about which they were uncertain; the third author coded these scenes appro- priately. We calculated Krippendorff’s alpha to test intercoder reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). For each of the four main codes (VISUAL, ACTORS, SPEAKING, and ROLE), we used the formula for nominal data with two obser- vers and no missing data (Krippendorff, 2007). The lowest alpha was 0.898 for SPEAKING; scores exceeded 0.90 for all remaining codes.

RESULTS

We coded 3,261 scenes in 7 hr, 5 min, 15 sec of footage; the average scene length was 7.8 sec. Most of the footage came from CNN (3 hr, 25 min, 45 sec; 1,330 scenes), followed by FOX (1 hr, 24 min, 36 sec; 413 scenes), NBC (51 min, 35 sec; 559 scenes), CBS (43 min, 25 sec; 487 scenes), and ABC (39 min, 54 sec; 472 scenes). Our analysis of the VISUAL code shows that while scenes of the devastated landscape and safety operations proliferated (comprising 20% and 26% of total time, respectively), both were eclipsed by images of reporting from field locations and network studios (43% of total time). While looting scenes were an important and memorable part of Katrina coverage, they comprised only 2% of the footage in our sample (Table 1). The first hypothesis stated that despite the overwhelming presence of African Americans in New Orleans after the hurricane, Katrina broadcasts featured disproportionate numbers of Whites in speaking roles. We expected to find disproportionate numbers of White speakers despite a preponderance of African Americans in the city, especially among Katrina survivors. Our data support this hypothesis. In our analysis of the SPEAKING code, Whites spoke in 87% (n ¼ 2,833) of the total scenes; Blacks spoke in just 10% (n ¼ 313) of the scenes (Table 2).

TABLE 1 Types of Scenes (All Scenes).

Time

Type of scenes # of scenes h:m:s %

Reporting 920 3:01:54 43% Safety 1,129 1:50:02 26% Landscape 789 1:24:04 20% Graphics 149 0:23:35 6% Looting 104 0:8:16 2% Other 50 0:8:01 2% Policing 93 0:6:30 2% Corpses 27 0:2:53 1% Total 3,261 7:05:15 100%

Note. h:m:s ¼ hour:minutes:seconds. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. TABLE 2 Race of Speakers by Role (All Scenes).

White Black Other Both Total

Time Time Time Time Time

Speaker # of scenes h:m:s % Scenes h:m:s % Scenes h:m:s % Scenes h:m:s % Scenes h:m:s %

309 Reporter 1,461 2:29:28 35% 94 0:12:36 3% 62 0:5:30 1% 16 0:4:13 1% 1633 2:51:47 40% Anchor 917 2:24:25 34% 917 2:24:25 34% Official 284 0:46:30 11% 88 0:15:09 4% 372 1:01:39 14% Resident 75 0:12:08 3% 125 0:15:18 4% 5 0:0:44 <1% 9 0:1:40 <1% 214 0:29:50 7% Expert 31 0:9:22 2% 31 0:9:22 2% Law=rescue 45 0:4:39 1% 6 0:0:36 <1% 1 0:0:14 <1% 2 0:0:13 <1% 54 0:5:42 1% NGO 20 0:1:21 <1% 20 0:1:21 <1% Other 20 0:1:09 <1% 20 0:1:09 <1% Total 2,833 6:07:53 87% 313 0:43:39 10% 88 0:7:37 2% 27 0:6:06 1% 3261 7:05:15 100%

Note. h:m:s ¼ hour:minutes:seconds. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 310 K. A. Johnson et al.

These racial disparities in SPEAKING data as a whole were mirrored among newsworkers. Just as anchors and reporters dominated the VISUAL category, they dominated the SPEAKING code, speaking in 74% of the footage (Table 2). The vast majority of this reporting coverage (69% of total scenes) featured White speakers, compared to a very slim 4% of footage narrated by Black reporters, including scenes where both Black and White reporters spoke. News sources (including officials, experts, law enforcement, rescue personnel, NGO representatives, and residents) showed more bal- ance, with 17% of the footage featuring White speakers and 8% showing Black speakers. Ironically, it was New Orleans residents—who had miniscule speaking roles overall—who represented the only instance where the preva- lence of Black speakers (4% of all footage) and White speakers (3% of total footage) was comparable. In sum, our data suggest that in a tragedy whose victims were dispro- portionately African American and poor, the dominant speakers were White. In this majority Black setting, African Americans ironically were unlikely to have a voice. Hypothesis 2 stated that news reports are critical of African American looters without allowing them to explain their actions. We expected critical commentary about African American looters that denied residents an opportunity to contextualize their behavior. Our data supported this hypothesis. We found harsh assessments of African Americans’ behavior in looting scenes, but—as was the case with the footage as a whole—few scenes containing Black speakers. Most (79%; n ¼ 77) of the 104 looting scenes featured African American participants; only 9 sec (2%; n ¼ 4) of looting scenes showed White actors exclusively (Table 3). Yet most (71%; n ¼ 83) of the looting scenes had White speakers (Table 4). Thus, looting was depicted largely as an African American phenomenon whose meaning was interpreted and commented upon by White reporters, White anchors, White officials, and White residents.

