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S-0899-0005-07-00001

Expanded Number S-0899-0005-07-00001

Title items-in-Middle East - operations and other missions - UNIFIL - Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978)

Date Created 19/03/1978

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0899-0005: Peacekeeping - Middle East 1945-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit CONFIDENTIAL 2 May

NOTE FOR THE -GEEfE

THE CAIRO AGREEMENT

The Cairo agreement, signed on 3 November 1969, attempts to regulate the relationship between the Palestinians and the Lebanese authorities. The agreement itself contains 19 points; the first four points deal in general terms with the Palestinian presence in , and point 4 in particular states as follows: "palestiniansresiding in Lebanon are^to be permitted to participate 3EnJbKe"™PaTestinian revo- ,,^»M~-~"<«>™»^ lution through its armed struggle within the framework ^C-fl—""IttBl^^f^S^j^^rc^^N -P T ^%TPv^*^ ^ *•* x^% e*^*'*f**'V x> i ^rvi ^*» *?* v» *3 f* ^^f^mt ^ ^ ^»»" ITlT^ ^ v^^.»« ^ i i^ i v* V*••* ese sovereignty and securit5 y « T'ne remaining MHsasitjsiiaaK^wfflwaw^Wi^^T**commando activitie^ s i.n Lebanon, , and_ the manner in which co-operation should be established between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian commando groups.

Specific details of how the agreement itself should be executed are contained in annexes which have thus far never been published. However, in a meeting with General Khoury in Beirut on 15 April 1978, he disclosed that according to the Cairo agreement *->"=> pr.n j ^ TTQ±_,, allowed to have armed element*fsr in the western sector southern Lebanon, the PLO is permitted a battalion of armed men. in the central sector (tha€snraslSr^e area °£ S^§iii^^ * t^ie PLO ^s Perm^tte(^«^P J2fiJ[} 3ePl°ye3 i-n 5 aapositions, each one not exceedingBs1§0>°imen. The deploy- ment in this central sector should be primarily for medical and logistic support.

It should be noted that when the PLO speak about the Cairo agreement, it is usually in the context of their having freedom of action to carry out commando activities from southern Lebanon against Israeli territory. Thisinterpretation is often challenged m in private by th'"'•••e Lebanes'^"-iiaii i i— e"""•'" I authorities"•''"*''*"' "-^''il"(iB'»ittlJl|^-w^^ . PERMANENT MISSION OF LEBANON TO THE

Bee UNITED NATIONS PLAZA

NEW YORK, N. Y. IOOI7 TEL. ELDORADO S-546O-I

STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR GHASSAN TUfiNI, OF LEBANON TO THE UNI1ED NATIONS. ON APRIL 21, 1978 AT THE EIGHTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE FINANCING OF U.N.I.F.I.L.

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY Mr. President,

The Eighth Special Session of our General Assembly is a very special session indeed. It is not an administrative and financial meeting. Nor is it just another political forum where we assemble to debate and debate and debate, endlessly, and endlessly passing resolutions that never translate into reality. If we are meeting today, it is because there was, Mr. President, a unique response in the world community, which we here embody, to the appeal of a Member-State in-agony ... a response to Lebanon's "peace-cry": LET MY PEOPLE LIVE.

Paraphrasing, if I may, the words with which the distinguished representa- tive of the United Kingdom concluded the meetings of the Security Council he was chairing last month, I would here repeat, as a testimony, that, "in our imperfect world, the Security Council has asserted its ability to discharge its responsibilities for securing as best it could, international peace and security."

Mr. President, ,. .

In our Fifth Committee, there was, as you know, a magnificent concensus on the objectives of Resolutions ^25 and lj-26, their unequivocal character, the spirit of practicality with which they were voted, then the swiftness with which the Secretariat moved to implement them.

The soldiers of peace, Mr. President, are now active in my bleeding country. And, before moving any further in this debate, I beg to be allowed to interpret the moment of silent meditation which we shared yesterday as a solemn

salute and tribute to those who have chosen to imperil their lives, far from their own homelands, for the cause of international law and order.

In such moments of dramatic history, budgets, and figures, and statistics, and costs, all suddenly acquire a different dimension. They become so unimportant, so futile, when compared with the sacrifice of human lives, let alone the destruction of homes, of property, of the very means of livelihood, of villages and cities and the fabric of communities suddenly disrupted and withering away.

Yet, Mr. President, allow me to present the financial proposal put before

your Assembly in the form of a very candid equation: Peace equals IMIFIL, which

in turn is contingent upon your voting its budget; whence you are once more

called upon to express, by your vote, an international will for peace. It is in this perspective, transcending finances and administration, that the delegation of Lebanon views the draft resolution which we are co-sponsoring.

