OH, Se Eung, 1933- DR. PHILIP JAISOHN'S REFORM MOVEMENT 1896- 1898: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE "INDEPENDENCE CLUB".
The American University, Ph.D., 1971 History, modern
t University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan I
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by
Se Eung Oh
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy in
International Studies
Signatures of Committee
Chairman U ^ lo
Deah of the School Date: &'/%/&>______ig?0 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
The American University MAY 2 41971 Washington, D.C.
H*>3i2L
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DR. PHILIP JAISOHN'S REFORM MOVEMENT 1896-1898: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF -THE "INDEPENDENCE CLUB"
fcy Se Eung Oh
Abstract of a Dissertation
Presented to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Studies
December 1970
The American University Washington, D.C.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
In January, 1896, the Korean-born and -reared, but
American-educated physician, So Jai-pil, now also known as
Dr. Philip Jaisohn, returned to Korea with a design for
reforming and modernizing Korea's governmental and societal
structure. At that time, he made no pronouncements on his
ultimate hopes for Korea, which were to evolve around her
actual independence— economically, politically, and
socially— from the colonial powers which had vied for cen
turies for control of Korea. Instead, Jaisohn began method
ically to acquire the support of the Korean populace, and
what foreign friends she had, by educating them through the
thrice-weekly publication in both Korean and English of a newspaper, Tong Nip Sh-inman, or The Independent. TJsing
exclusively the more easily learned Korean alphabet, and
advocating both its wider use and other changes which would democratize the educational system, Jaisohn exposed corrupt
political practices, and, at the same time, suggested (and, later, pressured for) steps which should be taken and
methods for the improvement of all facets of Korean society— including a more democratic selection of government
officials.
Jaisohn soon initiated, in summer, 1896, the
2
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"Independence Club," and then continued to he the guiding
force of the club without making known his role in either
its organization or its operations. This club, formed
ostensibly for the nationalistic purposes of building two symbols of Korean independence— the Independence Arch and Independence Park— attracted wide membership and support
from various segments of the population, including many high
officials and even the royal family. (Jaisohn, through
The Independent and the Independence Club, always advocated,
as a means of developing nationalistic feelings, the primacy
of the monarchy.) The club's activities later expanded,
however, into more controversial areas, and included weekly public debates on national issues. These not only attracted
wide interest but also served to educate the population,
and, most directly, potential leaders in the arguments on
all sides of scores of national "issues. Eventually, as the
club's more radical members came into control, its activi ties— in pressuring the government and public officials for
reforms and dismissals— grew more direct, culminating in
1898 in enormous public rallies and demonstrations involving tens of thousands of participants. Club pressure and tactics did succeed in many of its
aims: ridding Korea of Russian domination, ending the suze
rain relation with China, ousting corrupt officials, and
winning government reforms. But, by May, 1898, Jaisohn had
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been exiled, and "by Christmas, 1898, the club had been
abolished by imperial decree. Scholars have suggested variously that the indepen
dence movement failed owing to foreign intervention, or that
Jaisohn1 s demands were too radical and too advanced for Korea, or that the club overestimated its grass-roots
support, or that internecine strife within the club caused
its early demise.
This research agrees that the club did, at the end,
make itself vulnerable to abolition by losing the people's
support, but finds considerable evidence to dismiss the
other contentions above and to lay the major blame for the club's failures at the feet of Emperor Ko Jong,
Philip Jaisohn himself, and the weak leadership of his
successors after Jaisohn's exile.
The emperor was essentially weak-willed; and,
because he retained always as his court favorites a group
of extremely conservative and deeply anti-club officials,
he habitually reneged on his promises to the club and his
decrees for reform. It is not correct that Jaisohn demanded the immedi
ate or the perfect realization of his goals, for his
proposals were gradualistic and, taken in steps, not too
far-removed or too idealistic for the Korean experience.
It is true, however, that Jaisohn's outspokenness and lack
of tact in both personal and political matters gained too
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many powerful enemies for him or the weak leadership of the
club after him to overcome.
Moreover, the club's end did not mean the failure of
the movement. Not only were many of Korea's future leaders
trained by the club experience, but also many changes in Korean society were indeed effectively brought about by the
club's efforts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE
The most serious and far-reaching reform movement
in the history of Korea was certainly the Independence Club
movement of 1896 through 1898, which was initiated by
Philip Jaisohn (So Jai-pil, ). This movement is significant and unprecedented because of its two major
characteristics: first, the application of a fully rounded
political philosophy which is understandable and relevant
even today; and second, the considerable grass-roots support
for the movement, which was primarily due to the publication of a nationally distributed newspaper published in Seoul,
The Independent.
The philosophy and methods Jaisohn applied to the
movement derived from his experience with the abortive 1884-
coup d'etat, and from his experience and life in the
United States from 1885 to 1895* Jaisohn determined that the reasons for the failure of the 1884 coup were its lack
of public support and its overreliance on the Japanese.
Therefore, when Jaisohn launched this movement for inde
pendence, he began by educating the masses through the pages
of The Independent, and the results were tangible, for he received a great deal of support from those newly educated
people. Jaisohn made this public support the foundation of
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the movement, rather than any alien element.
The Independence Club and its leader, Jaisohn, have
been variously criticized. L.H. Underwood commented that
Jaisohn was ". . . perhaps too impatient and precipitate in
trying to hasten the accomplishment of these great ends, a
fault common with young and ardent patriots."'1' Among other
remarks, Gregory Henderson wrote that ". . .the quarrel and disunity erupted even before the club was broken up by force [from its opposition]." Chung-sik Lee stated that
"Over-estimation of progressive sentiment was, however, one of the crucial errors made by the Independents." And both
Henderson and Lee agreed that, if the Independence Club had Zj. utilized the remnants of the Tong Hak Rebellion, which had
many of the same political aims, the club might have had stronger appeal. Horace H. Underwood commented that Jaisohn "... led the people of Korea even in a day when c their ears and eyes were still closed." And H.B. Hulbert
^L.H. Underwood, Fifteen Years Among the Top-Knots or Life in Korea (New York: American Tract Society, 1904], pp. 208-209. 2 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968], p. 66. ^Chung-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963)? P- ^>8.
^See Chapter 7, p. 225, fn. 7- ^Horace H. Underwood, "Leadership in Korea," The Culture of Korea, ed. Changsoon Kim (n.n.: Korean American Culture Association^ 194-5), p. 312.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expressed his reservations by saying that "Whether this
[Independence Club campaign] was wise or not is a question."
Most importantly, Jaisohn himself and Yun Chee-ho,
who took over as president of the club and as publisher of The Independent, had their own analyses of the reasons for
the demise of the club. Jaisohn maintained that "foreign
influence was mainly responsible for the destruction of the Independence Club. Certain Powers did not wish Korea to be n strong."r And Yun Chee-ho wrote that he regretted having to
"admit that many a foolish thing has been said and done by
the Independents. . . . and for having been unable to keep g them within the bounds of prudence and moderation." This research aims to test the statements above, and
also to answer the questions: "Why did the Independence Club
movement fail to accomplish what it advocated?" "Was there
no hope in Korea, then, to launch any kind of reform move ment because of the conservatism prevalent in the country?" "What were the chief factors operating to hinder the move ment?" "Could any alternative policies have been adopted
6Homer B. Hulbert, The Passing of Korea (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1906), p. l6l. 'F.A. McKenzie, Korea’s Fight For Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920)-, p. 73. 8T.H. Yun [Yun Chee-ho], "Popular Movements in Korea," The Korean Repository, V (1898; reprint edition, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), p. 469*
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by the Independence Club which would have secured success
for the movement?" And, finally, "hid the abolition of the
club in 1898 mark the complete failure of the movement?"
In order to reach answers with substantial evidence
to these questions, detailed analyses are made of the
philosophy of The Independent, of the composition and function of the Independence Club, of the activities of the
club, and of the government's reaction to the club's activ
ities. In addition, in order to explore the possible
influence on Jaisohn of the 1884 coup in which Jaisohn
actively participated, a considerable analysis of the 1884-
coup is undertaken. Together with Jaisohn1 s personal
history, this background research will be found in
Chapter 1. As to the materials employed in this research,
three sources are very heavily used. The newspaper, The Independent, spelled out the philosophy of the club, and reported everyday occurrences in which the movement was
involved. It has proved very useful in determining the
accuracy of the reports of those events, not only because the paper was printed soon after they occurred, but,
perhaps more, it had to be truthful to avoid giving any cause for punitive action by the government, which was
seeking any justification to oppress the club.
Second, the Kwan Bo [Government Gazette] has been
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heavily used to determine the government's reaction to
Independence Club activities. The extent of the govern
ment's responsiveness to club demands can often be measured
by the dates of the Kwan Bo issues, which announced,
promptly and accurately, all appointments, dismissals, and
imperial opinions. The attitudes of the monarch, Ko Jong, who was the single most important and decisive factor
bearing on the success of the movement, could be determined
from a close study of the Kwan Bo.
The third major source has been a volume by an active participant in the club movement, Chong Kyo— namely,
Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa (i|^ ® [History of Korea]. Since the book was written several years after the disband
ment of the club, Chong Kyo was able to interpret many
facts which had gone either unnoticed or had been kept
secret during the Independence Club era. In transliterating Oriental names into English, this research'follows the formula of placing the family, or last, name first and then of connecting the first and middle names
by a hyphen. However, the names of authors of books written
in English, whatever the national origin of the author or
editor, are made to follow the Western practice of placing the given name first and the family name last. I would like to express my gratitude to Pro'fessor
Chung-sik lee of the University of Pennsylvania for valuable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assistance in the selection of this topic; to Professor
Charming Liem of the State University of New York at
New Paltz, who, as a former assistant to Philip Jaisohn,
was able to guide me to many sources of information; and
most particularly to Professor Michael Lindsay of The
American University who has generously shared with me his
time and valuable counsel in the solution of many problems. To Mrs. Roberta Mathews, I would like to offer thanks for
her invaluable editorial assistance.
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Page PREFACE...... ii
Chapter
1. PHILIP JAISOHN AND KOREA BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB ...... 1
THE DOMESTIC SITUATION BEFORE KAP SHIN CHUNG BYUN ( I*L# ) OR THE 1884 coup d'etat .T.T. . 1 PHILIP JAISOHN AND KAP SHIN CHUNG BYUN . . . 8
PHILIP JAISOHN'S E X I L E ...... 22
2. TONG NIP SHINMUN OR THE INDEPENDENT . 33
THE INDEPENDENT AS AN E D U C A T O R ...... 39
The Use of the Korean Alphabet for Mass E d u c a t i o n ...... 39
On Civil R i ghts...... 46 ♦ The equality of peoples...... 46
Equality of the sexes ...... 47
On the Political System ...... 49
THE INDEPENDENT ON THE REFORM OF SOCIAL EEOEEEMS— T T ...... 54
Housing ...... 55
The Water S u p p l y ...... 56
Medical C a r e ...... 57
viii *
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page
THE INDEPENDENT AS AN AGENT OF REFORM . . . 58
Pressure on Conservative Officials .... 59
Pressure Against Official Malfeasance . . 64-
Pressure For the Reform of Government Institutions...... 66
The legal system...... 66 The police d e p a r t m e n t ...... 68
The memorial s y s t e m ...... 69 THE INDEPENDENT AND THE E M P E R O R ...... 72
3- THE ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, AMD EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB .... 77
THE ORIGIN OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB AND THE INDEPENDENCE A R C H ...... 77
THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE C L U B ...... 89
♦ Yun Chee-ho (^ ) ...... 95 Yi Sang-jae {*■) ) ...... 98
Yi Seuhg-man (-^ ) ...... 99 Chong Kyo ( ) ...... 100
THE SELF-TRAINING PROCESS TO ORE ATE A POLITICAL F O R C E ...... v...... 102
4. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB AGAINST FOREIGN DOMINATION...... H I
KOREA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS...... Ill THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INDEPENDENCE’ CLUB AGAINST RUSSIAN I N F L U E N C E ...... 124
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page
DR. JAISOHN’S DEPARTURE FROM KO R E A ...... 138
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USE OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES...... 145
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST FOREIGN SETTLEMENTS AND L E A S E S ...... 149 THE GRANTING OF CONCESSIONS TO FOREIGNERS . 154
5. THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE OFFICIALS AND THEIR E F F E C T S ...... 159 CHO PYUNG-SIK ( ^ ^ ) ...... 159
YI YONG-IK ) • ...... 164
SEVEN OTHER MINISTERS ...... 170
THE EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENCE CLUB ACTIVITIES...... 180 6. THE CLIMAX OF INDEPENDENCE CLUB ACTIVITIES . . 184
FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL . . 184
KWAN MIN KONG DONG HOE (’£'&'£ ) AND THE ADOPTION OF THE SIX ARTICLES...... 196
FATAL CLASHES WITH THE OPPOSITION...... 203
THE DISBANDMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB . . 214
7. CONCLUSION.... 219
APPENDIX ...... 240
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... » * ...... 243
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PHILIP JAISOHN AND KOREA BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB
THE DOMESTIC SITUATION BEFORE KAP SHIN CHUNG BIUN ) OR THE 1884 COUP D'ETAT
Korea suffered from severe factionalism throughout
the entire nineteenth century. The limited number of
available government positions was ruthlessly contested for
among passers of the Civil Service Examination.'1' Most of
the scholar-gentry class belonged to one of four’ main
factions, namely Nam In ( ^ / ^ ) or "south men," Puk In
or "north men," No Ron (^>|^) or "old school," and So Ron
) or "young school." These four factions together
were called Sa Sek (an'fe), or "four colors," describing the p quadripartite Yi dynasty factionalism.
After the coronation at the age of twelve of
During the Yi dynasty, the government gave the examinations once in every three years, producing thirty-three successful candidates each time. However, the actual number of passers of the examination, through the entire Yi period, tripled due to the sale of offices, to unofficial examinations, and for political reasons. Pak Tong-suh, Han Kuk Kwanryo Chedo eui Yuksa chuk Chunkae (Seoul: Han Kuk Yunku Tosuhkwan, 1^61), pp. 29-$0« 2 For the definitive study on factionalism during the Yi dynasty, see Kim Pyung-gon, Yicho Tangjang Sawha (Seoul: Sam Jung Dang, 1967). 1
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King Ko Jong, who reigned between 1864 and 1907, the king's
father Tai Won Kun was the real power behind the throne. In
1866, Tai Won Kun selected his daughter-in-law, a lonely and seemingly timid fifteen-year-old orphan from the Min family,
to become the queen, in order to prevent any possible intrusion by her family into his power. In spite of
Tai Won Kun's careful selection, Queen Min and Tai Won Kun
became terrible rivals for the next twenty years, affecting
the country disastrously. Tai Won Kun's aggressive and domineering personality
allowed him to carry out several difficult policies. He pushed through the vast reconstruction of the palace,
engraved irredeemable coins of very high standard, and
forced citizens to make contributions of money to the royal
treasury. He also closed the centuries-old Confucian
schools, criticizing them for being cradles of factionalism. He also ordered the massacre of Roman Catholic missionaries of Korean and French origins, criticizing them for being the
tools of Western imperialism. Tai Won Kun strongly resisted
the pressure from the imperial powers to open Korea.
^On the struggles between Tai Won Kun and Qp.een Min's family, see Chang To-bin, Tai Won Kun kwa Myung Sung Whang Hoc? (Seoul: Dukheung Suhlim, 1927); and Kin Ki-mei, Kosen Taiinkun to Bihki(Tokyo: Yoyosha, 1967). ^For Tai Won Kun's policies, see Ching-young Cho, "The Decade of the Tae-Won'gun" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Harvard University, I960).
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Although, some had merits, Tai Won Kun's policies alienated
much of the populace, including the powerful scholar-gentry class, helped produce serious inflation, brought retaliatory
expeditions by the French fleet, and inspired doubled
efforts by other powers to open Korea.^ All of these conse
quences, of course, affected the country grievously, and,
naturally, put Tai Won Kun in a very vulnerable position. The most intense pressure on Tai Won Kun came from
Korea's suzerain China. Li Hung-chang, most influential man
in the powerful Tsung-li Yamen, had been advising Tai Won Kun
to open Korea because, in any case, Korea would not be able
to resist foreign pressure— a recommendation which was per
sistently ignored by Tai Won Kun. Eelations between
Tai Won Kun and Li Hung-chang deteriorated, particularly
because of interference by Queen Min. When Tai Won Kun decided to choose as crown prince his grandson by the king
and a court woman named Yi, Queen Min decided to take advan tage of Tai Won Kun's vulnerable position to oust him from
power. When Queen Min gave birth to a male child in 1874-,
she succeeded in alienating Tai Won Kun from the king and
5Although most of the colonial powers in the Far_ East, such as Japan, Eussia, Germany, France, and the United States, had tried to open Korea, all failed until Japan con cluded the Treaty of:Kang Wha in 1876. The most serious military threats to Korea came from the French fleet under Admiral Eose in 1866, and from the American fleet under Admiral Eogers in 1871, which inflicted much damage on Korea.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Li Hung-chang. and in ousting Tai Won Kun. Soon her own son
was installed as crown prince.
Once Queen Min had become the major power in the court, she concentrated only on solidifying her power,
disregarding the people. She often sponsored expensive
parties and invited sorceresses into the palace to work their magic for the prosperity of her husband the king, the
crown prince, and herself. She was so dependent upon the
advice of sorceresses that, at their instruction, she prayed
for prosperity by sending her officials to the Diamond Moun
tains ( ) to make valuable offerings of rice and
money to each of the twelve thousand peaks.^ And the eco
nomic;-situation under the Mins was even worse than it had 7 been during Tai Won Kun’s reign.' Queen Min commenced negotiations with Japan regard
ing the opening of Korea, as Li Hung-chang of China had g hoped; they concluded the Treaty of Kang Wha. Subse
quently, the Japanese began their economic and political
penetrations into Korea. Queen Min was very amenable to
the Japanese plans for innovations in some of the Korean
^Chang Tobin, Im 0 Kun Ran kwa Kap Shin Chung Pyun (Seoul: Dukheung Suhlim, 1927)? p. 56. ^Kang Man-keel and others, Han Kuk Byun Dae Sa: Siryun e seun Wangcho (Seoul: Sinku Munwha Sa, 1969;, I, 162. kpor the Chinese role in negotiating the treaty, see Frederick F. Chien, The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy, 1876-1885 (n.p.:Shoe String Press, 1967).
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systems, because these would mark the defeat of the conser
vative Tai Von Kun. These reforms included her permitting
Japanese Army Lieutenant Horimoto to reorganize the Korean
Army. With the adoption of the new system, about one thou sand soldiers under the old system lost their jobs. Because
they were unable to get their final eleven months' salary, they were desperately bitter toward the Min government.
In July, 1882, when the widespread dissatisfaction among the soldiers under the old system became a matter of
public controversy, the government tried to assuage them by
distributing one month's worth of food rations to each soldier. Then, when the soldiers found that not only had a
whole month's rations not been given as promised, but also
that a great amount of sand had been mixed in the rice which was distributed, they revolted and killed the official g who had distributed the rations. When the soldiers realized the seriousness of their
crime, they reasoned that the only way to avoid their punishment was to overthrow the government. A throng of
mutineers, yelling for the downfall of the government, broke into government buildings and into the homes of important
Min family members, killing about ten Min officials. The
highly aroused and elated soldiers then opened jails,
9yi Pyung—do, Han Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1969), p. 484.
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releasing prisoners, and attacked and set fire to tlie
Japanese Consulate. In this attack several Japanese,
including Lieutenant Horimoto, were killed. . Japanese Charge D'Affaires Hanabusa barely escaped from the scene; later that night he managed to make his way to Inchon where
he found a British ship going to Japan which gave him a
lift.10
The rebels also attacked the palace in an attempt to kill Queen Min, who escaped by disguising herself as a
palace maid. The queen fled to one of her relatives in
Chung Ju, while most people believed her to be dead; and
some were even preparing for her funeral. The whole series of rebellious acts committed by the
soldiers was called the Im 0 Kun Ran or "the
1882 military mutiny." Finally, the king, who was unable to
halt the chaotic sequence of events, accepted the rebels'
demand that he recall his father, Tai Won Kun, to whom the soldiers felt more loyalty. Happy to be reinstated,
Tai Won Kun came back to the palace and began to reorganize the government with his own clan.
Meanwhile, the Min family's trusted official
Kim Yun-sik, who was in China at the time, appealed to
10Hwang Hyun, Mae Chun Ya Rok [Hwang Hyun's inside story], reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of Rational History (Seoul: Shin Jee Sa, 1955)» P- 58.
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Li Hung-chang to suppress the rebels whom Kim alleged were
anti-Chinese and directed by Tai Won Kun. Li responded
by sending in three thousand troops under General
Wu Ching-chang ( ). On August 30, 1882, the Chi
nese troops kidnapped Tai Won Kun, who as the king's father
was the regent, and took him to China. The king then sent
Yi Yong-ik,^ who had been transmitting communications
between the king and queen, to return the queen from
Chung Ju. The queen again took power, reorganized the gov
ernment , and ordered the executions of many rebel leaders
and officials of Tai Won Kun's administration.
The Korean people were dismayed both by the struggle for power in the court and by the economic situation. As
the first American minister to Seoul, Lucius H. Foote,
reported to the United States secretary of state, "[T]he Korean government is not sufficiently strong either to con- 12 trol its own people or to resist outside pressure."
11 Yi Yong-ik became a trusted agent of the king from then on, and later became the head of the Bureau of Engraving. He also became a target of severe criticism by the Independence Club (see Chapter 5, pp. 164-169.) 12 Quoted in (reds.) George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, Korean-American Relations (1883-1886): Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), P. 4.
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PHILIP JAISOHN AND KAP SHIN CHUNG BYUN
Philip J a i s o h n ^ was horn in South Chulla Province 14- in 1863, from a high-ranking Yang Ban family. When Jaisohn was seven years old, he was sent to his uncle in
Seoul, Kim Sung-heun, who was the Cham Pan (•&*!) ). a cabinet-level rank, where he was to prepare for the civil
service examination. Jaisohn memorized important Chinese
classics like Chun Ja ), Sa Ki ), Sa Suh ),
Jaisohn's original name was So Jai-pil When he first arrived in the United States, he found many_ American practices and customs strange for a Korean, partic ularly using the English language. He had to adjust to the different rules of syntax and grammar of English, and to placing the family name last instead of first as in Korea. When he became a naturalized United States citizen, he adopted an American name by reversing his last and first names. So Jai-pil was changed first to Pil Jai So. Then Pil was translated into "Philip,” and Jai So became "Jaisohn." (Almost forty years later, after he returned to the United States, he made a play upon his adopted name by using the letters of his last name, in reverse, to create a pseudonym, N.H. Osia, which he employed in writing a political novel about the controversial movement for independence in Korea.) ^Yang Ban is the name of the highest class of scholar-gentry in Korean society. Eor details on Korean class structure, see Chapter 2, pp. 4-3-44. One of Jaisohn's ancestor's daughters was Queen Chung Sung ( ), wife of the twenty-first king of the Yi dynasty, Yong Jo ), who reigned between 1725 # and_ 1776. Jaisohn's father passed the civil service examination in the year Jaisohn .was born. Therefore, Jaisohn1 s nickname was Sang Kyung jfc ) or "Double celebration." Jaisohn's mother also came TronTa very distinguished family. Kim Sung-keun, with whom Jaisohn resided while preparing for the civil service examination, was the brother of Jaisohn's mother. Kim To-tae, So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso.jon [Autobiography of Dr. Philip JaisohnJ (.Seoul: Susonsa, 1948), pp. 30-31-
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and Sam Kyung ( ), and, when he was only thirteen years
old, he passed the examination with the highest grades of those taking the test.^
Jaisohn was from his boyhood considered unusual and independent. He despised wearing the traditional, expensive
silk robes and being carried around in sedan chairs which
were the customs of persons born to his class, and he was reluctant to be identified at all with the envied Yang Ban.
He termed the Yang Ban "brainless creatures," and was more
interested in playing with commoners' children with whom he 16 felt more comfortable. As far as his teachers were con
cerned, Jaisohn incorrectly exploited his knowledge of Confucian ethics by inverting the ancient truths of the philosopher. To the question "Did not the sage of old teach
that man is man only because of his possession of ethical
concepts?" young Jaisohn added another, "Did those [Yang
Ban] boys have any ethical sense at all?" His answer to the latter was no, because of the Yang Bans' satisfaction with their luxury while thousands of commoners' children around 17 them were dressed in rags. ' A frequent visitor at the home of Jaisohn's uncle,
^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., p. 38.
^Charming Liem, America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohn (New York: Q?he William-i'rederick Press, 1952], p. 13- 17Ibid.
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Kim Sung-heun, with whom Jaisohn resided, was Kim Ok-kyun, a TO highly respected proponent of reform. Kim Ok-kyun paid careful attention to the young Jaisohn because he was highly
regarded as capable and as a "boy genius." Jaisohn was
included in the frequent conversations of Kim Ok-kyun, who
was fifteen years his senior, with fellow sympathizers of
reform, such as Prince Pak Yong-hyo (
son-in-law of the late king, So Kwang-pum (
Jaisohn's uncle and a member of the first Korean Mission to
Washington in 1883, and Hong Yong-sik ( >3^ , who
became the first minister of the Post Office Department.
Together they discussed world affairs and Korean reform, after reading the books which had been secretly brought in 19 from Japan. After the 1882 military mutiny, the king "abetted 20 the work of the progressives in Korea," a situation which
was exploited to the fullest by Kim Ok-kyun in the prepa rations for future reform. With Korea's future in mind,
1 ft Kim Ok-kyun was the distinguished leader of the Korean progressive movement. For the background and history of Kim Ok-kyun, see Andrew Changwoo Nahm? "Kim Ok-kyun and the Korean Progressive Movement" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Stanford University, 1961); Min Tae-won, Kap Shin Chung Pyun kwa Kim Ok Kyun (Seoul: Kukje Munwha Hyup Soe-, 1947); and Kim Suk-byung and others, Kim Ok Kyun (Pyungyang: Sahoe Kwahak Yuksa Yunkuso, 1964).
^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., p. 63. 20 McCune and Harrison, op. cit., p. 10,
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Kim arranged to send sixty-one promising students to Japan,
among whom were the future leaders of the Independence Club, 21 including Philip Jaisohn and Yun Chee-ho. Jaisohn and nine other young men entered the Tokyo Toyama School , which was a .military training school for
youths. For two years Jaisohn studied military tactics, gymnastics, modern sciences, geography, and history, and
then graduated from the school with honors. Jaisohn along
with his friends returned to Seoul in the spring of 1884-.
The young men who returned from the Tokyo military
school proposed the establishment of a similar school in
Seoul. When they informed the king of their idea, they were
invited to the palace to give a demonstration drill in the presence of the king. Their demonstrations, led by Jaisohn, so fascinated the king that the monarch immediately promised 22 to open a school with Jaisohn as the principal. The
youths were soon frustrated, however, when the plan was can celed because of the objections of the anti-Japanese queen.
As an alternative, the king repeatedly invited American
21 Those students were sent with the understanding that they would study the whaling industry, after Kim cleverly persuaded the king that a whaling industry for Korea would bring enough money in to remedy the economic_ problems of Korea. Because of his testimony oji the whaling industry, Kim was appointed Po Kyung Sa ( fef. ^5^) ["Whale commissioner"], and with this title Kim was able to procure expenses for the students. Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 74-. 22Ibid., p. 85.
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Admiral Shufeldt to organize a military school with the help
of those Japanese-trained cadets. This plan also died
because Shufeldt never accepted the invitation.
Meanwhile Kim Ok-kyun, on his frequent trips to
Japan, explored all possibilities for Japanese aid to Korean reform.2^ The Japanese were naturally in favor of Kim
Ok-kyun1s efforts to introduce reform programs in Korea, for
they would result in the elimination of the strong conser
vative influence, backed by China, in the Korean government.
However, Japan's official policy remained non-intervention, because, as Iwakura, the most influential man in the govern
ment, expressed it, it would be "unwise to cause a war with OIL China over insignificant Korea." Japan had another impor tant reason for demonstrating her propriety and respectabil
ity by not intervening in the domestic problems of Korea: she hoped to revise the unequal status given her in earlier 25 treaties with the Western nations.
2^Kim Ok-kyun went to Japan in 1881 with a ten-man study group sponsored by the Korean government, and he was sent back to Japan in 1882 with the Apology Mission headed by Pak Tong-hyo and So Kwang-pum, the mission which was assigned with apologizing for the 1882 military mutiny which had inflicted much damage on Japan. 2Z*Nihon Gaimu Sho [Japanese Foreign Ministry], Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents] ([Tokyo:] Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai), Vol. 15, Document No. 133 j P* 254- (hereafter referred to as Nihon Gaiko Bunsho). ^Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1 I960), p. 139.
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Nevertheless, Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue
treated the Korean reformers, who had come to Japan to apol
ogize for the army mutiny, very cordially, and even arranged for the loan of 170,000 yen, part of which was then used for
the indemnity payment to Japan. Although the Korean
reformers were unable to acquire the much hoped for official
recognition of-their cause by the Japanese government, they were generally encouraged by the Japanese government's sym
pathy with their interests in Korean reform. The reformers
received even better treatment from the Japanese liberals,
particularly from one liberal leader, Fukuzawa, who encour aged the reformers and "promised good results for the cause 27 of people1s right.n ( When the reformers came back to Korea, they learned of a dismaying situation. Kim Ok-kyun and other progres
sives had worked hard to locate some progressives from the powerful Min family. They selected Min Yong-ki, the rela
tively young and powerful nephew of Queen Min, and strongly recommended his appointment as head of the Korean Delegation to America in 1883. Contrary to their expectation, however,
Min Yong-ki became more conservative and openly criticized
26C.I. Eugene Kim and Han Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967)* pp. 42-4-3.
^Conroy, op. cit., p. 134.
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the progressives' activities.28
Frustrated with developments— namely, Min Yong-ki1 s
desertion of them, other conservative pressure against the
progressives, and the cancellation of the plan to establish
a modern military school which would have given hope to the young Japanese-trained cadets like Jaisohn— Kim Ok-kyun and
the progressive leaders went into seclusion where they seriously thought about attempting a coup d'etat as the only
solution to achieve a thorough overhaul of government.
During the summer of 1884, the progressives had fre quent discussions about the Sino-French War, which encour
aged both Japanese and Korean progressives to hope for the
possibility of a Chinese defeat. According to Kim Ok-kyun's
diary, a student of the Japanese liberal Fukuzawa, Inoue Kakugoro ( ^ Jl. ), informed Kim Ok-kyun that
"[Japanese Minister] Takezoe told him and Shimamura [Takezoe's assistant] that Japan had decided to attack
China."29
28Kim Ok-kyun, "Kap Shin II Ki" ["1884 Diary"], in the Annex of Min Tae-won, op. cit., p. 108. Hereafter, all references' to Kim Ok-kyun's "Kap Shin II Ki" are called the "Diary." '29Kim Ok-kyun, "Diary" (October 31> 1884), p. 115* Professor Conroy also acknowledged the existence of the plan while also implying his reservations as to the whole truth of it, in Conroy, op. cit., p. 147. But a Japanese source categorically denied Kim's diary entry, calling it a fabri cation intended to make Japan the scapegoat for the failure of the 1884 coup; Yamanabe Kentaro, Nihon no Kahkoku Heigo (Tokyo: Taihei Shuppah Sha, 1966), pp. 149-186.
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Whatever the truth about the controversial statement
by Takezoe, it should be noted here that the Japanese incli
nation to support the Korean progressives, who were cau tiously seeking Japanese military aid, gave decisive momen
tum to launch the coup. In connection with the relation
ships among the persons involved, C.I.E. Kim and H.K. Kim
summarized the situation: (1) Although Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru did not deliberately aim to incite the coup, the ambiguous policy then adopted and relegated to Takezoe for implementation contributed greatly to the coup. (2) Takezoe's misjudgement and ineptitude directly involved him in the coup preparations from which he could not extricate himself; had it not been for his display of anti-Chinese bellicosity and his implied support for the Progressives, the fire of revolutionary enthusiasm might have remained under control. (3) The Korean Progressives and the Fukuzawa liberals in Japan were ultimately and most immediately responsible for the coup.30 Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo, So Kwang-pum, Hong
Yong-sik (director of the newly established Post Office
Department), and Jaisohn planned to launch the coup on the night of December 4-, during the banquet celebrating the inauguration of postal service in Korea. Host of the ban
quet Hong Yong-sik carefully invited all the conservative
leaders in the government together with foreign dignitaries.
The plan, which had the full knowledge of Japanese Minister
Takezoe, was to set a fire and to explode dynamite near the
^ K i m and Kim, op. cit., p. 4-9.
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palace, which would cause conservative officials to head
toward the palace to affirm their loyalty to the monarch.
Then, the plan was, they were all to be killed in an ambush
by a group which included the young Japanese-trained soldiers under the supervision of Jaisohn. The fire and the
explosion of dynamite were also intended to scare the monarch, who, it was anticipated, would then invite into the
palace a company of Japanese soldiers who were there waiting 31 for just this opportunity. The coup was not carried out exactly as planned, due
to difficulties involved in setting the fire at the desig
nated place, and because the conspirators failed to kill the
first man who jumped out from the banquet, Min Yong-ki, who,
though seriously wounded, was still able to run back to the
party where many foreign dignitaries still remained.