TABLE 3 Race of Actors Depicted in Looting Scenes.

Time

Race Scenes h:m:s %

Black 77 0:6:30 79% Both 19 0:1:22 17% Unknown 4 0:0:15 3% White 4 0:0:09 2% Total 104 0:8:16 100%

Note. h:m:s ¼ hour:minutes:seconds. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 311

TABLE 4 Race of Speakers in Looting Scenes.

Time

Race Scenes h:m:s %

White 83 0:5:51 71% Black 16 0:2:01 24% Other 4 0:0:19 4% Both 1 0:0:05 1% Total 104 0:8:16 100%

Note. h:m:s ¼ hour:minutes:seconds. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Much of this commentary was critical of looters, who were said to con- tribute to such ‘‘anarchy’’ that on August 30, 2005, CBS anchor Bob Schieffer, citing an unnamed source, likened New Orleans to ‘‘downtown Baghdad.’’ Likewise, CNN anchor Aaron Brown rebuked residents who seemed to capitalize on the disorder:

Aaron Brown: Jefferson Parish is just outside of New Orleans ...There (White male) is some looting and lawlessness there. And we’re joined by Deano Bonano, the chief of emergency operations in the parish. ...Um, tell me, give me a sense of how bad this lawlessness is in your parish. Deano Bonano: ...We do have some problem with looting. I can tell you (White male) last night at midnight when I got off duty I went to go check on my house and actually ran four looters out of the neighborhood ... Aaron Brown: Wow. Deano Bonano: ...so it is going on. Aaron Brown: ...But do you have any sense of people who are breaking into stores because they have no food, have no water, and they need both, and how many people who are stealing guns and beer and sneakers and what have you? Deano Bonano: I think you have more of that going on than people look- ing for food ... Aaron Brown: Well, this is just, this is just crime. Deano Bonano: Correct. Aaron Brown: This is just inexcusable, appalling crime.

But such criticism was not always consistent with narratives from survivors themselves. While the most direct way to ascertain motives is to ask people what drives their actions, reporters posed this question of looters in only 3 of the 104 looting scenes, comprising 21 sec (4%) of the looting footage that we examined. In each scene, when African American looters 312 K. A. Johnson et al. were allowed to explain their actions, they described looting as an urgent, event-driven deviation from normal behavior. In the first such scene, on August 31, 2005, NBC reporter Martin Savidge approached a woman who was carrying an armload of new tennis shoes on a downtown sidewalk:

Martin Savidge: You know you’re not supposed to do that. (White male) RESIDENT: I know, but if we barefoot and we walkin’ in the water, (Black female) our feets is gonna get cut.

In the second scene, which aired on September 2, 2005, CBS reporter Tracy Smith explained that without government protection, victims had to fend for themselves:

Tracy Smith (voice over: The only food came from people who could by White female) take it. Derrick Leve: Looter is a person that would go in a store and (Black male) come out with a television. I went in Wal-Mart and came out with ...pita bread and ...fruit ... and I wrote down anything I took to feed my family.

The third segment, showing footage from the Ernest N. Morial Conven- tion Center on September 2, 2005, was introduced by NBC reporter Martin Savidge:

Martin Savidge (voice over: This woman confesses she stole this fruit. by White male) Resident: We feedin’ the children! (Black female)

