Jeffrey r. Parker and rom y. Schrift *

to date, research on no-choice options has primarily examined the conditions that foster choice deferral, thus focusing on the frequency with which consumers select the no-choice option. in this article, the authors argue that even if the no-choice option is not selected, its mere presence in the choice set may alter consumers’ choices. more specifically, they investigate how decision processes and preferences change when consumers have a no-choice option versus when they are forced to choose from a given choice set. they propose that the inclusion of a no- choice option in a choice set affects preferences by leading consumers to determine not only which alternative is best, but which, if any, are acceptable (i.e., meet the consumer’s minimum needs). accordingly, the authors demonstrate that the inclusion of a no-choice option in the choice set (1) leads to more alternative- (rather than attribute-) based information processing, (2) increases the importance of attributes that are more meaningful when alternatives are evaluated one by one (i.e., enriched attributes), and (3) increases the importance of attributes with levels that are closer to the consumer’s minimum needs (thresholds). they demonstrate that such changes influence consumers’ preference structures and ultimate choices. they conclude with a discussion of the theoretical, methodological, and managerial implications of these findings.

Keywords : no-choice options, decision criteria, rejectable choice sets, information processing, conjoint analysis

rejectable choice Sets: how Seemingly irrelevant No-choice options affect consumer Decision Processes

It is increasingly the norm for stated choice experiments we focus on the flip side of the coin: the decision processes to include a “no-choice” option that gives participants an and choices of consumers who do not opt for the no-choice out when they do not like any of the alternatives in the given option—that is, those who ultimately select one of the avail - choice set. To date, most of the literature on no-choice able alternatives. Could it be that the mere opportunity to options has focused on the numerous factors that lead to reject all of the available alternatives changes consumers’ choice deferral and which alternatives are more likely to decision processes and choices? If so, why and in what way? lose choice shares to the no-choice option. In this research, From a rational point of view, adding a no-choice option to the choice set should change neither the preference struc - tures nor the ultimate choices of consumers who do not opt *Jeffrey R. Parker is a doctoral candidate, Columbia University Busi - ness School (e-mail: [email protected]). Rom Y. Schrift is for the no-choice option. However, in this research, we Assistant Professor of Marketing, the Wharton School, University of Penn - argue and demonstrate that the mere addition of a no-choice sylvania (e-mail: [email protected]). The authors contributed option to the set changes consumers’ judgment criteria. In equally to this research, and order of authorship was determined by a coin toss. The authors thank Don Lehmann and Oded Netzer for their help and particular, it shifts the consumer’s focus away from compar - continuous support of this research. They also thank Jacob Goldenberg, ing the alternatives with one another to determine which is Ran Kivetz, Jonathan Levav, Leonard Lee, Page Moreau, and Olivier best (a comparative judgment) to evaluating the alternatives Toubia for their helpful comments and insights. Robert Meyer served as one by one to determine which, if any, meets the consumer’s associate editor for this article. needs (an evaluative judgment). This change in judgment