Because of Kim Ok-kyun1s capable and swift leadership, how ever, the group managed to succeed in their goal, killing many powerful conservative leaders, such as Min Yong-mok,
jO Min Tai-ho, and Cho Yong-ha. The king, queen, and crown
prince were transported to Kei Dong Palace ( which had fewer security problems. The company of Japanese
soldiers was assigned to protect the royal family under the
^For the details of the plan, see Min Tae-won, op. cit., pp. 4-5-49 •
^ Y i Pyung-do, op. cit., p. 4-87*
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direct supervision of Minister Takezoe.^
The next day, the new government, in the name of the king, announced the names of the new members of the Council
of State, assigning most of the coup leaders to the impor
tant positions. Kim Ok-kyun was named as finance minister,
Pak Yong-hyo as military minister, So Kwang-pum as foreign minister, Hong Yong-sik as deputy premier, and Jaisohn as 34 commander-in-chief of the army. Also included in the new
government were several members of Tai Won Kun1 s family. The premiership went to Tai Won Kun's elder brother,
Yi Jai-won.^ Also on December 5 the government announced, in the
^ A s the coup leaders had planned, Kim Ok-kyun tried to persuade the king that Chinese were attacking the palace. Although the coup leaders succeeded in forcing the king to move to Kei Dong Palace, he did not believe the story of the Chinese attack. In connection with the imperial request to the Japa nese minister for protection, there are, again, conflicting accounts. In one, Kim Ok-kyun claimed that the king wrote seven letters after he had been furnished with paper and pen: "11 Bon Kong Sa Nae Ho Jim" [ ^ , or "Let the Japanese minister come and give me protection"]; Kim Ok-kyun, "Diary" (December 4, 1884), op. cit., p. 143- Another source claimed that, when the monarch refused to call for the Japanese, "So Kwang-pum drew out a piece of foreign note-paper and pencil and wrote in Chinese words, 'Let the Japanese minister come and give me protection'"; Clarence N. Weems (ed.), Hulbert's History of Korea, II (New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1962), 237•
^Kim Ok-kyun, "Diary" (December 4, 1884), op. cit., p. 146. 55Ibid.
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name of the king, several reform decrees, the most important
of which were (1) for the end to the suzerain relations with
China and the prompt return of Tai Won Eun from Chinese cap
tivity; (2) the abolition of the Yang Ban system and the
equality of all the people; (3) the reform of the land tax
law and the criminal laws; (4) the setting up of new
training techniques for, and the reorganization of, the
military; and (5) the establishment of unitary control of
the national finance by the Finance Ministry.
The new government survived only three days. The
reform decrees never had a chance to be put into effect.
About one thousand Chinese troops in Seoul, together with
conservative Korean soldiers, launched an attack on the
palace, which was being guarded by some of the reformers
and about two hundred Japanese soldiers. The badly outnum
bered Japanese troops decided to withdraw from the palace, 37 not heeding the desperate objections of the reformers. Another serious miscalculation by the reformers was
their expectation of the public support which would ensue
if they promptly announced the reform of the government
^ K i m Ok-kyun, "Diary" (December 5j 1884), op. cit., pp. 148-149. ^ I t was reported that Jaisohn drew his sword to threaten the Japanese commander and to demand that the Japanese soldiers stay and see it through, but his threat was in vain. F.A. McKenzie, Korea's Fight For Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Eevell Co., 1920), p. 37-
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under the captive king's authority. Instead, there was public outrage against them, and the whole affair was
labeled a Japanese colonial intrigue. Someone among the
reformers suggested that they should fight the Chinese to
the death. But the leader of the ill-prepared coup, Kim,
persuaded the group to save their lives for the future
reform of Korea. Some of them did fight to the end; while
some escaped deep into the countryside. The leaders of the
coup, however, did not have any chance to survive if they
remained within the territory of Korea. Hong Yong-sik, who
was a completely trusted official of the king, decided to accompany the monarch to the other side of the camp so that
his friends could escape. As soon as Hong entered
Chinese-held territory, he was slain by the Chinese. Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo, So Kwang-pum, and Jaisohn joined
the fleeing Japanese to the port of Inchon where they were
allowed to board a Japanese ship, which soon sailed to
Japan. The 1884- coup was one of the saddest stories in the
history of Korea. The intentions and philosophy of the coup
leaders were much more profound than the public statements
in the December 5 decrees. The coup leaders underestimated
Chinese strength and overrelied upon the opportunistic
Japanese. The drama ended with the deaths of hundreds of
people, including many progressive patriots. The coup
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leaders had been too naive and too idealistic and had
launched the coup with not much more than wishful thinking;
and then they proved to be too realistic by compromising
their ideals in order to bring in another reactionary
group, that of Tai Won Kun, into the revolutionary govern
ment only to utilize their anti-Min sentiments. As Jaisohn
later rightly remembered, "The coup failed because of the
lack of public support and because of overreliance upon
others,11^® namely, upon the Japanese. Lastly, it may be interesting to examine the char
acteristics of the 1884 coup from the viewpoint of Thomas Meadows' definitions of "revolution" and "rebellion."
He differentiated between the two as follows: Revolution is a change of the form of government and of the principles on which it rests: it does not necessarily imply a change of rulers. Rebellion is a rising against the rulers which, far from necessarily aiming at a change of governmental principles and forms, often originates in a desire of preserving them intact. Revolutionary movements are against principles; rebellions against men.59 Yamanabe Kentaro in criticizing the coup underlined
two facts: first, the inclusion of Tai Won Run's family,
another reactionary group, in the new government, proved
that the coup leaders were simply trying to seek political
^®So Jai-pil [Philip Jaisohn], "Hoe Ko Kap Shin Chung Pyun" ["A few recollections of the 1884 coup1'], in the Annex of Min Tae-won, op. cit., p. 81. ^Thomas T. Meadows, The Chinese and Their Rebellion (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1856), p. 25. "
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power by replacing one reactionary group with another
reactionary group— the Min family with that of Tai Won Kun;
second, the structures contained in the reforms as decreed
on December 5 were not well enough developed to be carried
out, and the new officials were expected to operate on the
foundation of the previous organization. In other words,
although the reformers were advocating the reform of gov
ernment organization, they provided merely for new people AO to function within the old structure. What Yamanabe was
in effect saying was that the 1884- coup was a rebellion, not
a reform-inspired revolutionary movement, if Meadows' defi
nitions are applied to this situation.
On the other hand, one could defend the coup
leaders by saying that, first, the Tai Won Kun group was
brought into the government in order to strengthen it by
forming a coalition of anti-Min supporters which might draw
wider public support than the type of anti-Min position the
coup leaders alone represented. The reform leaders must
have believed that the zeal of the reformists for their
moral and political philosophy would prevail over conser
vative opinion in the government. Second, as to the
December 5 decrees, the coup leaders, in order to acquire
the urgently needed public support, expressed their
^Yamanabe, op. cit., pp. 168-169.
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intentions only in broad terms, not having enough, time to
announce the details of the whole plan for government
reorganization. There is adequate evidence to say that,
in terms of Meadows' distinction between revolution and
rebellion, the coup leaders' aims and statements of philos
ophy, however incomplete when publicly announced, and the
genuineness of their zeal for reform, however poorly planned
their decrees, prove the 1884 coup to have been a true
revolutionary movement.
PHILIP JAISOHN'S EXILE (1884-1895)41
The four ill-fated reform leaders arrived at
Nagasaki, Japan, three days after their escape from Inchon.
The naive reformers, who were inexperienced in world
affairs, still expected Japanese support for their future
efforts in the reform movement. They even expected a hero's
welcome from the Japanese; and they hoped to return to Korea
soon with Japanese military support. They were penniless
and hungry. Kim Ok-kyun, who was also an accomplished
artist, led them to a hotel, where they began to draw with
bamboo grovels on silk scrolls, which they put up for sale.
Prince Pak Yong-hyo added classic poems to these. The
^T here are few records on Jaisohn's life in the United States during this period, except for two books written by Kim To-tae and Channing Liem. In this section of the chapter, those sources are very heavily relied upon. (See pp. 8 and 9? fns. 14 and 16.)
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Japanese did not hesitate to pay adequate sums of money for
the scrolls, since the four reformers needed funds to go to
Tokyo.
Contrary to their expectations, Japanese Foreign
Minister Inoue was reluctant even to see them. When they
finally secured an audience with Inoue, he flatly denied that he could help the Korean reformers because of the risk
of inciting war with China. This was too much for the
emotional young Jaisohn, who shouted at Inoue:
What way is this for Samurai to treat Samurai? . . . We- trusted you, and now you betray and forsake us. I have had enough of you. I am going to a new world, where men stand by their bonds and deal fairly with one-another. I shall go to America. ^
The more experienced and more mature Kim Ok-kyun calmed down Jaisohn, by telling him that what had happened
with Inoue was "true of all nations." They sat down and
had realistic and serious discussions about their futures.
The decision was made that Kim Ok-kyun would remain in Japan to devise plans for the future of the movement, while Pak, So, and Jaisohn would go to the United States to learn
of those aspects of Western civilization which seemed
essential for them to apply in the future in their own
country. They already had hopes of returning to Korea in
42 McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 39-4-0. 45 -\Liem, op. cit., p. 30.
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the future, because the Chinese control of Korea was
obviously weakening due to the Japanese and Russian pene
trations into Korea.
They stayed in Japan for three months to prepare
for their visit to the United States. The intelligent
young Jaisohn concentrated on learning English, thinking that at least one in the party should be able to communi
cate with Americans. The others continued to draw bamboo
scrolls and to write poems, until they earned a sufficient
amount to go to the United States.
After a sad farewell with Kim Ok-kyun, the three
Korean Yang Ban arrived in San Francisco in April, 1885.
Although they considered the United States a "paradise," there were no eager buyers for bamboo scrolls there. The
most versatile among the three, and the only one who had
some knowledge of English, was Jaisohn, who decided to go
job hunting. Finally, Jaisohn found work— delivering fur
niture advertisements door-to-door at San Francisco homes.
He was to earn two dollars for every five hundred sheets he
distributed. Happy with his new job, Jaisohn offered
friends their living expenses and advised them to study
English at home. Prince Pak Yong-hyo and So Kwang-pum were far from
content with their situation, and, of course, uncomfortable
about being supported by young Jaisohn. So Kwang-pum chose
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to go to New York with the help of John T. Underwood, the
brother of a pioneer missionary in Korea. He later entered
M l Rutgers University. Meanwhile, Prince Pak came to the
decision that the United States was not the place for him.
Prom a nephew of the Japanese liberal Fukuzawa, Pak secured
the loan which covered his trip back to Japan. Although Pak was strongly inclined to be a progressive liberal, he
chose Japan where he was widely recognized as a nephew of 45 the late king. Left alone in San Francisco, Jaisohn worked hard at
his job 5 walking many miles to earn two dollars per day. During the night he attended English class at the YMCA, and
made many American friends. He also became a very devout
Christian, and attended a Presbyterian church every Sunday.
Among the church members Jaisohn met a man named
Roberts, who seemed very sympathetic with, and impressed by,
Jaisohn's diligence and strong desire for learning. Roberts
invited Jaisohn one evening to a dinner where Jaisohn was introduced to a Mr. Hollenback, who was not only very
wealthy but also a trustee of various educational insti
tutions, such as Lafayette College, Harry Hillman Academy,
and the University of Pennsylvania. After lengthy dis
cussion with Jaisohn, Hollenback promised that he would help
^Ibid., p. 33. ^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
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Jaisohn in his education, if Jaisohn would come to 46 Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, where he resided. This was a
great opportunity for Jaisohn, who had come to America for the specific purpose of acquiring an education.
After more than two years of hard times in
San Francisco, Jaisohn went to Wilkes-Barre in September,
1887. There he entered-Harry Hillman Academy to prepare
for college. Although Hollenback offered to pay the entire
bill, Jaisohn insisted upon earning part of his expenses,
and he was hired as a gardener by the headmaster of the
academy. It was a happy moment in Jaisohn1 s life, and he
was overwhelmed by optimistic expectations.
Soon, however, he was struck by tragic news:
because of Jaisohn's participation in the 1884- coup, his 4-7 family was now dead. 1 The shocking news was deeply upset
ting to Jaisohn. But because of the warm attention and
compassion of the families of the headmaster and of Hollenback, and, most importantly, because of his religious
^Liem, op. cit., p. 35* ^ I t was the custom in Korea that, if one had com mitted treason, one's family should commit suicide, or the government would execute them. Jaisohn's parents first committed suicide, followed by Jaisohn's wife, who poi soned herself. The Jaisohns' only son, who was two years old, reportedly died of starvation because there was nobody to take care of him. And Jaisohn's fifteen-year-old brother, So Jai-chang, was executed in downtown Seoul, apparently because he had not committed suicide. Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 151.
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faith, he was able to continue his studies. However, the bitterness which arose from the disaster which had befallen
his family in Korea inspired him to follow through with
naturalization procedures. He became an American citizen in 1888, at which time he adopted the American name,
Philip Jaisohn. He was the first Korean to be naturalized
in the United States. In 1890 Jaisohn graduated from Harry Hillman
Academy with honors, and passed the entrance examination
for Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He later
recalled that his studies at Tokyo Toyama School in mathe
matics, history, and geography greatly helped him in 48 achieving high grades at the academy.
When the philanthropist Hollenback brought Jaisohn
to Wilkes-Barre, he had something in mind which he had
never told Jaisohn. Hollenback wanted to pay for Jaisohn1 s
schooling in the hope he would return to Korea to work as a Christian missionary. Shortly before Jaisohn1 s first term
at Lafayette College, Hollenback called Jaisohn to come to
a discussion about Jaisohn's future. Hollenback offered
him seven thousand dollars, to be paid in yearly install
ments for the next seven years, with the condition that,
after four years at Lafayette, Jaisohn would study theology
^Ibid., p. 156.
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for three years at Princeton, and then go back to work in
Korea as a missionary. J • Jaisohn was asked to put the
agreement in writing if he wished to accept the offer.
The handsome offer did not lure him. Although he had a deep desire to study law, he discarded that ambition;
moreover, he was not at all sure that he was capable of
being a good missionary. Furthermore, he had no guarantee
that he could even go back to Korea, because he was con
sidered a criminal there. He had to decline the offer.
Although Jaisohn1s anxiety to study at Lafayette almost
pushed him to ask Hollenback for a loan, Jaisohn1 s conscience did not permit him to make the request, and he
decided to postpone his college education until he could
save some money. Jaisohn wrote to Lafayette College requesting per
mission to delay his admission until he could accumulate
enough money to pay for his school expenses. Unexpectedly,
Jaisohn received a letter from a chemistry professor, Hart, offering Jaisohn his entire expenses in return for Jaisohn1s 50 light work around Hart's house. Grateful, Jaisohn enjoyed
studying at Lafayette, where he became particularly fond of chemistry. An unfortunate turn of events again affected
Jaisohn's life: when Professor Hart died one and one half
^Liem, op. cit., p. 40. ^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
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years later, Jaisohn had to quit the college. He left
Easton for Philadelphia to seek a job.
In Philadelphia, Jaisohn did not have any luck in finding a job. One night the exasperated Jaisohn suddenly
thought of paying a visit to the president of the United
States, whom Jaisohn remembered was called "the 'servant' 51 of the people."*^ The next morning he went to Washington
to see the president. The secretary in the White House
naturally refused Jaisohn1s request to see President
Cleveland. However, the secretary sent Jaisohn to the
director of the Civil Service Commission, who helped him to
find work as a translator of Japanese and Chinese at the
Army Medical Library, at a monthly salary of $125. During the next four years, Jaisohn studied at
George Washington University Medical School while he worked
at the Army Medical Library. Although Jaisohn had not
intended to become a medical doctor, he became very much
interested in medicine, and he graduated in 1895 with a
Doctor of Medicine degree. He was the first Korean to 52 receive a medical degree from a United States institution.
Soon after graduation, Jaisohn was appointed to Garfield
Hospital in Washington, where" he worked under the super
vision of Dr. Walter Reed.
-^Liem, op. cit., p. 4-1. ^ I bid ., p. 4-5.
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In tlie hotel where Jaisohn lived in Washington, the 53 family of famed Colonel George Armstrong^ also stayed.
Jaisohn, then an eligible bachelor, fell in love with a
daughter of Colonel Armstrong, and soon married her.
Jaisohn was very happy with his wife and with his precious
degree, except for his sorrowful memories of Korea and his feelings of devotion to Korea which led him to feel it his
duty to reform Korea. Meanwhile, after the Sino-Japanese War, Japan was
planning a swift reform of Korea by backing the Korean pro gressive leaders of the 1884 coup. Since Kim Ok-kyun had 54 already been assassinated, Japan forced the Korean court to pardon Pak Yong-hyo, So Kwang-pum, and Philip Jaisohn.
Japan then brought back Pak Yong-hyo to Korea and helped
him to become the most powerful man in the Korean court,
He became famous for having created the Railway Postal Service in the United States during the Civil War. A statue of him was placed in front of the Chicago Post Office to commemorate his contributions. Kim To-tae, op. cit., p . 166. ^ T h e Korean court regarded Kim Ok-kyun as an unpardonable offender after the 1884 coup. Since Japan refused to hand over Kim to Korea, assassins were sent to Japan to kill him. The assassins found it very difficult to accomplish their mission in Japan, because Kim was very well protected by the Japanese. Finally, a plot was devised in which Kim Ok-kyun was lured into visiting Shanghai, where he was shot to death on March 28, 1894. The body was taken back to Korea where it was cut up into many pieces, and exhibited to the public as the remnants of a traitor. Min Tae-won, op. cit., pp. 10-14.
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with, the title of home minister. And Tokyo directed the
Japanese minister in Washington to persuade So Kwang-pum and
Jaisohn to go hack to Korea for their work of reform. In
response to Tokyo's request, the minister replied, " . . .It
is positively impossible to persuade Dr. Philip Jaisohn, who
has an American wife and a medical license to practice, to
go to Korea. . . . The letter, dated September 9, 1895, informed Tokyo, however, of a payment made to So Kwang-pum
for his fare to Korea, and of So's departure dabe of
September 15 from the United States. Soon after his
arrival in Korea, So became the justice minister. The reason for Jaisohn's refusal was perhaps that he
had reservations about a Korean reform plan backed by the
Japanese; although he feared that a plan could not succeed
without Japanese support, he was at the same time wary of
potential obligations to Japan should they succeed because
of her aid. However, when Pak Yong-hyo^ came to Washington
and spoke to Jaisohn of his possible service to Korea, 57 Jaisohn could not refuse the challenge.
^Nihon Gaimu Sho [Japanese Foreign Ministry], Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [Japanese diplomatic’documents] ([Tokyo:] ifihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai), Vol. 27, Book 1, Document 366, PP. 555-556. ^ O n the reason for Pak's voyage to the United States, see Chapter 6, fn. 72.
^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., p. 167*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Only several months after Jaisohn finally found happiness
in the United States, he left for Korea with his new wife.
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TONG NIP SHINMUN OR THE INDEPENDENT1
Dr. Jaisohn came hack to Korea in January of 1896,
to continue his work for the reform and independence of
Korea. He had been offered the post of foreign minister,
but he did not want to accept an official position as he did
not wish to become involved in political maneuvering; he
also recognized that there would be stronger pressure to
support the establishment if he were part of it. He there
fore declined the offer in favor of publishing his own
paper, The Independent, through which he planned to educate the mass public and ultimately to bring about the reform of
Korea with the support of this newly educated group.
Since Korea was in great chaos after the Sino-Japan-
ese War, the government realized the need for reform but did
The Korean edition is titled Tong Nip Shinmun, meaning "The Newspaper of Independence," while the English edition is titled The Independent. In this study both Eng lish and Korean editions will be called The Independent. However, in the footnotes the English edition will be identi- fied as the English edition. Therefore, when the citation is simply to The Independent, this will indicate the Korean edition, upon which this-research relied more. In order to avoid repetition, some of the important ideas which appeared in The Independent and which are directly connected with the activities of the Independence Club will be discussed in the appropriate parts of the chap ters dealing with the club.
53
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not have a program or even ideas about where to begin. When
the government offered Jaisohn another job, as advisor to
the Privy Council, Jaisohn accepted and also requested government aid for the publication of a newspaper which
would advocate reform. The government at the time felt that
its goals and those of Jaisohn were similar; so, at the urg
ing of Premier Kim Hong-jip, the sum of five thousand won
was promised to Jaisohn for the publication of the news- p paper. However, the king's flight to the Russian Legation
on February 12, 1896, led to the assassination of the pro-Japanese premier, and many of his cabinet members 7. escaped to Japan. Fortunately for Jaisohn, the next pre mier was pro-Western— the former minister in Washington,
Pak Chung-yang. Dr. Jaisohn not only received the previous government's commitment of five thousand won, but he was
also allowed to use a building in Chung Dong, behind the
American Consulate, for the publication of the paper.
With this financial backing Dr. Jaisohn ordered a
% i m To-tae, So Jai-pil Paksa Chasojon [Autobiogra phy of Dr. Philip Jaisohnj [Seoul: Susonsa, 1948), p. 209. For the general value of won at that time, some of the gov ernment pay scales will be introduced. The annual salary of the premier was 5>000 won, of ministers 4,000 won, and of police officers between 120 and 500 won. For detailed pay scales of the bureaucracy, see Kwan Bo [Government Gazette] (Seoul: Korean Government Publication), March 27 > 1895.
^Yi Sun-keun, Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun [Modern Korean history] (Seoul: Eulyu Munwhasa, 1966), p. 732.
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press from Osaka, Japan. He had hired two assistants for
the reporting section; one was sent to the markets for
prices and to pick up rumors, and the other was sent to the
government buildings to get official bulletins and any
stories which were being leaked. There were also eight
employees in the printing section who at first knew nothing 4. about printing. Homer B. Hulbert lent two of his printers
free of charge to help Jaisohn, who later remembered that
Hulbert had contributed a great deal to the auspicious beginnings of The Independent. Jaisohn had to supervise
the printing section as well as to write the entire English section of the paper and all but the "Government Gazette" 0 and some local news in the Korean part. The first edition of The Independent appeared on
April 7, 1896, and it was then published three times a week:
Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The four-page paper
consisted of a Korean part containing an editorial (which Jaisohn used as the forum from which to spread his reform ideas), an abridgment of the Government Gazette, foreign
news and local and miscellaneous news, all of which occupied
4. A distinguished American who did much scholarly work on Korea and who worked for the English language periodical, The Korean Repository, in Seoul.
^Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 214. ^Ibid.
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pages one and two. Advertisements in Korean and English
appeared on page three, and the English part, consisting of
the editorial, the "Government Gazette," foreign news, and
brief notices, occupied page four.
After the edition of January 1, 1897, The Indepen dent was split into a Korean and an English edition, each
containing four pages. The contents and the pattern of the new editions were the same as previously, but all depart ments were expanded. The contents of the two editions on
any given day were not necessarily the same, but identical
material was often used in the two languages on different
days. After Jaisohn was forced to leave Korea in May, 1898,
as will be explained later, the American- and Shanghai-edu
cated president of the Independence Club, Yun Chee^ho, took over the post of editor, but the function and tone of the
paper did not change much. For the last few months of its
life in 1898 the Korean edition was published daily although
the subscription price was unchanged. At first only three hundred copies were printed, but
circulation increased rapidly until three thousand copies <7 were being distributed, a tenfold increase.' Jaisohn
claimed later that many subscribers gave their copies to
7 Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 213*
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friends and neighbors when they had finished reading them
and that one copy of the paper was often read by two hundred
people.^ At first the paper operated at a monthly loss of
between 150 and 180 won per month, a loss Jaisohn had to
absorb himself. Nevertheless, he had eight branch offices—
in Chemulpo, Wonsan, Pusan, Pachoo, Sando, Pyungyang, Suwon, and Kangwha. There is no evidence of the exact relationship
between these branch offices and Seoul, but they seem to
have existed primarily to help distribute the paper, and g agents were paid twenty percent of total sales.
Since there were so many financial and technical
difficulties involved in publishing the paper, why did
Jaisohn put so much effort into bringing out an English
edition if the purpose of The Independent was to educate the •
Korean people for the reform and ultimate independence of
Korea? The answer is that the English edition was widely read among foreigners in the Far East, and it made them
aware of Korea and brought sympathizers to Jaisohn's
crusade.
Q F. A. McKenzie, Korea's Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920), p. 67. "^Classified advertisements carried in the first seven issues of The Independent.
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The Korean Repository praised The Independent for
its contents and its layout, congratulating Jaisohn on the
"splendid opportunity now "before him to do good.”"1"^ The
[Baltimore] Sun, evaluating the English edition of The
Independent dated December 15, 1896, which criticized newly
appointed Justice Minister Cho Pyung-sik, commented: The Independent does its duty fearlessly, and in a manner highly honorable to Korean journalism, when it warns the so-called conservative party now in power that if Korea continues to act thus, she will surely drop into a quagmire where no friends can possibly help her.11 A traveler-writer, Isabella B. Bishop, wrote of The
Independent in 189?: One of the most important events in Seoul was the establishment in April, 1896, by Dr. Jaisohn of "The Independent" [sic] . . . and in creating a public opinion which shall sit in judgement on regal and official misdeeds. It is already fulfilling_an impor tant function in unearthing abuses and dragging them into daylight, and is creating a desire for rational education and reasonable reform, and is becoming some thing of a terror to evil-doers. Dr. Jaisohn is a Korean gentleman educated in America, and has the wel fare of his country thoroughly at heart. The sight of newsboys passing through the streets with bundles of a newspaper in Eun-mun under their arms,
The Korean Repository, IV (1897, reprint edition, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), 50. (All citations from The Korean Repository in this study refer to the reprint edition!
^T h e [Baltimore] Sun, February 1, 1897- Also reprinted in The Independent, English ed., April 1, 1897*
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and of men reading them in their shops, is among the novelties of 1897.
Dr. Jaisohn was Western-educated, and many of
the ideas which he advocated were accepted in the West
while still being revolutionary in Korea. It was natural
for him to try to win over to his cause those who would
be sympathetic, and the English edition made his campaign
for the reform of Korean society known to those people.
In the following section those reforms which
Dr. Jaisohn tried to bring about will be enumerated and
explained.
THE INDEPENDENT AS AH EDUCATOR
The Use of the Korean Alphabet for Mass- Education
The Korean edition of The Independent was written
entirely in Korean letters, except for the few cases
when it was necessary to use some Chinese characters:
when the Korean letters alone would give a false or ambiguous meaning, when an advertisement was Chinese-ori
ented, or when it had an important announcement to make to
IP Isabella B. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1897), PP- 4-39-44-07
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the conservatives who favored Chinese characters.1^
The Korean alphabet was called Eun Nun
meaning low-class letters,1^ as contrasted with
Han Mun or great Chinese letters. Eun Mun was
developed by the fourth king of the Yi dynasty,
Se Jong Tai Wang , who ruled between 1419 and 1450.
Eun Hun has been described as "an excellent native alphabet 15 and is easily learned,” ^ since all words can be written
with some combination of fourteen consonants and ten vowels.
To many Western experts, Eun Hun is ”a highly scientific 16 phonetic writing system.” The conservative Korean ruling class did not bother
to learn Eun Mun, but spent many years studying Chinese
^For example, the announcement by the Independence Club that it would demand the fulfillment of a resolution adopted by "The Official-Civilian Joint Conference” was carried in both Korean and Chinese writing (see The Indepen dent , December 12, 1898). 14 After World War II the name was changed to Han Geul, meaning Korean letters. ^F. D. David, Our Neighbors, The Koreans (Hew York: Field Afar Press, 1949), p . 41. 16E. 0. Eeischauer and J. K. Fairbanks East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1965), p. 462; For an excellent study of Eun Mun, see Gari K. Ledyard, "The Korean Language Reform of 1446: The Origin, Background and Early History of the Korean Alphabet" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Columbia University, 1965).
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characters, knowledge of which was the most important
status symbol of the highly regarded scholar-gentry class.
The editorial in the first Korean edition made it plain that The Independent was going to use only Eun Mun so that
the newspaper could be read by anyone who was literate, by 17 any man or woman of either high or low class. ' This
editorial made a comparison between Eun Mun and Han Mun, saying that Eun Mun is not only easier to learn but is also
in Korean letters, which all Koreans should learn. The
paper then attacked those who studied only Chinese and who considered others ignorant because they had not studied
Chinese. The paper's policy was that it was very important
. . . for all Koreans to learn Eun Mun, since, because it is so easy, it would bring about equality; everyone could be literate and therefore national pride and ultimately the independence of Korea would come about. 18 Jaisohn showed his determination to use only Eun Mun
in The Independent when it was announced that only communi cations written in Eun Mun would be received by and publi
cized in his paper, while letters written to the paper in IQ Chinese characters would be ignored. The paper went fur
ther when it asked the Education Ministry to publish a
~*~^The Independent, April 7? 1896. ^®Ibid.
19Ibid.
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Korean dictionary and Korean grammar books in order to give 20 a systematic education to the younger generation. The
Independent regarded learning Eun Mun as one of the ele
ments necessary for the independence of Korea, as it would
bring respect for Korean culture and help develop national
feeling. Conversely, the more Koreans concentrated on
learning Chinese, the weaker would be their desire for
independence. Jaisohn emphasized that mass education was a prereq
uisite for the ultimate reform of Korea; there are many edi torials advocating the use of Eun Mun rather than Han Mun,
which could only be learned by the rich who could afford to
study for many years. The Independent often compared the
chaotic state of China, where only the classics such as The
Four Books and The Three Ethics were taught, with the rela
tive calm of European countries where a practical education
was provided, concluding that education was the reason for
Europe's being ten times stronger than China. It is significant that The Independent advocated the
change from the fundamental value system of the Ti
dynasty, the system whereby the use of Han Mun led virtually to the exclusive use of education by the most
^ T h e Independent, August 1897-
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21 privileged class, the Yang Ban. Citing the difficulty
involved and the length of time it took to learn Han Mun and
lang Ban (m ) represented the ruling class in the Yi dynasty. When the fourth king of the Koryo dynasty (A. D. 918-1392), Kwong Jong ( ^ ), who ruled between 950 and 975» introduced the Civil Service Examination System to Koryo from the Tang dynasty of China, there were two sepa rate examinations, the Literary and the Military. During the reign of the next king, Kyung Jong, the Literary Class was called Tong Ban (]& ) or East Class, and the Military Class was termed Suh Ban or West Class. Later during Kyung Jong's reign they were merged into one unified class called Yang Ban, meaning "Both Classes." Tai Pak Kwa Sa Jon [Korean encyclopedia] (Seoul: Hak Sun Sa, 1959), LV, 591, s.v. "Yang Ban." During the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), class distinc tions were very strictly observed along the lines of the four officially designated classes. These were (1) Yang Ban, (2) Chung In [middle class], (3) Sang Min [commoner], and (4-) Chon Min [low people]. The Yang Ban class was divided again into another four parts: Eoyalty, Nobility, Yang Ban, and To Ban. Therefore there were two meanings of Yang Ban, the broad sense meaning the upper class and the more specific use meaning the educated group. Paik Hyun-ki, "The Korean Social Structure and Its Implications for Educa tion," Aspects of Social Change in Korea, eds. C. I. E. Kim and Changboh Chee (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The Korean Eesearch and Publications Inc., 1968), p. 7- Eoyalty and Nobility included the king and his clan. The specific term Yang Ban applied to the descendants of, high officials down to the fourth generation from the origi nal office holders. The To Ban was composed of Yang Ban relatives residing in the countryside and those more than four generations away' from the office holders. If a man was born to the concubine of a Yang Ban, he belonged to the Chung In class. Professor Yi Man-kap cited by Paik Hyun-ki, ibid., p. 11. Eor a critical yet interesting account of the Yang Ban, see Pak Chi-won, Yang Ban Jun [Yang Ban stories], trans. Yi Suk-ku (Seoul: Kun Yong Sa, 194-7). It might be noted that there is not a single compre hensive study of the Yang Ban in any language.
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also the conservative Confucian ethic, the Yang Ban believed
themselves justified in enjoying high prestige and social and economic privileges. Near the turn of the nineteenth century Pah Chi-won wrote about the Yang Ban:
Heaven made four classes of people and it made the scholar-gentry class the highest. This class is the Yang Ban who do not have to plough the land or engage in business. Since by study they pass the literary tests, the worst they will become is Chin Sa. The certificate for passing the exam is called Hong Bi or "red symbol." Though it is small in size, the possessor can do anything he wishes and people call it the "money-maker." The possessor can order his neighbors to plow his land before they do their own. If the neighbors are disobedient, they can be punished by pouring bleach in their noses and by grabbing their hair. Even facing these private punishments, they are not supposed to complain.22
Because they were so greatly privileged, the Yang
Ban became die-hard conservatives blocking any change in the
value system of the society. Those who were not Yang Ban, 25 ninety percent of the population, were denied even the
opportunity to try the Civil Service Examination, which was the only path by which they could join the exclusive group
of the Yang Ban. Typical of the many Western observers who wrote their impressions of the Yang Ban, Mrs. Bishop called them
22 Pak Chi-won, op. cit., p. 7* ^William E. Griffis, Corea: The Hermit Nation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907)? P» 443.
