The Impact of the Type 094 Ballistic Missile Submarine on China's Nuclear Policy

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The Impact of the Type 094 Ballistic Missile Submarine on China's Nuclear Policy View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2009-06 The impact of the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine on China's nuclear policy Bell, Samuel D. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4700 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE IMPACT OF THE TYPE 094 BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE ON CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY by Samuel Bell June 2009 Thesis Advisor: Christopher Twomey Second Reader: Jeff Kline Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2009 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS The Impact of the Type 094 Ballistic Missile Submarine on China’s Nuclear Policy 6. AUTHOR(S) Samuel Bell 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the implication of China’s near completion of a viable nuclear triad. The objective is to determine first, how this submarine will fit into China’s no-first-use policy with regards to their nuclear weapons. And second, determine how advanced this weapon platform will be. With the introduction of multiple Type 094 “Jin” class ballistic missile submarines, has Beijing set the stage for a possible return to Cold War level anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations by the United States? The Type 094 has been discussed at length in open source publications. This thesis advances those discussions by examining them in detail. Expected noise level, target sets, and class size are dissected and compared to historical data to verify the likelihood of mission tactics. This technical data, combined with a summary of the challenges faced in terms of submarine communications and control, will highlight Beijing’s decision to deploy this new technology conservatively or more … to maximize the intended target set. Washington must view the Type 094 as a vast improvement over their single Type 092 “Xia” class ballistic missile submarine. Atrophied United States ASW assets must be upgraded to meet this new challenge. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES Type 094, Chinese Nuclear Policy, No First Use, Jin, Ballistic Missile Submarine 124 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THE IMPACT OF THE TYPE 094 BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE ON CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY Samuel D. Bell Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2003 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2009 Author: Samuel D. Bell Approved by: Christopher P. Twomey Thesis Advisor Jeffery Kline Second Reader Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis examines the implication of China’s near completion of a viable nuclear triad. The objective is to determine first, how this submarine will fit into China’s no-first-use policy with regards to their nuclear weapons. And second, determine how advanced this weapon platform will be. With the introduction of multiple Type 094 “Jin” class ballistic missile submarines, has Beijing set the stage for a possible return to Cold War level anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations by the United States? The Type 094 has been discussed at length in open source publications. This thesis advances those discussions by examining them in detail. Expected noise level, target sets, and class size are dissected and compared to historical data to verify the likelihood of mission tactics. This technical data, combined with a summary of the challenges faced in terms of submarine communications and control, will highlight Beijing’s decision to deploy this new technology conservatively or more … to maximize the intended target set. Washington must view the Type 094 as a vast improvement over their single Type 092 “Xia” class ballistic missile submarine. Atrophied United States ASW assets must be upgraded to meet this new challenge. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE ..................................................................1 B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 D. METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP.........................................................11 II. BACKGROUND AND BENEFITS OF THE TYPE 094 .......................................13 A. SURVIVABILITY AND DETERRENCE DOCTRINE ............................13 B. GREAT BRITAIN CASE STUDY...............................................................20 C. TYPE 094 DEVELOPMENT DRIVING FACTORS.................................25 D. TYPE 094 REALITIES .................................................................................31 1. Shape ...................................................................................................32 2. Skin Friction (Sail/Surfaces) .............................................................32 3. Flood Openings ..................................................................................33 4. Propeller..............................................................................................34 E. TYPE 094 EXPECTATIONS .......................................................................35 F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................38 III. TYPE 094 BASING AND NUMBERS.....................................................................41 A. FUTURE NUMBER ESTIMATES..............................................................41 B. DEPLOYMENT TYPE .................................................................................46 C. POSSIBLE HOME BASE LOCATIONS AND TARGET SPECULATION.............................................................................................52 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................58 IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TYPE 094 ON CHINA’S NO-FIRST-USE POLICY......................................................................................................................61 A. HISTORY .......................................................................................................62 1. Chinese Nuclear Weapons Purpose..................................................62 2. Guiding Principle or Evolving Doctrine ..........................................64 3. Force Size Requirements...................................................................66 4. Strategy Flexibility.............................................................................67 B. RECENT POLICY CHALLENGES ...........................................................68 C. INCORPORATION OF SSBNS AND LAUNCH POLICY ......................71 D. SUBMARINE CASUALTIES.......................................................................78 E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................81 V. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .................................83 A. BALANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER...........................................................83 B. ESCALATION CONTROL OPTIONS.......................................................87 C. CURRENT U.S. POLICY .............................................................................89 1. Considerations for Future United States—Taiwan Policy.............92 2. Overall U.S. Policy Change Recommendations ..............................94
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