© 2011, American Marketing Association Journal of Marketing Research ISSN: 0022-2437 (print), 1547-7193 (electronic) 840 Vol. XLVIII (October 2011), 840 –854 rejectable choice Sets 841 criteria is found to systematically affect consumers’ prefer - Researchers and practitioners alike have long recognized ence structures and ultimate choices. the importance of studying and addressing the no-choice After reviewing the relevant literature and developing our option. Indeed, it is now a common practice to include a no- theoretical framework, we present six empirical studies, choice option in choice experiments (e.g., choice-based which are divided into two main sections. In the first section, conjoint studies). Adding such a base alternative to the we demonstrate the shift in judgment criteria by showing that design offers several advantages, such as estimating the mere addition of a seemingly irrelevant no-choice option absolute demand and eliminating statistical biases (e.g., (1) results in consumers processing information in a more Haaijer, Kamakura, and Wedel 2001). Previous research has alternative- (vs. attribute-) based manner (Study 1), (2) leads also examined behavioral and psychological responses to consumers to store and recall information from memory in no-choice options, including (1) factors that lead to choice a more alternative- (vs. attribute-) based manner (Study 2), deferral (e.g., Dhar 1997; Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995; and (3) makes concepts associated with an evaluative judg - Gunasti and Ross 2009; Luce 1998; Tversky and Shafir ment more accessible in consumers’ minds (Study 3). 1992), (2) what types of alternatives are more likely to lose In the second section, we demonstrate how this shift in choice shares to the no-choice options (Dhar and Simonson judgment criteria influences consumers’ preferences and 2003), and (3) how different response modes interact with ultimate choices. Specifically, we show that adding a no- choice-set characteristics to influence purchase deferral choice option to the set increases the weight consumers (Dhar and Nowlis 2004). While the extant literature has attach to enriched (rather than comparable) attributes (Study largely focused its attention on the determinants for (and 4). Next, we demonstrate that the relative distance between consequences of) choice deferral, as well as the statistical the choice set and consumers’ minimum needs (thresholds) implications of incorporating no-choice options in choice becomes relevant and influences preferences when a no- experiments, we focus on the impact of no-choice options choice option is included in the choice set (Study 5). on consumers who do not opt for the no-choice option. That Taken together, the results of Studies 1–5 raise an impor - is, we investigate whether, why, and how the mere inclusion tant methodological question. Specifically, will the inclu - of a no-choice option affects consumers’ preferences for the sion or exclusion of a no-choice option in choice experi - originally available alternatives. ments systematically shift consumers’ preferences and, The presence or absence of a no-choice option in the consequently, the recovered parameters? Recent findings choice set should not rationally affect the preferences of consumers who do not choose the no-choice option. That is, (Gilbride and Allenby 2006) suggest that parameter esti - if the no-choice option does not provide any utility to the mates can indeed be affected by the inclusion or exclusion consumer, this undesired no-choice option should not affect of a no-choice option. Accordingly, in Study 6, we collabo - that consumer’s relative preference for the other available rate with a food company to directly examine this question alternatives. However, in this research, we challenge this using a choice-based conjoint analysis. The results confirm assumption and show that the inclusion or exclusion of a that the presence or absence of a no-choice option in the seemingly irrelevant no-choice option will shift consumers’ design systematically shifts consumers’ preferences in a preferences and choice. direction consistent with our predictions. We conclude by The notion that the addition of a seemingly irrelevant discussing the theoretical, methodological, and managerial alternative to the set may affect preferences and choice implications of our findings. shares is not novel in itself. For example, Huber, Payne, and REJECTABLE CHOICE SETS Puto (1982) demonstrate that the addition of asymmetrically dominated alternative (decoy) changes the choice shares of As consumers, we are faced with numerous decisions the originally available alternatives, a violation of regular - every day. In some situations, we are forced to choose one ity. Similarly, we argue that the inclusion or exclusion of a of the alternatives from the immediately available choice set seemingly irrelevant no-choice option may change con - (hereafter, we refer to this as choosing from a forced choice sumers’ preferences and ultimate choices by shifting their set). For example, the choice of necessities such as food, focus and judgment criteria. shelter, and medical care often cannot be deferred or avoided, at least not without incurring severe consequences. EVALUATIVE VERSUS COMPARATIVE JUDGMENTS Similarly, external restrictions such as laws requiring auto Imagine a consumer facing a choice between Alternatives insurance force a choice, as can product failures, expiration A and B, and assume that for this consumer, a no-choice dates, and dwindling supplies. In other situations, the possi - option (should it be offered) is undesirable (i.e., both A and bility of choosing none of the available alternatives in the B are acceptable). Given a forced choice set, this consumer choice set (i.e., take the no-choice option; hereafter, choos - is confronted only with the task of choosing the best avail - ing from a rejectable choice set) is a more viable option. It able option (i.e., picking the winner). Accordingly, we argue is important to note that even within the same product cate - that choosing from a forced choice set will trigger a more gory, consumers may choose from a forced choice set at cer - comparative judgment process in which the consumer tain times and from a rejectable choice set at other times. directly compares the alternatives and is focused on picking For example, a consumer must buy toilet paper when the the winner. However, when choosing from a rejectable household runs out (i.e., choose from a forced choice set), choice set (i.e., when a no-choice option is also available in but the same consumer may also choose to purchase toilet the set), the consumer needs to determine not only which paper when the household is fully stocked, perhaps due to a alternative is the winner but also whether any or all of the categorywide price reduction (i.e., choose from a rejectable alternatives are worth choosing at all. Simply being the best choice set). does not guarantee that an alternative is good enough to be 842 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011 chosen. Nor does being good enough suggest that an alterna - randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the rejectable tive is the best choice. As such, facing a rejectable choice set or the forced choice-set condition. Participants assigned to should trigger a relatively more evaluative judgment process the forced choice-set (FC) condition were asked to choose in which the consumer also determines the adequacy of their preferred laptop from the two that were offered. Par - each alternative independently. That is, the consumer evalu - ticipants in the rejectable choice set (RC) condition were ates each alternative, one at a time, to determine whether asked to choose from the same two laptops but were also each alone is acceptable to be chosen at all, in addition to given the option of choosing neither laptop. picking the winner. We hypothesize that such differences in We developed a computer program similar to Mouselab judgment criteria will change several fundamental aspects (Johnson et al. 1991) to track the participants’ information in consumers’ decision processes and preference structures. processing patterns. The program presented the alternatives on the computer screen with the specific levels of each Study 1: Information-Processing Patterns attribute hidden. To reveal each alternative’s attribute val - The definitive component of a rejectable choice set is the ues, the participant had to drag the computer mouse to the consumer’s ability to reject all alternatives in the set (i.e., corresponding attribute box and click on the box. The pro - take the no-choice option). Thus, a consumer choosing from gram allowed for no more than one attribute level to be visi - a rejectable choice set must determine both which alterna - ble at any point in time. Thus, if a participant viewed the tives are acceptable for selection and which alternative is brand of Option A and then clicked on the box for the brand the best. The latter determination involves comparing the of Option B, the brand box of Option A would close. To alternatives directly, a comparative judgment. The former familiarize participants with the procedure, a short practice involves determining whether the value of each alternative round was conducted. In the target round, participants were alone exceeds the consumer’s minimum needs, an evalua - asked to choose the alternative they preferred (or “neither” tive judgment. Accordingly, we argue that these two types in the RC condition) by clicking on their preferred alterna - of judgments will elicit different information-processing tive (or the “neither” button) whenever they desired. The patterns. Specifically, a comparative judgment should elicit program recorded the pattern of boxes that each participant information-processing patterns in which the consumer viewed, the participants’ response latencies, and their final more frequently shifts his or her attention from one alterna - choices. tive to another (attribute-based processing) than from one Results . To investigate differences in search patterns attribute to another within the same alternative (alternative- between the conditions, we analyzed the transitions partici - based processing). Conversely, an evaluative judgment pants made when viewing the alternatives. A transition is should elicit a more alternative-based processing pattern. simply the movement of attention from one unit of informa - In related work, Dhar and Nowlis (2004) manipulate the tion to another, which was captured by the opening of the order in which participants made each of these types of onscreen attribute boxes. We define a move from an attrib - judgments, demonstrating that consumers who make a buy/ ute in one alternative to an attribute in the other alternative no-buy decision first (a more evaluative judgment) tend to (attribute-based processing) as an attribute-based transition. exhibit more alternative-based processing, while the oppo - Conversely, we define an alternative-based transition as a site is found for consumers making an unconditional brand move from an attribute in one alternative to a different choice first (a more comparative judgment). Extending this attribute in the same alternative (alternative-based process - work, we predict that merely choosing from a rejectable (vs. ing). Following established procedure (Dhar and Nowlis forced) choice set elicits a more evaluative (vs. compara - 2004; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988), we coded each tive) judgment, which will result in more alternative- (vs. attribute-based transition as +1 and each alternative-based attribute-) based information-processing patterns. To test transition as –1. We then summed all transitions and divided this hypothesis, we employed procedures that enabled us to that number by the total number of transitions to form a track the pattern in which participants viewed and processed “pattern” score for each respondent. The range of possible the available information. pattern scores is –1 to +1, with negative scores representing Method . Thirty-six undergraduate and graduate students more alternative-based processing and positive scores rep - from a large East Coast university participated in this study. resenting more attribute-based processing. The study, which was administered using computer work - Consistent with our predictions, participants in the RC stations, asked participants to choose a laptop from two condition showed significantly lower pattern scores than available models. Each laptop was described on six attri - participants in the FC condition (M = .17, M = .59; butes: brand, model, processor speed, hard drive, style, and RC FC F(1,35) = 4.58, p < .04). Thus, choosing from a rejectable weight (for full descriptions, see Table 1). Participants were choice set triggered relatively more alternative-based pro - cessing