We also read in it, and invite all the Member-States to read in it unequivocally a reaffirmation of the principles adopted by the Security Council: namely, the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Israeli aggressor, to be confirmed by United Nations Interim Forces entrusted with the task of establishing an "area of peace" and helping the Government of Lebanon

in restoring its sole sovereignty over all its territory, within its internationally recognized boundaries-.

Mr. President,

The Secretary General has just returned from a visit to Lebanon and to Israel. He has also met with UNIFIL's commanders and soldiers, and ascertained directly the difficulties of peace-keeping as well as the needs, present and future, involved in maintaining and developing this international undertaking.

Our tribute to Dr. Kurt Waldheim will be meaningless if we do not take very

seriously the conclusions that he has brought back from this visit, where he found it necessary to engage the prestige and responsibility of both his personality and function. We are grateful that he should have spoken so frankly, so honestly, and with such deep concern, of Lebanon's terrible and poignant crisis, as well as of Israel's reluctance to withdraw immediately, let alone the sad realities of the Palestinian diaspora in revolt, and the grave consequences and implications thereof. It is, Mr. President, a hazardous game to speak of causality at this stage. But it is obvious to us that one of those inevitable implications was the traumatic clash between a Logic of Revolution -- Palestinian, of course, but also generally Arab — and the Logic of the State, the Lebanese Statef Yet, solidarity with the Palestinian cause was and is still maintained in the face of

Israel's constant efforts at de-stabilizing Lebanon, through war and during peace — the last and most patent of these efforts, which interests us here directly, being the difficulties created by Israel with which are confronted the poor unarmed villagers wanting to return to occupied South Lebanon, which Israel wants to maintain as a barren empty land.

The resolution submitted to this Assembly should be read and approved within the context and in the light of the Secretary General's conclusions, as well as the thoughts already expressed by the Representatives of the States most concerned by peace in the Middle East, and particularly the Ambassador of the United States of America who, having so forcefully sponsored Resolution ^25, must feel today, I presume, particularly obligated to uphold it in all its components, and whatever the consequences shall be.

Indeed, a standard had been set by the Members of the Security Council which we feel this Assembly must maintain, for then we shall believe, in the shattered Middle East, that this is the beginning of the end!

Mr. President,

The men who have come from Sweden, Ghana, France, Norway, , Canada Hepal, Senegal, and the many others who had come before or may still have to come to establish international "presence" in Lebanon and the Middle East — those men, Mr. President, are the expression of a new perception by this Organization of the brotherhood between the United nations — a brotherhood that rejects not only aggression, but all forms, old and new, dead or reborn, of colonialism and .imperialistic designs.

We for one, in the Lebanon, view international "presence" not only as an expression of concern for our fate or assistance in our struggle for survival, against all odds, but rather as a challenge addressed to us and to the world community -- a challenge to preserve the sovereignty, the unity, and the.freedom of Lebanon without which there can be no stability and hardly any order, justice, or peace in this most important part of the world.

Mr. President,

An Israeli newspaper, DA.VAE, said in the wake of the invasion: "It is easy to lose in Lebanon, but very difficult to win."

Once, Mr. President, back in history, thousands of years ago, my country was described as the land beloved by the gods, where strangers were always welcome with a message of peace and fraternity. Since then, we believe, our history, ancient and modern, has proven beyond doubt that conquest is vain and doomed, whereas the brotherhood of nations, of religions and cultures, is the reality that shall always prevail and triumph.

Let there be, therefore, no place for despair in our hearts, and no place for the logic of despair in our minds, the logic that breeds hatred, violence, and terror.

Let this august Assembly restore hope, and let peace be with us, a reality beyond doubt. 20 April 1978

Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to the Members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to report to the Council immediately on my return from the Middle East. You have before you my letter of 19 April which is concerned especially with the question of Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. This matter is of primary concern, and it was, of ~-.."~^? course, the main focus of my talks in Israel. It is also a

prerequisite for the effective deployment and functioning of

UNIFIL. I should therefore like to comment briefly on the v ..... lu" ...... ' ...... u. specific steps for withdrawal which are described in my letter. First of all, I wish to emphasize the assurance by the Prime Minister of Israel, reaffirmed by both the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, of the firm intention of Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory. In my talks with Defence Minister Weizman on the evening of 17 April, I suggested that General Siilasvuo and the Israeli Chief of Staff should meet on the following day to work out detailed arrangements for Israeli withdrawal. As a result of this meeting the specific withdrawal measures described in my letter to the President were put forward. Although these j* measures are a step forward in the implementation of Resolution 425, they do not yet constitute full implementation. - 2 -

It is for this reason that, as stated in my letter, I have instructed General Siilasvuo, as a matter of urgency, to continue his contacts with the Israeli authorities with • *•• • ; view to the establishment of a date for^the eXrffi and \complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon mich I consider essential. /I myself made clear to the Israeli authorities the deep concern of the Council in this regard and the urgent necessity for a complete implementation

of the terms of Resolution 425 on withdrawal. I shall keep the Council informed of further developments. I also wish to inform the Council that I shall shortly be reporting to it on the conclusions I have reached concerning the functioning and development of UNIFIL in the light of my visit to the area of operations and my talks with the