DISCUSSION

In this content analysis of television broadcasts in the first week of Katrina reporting from New Orleans, we found support for our two hypotheses. First, in a story that had a disproportionate impact on the African American community, the news featured disproportionate numbers of Whites, particularly in speaking roles. Second, while these newsworkers expressed sympathy for storm victims, they criticized looting without contextualizing it, thereby marginalizing residents who seemed to reject White middle-class norms regarding theft and crime. The combination of sympathy for and criticism of African Americans is consistent with aversive racism. These data signal an ideological divide between news organizations, whose personnel and sources favor established norms (Schudson, 2003, Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 313 pp. 134–153), and residents, whose perspectives may be more fluid. News- workers’ White middle-class etic (outsiders’) perspective (Pike, 1967) was particularly apparent in looting stories. For example, when NBC reporter Martin Savidge asked the looter who was carrying tennis shoes to explain her behavior, he did not say, ‘‘Why are you doing this?’’ Instead, he said, ‘‘You know you’re not supposed to do that,’’ a verbal scolding not unlike a parent reproaching a child, and one that implies that the woman was mor- ally deficient. Similarly, when Savidge noted the looter at the Convention Center, he said, ‘‘This woman confesses she stole this fruit’’ (italics added for emphasis). This word choice, unlike more-neutral language (e.g., ‘‘This woman says she took this fruit’’), signals inherent wrongdoing. We believe that their etic perspective led reporters to imply that looters were more rapacious than eyewitness accounts suggest. While some looters clearly took nonessential goods from stores (Anderson, Perlstein, & Scott, 2005; Perlstein & Thevenot, 2005), many grocery stores were looted for food and beverages (Anderson et al., 2005; ‘‘Peeling open a store’’, 2005; Varney, 2005) and drug stores were pilfered for medication, all of which was in notoriously short supply. Indeed, at least one storeowner invited neighborhood residents to take food before it spoiled in the summer heat (Anderson et al., 2005). In this way, the typical looting story, like coverage of urban disturbances in 1967, was racially inflammatory because it was decontextua- lized, that is, presented without emic (insiders’) descriptions or explanations (Pike, 1967). Reflexively attributing looting to wanton opportunism overlooks alternative explanations for such behavior beyond simple post-disaster survival. For example, disaster survivors may view catastrophic events as opportu- nities to erase longstanding injustices and to realize wishes that are normally unattainable (Fritz, 1961, p. 685). Thus, some storm victims may have viewed stealing as their only opportunity to compensate for their second-class citizenship. For others, looting may have reflected despair. Whatever day-to-day anguish low-income Blacks felt before Katrina was undoubtedly heightened by the devastation of the hurricane and agonizing rescue delays. Abusive treatment from National Guard soldiers and police officers who routinely approached unarmed residents with weapons drawn, and who reportedly threatened to shoot residents for stealing clean underwear (Bradley, 2005) or for reporting the death of an elder (Wayne, 2005), undoubtedly exacer- bated survivors’ despair. And when people despair, ‘‘they see no point in trying or caring any more’’ (Reading, 2004, p. 150). Katrina looters may have understood the futility of trying to adhere to mainstream behavior norms that may not have been germane to a marginalized community under great stress. Indeed, such norms might not have applied to New Orleans in the first place. The city is notorious for corrupt police officers and public officials (Range, 2000); survivors may have taken their cues from such official 314 K. A. Johnson et al. misconduct. As one resident remarked at a looting site, ‘‘It must be legal. The police are here taking stuff, too’’ (Perlstein & Thevenot, 2005). Thus, it may be inappropriate to evaluate post-Katrina looting with norms that apply to other locales. Finally, the etic view also helps to explain why reporters announced as ‘‘news’’ statements that most persons of color probably take for granted. For example, on September 2, 2005, CNN anchor Aaron Brown announced that because of Katrina, ‘‘Once again, race has become part of the national story.’’ But one need not be a historian to appreciate how race has always been a part of ‘‘the national story.’’ Likewise, millions of persons of color routinely confront problems related to race, as well as class, and are therefore well aware from daily experience that race does matter. We suspect that comments such as Brown’s emerged from a newsroom culture where journalists universalize a White middle-class perspective and thus produce news that seems revelatory only to middle-class Whites. Similarly, a journalist more intimately familiar with the Black community’s history of victimization by the police may not have uttered a statement about efforts to restore law and order in New Orleans. On September 1, 2005, Aaron Brown announced, ‘‘Some National Guard troops have arrived, 300 out of Arkansas with ‘shoot to kill’ orders. They are working the streets trying to take them back. That’s a bit of good news we can report tonight’’ (italics added for emphasis). Police officers are typically authorized to use deadly force when a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officers or to other people (Hall, n.d.). But using deadly force against African Amer- ican suspects to discourage property crime such as breaking and entering, which does not involve the use or threat of force against a person, is a highly controversial tactic that critics say shows disregard for African American lives (Flamm, 2005, p. 155). A journalist more familiar with the history of African Americans’ troubled relationship with police officers might have presented a shoot-to-kill order in New Orleans as a potential problem rather than as ‘‘good news.’’ We are not suggesting that White news personnel cannot cover the black community competently. But in New Orleans, overreliance on White journalists and White sources diminished insiders’ explanations of African Americans’ attitudes and behavior, which we believe were more credible. In so doing, Katrina news propagated racial propaganda. Accordingly, we propose that E. Herman and Chomsky’s (2001) model be revised to account for the racial dimensions of propaganda by (a) incorporating journalists’ reliance on White sources; and (b) asserting aversive racism (replacing anticommunism) as an ideology that helps to preserve the power of elites (in this case, middle-class Whites). Like other analyses (e.g., Sparks, 2007), ours is a sympathetic reading of E. Herman and Chomsky that attempts to extend their model from one genre (international news) to another (domestic news). E. S. Herman (2000) himself recognized the rolling nature of the constituents of Racial Propaganda and TV Coverage of Katrina 315 the propaganda model. Our work joins research by Voorhees et al. (2007) as one of few studies to offer statistical support for qualitative reports (e.g., M. J. Davis & French, 2008; Kahle, Yu, & Whiteside, 2007; Shah, 2009; Thevenot, 2005–2006) that Katrina news propagated racism. Admittedly, our slender sample of looting footage says little about looting portrayals as a whole, particularly after reporters began to reflect publicly on the implications of their coverage (e.g., Carr, 2005; Rosenblatt & Rainey, 2005; Thevenot, 2005–2006). On the other hand, many of the looting scenes in our sample were rebroadcast in shorter segments throughout and after the first week of the Katrina crisis, such that outsiders’ interpretations of insiders’ behavior were not confined to the small sample we have analyzed here. While we believe that the Katrina broadcasts constitute evidence of racial and social-class hegemony, there are alternative explanations for the overwhelming presence of White faces and speakers. For example, in a southern political landscape where power is racialized, middle-class Whites have significantly more authority than do poor Blacks. Yet, African Ameri- cans have more political power in Louisiana than in any other state (Parent, 2006). In 2000, there were over 650 Black elected officials in Louisiana (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Power differences may have contributed to the over- representation of Whites on screen, but clearly other factors were at play. One such factor might be audience considerations. Westin (2000, p. 21) found that television news producers exclude racial minorities from news- casts, using coded language such as, ‘‘It’s not good television,’’ on the theory that showing too many brown faces alienates White viewers. And broadcasters’ preference for upscale audiences who attract advertisers is well-established (Croteau & Hoynes, 2000). Thus, African Americans may have been driven out of Katrina broadcasts by audiences’ perceived preference for Whites, and advertisers’ preference for affluent viewers.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental unresolved question posed by our research reaches back to 1967. If the Kerner Commission was correct that integrated staffs have a salu- tary effect on news content, our research suggests that 38 years of integration efforts have had little impact, either on personnel—only 4% of speaking time in our study went to Black reporters—or on content. Where is the tipping point beyond which a critical mass of minority journalists makes a difference? Follow-up studies may help illuminate such questions. We have already indicated the value of examining a larger sample of Katrina footage. Specifi- cally, it would be interesting to compare looting coverage before and after journalists’ self-critical discussions of their portrayals of African Americans, to examine how those discussions were reflected in content. We also think it would be valuable to compare through in-depth interviews the racial 316 K. A. Johnson et al. attitudes and perspectives of a cross-section of journalists, akin to what Nishi- kawa and colleagues (2009) reported. Such research could help determine whether journalists of color at White-owned news organizations are indeed more racially moderate than their counterparts at minority-owned outlets (and perhaps even more moderate than some of their white colleagues), as van Dijk (2009) suggested. This work in turn could lead to the develop- ment of targeted strategies to encourage diverse groups of journalists to think critically about representations of African Americans, and to reflect this think- ing in their coverage of the Black community. In the meantime, however, broadcasters seem not to have addressed the fundamental issue of who has a voice. Until they do, aversive racism will surely persist.

NOTE

1. For example, on Friday, September 2, 2005, CBS Evening News with Bob Schieffer began with a 10-min, 15-sec segment of New Orleans stories. Five consecutive stories were narrated in turn by in-studio anchor Bob Schieffer, on-the-ground anchor John Roberts, and reporters Lee Cowan, Byron Pitts, and Tracy Smith. Schieffer introduced the newscast with a voiceover of the day’s images. The story lasted a little less than a minute, then the visual shifted to John Roberts and a longer voiceover of additional images, including snippets of interviews. Roberts then introduced reporter Lee Cowan, whose 2-min, 20-sec report covered evacuation efforts from the New Orleans airport. The camera returned briefly to Roberts, who introduced a 1-min water-rescue story by Byron Pitts, then back to Roberts, who introduced Tracy Smith, whose 1-min, 20-sec story focused on delayed relief efforts.

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