patterns. Furthermore, analysis at the individual table 1 level revealed that 88% of participants assigned to the FC StimULi USeD iN StUDy 1 condition had a positive pattern score compared with only 61% of participants assigned to the RC condition ( 2(1) = Attribute Laptop A Laptop B 3.70, p < .054). Additional analyses did not reveal any sig - Brand HP Dell nificant differences in the total time participants viewed the Model name Pavilion Inspiron information before making their choice (we performed test - Processor speed 2.4 GHz 2.1 GHz Hard drive 200 GB 220 GB ing on the log-transformed response latencies: M RC = 3.16, Style Sleek Rugged MFC = 3.24; p > .65) or the number of attributes examined Weight 5.2 lbs. 4.8 lbs. (M RC = 12.80, M FC = 12.30; p > .60), suggesting that the rejectable choice Sets 843 involvement, task complexity, and effort invested in the task table 2 were similar across conditions. StimULi USeD iN StUDy 2 Finally, we examined whether the difference in processing patterns was consistent throughout the course of the deci - Attribute Laptop A Laptop B sion process or whether it was characterized by a two-stage Attribute Laptop A Laptop B process (i.e., began with alternative-based processing to Brand HP Dell determine acceptability and then proceeded with attribute- Processor speed 2.4 GHz 2.1 GHz based processing to reach a decision, or vice versa). To do Model name Pavilion Inspiron so, we split each participant’s pattern into two stages Hard drive 200 GB 220 GB according to the number of transitions and time. We found Weight 5.2 lbs. 4.8 lbs. no difference in either the FC or RC condition between the first- and second-half patterns (both Fs < 1). asked to choose from the same two laptops but were also Discussion . The results of Study 1 support the assertion given the option of choosing neither laptop. Unlike Study 1, that choosing from rejectable choice sets triggers a rela - all the information about both laptops was visible at all tively more evaluative judgment. Specifically, consistent times (i.e., the participants did not need to reveal the infor - with an evaluative judgment, participants who faced a mation). After the participants made their choices, a second rejectable choice set processed the available information in screen appeared with all the information about the laptops a more alternative-based manner. Conversely, consistent removed. The participants were then asked to recall as much with a comparative judgment, participants who faced a information as they could about the laptops (the participants forced choice set processed the available information in a were unaware they would be asked to recall this informa - more attribute-based manner. In addition, our analyses help tion). Then, we recorded the pattern in which the informa - rule out rival explanations such as increased task complex - tion was recalled for analysis. ity or decreased involvement in the RC condition. Admit - Results . To analyze participants’ recall patterns, we used tedly, this process-tracing methodology may raise some a coding scheme similar to that used in Study 1. In particu - concerns with respect to measurement effects and interfer - lar, we examined every two consecutive units of informa - ence with participants’ natural decision-making process. tion participants recalled. If the two units recalled were Therefore, in Study 2, we employ a different methodology across the two alternatives, we coded the transition as +1 to address such concerns and to further strengthen our argu - (attribute-based transition). Conversely, if the two units ment regarding shifts in judgment criteria. In particular, recalled were within a single alternative, we coded the tran - without interrupting the decision process, we examine how sition as –1 (alternative-based transition). Thus, if a partici - consumers encode and retrieve from memory the informa - pant first recalled one unit of attribute information for Lap - tion characterizing the alternatives. top A (e.g., brand name A) and then a unit of attribute information for Laptop B (e.g., brand name B), we coded Study 2: Information Recall Patterns this transition as +1 (attribute-based transition). However, if If rejectable choice sets indeed trigger more evaluative the participant first recalled one unit of attribute informa - judgments, this should manifest not only in the way con - tion for Laptop A (e.g., brand name A) and then another unit sumers process the available information but also in the way of attribute information for Laptop A (e.g., processor speed they store and retrieve this information from memory (e.g., A), we coded this transition as –1 (alternative-based transi - Bousfield 1953; Tulving 1962). Therefore, because we tion). As in Study 1, we summed all transitions and divided expect rejectable choice sets to elicit more evaluative judg - the sums by the total number of transitions to form a pattern ments, we expect consumers to organize, and later recall, score for each participant (ranging from –1 to +1). choice-relevant information in a more alternative-based As we predicted, participants in the RC condition showed manner. Conversely, because we expect forced choice sets significantly lower pattern scores than participants in the FC to elicit more comparative judgments, we expect consumers condition (M RC = –.05, M FC = .26; F(1, 86) = 4.65, p < .04) to organize, and later recall, choice-relevant information in indicating that participants in the RC condition processed a more attribute-based manner. Although the expected recall and recalled the information in a more alternative-based patterns tap into a different psychological process, they map pattern. Analysis at the individual level revealed that 67% onto the information-processing patterns observed in Study of participants assigned to the FC condition had a positive 1. To test this hypothesis, we employed procedures that PATTERN score compared with only 45% of participants enabled us to track the pattern in which participants recalled assigned to the RC condition ( (1) = 4.27, p < .04). Note the information characterizing the choice set. that there were no differences between the RC and FC con - Method . Eighty-seven undergraduate and graduate stu - ditions in terms of the number of attributes recalled (M RC = dents from a large East Coast university participated in this 8.54, M FC = 8.72; F(1, 86) = .18, p > .6) or recall accuracy study. As in Study 1, participants were seated at a computer (M RC = 6.81, M FC = 6.81; F(1,86) = .00, p > .99). workstation and were presented with information about two Discussion . To summarize, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate laptops from which they were asked to choose. Each laptop that rejectable choice sets change how consumers process, was described on five attributes: brand, processor speed, encode, and retrieve choice-relevant information. In par - model, hard drive, and weight (for full descriptions, see ticular, Study 1 demonstrates how adding a no-choice Table 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two option to the set triggers more alternative- (rather than conditions: the RC or the FC condition. Participants attribute-) based information processing. Study 2 shows that assigned to the FC condition were asked to choose from the choosing from a rejectable choice set not only alters the two offered laptops. Participants in the RC condition were manner in which the information is processed but also 844 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011 changes the way this information is stored in and retrieved The second (ostensibly unrelated) part of the survey was from memory. These results support our main assertion that identical for all participants. Each participant was asked to introducing a no-choice option triggers a more evaluative play a word-find puzzle game constructed of a 15 ¥ 15 matrix than comparative judgment. In the next study, we directly containing 225 letters (for the actual stimulus employed, see explore these shifts in judgment type by examining whether Figure 1). Participants were given one minute to find and evaluative or comparative concepts become more activated write down as many four-letter or longer words as they in consumers’ minds when choosing from either forced or could find in the matrix. The instructions required that the rejectable choice sets. words be meaningful and constructed out of letters that were linked in a straight line (horizontal, vertical, or diago - Study 3: Concept Activation and Accessibility nal) in the letter matrix. The one-minute time limit con - Previous research has shown that recent activation of strained the number of words the participants could find, concepts in the mind can increase their accessibility on sub - leaving them only enough time to identify the words that sequent tasks (Higgins 1996) and can even affect behavior “popped out” at them. This enabled us to determine which (Wilson and Capitman 1982). Indeed, having certain con - concepts were more accessible in the participants’ minds. cepts activated in the mind can increase a person’s percep - Note that, unlike traditional word-find puzzle games, we did tual readiness for those concepts (i.e., the person will be not give participants the list of words that were to be found. more prepared to see things related to the activated knowl - The word-find puzzle contained eight evaluative-related edge; Higgins 1996). For example, consider a dieting con - words (e.g., need, acceptable, enough, adequate) and eight sumer. Words such as “diet,” “calories,” and “weight” will comparative-related words (e.g., best, loser, favorite, com - be more accessible in a dieting consumer’s mind than in the pare). In addition, there were many words in the puzzle that mind of a consumer who is not dieting. Accordingly, were unrelated to either concept (e.g., test, seer, table). Par - because such concepts are activated and are more accessible ticipants received a full explanation of the task and an in the dieting consumer’s mind, he or she should find such example of the game before beginning the target task. words and concepts to be more salient and identifiable in In the third and final section of the survey, participants the environment (e.g., menus, commercials). were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or As we have postulated, and as Studies 1 and 2 show, disagreed with four statements taken from the maximization choices from rejectable choice sets trigger a more evalua - scale (Schwartz et al. 2002). Responses, collected on 1 tive judgment, and choices from forced choice sets trigger a more comparative judgment. A central component of evalu - (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”) scales, ative judgments, per our definition, is an increased focus on measured the participants’ chronic tendency to compare determining the acceptability of the alternatives (i.e., does it objects in different judgment and decision-making contexts meet the consumer’s needs?). Accordingly, we predict that (for the list of the four items, see Appendix A). concepts related to determining the acceptability of the alternatives (hereafter, “evaluative-related concepts”)—for figure 1 example, “minimum” or “needs”—will become activated StUDy 3 WorD PUZZLe when choices are made from rejectable choice sets. The activation of these concepts in the mind will then make evaluative-related words in the environment more easily !"#$"%#&'()*+,& identifiable. -./0&12*(-0!3'4 Conversely, a central component of comparative judg - ments is an increased focus on choosing the best available #",5%++%&&)&236 alternative. Accordingly, we predict that concepts related to choosing the best alternative (hereafter, “comparative- 7-,-(89023+7(+% related concepts”), such as “best” or “winner,” will become ,()24.84#$*+&$: activated and will be more readily identifiable when choices are made from forced choice sets. 1"&!.7*##,),-/ , Method . We sampled 151 nonstudent participants from a &&2-,,7,&!($,)8 large online panel. The study consisted of three parts, and participants were randomly assigned to one of three condi - -$19),&+,$+03'1 tions: the FC condition, the RC condition, or the control 75(57% +$)(5: % + * condition. In the first part of the survey, participants assigned to the FC condition were presented with two lap - 1"/$'-8!$+%,71- top computers described on four attributes (weight, hard !9-,!.&+2,//&2* drive storage, number of USB ports, and screen size) and were asked to choose their most preferred laptop. Partici - ,'9"#"4+(#/+4/1 pants assigned to the RC condition were asked to choose between the exact same laptop computers but were also ),68*),,$*0#&(8 given the option to choose neither. Participants assigned to )!3!/%:/1,*2#41 the control condition automatically skipped the first part of the survey and therefore were not exposed to any choice set &7,68&+,)4."!!/ or descriptions of laptop computers. rejectable choice Sets 845