Chief Co-ordinator, the F^oa^tiommander and the Ccfcufe-itlge: •*r u*"^ ^ Commanders. Specifically, I shall be proposing an>£ncrea •^ in the overall size of the Force, now only to say

< J =ar SSSS5*= = " <*k=s3i that I wa/yvdeeply imocessed both .nee and bearii extreme difficulty TED ATIQ Distr. GENERAL

S/12657 20 April 1973

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1978 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On completing my visit to the area., I wish to inform the Security Council without delay of the current' state of affairs concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution U25 (1978),, especially in relation to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. In the light of my visit to the area of operations, I shall "be communicating in a separate letter my further recommendations concerning the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon.

During my visit to the area, I had extensive talks with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon concerning the implementation of resolution U25 (1978) in all its parts. I also had talks with Mr. Arafat concerning practical arrangements for the implementation of the resolution. I shall be reporting more fully on this aspect of my visit at a later stage.

In Israel I had talks with.the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister concerning the implementation of resolution U25 (1978) and especially the question _of Israeli withdrawal. During these talks I stressed the urgent need for withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in accordance with resolution U25 (1978). The Prime Minister assured me of the firm intention of Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory.

In this connexion,, I have now been informed by the Israeli authorities of the following specific steps in this regard:

For purposes of withdrawal., Israel proposes that the withdrawal will take place in two phases, from a central area, from which the IDF will be completely withdrawn by 30 April 1978, and from a belt along the ADL in the -south and to the north, the withdrawal from which will be arranged in the near future. A map delineating this plan will be provided to the members of the Council as soon as possible.

The central area, from which the IDF will complete its withdrawal on 30 April 1978, may be described as follows: the area of withdrawal south of the Litani is bordered on the west by the Mediterranean, in the south by grid line ^72, in the east by an approximate north-south line 2 kilometres east of the villages of Majdal Silm, Jwayya and Qana. This central area is approximately 550 square kilometres, and, together with the area previously vacated by Israel on 11 and

78-08761 S/12657 . English Page 2 lU April, amounts to approximately 750 square kilometres and represents approximately 65 per cent of the total territory of southern Lebanon occupied by Israel.

I have instructed General Siilasvuo to continue, as a matter of urgency, his contacts with the Israeli authorities with a view to complete withdrawal of Israeli forces in accordance with Security Council resolution *i25 (1978) .

I should be grateful for the possibility to elaborate orally to the members of the Security Council on the above letter at the earliest opportunity.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM * '

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

19 'April 1978

Mr. President,

On completing my visit to the area, I wish to inform the Security Council without delay of the current state of affairs concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) , especially in relation to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. in the light of my visit to the area of operations, I shall be communicating in a separate letter my further recommendations concerning the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon.

During ray visit to the area, I had extensive talks with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon concerning the implement- ation of resolution 425 in all its parts. I also had talks with Mr. Arafat concerning practical arrangements for the implementation of the resolution. I shall be reporting more fully on this aspect of my visit at a later stage.

In Israel 'l had talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister ' concerning the implementation of resolution 425 and especially the question of Israeli withdrawal. During these talks I stressed the urgent need for withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425. The Prime Minister assured me of the firm intention of Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory.

His Excellency Mr. Andrew Young president of the Security Council - 2 -

In this connection, I have now been informed by the Israeli authorities of the following specific steps in this regard:

For purposes of withdrawal, Israel proposes that the withdrawal will take place in two phases, from a central area, from which the IDF will be completely withdrawn by 30 April 1978, and from a belt along the ADL in the south and to the north, the withdrawal from which will be arranged in the near future, A map delineating this plan will be provided to the members of the council as soon as possible.

The central area, from which the IDF will complete its withdrawal on 3O April 1978, may be described as follows: the area of withdrawal south of the Litani is bordered on the west by the Mediterranean, in the south by grid line 672, in the east by an approximate north- south line two kilometres east of the village of Majdal silm, Jwayya and Qana. This central area is approximately 55O square'kilometres and together with the area previously vacated by Israel on 11 and 14 April amounts to approximately 75O square kilometres and represents approximately 65 percent of the total terri- tory of southern Lebanon occupied by Israel*

I have instructed General Siilasvuo to continue, as a matter of urgency, his contacts with the Israeli authorities with a view to complete withdrawal of Israeli forces in accordance with Security council resolution 425.