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Oh "the licensed vampires of the country," and a distin
guished scholar wrote that they lived "in ancient privilege
and prerogative . . . virtually paying no taxes or tolls, [preying]upon the common people."^
Although Jaisohn knew and understood the power of
the Yang Ban, he called them "the do-nothing class," who 26 contributed only to the weakness of the Korean economy,
and he even demanded that they change their ways and asked
the foreign missionaries to help Korea by educating the 27 Yang Ban. ' One editorial said:
The class which especially needs instruction on morality and general knowledge is the yangban families [sic]. . . . [T]he farming class in the interior is generally honest and obedient, but the so-called yang- bans, who have been making their livings at the expense of others for generations, are the ones who are making all the mischief and create all the trouble in the country.28
Thus The Independent mounted an attack on the privi
leged class not only by advocating mass education using the
simpler Eun Mun, which would take away their monopoly on
Bishop, op. cit., p. 448.
^Griffis, loc. cit. ^Philip Jaisohn, "Korean Finance," The Korean Repository, op. cit., Ill (1896), 167. ^The Independent, English ed., December 22, 1896.
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learning, but also by directly criticizing tbeir strangle
hold on Korean society. The paper was trying to lay the
philosophical ground for change, and the Yang Ban were a natural target for reform.
On Civil Rights
The equality of peoples. Advocating the equality of
people was not new in Korea at the end of the nineteenth
century. Kap Sin Chung Byun in 1884, Tong Hah Ban in 1894,
and Kap 0 Kyung Jang in 1894 all tried to bring about the abolition of the class system. However, as we have seen in
Chapter 1, Kap Sin Chung Byun survived only three days, and
the Kap 0 Kyung Jang did not gain popular support as it was
thought to be a Japanese conspiracy. Neither movement ever
reached the grass roots, and they both ended as little more
than dreams of the Kap Sin leaders and the Japanese. In
contrast to those movements, the Tong Hah Ran was a sponta neous uprising of the oppressed against the oppressors, but
it was not philosophically based nor did it have the wider
purpose of bringing about equality for all peoples.
So for the first time in Korean history, there
appeared a far-reaching, systematic process to teach the
people that God gave people equal rights— rich and poor, high and low, of whatever bachground, means of mahing a
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OQ living, or education; 7 that those rights could not he
taken away from them hy any person or institution except by 30 the court after an impartial trial; 'kk® origin of the state was explained as being for the interests of a collec
tive society; and therefore people should agree to pay taxes
to support their officials, who on their part should fulfill
their duties to protect the people and work for the better- 31 ment of society„
Equality of the sexes. The status of women in
nineteenth-century Korea was very low. From the time of
marriage a Korean woman was almost a slave to her husband—
in accordance with the classical Confucian ethic of
Yo Pil Jong Bu W-X. ) that a woman must obey her husband in everything. Except for those who were of such a
low class that they had to work in the fields, no woman could go out during daylight and "to go out suitably con
cealed at night, or in a rigidly closed chair, are the only
outings"3^ allowed by a custom which had more force than a
law, so strong was the custom of seclusion. Men were
allowed more than one wife, though this practice was enjoyed
most by the Yang Ban, who could afford concubines. Although
^The Independent, October 16, 1897*
3°Ibid., March 9, 1897- 31Ibid., April 17, 1897-
3^Bishop, op. cit., p. 34-1.
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a.woman could not divorce her husband, there were seven
grounds which a man could cite for casting off his wife.
These were incompatibility with the husband's parents,
adultery, jealousy, barrenness, incurable disease, a 33 quarrelsome dxsposxtxon, or theft. ^
Dr. Jaisohn, who had just married an American,
thought it barbarous to treat women so badly. The Indepen
dent campaigned for courtesy and consideration to be shown
to the weaker sex, for, it said, if men continued to treat
women so badly merely because they have the advantage of physical strength, it will be impossible to bring about a
healthy society. Therefore the concubine system should be
abolished, and there should be legal equality of the
sexes. 34 Following this, Jaisohn, in an editorial, criticized
the marriage procedure in Korea. He believed that unhappy
marriages stemmed from the old custom of arranged marriages,
which meant that many brides and grooms met for the first
time at the marriage ceremony. The editorial explained that
Western countries have a minimum age requirement for
marriage and that people there married on the basis of
^George H. Jones, "The Status of Women in Korea," The Korean Repository, op. cit., Ill (1896), 227-
^ The Independent, English ed., April 21, 1896.
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mutual trust and love.^ Using the logic that marriage is
an important foundation for a healthy family and a healthy
society, Jaisohn tried to persuade his readers that a strong
system could he built only by families which were based on
mutual respect, and this could come only with the equality
of men and women.
On the Political System
The Independent often used such terms as "political
science," "democracy," and "political parties." Since he
was trying to educate his readers for democracy, Jaisohn
defined his terms. "Political science" was explained as
"the philosophy and theory developed by the civilized 36 nations after many thousand years of experience." One of the points he emphasized was that in order for Korea to have a good political system it would be necessary for everyone
to study political science, but he realized that there was
little hope for this in the near future. He did, however,
have practical short-term proposals, and, as the first step,
he advocated the election of local officials. He reasoned:
The main theory of politics is that if an appointed magistrate makes mistakes, the people think the whole government structure is unsatisfactory; however, if an
^ The Independent, February 12, 1898.
36Ibid., April 14, 1896.
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elected magistrate is unsatisfactory, it was the mistake of those who elected him and, they will try to elect a better one the next time. This system allows people to participate in public affairs and share the responsibil ities of politics. If this system is adopted there will be progress in one or two y e a r s . 57
A good official was defined as one who is honest and a servant of the people, whether or not he had studied political science, and one who would also explain the king's 38 policies to those who had doubts about them. The paper went on to develop Jaisohn's theory of
personnel administration. He contended that ministers were
not staying long enough in their positions to learn their
jobs: as it took at least a few months to understand his
duties, a minister should hold his position for a minimum of one year.^ When a minister was dismissed, the reason for
the dismissal should be made public, for this would warn
other ministers not to do the same thing if they did not
wish to be dismissed. As the king was entirely responsible for appointing
ministers, it could be said that he was responsible for the
^The Independent, April 11, 1896. The English edition of January 16, 1897, contained an identical view.
^The Independent, April 16, 1896.
^Ibid., May 2, 1896. For example, there were fifteen foreign ministers during the years 1896 to 1898, an average of five per year. Kwan Bo [Government Gazette], op. cit., issues between 1896 axuT’1898.
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short ministerial terms, but The Independent never criti
cized the king so openly. However, one of the Six Articles
demanded by the Independence Club in October, 1898, was that
the king should be guided on important matters by the
majority opinion of the Council of State; and that the
responsibility for giving advice should lie only with the Council of State, a change which would have indirectly taken
away the king's power of appointment. The struggle between the conservatives and progres
sives grew more fierce as The Independent continued to press
for reform. For his readers Jaisohn attempted to analyze
the conflict as one of opposing political parties. Politi
cal parties in the modern sense, of course, did not exist in Korea at that time, however: there was no party organization,
no membership, and no platform. But the paper emphasized
that there could be constructive competition between the two
groups, "as to hear and to see others as well as to speak and forget petty grievances is necessary if anyone is to
become a successful political leader." An editorial in the English edition stated Jaisohn's
ideal system: Whichever party really desires to win its cause must never "give up the ship" nor "say die." If the princi-_ pie is founded upon the solid rock of morality, and their
^ T h e Independent, English ed., August 25, 1896.
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actions speak their beliefs, the world will be with that party and its cause will win. As far as staying quality and courage of conviction are concerned, the conservative party shows up strongly. . . . We watch the struggle with interest and be sure that the right will win in the long run.4-1
Editorials in the Korean edition later analyzed
what the two groups were trying to accomplish: the conserva tives were characterized as the group which was trying to
restore the customs which had prevailed before the 42 Sino-Japanese War, whether they had been good or bad,
who opposed trade with all foreign countries except China, who opposed the American and French efforts to lay a railway
from Seoul to Euich and Inchon as they preferred that people
and goods move slowly in bullock-drawn carts. And, in the
best tradition of political polemic, the paper complained that the conservatives were "less needed than dogs.”
The next Korean edition editorial explained the
philosophy of the progressives. They, it was asserted, were
studying the developed countries to learn their techniques
and to understand their systems of law, politics, and
economics. This learning would open the way to a modern 44 Korea, under the king's leadership, and the Korean people
^ T h e independent, English ed., August 25, 1896.
^^The Independent, August 27, 1896.
^Ibid., August 29» 1896. ^Ibid., September 1, 1896.
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would "be able to express their opinions without fear and to
unite for success in reaching their goals. It concluded by
saying that if the progressives should win the support of
the majority they would be the government of the people with
the trust of the people. ^
The paper went on to discourse upon how good it was
to have two parties testing each other in open debate in 46 Congress, but it did not go so far as to advocate the
setting up of a Korean Congress on United States lines.
One of the moves which it did openly advocate was
freedom of assembly. In the city of Kong Ju there were some
remnants of the Tong Hah Ran ( W » i ), led by a man named
Kim Bu-hun. He styled himself the new leader of the Tong
Hahs and went among the people preaching a strange doctrine, including the prediction that fire-rain would soon fall upon
the earth and destroy all those who did not obey his com mands.^ He had converted nearly one hundred families, and
it was reported that people had implicit faith in this
fanatic. The reports reaching Seoul said that the magistrate
of Kong Ju did not have the power to stop him. This new movement was considered a threat to Korean security by the
^The Independent, September 1, 1896. h C. Ibid., both the Korean and English editions of January 28, 1897- ^The Independent, English ed., March 4, 1897*
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Court and most of the conservative-minded populace, and
they tried to suppress the movement. The Independent
stated, however, that, since the fanatics had not yet
broken any law, it would be illegal for the officials to prosecute them.
In many ways the reforms which Jaisohn advocated
were impractical to implement: he had a dream of Korean
society becoming an idealized version of America, of Korea as a country in which there was complete equality, where
there was complete freedom of speech, and where officials
were elected by popular vote. The participation of the
great majority of the people was the cause he believed most
important, for, as he wrote,
Open discussion by the public would lead to their participation in public affairs, and this participation would lead by the people's consensus to reform policies which would be the most important part of their success.49
THE INDEPENDENT ON THE REFORM OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS
As well as being concerned with political conditions in the country, The Independent was concerned about the
physical health and welfare of the people, and in its drive
to make Korea a state equal to developed European
^The Independent, English ed., March 4, 1897.
^ T h e Independent, June 30, 1896.
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50 countries, it stressed improvement in three areas:
(1) housing, (2) the water supply, and (3) medical care.
Housing
Korean houses were usually built of mud placed over
a wooden skeleton. Wall paper was used on the sides and oil
paper on the floor. The fireplace was outside the house,
and hot air was sent under the floor to the opposite corner where the chimney was placed. Heavy, flat stones were used
under the mud of the floor to avoid the danger of fire, so
it took a great deal of wood to warm up this thick material.
Also, the floor near the fireplace was usually too hot to sit
on, while the floor near the chimney was still cold. There
was no system of ventilation whatsoever.
Since this sytem of heating was so inefficient and unhealthy, as well as being very dangerous as it often caused the house to burn down, the paper provided practical
advice on how to improve this traditional construction. The
fireplaces should be built with grates or stoves with doors
installed inside, and, if this were done, coal could be
burned.^'1' Since the paper maintained that the continued
burning of wood was robbing Korea of her forests, which were
^T h e Independent, May 2, 1896. ^The Independent, English ed., July 21, 1896.
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an important source of building materials and which before
had prevented soil erosion, it pressed for the use of coal.
There was an abundance of coal in Korea which would also be 52 used later by the railway when it was built.
The Water Supply The public water wells in Seoul were centers of
contamination and disease and adversely affected the whole
community. Jaisohn emphasized the importance of water, say
ing that "you can estimate the level of civilization of a 55 people by the amount of water they use."-^ To solve this urgent problem, the paper suggested
that a short-term solution would be the building of a pipe
line to bring water from the Han River, and that as a more
permanent solution a reservoir should be built in a valley near Seoul. The paper estimated that} if every family in
Seoul contributed 150 percent of what they spent on water in
a year, there would be sufficient revenue to pay interest on the investment at 7 percent and there would still be a sur- 55 plus to cover running expenses and repairs.
The Korean edition editorial two days later gave an
immediate solution to the problem of tainted water: all water should be purified by boiling. A large pot of boiled
^^The Independent, English ed., April 30, 1896.
55Ibid. 54Ibid. 55Ibid.
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water could be kept in the shade so it would always be
ready.^
Medical Care Because Jaisohn was an American-trained physician,
The Independent naturally took an interest in medical matters. There were two practices in Korean medicine which
it particularly deplored as being unhygienic and even dan
gerous. The first was chim, which meant pricking the skin
with a large needle to improve blood circulation or to cure
internal diseases. The instrument was made of iron and was
three to five inches long with a sharp point. The chim practitioner carried this implement, unwrapped and seldom washed, in his pocket— a practice which could lead to the
spread of infection. The Independent demanded that the 57 government prohibit its use. ' The second custom which was deplored was the use of
a mudang ("sorceress") to cure the sick. It was an old
Korean practice, persisting in some areas even today, when there was sickness in the house to call either a blind man
or a mudang to beat drums, sing songs, play cymbals, and
dance, all of which were supposed to chase out evil, the
^The Independent, May 2, 1896.
^The Independent, English ed., December 1, 1896.
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source of the sickness. There were more than one thousand
mudang in Seoul alone who'earned an average of fifteen
dollars per month, which indicates that they were much in demand.^® The owner of the house to which the mudang had been
called had to prepare a big feast to give to the evil
spirits. After the devils had been chased away, the patient
was to eat the feast, for a feast offered to the devils was
meant to be good medicine for the patient. The Independent
recounted the case of a patient with dysentery who died
after eating raw turnips and boiled rice given by a mudang, and demanded that this dangerous custom be outlawed by the
police.^
THE INDEPENDENT AS AN AGENT OE REFORM
One of The Independent1s main purposes was to apply
pressure upon those government officials who were corrupt as
well as upon government institutions which it contended
needed to be changed. The conservatives, who knew that they were vulnerable to attack, took a very cautious line in
defending themselves, mainly memorializing the king that
-^Bishop, op. cit., p. 443. ^ T h e Independent, English ed., December 1, 1896. The English edition of February 18, 1897? contains the identical view.
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Jaisohn and his newspaper were a bad influence on the
people. But the paper continued to attack all the targets
it believed needed attention.
Pressure on Conservative Officials
In an early reform campaign Jaisohn had called for
changes which he thought would help in modernizing Korea,
such as getting rid of the topknot, wearing simple Western
clothing, abolishing the lunar calendar, giving up the
suzerain contribution to China, as well as what has earlier
been discussed, advocating the use of the Korean alphabet. The minister of education was strongly opposed to The Independent1 s program. He memorialized the throne with
the complaint:
. . . The adoption of foreign clothes by soldiers, policemen, and students, and bhe cutting of hair are the first steps towards making barbarians; the use of the Korean alphabet and the adoption of the Western calendar are the first steps towards throwing off the influence of China; the new regulations for the cabinet, giving members freedom to discuss matters publicly, deprive His Majesty of some of his power and encourage the free dom and liberty of the people.60
The Independent countered the attack by saying that
Education Minister Shin Ki-sun did not have the qualifica
tions to be education minister, and that, although his post
was one which could be a great influence upon the development
of Korea, the minister was effective in resisting change in
^The Independent, June 4-, 1896.
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Korea.^
In the next few days the paper not only criticized
the philosophy of the conservative group but also encouraged students to agitate in opposition to Minister Shin's go fix policies. % When the students at the Pai Chai School, ^
which had been founded by American missionaries, responded
to Jaisohn's call by cutting their hair and wearing uni
forms, the paper paid them lavish compliments, saying:
The students of Pai Chai School look well in their new caps and uniforms. They seem to be proud of their new dress and all regret that they did not adopt it sooner. . . . Long live Pai Chai.°^ Minister Shin was furious with Jaisohn and his paper,
but there was little he could do against him as the king
thought that Korea needed some change. Worse things were to happen to the education minister: after an edition of
61 The Independent, English ed., June 6, 1896. 6? The Independent, June 11, 1896. 65Pai Chai School ) was opened for Korean boys in 1886 under the supervision of Methodist missionary H.G. Appenzeller. Even before the formation of the Indepen dence Club on July 2, 1896, Jaisohn had given lectures at this school. His lectures gave momentum to the student reform organization, Hyup Sung Hoe ( )» under Syngman Bhee, who became an active member of the Independence Club and ultimately the first president of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Even though the relationship between the Hyup Sung Hoe and the Independence Club was very close, there was no official connection betweenjthem. ^The independent, June 16, 1896.
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Yu Hak Kyung Wi (''t^ ) [Treatise on Confucian studies] was published at government expense under the
auspices of the Education Department, The Independent
criticized him and the book in an editorial as follows:
On page 42 he says "of late the so-called Ye Su Kyo (Christianity) has been trying to conEamlnate the world with its barbarous teachings. It deceives the masses with its stories of Heaven and Hell; it interferes with the rites of ancestral worship; interdicts the custom of bowing before the gods of heaven and earth." These are the ravings of a disordered intellect and are not worth discussing. On page 50 he says "How grand and glorious is the Empire of China the Middle Kingdom! She is the largest and richest in the world. The grandest men of the world have all come from the Middle Empire." At page 52 "Europe is too far away from the center of civilization, that is the Middle Kingdom, hence Russians, Turks, English, Erench, Germans and Belgians look more like birds and beaSts than men and their language sound like the chirping of fowls." [sic] .... Mr. Sin [sic] has a fine contempt for Europe and Europeans but let us see how it would work practically. He wears cotton pants which were probably woven in Manchester. The watch he wears was peraps [sic] made in Switzerland. He lights his pipe with matches from Vienna unless he prefers the cheaper Japanese product, he reads by the light of American Kerosene [sic] oil, he probably wears a piece of amber from the Baltic in his topknot; if it were not for European glass he would not be able to look out of his windows in winter, his friends the insurgents are armed with weapons made in Europe and his sovereign is the guest of one of these "low-down bird-chirping Europeans" .... We are on the whole pleased at his ravings for he is overdoing it and is hastening to his fall.65
This criticism, written by a man educated in the
^ The Independent, English ed., September 29, 1896.
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United States, was enjoyed "by the common people. Many
people were receptive to The Independent's ideas, and,
because of the wide acceptance of the newspaper, few who
were on the receiving end of criticism dared to fight back.
One week after he was criticized by the paper, Minister Shin
was forced to resign from his position, and the post was
filled by an Independence Club member, Min Sang-ho.^7 This was a victory for Jaisohn and The Independent, which then
thanked the king for siding with reform. It might be of interest to introduce here the full
text of an editorial which was written in response to the appointment of Minister of Justice Cho Pyung-sik. He was an
arch-conservative and would two years later directly con
tribute to the destruction of the Independence Club. The
newspaper commented: The newly appointed Minister of Justice, Mr. Cho Pyengsik [ sic], has a remarkable career as a statesman. The brief record of his official life is as follows:— When he was Governor of Chung Chong Province he stole $8000 from the people of the province, which fact was reported to His Majesty by a special Inspector. So he was dismissed from the Governorship. But later on he was promoted to Minister of Justice. He made another brilliant record while he was holding the portfolio of Minister of Justice:— One day when he was passing a certain place in the city. He noticed his former Private Secretary who was with him while he was Governor of Chunchong [sic]. [This Private Secretary had given
^Kwan Bo, op. cit., October 2, 1896.
^Ibid., October 5? 1896.
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rather free information to the Special Inspector in regard to the robbery the Governor committed]. He ordered his servants to seize him and took him into the Law Department where this unfortunate man was murdered by the Minister. On account of the crime of the murder the Minister was banished from Seoul for a few months. He was soon appointed Governor of Hamkyeng Province where he ordered the export of grains from the port of Wonsan to be stopped. The Japanese government made a strong protest against this order, and made the Korean Government pay $90,000' indemnity for the little fun of the Governor. This Government did not mind paying the trifling sum of $90,000 as the Governor's service to the country was considered worth more than that amount. Therefore he was again appointed Governor of Chungchong [sic] Province. The consist ant [sic] Governor kept up his former record of robbery in that province by taking $12,000 and killing twentytwo [sic] innocent people while collecting the money. He was again arrested on the charge of robbery and murder and sentenced to so many years' imprisonment. But the government could not spare him so long in the prison, so after serving one year in the jail, he was again appointed Grand Master of Ceremony in the Royal Household Dep't. Some months ago he memorialized the Throne to _ re-establish the old system of Government, to abolish the use of the Bun Mun, to kill the relatives of political criminals, to wear the old style court dress by the officials, ect. [sic] but his suggestions were not accepted by the Throne. How, he comes out again as Minister of Law and Councilor of the State. What a checkered c a r e e r . 68
This strong criticism was not sufficient to get the
king to change the appointment. The king was at the time
still in the Russian Legation surrounded by conservative officials, many of whom were friends of Cho, and he promoted
Trim instead eleven months later to minister of foreign
affairs. In that office Cho signed an important treaty with
Russia, which would have given Russia the power to direct
^ T h e Independent, English ed., December 13? 1896.
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the Korean Finance Department, In Chapter 4 it will be
seen how Jaisohn, using the influence both of The Indepen
dent and the Independence Club, finally managed to have Cho dismissed.
Pressure Against Official Malfeasance As the first edition of The Independent had clearly
stated, one of the functions of the paper would be to expose the wrongdoings of officials, regardless of the importance CQ of their positions, 7 and it proved to be effective in doing
this. A large part of the local news section was filled
with accounts of official corruption, unfairness, bad admin
istration, and other wrongs which the paper urged be
corrected. The information came partly from members of the
reporting staff, but to a larger extent from people who had
suffered from the consequences of the officials' acts
because the paper encouraged its readers to contribute such
information. One of the stories that the paper carried related
how Government Inspector Chon Yun-sin, who had been sent to
Kyung Sang Province to look into the condition of the
people, squeezed seven hundred won from Kim and Park and 70 one thousand won from Kim Kwang-suk.' Another was an
^ T h e Independent, April 7» 1896. ^The Independent, English ed., February 6, 1897*
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account of how Magistrate Yi Chung-suk of Sakyong was free
in taking bribes and made judgments advantageous to himself.
In one case, one citizen had sued another, but, because the
defendant had bribed the magistrate with 84-5 won, the plaintiff lost the case. With the encouragement of The
Independent, the plaintiff came to Seoul to appeal to the
Ministry of Justice. Although he was discouraged from
continuing the case by friends of the magistrate, the per
sistent citizen wrote the facts of the case to Minister of 71 Justice Han Kyu-sul, who brought the matter to court.
There the magistrate was sentenced to life imprisonment
with hard labor. The Independent praised the action, say ing that justice had finally been done, calling it "one of the most encouraging signs of the ultimate triumph of West
ern civilization in Korea," and congratulating Minister
Han.*^ The case had also been a triumph for The Indepen
dent , as the publicity it had given to the affair made
government action necessary. There were many stories on the corruption of the
tax-collecting officials. From the three kinds of taxes
^Minister Han was very sympathetic to Jaisohn1 s crusade. One month after the minister's action he was dis missed. The next July he joined the Independence Club. The harsh attack by the paper on newly appointed Minister of Justice Cho Pyung-sik may have been influenced by this connection (see pp. 62^63). ^The Independent, English ed., November 17, 1896.
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collected in Korea— land taxes, customs taxes, and mines
taxes, the paper believed that a great deal was being embezzled and warned the officials that the tax should be 73 collected and distributed as the law defined. ^
There were several more cases in which victory was
won over the corrupt or inefficient officials whose mis
takes The Independent publicized. Most of the stories,
however, had no direct effect. Those officials whose
wrongdoings were made public felt certain public pressure
and so became much more careful in their public actions.
The deep-rooted conservatism, the centuries-old class sys tem, and the tradition of the all-powerful official made it
very difficult for The Independent to bring about drastic
change. However, the paper's policy brought about some
reaction against the conservatives by the oppressed, and this was encouraged by the progressives around Jaisohn.
Pressure For the Reform of Government Institutions
The legal system. The Korean legal system of the time provided no way for commoners to prosecute members of
the Yang Ban class for criminal activities. This, of
course, made it impossible for real justice to be done and
also made it very difficult to stop officials from doing
^ The Independent, November 16, 1897•
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whatever they wished. It became apparent to Jaisohn that,
before the bureaucracy could be made to function efficient
ly and honestly, it would be necessary first to change the
legal system.
One example which proved his point occurred when
the people in Anak, Whang Hae Province, were asked to pay
more taxes than the law required. They complained in vain
to the magistrates, so two representatives came to Seoul to
see the proper officials to convey their complaint. The
reaction of an official in the Home Ministry follows: If the complaint is true it is against the law. Therefore the Governor of the Province is hereby ordered to make a report on the case to this Office after making an investigation. But the Department thinks that the custom of making complaints by the people, against the actions of their officials is hateful as well as despicable. Therefore the Governor is authorized to arrest these two complainants and . punish them severely for making complaints. 7^
After printing this story, the paper ran strong
editorials on the right of the commoner to have a fair legal
system and declared this privilege to be a fundamental
requirement for the reform of the country. Jaisohn1 s concept of law was well expressed in
another editorial, which said: No government can claim to fulfill its duties to the people until it furnishes them a court in which every citizen from the highest to the lowest can be absolutely sure of having a fair trial without fear or favor. The
^ The Independent, English ed., March 16, 1897-
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existence of such a court stands in the very forefront of Korea's needs today. . . . Y/hat the people must have is a court or courts where they can lay charges against any man who has wronged them whether it he a sneak thief who has stolen a pipe or a magistrate who has stolen a wife. And in such a court the accuser and the accused must have perfect freedom to bring up their witnesses and give their evidence. That this can all be done in one season is evidently impossible but a beginning can be made here in Seoul by having at least one court where the social standing and wealth of accuser and accused shall alike have nothing to do with the judgement ren dered. It would be an object-lesson to Koreans. If Koreans cannot be found who can adjudicate cases impartially then the government should secure the services of a foreigner to act as a judge who would show the Koreans how the thing is done. . . . There are some things that can not be done till a large number of the old formalized Chinese-class-logged generation has died off and given place to younger men who care more for the future of the nation than for its past./-7
This editorial received a partial official response
when the government appointed General O.K. Greathouse to
advise and supervise the judges and the procedure in court 76 during important trials.
The police department. Another component of the
legal system which was strongly criticized in the paper was
the police department, which also ran the prison system.
A reporter for The Independent had occasion to visit
the prison at the Seoul Police Department where he saw an
injured butcher, who, from a serious cut across the side of
^ The Independent, English edition, June 23, 1896.
76Ibid., October 10, 1896.
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dying from the loss of blood but was receiving no medical 77 attention.'1 The reporter also saw in a district prison a
number of criminals who had been beaten across the legs
below the knees until their bones were fractured. As well
as this outright brutality, prisoners had to endure unheated,
unsanitary cells, and starvation rations.'7®
The Independent felt it was a mark of civilization
that a government should show no resentment against a crimi
nal. Criminals should be punished according to the enormity
of their offenses only according to the law. Jaisohn then proposed that a foreign physician could be secured for three
thousand dollars per year to alleviate conditions in the
prisons. 79 There were several persons who had been confined in
jail for several months without having had any specific
charges laid against them. The paper asserted that the
police department was proceeding illegally in detaining
them for such a period without due legal process.
The memorial system. Another important institution
of government which Jaisohn believed impeded the proper
''"'Th e Independent, English ed., August 22, 1896. The Korean edition of August 25 carried the same story.
^Ibid., English ed., August 22, 1896. ^Ibid.
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functioning of the government was the "memorial system."
He attacked it as a system by which bad officials held onto
their jobs and could even get a promotion by maligning their
rivals. The bad effects of the memorial system were publi cized by the paper in regard to a libel suit which Jaisohn
had brought against a government official, Chung Sung-woo,
who had memorialized the throne as follows:
These so-called progressives in and out of the country . . . claim that the changes will benefit the people while in reality they want to eat up every thing they can lay their hands on. They herd with foreigners and between them cook up plots and crimes. Some have been killed and some punished but many still hold office and make a disturbance in the country. Some who escaped in 1884 came back in June of 1894 and committed horrible crimes and were also connected with the murder of the Queen. Dr. Jaisohn committed a great crime in 1884 and now comes back and dabbles in politics again and calls himself a foreigner. YJhat business has he then in Korean affairs? His newspaper is printed for the pur pose of criticizing other people and it destroys the right principle. So it is not good for the country nor the people but its sole purpose is to change the laws and customs of the ancient kings and aims to upset the country. Such traitors ought not to be allowed between heaven and earth. Kim Ka-chin and An Kyung-soo who took a prominent part in 1894 have brought irremediable disease upon the country. Pak Chung-yang and Cho Pyung-jik simply covet office, have no right prin ciples and cause insurrections in the country. Yi Yung-yong has some commendable qualities but they are outweighed by his evil ones, his worst fault being that his whole family holds government positions. . . . If you consider their crimes they cannot be pardoned. . . . Bring back the dead bodies of the members of the former cabinet and pulverize their coffins and their bones and discharge them from the government. . . . Resold the pardon of Dr. Jaisohn and punish him if you C3H*
®^I1 Sung Rok (Seoul: Korean Government Publication), Vol. 433 (July 97 1556).
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Jaisohn sued Chung for two thousand won, which, if
he won, would he contributed to the Independence Club for
the building of the Independence Arch. The court ruled on
July 18, 1896, that Chung had accused Dr. Jaisohn without
grounds, had caused him great inconvenience, and had damaged
his reputation. Since Chung's financial capacity was not
sufficient to pay the larger sum, he was fined only one
Q 1 thousand won, which was conveyed to Jaisohn by the court.
This was a double victory for Jaisohn, as it demonstrated
both that a Yang Ban could be punished by court action and also warned other conservatives that denigrating Jaisohn in
a memorial could be costly. The paper cited another case in which a memorial had been abused: a privy councillor, Yi Kyo-hoon, memorialized
the throne that his grandfather's grave had been desecrated
by Kim Yung and his relatives. His Majesty ordered that Kim 82 and his relatives be arrested and severely punished.
Jaisohn did not criticize this action of His Majesty, but
expressed concern that the memorial might have accused the wrong person since it was common to punish accused persons
without a trial, and the paper commented: The news from China describing the situation of Chinese politics leads one to believe that reformation
8^The Independent. July 23, 1896.
82Ibid., March 6, 1897.
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which lias 1)6611 talked about so much of late, seems hope less. . . . Most of the high officials are opposed to reformation on general principle, without reasoning, and nationalism, or patriotism in their true sense, are unknown to them. There is much jealousy and intrigue among the ministers, and their sole purpose is to pre vent each other from obtaining influence with the Emper or, for the fear that some of them might accomplish something in the way of reformation. Jaisohn's statement implied that the institution of
the memorial was the main method used to destroy the move
ment for the reform of Chinese affairs. The paper main
tained that the memorial was mostly used as a form of
blackmail. Asr an alternative, Jaisohn suggested the forma
tion of an elected council to advise the throne. He asserted that such a body would be better qualified to tell
the king the mind of the people, while all the memorial system did was to prevent meaningful change in the country.
THE INDEPENDENT AND' THE EMPEROR
Throughout its pursuit of reform for Korea The
Independent refrained from attacking the emperor directly.
It did not try to change the traditional position of the monarch, and in fact tried to identify the emperor with
Korea, holding that a strong emperor would be helpful to the
O /i country. Tet, the paper did criticize him indirectly, as,
^T h e Independent, English ed., February 2, 1897* Qh The Independent, September 8, 1896.
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for instance, when they called the king's officials and
advisors irresponsible for making the king stay at the
Russian Legation when there was ample evidence that the
emperor himself had chosen it as the safe place to stay. As for the emperor's relations with government
officials, the paper asserted:
The concentration of more power to His Majesty should help effective government. And since His Majesty has delegated certain powers to the ministers, they should not bring trifling matters to His Majesty as this would affect the health of the emperor.
Jaisohn wanted to see the country governed by a
Council of State which would initiate policies and carry
them out after obtaining the emperor's consent; and he
wanted to see that those laws should be supreme and should
be obeyed by all ministers. However, there was no implica
tion that the emperor should also come under the law; on the
contrary, Jaisohn contended that the absolute subordination
of the ministers and the people to His Majesty would be a
vital element for strengthening the country. Therefore, all
the frequent criticism in The Independent was directed
against the relevant ministers. Even when The Independent
criticized the memorial system or the appointment of Cho Pyung-sik, the paper never suggested that His Majesty might have made an error of judgment but rather that the
^The Tridependent, October 1, 1896. Also in the English edition of February 27, 1897-
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system itself or the person directly involved was to "blame.
With regard to the emperor's relations with his subjects, the paper stated that "if a subject does not
appreciate the emperor's unending efforts, night and day for the country, it would not only be against ethics but also 86 against humanity." The paper then listed the responsibil
ities of a subject: (1) to love the emperor and help him to
acquire the highest position in the world; (2) to give him
comfort; (3) to help him to eliminate the difficulties which
may shake the foundation of the country; and (4) to promote
a better understanding between the people and the emperor.®*'7 In the first edition of the paper the Korean edito
rial had ended: M[T]he paper is working for, and to assist,
the Monarch. . . . [B]efore ending this editorial we pause a
minute to pray for His Majesty's great happiness and long life."88 The Independent did not fail to congratulate the prince and the emperor on their birthdays and to suggest
that on such days the flag should be raised on all the
government buildings and by private families and that all
should pray for the long life and greater happiness of the
86 The Independent, August 22, 1897- Identical sen timents were expressed in the editorial of July 30, 1896.
87Ibid., August 22, 1897- 88Ibid., April 7> 1896.