Results . To examine each participant’s concept accessi - ment that consumers employ, as evidenced by the type of bility, we first calculated the proportion of total words that concepts that become more accessible. Specifically, after he or she found that were evaluative related and the propor - choosing from a rejectable (forced) choice set, relative tion of total words that were comparative related. Next, we accessibility of evaluative- (comparative-) related concepts subtracted the proportion of evaluative-related words from increased, indicating that the mere addition of a no-choice the proportion of comparative-related words to construct a option to the set activates a different set of concepts that relative accessibility score ranging from –1 to +1. Accord - help the consumer decide whether a certain alternative ingly, higher accessibility scores indicate a greater relative meets his or her needs. accessibility for comparative-related words. Finally, to Notably, the observed differences in accessibility were determine and control for each participant’s chronic ten - more pronounced for participants who had lower chronic dency to compare objects, we averaged each participant’s tendency to compare objects, indicating a potential bound - responses on the four maximization scale items. A higher ary condition; no-choice options have less of an effect on score indicated a greater chronic tendency for comparing consumers who chronically engage in comparative judg - objects and therefore should translate into a greater innate ments. Finally, it is important to note that the total number accessibility for comparative-related words. of words found did not differ between experimental condi - We ran a single-factor analysis of covariance using the tions (M RC = 4.75 vs. M FC = 4.67; F(1, 145) = .03, p > .85), relative accessibility score as the dependent variable and the nor did the proportion of unrelated words found (M RC = .39 aforementioned chronic tendency for comparing score as a vs. M FC = .36; F(1, 145) = .28, p > .59). This suggests that covariate. First, as expected, we observed a significant main the addition of a no-choice option did not significantly effect for the covariate (F(1, 145) = 5.68, p < .02), indicat - change the level of involvement or induce greater effort in ing that a greater chronic tendency for comparing objects completing the task. was reflected in a greater relative accessibility for compara - tive-related words. Furthermore, a planned comparison ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS, THRESHOLDS, AND CHOICE revealed a significant difference in relative accessibility In the previous section, we hypothesize and demonstrate scores between the RC and FC conditions (M Rejectable = .15, that rejectable choice sets influence the psychology of MForced = .20; F(1, 145) = 3.90, p = .05). That is, controlling choice and alter consumers’ judgment criteria. We show for the chronic tendency to compare objects, we observe how processing patterns, information encoding and retrieval, that participants found a significantly greater proportion of and concept accessibility differ according to whether a no- comparative- (vs. evaluative-) related words after having choice option is included in the choice set. A question that made a choice from a forced (vs. rejectable) choice set. As arises is whether the mere presence or absence of a no- expected, we observed a significant interaction between the choice option will also change consumers’ preferences. This experimental conditions and the covariate (F(2, 145) = 3.95, question is important not only from theoretical and prag - p < .03); the difference in relative accessibility between the matic perspectives but also from a methodological perspec - RC and FC conditions was more pronounced for partici - tive. Indeed, if the inclusion or exclusion of a no-choice pants with a relatively low chronic tendency to compare option systematically affects consumer preferences, the objects. Importantly, we found no difference in the chronic decision whether to include a no-choice option in the tendency to compare objects between participants assigned experimental design may be more complex and impactful to the RC and FC conditions (M Rejectable = 3.77, M Forced = than previously thought. 3.92; F(1, 148) = .53, p > .46). Thus, choosing from forced In this section, we proceed to examine if and how these or rejectable choice sets did not affect our chronic tendency changes in decision processes can influence preference measure. Finally, the relative accessibility score was posi - structures and choice. Note that because the current research tive in both the RC and FC conditions, indicating that does not focus on the preference for choice deferral, we comparative-related words were generally more accessible constructed the stimuli in each study to make the no-choice than evaluative-related words. Although there are many option unappealing and unlikely to be chosen. Specifically, potential explanations for this finding, it does not run we designed the stimuli to contain alternatives with suffi - counter to our hypothesis. ciently high levels on all attributes while still forcing a To demonstrate the results more clearly and for ease of trade-off between the alternatives. This approach was exposition, Table 3 presents the relative accessibility scores largely effective: The frequency of “no-choice” responses across the three conditions (RC, FC, and control) broken in all of the following studies was relatively low (approxi - down by low versus high chronic tendency to compare mately 6% across all studies). Nevertheless, we detail, in objects (using median splits). each study, how we handled the few no-choice responses to Discussion . Study 3 further demonstrates that introduc - avoid potential statistical biases. ing a no-choice option to the set changes the type of judg - Study 4: Enriched Versus Comparable Attributes table 3 Previous literature has shown that the relative importance StUDy 3 reLatiVe coNcePt acceSSibiLity reSULtS of different attributes varies across types of judgments and preference elicitation tasks (see, e.g., Tversky, Sattath, and Low Chronic High Chronic Slovic 1988). Because it is particularly relevant to the cur - Condition Tendency to Compare Tendency to Compare rent context, we follow Nowlis and Simonson’s (1997) dis - Rejectable choice set .02 .30 tinction between comparable and enriched attributes. These Forced choice set .13 .28 authors define “comparable attributes” as attributes con - Control –.04 .12 sumers use to compare options relatively easily and pre - 846 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011 cisely (e.g., price). In contrast, they define “enriched attri - (brand) was weighted more heavily. Then, we submitted butes” as attributes that are more difficult to compare but these relative attribute importance scores to a one-way are more meaningful when evaluated alone (e.g., brand analysis of variance. name, country of origin). Nowlis and Simonson find that In support of our predictions, the relative importance consumers weight comparable attributes more heavily when scores were higher in the FC condition than in the RC con - they are faced with a comparative judgment (e.g., choice). dition (M FC = 1.5, M RC = –.14; F(1, 45) = 4.78, p < .04). In However, when faced with a more evaluative judgment the FC condition, the importance of the resolution attribute (e.g., purchase likelihood, ratings, overall liking), con - was 5.92 (SD = 1.1) and was higher than the importance of sumers weight enriched attributes more heavily. For exam - the brand attribute, which was 4.42 (SD = 2). However, as ple, a student choosing between two laptops would be likely we predicted, in the RC condition, the importance of the to weight price more heavily in the decision, whereas a stu - comparable attribute (resolution) decreased to 5.05 (SD = dent who is simply deciding whether to purchase a certain 1.4), and the importance of the enriched attribute (brand) laptop would be likely to weight brand more heavily in his increased to 5.18 (SD = 1.5). These shifts in relative weights decision (Hsee 1996). also translated to differences in choice shares. Specifically, In accordance with this literature, we predict that con - the choice share of the alternative that was superior on the sumers choosing from rejectable (vs. forced) choice sets, enriched attribute (i.e., Canon) was higher in the RC condi - which lead to more evaluative (vs. comparative) judgments, tion than in the FC condition (M RC = 39%, M FC = 12.5%; will weight enriched (vs. comparable) attributes more heav - 2(1) = 3.95, p < .05). Overall, only 4 participants took the ily in their decision. Furthermore, we predict that these no-choice option. In Appendix B, we discuss how we han - shifts in attribute weights will result in corresponding shifts dled these responses to eliminate potential biases. in the choice shares of the available alternatives. Study 4 Discussion . The results of Study 4 support our predic - tests these predictions. tions. Specifically, we find that consumers weight enriched Method . Forty-six undergraduate and graduate students attributes more heavily when choices are made from from a large East Coast university participated in this study rejectable (vs. forced) choice sets. In addition, these shifts as part of a larger experimental session containing unrelated in attribute weighting affect the choice shares of the avail - studies. Participants were presented with descriptions of able alternatives. Particularly, the choice shares of the alter - two digital cameras from which they were asked to choose. native superior on the enriched attribute increased when The digital cameras were described on one enriched and one choosing from a rejectable choice set. Thus, this study comparable attribute: brand and resolution, respectively. demonstrates how the mere addition of a no-choice option The first alternative was a Nikon camera with 7.2- to the set changes consumers’ preference structures and ulti - megapixel photo resolution, and the second alternative was mate choices. Next, we examine another way rejectable a Canon camera with 6.1-megapixel photo resolution. In a choice sets can modify the importance consumers assign to pretest (N = 18), participants ranked ten digital camera various attributes. brands from best to worst. Of 18 participants, 17 ranked Canon higher than Nikon ( 2(1) = 14.22, p < .001, tested Study 5: The Role of Attribute-Specific Thresholds against 50%). Accordingly, the two alternatives imposed a Consumers facing a rejectable choice set are relatively trade-off between the enriched attribute (brand) and the more concerned with their minimum needs (i.e., thresholds) comparable attribute (resolution). because the acceptability of the alternatives is of relatively Participants were randomly assigned to either the FC greater concern (see Study 3, which shows increased acces - condition or the RC condition. In both conditions, the two sibility of threshold related concepts). Accordingly, the con - alternatives were presented side-by-side at the top of the sumer must consider what his or her requirements, or mini - page (we counterbalanced the order of presentation across mum levels, are for each attribute to make an alternative participants), and participants were asked to choose the acceptable. These minimum levels may be thought of as digital camera they preferred. In the FC condition, partici - attribute-specific thresholds (hereafter, thresholds), or refer - pants were asked to choose one of the two cameras. In the ence points from which each alternative is evaluated. In RC condition, participants were also informed that they contrast, consumers choosing from forced choice sets will could choose neither, and an additional option labeled “nei - primarily focus on choosing the winner. Therefore, when ther” was added. After participants made their choice, they facing a forced choice set, thresholds become less relevant were asked to indicate on 1 (“not important at all”) to 7 for, and less impactful on, consumers’ choices. It is impor - (“very important”) scales how important each attribute tant to note that these thresholds may either be retrieved (brand and resolution) was in their decision. Finally, partici - from previous experience (internal reference point) or con - pants were asked if and for how long they had owned a digi - structed according to the choice context (external reference tal camera and if and when they planned to purchase a new point). However, this important distinction is beyond the camera. scope of the current study. Results . First, we examined the importance participants If rejectable choice sets make consumers think about attached to each of the attributes. To form a single relative thresholds, as Study 3 suggests, an important question is importance score for each participant, we subtracted the how such thresholds may affect attribute weighting and importance of the brand attribute (the enriched attribute) choice, even if all alternatives exceed the consumer’s mini - from the importance of the resolution attribute (the compa - mum needs (i.e., all alternatives are acceptable). We argue rable attribute). Thus, higher scores would indicate that the that the answer lies in the principle of diminishing sensitiv - comparable attribute (resolution) was weighted more heavily, ity, which suggests that the marginal values of both gains and lower scores would indicate that the enriched attribute and losses decrease with their distance from the consumer’s rejectable choice Sets 847 reference point (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In the control condition (Figure 2, Panel A), participants Thus, on each attribute dimension, the further away the were informed that 97% of the population in the survey alternatives in the choice set are from a consumer’s refer - indicated that their minimum acceptable level for both the ence point, the less sensitive that consumer will be to differ - sound quality and visual quality was five to six stars, ences between those alternatives. thereby establishing the participants’ thresholds for both Consider a consumer facing a rejectable choice set and attributes at a relatively equal distance from the choice set. focusing on his or her thresholds for each attribute when In the shifted-sound condition (Figure 2, Panel B), partici - evaluating the alternatives. The perceived difference between the alternatives with respect to a specific attribute figure 2 will appear increasingly smaller the further the alternatives iLLUStratioNS of threShoLDS aND choice Set " " in the choice set are from this particular attribute’s thresh - emPLoyeD iN StUDy 5 old. Accordingly, this attribute is likely to receive little weight when the choice is made. Conversely, if the alterna - A: Control Condition tives in the set are closer to this attribute’s threshold, the perceived difference between the alternatives will seem