I should be grateful for the possibility to elaborate orally to the members of the Security Council on the above letter at the earliest opportunity.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim' I, f

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S /PRIP TO MIDDLE EAST

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

1. Deployment of UNIFIL and future build-up.

2. Understanding of definition of area of operation - maximum area occupied by IDF.

3. General concept of UNIFIL operation - a progressive handing over to Lebanese authorities, starting on northern edge of area of operation and proceeding steadily southward. In practice this would involve, in first stages, Lebanese elements working very closely with UNIFIL/

k. Practical steps for deployment of Lebanese army and gendarmes - 30 gendarmes already in place, three companies ready to be deployed subject to suitablepplans in co-ordination with UNIFIL. Enquire future availability of army and gendarmes (recall that originally we were told that one brigade was ready).

5. Relations with armed groups:

a) Palestinians. Understanding with Arafat on efforts to keep other Palestinian groups under control, contingent on Israeli withdrawal - Lebanese co-operation.

b) Christians. What are their intentions in relation to Major Haddad? Israelis constantly raise this point, suggesting Haddad be incorporated into Lebanese army. Stress absolute necessity for co-operation and restraint on Haddad's part.

6. Check Lebanese attitude to high-level meeting with Israelis, which Israel has constantly suggested.

7. Do Lebanese government intend to assume authority and deploy forces in Tyr^and surroundings? - 2 -

8. Return of refugees and other humanitarian aspects. (Saunders)

ARAFAT

1. Importance of maintaining peaceful character of area of operations and avoiding hostile activities of any kind, in accordance with decision of Security Council. Modalities for maintenance of peaceful character of area and also of Tyr.

2. Co-operation between UNIFIL and Palestinian elements.

3. Importance of working arrangements for Kashmiye Bridge.

4. Freedom of/movement for UNIFIJL throughout area. This includes orders not to shooTfat UN helicopters, which are clearly marked.

5- Urge importance of co-operation with restoration of Lebanese sovereii

6. Necessity of PLO co-operation in moving Lebanese elements to south, which is prerequisite for Security Council aim or restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

7. Arafat will certainly raise understanding of and respect for Cairo and Shtaura agreements.

8. PLO will also raise level of armaments of UNIFIL, with special reference to armoured vehicles. It should be stressed that armoured vehicles with battalions are armoured personnel carriers; they are defensive vehicles with no offensive armaments, and are exclusively for the security and mobility of troops in the area in which they are operating. - 3 -

9. Important to stress method of operation of peacekeeping forces, which is through peaceful arrangements with all parties, dependant on mutual respect and not use of force.

FOREIGN MINISTER KKADDAM

1. Syrian assistance and co-operation in facilitating the very difficult task of UNIFIL, (a) vis-a-vis Palestinian elements, (b) with regard to assistance in restoration of Lebanese authority.

ISRAEL:

DEFENCE MINISTER WEITZMAN

1. Deployment and build-up of UNIFIL.

2. Necessity of Israeli withdrawal - need for a timetable. Full effectiveness of UNIFIL is dependant upon Israeli withdrawal. Mounting pressures in Security Council, and risks of special session of Assembly becoming massive and acrimonious debate on Middle East problem. Hope very much that UNIFIL can facilitate and expedite Israeli withdrawal, which is declared intention of Israeli government.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAYM

1. The Middle East situation in general - prospects for the negotiating process and risks of forthcoming special session of General Assembly on financing UNIFIL, which might easily be converted into general Middle East debate. Request all possible measures to avoid this. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

1. Necessity for Israeli withdrawal. Fully understand danger of creating a vacuum - UNIFIL will do utmost to avoid this, but cannot function fully effectively as long as its area of operation also contains Israeli forces in strength.

2. Problem of Christian elements in southern Lebanon.

GENERAL SIILASVUO AND GENERAL ERSKINE

1. Build up of UNIFIL. Prospects: Nigeria, Ireland, Fiji. Is it necessary to increase strength from present UOOO level?

2. Concept of operations. (See para. 3 on page l)

3. Exact instructions of UNIFIL for carrying out its task: use of force dealing with armed elements; control of movement; maintenance of peaceful character of zone and prevention of hostilities.

U. Armament (criticism about APCs). Necessity to avoid notion that UNIFIL is an aggressive force towards any of the parties. UNIFIL must work by standard peacekeeping means. Dangers of naval element in this regard.

5. Hazardous political context of UNIFIL in Security Council. Necessity that UNIFIL not be seen simply as collaborator of IDF. Co-operation with Lebanese authorities. Necessity of discretion in talking to press.

6. UNIFIL headquarters - Sayda provisional. Some criticism as to location, communications (Canadians). 7. Weed for full co-operation between and co-ordination of all peacekeeping operations in the Middle East.