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ruling family. Heading tlirough the paper makes it apparent
that its attitude was conforming to the traditional Confucian ethic of national harmony between the emperor and
government officials and citizens.
Notwithstanding its support of the monarchy, the newspaper simultaneously pursued its course of demanding the 89 absolute right of all citizens to their civil liberties.
At the same time, moreover, it propounded the theory that
the proper relationship between the state and the people
required that "the people agree to pay taxes to the govern- 90 ment for their convenience in having an orderly society."
Often the newspaper would merge these positions and would
append an appeal for civil liberties with a statement like
"Believing that the emperor endeavors to rule Korea for prosperity and happiness, we honestly hope His Majesty will 91 have a long and happy life." On a matter of political theory, the question arises
as to where The Independent considered that the national sovereignty should rest: with the modern concept of the
general popular will, or with the traditional concept of the monarchy. Although the paper devoted more space to the
activities and prerogatives of the emperor than to
^9Th.e Independent, March 9? 1897- See pp. 46-4-7 above. 9°Ibid., April 7, 1897- 91Ibid.
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measured so simply. Jaisohn saw realistically that in the
Korean situation reform could not be achieved by antagoniz
ing the emperor, and that, in fact, the emperor's coopera
tion was a great asset to the reform movement. Identifying
the royal family with nationalism gave respectability to
what they were working for. Jaisohn therefore never
described the emperor as having absolute power but used
terms like "civil rights" and the "electoral system" and implied in subtle ways that the citizens were the foundation
of the nation and that sovereignty resided in the people. Thus, there is no clear exposition on where sovereignty resided in Jaisohn's system. He advocated both the supreme
status of the emperor and the fundamental rights of the
people, as if these two positions were not in conflict; and
he emphasized that the emperor was the ideal person to work
for the greater benefit and "the pursuit of happiness" of
the people.
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THE ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT
OP THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB
THE ORIGIN OP THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB AND THE INDEPENDENCE ARCH
When Jaisohn arrived in Seoul on January 1, 1896,
there already existed a social group called the Chung Dong
Club, which had been formed in 1894. The members included
many influential European diplomats and missionaries in Korea as well as several prominent Koreans. Some of the important Korean members were Min Yong-whan, Yi Sang-jae,
Yi Wan-yong, Yi Chae-yun, Yi Pum-jin, Yi Hak-kyun, and
Yun Chee-ho, who had just come back from studying in the United States and Shanghai; and among the Americans were John M.B. Sill, the American minister to Korea; Generals
M. Dye and C. Legendre, who were in Korea as advisors to the Korean government, and H.G. Underwood and H.G. Appenzeller,
who were both missionaries. Other important members were
the Prench charge d'affaires in Korea, V. Colin de Plancy,
and Dr. Philip Jaisohn, who joined the club later.'*'
^Moon Il-pyung, Han Mi Kwankae Osipnyun Sa [History of fifty years of Korean-American relations.! (feeoul: Cho Kwang Sa, 1945)> P* 198. 77
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2 The Chung Dong Club was very influential in Seoul
and greatly concerned about the development of Korea. The
majority held strong anti-Japanese sentiments when Japan
showed her determination to dominate Korean domestic
affairs. Many of the members joined in the plot to remove
the king from virtual Japanese custody on November 28, 1896.
The king at the time was naturally worried about his per
sonal safety, as the queen had been assassinated inside the
palace grounds by Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans. The
plans to rescue the king were thwarted because the
pro-Japanese group was informed of the plot. The Japanese
with palace influence then tried to have the plotters
arrested. The partners in the intrigue, however, managed
to escape to the Russian Legation. As the Russians did not
want to have to hide all the antigovernment leaders, the
Russian minister, Waeber, arranged with the American minis
ter, Sill, to hide eight of them in the American Legation
while the Russians kept two.
^Chung Dong ( & ) is the name of a small section of Seoul where most, of uhe foreign legations were situated. Opposition politicians called the club Ku Mi Pa ), or "European and American faction." The club was more social than political. Although the members were generally opposed to Japanese activities in Korea, there is no evi dence of the club's publicly sponsoring political activities.
^Horace N. Allen, Korea: Fact and Fancy (Seoul: Methodist Publishing House, 1904;, p. 194-; and Kim T<>-tae, So Jai-pil Paksa Chasojon (Seoul: Susonsa, 1948), p. "269.
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Even though, the American minister was sympathetic to
the antigovernment conspirators, he had at least to pretend
that America was neutral on the question of the struggle for power in the court. After Minister Sill had given asylum to
the eight, he notified Washington and asked that they be
taken to Shanghai by the American ship "Yorktown" which was
to leave shortly. Secretary of State Olney telegraphed Sill on
December 3? 1895? and again on January 11, 1896, strongly objecting to what Sill had been doing and to what Sill felt
to be the duty of an American minister. Olney used strong
words: Refugees cannot be sheltered by you against officers of de facto government charged with apprehending them as violators of the laws of their country. Use of Yorktown in manner suggested is wholly inadmissable. The Depart ment sees with disfavor your disposition to forget that you are not to interfere with local concerns and politics of Korea but are to limit yourself strictly to the care of American interests...... Your course in continued intermeddling with Korean political affairs in violation of repeated instructions noted with astonishment and emphatic disapproval. Cable briefly any explanation you have to make also answer whether you intend to comply with instructions given.4
Even though Sill replied that he would "act accord
ingly to instructions scrupulously,"^ Sill kept the eight
Quoted in (ed.) Spencer J. Palmer, Korean-American Relations (1887-95)? Documents Pertaining to the Par Eastern Diplomacy of the United States (Berkeley and Los Angeles! University of California Pres¥, 1963)? p. 140. ^Ibid., p. 141. The telegram was dated January 13*
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refugees in the legation until they again tried to take the
king to the Russian Legation on February 11, 1896, at which
time they succeeded. The Americans in Seoul, most of them members of the
Chung Dong Club, were generally sympathetic to the king's
cause. But, since the king -understood that the official American position on Korean domestic politics was that of neutrality, the anti-Japanese group had secret consultations
with Russian Minister Waeber. He brought in one hundred f: sailors from Inchon, with whose help the anti-Japanese
faction, both Korean and foreign, succeeded in their plan. The emperor ruled the country for twelve months from
the Russian Legation, using pro-Russian advisors from the
Chung Dong Club, particularly Yi Pum-jin, who later became
justice minister and police chief, and a Russian language
interpreter named Kim Hong-yuk. Russian soldiers guarded
the legation closely, and, since access was difficult for outsiders, the Russian minister naturally became an
important advisor to the king. As soon as the king was safely settled in the lega
tion, he issued an ordinance removing all the pro-Japanese
cabinet, and a few days later he issued an announcement
detailing the criminal activities of the former premier,
^Yi Pyung-do, Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1961), p. 545.
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n Kim Hong-jip.' The former premier and a cabinet member,
Chung Byung-ha, were killed by a mob in downtown Seoul, but
the other members escaped to Japan.
The majority of the members of the Chung Dong Club
had fought against Japanese domination of Korean affairs
because they wanted an independent Korea and were uneasy at
the Russian influence over the king. They had supported
Akwan Pachun [the king's removal to the Russian Legation]
for a variety of reasons: some had wanted personal power, some were hostile to the pro-Japanese cabinet, but they all had agreed that the king should be freed from his forced
seclusion with the Japanese and that the Japanese plan of
complete domination of Korea should be stopped. However,
they did not have a plan which would guarantee the complete
freedom and security of the king, and so they had to accept
the domination of another foreign power— Russia. They
accepted Russian help as it was the only way by which they
could overthrow the pro-Japanese government and stop
Japanese influence on the Korean government. They had not
considered that their action would lead to the Russian domination of the Korean court, so, when Jaisohn advocated
the return of the king to his Korean palace, he was
supported by many of the anti-Japanese Yang Ban.
^Kwan_Bo [Government Gazette] (Seoul: Korean Government Publication), February 11 and 15 ? 1896.
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Dr. Jaisohn had been strongly against putting the
king in any foreign legation. He visited the king in the
Russian Legation and strongly urged him to come hack to the Q Royal Palace, hut in vain. When The Independent was first
published, ahout two months after Akwan Pachun, it gained
wide support from many of the Chung Dong Cluh members, young progressives, and government officials. This support
gave Jaisohn the opportunity to organize a political group. Hulhert, an expert on nineteenth-century Korea, observed,
"From the first it [The Independent] exerted a powerful
influence among the Koreans and was one of the main factors g which led to the formation of the Independence Club.”
Jaisohn, telling of the formation of the Indepen
dence Club said: Since I thought it very difficult to advocate liberal and democratic reform just through a newspaper, after serious consideration I decided to make a certain kind of political group to achieve the above mentioned purposes. This was the creation of the Independence Club.10
More specifically, a group of around twenty-five
government officials, many of them Chung Dong Club members
and other progressive elements, gathered at Jaisohn1 s home
®Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 211. ^Clarence N. Weems (ed.), Hulbert's History of Korea, II (New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1962),308.
^ K i m To-tae, op. cit., p. 215.
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on July 2, 1896, and formed the Independence Club."^
Two important facts stand out in connection with the
formation of the Independence Club. The first fact is that
Jaisohn did not identify himself or his publication, The
Independent, with the new organization, although everybody
at the time knew that he was in control of the club. His
official connection with the club was as an advisor; and the relationship between the club and the publication was not
explicitly stated until his autobiography was published in 12 194-8. The second fact is that Jaisohn did not character
ize the Independence Club as a political group. Instead, he
identified the new club's purpose as being to build the
As to the exact date of the first organizing meeting of the Independence Club, no clear record has as yet been found. Chong Kyo stated only that "A Seoul gentleman organized the Independence Club in July,” but he did not specify the exact date, in Chong Kyo, Hah Kuk Ki Nyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959)> 146; Hwang Hyun stated that the Independence Club was orga nized in May of 1896 (This may be using the lunar calendar, and the lunar May and the solar July did coincide that year.), in Hwang Hyun, Mae Chun Ya Rok [Hwang Hyun's inside story], reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Shin Jee Sa, 1955)j P* 203; an English language periodical stated that "The year 1896 saw the formation in the Spring of the Independence Club,” in The Korean Repository, III (1896; reprint ed., New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), 457; however, The Independent of July 4, 1896, mentioned "the formation of a club on July 2," and the issue of July 7 was the first to use the name the "Independence Club," and so it seems that the club formed July 2 was, indeed, the Independence Club. 1 ? Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 215-
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Independence Arch and Independence Park to show the world
that Korea was an independent country, and to elevate the
position of the king to equality with other heads of state m the world. ^
In the early stages the club was completely
dominated by, and identified with, organization to achieve those particular purposes. Even Jaisohn himself confused
the two when he said at one time that the proceeds from his
successful libel suit against Chung Sung-woo should be 14 contributed to the fund for the Independence Arch and on
another occasion said they were to go to the Independence
Club.1^ This is evidence that Dr. Jaisohn deliberately
identified the newly organized club with the nationalistic occupations of building the Independence Arch and of build- 16 ing the Independence Park.
The Independent, July 14, 1896. All references to The Independent alone refer to the Korean edition. Cita- tions from the newspaper1s English edition are so indicated.
^ T h e Independent, English ed., July 14, 1896.
^Th e Independent, July 23, 1896. 16 It is not difficult to argue that at the beginning of July, 1896, Jaisohn planned the club simply as a group to work for the purpose of building the arch and the park, because Jaisohn concentrated so much on the projects without giving any indication of his desire to develop the club into what it became later. However, a stronger argument is that, considering his well organized crusade for reform, and the club's activities shortly after its formation, Jaisohn made it deliberately nationalistic .rather than politically partisan in order to get it off the ground.
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As a result of this identification, the crown
prince contributed one thousand won,"*'*'7 and government
officials sent in money and even applied for membership.
Even Kim Chung-whan, head of the Bureau of Local Affairs of the Home Ministry and an arch-conservative, circulated a
memorandum to thirteen provinces asking the governors to X8 cooperate with the Independence Club. The contributions for the building of the arch and
the park, including the 1,000 won from the crown prince and 510 won1^ collected at the organizing meeting of the club,
amounted to a total of 5,897 won from some two thousand
people.^ Jaisohn thought it best to build the arch on the
^The Independent, July 21, 1896.
18Ibid., December 5, 1896. 19Ibid., July 4, 1896. 20 Computing the exact amount contributed for the construction of the arch is rather difficult. Jaisohn1 s autobiography at one point said that the fund for the arch "was exclusively my own contribution" (Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 202); but later he says that "several people's and my contribution amounted to 1,600 won, and the cost was 1,520 won" (ibid., p. 207). Chong Kyo said, "The Independence Arch cost 3,825 won" (Chong Kyo, op. cit., I, 146). The most reliable source seems to be Han Heung-soo, who added up the amounts and names of contributions which appeared in the Cho Sun [Independence Club organ] and arrived at the figure quoted in the text; see Han Heung-soo, "Tong Nip Hyup Hoe e Kwan Han Yun Ku" (unpublished Master's thesis, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1963), p. 27-
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site where the Ang Eun Mun ) [Gate of welcome and 21 blessing], symbol of Korea's inferior position to China,
had stood before being torn down during the Sino-Japanese
War, where only two pillars now remained. To build the arch
there would emphasize the independence of Korea as indicated
in the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1876 (Kang Wha); the Korean-American Treaty of 1882; the Sino-Japanese Treaty of
1885 (Tientsin); and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1895
(Shimonoseki). The Independence Club at Jaisohn1s suggestion
decided to build the arch in the style of the Arc de Tri-
omphe in Paris. Since Koreans did not have experience
building in the Western style, the blueprint was drawn up
by a Swiss subject who worked at the German Legation. The
responsibility for the actual work was given to a Korean
civil engineer, Mr. Shim, who had done some work with 22 European buildings. On November 21, 1896, a ceremony was held to lay
the cornerstone for the arch. The Korean Repository
described the ceremony as follows:
2^Ang Eun Mun was built in the northwestern section of Seoul during the reign of the third king (1401-1418), Tai Jong, of the Yi dynasty. The Korean king would go out to the gate when he received the Chinese Mission to Korea. The gate itself was in recognition of the suzerainty of Ming and Ching China.
22Kim To-tae, op. cit., pp. 202-205.
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. . . [T]he Independence Club [is] composed exclu sively of Koreans who are more than passively interested in the social and material development of their country as well as in her independence. It is to members of this club that we trace in large measure the rapidly improving conditions of the people. . . . The day was pleasant, the audience large; probably between 4,000 and 5,000 men were present; foreign representatives, and private residents of Seoul all attended. . . . Nor were the guests sent away hungry, for a generous feast was spread in the neighboring pavilion, during the discus-^ sion of which the representatives of various powers paid their compliments to Korean independence.23 There were three speeches during the ceremony— by
Ahn Kyung-su, president of the club, by Yi Wan-yong, chair
man, and by Jaisohn, advisor. The speeches were
". . . clear, forcible and to the point and evinced an unex
pected degree of oratorical power. The sentiments expressed 24 were entirely fitting the occasion." The government also let the Independence Club use
the Mo Wha Kwan ) or "Respect China Hall," located
next to the site of Ang Eun Mun, as their meeting place and
office. The crown prince himself wrote the new sign, "Tong
Nip Kwan" ( “f'g )» or "Independence Hall," to hang on the entrance of the hall, thus showing the government1 s 25 support for the activities of the club. ^
2^The Korean Repository, op. cit., Ill (1896), 457- 458.
24Ibid.
2^Chong Kyo, op. cit., I (1959), 158. Also The Independent, May 25, 1897 •
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One year after laying the cornerstone, the arch was
completed, and on November 20, 1897 > a ceremony was held for
the celebration of the successful completion. At this meet
ing Jaisohn made an enthusiastic speech, saying:
We have nominal independence written on the pseudo-treaties. The real independence of Korea will only be achieved by the participation of every citizen to work toward that goal. We have now destroyed the symbol of our dependence on China and have built the arch as a new symbol of independence. Let us seriously consider our future and do our best for the betterment of the country.26
The site which had once been the symbol of Chinese
superiority in Korea was thus turned into the symbol of
Korean independence, and a wide area adjoining the arch and
the hall was named Independence Park. The arch is still
standing today. It has been the symbol of the Independence
Club and the reform movement in the country from then until
the present, but, most important, the arch brought about the
organization of the Independence Club and provided public support for the club's difficult task of beginning a reform
movement.
26Kim To-tae, op. cit., pp. 203-204.
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THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OE THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB
On July 4, 1896, The Independent published a list of
the charter members of the Independence Club. They were
Ahn Kyung-su, Yi Wan-yong, Kim Ka-jin, Yi Yun-yong,
Kim Chong-han, Kwon Jai-hyung, Koh Yong-hee, Min Sang-ho,
Namkung Ok, Yi Sang-jae, Hyun Heung-taek, Kim Kak-hun,
Yi Keun-ho, and Yi Chae-yun. The same edition also announced the results of the
election held two days previously: Ahn Kyung-su was elected
president and treasurer, while Yi Wan-yong took the chair
manship of the decision-making executive committee. The elected committee members were Kim Ka-jin, Kim Chong-han,
Min Sang-ho, Yi Chae-yun, Kwon Jai-hyung, Hyun Heung-taek, Yi Sang-jae, and Yi Keun-ho. The meeting also selected ten
coordination members: Song Hun-bin, Namkung Ok, Sim Eui-suk,
Chung Hyun-chul, Pang Han-chu, Oh Se-chang, Hyun Jai-bok,
Yi Kai-pil, Park Seung-cho, and Hong Woo-kwan. After Akwan Pachun [the king's flight to the Russian Legation] many of the above-mentioned people became
very important in the new government. Yi Wan-yong became
foreign minister and education minister, Yi Chae-yun became
mayor of Seoul, and Min Sang-ho became Foreign Ministry
bureau chief. They all were among the eight refugees who
sought asylum in the American Legation from November 28,
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1895 (the time of the unsuccessful attempt to remove the
king to safety), until February 11, 1896 (Akwan Pachun).
Although Yi Pum-jin, justice minister and police chief and the most powerful man at court after Akwan
Pachun, did not support the Independence Club, many club
members in addition to those mentioned above occupied high
government positions. They were Koh Yong-hee, deputy minis
ter of agriculture and later minister; Kwon Jai-hyung, who
was deputy justice minister and secretary to the cabinet and
wno later became a Supreme Court justice; Namkung Ok, who
was Home Ministry bureau chief; Yi Sang-jae, General Affairs Bureau chief for the Council of State; and president of the
club Ahn Kyung-su, who was an army general and became a
privy councillor.^7 Ahn was also managing the newly
established Korean Bank with the help of the Finance Depart ment advisor, J. McLeavy Brown. The structure of the club did not change much during its first year. Because of government support for the club in connection with the building of the arch and the park,
many younger progressives, Christians, and patriots in Seoul
joined the club. In July, 1897? a large number of govern- 28 ment officials, including Acting Premier Pak Chung-yang,
^Positions held by club members are recorded in various issues of Kwan Bo. op. cit. ^The Independent, July 22, 1897-
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joined the club, which then expanded the executive commit
tee to include important and influential new members, and
abolished the Kan Sa, or coordinating committee.
During the early period, while the club was almost
entirely'devoted to building the arch and the park and
enjoyed the full support of the king, there were approxi mately two thousand members.^ When the club launched an
active campaign against the conservative elements in the
government and against the foreign domination of Korea,
many of the government officials left the club, but large
numbers of non-official, younger, and more active members
joined. During the time of the worst government suppres
sion, in December, 1898, the membership numbered 4,173-^
Therefore, the total membership must have been considerably
higher in summer and fall of 1898, when the club had mass
support and operated without contravening official pressure. Admission to the club was very easy, and all one had to do when making application was to notify the club office
of one's name and address.^ The open membership policy
^ The Independent, December 31? 1896. However, Jaisohn in a letter to McKenzie, written in response to the latter's request-, claimed that the membership increased in three months to nearly 10,000. IP .A. McKenzie, Korea1 s Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920.), p. 68.
^°Chong Kyo, op. cit., I, 364.
^The independent, December 26, 1896.
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encouraged wide participation from all classes of people.
In the early days of the Independence Club, leader
ship consisted of President Ahn Kyung-su and Chairman
Yi Wan-yong, under the behind-the-scenes direction of
Jaisohn, as advisor. As the Independence Club became a
more political and aggressive organization, beginning in the
latter part of 1897, many high government officials left the club, partly under pressure and partly in disagreement with
its controversial direction. In spite of conservative pres
sure, however, Ahn and Yi remained as members. As the
population of the membership changed from older, established
officials to younger, more active participants, the charac
ter of the club grew increasingly radical. Ahn became increasingly reluctant to be connected with the club at all, but, instead of resigning, he chose to
work secretly in support of the new crown prince, an act
which ultimately brought about a charge for his arrest. He
finally escaped to the Japanese section of the foreign 32 settlement, and he later fled to Japan in July, 1898. Another important leader of the club who became unhappy with
its growing radicalism was Yi Wan-yong. At the general
meeting of the club on February 27? 1898, he was elected
president, Yun Chee-ho became vice-president, Namkung Ok was
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., I, 207-
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chosen secretary general, Yi Sang-jae and Tun Hyo-jung were
elected clerks, and Chong Kyo, Yang Hong-muk, and Yi Keun-ho 33 were picked to he "club planners.
The government named Yi Wan-yong as a governor of
Chulla Buk Province on March 15, only sixteen days after
his election as president of the club. This appointment
could be interpreted as an attempt to hinder club activi
ties. Nevertheless, Yi accepted the job and left the
duties, but not the title, of the presidency of the club to
the vice-president. Furious at Yi Wan-yong's attitude, the
younger and more militant members met on July 17 to depose
Yi from his position. One of their main complaints against him was that he had been cowardly in dealing with the 35 foreign concessions while he was foreign minister.
However, in the natural course of things Yun Chee-ho took
over after Yi left to take up the governorship. After the
election meeting of August 28, 1898, Yun Chee-ho had become
president, Yi Sang-jae vice-president, Park Chi-hoon and 36 Han Man-yong were clerks, and Yi II-sang treasurer.
As will be seen in the next chapter, Jaisohn was
55Ibid., I, 183. ^Kwan Bo, op. cit., March 15, 1898.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., 1 , 207-208. ^The Independent, August 30, 1898. Also Chong Kyo, op. cit., I, 223.
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forced to leave tlie country on May 14-, 1898, after the club
had successfully eliminated the Russian advisors to the
Korean government. There are few records of the activities of President Ahn Kyung-su and Chairman Yi Wan-yong during
the early days of the club. This may be interpreted as
showing that Jaisohn was dominant. After his exile the gob
was inherited by Yi Sang-gae, Yun Chee-ho, Namkung Ok, and
Yi Seung-man, while Yun Chee-ho was to continue the publi- 57 cation of The Independent. The radical young members who took over the club
leadership in early 1898 were not new members of the club,
but faithful and patriotic progressives who had built their convictions for reform under Jaisohn's teaching during the
last two years. Among others, they were Yun Chee-ho,
president, Yi Sang-gae, vice-president, and the young
agitators who usually stayed with the majority of the
club's opinion, like Chong Kyo and Yi Seung-man (^ ) [Syngman Rhee].^® In order to evaluate club activities
during the most important period from spring of 1898 to the
end of that year, it may be worthwhile to study briefly the
personal backgrounds and personalities of these men.
^ K i m Seung-hak, Hanknk Tong Nip Sa (Seoul: Tong Nip Munwha Sa, 1954-), p. 159* Seung-man, known to the West as Syngman Rh.ee, was president of the Republic of Korea from 194-8 to I960.
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Yun Chee-ho^
Yun Chee-ho, who took over Jaisohn's unfinished
work after Jaisohn's departure for the United States, was
the most important figure, among the club members, in Korea.
Yun had been in the group of sixfcy-one who went to Japan in 1881, having been selected by the future leader of the 1884
coup, Kim Ok-kyun. While he was in Japan he met
Lucius H. Foote, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipo
tentiary of the United States of America, who was in Japan
to study the Korean situation before he came to Korea.
Foote brought Yun Chee-ho back with him as an interpreter
when he arrived in Seoul on May 12, 1883, and Yun for the
next two years was the official interpreter to the minister
and his means of communication with the king. There is no evidence of Yun's joining the 1884 coup,
even though he had been sent to Japan for that purpose by
Kim Ok-kyun, and Yun's father, Yun Ung-yul, was one of the
major figures of the coup. Instead, with Foote's help, he
went to Shanghai to study in 1885, and became the first
Korean to be baptized in Shanghai by the Southern Methodist Church. He then went on to the United States, three years
^ F o r Yun's personal background, see Kim Yong-eui, Chwa Ong Yun Chee Ho Suns eng Ryak Chun [Brief history of Yun Chee-hoJ (Seoul: Kidokkyo Chosun Kamlihyo Chongliwon, 1954).
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after Jaisohn, in 1888, to study at Vanderbilt University
and Emory University, majoring in theology. He returned to
Korea by way of Shanghai in 1895 and was appointed deputy
minister of education. Even though he was sympathetic to 4 0 Akwan Pachun and a Chung Dong Club member, he was not
directly connected with the removal of the king to the Russian Legation. After Akwan Pachun he was promoted to
minister of education and became a privy councillor. At the
coronation of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia he was the
second-ranked member of the Korean delegation, a trip which
kept him out of the country from March, 1896, until
January, 1897. There is some evidence that Yun tried to lead the club along a much more moderate path than Jaisohn had done.
His attitude with regard to the Seoul-Pusan railway conces
sion to Japan, as will be seen in the next chapter, is a
case in point. As a result there was direct conflict
between him and the young radicals who were the most vocal
and who virtually controlled the club. Surely, considering Yun's background and personal
ity, it would have been surprising for him to have held a
more liberal stance than he did. His personality was generally regarded as bland anfl weak. His contemporaries
^Ibid., p. 94. This is the only source which claims that Yun was a Chung Dong Club member.
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noted with, considerable amazement the rigidity of his mien
and of his daily habits and his apparent preoccupation with
form.^ Ho doubt his puritanism was strengthened by his
education and training in orthodox Protestantism. But it is also noteworthy that he was born a privileged gentleman from
a very rich family, received a traditional, high education—
learning a commanding knowledge of at least four foreign
languages (English, French, Chinese, and Japanese). Considering the traditional elements of his background, it
is not surprising that he also had a Chinese wife. Even after the Independence Club was disbanded, Yun
maintained that the strength of the country would stem from
morality, knowledge, and a cultivated attitude, rather than
from uncontrolled radical activities. And in later years,
when he issued scholarships to Korean youths, he required
recipients of the scholarships to study either natural
sciences or theology. Although Yun did not accept an offer to become mayor of Seoul in the midst of the turmoil between the
government and the Independence Club, he did become Tukwon Kamli ), "governor of Wonsan treaty
Kwang-su, Yi Kwang Su Chun Jip (Seoul: Sang Jung Dang, 1962), Yol. XvII, pp. 3^3-384.
42Ibid.
^ K i m Yong-eui, op. cit., p. 127.
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port,” and became acting foreign minister in 1904. In
later years be devoted himself to Christian work in Korea.
At the date of the club's demise in 1898 he was only
thirty-four years old.
Yi Sang-.jae
Yi Sang-jae was vice-president of the club until its last struggle and was one of the most vigorous and 44 aggressive leaders in the club. In 1898 he was
forty-seven years old, older than most of the activists
there. When the Korean Legation was first opened in
Washington in 1887, he was first secretary, a position he held for more than a year. He had a straightforward and
incorruptible character. An illustration of his forth
rightness was shown when, after the 1884 coup, in which his
boss, Hong Yong-sik, had been killed while playing a leading
part, he went to the Police Department and said: Since I have to take care of my old father, I am going to my native home. If you find any crime against me, because I was Postmaster Hong Yong-sik1s man, please let me know. I won't be hiding.45
Por an account of Yi's background, see Eepublic of Korea, Wol Nam Yi Sang Jae Suns eng Eyak Chun [Brief personal history of Yi Sang-jae1 (Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1956). ^Ibid., p. 23-
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He continued to work for the independence of Korea
after the Independence Club disbanded. During the nation
wide uprising against Japanese rule on March 1, 1919, he actively joined the demonstrators and was jailed, though he
was later released when his old friend, Yun Chee-ho, posted 46 bond. He was president of the Chosun Ilbo, a major daily
newspaper published in Seoul, and he worked unceasingly for
the education of Koreans until his death in 1927.
Yi Seung-man Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) was one of the youngest
members of the club, being only twenty years old in 1896.
Even before the club was formed, he had wished to learn about the West and had learned English from the mission
aries in return for teaching them Korean. He had helped
Jaisohn by organizing the Hyup Sung Hoe, a progressive youth organization, in the Pai Chai School, where he was a teacher
of the Korean language. Later he published the Hyup Sung
Hoe Bo, a weekly version of The Independent for younger
readers. In Independence Club activities Yi Seung-man was
the leading spokesman for radical positions. He devised
much of the radical rhetoric; and he often appears in accounts of proceedings to have taken the role of extreme
"provocateur."
^Ibid., p. 127.
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After the club was abolished in December, 1898, Yi
held the monarch responsible for its dissolution and
demanded that he step down from the throne— which was
judged an act of sedition and resulted in his being jailed 4-7 in January, 1899, with a life sentence. ' After seven years he was pardoned when a charter member of the Indepen
dence Club, Min Yong-whan, became the new premier. Soon
after his release from prison, he came to the United States
and studied at Harvard, Princeton, and George Washington
universities. During his residence in the United States he
continued to work for the independence of his country, and,
when it was finally won, after World War II, he became the
first president of the Republic of Korea.
Chong Kyo Chong Kyo was another active member of the club.
Born into a Yang Ban family, he was a magistrate of Suwon
and Chang Yun before he joined the Independence Club in
1896. He was elected to the three-man planning committee of
the club at the February 27 * 1898, meeting. His forceful
ness anfl integrity were often shown in the course of club
activities. After receiving secret instructions from
^ P a k Sung-ha, Unam Yi Seung Man Paksa Chun [The life of Dr. Syngman Eh.eeJ [Seoul: Myung Se Dang, 1^56), p. 50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 48 Jaisohn, he organized the first mass rally sponsored by
the club to protest the Russian domination of Korea. When
Yun Chee-ho tried to get support to cooperate with the
Japanese in their attempt to secure the Seoul-Pusan railway 4-9 concession, Chong Kyo opposed him, but in vain, although
he had the majority of the club behind him. With the
persuasion of more radical members, like Yi Seung-man, however, the club was pressed to take a harder line against
foreign domination. After the club was disbanded, Chong went into
seclusion at H i , Chulla Province, and turned down many offers of government positions in order to concentrate on
writing books. One of his works, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa
), is a two-volume history of the period
between 1864- and 1910 and is fascinating in its descriptions 50 of events which took place "behind the scenes." In fact,
the first volume, used together with The Independent, is the
most valuable source for the study of the Independence Club.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 182. ^ I b i d . , p. 250. 5°it should be noted that, although The Independent campaigned so vigorously for the use of Eun Mun, all o? Cho's works are written in Chinese characters.
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THE SELF-TRAINING PROCESS TO CREATE A POLITICAL FORCE
After his success in forming the Independence Club,
Jaisohn did not forget the importance of training the
members of the club— as well as the public at large— to
fulfill his plans for reform through their collective
political activities. The editorials in The Independent
were the major platform from which ideas of reform were propagated to awaken some Koreans from their deep-rooted
conservatism, but Jaisohn also spoke at street corners, at
the Pai Chai School, and to meetings of the club members of his
. . . intention to sow the land with his ideas of the rights of individual citizens, and to get a confla gration started that would do in a small way what the French Revolution did with its yells and groans and gunpowder.51
His frequent speeches at the Pai Chai School won him
a devoted following. Members of the school set up the Hyup Sung Hoe ( ) [Small Independence Club], and
their publication was the Hyup Sung Hoe Bo their version of The Independent, edited by the patriotic
young teacher named Yi Seung-man, who has been more fully
discussed above. Evidence is lacking which would show that
^James S. Gale, The Vanguard: A Tale of Korea (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co.7 1904), P- 225-
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this organization at Pai Chai worked in a formal, or even
informal, connection with the Independence Club, although
individual members like Yi Seung-man certainly did. Never theless, it was the best response to the call of the Inde pendence Club for other groups and it was undoubtedly the
kind of progressive, activist initiative that Jaisohn hoped
for.
At first, Jaisohn spoke on such unimportant topics as "Should all citizens cut their topknots?" or "Is it
necessary to have street lamps at night?"^52 In due course, 53 however, his speeches became more bold^ and he spoke on the
important issues about which he wrote in The Independent—
civil rights, the definition of the state as a product of a
contract between the people and the state, criticism of the
legal system, of the Yang Ban class, and of the corruption
of certain officials. These ideas became more popular when
they were expressed in eloquent speeches than they had from
cold, printed words. Among other important speeches was an interpretation
of the American Declaration of Independence, which intro
duced people to the ideas of Jefferson, Locke, Rousseau, and
•^Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 216.
^Charming Liem, America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohn CNew York: The william-Frederick Press, 1952), p. 30.