larger, and the attribute will be weighted more heavily in d l g " o

" n i h

choice. t "" s a e r R If we now consider a consumer facing a forced choice set, " h alternative a t r

a such effects should attenuate. Specifically, because forced " y t t i l

" S alternative b a choice sets trigger a more comparative judgment, thresholds u y

" t Q i

l and minimum needs become less relevant. Accordingly, l

" a a u u

" s consumers facing a forced choice set will be less sensitive i Q

" V to the relative distance between the alternatives in the d

" n choice set and their thresholds. u Sound Quality threshold

" o

To test these predictions, we manipulated the distance (in " S " the attribute space) between the altern"atives in the choice " 0 " "" 0 V isu al Quali ty Star R ating set and participants’ thresholds by shifting consumers’ " thresholds while holding the location of the choice set in the " B: Shifted-Sound Condition attribute space fixed. Specifically, we described two televi - " sions on two ten-star scales: (1) visual quality and (2) sound " "

d quality. We used these ten-star scales rather than actual l " g " o

" n h " i s attribute values (e.g., screen size, number of pixels) to t

"" e " a """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""r h ensure that the participants would have no preexisting R " "" t alternative a

" r

y " a thresholds. Moreover, we constructed these attributes in " t t " i l S " a alternative b " such a manner as to not render one attribute more compara - " u y t " " Q i """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Sound Quality threshold l ble (or enriched) than the other. This allowed us to disentan - l a " " a

" u u s gle the effects observed in Study 4 fr"om the effects pre - " i

"" Q V " dicted in the current study. We manipulated the participants’ "" d " " n thresholds by describing the minimum needs of other con - " u " """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""o S sumers in the market. " "" 0 Method . One hundred twenty-two " undergraduate and "" 0 graduate students from a large East Co" ast university were "" Visual Quality Star Rating " "" presented with two fictional television"s that were rated on "" C: Shifted-Visual Condition two 10-star attribute scales (visual qua"lity and sound qual - "" ity), ostensibly created by a reputable e"lectronics magazine. "" " The first alternative was rated 9.1 and 7.7 stars on sound "" " d g "" " " l o n

" i and visual quality, respectively. The second alternative had " h t s a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" e

" r

a lower rating for sound quality but a better rating for visual R h " alternative a r """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""t

a

quality, with 7.2 and 9.6 stars, respectively. Because it y t

" t

" i l

S alternative b a would be impossible for participants" to assign any true " u y t Q """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" i

" l value to any given star level, participants were given infor - l a " """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""a u u