13 April 1978 BEU/PH m THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

21 March 1978

Mr. President, In my report to the Security Council of 19 March concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) , it is stated that the contingents of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon will be selected in con- sultation with the Security Council, and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation. As I informed the Council in my statement on the evening of 19 March, I have been in -touch with a number of Governments in all the different geographical regions with a view to ascertaining their willingness to provide a contingent for UNIFIL. For the Asian region I have received a positive response from Nepal, and for Western Europe I have received an offer of a contingent from Norway. I have also received an offer of a contingent from the Government of France, wh'ich has " informed nfe that its contingent would be available for immediate service. I shall continue my contacts to secure other con- tingents in order to ensure equitable geographic represen- tation and will report to the Council on further develop- ments. I have also contacted the Governments of , Iran and Sweden with a view to gaining their assent to the use of detachments from their contingents already in the Middle East to serve temporarily as an advance guard for UNIFIL. The Government of Iran has given its consent.

His Excellency Mr. Ivor Richard, Q.C. President of the Security Council It is urgently necessary that elements of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon should arrive in the area as soon as possible. For this reason, I wish to inform the Members of the Council of my intention, subject to the usual consultations, to accept the offers of the Governments of JFrance, Nepal^jand Norway, as a first step in establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in the area. I hope to be able to station detachments of the Austrian, Iranian and Swedish contingents already •teftg&aMosaBft tfSllJ^tW* ,rfss!i»ww«a in the Middle East to join the above-mentioned three con- tingents as an advance guard of UNIFIL. In view of the urgency of the situation and if the Council expresses no objection, I intend to proceed with the above arrangements forthwith. I shall of course undertake the other necessary consultations. Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim **

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

21 March 1978

Mr. President, In my report to the Security Council of 19 March concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) , it is stated that the contingents of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon will be selected in con- sultation with the Security Council, and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation. As I informed the Council in my statement on the evening of 19 March, I have been in touch with a number of Governments in all the different geographical regions with a view to ascertaining their willingness to provide a contingent for UNIFIL. For the Asian region .1 have received a positive response from Nepal, and for Western Europe I have received an offer of a contingent from Norway. I have also received an offer of a contingent from the Government of France , which has informed me that its contingent would be available for immediate service. I shall continue my contacts to secure other con- tingents in order to ensure equitable geographic represen- tation and will report to the Council on further develop- ments . I have also contacted the Governments of Austria, Iran and Sweden with a view to gaining their assent to the use of detachments from their contingents already in 'the Middle East to serve temporarily as an advance guard for UNIFIL. The Government of Iran has given its consent.

His Excellency Mr. Ivor Richard, Q.C. President of the Security Council - 2 -

It is urgently necessary that elements of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon should arrive in the area as soon as possible. For this reason, I wish to inform the Members of the Council of my intention, subject to the usual consultations, to accept the offers of the Governments of France, Nepal and Norway, as a first step in establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in the area. I hope to be able to station detachments of the Austrian, Iranian and Swedish contingents already in the Middle East to join the above-mentioned three con- tingents as an advance guard of UNIFIL. In view of the urgency of the situation and if the Council expresses no objection, I intend to proceed with the above arrangements forthwith. I shall of course undertake the other necessary consultations. Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim <- -

21 March 1978

Mr. President,

The Members of the Security Council have before them my letter concerning the composition of the United Nations

_.,n ..^—»=nrTn,- I-TC___ — • n ...... Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). For the information of the Members, I would like to make some remarks concerning the composition and also concerning developments since the Council adopted its resolution 426 on the evening of 19 March:

Orders to Siilasvuo and Erskine. Siilasvuo's meeting with Israeli Minister of Defence on 20 March and with Lebanese authorities on 21 March. O Conversations with Begin/and Tueni. Contacts with possifeo/xe contributorex s of contingents for the Force. Instructions to send observers to the north edge of the Israeli occupied area in relation to cessation of hostilities and withdrawal. Israelis have said that observers can move freely in their area of occupation and can take up posts at crossing points along the Litani River.

Israeli announcement of unilateral cease-fire at 1800 hours (LT) 21 March. - Other contacts in an effort to secure cessation of hostilities. - 2 -

As regards the composition of the Force, I should like to add some comments to what I have put in my letter to the President. I have contacted the Governments of Austria, Iran and Sweden with a view to using elements of their existing contingents in the Middle East. I expect a positive response from the Government of Sweden shortly. I have contacted the following Governments concerning the provision of contingents for UNIFIL: /Bolivia' , /Nepal , . • .*•"Romani• .- a and ^/Senegal - j-^ . So far, I have a positive response *r ~ from Nepal and a negative response from Romania. In addition, the Government of Norway is prepared to make available at very short notice its standby peace-keeping battalion. The Government of France has informed me that it is prepared to make available a battalion of 600 men for immediate service . I hope very much that the Members of the Council will be in agreement with my intention to accept the "offers of France, Nepal and Norway as a first step in establishing •Rca^-s-— .-,-._•-- .-•.--••*-• the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In the present extremely serious situation, it is vitally urgent that we proceed without any delay.