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Montesquieu.^ Channing Liem described the speech as
follows: When he thundered, pounding the table with his fists, "No man however powerful, and no government, however mighty, can take away these inalienable God-given rights from you or me; any government which dares to ignore the wishes of its people, I tell you is the enemy of the people; and any individual, or group of individuals, who tries to persuade you that either the Korean people are incapable of exercising their just rights, or that they cannot acquire the technological, military and industrial know-how from the advanced nations of the West, is a traitor to Korea," his electrified audience sprang to their feet with the wildest cheers.55
Yun Chee-ho was another eloquent speechmaker for the
club. Having had a missionary-sponsored education, he drew
many Christians to the club. In one of his speeches he
said: Every man kicks the dog that1 s down. Korea, gentlemen, is the down-dog, without friends and without any grounds for respect. The only way to work a change is for each man to be honest, and to strive to encourage honesty. Do right! Not only does the Bible, that has overturned the world, say so, but the Books of Confucius as well. Do what is right, and abstain from what is wrong, and gradually dishonest officialdom will disappear, and the laziness and rottenness, and good-for-nothingness that infects the country, will pass away. 5°
In nineteenth-century Korea few politicians made
public speeches. For they did not need public support when
^Channing Liem, op. cit., p. 51. ^Ibid. The contents of the speech are also reported in an editorial in The Independent of March 9, 1897*
•^Gale, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
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the ladder of success was climbed by many years of studying
the Chinese classics, and, once they had attained an
official position, only a conservative approach to life and
careful "string-pulling" were needed to keep it.
The tone of the' speeches given by Jaisohn and other
members of the Independence Club was impressive, and more and more people came to hear them. This public interest and
the club's plan to train future leaders by equipping them
with intimate knowledge of public problems led to the
organizing of a weekly discussion period at Independence
Hall. The Independent in May, 1897> carried an article
which said: The day before yesterday the Independence Club members hung up the sign of Tong Nip Kwan ] or the Independence Hall, which was graciously written by the crown prince. The club celebrated this occurrence and decided to meet every Sunday afternoon at three o'clock for a discussion meeting to promote necessary knowledge.57 Club members had no experience in running orderly
discussion meetings, and it took three months to explain
and teach the parliamentary rules of procedure. Orderly
discussions or debates between groups of differing opinions
and taking voice votes were all very strange and curious to
Koreans, because, to them, differing opinions meant a quarrel, which usually led to chaos. Because of the new
^The Independent, May 25, 1897-
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procedural use of ayes and noes tlie new meetings were called
"yes and no meetings."^®
The first official discussion period was held on
August 29, 1897, and, according to an account in The Indepen
dent , the procedure went as follows: First, one week in
advance of the meeting a topic was chosen, "Is the education
of the masses Korea's most urgent matter?" Then four
debaters were chosen, two to speak for the motion and two
against it. These prepared speeches were heard first, and
then the chair invited members of the audience to express
their views, many of whom did, including Ministers
Yi Wan-yong, Han Kyu-sul, and Yi Yun-yong. After hearing
all the arguments on both sides of the question, the 59 audience voted on the matter. '
The significance of these debates for the Indepen
dence Club was greater than just the learning of parlia
mentary rules and practice in making speeches: they made the
members more interested in direct participation in public
affairs and gave them the confidence to advocate their
beliefs although they knew they were not popular with the
all-powerful authorities. These weekly meetings became
increasingly popular and drew large crowds, including some
-^Gale, op. cit., p. 224-.
^The Independent, August 31, 1897-
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who thought that participation in them would he a new way to
acquire official positions. The topics discussed at the
weekly Independence Club meetings gradually changed from non-political subjects with little emotional charge to
political, controversial issues with more profound
ramifications.^
60 This progression-from non-controversial to contro versial topics can be seen in the following chronological listing of the subjects debated at the Independence Club discussions (with, in parentheses, the date on which The Independent reported that the event had taken place): (1) "Is the education of the masses Korea's most urgent matter?" (August 31, 1897) (2) "Is the repair of the streets the most important element in improving sanitation?" (September 7, 1897) (3) "Are business and trade most important to enrich a country?" (September 16, 1897) (4) "Are lighted streets urgent and essential to prevent robberies?" (September 26, 1897) (5) "Is the education of women morally and econom ically right?" (October 2, 1897) (6) "Would the use of Han Geul instead of Han Mun help the cause of national education?11 (October 23, 1897j (7) "Is a sound currency essential for commercial prosperity and the strengthening of independence?" (October 30, 1897) (8) "Is the sale and purchase of slaves morally wrong?" (November 6, 1897) (9) "Is studying the tradition and ethics of the Han and Tang dynasties, rather than modern subjects, good for Korea?" (November 13, 1897) (10) "Is the fact that good locations were chosen for the tombs of our forefathers the reason Korea has had prosperity?" (December 4, 1897) (11) "Is the encouragement of the study of medical science essential for the national health?" (December 11, 1897) (12) "Is military training more essential for a sound foundation for the protection of independence than the study of literature?" (December 18, 1897) (13) "Is it more beneficial to the people to culti vate fruit and vegetables rather than rice?" {December 23, 1897)
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As the debates became livelier and more complicated,
Yun Chee-ho translated Henry M. Robert's Pocket Manual of
Rules of Order for Deliberative Assemblies into Korean and
(14) "Is the patriotism of officials and civilians essential for the everlasting peace of a country?" (January 8. 1898) (15) "Since China is in a difficult position, should Korea as a neighbor come to her aid?" (January 22, 1898) (16) "Is expansion of the mining industries, such as gold, silver, copper, and iron, essential to strengthen national prosperity?" (January 29, 1898) (17) "Is the use of steam power more efficient and more practical than hand labor?" (February 5, 1898) (18) "Is it worse for one who knows the difference between right and wrong and does not act accordingly than for one who does wrong without understanding the difference?" (February 12, 1898) (19) "Considering the sanctity of human life, is it not a sin before God to allow any human being to live his life as a slave?" (February 19, 1898) (20) "The territory belonging to Korea is the result of the great achievements of the kings. Since this is a land where twelve million Koreans live, leasing even one inch to a foreigner is a traitorous act. Is this true?" (March 12, 1898) (21) "The finance of any country is like the veins of a human body. One should protect one's own veins, not relying on other people. Is this correct?" (March 26, 1898) (22) "Is it true that, for the security of the coun try, an impartial system of law should be implemented?" (April 2, 1898) (23) "Would the establishment of a Congress_ [Eui Hoe Won], be the most essential political institution to strive for?" (April 9, 1898) (24) "Is the establishment of branch offices of the Independence Club essential?" (April 23, 1898) (25) "Is criticism of government policies by non-officials wrong?" (May 7, 1898) (26) "Is it right for the strong to oppress the weak?" (Mav 21, 1898) (27) "The prosperity of a country depends, not on its size, but upon unity between government and the people. Is this correct?" (June 11, 1898) (28) "The protection of a fair legal system o f a country is- the responsibility of her citizens. Is this correct?" (June 18, 1898)
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not only distributed copies to club members but also put 61 them on public sale, advertising in The Independent.
These discussion meetings, debates, and lectures
laid the foundation for the direct political action in which 62 the club engaged in its last days. The public speeches
made by the leaders of the club explaining their beliefs won support for the mass rally. Often, after a particular issue
had been discussed at length at the club, feeling gained
such momentum that the government had to submit to the mem
bers' demands. Jaisohn later described those discussion meetings as
follows: The most remarkable thing I noticed was the quick and intelligent manner in which the Korean young men grasped and mastered the intricacies of Parliamentary rule. I often noticed that some Korean raised a
After the May 23, 1897> resolution to hold regular dis cussion periods every Sunday afternoon at three o'clock, The Independent carried articles discussing the previous Sunday's discussion and announcing the next topic. These Sunday meetings also became business meetings, and the discussion was sometimes postponed. As the club's interests grew wider, the meeting was scheduled to begin at one o'clock to allow time for both the business meeting and the discussion. This practice began in April, 1898 (The Inde pendent , March 26, 1898).
^ T h e Independent, April 23, 1898. ^ T h e "yes and no meetings," as Gale had described them were no longer held after the meeting of June 12, 1898, because after that date the club concentrated on mapping strategy for action.
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question of the point of order in their procedure which was well taken, worthy of expert parliamentarians of the Western countries.63
^McKenzie, op. cit., p. 68.
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THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB AGAINST FOEEIGN DOMINATION
KOREA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS
China was the only foreign country with which Korea
had any real contact until the opening of Korea by Japan in
1876. Korea then concluded treaties with the United States
of America in 1882, with Great Britain and with Germany in
1883, with Italy and with Russia in 1884, with France in
1886, and with Austria-Hungary in 1892.^ Of all these countries it was her nearest neigh
bors— China, Japan, and Russia— who were most interested in
exploiting their relations with Korea. China was anxious to
preserve the favorable position she already had in Korea;
Japan was planning to replace weakening China as the most
influential power; while Russia was cautiously widening her
influence in the area. So the Japanese found that no sooner had they
■^For details of these treaties, see Henry Chung (comp.), Korean Treaties (New York: H.S. Nicholas, Inc., 1919); and Korean Congressional Library, Ku Hanmal Choyak Ichan, 3 vols. (Seoul: Dong A Chulpan Sa, 196$).
Ill
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succeeded in usurping China's place in Korea after the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, than they had to grapple
with the Russians, who were preventing Japan from control
ling the Liao-tung Peninsula, which had been promised to
them in the Shimonoseki Treaty. To make matters worse for
the Japanese, Queen Min, the most powerful figure at the
Korean court, was organizing a coalition with the
pro-Russian faction of officials at court in order to force
out those who were pro-Japanese.
The Korean court "went so far in turning its back
on Japan that a project was mooted for disbanding the
Kunrentai troops, drilled by Japanese officers, and punish- P . . . ing their officers." At this critical time for Japanese
interests in Korea, a new envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary was appointed from Japan. He was
Goro Miura, an ex-army general and a former member of the
House of Peers without any previous diplomatic experience.
He arrived in Seoul on September 1, 1895*
His first act upon arriving was to send a detailed
report of the Korean situation back to Japan and to ask for
instructions from Tokyo on how to implement policy in
%*.A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea (London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.J, p. 264.
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Korea.^ Tokyo, however, was "being very cautious in dealing
with the delicate problem of expanding influence and did not
give Miura firm instructions. Miura, on his own,
"considered the settlement of the Korean difficulties merely Zj. a matter of prompt and vigorous action," and so the plan for Japanese action in Korea was initiated "by this diplo
matically inexperienced military man. Miura managed to introduce into the royal court a
long-time enemy of Queen Min and her father-in-law named
Tai Won Kun ). A legation conference on
October 3, 1895, arrived at the decision to bring about his 5 entry to court using the Japanese-trained kunrentai. g Oblivious of the plot, Korean War Minister Ahn Kyung-su
called on the minister on October 7 to ask for the Japanese
views on the proposed disbanding of the kunrentai. "It was
evident that the moment had arrived," Miura thought, "no n more delay should be made."
%ihon Gaimu Sho [Japanese Foreign Ministry], Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents] ([Tokyo:] Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai), Vol. 28, Book 1, Document No. 350, pp. 482-484- (hereafter referred to as Nihon Gaiko Bunsho). ^Clarence N. Weems (ed.), Hulbert*s History of Korea, II (New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1962;, 286.
^McKenzie, op. cit., p. 264. ^He later became the first president of the Indepen dence Club. ^McKenzie, op. cit., p. 265.
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Miura and First Secretary Sugimura consequently
determined to carry out a plot to kill the queen that very
night. Sugimura, as he later confessed, had planned the
assassination, hut with the approval of Miura. The Japanese
officers were clearly ordered to "do away with the Queen" and "... Fox [Queen Min] should he dealt with accordingly g as exigency might require.”
Early on the morning of October 8, the Japanese conspirators broke into the queen's apartment in the palace,
and the queen and three female attendants were put to the
sword, for apparently the assassins had been unable to
recognize the queen. The dying bodies were wrapped in a
bedspread and ignited with kerosene that the conspirators
had brought with them. Everything was consumed in the g flames except a few bones. The acting foreign minister of Japan, Saionji, sent
instructions to the Japanese ministers in America, Russia,
Great Britain, China, France, and Germany to convey to the
8Ibid., pp. 266-267. ^Ibid., pp. 65-64. All the evidence on the incident shows it was the Japanese officers, not the Korean kunrentai, who killed the queen. Miura tried unsuccessfully to make Tai Won Kun the scapegoat. Due to international pressure Miura and the others connected with the assassi nation were put in prison in Hiroshima, and they were tried the following January. Although the allegations were not denied, all the accused were released for lack of evidence. For the full text of the court findings, see McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 265-268.
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respective governments that "the Japanese government had no
connection whatsoever with the actions of Miura and the
others under suspicion. They will all he recalled and tried
according to Law.All the governments accepted Japan's
explanation except Russia's, which asked that all Japanese
troops he withdrawn from Korea. The Japanese minister in Russia also reported that the Russian newspapers were very
critical of Japan.^
The Tokyo government, considering the danger of
conflict with Russia, and as a diplomatic gesture, promptly
announced her intention of withdrawing her troops from Korea except for a few who would be leftto protect Japanese sub
jects in Korea and the telephone and telegraph lines. It
also declared that Japan would not interfere in Korean 12 internal affairs, though Japan had no intention of carrying out this promise. The other powers were then
concerned about the possibility that Russia alone would
control Korea. Germany and France expressed the fear that, if Japan reduced her strength in Korea, Russian domination would occur; and Great Britain went even further to justify
Japanese control of Korea, comparing the relationship
^Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, op. cit., Vol. 28, Book 1, Document 390, pp. 519-520. i:Lrbid., Vol. 28, Bk. 1, Document 392, pp. 521-522.
12Ibid., Vol. 28, Bk. 1, Document 398, pp. 525-526.
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between Japan and Korea with the relationship between Great
Britain and Egypt, and between France and Tunisia, that is, 13 of colonial subjugation. The United States,ite as expected, went along with the British point of view.'14
Encouraged by the favorable response from the other
powers, Japan thought it necessary to reach some kind of
understanding with Russia without weakening her own position in Korea. The Russians, on the other hand, were very satis
fied with events, as after Akwan Pachun [the flight of the
king to the Russian Legation], the king was under the
protection of Russia and a pro-Russian cabinet was in
office. Japan's anxiety to reach an understanding with
Russia was a boon to the Russians, and on May 14, 1896, the
Russian and Japanese ministers in Seoul issued a joint
memorandum which was almost unchanged from the Russian draft it recognized the pro-Russian cabinet and limited
the number of Japanese soldiers in Korea while permitting
Russia to station guards in Korea in numbers not to exceed 16 those of Japanese soldiers. This memorandum, known as
■^Ibid., Vol. 28, Bk. 1, Document 422, pp. 54-5-547-
1Z,Tbid., Vol. 28, Bk. 1, Document 421, pp. 54-1-543.
^Ibid ., Vol. 29, Document 451, pp. 785-786.
16Ibid., Vol. 29, Document 458, pp. 789-791.
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the Waeber-Komura Protocol, was a clear victory for Russia,
as Japan not only recognized future Russian penetration in
Korea, but also admitted Japanese guilt in the killing of
the queen. As Article I said, "... [M]ost effective and
complete measures will be taken for the control of Japanese soshi [gangsters]."'1'^ The spring of 1896 was marked by secret diplomatic
discussions in Moscow between Russia and the foreign
diplomats gathered for the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II.
Russian policy at that time was to expand' simultaneously in
three directions: to the north it was seeking a transit line
through Manchuria to VIadivostock; in southern Manchuria she
was seeking access to an ice-free port; and in Korea she was seeking a scheme to make the country a protectorate until it 18 could be completely annexed. Russia managed to reach
secret agreements with the three governments involved in the
area. In these transactions Korea was represented by
Min Yong-whan, Japan by Yamagata, and China by Li Hung-chang.
Russian Finance Minister Witte was the most influ ential person involved in these diplomatic maneuvers, because Russia's expansionist policy was directly connected
■^Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 87. 18B.A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906), trans. Susan W. Jones (Ann Arbor, Michigan: JTWVEdwards, 1952), p. 107.
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with foreign investment. Since Witte was, above all,
interested in the trans-Manchurian railway, he concentrated
his time on personal conferences with Li Hung-chang, not
deigning to enter personally into the negotiations with
Korea and Japan. Instead Russia was represented at these
talks by Foreign Minister Lobanov. Because they were secret negotiations, Russia
carried on separate talks with Japan and Korea. Yamagata first suggested to Lobanov that Russia and Japan divide
Korea between them into spheres of influence, the line to
be drawn at the thirty-eighth parallel of latitude, with
the northern half to go to Russia and the southern half to Japan.^ This proposal was rejected by Lobanov, because the Russians felt that the southern part would be more
valuable to them, and possibly also because Russia was
already "pledging to preserve the territorial integrity of
Korea in the negotiation of the secret Russo-Chinese treaty
of June 3.1,20 On July 9, the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol was issued,
containing four articles: (1) a joint; plan for financial assistance in case of Korean need; (2) a joint assistance
^Ibid., p. 104. The Japanese document states only the suggestion of a north-south division without mentioning the exact latitude; Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, op. cit., Vol. 29, Document 4-95 > P- 813. 20Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 87. Also Romanov, loc. cit.
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plan to establish, the Korean military and to set up an
effective police force; (3) Japanese control of the existing
telegraph lines while Russia was constructing the new rail
way line between Seoul and the Russian border; and (4) a
proclamation promising friendly discussions between the two
countries in the future. There were, in addition, two secret articles which pledged: (1) If either country felt
the necessity of sending more troops into Korea, the other's
agreement should be sought both for the dispatch of troops
itself and for the area where they should be stationed;
also that, in that event, a buffer zone should be set up;
and (2) Until the Koreans could themselves guarantee the
king's safety, the Russians' right to provide protection 21 for him, as they were doing, was recognized by Japan.
With this agreement Russia was able to maintain her
diplomatic advantage and to make the most of the Japanese
setback. It also allowed Russia to control most of Korea
with the cooperation of Korea's pro-Russian court. Japan
had tried to regain the superior position she had held previously but without success. The proposal to divide
Korea into spheres of influence was a sign of Japan's
weakness, as it was a concession for Japan. However, Japan
^NiJion Gaiko Bunsho, op. cit., Vol. 29, Document 4-78, pp. 815-818 •
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did accomplish. >■ her mini mum aim of temporary settlement in spite of her very unfavorable position.
Lobanov also had secret consultations with
Min Yong-whan, head of the Korean delegation. They did not
issue any formal protocol or treaty hut "in the form of an P? P^ answer" Lobanov and Min agreed y that: (1) Russian sol diers should protect the Korean king as long as he desired to
stay at the Russian Legation, and, when the king should
return to his palace, the Russians would assume general
responsibility for the king's safety; (2) the Russian gov
ernment would send military and economic experts to Korea to plan for the future development of Korea; (3) these experts would be under the supervision of the Russian minister in Seoul but would be advisors to the Korean government; and
PP Yi Sun-keun, Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun (Seoul: Eulyu Munwhasa, 1966), p. 756. ^Romanov, op. cit., p. 106. Also Kenjo Kikuchi, Kindai Chosen Shi [History of modern Korea] (Tokyo: Lai M k u Kenkyu Sho, 1937;, Vol. 2, pp. 500-503. Professor Koh has also done an interesting study of the background of this agreement. He feels that to have appointed a delegation in March to attend the coronation in May was leaving it rather late. He suspects it was Russian Minister Waeber who suggested after Akwan Pachun, on Pebruary 11, 1896, that Korea send a delegation. As for the conversations between Lobanov and Min which resulted in a statement "in the form of an answer," Koh thinks that a list of the important questions had been sent to Lobanov in advance by Waeber. Koh Byung-ik, "Rowhang Jaikwansik e eui Saheng kwa Hanro Kyosup" [Mission for the Russian coronation anfl the Russo-Korean negotiation], The Yoksa Hakbo [The Korean historical review], Vol. 28 (September, 1965), pp. 41-63.
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(4) there would he a new telegraph line between Seoul and
the Bussian border.
Clearly, the two sets of agreements conflicted.
Lobanov was trying to gain greater control over Korea by
planning secretly to join with Japan in exploiting Korea
while also trying to make Korea accept Bussian control-. So
it is correct, as Professor Asakawa put it, "Whatever the
truth of the reported Busso-Korean Agreement, Bussia did no
sooner sign her Japanese protocol of June 9, than she began 24 to violate its terms."
It should be noted here that though Lobanov clearly
prepared the way for Bussian domination of Korea, Witte
occupied himself with Chinese affairs and delayed putting into action the stipulations of the Busso-Korean under standing. In June Witte postponed the decision of making a
loan to Korea to buy the Japanese telegraph line. Lobanov's proposal for the establishment of a Busso-Korean Bank was delayed, and, further, the appointment of a Bussian advisor
for the Korean Finance Ministry was delayed "by raising the 25 irrelevant question of who was to pay the agent's salary." By the time Witte did try to implement Lobanov's
2^Kan'ichi Asakawa, The Bus so-Japanese Conflict: Its Cause and Issues (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904), p. 268. There is an almost identical admission in the Bussian source (see Komanov, op. 'cit., pp. 105-106).
2^Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 90.
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scheme, circumstances in Korea had changed greatly. The
Russians were fiercely opposed by the Independence Club, and this opposition caused them to retreat from almost 26 their entire plan. The successful anti-Russian campaign
of the club meant that Russia lost her favorable position in
Korea; and in April of 1898 Russia signed the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, in which Russia recognized Japan's commercial'and
industrial ties with Korea. The signing on April 25, 1898,
marked the beginning of a new Japanese dominance which
culminated in her annexation of Korea in 1910.
Although the main rivals for the control of Korea
were Japan and Russia, the other great colonial powers— America, Great Britain, Germany, and France— also competed
to acquire special privileges in Korea. Japan, which had
?6 It should be pointed out here that two of the sources give misleading impressions. Asakawa stated that "The anti-Russian sentiment grew so strong that a large num ber of intelligent Koreans organized the Korean Independence Society. . ." (Asakawa, op. cit., p. 270). As we have seen, the club was formed before the Russian colonial scheme became known. Furthermore, the club was not just anti-Rus sian but against all foreign interference in Korean affairs. Romanov claimed that " [t]he decisive role in this connection must have been played by Japan's communication to the Korean Government of the text of the Moscow protocol of May 28, secret articles and all" (Romanov, op. cit., p. 113)* However, it should be noted that there are indications that the king had never really trusted the Russians and had voiced some suspicions of Akwan Pachun to American Minister Allen. During the period of the Independence Club's greatest strength, there was strong public feeling for Korean nationalism, and the king knew, too, that there was public suspicion that men like Kim Hong-yuk and Cho Pyung-sik, who were pro-Russian conservatives, were abusing their power.
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been dominant, lost ground to Russia in 1896-1897. The
United States bad succeeded in gaining the trust of tbe
king, and tbe American ministers in Seoul often interfered
in Korean politics altbougb sucb interference was against
instructions from Washington. H.N. Allen, wbo became
American minister in Seoul in September, 1897, bad lived there
previously as a missionary and a legation secretary, and be
could say quite truthfully that "[t]he King literally 27 depends on me like a child on bis father." 1 As their
situation was so favorable, tbe Americans did not waste
opportunities to compete for concessions with tbe other
colonial powers.
Tbe colonial powers acquired dozens of economic, and
political interests in Korea between 1896 and 1898, which
was tbe period during which the Independence Club was
working energetically to enlist public support for Korean
nationalism and against foreign domination. An itemized
listing of the foreign investments which were legitimized
during this time and which so enraged the members of the
Independence Club may be seen in the Appendix.
27 1 Allen's letter to Jennie Everett, quoted m Fred H. Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), pp. 277-278.
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THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB AGAINST RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
Dr. Jaisohn realized that the Korean independence of
the Shimonoseki Treaty was only nominal, as it had been "given11 at the convenience of Japanese imperialism and had
not been won by the struggle of the Korean people. He
contended that this situation was critical, and he pleaded
that only the unity of the Korean people in opposition to po the status quo would free Korea from foreign domination. He warned government officials and the citizens of the dan
gers inherent in her position and compared Korea to a human
body, saying that Russia and Germany controlled the head and right arm and Japan controlled the two legs and the left po arm, so Korea would have to struggle hard to become free.
However, Jaisohn was not by any means fanatically
xenophobic. He welcomed the Waeber-Komura agreement, as he
drew from it the hope that one power would not become too
dominant in Korea.^ The Independent also praised the
Min Yong-whan mission to the Russian coronation, saying
that it was important for Korea to join in international
28The Independent, July 27, 1897. All references to The Independent alone refer to the Korean edition. Citations from the newspaper’s English edition are so indicated.
2^Ibid., October 9, 1897. ^Ibid., May 28, 189&
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51 society. Jaisohn sadly admitted the poor condition of
the Korean economy and the fact that, because there was no navy and only a poor army, Korea would not be able to deal
with other countries on an equal basis. But he emphasized
that Korea would eventually gain in world standing if she
maintained friendly relations and trade with all the treaty
nations.^2 As the Independence Club gained in strength and the
independence of Korea was formally promulgated on
October 12, 1897— at which time the title of the king
changed to "emperor," the club started a program to achieve
its goal of real independence. One of the most important
reasons for the club's haste in stepping up its activities
was the sequence of Russian actions in the attempt to gain
a dominating position in Korea. These actions not only
clashed with Korean feelings of nationalism, but also
brought hostile reactions from the other powers who had
treaty relations with Korea. In October, 1896, Russian Colonel Potiata, under a
one-year contract to the Korean government, led a group of
three officers and ten enlisted men to Seoul to train the
Korean Army and to protect the Korean king, who was then at
the Russian Legation. The Independent welcomed the Russian
51Ibid., October 24, 1896. 52Ibid., May 21, 1896.
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military advisors, saying that Korea needed military
training by an advanced nation because modem military
knowledge was a most important factor in the growth of a 33 strong Korea. v The paper also praised the discipline and effectiveness of the Russian Army.
In April, 1897, Russia tried to bring an additional 160 officers and soldiers to Seoul, but this time was
opposed by the Independence Club and its chairman, who was
also the foreign minister, Yi Wan-yong. Respite managing to 34 have him dismissed as foreign minister in May, the Russians succeeded in bringing only thirteen more officers
to Seoul in August. But from then on it was obvious that
the Russians intended to try to control Korea.
Russian Minister Waeber, who had managed to maintain
a good reputation in diplomatic circles in Seoul, was
replaced by Re Speyer— a change which was noted as bringing 35 "a new vigor to Russo-Korean relations.In October, one
month after Re Speyer's arrival, Admiral Kir Alexeiff was
brought in as the advisor to the Finance Ministry to replace
the British advisor, John McLeavy Brown, although Brown had a five-year contract for the position and had taken the job
^Ibid., October 24, 1896. ^ K w a n B o [Government Gazette] (Seoul: Korean Government Publication), May 12, 1897• ^Horner B. Hulbert, The Passing of Korea (New York: Roubleday, Page and Co., 1906), p. 1567
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in only April, 1896. Alexeiff claimed that the Russian
government was simply responding to the Korean emperor's
request that a Russian finance official supervise the Korean Finance Ministry.^ One month later, in November, a Russian
named Reminoff was placed in charge of the Korean arsenal. This meant that not only the Finance Ministry, but also the
Korean War Ministry and the Royal Guards— about 3»000 men— 37 were directly under Russian control.
On November 5» 1897> De Speyer and Foreign Minister
Cho Pyung-sik signed an eight-article agreement which would
consign Korean finance and customs completely to Russian
governance. The agreement gave power to the Russian
advisor not only to override an objection by the finance
The Independent, October 30, 1897- The exact text of the secret agreement between Lobanov and Min Yong-whan is not officially documented, but, on the subject of Russian assistance to the Korean Finance Ministry, a Japanese source states that "... only Russians would be hired for all the departments of the Korean government" (Kikuchi, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 501). A Russian source states, "The above-men tioned trustworthy persons will, obviously, under the direction of the Russian minister, serve as such advisors in the military and financial department" (Romanov, op. cit., p . 106). 37 Asakawa, op. cit., p. 268. ^The functions of this official as designated in the agreement describe the concept, in English, of "director," but the Korean word ko mun (-aL-^r ) translates directly to "advisor." Hulbert uses the term "director" (Hulbert, op. cit., p. 157)-
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minister, but it also said that "in view of the friendly
relations between the two countries, the agreement will be 39 m force indefinitely.
Finance Minister Pak Chung-yang, a not very active
member of the Independence Club, memorialized the emperor, /j_0 criticizing the agreement; he was dismissed the next day.
Disturbed about developments in Korea, Great Britain dis
patched eight British ships led by Admiral Bullet, which
arrived in Inchon and remained for several days. Though the
British ships did not engage in any threatening activities,
both the Korean and Bussian governments must have felt the
pressure, as Mr. Brown was hastily restored to the position 4-1 of finance advisor early the next year. The Independent
launched a harsh attack on the Busso-Korean agreement regarding the post of advisor to the Finance Ministry, and
the paper soon widened its attack to include the military advisors, whom it had earlier approved, and demanded the
total withdrawal of Bussians from posts in the Korean 4-2 government.
^yThe full text of the agreement appears m The Independent, November 16 and November 18, 1897* 4-0 Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 8 , 1897-
^^Pak Un-sik, Han Kuk Tong Sa, trans. Pak No-kyung (Taigu, Korea: Talsung Printing Co., 1946>), p. 133-
^Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959)? P» 181
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Ignoring the strong objections which were being voiced about Russia's strategy, De Speyer and Kir Alexeiff proceeded with their plan to establish the Russo-Korean
Bank, which was also to function as the Korean Central
Bank, with branches in all the provinces to handle local H.7. budgetary matters as well as tax revenues. The Independence Club, realizing that mere verbal
criticism would not be effective, met on February 20, 1898,
to decide on the most expeditious way to eliminate the
Russians from control of the Korean government. At this
meeting more than one hundred members signed a petition
against the Russian presence in Korea and declared that, if
necessary, they were ready to die for the emperor and Korean independence. The meeting also adopted a motion proposed
by Yun Chee-ho, that they elect Yi Sang-jae and Yi Keun-ho
to compose a memorial. This was the first official memorial
sent by the club, and it was handed to the emperor the next day. It was of great significance, as it was the first
memorial to have its contents adopted by a majority vote
among commoners. The memorial emphasized:
. . . the God-given rights of Korean indepen dence. . . . which would be maintained only by guidance of the people by the emperor toward the betterment. . . . and ultimately a united Korea would not be weak before
Zl x -Xhong Kyo, op. cit., p . 181.
^ T h e Independent, February 22, 1898.
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ten or a hundred countries.^
The emperor responded to the memorial by agreeing with the
substance of it and encouraging the club to try to achieve
their ideals through the normal processes of government and 46 not just to complain about events. The Independent
printed the emperor's response and asked its readers a
rhetorical question: Was it a crime if the club memorialized 47 certain matters without trying to achieve them?
At the time of the coronation in Moscow, Lobanov had
carefully paved the way for the successful completion of his
plan for the winning of Korea with the help and expert
knowledge of Waeber, the minister in Seoul. As has been
indicated, however, Witte's delay in approving key matters
connected with foreign investment made the Russians late in
trying to implement her plans, and, when they resumed one
year later, the Korean situation had changed drastically.
The emperor was no longer at the Russian Legation and there
fore no longer so amenable to Russian advice; the Indepen dence Club was gaining in public strength; and the
pro-Russian Koreans were either being won over to the idea of Korean independence from all foreign influence or had put
^ The Independent, February 24, 1898; also, Chong Kyo, op. ext., pp. 173-175- ^ T h e Independent, February 26, 1898.
47Ibid.
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themselves in extremely vulnerable positions since tbe
public trend was opposition to foreign domination.
Although the actions the Russians initiated in the
summer of 1897 bad been approved by the king, represented by
Min Yong-whan in Moscow the year before, the king had since listened to other counsel, and the opposition mounted by the Independence Club threatened the success of the Russians'
plan. In this difficult situation Russia decided that she
would simply have to put more pressure on Korea to cooperate, and she pushed ahead with her plans, completely disregarding
Korean objections. At the time that the Independence Club was arousing
public feeling against having Russian advisors at the
Finance and War Ministries, against the Russo-Korean Bank,
and against the stationing of Russian soldiers in Korea, the
club discovered that Russia was also to be allowed to lease 48 80,000 square meters of Chul Yong Island, off the Pusan coast. This new incursion was brought to the attention of
members at the regular Sunday meeting on February 27, 1898.
Chong Kyo gave a rousing speech at the meeting, saying,
". . .we should defend our independence and oppose the
^Westerners call it Beer Island. The lease was a Russian attempt to remove the Japa nese influence from the southern sea of Korea. Japan had already leased 98,000 square meters on the island and had built a coaling station there in 1886. For the Japanese- Korean agreement, see Ku Hanmal Choyak Ichan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 14-15.
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zl q Russian demands for the lease of the island." J He
demanded that the acting foreign minister, Min Chong-muk,
make public the process by which the lease was being given.
It was at this meeting that, for the first time since the formation of the club, the newly elected officers of the
club put forward concrete proposals on how to carry out 50 more effectively the struggle for their goals. It was already public knowledge that former Foreign
Minister Yi To-jae had been dismissed because of his objections to the lease, that the Russian language inter
preter and secretary of imperial affairs, Kim Hong-yuk, had
arranged that Min be appointed acting foreign minister
solely to lease the island to Russia, and that the case had
not been brought before the Council of State for discussion.