mation ostensibly taken from a nationwide survey in which s "" i " Q

V participants indicated their minimum "acceptable level on "" d " n each scale. We used these minimum levels to establish and " u Sound Quality threshold """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" o manipulate the participants’ thresholds on the two attributes. S " """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 0 Participants were randomly assigned to "one of six conditions " 0 in a 2 (choice set type: forced choice set" vs. rejectable choice " Visual Quality Star Rating set) ¥ 3 (which attribute-specific thresh"old was shifted to be " " " D: Quality Star Ratings by Alternative closer to the choice set: control vs. sou"nd threshold shifted " vs. visual threshold shifted) between-s"ubjects design. Fig - " Alternative A Alternative B ure 2 illustrates the location of alterna"tives and thresholds Sound Quality "Star Rating 9.1 7.2 " Visual Quality "Star Rating 7.7 9.6 in the attribute space across all three scenarios. " 848 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011 pants were informed that 97% of the population in the sur - difference in the FC condition (M Shifted_visual = 58.3%, vey indicated that their minimum acceptable levels were six MShifted_sound = 58.1%; F(1, 121) = .00, p > .95). The inter - to seven stars for sound quality and five to six stars for action between choice-set type (rejectable vs. forced) and visual quality, thereby shifting the participants’ thresholds choice-set location (closer to visual quality vs. sound qual - on sound quality to be relatively closer to the choice set than ity threshold) was marginally significant (F(1, 121) = 3.87, their visual quality threshold. Similarly, participants p < .08). assigned to the shifted-visual condition (Figure 2, Panel C) These findings confirm the prediction that, when choos - were informed that 97% of the population in the survey ing from a rejectable choice set, consumers will weight indicated that their minimum acceptable levels were six to attributes more heavily as the distance between the choice seven stars for visual quality and five to six stars for sound set and the attribute-specific thresholds decreases. Impor - quality, thereby shifting the participants’ thresholds on visual tantly, this sensitivity to the distance between the choice set quality to be relatively closer to the choice set than their and the attribute-specific thresholds was not apparent when sound quality threshold. Note that both available alterna - participants made the choice from a forced choice set. tives exceeded all possible thresholds in all three conditions. Finally, although we made no specific predictions regarding After examining the choice set and survey information, the attribute weights assigned in the control conditions, two participants rated the relative importance of each attribute important aspects should be noted. First, as expected, the in making their decision. Specifically, participants com - weight assigned to visual quality in the rejectable-control pleted a constant-sum allocation task by allocating 100 condition falls between that assigned in the two RC–shifted points between the two attributes (sound and visual quality) conditions. Second, the finding that the weights assigned in according to the importance of each attribute. Subsequently, the RC–control condition do not significantly differ from participants indicated their choice of television. We pre - those assigned in the FC–control condition (M RC_control = dicted that, in the RC conditions, the importance weight of 63.5%, M FC_control = 62.5%; F(1, 121) = .06, p > .81) sug - visual (sound) quality would be higher (lower) in the gests that participants did not consider either attribute as more enriched or more comparable than the other. As men - shifted-visual condition than in the shifted-sound condition. tioned previously, we did this intentionally to disentangle Importantly, we did not expect such differences in the FC the effects observed in Study 4 from those predicted in the conditions. current study. Results . We compared the attribute weights allocated to Examining the choice shares of the different alternatives, visual quality across the different conditions (see Figure 3). we find additional support for our predictions. Specifically, For this analysis, we consider only the weighting of a single in the RC conditions, the choice share of the alternative attribute (i.e., visual quality) because the constant-sum allo - superior on visual quality was 91.3% in the shifted-visual cation task dictated that an increase in the weighting of one condition compared with 72.7% in the shifted-sound condi - attribute resulted in an equivalent decrease in the weighting tion ( 2(1) = 3.67, p = .056). Moreover, and consistent with of the other attribute. As predicted, in the RC conditions, the our predictions, such a difference in choice shares between relative weight assigned to the visual quality attribute was the shifted-visual and shifted-sound conditions did not exist significantly affected by the shift in thresholds. In particu - in the FC condition (75% and 72%, respectively; 2(1) = lar, the relative weight of the visual quality attribute was .91, p > .75). As expected, because we constructed the alter - significantly greater when its threshold was closer to the natives to be greater than the thresholds, the frequency of choice set (M Shifted_visual = 70.9%, M Shifted_sound = 60.9%; no-choice response was extremely low (two participants) F(1, 121) = 6.35, p < .02). Furthermore, we did not find this and therefore did not significantly affect the results. Discussion . Study 5 confirms the prediction that manipu - figure 3 lating participants’ thresholds would shift attribute impor - StUDy 5: the iNfLUeNce of threShoLDS iN tance weights only for choices made from rejectable choice reJectabLe SetS sets. That is, we found the proximity of the choice set to the attribute-specific thresholds to be relevant and to influence attribute weighting and preferences only when a no-choice 75% option was available; the closer an attribute-specific thresh - control old was to the rejectable choice set, the greater the weight y

t participants attached to this attribute. We also demonstrate i Shifted-visual l 70% a that such shifts in attribute weights can affect choice shares.

u Shifted-sound Q

In contrast, the relative distance from a forced choice set to l a

u 65% the attribute specific thresholds was irrelevant and did not s i

V affect attribute weighting or choices.

f

o To provide convergent evidence, and because the expected

e 60% c interaction between choice-set type and threshold location n a

t was only marginally significant ( p < .08), we replicated r

o Study 5 using different stimuli. Specifically, in an identical p 55% m

I 2 ¥ 3 between-subjects design, 126 undergraduate and grad - uate students sampled from an online panel were presented with two fictional restaurants that were rated on two ten-star 50% rejectable Set forced Set attribute scales (service quality and food quality), ostensi - bly created by a reputable dining magazine. The procedures, rejectable choice Sets 849 manipulation, and analyses employed were identical to choice set. 1 These authors use a dual response format in those performed in Study 5. As we predicted, when partici - their study in which participants first made a choice from a pants chose from the rejectable choice set, the importance forced choice set and then subsequently indicated whether of service quality was significantly greater when the service they would actually purchase the chosen alternative. They quality (vs. food quality) threshold was closer to the choice performed two analyses on these data. The first analysis set (M Service = 40.8% vs. M Food = 30.9%; F(1, 125) = 8.55, ignored the subsequent “would you purchase” question, p < .01). In contrast, we did not observe such differences thereby estimating partworths only on the basis of the when participants chose from forced choice sets (M Service = forced-choice responses. The second analysis used the same 36.8% vs. M Food = 36.5%; F(1, 125) = .01, p > .93). Impor - data but recoded observations that were subsequently fol - tantly, the expected interaction between choice-set type lowed by a “no, I would not purchase the chosen alterna - (rejectable vs. forced) and choice set location (closer to tive” response as “none” responses. Comparing the results service quality vs. food quality threshold) resulted in a sig - of these two analyses, the authors find that price (a compa - nificant interaction (F(1, 125) = 4.55, p < .04). Table 4 sum - rable attribute) was more important in the analysis that did marizes the results of Study 5 and its replication. not incorporate the no-choice responses (i.e., incorporated only the forced choice-set responses). Moreover, the format Study 6: Rejectable Versus Forced Choice Sets in Choice- attribute (DVD vs. VHS), which is a more enriched attrib - Based Conjoint Application ute, was more important in the analysis that incorporated the As we mentioned previously, whether the mere inclusion no-choice responses. Of note, this result held only for the of a no-choice option in the set will affect consumers’ pref - elimination-by-aspects model. (Comparison across the two erence structure is also important from a methodological models is much less straightforward for the other tested perspective. Taken together, the results reported in Studies screening rules.) 1–5 suggest that, indeed, consumer preferences systemati - In the current study, we directly compare the change in cally shift when choosing from forced versus rejectable attribute weights by employing two conjoint designs choice sets. In this study, we demonstrate such shifts in (between-subjects): one in which participants chose from preferences by employing a commonly used methodology rejectable choices sets and one in which participants chose for preference estimation—namely, choice-based conjoint from forced choice sets. In addition to demonstrating the (CBC) analysis (Green and Srinivasan 1990; Wittink and practical implications of our research, using the conjoint Cattin 1989). methodology enables us to (1) test the effect of rejectable One of the most commonly used approaches for collect - choice sets in a richer environment that includes a greater ing conjoint analysis data is a CBC design. In CBC, partici - number of attributes and alternatives and (2) estimate attribute pants face a given number of choice sets (one at a time) and weights from consumers’ revealed preferences (choices) are asked to choose their most preferred alternative from rather than stated preferences (i.e., the self-reported weights each choice set. Such choice sets may or may not include a in Studies 4 and 5). We predict that enriched attributes will no-choice option (i.e., be rejectable or forced choice sets), become relatively more (less) important in a CBC design depending on the CBC design. The main rational for adding that uses rejectable (forced) choice sets. We predict the a no-choice option in a CBC study is to estimate the cate - opposite pattern for comparable attributes. gory demand. However, given the results of the preceding CBC design and data description . We conducted a con - studies, the decision of whether to include or exclude a no- joint experiment in cooperation with a food company that choice option should be carefully evaluated because it may wanted to test which green and other socially responsible systematically influence the recovered parameters. Indeed, initiatives it should pursue for its products. Because the con - recent research provides intriguing evidence that no-choice joint study involved a real firm and its actual target market, options may have a substantial impact on preference esti - we exclude some sensitive and/or identifiable information mation in CBC designs. Specifically, Gilbride and Allenby (e.g., the company name, specific products) from the study (2006) model different screening rules that decision makers description. We tested two versions of the CBC survey. Both employ and analyze data from CBC designs (conducted on surveys were identical except that one presented participants consumers’ preferences for documentary films) that either with forced choice sets (the FC condition) while the other included or excluded the option of rejecting the entire presented participants with rejectable choice sets (the RC condition). The alternatives (food products) were described table 4 using both comparable and enriched attributes. Specifically, imPortaNce Weight reSULtS for StUDy 5 (aND the each choice set contained three alternatives that were rePLicatioN StUDy) described on six attributes. The comparable attributes were retail price (in US$) and calorie count (in calories per serv - Rejectable Forced ing) of the product. The enriched attributes were brand Condition Choice Set (%) Choice Set (%) name, type of green initiatives, and two other attributes that Televisions: Relative Weight of Visual Quality cannot be disclosed for proprietary reasons. The conjoint Shifted-visual 70.9 58.3 task included a full description and explanation of the six Control 63.5 62.5 attributes followed by the 16 choice sets. We constructed Shifted-sound 60.9 58.1 the choice sets to form an orthogonal balanced design using Restaurants (Replication): Relative Weight of Service Quality the macros %mkturns, %mktex, %mktlab, and %choiceff in Shifted-service 40.8 36.8 Control 39.8 34.3 Shifted-food 30.9 36.5 1We thank an anonymous reviewer for mentioning these findings. 850 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011