Not easy to get governments to agree to participate ...... /RESA25 (1978) 19 Ma-rch'l97S

RESOLUTION (1978)

Adopted Jby the^e_curity Council at its SQH.h r&cetin on 19 March 1978

The_Secvirity_ ^Council. ,•

_ of the letters of the Permanent Representative of (S/12^00 and S~7l26o6) and the Permanent Representative of Israel (lS/12607),

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel-,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace.

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East3 " :,

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence "of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease.-its military action against gbanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith Tts"l'or^eT"f'rbm~'all "Lebanese territory'; """"""' ~.--—~-<^.^/.-^ -~-«—

3o Decides , in the light of the -request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of conf iming the withdrawal of Israeli forces , restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Hations;

4«, Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty- four hours on the implementation of this resolution.

78-05520 I JED MAT IQ Distr. GENERAL

S/RESA26 (1978) 19 March 1978

RESOLUTION k26 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2075th meeting on 19 March 1978

The Security Council

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution ^25 (1978) contained, in document S/12611 dated 19 March 1978;

2. Decides that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

'78-055^0 Draft

PROVISIONAL s/ u 4/^~ 19 March 1978 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) contained in document S/12611 dated 19 March 1978; 2. Decides that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so _: / decides. Statement by the Secretary-General

Mr. President, Now that the Council has approved my report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), I shall proceed to put into effect the plan of operation outlined in paragraph 9 of that document. I shall instruct Lt. General Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, immediately to initiate meetings on the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations area of operation.

As I have informed the Council this morning, following its adoption of Resolution 425 on Southern Lebanon, I have instructed Major-General Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to deploy UNTSO observers with a view to confirming the cessation of military action in the area.

In order to provide for an immediate presence of the new Force in the area, I have instructed Lt. General Siilasvuo to co-ordinate with the Commanders of UNDOF and UNEF the temporary transfer of reinforced companies from the Austrian Contingent in UNDOF and the Swedish Contingent in UNEF to serve, temporarily, as the advance guard of UNIFIL.

l r ri t i U 1 ^n ,. ninia—*— " "*'" " ""'--^B^ftKMB^uilllH^^ - ' ^ * I have contacted the Governments concerned with a view to having their agreement to the proposed temporary transfer. - 2 -

I have today made initial contacts with a number of Governments with a view to ascertaining their willingness to provide contingents for the new Force. I hope to be able to consult with the Council on this matter in the very near future.

As we are about to engage in this new operation, I feel obliged to point out to the Security Council the extreme complexity and difficulty of the task confronting the United Nations Force in Southern Lebanon. It will have to ensure the peaceful character of the area of operations and to that end control movement into and out of the zone. It will have to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, including the army and police, in the process of restoring Lebanese sovereignty.

A number of basic prerequisites have not yet been clarified. These include the modalities of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. I shall do my best to clarify these and other matters both here at Headquarters and through the contacts which I have instructed General Siilasvuo to initiate in the area.

The nature of United Nations Peace-keeping operations, as ordered by the Security Council, requires the full co-operation of all those concerned for their effectiveness. I take this opportunity to appeal once again for such co-operation. These operations also require the full and constant support of the Council itself. This will certainly be particularly true of the operation on which we have just embarked. I shall, of course, keep the Council fulj.y informed of developments relating to the Force and shall not hesitate to seek its support whenever necessary. Statement by the Secretary-General

Mr. President,

Now that the Council has approved my report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) , I shall proceed to put into effect the plan of operation outlined in paragraph 9 of that document. I shall instruct Lt. General Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping frt*-<-«-*4-/7i$ Missions in the Middle East, •*»<•— *-™« •*- * <-+• -\ meetings __ ri11gp.Q3j£_ °f ^g^g^-M-g— Qja—fchg MQfJ&3J«£3-G.$~~**3: the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations area of operation.

As I have informed the Council this morning, following its adoption of Resolution 425 on Southern Lebanon, I have instructed Major-General Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to deploy UNTSO observers with a view to confirming the cessation of military action in the a TO a ^ritorl r i i^ jkhjl.g-d=uaajaaasawM^^

In order to provide for an immediate presence of the new Force in the area, I have instructed Lt. General Siilasvuo to co-ordinate with the Commanders of UNDOF and UNEF the temporary transfer of reinforced companies from the Austrian Contingent in UNDOF and the Swedish Contingent in UNEF to serve, temporarily, as the advance guard of UNIFIL. I have contacted the Governments concerned with a view to having their agreement - 2 - to the proposed temporary transfer.

I have today made initial contacts with a number of Governments with a view to ascertaining their willingness to provide contingents for the new Force. I hope to be able to consult with the Council on this matter in the very near future .

