Chapter Twelve

Modernization, Culture and Morality in Europe: Universalism, Contextualism or Relativism?

Hermann Dülmer

Introduction

Diagnoses of moral decay are probably as old as humankind. In recent times, for instance, Noelle-Neumann (1978) complained about the decay of civic virtues like diligence, discipline and achievement motivation in Germany. A more positive picture of value change is presented by Ingle- hart (1997: 23, 28, 44–45, 90, 104). Although Inglehart concedes that in postmodernizing societies, achievement orientation has decreased rela- tive to other value orientations, at the same time he assumes that in such societies there is an increase in tolerance towards minorities like immi- grants, or with regard to sexuality and family. However, if tolerance is becoming more and more prevalent, then the question arises of whether common universal, absolutely valid, moral guidelines exist any longer or whether morality is becoming increasingly relativistic. Another possibility would be that existing universal moral guidelines are being applied more flexibly, with potential negative consequences being taken into account. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the following questions: Do people in Europe think that there are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil whatever the circumstances (moral universalism/ absolutism), or do they think that such guidelines do not exist (moral rela- tivism). If people do think that there are absolutely clear guidelines, do they consider deviations from these guidelines as sometimes justifiable by the circumstances (restricted moral universalism/moral contextualism)? In order to improve our understanding of possible differences in morality perceptions between people within as well as between different European societies, hypotheses about social change and its impact on morality per- ceptions are derived from theory and tested empirically. A final question that is addressed is the extent to which our rather subjective morality perceptions are in accordance with our real moral judgements when we 252 hermann dülmer are confronted with questions about the moral justifiability of specific behaviour.

Society and morality

Moral rules like those found in the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament (Thou shalt not kill, commit adultery, steal, . . .) are the Judeo- Christian version of a universal moral norm that can be found in virtu- ally every society (Inglehart, 1997: 37, 40, 54). In traditional, pre-industrial societies such rules are usually seen as the will of an omnipotent deity or other supreme supernatural power. Revealed by such a higher power, moral rules are seen as absolute truths with absolute validity (Inglehart, 1990: 184, 1997: 37–38, 88; Inglehart & Baker, 2000: 25). In traditional, pre-industrial societies absolute and steadfast rules basi- cally serve two functions, a societal and a psychological one (Inglehart, 1990: 177–179, 1997: 40–42). From the perspective of society, absolute rules are crucial for a society’s viability. The moral rule ‘Thou shalt not kill’, for instance, serves the societal function of restricting violence to nar- row, predictable channels and prevents a society from tearing itself apart. Moral rules like ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery’ serve the societal func- tion of maintaining the family as a key economic unit for reproduction. As long as divorce, abortion and homosexuality threaten reproduction and child-rearing within the family, they are harshly condemned by the soci- ety. This applies at least to all traditional, pre-industrial societies with few exceptions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 7; Inglehart & Baker, 2000: 23). From the perspective of the individual, absolute rules also serve a psychological function. In traditional, pre-industrial societies people have little control over nature. In a highly uncertain environment, where the individual is confronted in his or her daily life with existential threats (like the dan- ger of crop failure, starvation and untreatable diseases), people are under high stress (Inglehart, 1997: 40). In order to compensate for their lack of physical control and to reduce stress, people appeal to metaphysical powers that seem to control the world. The benevolence of such higher powers can be gained by following rigid rules that ensure a maximal pre- dictability. All in all, absolute rule obedience and the belief that an infal- lible higher power will ensure that things turn out well, at least in the long run, fulfil basic physical and economic security needs (Inglehart, 1997: 38, 42; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 27).