SAS. Both the position of alternatives and order of choice table 5 sets were fully randomized across participants. coNJoiNt StUDy (StUDy 6) Parameter eStimateS One hundred forty-three participants who indicated at least one food purchase occasion from the specific category Posterior Mean in the past six months were randomly sampled from large Forced Rejectable metropolitan areas on the East Coast of the United States. 2 Choice Set Choice Set Participants were randomly assigned to either the FC or RC Level Condition Condition condition. Enriched Attributes Analyses and results . To compare the relative weight of Brand 100 the comparable versus enriched attributes across the two 2 .49 –.08 conditions, we estimated participants’ partworths using the 3 .94 1.23 4 .80 .36 hierarchical Bayes method (e.g., Allenby and Ginter 1995). 5 .23 .22 We coded the hierarchical Bayes Markov chain Monte Green initiative 100 Carlo (MCMC) procedure in Gauss. We used the first 2 .54 .44 80,000 iterations of the MCMC samples as a burn-in and the 3 .90 .28 last 5000 iterations to estimate the conditional posterior dis - 4 .49 .50 tributions. To test the convergence of the MCMC, we 5 .65 .42 employed the method Gelman and Rubin (1992) propose, Attribute 3 100 2 .85 1.27 which compares the within and between variance for each 3 .82 1.44 parameter across multiple chains. Using three parallel 4 1.10 1.43 chains, the scale reduction estimate for all the parameters Attribute 4 100 was below 1.03, in support of convergence. 2 .99 .83 Following existing literature, we define attribute weight 3 .71 .45 as the normalized range of the attribute’s partworths (Green Comparable Attributes and Srinivasan 1978). More formally, if we define for indi - Price 100 2 1.18 .93 vidual i the range of attribute k that has j levels as R ik , 3 2.42 1.96 where 4 3.52 2.73 Calories 100 (1) Rik = max j{P ikj } – min j{P ikj } 20.33 3 .34 .44 and P ikj is the mean posterior partworth of level j of attri- bute k for individual i, the relative weight of attribute k for Notes: Estimates in bold have a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. individual i will be given by T ik , where

(2) Tik = R ik /kRik . This observation demonstrates, in a richer environment than Note that the calculated weights are relative because they our preceding studies, that choosing from a rejectable are normalized and sum to 1: choice set increases the weight that consumers attach to the enriched attributes. Note also that running the conjoint (3) kTik = 1. study and increasing the external validity does not come without a cost. In particular, because we performed the CBC We summed the relative weights of the comparable attri- in a richer environment, it was more difficult to reduce the butes (i.e., price and calories) to form an overall weight of number of no-choice responses (see the distribution of the the comparable attributes. Similarly, we summed the weight no-choice responses in Appendix C). As we mentioned pre - of the four enriched attributes to form the overall weight of viously, completely ignoring these responses may introduce enriched attributes. Because the logit scale parameter can - a statistical bias. Therefore, we included the no-choice cels out when calculating the attribute weights (as defined responses in the aforementioned conjoint analyses (for a in Equation 2), we are able to compare the relative attribute more conservative test in which the no-choice responses weights across the two conditions. were coded in a manner that runs counter to our hypothesis, An analysis performed on the population means sup - see Appendix C). ported our prediction at the aggregate level. Specifically, the relative weight of the comparable attributes was 49.6% in GENERAL DISCUSSION the FC condition, whereas in the RC condition, the impor - To date, the literature on no-choice options has largely tance of the comparable attributes was 43.7%. More impor - focused its attention on the determinants and consequences tant, an individual-level analysis revealed a significant dif - of choice deferral as well as the statistical implications of ference between the relative attribute weights of the including or excluding no-choice options. In contrast, this comparable attributes in both conditions (M FC = 44%, M RC = research focuses on the impact of no-choice options on the 38%, p < .05). Table 5 presents the partworth estimates. choice processes and preferences of those consumers who Discussion . As we predicted, when participants chose do not defer choice. We demonstrate that the mere presence from a rejectable (vs. forced) choice set, the comparable of a no-choice option in the choice set changes important attributes were relatively less important for their choices. aspects of consumers’ decision processes; we show that no- choice options affect the preferences of consumers even 2Twenty-one participants failed to complete the survey and were omitted when the no-choice option is undesired and not selected. from the analysis. Next, we highlight the key findings of the six presented rejectable choice Sets 851 studies; discuss alternative explanations; and conclude with consumers perceive the no-choice option as a viable one can the methodological, managerial, and theoretical implica - be affected by numerous factors, such as the product cate - tions of these findings. gory from which the choice is being made, individual dif - ferences (e.g., need for closure; Webster and Kruglanski Review of Key Findings 1994), and different marketing communications. We argue that choosing from a rejectable choice set (i.e., Admittedly, in the experimental designs employed here, a choice set with a no-choice option) versus choosing from the distinction between forced and rejectable choice sets a forced choice set (i.e., a choice set without a no-choice was made unambiguous by the explicit inclusion or exclu - option) results in a more evaluative (rather than compara - sion of no-choice options. However, it is conceivable that, tive) judgment. Consistent with this argument, we demon - in real life, consumers seldom encounter such overt no- strate that consumers use a more alternative- (attribute-) choice options, because these options are rarely made based processing pattern when faced with a rejectable (forced) choice set (Study 1) and also recall attribute infor - salient by marketers. In contrast, it is also conceivable that mation in a corresponding pattern (Study 2). Furthermore, every decision consumers make contains a no-choice we find that concepts associated with more evaluative option. Simply put, people never have to choose. We argue (comparative) judgments were more accessible for partici - that choices and, more important, the way consumers per - pants who had previously made a choice from rejectable ceive them do not typically fall at these extremes. Instead, (forced) choice sets. Also consistent with this change in type the degree to which the no-choice option is salient to, and of judgment and with previous literature, we demonstrate considered viable by, consumers may be influenced by the that adding a no-choice option to the set increased the interaction of the aforementioned factors and, therefore, lie importance of enriched attributes (Studies 4 and 6) and the on a continuum. Thus, we believe that examining the con - importance of attributes with levels that were closer to con - textual and psychological factors that either accentuate or sumers’ attribute-specific thresholds (Study 5). Finally, we attenuate the perceived viability of no-choice options to show that such shifts in preferences may lead to shifts in the consumers (or rejectability mind-set) is an important direc - choice shares of available alternatives (Studies 4 and 5). tion for further research. Alternative Explanations Methodological and Practical Implications Taken together, the six studies presented here support our One implication of our findings involves the construction conceptual framework and predictions. However, to or design of choice experiments (including, but not limited advance the uniqueness of our theoretical explanations and to, choice-based conjoint tasks). Our findings suggest that to rule out several rival accounts, we conducted several researchers and practitioners should be aware of the poten - additional analyses. For example, one could argue that tial impact of including or excluding no-choice options. We including a no-choice option in the choice set introduces noise into our measurement due to enhanced task complex - argue that they should carefully consider the inclusion or ity and/or confusion. However, throughout our studies, we exclusion of a no-choice option and aim to match the choice did not find support for such a claim. Specifically, in Study set construction (i.e., rejectable vs. forced choice sets) to 1, participants choosing from rejectable or forced choice those they are designed to mirror in real life. Specifically, sets did not significantly differ on the amount of time spent research that focuses on purchase situations in which a no- or the amount of information observed before making their choice option is more feasible and accessible in consumers’ choices. Similarly, in Study 2, participants choosing from minds should aim to add a no-choice option to its design. rejectable or forced choice sets did not significantly differ Conversely, research that focuses on purchase situations in in the amount or accuracy of information they recalled. which consumers perceive the no-choice option as less Finally, in Study 3, we observed no difference between the viable should avoid adding a no-choice option to its design, rejectable and forced choice set conditions in terms of the because it may falsely bolster the importance of the more number of words participants found in the word-puzzle task. enriched attributes. In addition, we performed Levene’s test for equality of Additional implications relate to the notion of choice variance across Studies 4 and 5 to test arguments pertaining architecture (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Marketers can to heteroskedasticity between the forced and rejectable examine different ways of constructing a rejectable choice choice set conditions. However, these tests failed to find set (i.e., making the no-choice alternative salient and viable) significant evidence for heteroskedasticity on the reported or triggering a rejectability mind-set to highlight (shadow) attribute weights in Study 4 (Levene statistic = 1.499, p > their products’ advantages (disadvantages). For example, .22), Study 5 (Levene statistic = .44, p > .50), or the replica - different marketing communications such as “Is It Time to tion of Study 5 (Levene statistic = .37, p > .54). Overall, task complexity, increased confusion, and decreased involve - Replace Your Old Car?” compared with “It Is Time to ment do not appear to be the main drivers of the observed Replace Your Old Car!” may prompt a rejectability mind- results. set (i.e., make the no-choice option more salient in the con - sumer’s mind, thereby affecting their choice). This should Rejectable Versus Forced Choice Sets in the Real World be done with the awareness that the marketer is risking the In our everyday lives, no-choice alternatives may repre - possibility that consumers might opt for the no-choice sent several different options, such as not to purchase at all option when it is made more salient. However, this may not or to procrastinate and perhaps search for additional infor - be a concern in some situations (e.g., a marketer who tar - mation and/or alternatives. In addition, the degree to which gets his or her competitors’ customers). 852 JoUrNaL of marketiNg reSearch, october 2011