Embarrassed by the club's demands, Min answered by saying
that the Russian lease had been granted in the same manner
as the Japanese lease of 1886, and he pointed out, further,
that the lease of Wol Mi Island to Japan had not been
discussed before the Council of State.^ Forced to take action after the club had attacked Min, the emperor
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 176-177 • -^For the results of the elections, see Chapter 3, PP- 92-93- ^The lease of territory on this island to Japan was signed in 1891- Korea was represented then by Min Chong-muk. Ku Hanmal Choyak Ichan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 16-17-
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expressed his dissatisfaction with Min's answer and Min 52 resigned from his post. Yet, a day later the Kwan Bo announced his appointment to the post of minister of 55 foreign affairs^— a promotion which obviously had had the
hand of the Russians and their friends among the reaction
aries at court.
Incensed at the government's actions, the club at its next Sunday meeting discussed and adopted a resolution
which said: The territory belonging to Korea is the result of the great achievements of the kings. Since this is a land where twelve million Koreans live, leasing even one inch to foreigners is a traitorous act.5^-
The members at the meeting went so far as to demand that the foreign minister cancel the leases which had already been given to Japan and Russia, arguing that those leases would
tempt other powers to ask for leases. The club also sent
letters to the members of the Council of State asking them 55 to punish the foreign minister as a traitor. Jaisohn found that there was only one way to make
the deaf ears of the conservatives at court listen to the
-^Kwan Bo, op. cit., March 2, 1898.
55Ibid., March 3, 1898. -^The Independent, March 12, 1898.
Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 180.
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national cry to stop the Russian scheme. The Independent,
on March 3? in an editorial titled ’’The Duty of Korean
Citizens," deplored the fact that eighty percent of Koreans
were indifferent to the affairs of government. It compared
a nation with the mechanical system of a watch, with the
analogy that just as a watch could function only with the
full cooperation of all its parts, large or small, so a nation could only be healthy if all the citizens worked
together toward building the nation. The same editorial
asserted that it was the duty of each citizen to persuade
other citizens that if they were indifferent to what
happened in their own government then they were not partic
ipating in the process to create a better country.^
In the meantime Jaisohn secretly asked Chong Kyo to organize a mass rally. ^ So, on March 10, at 2 P.M., the
club sponsored the Man Min Kong Dong Hoe ( [All people's conference] in downtown Seoul. About
eight thousand people gathered,^® including Russian
Minister De Speyer and other members of the diplomatic
corps, who heard speeches by Hyun Kong-yum, Hong Chung-woo,
^T h e Independent, March 3» 1898.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 182. •^The Korean Repository, V (1898; reprint ed., New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964)* 114. The Inde- pendent, March 12, 1898, said "there gathered more than ten thousand people."
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and Yi Seung-man, and others advocating the unity of the
people against the Russian domination of the Korean govern
ment, and demanding that the government take heed. These
speeches moved the audience "like boiling water, and when
they were reported later to the king, he listened to the
arguments with great sympathy. Encountering this serious threat to their plans, the
pro-Russian officials two days later sponsored a mass
meeting to denounce the Independence Club at the same rally ground. Even though a curious crowd gathered, it proved to
be a fiasco when the announced speakers failed to appear, and, instead, a man in the crowd took the platform to rail
against Kim Hong-yuk, the organizer of the rally.
During the night of May 6 Russian Minister De Speyer
brought to the Korean foreign minister a telegram from the
Russian government which was an ultimatum demanding a
clarification within twenty-four hours of the Korean government's position on the matter of Russians in Korea.
The Russians said that the call for withdrawal of their countrymen was "maneuvered by a group of do-nothing unemployed gangsters.
59choi Joon, "Kojong Sidae Communication Hyungtae eui Kochal: Teukhee Tong Nip Shinmun kwa Hyuphoe leul Chungsim euro" [A study on the forms of communication during the reign of King Ko Jong], Sahak Yuenku [The study of history], III (April, 1959) ^The Independent, March 10, 1898.
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De Speyer threatened that, if the Korean government
failed to answer within that time period or if it expressed
disapproval of the Russians in Korea, "the Russian govern- 61 ment would take further steps." The foreign minister
replied that it was almost impossible to send a reply within twenty-four hourse and notified the emperor of the new
Russian intimidation. The emperor responded as he usually
did when a decision was needed for a difficult problem: he 62 directed the ministers to take proper action. The Russian ultimatum was not answered until
March 12. However, after the successful mass rally spon
sored by the Independence Club and the fiasco of the
pro-Russian rally, the foreign minister, with the approval of the emperor, asked De Speyer to withdraw his advisors
from the Ministries of Finance and War, to close the
Russo-Korean Bank; and he canceled the lease for Chul Yong
Island, saying that the decision was "the unanimous desire 63 of our sovereign and his people." ^ Japan was asked to
remove her coaling station from the island for the same
reason. Although Russia had threatened to "take further
steps," she decided to accept the decision in order to
^The Independent, March 10, 1898. ^Ibid.
k^The Korean Repository, op. cit., V (1898), 116.
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avoid worse retaliation. A month, after the Koreans made
their request, De Speyer and the other Russians were
recalled. Japan was undoubtedly pleased that the Indepen
dence Club won that victory, as it eliminated major parts of
the Russian scheme for expansion into Korea, but she was at
the same time wary that the growing strength of the club might be a barrier to her future plans also.
The club had a victory celebration at Independence
Hall on March 13, and gained many new members. It was at
this meeting that the members agreed to issue a club badge with eight letters, Tong Nip Hyup Hoe Chung Run Aekuk, or
) ["Independence Club, Loyal to the
Emperor and Patriotism"], on a background of the blue flag
of Korea. The badge was to be worn by all members as the symbol of the club's struggle for reform and the indepen
dence of Korea.
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DR. JAISOHN'S DEPARTURE FROM KOREA
The club's successful fight to eliminate foreign
advisors from the government proved ultimately to be costly
for the club. Although the government certainly could have
found other pretexts for expelling Jaisohn, they chose to use the fact that he was an American citizen but an advisor
to the Privy Council. Although the emperor had accepted the club's demand
that he expel the Russian advisors from the government, he
either disliked being dictated to by a public meeting or he
was reluctant to see the club become too influential, for he began to persecute the club and its members in various ways.
First, reshuffling the high officials so as to balance pro- and anti-club sentiments among them, he fired the. mayor
of Seoul, Yi Chae-yun, who was a club charter member; and,
then, he also dismissed the two ministers who had been attacked by speakers at the mass rally, Foreign Minister
Min Chong-muk and Finance Minister Cho Pyung-ho. He appointed the much criticized secretary for imperial affairs,
Kim Hong-yuk, to be mayor of Seoul, and he sent the club
president Yi Wan-yong to Chulla Buk Province as governor thus prohibiting him from taking an active role in the
club. Even after the March 10 rally, the emperor
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continued to rely mainly on tlie advice of the conservative
group who monopolized his retinue. The emperor was not
completely opposed to Jaisohn's activities as he knew that
they helped greatly to raise his prestige; but that was not
a sufficient reason to protect the club from the conserva tive officials. The conservative rhetoric which often called Jaisohn a foreigner who should have nothing to do
with foreign affairs was accepted by the emperor. In addition to the vigorous campaigns waged by
Russia and Japan against Jaisohn, none of the foreign diplo mats were sympathetic to Jaisohn's aspirations— not even American Minister Allen whom the emperor asked to arrange to
return Jaisohn to America. Allen advised Jaisohn to leave
Korea, and said that he would try to intercede on his behalf
so that Jaisohn would receive his salary for the remaining
years of his ten-year term as a Privy Council advisor. In
fact, Allen warned that, if the Korean government would not
agree to pay Jaisohn's salary, he would send for American 64- warships to force them to do so. Jaisohn was supposed to
believe that the minister really had his interests at heart. As for the Russians, Jaisohn was still the major
obstacle in the way of their controlling the Korean govern ment, and they lost no opportunity to vilify the club and
Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 190.
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its members. The members were described as unemployed
hoodlums working against Russia. It was even reported that
the Russian ambassador in Washington, Mr. Cassini, arranged
for his daughter to talk to President Theodore Roosevelt in
the hope she could influence him to return Jaisohn to the
United States.^ Japan discovered that the strongly nationalistic
temper of the club was not only ridding Korea of the
Russian presence, but was threatening also to spoil Japanese
plans to regain hegemony over Korea. In order to counter
the effects of the club, the Japanese hired an American public relations expert named Williams (who was paid an
annual salary of 825,000 by the Japanese government). Williams then launched a vindictive anti-Independence Club
campaign: speeches were made against the club, and articles
criticizing it appeared in the papers, all of which belittled the Korean reform movement as being nothing but
"the folly of a 'Don Quixote.1" When it became known to the Korean public that the
Korean government had asked Jaisohn to leave the country
because he was an advisor to the government although tech nically a foreigner, the club organized a campaign to
6^Kim To-tae, So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso.jon [Autobiog raphy of Dr. So Jai-pil, or Philip JaisohnJ (Seoul: Susonsa, 1948), p. 219.
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oppose the government move, hut to no avail. Jaisohn found
that even his close friends among the missionaries felt that
his ideas for reform were too advanced for Korea, and they
suggested that he accept the government's request and return to America.
Exacerbating his agony was the fact that he was
receiving threats to his life. If he had not been an Ameri
can citizen, or, if he had renounced his American citizen
ship, he might have been assassinated by desperate reaction aries.^ His departure was hastened when he received a
telegram, presumably from his mother-in-law in the United
States but which proved later to have been a fraud, saying
that she was seriously ill. So, finally he left Korea with
his American wife and their new-born baby, leaving his unfinished work to the club members and the publication of 68 The Independent to Yun Chee-ho.
k^Yi Sun-keun, op. cit., p. 863. 6R After returning to the United States, Jaisohn could do little to help with the difficult tasks he had initiated in Korea, except to encourage club members by repeating his hopes for reform through a letter printed in The Independent of September 13, 1898. Until the end of the Spanish-American War, Jaisohn served in the Army Medical Corps under the famed Dr. Walter ■Reed. After the end of the war, in 1899, be joined the fac ulty of the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, where he taught pathology. During this period, he, with a friend, opened a small printing and stationery store in Philadelphia, in 1907* By the end of World War I, the business had expanded to a chain of three stores employing from sixty to seventy people. "At the rate of growth it was thought that his business might be worth two million dollars in another
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Jaisohn departed at 11 A.M. on May 14 from Yong San
near the Han Eiver. The members of the Independence Club and Hyup Sung Hoe, government officials, and foreign
ten years” (Channing Liem, America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohn LNew Y'ork: tfhe William-Frederick Press, 1952J, P« 58;. Many peoples of the world were eager to realize the "self-determination of the oppressed," which President Woodrow Wilson spoke of after the end of World War I, and the Koreans were no exception. On March 1, 1919, a huge national demonstration for independence occurred in Korea, but it was soon suppressed by the Japanese. On that day, hundreds of Koreans died, and thousands were arrested. Jaisohn was too disturbed by these events simply to watch and wait quietly. His passionate patriotism for Korea again forced him to give up his medical career and reinvigorated his actions. He wrote many articles in news papers and lectured widely for the cause of Korean indepen dence. He organized the "Friends of Korea" with the Reverend Dr. Thompson of Holy Trinity Church in Philadel phia; and he sponsored and chaired a Korean nationalist conference which was attended by about two hundred Koreans from all over the United States at Independence Hall, with the good will of the mayor of Philadelphia. Jaisohn was asked to become the group's director of publicity and public relations at this meeting, which ended with a two-day parade by the Koreans and some American friends to proclaim their support for Korean independence. He had numerous successes as a publicist. Under a pseudonym, he authored and published a book on the "March 1 Movement" in Korea: N.H. Osia [Philip Jaisohn], Hansu's Journey (Philadelphia: Philip Jaisohn & Co.), 1922"I Also in this period U.S. Senator Thomas, at Jaisohn's request, sub mitted a resolution draft before the Senate, which would have recognized the independence of Korea but was defeated. Also in his role as propagandist he hired an American lawyer during the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, to pressure the Japanese delegation on Japanese policies in Korea. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes's off-the-record pres sure on the Japanese culminated in the appointment of a new governor-general of Korea, Viscount Saito, "who was the most liberal Japanese to rule Korea" (Liem, op. cit., p. 54). And in 1925, when the Institute of Pacific Relations spon sored a pan-Pacific conference in Honolulu, Jaisohn as a_ Korean delegate embarrassed the Japanese for their colonial
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dignitaries had gathered to see him off. Jaisohn made a
farewell speech declaring that the Korean people should
strengthen the foundation of Korean independence by
respecting their fellow countrymen and the emperor, and
policies (Kim To-tae, op. cit., pp. 256-257). During this time, though Jaisohn received financial aid from friends and a gift of $9 >990 from an anonymous American in Korea, his income was far from sufficient to cover his expenses. Jaisohn spent all of his savings and the cash from mortgages on his property, including his shop, amounting to $76,000. He went bankrupt in 1924. Jaisohn later recollected that during the worst period his family often had to skip meals. He went back to the University of Pennsylvania, and, later, to practice in other clinics. After the outbreak of World War II he worked for the government as a physician examining draftees. For his devotion to the armed services he was awarded a U.S. Congressional Medal, "awarded in the name of the Congress of the United States for faithful and loyal service'.'(Kim To-tae, op. cit., p. 261). With the end of World War II, Jaisohn was selected by John R. Hodge, Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in Korea, to be his chief advisor on political affairs. Jaisohn, then eighty-four years old, went back to Korea in July, 1947, with his daughter as his secretary, and Channing Liem as his assistant. During his stay in Korea, Jaisohn demonstrated again his integrity and his zeal for reform and for the indepen dence of Korea. He firmly turned down a broad-based appeal to be a candidate for the first president of the Republic of Korea, and asserted again that what he was most interested in was the education of the masses rather than political office (Kim To-tae? op. cit., pp. 262-263). When real independence came to the Republic of Korea in August, 1948, thus ending American military government, Jaisohn left the next month, leaving a large crowd of weeping well-wishers behind once again. Six months after the outbreak of the Korean War, on January 5? 1951? lie died in a hospital near his home in Media, Pennsylvania. It was reported that the shocking news of the Korean War had seriously aiffected his health'.,' not unexpected for a man who once said, "I wonder what [the] boys would do to me if I went to Pyongyang today to urge peace upon them. I cer tainly would do anything if it would only result in peace" (Liem, op. cit., p. 85).
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that, if necessary, they should he willing to die in the 69 attempt to make Korea the equal of other countries. His
face was tearful and his voice hoarse, and his emotions so overwhelmed him that he could not finish his speech.
Several club members responded with speeches praising
Jaisohn and his dream of reform, and promising that they would try to carry on his endeavors. Many people wept, and 70 "tears were added to the waters of the River Han.*
His last article was the editorial in The Indepen
dent of May 17, 1898, asking that readers continue to
support the Independence Club and the movement for reform in
Korea, anfl expressing the hope that Yun Chee-ho would
continue to teach the convictions of the reform movement in
The Independent.
^The Independent, May 19 > 1898. ^Ibid.
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THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USE OP FOREIGN MERCENARIES
Clarence R. Greathouse, a former United States
consul general in Yokohama, had become the legal advisor to 71 the Korean government in August, 1890.' He had been
"recognized as an able and efficient man in his official 72 capacity," and The Independent had often praised his capa
bilities and the contributions he had made to legal reform
in Korea. Greathouse was also a very ambitious man and had,
once, in 1893, held the position of postmaster general of Korea. Not only was he a favorite of the emperor, but he also had many close friends among the conservative officials, one of whom was Yi Yong-ik, section chief of the Bureau of Engraving which also controlled the railways and
customs. Yi Yong-ik was an object of attack by the club, 73 whose pressure ultimately led to his resignation. Greathouse's relations with the conservative elements in the
government made his opposition to the Independence Club readily understandable. He was also worried bythe club's
Allen, Korea: Pact and Fancy (Seoul: Methodist Publishing House, 1904;, p. 181. 72 ' Hulbert, op. cit., p. 168. ^For the relationship between Yi Yong-ik, see Chapter PP- 164-169-
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campaign against the use of foreign advisors, as, if it were
successful, he would lose his own position. So, after the
Russians withdrew their guards from the palace, Greathouse
proposed that the emperor hire mercenaries to guard the
palace. The idea was accepted. On the surface, this suggestion showed concern only for the emperor's safety, hut
its real intent was to provide Greathouse's conservative
friends a force which they could use against the Independence Club.
With a member of the Imperial Household,
Chang Bong-whan, Greathouse managed to find thirty men in Shanghai who were willing to contract to guard the palace 74 for seventy won per month. They were a strange medley
from various parts of the world: there were nine Americans,
nine British, five French, five Germans, and two Russians.
Two days after they arrived in Seoul, the club sum
moned its members to an urgent meeting to discuss the use of foreign mercenaries for the palace guard. The meeting ended
after the members had unanimously decided that:
[Dependence on foreign mercenaries to guard the palace of an independent country is a shameful insult to the Imperial Household, the palace guards, and, furthermore, to all citizens.75
74 ' Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 237• ^ The Independent, September 20, 1898.
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At the meeting club members expressed deep disapproval of
the government for its hiring of foreigners. When the gov
ernment had asked Jaisohn and the Russians to leave the
country, it had pledged its intention not to hire foreigners again. The club was so enraged by the foreign palace guards
that it formed four investigating committees of three men
each, who were sent to find out how the hiring of the mer cenaries had been allowed to happen. The four ministers who
should have been directly involved claimed that they had not
been and that they had not been aware of Greathouse1 s activ ities. Furthermore, when questioned by the delegations from the club, all four— the ministers of foreign affairs, of the
Imperial Household, of war, and the police chief— expressed 76 objections to the hiring of foreign mercenaries. Because they had not received any guarantee that the
mercenaries would be sent away, but encouraged by the atti
tude of the four ministers, the club met the next day and
decided to march to the Foreign Ministry to demand that the
government guarantee that the mercenaries would be sent back An important element of this demonstration was that fifty of
the most respectable and gentlemanly members of the club
were selected to supervise the demonstration, a strategy
^The Independent, September 20, 1898.
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which, resulted in a most orderly and well-organized protest.
A few of the demonstrators went inside to see the foreign minister while the rest waited outside in an orderly
manner for the minister's response. At last the minister
came out and announced that "There will he a Council of
State meeting tomorrow at noon. I assure you that I will he 77 speaking against the hiring of mercenaries at the meeting. He promised that the club would be notified of the result of
the meeting as soon as possible. The demonstrators were satisfied with this answer and dispersed, after planning to
gather again the. following day at three in the afternoon if
the Council of State did not take the appropriate steps.
The Council of State did not reject the arguments
which had been advanced by the club on the undesirability of
having foreigners in such a vital role; and so it was decided to send the mercenaries back to Shanghai and to pay
them one year's salary and transportation, all of which cost
the Korean government $30,000.7® Although there is no clear record of the process by
which the Korean government had agreed to hire the merce
naries, it is probable that Greathouse independently had suggested the idea to the emperor and was granted permission
77Ibid.
7^The Korean Repository, op. cit., V (1898), 467.
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directly, as no one else in the government admitted any
knowledge of the scheme. On the other hand, it is possible
that the ministers had acquiesced and later pleaded ignorance
against the onslaught from the Independence Club. It would
have been typical behavior on the part of the emperor to
accept a plan submitted by a trusted official or foreign friend, and then, if the advice put him in a difficult
position, to turn the responsibility over to the Council of
State to remove himself from the difficulty.
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST EOEEIGN SETTLEMENTS AND LEASES
Mok Po and Jeung Nam Po were the two ports opened
for the treaty nations on October 1, 1897, in addition to the ports of Inchon, Pusan, and Wonsan, which already had
been opened. When the Russian minister, De Speyer, was
"seeking some roundabout route to the protectorate, pending
the full development of its powers for her complete annexation,and taking advantage of the then pro-Russian
government, he realized it would be difficult to compete
with Japan, which already held the dominant position in QQ foreign settlements. Therefore, when he asked for the
79 Romanov, op. cit., p . 107 • 80Por example, in 1895 there were approximately 15,000 foreigners in Korea, of whom 12,303 were Japanese. Cited from Tokunaga Isami, Kankoku Soran (Tokyo: Haku Bun Kan, 1907), pp. 32-33, in Yi Sun-keun, op. cit., p. 778.
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lease of Chul Yong Island, almost simultaneously he asked
that Russia be allowed to purchase outright an area of
280,000 square meters in the two new foreign settlements and
all the islands within ten Korean li [two and one half miles]
from the settlements. De Speyer was invoking Chapter IV of
the Russo-Korean Treaty of July 7> 1884, which stated that "Russians may rent or purchase land or houses in the settle- 81 ments . . . within a distance of ten Korean li. ..."
Because of the objections raised by the Independence
Club to the lease of Chul Yong Island, however, the lease,
which had been granted, was withdrawn, and Russia realized that it would not be easy to purchase the land she wanted.
When the new Russian minister Matunine arrived on Hay 1,
1898, however, he recommenced the negotiations for the
leases, and he demanded that the foreign minister allow the
purchases of land. The controversial Cho Pyung-jik acceded to the demand. In two consecutive editorials The Independent
In 1896, there were altogether 258 foreign consular offices and business establishments, of which 210 were Japanese, while the Russians had none. And in 1898, there were 17,812 foreigners in Korea: 15»062 were Japanese; 2,530 were Chinese; and 220 were Europeans. Hosokawa Karoku, Shoku Hin Shi [The colonial history] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai ShinpoSKaT 19^1), p. 253. 81 [Nihon] Gaimu Sho Joyaku Kyoku [Bureau of Treaties of the Foreign Ministry of Japan) ], Kyu Joyaku Isan: Chosen, Ryukyu [Old treaties collections: Chosen and RyukyuJ, Vol. ill U934), pp. 578-579.
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criticized the treaties that Korea had signed with the
treaty nations, and, in detail, analyzed and interpreted the Qp obligations and rights inhering in the treaty clauses. The newspaper asserted that the agreements on trade and com
merce, including the Russo-Korean Treaty of 1884, had been
signed in the spirit of mutual benefit and cooperation, but
that the treaty terms had been repeatedly violated by for
eign nationals. The editorials then listed complaints against those nationals: Russians had recently beaten Koreans in Wonsan; Japanese drunkards roamed in Seoul and
Inchon; and there had been many illegal purchases of prop
erty, not to speak of illegal trade activities outside the
settlements. The paper continued, pointing out that the
spirit of Chapter XV of the Russo-Korean Treaty should be
interpreted to mean that the purchase of land would be only
for the purpose of trade or for consular offices and not for
naval bases or other aggressive purposes, because the for
eign settlements were still an integral part of Korea.
In the meantime, Yi Seung-man had been chosen the
envoy of the Independence Club to find out from the foreign
minister whether the report was true that the Russians had
bought a large part of two settlements. Because the minis
ter's answer to the inquiry had been very evasive, when the
82The Independent, May 19 and May 21, 1898.
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club met on May 22 it selected a five-man committee to meet 83 again with the minister.
The threat of another public rally accusing the min
ister of unpatriotic dealings forced him to answer on May 27.
He denied that the settlements had been sold to the Russians, and he apologized that great misunderstanding had arisen from the use of the ambiguous word "base,” which the Rus
sians had used in their request for the site of a new consu- 84 late building and houses for traders. The foreign minis
ter, Cho Pyung-jik, nevertheless canceled the sale, and
then, three days later, resigned his post,®^ an event which
suggests that the "misunderstanding” was not really an inno
cent one. The Russians were thus prevented from maintaining
a naval base at the southern tip of the peninsula. Although the editorials in The Independent on May 19
and May 21 pointed out the many violations of treaty pro
visions on the part of foreigners, the club could not remedy
past violations. But, during October, the club elected
Yi Seung-man and two others to meet with the new foreign minister, Pak Chae-soon, in order to convince him that he
should guarantee that the terms of the treaties were
^The Independent, May 26, 1898. 84 Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 193•
^ Kwan Bo, op. cit., May 30, 1898.
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strictly observed— "which would he very helpful for Korean QC commerce and farming.1’ This delegation was also charged
with pointing out to the minister that the Japanese had
already spread over all the thirteen provinces, buying houses and land illegally and opening shops without authori
zation. The foreign minister admitted to Yi Seung-man's
committee that foreigners had violated the terms of the
treaties, but he promised that he would try hard to prevent
further violations in order to protect Korean interests. He
also said that he was considering a plan to bring the for
eigners who were illegally in the interior back to the settlements. He concluded that there were two problems:
first, the lack of cooperation and the disregard for the
national interest of the Koreans who helped foreigners to
make their purchases of property; and, second, the lack of
government funds to buy back the lands and houses that for eigners had already purchased made it impossible for him to
satisfy completely either the club or his own inclinations o n with regard to the matter of foreign violations. The minister’s answer was reasonably well received
among the club members, for they knew that little could be done about faits accomplis. Furthermore, among the
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 264-. ^Ibid., p. 265.
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Independence Club leadership there was a softening of atti
tude toward the foreign exploitation of Korea. The club recognized that the alliance of foreigners and conservative
officials in the government was too formidable a power com
bination for the club to defeat, as had been demonstrated
when that union had succeeded in having Jaisohn exiled.
They decided to concentrate on bringing about the reform of the government structure, because they comprehended that
foreign exploitation was connected with the weak points in the Korean government and that their strength would be more
effective if concentrated on remedying the fundamental weak
nesses of the system.
THE GRANTING OE CONCESSIONS TO FOREIGNERS
The Independence Club had always been strongly
opposed to the granting of concessions for mines, railways,
and forests to foreigners although it had been commonly done
before the club came into existence. As early as January20, 1898, a few months after the beginning of the club's
anti-Russian activities, the government issued a decree to
the effect that no more concessions for mines and railways 88 would be granted to foreigners. French Minister Colin de Plancy, however, requested
®®Allen, op. cit., p. 205.*
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from Korea's Foreign Minister Cho Pyung-jik a concession for 89 a coal mine in Pyungyang and for two lesser ones elsewhere.
The French minister reminded Cho that when the former minis
ter, Yi Wan-yong, had granted France the railway concession between Seoul and Eichu in July, 1896, the Korean government
had promised France three additional concessions. The
Frenchman claimed that it was impossible to cancel the pledge. But de Plancy had brought up the matter at the
wrong time, as the foreign minister was in a difficult
position due to the strong opposition of the Independence
Club to the sale of much of the newly opened foreign settle
ments to Russia. The Independence Club brought pressure
against the foreign minister to refuse the Russian purchase,
and also stipulated that the French demand should not be 90 accepted either. Consequently, the two requests were
refused at the same time. On August 24, 1898, the ex-premier of Japan,
Ito Hirobumi, arrived in Seoul to negotiate a concession for
the Seoul-Pusan railway following the Nishi-Rosen Protocol
of April in which Russia had recognized Japanese interests
in Korea. Since they must have been aware of the purpose of
^ The Independent, May 19, 1898. ^T h e Germans were luckier, and obtained a mining concession on July 18, 1898— an event which escaped the notice of the club. Allen, op. cit., p. 228.
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his trip, it is strange that several of the club members,
including the president, Tun Chee-ho, welcomed Ito, and that
they presented him, moreover, with a silver cup painted with 91 a picture of the Independence Arch as a farewell present, after he had been successful in obtaining the concession.
In fact, The Independent carried a partial text of Ito's
speech on education and public opinion and commented favor- 92 ably on it. During the weekly meeting of September 4, the club
discussed the recent grant of the railway concession to
Japan. The meeting exhibited a serious split between the
anti-Japanese group, led by Yi Seung-man and Chong Kyo, and
another group which did not want to take action, led by the
former secretary of the club, Namkung Ok. Despite the opposition of leading members, the club, by a majority vote,
adopted Chong Kyo's motion to select a fact-finding commit
tee to investigate all the concessions Korea had granted for
mines, railways, and forests. Chong Kyo and four others
were elected to the committee, which went to the Foreign
Ministry the next day and brought back detailed information
on the granting of concessions to foreigners since the
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 224. ^ T h e Independent, August 30, 1898.
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beginning of 1896.*^
The committee summoned an emergency meeting, which,
because of rain, was attended by only about one hundred mem
bers. Yun Chee-ho, who was presiding at the meeting, dis
missed the meeting as there were less than one-third of the
members present, although the quorum rule had never before 94 been invoked.J When many of those present spoke out at Yun
expressing their dissatisfaction at the ruling, Yun and several members walked out, leaving shouting members
behind.^ The Independent, which had been faithfully reporting
the club meetings, did not mention either this particular
incident or anything about the Japanese concession for the
Seoul-Pusan railway. Since there are no records on the
reasons for Yun's and his followers' behavior, it is neces
sary to speculate on the motive behind their action. The available material on Yun's background and personality show
that he was a person of weaker will than Jaisohn and with a less liberal inclination. He certainly should have exer
cized more leadership in the club, but he was too cautious.
Chong Kyo criticized Yun Chee-ho for not taking action
against Japan but explained his actions by saying,
93,'Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 229-230.
95Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Since Yun was a Christian, he was afraid of cutting off good relations with the Europeans and the Japanese that he liked, and Namkung Ok sided with Yun because he did not wish to break good relations with many of his close friends in government.96
96Ibid.
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THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE OFFICIALS
AND THEIR EFFECTS
CHO PYUNG-SIK
Cho Pyung-sik, one of the emperor's favorites,
was the target of almost continuous criticism by the
Independence Club and The Independent.'1' It was he who as
foreign minister had signed the controversial Russo-Korean agreement which would have put the Korean Finance Ministry 2 completely under the control of the Russian government.
As a result of the vigorous campaign waged by the Indepen
dence Club against it, the agreement was canceled, and
Cho Pyung-sik stepped down as a minor official.
On July 14, 1898, however, Cho was appointed Cham Chung ),^ the powerful second-ranking position in
■^For details of The Independent1 s criticism of his appointment as justice minister, see Chapter 2, pp. 62-63.
^See Chapter 4, pp. 127-128. ^Kwan Bo [Government Gazette] (Seoul: Korean Govern ment Publication), July 15? 1898. According to the Ordi nance for Government Organizations daljed September 24, 1896, the system using a Council of State ) was rein troduced, and the old "cabinet systenr was abolished. The
159
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the Council of State. Because he was, understandably, a
bitter enemy of the club, he did all he could to destroy it.
He tried to connect the crimes against the state which had been committed by the club's former president, Ahn Kyung-su,
with all club activities, and he memorialized the king to
downgrade many of the club members. It was reported that,
after the Russians withdrew, Cho felt so insecure that he
asked the French Legation for protection, if it became nec-
essary for him to flee.
Two days after he was named Cham Chung, the club met
to discuss Cho's appointment. It selected a three-man committee to write a letter to Cho asking him to resign from
the new position for the sake of the country. An editorial
in The Independent said that "the paper did not have the
intention of exposing all of his misdeeds during his
official life," but threatened that it might do so if he did
new Council of State was composed of a Eui Chung or "premier," and the Cham Chung ranked second as head of the most powerful department, the Home Ministry. Ranking below them in the Council were eleven other members— Chan Chung jfct ), six of whom were ministers (of the Foreign, Finance, Justice, Education, War, and Agriculture-Trade Ministries). Finally, there was the Cham Chan ( ^ ). The Council had a total of fourteen members and was t M highest organ of the state below the sovereign. Yi Sun-keun, Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun [Modem Korean his tory] (Seoul: Eulyu Munwhasa, 1966), p. 852. ^Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Hyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo C&ong Sa, 1959)? P- 208.
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not resign.^
Cho replied promptly to the committee's letter, say
ing that he was not going to deny or explain all the charges
it had laid against him. Further, since the appointment and dismissal of an official was entirely the emperor's prerog
ative, he would not accept the club's demand. The next day
he sent the club another letter, but this time he seemed
less firm in his determination to continue in the position.
In this letter he wrote that it was hardly fair for the club
to demand his resignation when he had spent only two days in
the position. The letter went on to ask the club to do him
the courtesy of delaying their demands until a more appro
priate time.k The club came to the conclusion that the only way to
force Cho to resign was to harass him until he did so. The
members decided to follow Cho wherever he went. The club selected a group of thirty men who went to Cho's home while he was out and left notes requesting him to meet them as
soon as possible and who then waited overnight for him at
the club's office. Early in the morning Cho sent an answer
asking them to meet him at his home at 4 P.M. that day. Cho was not at his home at 4 P.M. but left a letter there
.^The Independent, July 19, 1898. (All references to The Independent alone refer to the Korean edition.)
6Ibid., July 21, 1898.
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explaining that, since he was occupied with official "busi
ness, he hoped that all communications between him and the 7 club could be carried on by correspondence. Furious at Cho's trick, the club members returned to their office to
plan a new strategy. The Independent carried a story
calling Cho a liar, and added that the club would not allow O itself to be deceived by him again. Frightened by the
club's determination to make him resign, Cho decided that he
would have to take refuge in the palace. The emperor found himself in the midst of the
struggle; on one side, the club was demanding Cho's resig
nation, and, on the other, conservative officials were
denouncing the club and its intentions. In order to have
the club's intentions clarified, he summoned the acting
president of the club, Yun Chee-ho, to the palace. Yun told the emperor that there had been no change in the purpose of
the club since it had been established with the emperor's
support two years before. Yun continued, "It would be very
helpful to Your Majesty to know the feelings of the general populace, who are represented by the club, on government affairs."^ Yun reminded him also that the club's favorite slogan was "Loyalty to the Emperor and for Patriotism," and
^The Independent, July 22, 1898. ®Ibid.
^Ibid. It should be noted here that the club often claimed that it represented the general populace.