As we are about to engage in this new operation, I feel obliged to point out to the Security Council the extreme complexity and difficulty of the task confronting the United

Nations Force in Southern Lebanon. fifm A number of basic prerequisites have not yet been clarified. These include the modalities of the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Southern Lebanon* a&dlaB-fefeQ~uie±exmijBa45Jre^ of functioning- —B^UI i niiuiWJjji-^^.,,.^^.,,,,! m»P.M'""""-'n.-T» I shall o clarify these and other matters both here at Headquarters and through the contacts which I have instructed General Siilasvuo to initiate in the area.

The nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations , as ordered by the Security Council, requires the full co-operation of all those concerned for their effectiveness. I take this opportunity to appeal once again for such co-operation. These operations also require the full and constant support of the

Council itself. This will certainly be particularly true of the operation on which we have just embarked. I shall, of course, keep the Council fully J&^ggraagggteaa^ informed of developments relating to the Force and shall not hesitate to seek its support whenever necessary. UNITED NATIONS

19 March 1978

COUNCIL 'ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Report'of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution k25 (1978)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1|25 (1978) of 19 March 1979^S"which the Council,'among other things, decided to set up a. United Nations Force in Lebanon under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it on the implementation of the resolution.

Terms of reference .''".. ... , ......

2. The' terms of reference of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (IMIFIL) are: ': ' ......

(a) The Force, will determine compliance with paragraph 2 ..of Security Council resolution'->25'(1978). . . . ' .' ' . , . '-

(b) The Force will confirm .the withdrawal of-Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the 'return of its effective authority in the area.

(c) The Force will establish and maintaii^'an -sfrea of operation/, th* 1 •^ gLTg^rt^Ki-Ta^a TaKrliM*^, ^-f* T-TVi -T ^T-i T.T-? T 1 T-j g^rl A^^VJirUrifi ^ ^ " ^C ^« " ^-. T 4-« 4-^ rt« -, T-T .-i.l^«d**fcJ4VUM^^

(d) The Force will uss. its best efforts to prevent, the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that'its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. ' '.''.''.' ... - - -

(e) In the fulfilment of this __task thg Force, will have the, co-operation of the 1'Iilitary Observers of

General -considerations

3. ' Three'essential cohditibns must be met fo-l-r the Forc- e to be effective. Firstly, it must have at" all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with/the full co-operation of all the parties' concerned. Thirdly^/it must ,be

h. *" ^fee guidelines fSav^L) proved satisfactor therefore suggest that they be used or/ce. These guidelines are,^fflqtati' J s mutandis^/ as Revisions of provisional document S/12611

Para. 2 (c) will now read; " (c) The Force will establish and maintain itself in an area of operation to be defined in the light of para. 2 (b) above."

Para. 2 (e) will now read; "(e) In the fulfillment of this task, the Force will have the co-operation of the Military Observers of UNTSO, who will continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL." Para. 4 will now read: "4. Although the general context of UNIFIL is not comparable with that of UNEF and UNDOF, the guidelines for these operations, having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical application to the new Force. These guidelines are, mutatis mutandis, as follows: Para. 4 (b). Delete the last two sentences.

Para. 4 (e).will read: " (e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality."

Para. 5, second line. The word "normally" will be deleted. Para. 6 will now read; "6. I envisage the responsibility of UNIFIL as a two- stage operation. In the first stage the Force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this is achieved, it will establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In this connexion it will supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty." DRAFT

PROVISIONAL

S/Agenda/2075 19 March 1978 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE 2O75TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

To be held in the Security Council Chamber at Headquarters on

1. Adoption of the agenda 2. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12606) ' vv Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12607) "_ Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (197R) (S/l?611) Revisions of provisional document S/12611

Para. 2 (c) will now read: " (c) The Force will establish and maintain itself in an area of- operation to be defined in the light of para. 2 (b) above." Para. 2 (e) will now read: "(e) In the fulfillment of this task, the Force will have the co-operation of the Military Observers of UNTSO, who will continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL," Para. 4 will now read; "4. Although the ^general context of UNIFIL is not comparable with that of UNEF and UNDOF, the guidelines for these operations, having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical application to the new Force. These guidelines are, mutatis mutandis, as follows: Para. 4 (b). Delete the last two sentences. Para. 4 (e).will read: "(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality." Para. 5, second line. The word "normally" will be deleted. Para. 6 will now read; "6. I envisage the responsibility of UNIFIL as a two- stage operation. In the first stage the Force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this is achieved, it will establish and maintain an area of operation~as defined. In this connexion -it will supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the (jj/U-(n-ffA (*>-is^>-1l-»-*~C'.»JS peaceful character of the area of operation,/and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty." DRAFT

PROVISIONAL

S/Agenda/2075 19 March 1978 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE 2O75TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

To be held in the Security Council Chamber at Headquarters on

1. Adoption of the agenda 2. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent^ Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12606) Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12607)

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) (S/l?611) Draft

PROVISIONAL

19 March 1978 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) contained in document S/12611 dated 19 March 1978; 2. Decides that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so ... <• decides. Press Section la

SG/SM/251^ sc/3963 19 March 1978

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SECURITY COUNCIL FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION OH ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN LEBANON

Following is the text of the statement made today in the Security Council by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim following the adoption "by the Council of resolution 1*25 (1978) for the establishment of a United Nations force in Lebanon:

I have noted carefully the terms of the resolution which the Council has just adopted and shall be circulating the report called :-for in that resolution in a very short time. I hope that the Council will "be able to consider my recommendations at the earliest possible date so that we may proceed without delay with all of the necessary arrangements for the establishment of the United Nations Force in Lebanon.