Theoretical Implications responding information) than on nonalignable differences Consistent with the literature on context effects and con - when choosing (Lindemann and Markman 1996; Markman structed preferences (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; and Medin 1995; Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974). Accord - Simonson 1989), the current research demonstrates how a ing to our conceptualization, having consumers choose from seemingly irrelevant and ultimately undesired alternative a rejectable choice set may reverse such observations. (the no-choice option) changes consumers’ decision pro - Attributes can be further distinguished in terms of complex - ity (simple vs. compound), concreteness (concrete vs. cesses and choices. It is noteworthy that some similarities abstract), and tangibility (tangible vs. intangible). In each of exist between the current findings and the asymmetric these distinctions, we would predict that the consumers fac - dominance effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982). In the ing a rejectable choice set would be more likely to incorpo - asymmetric dominance paradigm, as well as in our studies, rate the latter type of attribute. We believe this is a fruitful the addition of an undesired alternative, the dominated alter - direction for further research. native (decoy) or the no-choice option, respectively, results in a shift of choice shares between the alternatives in the APPENDIX A: LIST OF ITEMS USED IN STUDY 3 original set. Such shifts in choice shares are violations of the We used the following items, taken from the maximiza - economic assumption of regularity. tion scale (Schwartz et al. 2002), in Study 3: Parallels can also be drawn between our findings and the work of Hsee and colleagues (Hsee 1996; Hsee and Leclerc •When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check other 1998; Hsee et al. 1999). These authors distinguish between stations to see if something better is playing, even if I’m rela - joint and separate evaluations and show that preference tively satisfied with what I’m listening to. reversals can occur when switching between these two •No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the lookout for better opportunities. modes of evaluation. The reason for these preference rever - •I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the best sals, similar to our results, is a differential reliance on, or movies, the best singers, the best athletes, the best novels, etc.). importance of, different types of attributes. More specifi - •Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling to pick cally, they find that certain attributes (e.g., comparable the best one. attributes) are more impactful during joint evaluations, while others (e.g., enriched attributes) are more impactful APPENDIX B: ANALYSIS OF STUDY 4 during separate evaluations. The current work documents INCORPORATING THE NO-CHOICE RESPONSES similar findings without imposing a particular evaluation As mentioned in the article, the analysis reported in Study mode and supports the notion that separate versus joint 4 did not take into account the few no-choice responses that evaluations are situated on a continuum. That is, although were collected. In total, four participants chose the “neither” all our participants technically made a joint evaluation (i.e., option. Merely eliminating these responses from our analy - observed the entire choice set simultaneously and chose sis might introduce bias into our results. Specifically, it their desired alternative), the addition of the no-choice could be argued that participants who chose the no-choice option triggered a more separate evaluation mode. option might have chosen in a manner opposing our Although the focus of the current research is on how hypothesis had they been forced to choose. Therefore, to rejectable choice sets affect consumer decision processes conduct the most conservative test possible, we coded all and choices, we could take a broader perspective and argue the no-choice responses in a manner that opposed our that our results suggest that rejectable choice sets alter the hypothesis (i.e., all were coded as choosing the Nikon cam - consumer’s mind-set, or cognitive orientation (see Achtziger era). The results still approached significance (M = 32%, and Gollwitzer 2008; Xu and Wyer 2007, 2008). Specifi - RC MFC = 12.5%; z = 1.61, p < .1). Finally, a less conservative cally, we find that rejectable choice sets affect not only yet reasonable test codes the no-choice responses according choice but also information processing, attribute weighting, to the attributes importance scores. Specifically, if the and concept accessibility. In other words, several cognitive attribute score is positive (negative), we could infer that the processes are affected by the availability of a no-choice alternative superior on resolution (brand) would have been option, thereby placing the consumer in what may be con - chosen. Conducting such a test revealed a significant effect sidered a rejectable (or rejectability) mind-set. Study 3 indi - (M RC = 41%, M FC = 12.5%; z = 2.28, p < .03). cates direct evidence of a rejectable mind-set: Choosing from a rejectable (vs. forced) choice set affected partici - APPENDIX C: ANALYSIS OF STUDY 6 pants’ performance on a subsequent task (the word-puzzle INCORPORATING THE NO-CHOICE RESPONSES game). Further examining the rejectable mind-set and other Table C1presents the distribution of no-choice responses factors that may trigger it, as discussed in the previous sec - of the 63 participants assigned to the RC condition. As can tions, seems to be worthwhile avenue for further research. be seen, the majority of participants (63.5%) did not choose The findings offered here also lead to other interesting the no-choice option at any point in the survey, and 87% of and important predictions. For example, in the current participants chose the no-choice option no more than three study, we followed Nowlis and Simonson (1997) and differ - times. However, to perform a more conservative test, we entiated attributes on the comparable-enriched dimension. coded all the no-choice responses counter to our predic - However, researchers could also differentiate between tions. Specifically, because we predict that comparable alignable and nonalignable attributes (see Markman and attributes will be weighted less in the RC conditions, we Gentner 1993). Research focusing on similarity judgments, coded all the no-choice responses as a choice of the alterna - as well as research on choice, has demonstrated that con - tive superior on the most important comparable attribute sumers tend to focus more on alignable differences (or cor - (i.e., lowest price). rejectable choice Sets 853

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