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requested His Majesty's benevolent regard for tbe club,
comparing such, an attitude to that of a parent1 s love for
even a continually crying baby.10
Satisfied with Yun Chee-ho's explanation of the pur
pose of the club, the emperor encouraged the club to give
him continuous advice for the betterment of the country.
Hearing that Cho Pyung-sik had taken refuge in the palace,
the emperor was reported to have told Cho that "Since the
club is so opposed to your hiding out in the palace, you had better leave,"11 but the emperor still did not ask that he
resign his position.
Cho Pyung-sik believed that he no longer had the
support of the emperor, however, and so he submitted his 12 resignation one week after his appointment, on July 21.
This was another major victory for the Independence Club.
The Independent printed an editorial expressing its grati tude for the benevolent judgment of the emperor. The paper also warned members of the club that they would have to
continue their patriotic activities without being over
confident, quoting Tokugawa Iyeyasu of Japan to underscore
the advice that the club should "move towards its goals
neither too hastily nor too lazily as if it were on a long
1GIbid. i:LIbid.
12KwanBo, op. cit., July 22, 1898.
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journey."1^
II XONG-IK
Another target of Independence Club criticism was
li Yong-ik, chief of the Chun Whan Kuk ("Bureau of Engrav
ing") in the Finance Ministry. The position of bureau chief
was a powerful one: he not only controlled the circulation of currency, but he also supervised the granting of con
cessions for mines and railways. Yi was pro-Russian, very
conservative, and had already acquired a bad reputation
during his previous terms of official duty, which included a
term as governor of Pyung Ahn Buk Province, a post he had
acquired after Akwan Pachun. The Korean currency system was in a state of chaos. At the time that Japan arrived in Korea in 1876, there were 14 nearly 3 >000 kinds of currency in use in Korea. Some were
local coins, and some were of federal government issue, but, "distrusting the currency, the people preferred the direct 15 exchange of goods except for making tax payments." ^ At the time of the Japanese-backed reform movement of 1894, Kap 0 Kyung Chang ( , an ordinance was
■^Quoted in The Independent, July 25, 1898.
^Cho Ki-jun, Han Kuk Kyung Jae Sa (Seoul: II Shin Sa, 1962), p. 547. 15Ibid.
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issued regulating the minting of new coins. It adopted the
Japanese silver standard but also allowed the circulation of 16 several grades of copper coin. Since it was unable to
acquire enough silver for its needs, however, the government
found it convenient to issue only copper coins, the intrin
sic value of which was only two thirds that of the face 17 value, the government pocketing the difference. ' In 1896 the government1 s income from various tax
revenues was 4,809,4-10 won, which accounted for 50.8 percent of the total bvitfget. The government's profit from using
debased coins was an additional 1,282,450 won, accounting
for 26.6 percent of the total expenditures. The rest of the
federal income came from the sale of offices and other
miscellaneous revenues. The budget of 1898, however, had a
deficit of 1,507,421 won, which had to be covered by foreign 18 loans, mainly from Japan. Worst of all for the Korean economy, foreign traders would sell their goods for silver
only, although they purchased Korean labor and goods with 19 copper coin, thus draining Korea of silver.
Philip Jaisohn and The Independent had long been
■^Yi Pyung-do, Han Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1969), p. 499. ■^Yi Buk-man, Yi Cho Sahoe Kyung.jae Sa Yunku (Seoul: Tai Sung Chulpan"Sa, 1948.), p. 19^. 18Ibid., p. 212 ^Cho Ki-jun, op. cit., p. 348.
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very critical of the financial situation and had suggested
that it he corrected by allowing the Finance Ministry to
plan the budget without interference from other government branches. 20 The Independence Club tackled the problem
during its weekly discussion period of October 24, 1897 > in
a debate on the question, "Is a sound currency essential for
commercial prosperity and the strengthening of indepen- 21 dence?" Though the club did not have much hope that their
lobbying would remedy the situation, they decided to try.
The club met on June 17, 1898, to search for a
remedy for the financial crisis, and a committee was
selected which was to find out from the finance minister 22 what his policies were. The committee wrote to the finance minister, Sim Sang-hun, and asked for an explanation
"for issuing the copper coins only when the regulation
required a mixture of silver and copper coins." The letter
informed the minister that his financial policies were very harmful to the people and the country. The minister replied
?o Philip Jaisohn, "Korean Finance," The Korean Repository, III (1896; reprint ed., New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), 166-168; The Independent, May 20, 1896; ibid., March JO, 1897; ibid., June 16,”T898; ibid., July 11, 1898. Though the Chun Whan Kuk was theoretically under the Finance Ministry, it had been the custom for the bureau to supply the needs of the Imperial Household without securing the approval of the minister for such expenditures.
^The Independent, October 30, 1897- ?? Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 199•
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the next day, admitting that copper coins had recently been
minted but adding that these new coins were being kept in storage until the silver coins were minted so that the two
27) could circulate together. On the following day, June 19, the committee brought
some of the newly minted copper coins to the minister so he
could see that they were in circulation and that what he had
said was untrue. The minister finally admitted that he had
given false testimony, and that grave circumstances had made
it necessary for the department to circulate recently oh 40,000 won worth of copper coins.
The Independence Club understood the minister's
difficult position, as the arch-conservative Yi Yong-ik,
who was chief of the Bureau of Engraving, had become the emperor's favorite when Yi had acted as a messenger between
the emperor and Queen Min during the difficult days of the
1882 military mutiny, Im 0 Run Ran ( Not consid
ering the economic effects, Yi Yong-ik was thinking only of
pleasing the emperor by issuing more of the depreciated coin. Thus, the club's criticism of the financial policies
of the government was really aimed at Yi. Originally the club had campaigned against the unregulated issue of depreciated coins, but after investi—
25Ibid. 24Ibid.
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gat ion the club took the position tbat not only should
Yi Yong-ik be dismissed, but also he should be tried for his
crimes and be punished. On July 29, the club called a
meeting to discuss the matter and, as always, elected a committee to take appropriate action. The next day the com mittee met with Acting Premier Suh Chung-soon, Imperial
Household Minister Yi Chae-soon, newly appointed Finance
Minister Min Yong-ki, and Agriculture-Trade Minister
Yi To-jae. The delegation informed these ministers of the
club's conviction that Yi Yong-ik's activities had been only
for his own interest and that his corruption had harmed the
people and the country during his long official life as a magistrate, as a supervisor for the railways, in the bureau
of mines administration, as governor of Pyung Atm Buk Prov- 25 ince, and, last, as chief of the Bureau of Engraving. The committee demanded that they not only have Yi Yong-ik dismissed from his post as bureau chief, but also that he
be punished according to the law. Acting Premier Suh promised the committee that he
would take appropriate action after memorializing the
emperor about these facts. In the meantime, Yi Yong-ik, confronted by the grave charges, tried to persuade a friend,
who was also a friend of club member Choi Chung-sik, to use
25Ibid., pp. 219-220.
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his influence to pressure the club to soften the attack on
M m . He also mobilized his friends to memorialize on M s behalf but in vain. The government first relieved M m of
M s duties as supervisor of railway concessions and, four
days later, on August 9, dismissed M m from the post of 26 cMef of the Bureau of Engraving. Not satisfied with having caused Yi to be dismissed,
the club brought a suit against M m which went as far as the
Supreme Court. However, because the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, S M n Ki-sun, was another arch-conservative who had often been criticized by the club and The Indepen
dent ,2^ he helped Yi Yong-ik, and because the club was later
occupied with other activities, the suit lapsed. It should be noted here that, according to
Chong Kyo, the Bureau of Engraving stopped issuing depre
ciated coins after the club's campaign against Yi Yong-ik.
After the abolition of the club at the end of 1898, however, the bureau again issued a great number of copper coins, thus 28 leading the national economy close to collapse.
2^Kwah Bo, op. cit., August 5> 1898, and August 9, 1898. 2'7See the criticism of S M n Ki-sun in The Indepen dent in Chapter 2, p. 61. pQ Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 200.
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SEVEN OTHER MINISTERS
One of the frequent targets of the club was
Kim Hong-yuk, wbo bad begun bis notorious career as tbe
Russian Legation's interpreter after Akwan Pacbun [tbe
king's flight to tbe Russian Legation]„ He did all be could to belp tbe Russians in Korea. When Koreans, led by tbe
Independence Club, campaigned against Russian domination,
Kim Hong-yuk was not only severely criticized by pronounce
ments of tbe club but was even physically attacked by ruf
fians in Eebruary, 1898. While tbe emperor was in tbe Russian Legation, Kim was tbe real power behind tbe throne.
But after tbe mass rally on March 10, which marked tbe end 29 of Russian hopes in Korea, Kim was transferred to tbe much
less influential post of mayor of Seoul. Tbe post bad been
vacant because a charter member of tbe club, Yi Chae-yun,
was dismissed, presumably because of tbe rally in Seoul. After tbe withdrawal of tbe Russians from Seoul in April, Kim lost bis base of power and bis reputation sank
rapidly. In September be was arrested on an unknown
charge.^
^ F o r a description of tbe mass rally of March 10, 1898, and for subsequent appointments, see Chapter 4, PP* 134-135. ^The reason for tbe punishment was that tbe emperor was not happy that Kim Hong-yuk bad abused bis power wben tbe Russians were in control of Korean affairs. Tbe new
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Frustrated by his fate, Kim Hong-yuk plotted with
the supervisor of the kitchens of the Imperial Household to
put poison into the coffee to be served to the emperor and the crown prince. On the night of September 11, 1898, when
the emperor was with the crown prince, the minister for the
Imperial Household, Yi Chae-soon, War Minister Sim Sang-hun,
Finance Minister Min Yong-ki— who was also police chief, the
poisoned coffee was served. Although the emperor took only one sip because he thought it smelled peculiar, the crown
prince— who liked coffee very much— drank it all, immedi- •51 ately vomited, and, then, became unconscious.
The emperor was reported to have embraced the
unconscious prince and to have shouted for help. Many of
the servants rushed into the room, and they competed among
themselves for a chance to drink the coffee as an expression
of their loyalty: as a result, some ten people either lost
consciousness or were vomiting.^
Russian minister, Matunine, brought more moderate policies on the part of Russia toward Korea, and he was reluctant to associate with Kim Hong-yuk, and afraid of the Independence Club and a possible repetition of the demonstrations against his predecessor, De Speyer. Therefore, when Kim was publicly in disgrace, the government was able to prosecute him for his pro-Russian activities in the past. Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 232-233. ^Ibid., p. 233; and- The Independent, September 13, 1898. ^Chong Kyo, loc. cit.
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The police chief, who was at the scene, arrested
Kim Chong-wha, the cook who had brought in the coffee. Kim
later confessed to the authorities that he had been
instructed to do the poisoning by Kim Hong-yuk and his
protege, Kong Hong-sik. Subsequently, the latter were both executed.
Although no one died as a result of the poisoning,
the club sponsored a mass rally in central Seoul on
September 13, demanding "loyalty to the Emperor" from all citizens and insisting that the government give a full explanation of the incident. The rally was not held to cen
sure any particular person, as the club was still unaware of
the details of the incident. The chief of police sent a
minor policeman to assure those in the crowd that they would
have an explanation of the incident as soon as possible, and
to request that the rally disband for reasons of national security.^ Responding to the request, the crowd quietly
dispersed. The reaction of conservative members of the Privy Council ( 'y>br was to restore the long-repealed laws of Yun Chwa and No Yuk which permitted
those convicted of seditious crimes to be punished by
^The Independent, September 14-, 1898.
^ F o r the function and composition of the Privy Council, see Chapter 6 , p. 184, fn. 1.
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cutting to pieces the person convicted, along with his rela
tives and friends. On September 23, the Privy Council was
summoned for the first time since the Sino-Japanese War, and
it agreed to the reinstatement of the laws "by a vote of 35 thirty-three to one, pending the approval of the emperor. ^
The single dissenting vote was cast by Yun Chee-ho.
The Independence Club seized upon these events— the
Privy Council action to restore the uncivilized old laws and
the loopholes in the government's legal procedures— and made
them the subjects of scrutiny at the September 25, 1898,
weekly meeting. Those present sharply criticized the mem
bers of the Privy Council for voting for the restoration of
the barbarous laws. Another matter which had come to the club's attention in connection with the attempt upon the king's
life was that the two suspects had been treated in an irreg
ular manner while in prison awaiting trial. Kong Hong-sik was reported to be suffering from sword wounds inflicted in
prison, and, furthermore, Kim Hong-yuk was discovered to
have been concealing a pistol on his person while he was in prison. Consequently, the club also expressed its displea
sure with the administration of the laws by Minister of
^The Independent, September 26, 1898.
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36 Justice Shin Ki-sun.
Again the club elected two committees to deal with
the problem. The first of these was charged with investi
gating the entire proceedings of the case, first at the
Police Department and later at the Supreme Court. The pur pose of this committee was not only to put pressure on the
government to conduct a fair trial, but also to determine
the truth or falsity of club members' suspicions about 37 whether other high officials were involved. The committee
was to remain at the Police Department and at the court
house during the entire court proceedings. The club agreed
to pay for the expenses of the committee members while they 38 monitored the trial. The second committee was to meet with the members of the Privy Council who had voted for the re-enaction of the sedition laws and to urge them to resign
from the council. Police Chief Min Yong-ki on September 26 refused the
first committee's request, because "it had been customary
procedure not to allow anybody but the interrogation officer 39 and a clerk to the interrogation session." The request of
^ H e also held the posts of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and president of the Privy Council. Thus, the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the government were intertwined. ^The Independent, September 27» 1898. ^®Ibid.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 241-242.
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the second committee for the resignations of almost all of
the members of the Privy Council received a reply from Presi
dent of the Privy Council Shin Ki-sun criticizing the
"civilian organization which illegally discusses the official
functions of the Privy Council."^ He also justified the
Privy Council reactivation of those laws as the best method
to prevent future such crimes. Paced with the strong opposition of the government,
the club decided to take legal, action against the minister
of justice himself, Shin Ki-sun, and his deputy minister, Yi In-yu, as being responsible for the sword wound received by Kong Hong-sik in prison.^ The club committee who pre
pared this legal action was composed of Chong Kyo,
Namkung Ok, and Kim Tu-hyun, who then officially submitted
the case to the Supreme Court. However, Supreme Court Justice Ham Tai-yong refused the case, invoking a regulation
that the "Justice Minister should agree with any cases against the officials of Chik Im Kwan ( <4^ ^ In
^ T h e Independent, September 28, 1898. ^Earlier the club had suspected that the wound had been caused by Kong himself in a suicide attempt, but later the suspicion grew that another official had tried to murder him to prevent his giving damaging testimony.
^ h e bureaucracy at the time had three broad grades, each with several subclassifications. Chik Im Kwan ( ) was the highest classification, to which belonged the premier and the ministers and many of the deputy ministers. Next was the Chu Im Kwan , which was divided into
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other words, according to the regulation it was necessary to
have the permission of the justice minister to bring a case
against him. Such agreement being impossible, the club
tried another means of solving the problem.
On October the committee went to the premier and
the deputy premier, who were the justice minister's superi ors, and urged them to take action against the minister and the deputy minister of the Justice Ministry. Premier Sim
and Deputy Premier Yoon Yong-sun together sent a letter to
the club, dated October 4, which agreed with the club's
charge of negligence on the part of the Justice Ministry,
but carefully avoided the matter of asking for resignations.
Angered by their letter, the club decided to take the case
to the emperor. Club members gathered in front of the palace .gate,
declaring that they would stay there until the emperor
received their memorial favorably. This memorial, dated October 6 , had been expanded to include charges against seven ministers, and requested that the emperor dismiss them. The seven ministers were Premier Sim Sun-taek, Deputy
Premier Yoon Yong-sun, Imperial Household Minister
Yi Chae-soon, War Minister Sim Sang-hun, Finance Minister
six subgrades. And, yet further down, was the Pan Im Kwan ( *M| )> which had eight subgrades. For the Imperial Decree on Classification and for pay scales, see Kwan Bo, op. cit., March 29, 1895•
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and Police Chief Min Yong-ki, President of the Privy Council
Shin Ki-sun— who was also Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
and justice minister, and Supreme Court Justice and Deputy 42 Justice Minister Yi In-yu. ^ The justice minister and his deputy minister were
the original targets of the club, to whom were added the
premier and the deputy premier for*being unable or unwilling
to force their subordinates to resign from their posts. The
club's memorial also included the three powerful ministers
who were with the emperor and the crown prince at the time
of the attempted poisoning. It had been reported that those
three ministers remained seated when the emperor shouted for
help, and that they just watched while the palace staff
drank some of the remaining coffee with the intent of pro
ducing evidence of a poisoning attempt. The club memorial
criticized those ministers as being less loyal to their
sovereign than even the servants, and concluded that the ministers should be dismissed by the emperor and by the
i\i\ country. The club' s memorial also included the members of the Privy Council who had agreed to restore the barbarous anti-sedition laws. The memorial criticized the council
members for having put the emperor in such a difficult
^ T h e Independent, October 8 , 1898. ^Ibid.
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position with regard to other civilized nations by restoring
such inhuman and uncivilized laws, and it urged the emperor
to select government officials who could sincerely help the 45 emperor and the country. x
Meanwhile, the premier, reacting to the club's strategy, memorialized the emperor suggesting the dismissal of Shin Ki-sun. Faced with the flood of memorials, some
criticizing and some protecting Shin, the emperor tried to
settle the dispute by ordering the stoppage of ten days of }\CL Shin's salary, and warned the anti-Shin group not to be
too suspicious of government officials. The emperor also
protected the Privy Council members by saying that citizens
ought to respect the processes and functions of the Privy 47 Council. ' In response, club members gathered outside the
palace and would not obey the emperor's order to disperse.
They sent a second and a third memorial attesting the greater importance of twenty million citizens as compared
with seven ministers. The memorials made it clear that they would continue to wait at the gate until the emperor gave a
favorable answer, and that they would remain there one hun dred days and nights if the ministers stayed in their
^Ibid. ^ K w a n Bo, op. cit., October 7? 1898.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 248.
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positions that long. Many social organizations and school students, led
hy the Pai Chai School students, joined in the rally and waited in an orderly way for the “benevolent decision1' of
the emperor. The conservatives spread the rumor that all at the rally would be arrested, but the demonstration grew each
day despite the emperor's displeasure.
On October 11, the fifth day of the demonstration,
the emperor decided to give in to the mass protest. He ordered the dismissals of the justice minister and the
deputy minister, not because of the alleged negligence in
their duties, but for having allowed the body of
Kim Hong-yuk, who had been executed the day before, to be
dragged around the main part of Seoul by emotion-filled ZlQ citizens. J The other five ministers were also dismissed
for various reasons. But the emperor also expressed his
displeasure with the club for demonstrating in front of his palace, saying that memorialists should retire after sub
mitting their cases. In the same imperial pronouncement the emperor characterized the behavior of Yun Chee-ho, the pres
ident of the club, as “disobedient" and asked the Home 50 Ministry to take appropriate action against him.
48Ibid., p. 253- ^ K w a n Bo, op. cit., October 11, 1898.
^Ibid., October 12, 1898.
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Although the emperor did not replace the members of
the Privy Council, the club was satisfied with the victory
over the seven ministers. The victory also gave the club
members more confidence in taking action against government
conservatism and gave weight to their further hope to make the Privy Council become an institution which would help in
the reform of Korea.
THE EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENCE CLUB ACTIVITIES
Conservative elements in the Korean court, especially
those persons who had been criticized by the club or who had been dismissed from their jobs because of Independence Club
action, worked unceasingly for the abolition of the club.
Earlier, the club's campaign against foreign domination of
Korea had affected only a few officials, such as the finance minister and the foreign minister. During this period, since
the consensus of popular opinion was overwhelmingly with the
club and since it had the tacit support of the emperor in working for independence, there was no serious attack on the
club itself. During the latter part of 1898, however, when the club expanded its activities to bring about internal reform
and in the process disturbed many conservative officials,
opposition to it grew. Learning of the potentially great
strength of an organized group from the Independence Club,
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the conservatives tried to organize a group which would
counter the club as early as March, 1898. Two days after
the successful mass rally on March 10, 1898, which marked
Korean victory over Russian domination, the pro-Russian Kim Hong-yuk sponsored another rally which turned out to be a great fiasco-^ because of the nationalistic sentiment of
the populace. A second effort was made when C.R. Greathouse and
Yi Yong-ik, afraid of losing the privileges they enjoyed
under the old system, tried to organize a group which could
be used to fight against the club, while pretending to be 52 recruiting a corps of foreign palace guards. This scheme
failed when the club succeeded in directing the anti-foreign 55 sentiment of the people against the foreign mercenaries. A third effort to destroy the club was made after it
had successfully called for the dismissal of Cho Pyung-sik from the position of Cham Chung.^ Cho and a close friend,
Yi Chong-nae, organized a group called Hwangkuk Chungang
Chong Sanghoe ( or "Central Commercial Association," with Cho as president and Yi as vice-president.
-^See Chapter 4, pp. 134-135.
-^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 236.
-^See Chapter 4, pp. 145-148.
^"See Chapter 5j pp. 159-163.
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Although the association was ostensibly a group of people
who were engaged in commerce, Cho planned to use it as a
base for attacking the Independence Club. The other members of the association, however, were genuinely interested in
promoting their business interests and, dissatisfied with
the government's commercial and financial policies, joined
in the movement sponsored by the Independence Club to have
Yi Yong-ik, chief of the Bureau of Engraving, dismissed.
When its president, Cho Pyung-sik, was eventually arrested,
partly because he had tried to manipulate the association to
bring unreasonable pressure on the minister of agriculture
and trade and had tried to start a general strike by closing the shops of members,^ the association lost its chief
force. Not all attempts to impair the effectiveness of the
Independence Club, however, were failures. The Whang Kuk
Hyup Hoe ( It iii ) or "Imperial Association" was orga nized for the purpose of checking the influence of the club,
and it played a large part in the eventual abolition of the Independence Club. The emperor's favorite, Yi Ki-tong, chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the Justice Ministry, was president, and Koh Yong-keun, a first-grade member of
the Privy Council, was vice-president of the new
^Kwan Bo, op. cit., September 30, 1898.
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organization.-^ The Imperial Association was successful for
two reasons: first, it had the emperor's strong support, as
he was becoming irritated by the widening support given to
the Independence Club; and, second, all the ministers and
officials who had been criticized by the club, which was a large number by the end of 1898, were united in working for its abolition. This alliance of the emperor, ministers, and
officials all supported the Imperial Association at the most
critical phase of the Independence Club's reform movement,
as will be seen in the next chapter.
^ Chun Kwan-woo, "Yuksipnyun June Tyelbun Haetdun Kukhoe" [There might have been a Congress sixty years ago], Sin Tae Yang, VII:V (May, 1958), 158.
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THE CLIMAX OF INDEPENDENCE CLUB ACTIVITIES
FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
After six days and nights the rally in front of the
palace gate dispersed when the crowd was informed of the
dismissal of the seven ministers. The members of the club,
however, then went on to their offices to discuss how to
achieve their other demand, namely, a restructuring of the Privy Council.1 Since the members of the club deeply
believed that there should be reform of the Privy Council,
^ h e Privy Council (Jung Chu Won, or was established in Korea during the reign of Sung Jong of the Koryo dynasty, who copied much of the Tang dynasty government system. A considerable amount of power was given to this council during the earlier period when it acted as a deliberative advisory body. During the reign of the fifth king of the Yi dynasty, Mun Jong )* it became a some what weak organization of indolent bureaucrats waiting for appointments. Yi Pyung-do, Han Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1969), pp. 168, 326. During the Kap 0 Kyung Chang (1894- reform] the gov ernment established Kunkuk Kimu Chuh to study more of the reform ordinances, and abolished rhe Privy Council. This organization was independent and directly responsible to the king. A few-months later, the Privy Council was restored as an advisory chamber. Many of the members concurrently held high government posts. Chun Kwan-woo, "Yuksipnyun june Tyelbun Haetdun Kukhoe" [There might have been a Congress sixty years ago], Sin Tae Yang, VII:V (May, 1958), 159-
184-
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their original demand that the Privy Council should have
new members who were more loyal and patriotic was augmented
to a demand for a new council with new functions as well as new members.
The club selected a five-man committee to negotiate
with representatives of the government, and on October 15
they met with government officials, including the acting
premier, and submitted their propositions in writing "to p avoid possible future complications." The committee sub
mitted proposals in the form of two articles. The first was
"The government should not impose any taxes except for the
items defined by law." The second article read as follows:
Article II The government shall reorganize the Privy Council so it can discuss national problems; the members shall be selected partly by the government and partly by the Independence Club and all must be fair and honest. tl) Half of the members of the Privy Council shall be selected by the government and the other half shall be chosen by vote from among the members of the Inde pendence Club. (2) The president of the council shall be a govern ment appointee and the vice-president shall be elected by the club. (3) The rules of procedure of the council shall be drafted by the council after studying foreign examples. This draft shall become effective after government approval. The club committee received a generally favorable
reaction to the proposal and they left the palace, where the
^The Independent, October 17» 1898. All references to The Independent alone refer to the Korean edition.
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meeting had taken place, with a pledge from the government
that they would have an official answer within a week.
During the next week, while the club was waiting for
a favorable response to their proposal, several unexpected blows befell the Independence Club. First, the emperor
issued a decree on October 20, which read:
It is reported that in foreign countries there are civilian-sponsored associations which only exchange the peoples' opinions while there is also the government- established Kuk Hoe [Congress] ( @ ^ ) which dis cusses the interests of the people and votes on such matters. In our country we also have a civilian association, which, though I do not deny it has been-of some help for our progress, should not criticize gov ernment ordinances or government appointments. The act of holding a mass rally in front of the palace gate, and the frequent submission of memorials or the threat ening of high officials should be beyond the rights of even the Congress, not to mention of civilian associ ations . Hereafter, the police chief and other local officials should take appropriate action against those associations which move together as a group threatening the security of the country. In the meantime, the gov ernment will allow meetings of associations only at a Won Jong Chuh So 5Ljt PT , or "originally approved location"], and the government hopes those associations will do their best for the advancement of the people's knowledge.3
Second, the government-organized Imperial Associ
ation demanded the resignation of newly appointed Acting
Premier Pak Chung-yang, who was a valuable friend of the club, charging him with taking advice exclusively from the
Independence Club committee as if it were the only group
^Kwan Bo [Government Gazette] (Seoul: Korean Gov ernment Publication), October 21, 1898.
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Zl representing the people.
Third, on October 17, that conservative most dis
liked by the club, the corrupt Cho Pyung-sik, was appointed
Chan Chung ( ^ 36^ ) of the Council of State, only one
rank below the position he had been holding when the club
campaigned against the inappropriateness of his holding 5 public office. Even worse for the club-, the government also appointed as premier Yoon Yong-sun, who had been dis missed from the deputy premiership on October 11, after six
days of continuous demonstrations in front of the palace
gate. Yoon replaced Pak Chung-yang, who had been favorably inclined toward the club’s proposal for the reorganization
of the Privy Council. On October 22, the day of the deadline for the gov
ernment's reply to the club’s proposal, the frustrated club
members met as planned at their downtown office. A large
number of police officers appeared at the office to demand
that the club members disperse, invoking the new ordinance
which allowed civilian groups to meet only at the location
which had been originally approved, which in the case of
the Independence Club was Independence Hall in suburban
^Chun Kwan-woo, op. cit., p. 160.
^See Chapter 5, PP- 159-163- ^Kwan Bo, op. cit., October 21, 1898.
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Seoul. The majority of members favored going to the Police
Department and volunteering themselves for arrest. Conse quently, about fifty members marched down to the Police
Department in an orderly fashion. One of the officers on duty was surprised to have volunteers for arrest, and, in
the spirit of mercy, asked them to leave. Yun Chee-ho
replied, "Oh, but we cannot go away. We are here as 7 law-breakers and the matter must be settled."'
Unable to get rid of the club members, the police
requested advice from the palace as to what ought to be
done. A communication soon arrived from the emperor asking
the club members to leave. The members repeated that as
law-breakers they should be punished, and they became more insistent, showing their extreme frustration with the gov
ernment actions taken against the club in the past few days.
Early the next morning another imperial decree
arrived which said, "Though the club members are waiting for punishment, they are innocent. In this case, the home min
ister, the police chief, and the mayor of Seoul are respon
sible for delaying the communication of the imperial decree Q of two days ago" — which had prohibited the meeting of
civilian organizations except at their "originally approved
^James S. Gale, The Vanguard: A Tale of Korea (New York: Fleming H. Revell CoT, 1904), p. 229.
®Kwan_Bo, op. cit., October 23, 1898.
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location." The new decree warned those three officials of
their negligence and again urged the club members to dis
perse. The members politely refused and stayed overnight.
The next day, the club memorialized the emperor of
their sincere loyalty to the country and the emperor, in
these words: . . . [0 ]ur patriotic feeling for the country is so strong that if one member were punished and killed, ten members will follow him, and if ten were punished, a hundred or a thousand would follow him to the death. . . We only hope to serve Tour Majesty's prosperity to make Tour Majesty's position equal to that of other heads of state in the six continents. . . . We will be, even after our deaths in this world, loyal to your ancestors in heaven, forever. . . . As Tour Majesty's subjects, it is our right to criticize those officials if they are disrespectful to the country. Some say if the rights of the subjects were expanded it would mean robbing Tour Majesty of your rights. One cannot find more ignorance than that because without participation and the support of the populace, government and laws would collapse. . . . We sincerely hope Tour Majesty's honorable decision would help settle the problem in our country.9
On the same day the emperor responded with praise
for the club's memorial, saying, "Since I have made a plan
to open communication with the people, and for the progress
of the country, I want you to wait for the plan."^ The emperor went on to criticize some of the members of the club
for having disobeyed the imperial orders. It is very difficult to understand what exactly the
^The Independent, October 25, 1898. ^Ibid.
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emperor1 s plan was. However, the government that same day
announced the appointments of Pak Chung-yang as deputy pre
mier, Han Kyu-sul as chairman of the Privy Council, and Yun Chee-ho as the vice-chairman.11 Then Yun was summoned
by the government to take part in negotiations for the reorganization of the Privy Council.
The club members waiting to be punished at the Police Department discussed the government's reaction. The
main purpose of the demonstration was to block possible
future arrests of members by authorities invoking the
October 20 ordinance. The demonstrators wanted the emperor,
therefore, to announce that it would be legal for subjects
to discuss national problems anywhere; they did not desire a
pardon for this one instance. A motion by Yi Seung-man that they continue their demonstration until the government 12 granted the point was passed. Thus, the club was standing
up to two important issues. One was the reorganization of
the Privy Council, in the negotiations for which the club
11Kwan Bo, op. cit., October 24, 1898. Pak Chung-yang had resigned as acting premier only a few days before after being criticized by the Imperial Association for having taken advice in a conference with the club com mittee as if the club were the only civilian group repre senting the people. Pak and Han Kyu-sul were the highest government officials supporting the club's cause.
^Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959), P* 272.
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was represented by Yun,Chee-ho; and the other was the
repeal of the October 20 ordinance.
The club members again memorialized the throne on
October 25, contending that a country was healthy when the
people could both express their opinions to and cooperate 15 with the government. ^ The emperor responded sympatheti
cally, though in rather ambiguous terms. He recognized the
difficulties of a nation if there were divisions between the citizens and the government, and he also recognized, again, 14- the merits of the Independence Club's activities. The
demonstrators cheered the emperor's response, interpreting it to mean that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech
were now allowed. They then dispersed after four days of
demonstrating. Meanwhile, after reviewing the club's proposal for
the reorganization of the Privy Council, the government hoped to achieve two things in its negotiations with the
club's representative, Yun Chee-ho. Pirst, the government
negotiator proposed that, if the government acceded to the demand that one half of the seats on the council be held by non-members of the government, then the Independence Club
would no longer be without a voice in government and would,
therefore, disband. The second point carried to the
~^The Independent, October 27, 1898. ^Tbid.
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negotiations "by the government was that the seats thus
allocated would he held equally by members of the Indepen
dence Club and the Imperial Association. The first point was dismissed by Yun Chee-ho when
he restated the purposes of the club and made the assurance that, if the government acted properly, there would be no
criticism from the club, but only encouragement and help.
Yun firmly maintained that the existence of the club and the reorganization of the Privy Council were two separate 15 matters. ^
It was not so easy for Yun to justify the club's
claim that its members should occupy all the civilian seats on the council. Yun was able to argue only that the past
performances of the two groups, as to their patriotically
inspired activities, proved that they were not comparable.
Then he threatened to boycott the council if the Imperial Association were given equal representation with the Inde
pendence Club. The government negotiators seized upon the threat
of boycott and said that the government would be happy to give all the civilian seats to the Imperial Association.
However, in view of the ordinance which stated that "only
qualified and respected people should be members of the
^Chun Kwan-woo, op. cit., p. 162.
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Privy Council," 1 6 the president of the Imperial Association
admitted that his group would be unable to supply 17 twenty-five qualified members. ' Therefore, after three
days of serious negotiation, the government accepted the
major proposals of the Independence Club for the reorgani zation of the Privy Council.
Subsequently, the government issued on November 2
the seventeen-article "Privy Council Reorganization 18 Decree," which replaced the old decree of March 25, 1895- The important changes in the new decree, compared with the
old, were alterations affecting the numerical composition of council membership, the representation of its members, and
the definition of council functions. The old decree had stated only that "the number of the members should be less than fifty, appointed by the 19 emperor on the recommendation of the premier." The new
decree in Article II stated that the number of members should be fifty. And Article III stated that one half of
^Article III of the old, thirteen-article "Privy Council Organization Decree." Por the full text, see Kwan Bo, op. cit., March 25, 1895- ■^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 276. ^^For the full text, see Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 4, 1898. "^Article II of the old decree.