In order that no time will be lost in implementing paragraph 2 of the resolution, I propose to instruct Major General /Emmanuel AT7 Erskine, the Chief of Staff of IMTSO*, to establish close contact with the parties concerned and to deploy UNTSO observers with a view to confirming the cessation of military action in the area.

It is clear that the cessation of military action on all sides is a fundamental prerequisite for the implementation of the other parts of the resolution. I therefore appeal to all concerned to take all possible measures to put an immediate end to the hostilities in the area and to give the fullest co-operation to United Nations personnel in the area and in particular to the unarmed Military Observers in South Lebanon.

My report, which will be forthcoming shortly, will, I hope, provide the Council with the basis for further expeditious action in this very serious situation.

* -VA. V.-VA A-" v-Uf.

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

For information media - net an official reco.'d AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

March 19, 1978

Mission for the U.N. • ' V

TITHE AMERICAN INITIATIVE J;o replace the Is- Security Council session on the Lebanese question. r.'J. raeli troops in southern Lebanon with a U.N. But it is hard to imagine the PLO, which prizes its sta- .peacekeeping force is a natural. The Lebanese gov- tus at-the United Nations, being so stupid or arrogant -.ernment, rendered irresponsible by weakness, has , as to attack U.N. peacekeepers. The Syrians, who been unable to police Palestinian guerrillas there. could do nothing to stop the Israeli invasion of south- •, whose troops keep a shaky trucejn Lebanon's ern Lebanon, may huff and puff but they will proba- civil war elsewhere in the country, has-been unwill- blyliind that a U.N. force is for them a f acesaver and iiig to take on border policing. Israelis had hoped that a guard against collision with the Israelis in Lebanon. their support^ Christian villagers in southern Leba- As go the Syrians on this question, so presumably go non would seal the border, but the bloody Palestinian the Russians. ' raid of last Saturday demonstrated spectacularly the There is yet another reason for moving quickly to "inadequacy of the seal. - • put a U.N. force into place, and that is to keep the The Israeli drive into southern Lebanon has solved Lebanese question from clogging the American- a particular security problem but not for long. Main- Israeli agenda at a moment when President Carter taining the occupation will only add further to a toll hopes to engage Prime Minister Menachem Begin in of civilian casualties that is excessive even by the li- discussions aimed at resuming peace negotiations be- cense given a nation acting as Israel was in sore tween Egypt and Israel. Mr. Begin is due in Washing- provocation and in self-defense against Palestinian ton ,on Tuesday, and there are signs that he might terrorists. Continued occupation will ensure more Is- prefer to give Lebanon priority over the more cen- raeli-Palestinian battling, this time on a new line, tral and vexing issues that Mr. Carter wishes to get make it harder for Egypt to resume peace talks with cracking on. For Mr. Carter to move with all deliber- Israel, and crank a new and distracting source of mis- ate speed, however, he must show Israelis that he is understanding into Israel's relations with the United acting in Lebanon in a way that respects their legiti- States. , • \. ' mate demands for adequate temporary security on Enter the United Nations. Peacekeeping is one ac- their nothern frontier, pending a peace agreement. tivity in the Mideast that, since 1973, the world organ- This is precisely the bill that a U.N. peace force ization has learned to do well. Its units are already in could fill. Establishment of such a force wfMild rifjnv place on the lines between Israel and, respectively, onstrate tfiat theinternational community, and the > Egypt and Syria. On account of the particularly vola- _ do understand Israel's tile circumstances in Lebanon, appropriate rules of virtually unique situation in having a neighDorTin- engagement will have to be devised. Israel, as/a U.N. able or unwilling to halt continuous murderous at- member, would be honor bound to respect a U.N. tacks across the border. And in demonstrating that peacekeeping force, and it would have every incen- careful international arrangements can provide an tive to do so as long as the force performed its mis- effective substitute for the occupation of Arab land, sion effectively. To be sure, it is bizarre not to say I the establishment of a jiew U.N. force could also revolting to see the PLO, self-proclaimed author of| server| s a useful model f or f uftHer negotiated steps I the recent attack in Israel, taking part in the current] rpn Israei's^otEertf dnlief s~ " " '