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tlie members would be appointed by the emperor upon the
recommendation of the Council of State, from among the
officials who had contributed to the country. The other
half "should be elected by civilian organizations and must
have a knowledge of politics and law, and should be over the
age of twenty-seven." Although Article III did not specify the Independence Club as the civilian organization to elect
one half of the seats, an annex to the decree allowed that
"The Independence Club shall temporarily elect and fill the 20 seats allotted to the civilian organization." While the old decree allowed the Council of State to 21 bypass the Privy Council objections, the new decree stated
that "Cl]f the Privy Council and the Council of State dis
agree on certain matters, the Council of State should not
go ahead until it acquires the agreement of the Privy Coun- 22 cil through compromise or conference." Finally, the old decree had limited the council's
role to discussing the decrees and laws and then to giving
an advisory opinion, although it could be asked to consider
other requests by the Council of State. The new decree
expanded the area of discussion: not only was the council
on Article XVI of the new decree. ^Articles VIII and IX of the old decree. PP Article XII of the new decree.
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allowed to initiate, abolish, and amend the laws and
decrees, pending imperial approval, but it was also allowed to discuss matters brought to it by the people. J
The Privy Council under the new decree was far from a modern type of Congress, since the emperor had the right
to veto council decisions, but there were certainly
improvements in the new council, as delineated in the
articles. The new decree would have greatly improved the
functioning of government if the emperor were "benevolent
toward the people" in the manner the club had always urged,
if the Council of State had not been overwhelmed by the
innovations advocated by the club, and if the emperor had been willing to become the symbol of state rather than the
center of policy-making procedures and had approved the
innovations suggested by the Privy Council and the Council
of State. But the emperor was not at all willing to give up
his power to involve himself in all affairs of state and voluntarily to become a figurehead. Furthermore, he was
still at times deeply suspicious of the motives of the
Independence Club and, too, blindly protective of many of his conservative officials. Thus the Privy Council never had an opportunity to work in the manner the Independence
Club had planned.
23 ^Article I of the new decree.
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KWAN MIN KONG DONG HOE ( ) AND THE ADOPTION OP THE SIX ARTICLES
After the demonstration at the Police Department had
dispersed on October 26, many of the members of the Indepen
dence Club went back to the club office to discuss further action. A committee was elected to ask newly appointed premier, Yoon Yong-sun, who as deputy premier had been
forced by club pressure to resign only two weeks previously,
at the time of the campaign for the dismissal of the seven
ministers, to resign from his new position.
Reports of the club's renewed opposition to him made
Yoon submit his resignation the next day; and it was
accepted. 24 At that time, however, it was announced that
the president of the Imperial Association, Yi Ki-tong, had 25 been promoted to deputy minister at the Justice Department. The club also decided to sponsor a "Joint Conference
of Government Officials and the People" on October 28 in the
busiest commercial section of Seoul. The Independence Club
had long thought that close cooperation with government
officials would push the government to accept and carry out
the general reforms suggested by the club. This theory gave
the club its major rationale for criticizing and demanding
^Kwan Bo, op. cit., October 27, 1898.
^Ibid., October 28, 1898. Before his promotion he was chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs in that department.
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the resignations of the conservative officials. The club
issued invitations to all Chik Im Kwan and Chu Im Kwan officials, Pfi and to ex-officials who had ranked above the
deputy-minister level. Invitations were also sent to all
civic and student organizations. The purpose of the
meeting was expressed in the invitation, which read:
Since the malfunction of the Korean government leads to the threat of neighboring imperialism pene trating Korea, the club in the spirit of "Loyalty to the Emperor and for Patriotism" memorialized the emperor for guidance. The imperial opinion on the club's petition was that His Majesty felt that there would be difficulties for the country if there were divisions between govern ment officials and the people. In order to respect and fulfill the hopes of the imperial opinion, the club will sponsor a meeting between the officials and the people tomorrow at Chong Ro [ ] at 1 P.M. We hope that many of you can attend the meeting.27 The government, however, objected to having the
conference in the crowded center of the city and again invoked the October 20 ordinance that civilian groups were
to meet only at their approved locations, although the club
believed that this ordinance had been nullified by the
ordinance of October 26. Many club members and supporters
of the club were already at the scene when the order was
PfiThe two highest classes of the bureaucracy. Por details, see Chapter 5? P* 175i fn., 42.
^ The Independent, October 28, 1896. The club's invitation used the "imperial opinion" out of context. The "imperial opinion" referred to was from the decree calling for the dispersal of the previous demonstration at the Police Department.
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received, and they insisted that Cheng Ro was the most 28 effective place to hold the conference. They decided to spend the night there and wait until the government allowed
it to he the meeting place.
The main reason for the government's objection was
not the selection of the site but the emperor's suspicion,
carefully encouraged by anti-club officials, that the
meeting was a preparatory step toward introducing a repub lican form of government in Korea. The emperor had also
been told that only Yun Chee-ho, the president, and
Yi Sang-jae, the vice-president, were insisting upon meeting at Chong Ro, despite the fact that the members pre
ferred to use Independence Hall, respecting the October 20 29 ordinance. Yun Chee-ho and Yi Sang-jae were summoned to the palace to clarify their positions. They persuaded the
emperor not only that his suspicions were groundless, but
also to permit the meeting at Chong Ro. After a day's delay the meeting gathered according to plan in the heart of the city. It was the first meeting
in Korea of its kind, bringing together the two groups—
officials and plain citizens. Among the government
executives and former executives attending were Deputy
28 Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 281. 2^Ibid., pp. 279-281; and The Independent, October 29, 1898.
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Premier Pak Chung-yang, ^ Justice Minister Suh Chung-soon,
Agriculture and Trade Minister Kim Myung-kyu, Acting
Finance Minister Koh Yong-hee, Privy Council Chairman
Han Kyu-sul, Seoul Mayor Yi Chae-yun, Deputy Education Min
ister Yi Yong-sik, Deputy Imperial Household Minister
Min Yong-chan, Council of State members Yi Chong-kun, Kwon Jai-yong, Yi Sun-deuk, and former ministers
Sim Sang-hun, Yi Chae-soon, Chung Nak-yong, Min Yong-whan,
and Min Yong-ki. In addition to the several thousand Independence Club members present, there were also members
of almost all the existing groups, including members from 31 the rival Imperial Association. Because the government officials arrived late, the
meeting, with Yun Chee-ho as chairman, did not start until 4 P.M. Following keynote speeches by Yun Chee-ho for the
club and Pak Chung-yang representing the government, the
meeting got down to business. The sponsors arranged that the many proposals and motions be discussed in the form of
a document called the "Six Articles." These were formally passed by the meeting; the government officials also signed
them. Pak Chung-yang formally submitted the Six Articles
^The position of premier was vacant at the time, as Yoon Yong-sun had resigned suddenly two days before.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 281; and The Independent, November 1, 1898.
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to the emperor and asked for His Majesty's approval, which
was granted after the emperor heard the opinions of the mem bers of the Council of State.^ The Six Articles were as follows:
(1) That both officials and people shall determine not to rely on any foreign aid but to do their best to strengthen and uphold the Imperial prerogatives. (2) That all documents pertaining to foreign loans, the hiring of foreign soldiers, to grant concessions, etc., in short, every document drawn up between the Korean government and a foreigner shall be signed and stamped by all the Ministers of State and the President of the Privy Council. (3) That important offenders shall be punished only after they have been given a public trial and an ample opportunity to defend themselves. (4) That to His Majesty shall belong the power of appointing his ministers but that in case the majority of the Cabinet disapproves a man, he shall not be appointed. (5) That all sources of revenue and methods of raising taxes shall be placed under the control of the Pinance Department, no other department or officer or a private corporation being allowed to interfere therewith, and that the annual estimates and balance shall be made public. (6 ) That the existing laws and regulations shall be enforced without fear or favor.33 Surprisingly, when the emperor announced the
approval of the Six Articles, he also issued the "Pive-Article Imperial Decree" which was generally consis-
^ Some members of the Council of State did not sign. These were Foreign Minister Pak Chae-soon, Home Minister Yi Keun-yong, Acting War Minister Yu Ki-whan, and council mem ber Cho Pyung-sik. The Independent, November 1, 1898.
^T.H. Yun [Yun Chee-ho], "Popular Movements in Korea," The Korean Repository, V (1898; reprint edition, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964;, 467- Also The Independent, November 1, 1898.
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tent with what the Independence Club had advocated. A
summary of the imperial decree follows. It pledged: (1) To promptly enact the plan to reorganize the Privy Council, which would be the institution to hear the voice of the people; 34- (2) The government and the Privy Council should study and adopt regulative laws on associations and newspapers, after considering the Korean situation and foreign examples; (3) To investigate local administrators, whether present office-holders or ex-officials, to impose penalties for embezzlement or oppressive measures; (4-) To encourage the people to notify the home and justice ministries if they find out of illegal activi ties performed by imperial officials or censors, who should be punished; (5) To encourage commerce and business in the communities of Korea by establishing commercial schools.
The Kwan Min Kong Dong Hoe [Joint Conference of
Government Officials and the People] was the peak of
success for the Independence Club, because it demonstrated that public demands and pressure from using this kind of
meeting could influence government officials and the emperor. It also set a precedent that high government
officials could agree to public demands without waiting to
hear of the emperor's opinion. Finally, the approval of the Six Articles and the Five-Article Decree, considered together with the Privy Council Reorgenization Decree which
had become effective on November 2, were the most positive
^The reorganization of the Privy Council was pro claimed two days later. 55gwan Bo, op. cit., October 31» 1898.
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expression of the reforms that the club had been advocating.
The developments at the end of October, 1898, gave
hope for future innovations and the peaceful enlightenment of Korea. The Independence Club had never advocated that 56 Korea should have a Congress in the modem sense' or any
government body which would be extremely divergent from the
Korean political system of the time. If the Six Articles,
the Five-Anticle Decree, and the reorganization of the
Privy Council had been sincerely implemented, then Korea
would have come a long way toward becoming a modern state
without violent upheaval. However, it was not to be so.
The Independence Club gave a large party on
October 31 at Independence Hall in honor of the anniversary of the emperor's coronation. Cheered by their victory, the
club had arranged to have ten thousand copies of the Six
Articles and the Five-Article Decree printed for nationwide 57 distribution to the provinces and to the schools, ' but the copies were useless even before they were off the presses.
The Independent predicted that Korea would need at least forty or fifty years of education for democracy before she could effectively use a congressional system. The Inde pendent , July 27, 1898. ^The Independent, November 1, 1898; and Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 286.
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FATAL CLASHES WITH THE OPPOSITION
After the joint conference of October 29, many of
the more militant club members refused to end the rally,
adopting Yi Seung-man's motion "to wait to see that the government implements the Six Articles, since the govern- 38 ment has never honored its pledges in the past."-' Those
present at the rally at Chong Ro sent a letter to the gov
ernment on November 2 demanding, among other things, that
the government immediately enforce the fifth of the Six Articles, which would limit the control of tax collection
to the Finance Ministry and which criticized the Imperial Household Ministry's practice of taking direct control of
the tax collected on in sam [ginseng], on mining, and on 39 some lands. The rally finally dispersed at 4 P.M. on November 3,
because on November 5 the club planned to elect twenty-five members to the reorganized Privy Council. The club members
had stayed at Chong Ro from October 29 to November 3 to
impress the government with their determination to see the
Six Articles put into practice even though the emperor had
just approved them, thus showing that they did not have
^^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p . 285•
^The Independent, November 4, 1896.
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much faith in his words. The letter to the government
which emphasized the immediate end to the Imperial House
hold Ministry* s practice of collecting certain taxes also
risked giving offense to the emperor.
Those who were opposed to the club did not miss the
opportunity to turn the club's overzealousness to their
advantage. The handful of government officials who had
expressed their displeasure by not signing the Six Articles met to make plans to destroy the club. Cho Pyung-sik, who
was the one most fiercely attacked by the club, devised a
plot with War Minister Yoo Ki-whan, Deputy Justice Minister
and president of the Imperial Association Yi Ki-tong, Min Chong-muk, and Kim Chong-keun. They wrote and sent out anonymous letters which allegedly exposed the plan of the
Independence Club to elect a president and a vice-president for the republic they were planning to set up on November 5 40 when the club met at Independence Hall. In prominent places around the city, including the Independence Arch,
they posted notices which included the words, "... and 41 the new republic shall be headed by Mr. Yun. ..."
The emperor, although he gave no credence to this
new cause of the Independence Club, did not want to take
^°Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 289-290.
^ K i m Yong-eui, Chwa Ong Yun Che e Ho Suns eng Ryak Chun [Brief history of Yun Chee-hoJ [Seoul: Kidokkyo Chosun Kamlihyo Chongliwon, 1934), pp. 122-125-
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in case the accusations were true. Early in the morning of November 5> be ordered that all tbe leaders of the club be arrested; and he issued an imperial decree which ordered
the club to be disbanded and all the government officials
who had attended the Kwan Min Kong Dong Hoe to be dismissed,
as well as those who had signed the Six Articles. Seventeen
club members were arrested, and Independence Hall was raided
by the police, who confiscated all documents found there.
The next day the Government Gazette indicated that the conspirators were truly in power. Cho Pyung-sik was
appointed deputy premier while simultaneously holding the
home ministership, Min Chong-muk was foreign minister,
Kim Chong-keun was police chief, and many of the extreme
conservatives— particularly those who had declared
no Chong Kyo, op. cit., pp. 289-290; and The Indepen dent , November 7> 1898. Before the arrests of the club leaders had been ordered, Cho Pyung-sik had planned to have Yun Chee-ho killed at the palace gate. While he was at work in the printing shop of The Independent on the night of November 4, Yun was summoned by the emperor. Yun went to the palace immediately and was surprised that, even though it was very late at night, the emperor engaged him only in small talk, asking such questions as, "How is your father?" and "Today is cold, isn't it?" Then he asked for Yun to go to see Cho before he left the palace; but Cho also spoke only about inconsequential matters. Yun began to be suspicious and hurried home. Soon alter he arrived, the police knocked at the door. Yun escaped over a wall and took refuge with an American friend. It was learned later that Kim Yong-gin, who was supposed to kill Yun, had been overcome by scruples. Therefore, Cho managed to acquire imperial sanctions for the orders for the arrests on November 5 of the club leaders. Kim Yong-eui, loc. cit.
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themselves against the club— were brought into high l\.7 j positions. ^ The members of the Independence Club and many of the
people who heard of the arrests on November 5 were horrified
by these events. Tens of thousands of people gathered at
the Police Department, and they, also, demanded that they be
arrested because, they claimed, they were as guilty as the
I\!\ seventeen people in prison. Police Chief Kim Chong-keun
tried to have them forcibly dispersed, but this attempt
failed because those at the rally insisted that they would not be intimidated by a show of force but that they should
all be arrested and be punished after a proper court trial. The newly formed government then dismissed Kim although he 4-5 had had the job f01* only two days, and then appointed Shin Tae-yu as police chief. This move made no difference
to the demonstrators. Cho Pyung-sik and the other conspirators thought
^ Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 5 5 1898. The emperor's inability to make up his mind on. appointments has been well documented in Kwan Bo from November 5 to November 7- Per haps his indecisiveness was due to his habit of listening to too many advisors. To illustrate this point, three men— Nam Chung-ch\il, Min Yong-ki, and Cho Pyung-jik— were all appointed to the post of finance minister during the day of November 5- To hold a ministerial position for only a day was not uncommon, but to hold it for only a few hours was probably a record.
44- „ The Independent, November 7» 1898.
^Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 7i 1898.
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that the remaining members of the club would be helpless
now that their leaders were in prison and now that an impe
rial ordinance had been issued banning the club. Contrary
to their expectations, however, the rally seemed day by day to be swelling in number, and people were making contri
butions and gifts so that it could continue. The rally was
very sober and orderly to avoid giving the government 46 another reason to use force against them. When the seventeen prisoners were transferred to
the Supreme Court for trial, the rally moved with them. The government yielded to the demands of the demonstrators
by releasing all the prisoners on November 10 after an open court hearing, at which it was decided to punish the defen dants with forty lashes each, after they had been found
guilty of having instigated the club to commit several acts 47 of civil disobedience. The optimistic demonstrators moved to Chong Ro to
discuss further what action should be taken against those who had conspired to destroy the club. They memorialized
the emperor again, demanding (1) that the 0 Hyung (J2i_ ^j ),
hC. A suggestion by some members that the rally site be moved to the palace was rejected. And a liquor contri bution to be distributed to rally participants, because they were outdoors during cold weather, was sent back, also so as not to cause difficulties which might encourage the govern ment ' s use of force. The Independent, November 8 , 1898.
^ Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 14, 1898.
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the "five sinisters," (Cho Pyung-sik, Yoo Ki-whan,
Yi Ki-tong, Min Chong-muk, and Kim Chong-keun) who had con
spired against the club should be punished; (2 ) that the
Six.Articles should be promptly implemented; (3) that the
government should appoint honest officials who had an
understanding of the patriotism ■underlying Independence
Club activities; and (4-) that the world should be informed
of the earlier deeds of Cho Pyung-sik and Min Chong-muk 4-8 which would have sold the country to foreigners. The anti-club forces tried to mollify the demon
strators at Chong Ro by announcing an imperial decree which would transfer the tax-collecting authority of the Imperial 49 Household Ministry to the Finance Department, ' thus satis
fying the main demand of the rally; and Yi Ki-tong, presi dent of the Imperial Association and one of the "five sinis
ters," was demoted to become a minor army commander at Suwon.But at the same time Cho Pyung-sik reorganized
the Hwangkuk Chungang Chong Sanghoe, or "Central Commercial
^ T h e Independent, November 15, 1898.
^ Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 14, 1898.
5°rbid., November 15, 1898. During the joint meet ing of October 29, Yi Ki-tong had summoned in the name _ of ^ the emperor an emergency meeting of the Imperial Association to prepare for a possible fight against the rally at Chong Ro. When the emperor learned his name had been used, he expressed his displeasure; and Yi's friends gave him a vote of.no confidence. The Independent, November 5, 1898.
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Association,11 of which lie had, until recently, been
president, and the Imperial Association, so that the two
groups in concert could work against the Independence Club.51 Cho Pyung-sik and his associates used gangsters
like Kim Ok-kyun' s assassin, Hong Chong-wu, and
Keel Yong-su to strengthen the Imperial Association by using 52 their organization of peddlers. The peddlers mobilized
three or four thousand members from all over the country,
who then launched their own demonstration to show their
patriotism and loyalty by criticizing the Independence Club 55 rally which had tried to intimidate the emperor.
On the morning of November 21, several thousand
peddlers armed with sticks and stones attacked those
attending the club's rally in front of the palace gate.
The unexpected attack resulted in a number of casualties
among club members and their supporters, and the club, with
^ The Independent, November 4-? 1898. Por more about the Central Commercial Association, see Chapter 5» pp. 181-182. ■^Korean commerce in the 1890's was carried on entirely by peddlers. Although most of Korean society despised the commercial class, the peddlers held an important role in the national economy and tended to organize to prove their strength to the government. There were several thousand peddlers already organized throughout the country. -^Yi Sun-keun, Han Kuk Tong Nip Undong Sa (Seoul: Sang Mun Won, 1951)» pp. 250-231.
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its sympathizers, gradually dispersed under the attack.-^"
The peddlers occupied the scene of the rally for several hours, then retreated to their headquarters at the suburban
West Gate of Seoul. When what had happened became known, many of the
citizens of Seoul expressed horror. Encouraged by the reaction of the people, the club vice-president Yi Sang-jae
and activist Yi Seung-man led a counterattack against the 55 headquarters of the peddlers that same night.^ Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the
emperor consulted with many impartial officials as well as
with some of his trusted foreign friends, who, in general,
advised him not to support the peddlers and the conspirators
who were responsible for creating this dangerous situation.
On the following day Kwan Bo documented the emperor's reaction to the chaos. The appointments announced that day
returned many officials to high office who had held positions prior to the November 4- conspiracy: Min Yong-whan became deputy premier, Pak Chung-yang was now home minister,
^ T h e Independent, November 22, 1896. The club's rally was called Man Min ’Hoe ( T^L 'blie "People's Meeting." The extent of non-member participation in the rally is not documented, but the club supported' Koh Yong-keun as chairman of the People's Meeting although he was not an active leader of the club. ^ Y i Sun-keun, Han Kuk Tong Nip Undong Sa, op. cit., pp. 231-232.
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56 and Yi Chong-keun was now chairman of the Privy Council.^
Yun Chee-ho's arrest order was canceled, and he was simul- 57 taneously appointed vice-chairman of the Privy Council,
while his father, Yun Ung-yul, was made deputy home
minister. Kwan Bo reported that the "five sinisters" as
well as their cronies who had actually arranged to "bring in the peddlers had been ordered to be arrested and placed in
isolation.^® The same imperial decree also permitted the
restoration of the Independence Club; and it urged the 59 peddlers gathered at their headquarters to disperse.
The government also issued an imperial decree on
"Laws to Punish Those Who Rely on Foreigners and Harm the
Country." The decree was intended to punish (1) those who secretly asked foreigners for protection; (2 ) those who leaked classified material to foreigners; (5 ) those who arranged loans with foreigners or who tried to hire foreign
mercenaries or ships without government permission; (4) those who sought official positions through foreigners' recommendations; and (5) those who used the external 60 situation for conspiracy and terrorism. This decree,
dated November 22, was a demonstration of the emperor's
^Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 22, 1898. ^Ibid.
58Ibid. ^Ibid., November 24, 1898. 8^Xbid.
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decision to side with the Independence Club. The peddlers, however, enraged by the club's
counterattack and by the emperor's disapproval of their
actions, decided to attack the club's rally again on November 2?. To carry out their plan, they somehow lured
members of the rally crowd outside the city walls at the
South Gate. Again many were killed or wounded, even though 61 the club supporters hastily retreated inside the gate.
They decided to disband the rally, and to leave five hundred people to guard against future attacks by the peddlers. It
was also decided that they would gather again at Chong Ro
the next morning at 10 A.M., unless the government before 62 that time put into action its promises. On November 26 at 10 A.M., tens of thousands of club
supporters convened at Chong Ro, while the peddlers gathered outside the city wall and expressed their dissatisfaction
with the imperial decrees which they believed had insulted them. The situation became very tense, and the emperor decided to appeal directly to the demonstrators on both sides.^ His Majesty requested two hundred representatives
^The city of Seoul was surrounded by a stone wall which had four gates: north, south, east, and west. During the night and in times of emergency, the gates were closed. The citizens were opposed to the peddlers, so club members were relatively safe inside.
k^The Independent, November 25* 1898. k^Ibid., November 28, 1898.
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from each group to come at different times to the palace.
The emperor also invited foreign dignitaries, including all
the diplomats in Seoul, to attend, as well as government
officials. At 1 P.M. two hundred people came from the Chong Ko
"People's Meeting." The atmosphere was very dignified and
quiet. The emperor came out from his room and slowly walked
down toward the palace grounds where the people were waiting
for him, bowing deeply. The emperor appealed to them to
help him make Korea better. Admitting for the first time
his own responsibility in the recent state of affairs, he
promised to carry out the decrees for reform that he had already issued. The emperor also criticized the unlawful
activities of the peddlers, and promised to have them dis
persed. He promised, moreover, that he would do his best to bring about the rapid implementation of the Six Articles.
Satisfied with the emperor's declarations, the representa tives of the club left the scene shouting "Long Live the
Emperor!"^ At 3 P.M. the emperor received the two hundred rep
resentatives of the peddlers. He appealed to them also to
support him in his task of governing, and promised them that
the government would also listen to the peddlers in the
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future. Although, he urged them to restrain themselves, his
tone was conciliatory, and the listeners were satisfied. The emperor's appeals to the two groups were very
effective, indeed, and made both groups disperse their
rallies relatively satisfied. The explosive situation
which had existed since the morning of November 5 was at
last calmed.
THE DISBANDMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE CLUB
Although he had brought about a settlement, the
emperor was not happy with what had happened during the
month of November. He realized that major blame had to be
placed upon the conservative conspirators and those who had
incited the peddlers to attack the "People's Meeting,” but
the emperor was worried by the continuing demonstrations and the persistent demands of the club. Since Dr. Jaisohn
had left the country six months-before, he had been looking for a good pretext to ban the club permanently. He thought
he had sufficient grounds when the Cho Pyung-sik clique
brought him the fraudulent evidence of the club's plans to
establish a republic. Unfortunately for his expectations,
the forged evidence had only served to embarrass the
emperor. It should be noted that although the emperor did not
agree with many of the club's activities and tactics, he did
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not dispute the loyalty of the club's members or deny that
the club's efforts were for the betterment of the country. The emperor did honor the promise he had made to establish 65 the reorganized Privy Council, ^ and he appointed many
people to it who were either Independence Club members or
who were sympathetic to its causes.
Meanwhile, the situation in Seoul had not quieted
as the emperor hoped it would. Small groups of people from
both sides sponsored street corner speeches and organized 66 small rallies to castigate the opposing group. Purther-
more, the emperor was continuing his game of reappointing
conservative, anti-club officials. Pah Chae-soon and Yi Keun-yong, who had been, respectively, foreign minister
and home minister and were two of the four high officials 6*7 who had not signed the Six Articles, were now appointed
war minister and home minister; and Min Yong-ki, who had been finance minister when many of the anti-Independence
Club conservatives had been reappointed on November 5 £md
^During the chaotic situation of November 13,_ an imperial decree was issued to amend the November^ "Privy Council Reorganization Decree." Article XVI, which had allocated one half of the seats to the club, was abolished, and in its place the new decree stated that "the government shall select the members of the Privy Council from among those who have contributed to the country, and are qualified in politics and law." Kwan Bo, op. cit., November 13» 1898.
^ T h e Independent, December 5> 1898. 6?KwanJ3o, op. cit., December 4, 1898. Por previous appointments, see Chapter 6 , p.200, fn. 32.
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then been promptly forced to resign, was again appointed
finance minister.^ The Independence Club again sponsored a "People's Meeting" at Chong Ro on December 6 , and afterwards memori alized the emperor on the chief topic of the agendum,
deploring the government1s habit of reappointing conser vative and anti-club officials especially after the emperor
had promised to cooperate with the Independence Club's 69 reform program. Other memorials followed with the same
complaint.
The government responded to the memorials of the
Chong Ro rally by requesting that the Privy Council elect a
vice-chairman in accordance with Article III of the amended
law, and so Yun Chee-ho, with nineteen votes to the conser
vative candidate's ten votes, was elected to this office on
December 15.^ The government did not try to interfere with the election; and, when the council met again the next
day, it agreed to select eleven more Privy Council members, pending approval by the government. Each of the twenty-nine
members present proposed the names of eleven men, and the council then recommended the appointments of those with the
most votes.
^Ibid. ^The Independent, December 7, 1898.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 387-
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Among the eleven persons thus chosen were two who
were very controversial. One of these was Pak Yong-hyo, who was seventh on the list with ten votes, and the other was 71 So Jai-pil (Philip Jaisohn), who also received ten votes. The emperor had been very hostile to Pak Yong-hyo's pro-Japee-
nese stand in 1895? especially because the queen had been killed by Japanese. Furthermore, Pak was still under arrest 72 on a charge of treason' and had escaped to Japan to avoid
71Ibid., p. 389. 72 ' There is no clear evidence that Pak Yong-hyo was connected with the plot to assassinate Queen Min. He was a leading member of the cabinet as home minister during the Kap 0 Kyung Chang, which was marked by far-reaching reform programs sponsored by the Japanese. However, during the triple intervention against Japan, which proved Japan's weakness with regard to Russia, the Korean court tried to build ties with Russia in order to eliminate the Japanese influence. Pak tried to prevent the Korean court from drifting toward Russia, because such an alliance would have resulted in the cancellation of many of the reform programs already decreed. Pak urged the king to replace the old palace guards with Japanese-trained guards, as had already been decreed; but this plea encountered the objections of the king. Meanwhile, Japan had backed down from its support of Pak, partly due to American and Russian pressure, and partly because Pak's motivation was "nationalistic" rather than purely pro-Japanese. Although Pak had been the most powerful man in the faction-ridden government, he was now in a difficult position: he was opposed by many elements both within and without the government, including the king and the representatives of the most influential colonial powers. Then, one of Pak's enemies reported to Queen Min Pak's involvement in a plol; against her life. When the order for his arrest was made on May 14, 1895? Pak fled to Japan. Prom there he went to the United States, where he persuaded Jaisohn to go back to Korea for the sake of the reconstruc tion of Korean society that they both devoutly hoped for. For more details on the alleged plot to assassinate Queen Min, see Yi Sun-keun, Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun (Seoul: Eulyu Munwhasa, 1966), pp. 527-552; and see Chapter 1, p. 31.
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arrest ( and a possible death sentence) in May, 1895. As
for Jaisohn, the emperor had no intention of allowing him back after having had him deported.
Anticipating the emperor's reaction to the Privy
Council recommendations, those who opposed the club again
spread false rumors that Pak was to be the president of a new republic, and that there were secret ties between the 75 Independence Club and Pak and the Japanese government.'^
Although the rumors were groundless, the conspirators found
a ready audience among the general populace, who both hated Pak Yong-hyo and feared Japanese domination. By thus
losing the people's support, the club was without the
foundation for its existence. The emperor did not miss the opportunity, and on
December 25 an imperial decree was issued charging eleven 74- illegal acts to it and disbanding the Independence Club.
^Chong Kyo, op. cit., p. 389- ^The eleven charges against the club were (1) the club met in places which had been prohibited; (2 ) the club behaved in an uncontrolled manner, beyond that allowed by regulations; (3) the club disobeyed imperial decrees relating to the dispersal of meetings; (4-) the club regu larly criticized officials; (5 ) the club had members who hid in foreign legations to escape arrest; (6 ) the club had behaved high-handedly toward government authorities and had not respected their prerogatives; (7) the club had threat ened lower officials; (8 ) the club had sent gangsters to threaten court hearings; (9 ) the club members had thrown stones at guards while the guards were trying to maintain security; (10) the club had aroused the people against the imperial will; and (11) the club had recommended a criminal for a government position. Kwan Bo, op. cit., December 25, 1898.
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CONCLUSION
Filled with hopes for reform, Philip Jaisohn had
come back to Korea in January of 1896, after a ten years' stay in the United States. Refusing to accept the govern
ment's offer to appoint him foreign minister, he left him
self more free to involve himself in— more specifically, to
guide— the reform movement as an advisor to the Privy
Council. Remembering the 1884 coup d'etat, which, he thought, had failed because of lack of public support and
because of overreliance on the aid of a foreign country,'1’
Jaisohn published The Independent, which realized much of
Jaisohn's aim to educate the masses, and, then, to use the
newly educated populace as the foundation of his reform
movement. The Independent often elaborated his political
beliefs, most of which were strange to the majority of Koreans. Jaisohn advocated the introduction of an election
system for choosing magistrates; an opposition system of
1So Jai-pil [Philip Jaisohn], "Hoe Ko Kap Shin Chung Pyun" ["A few recollections of the 1884 coup"], in the Annex of Min Tae-won, Kap Shin Chung Pyun kwa Kim Ok Kyun (Seoul: Kukje Munwha Hyup Hoe, 1947)/pp- 81-82.
219
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politics with public support for each side, instead of
factionalism; an impartial legal system; the government as
an institution to serve the people; the usage of the Korean alphabet and the encouragement of mass education with it,
instead of adherence to the tradition of having only the
well-to-do learn Chinese characters; the independence of
Korea from her centuries-old suzerain relation with China;
equality among the people and between men and women.
The Independent also argued for reforms in the social,
medical, housing, and sanitary fields; in other words, it covered the gamut of problems Jaisohn saw Korea to be
facing, whether they were of a philosophical, sociological,
or everyday practical nature. As to the feasibility of the reforms advocated by
The Independent, one is apt too quickly to conclude that its aims were too idealistic for the time, or that the recommendations for reform lacked a careful program of gradual improvements, as for example, did the advocations of Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese reformer, several years later.
A warm argument: could arise, for example, if one were to
ask, "How could Korea of the 1890’s possibly have adopted
an election system, when she cannot have an effective
election system even today?" In order to answer that question, two considerations
should be brought to bear here. First, what Jaisohn
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. advocated was the election of magistrates whose powers were limited in the highly centralized Yi dynasty. In 1879, some
twenty years before the era of The Independent, Japan had
established an elected prefectural assembly, with very
limited power, but which provided the foundation for the p first national Diet election eleven years later in 1890.
Second, the election of magistrates was not new in Korea.
As early as the Silla period ( , A.D. 57-935), Koreans had experience with the Wha Paik ( ) confer- 7 ences, at which village chiefs elected their magistrates. Jaisohn's rhetoric in The Independent was passionate
and demanded changes urgently, but Jaisohn was not so
unrealistic as to expect the immediate realization of these
goals; rather, he recognized improvement as being neces sarily gradual. Driven both by the certainty that what he
advocated was just, and by the faith that the Korean
populace could be educated in the reasonableness of these ends, he pushed, unremittingly, for perfection of all these
aspects of Korean society. Thus Jaisohn1s advocacy of the
election of magistrates, together with his strong zeal to
E.O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Go., 1965), pp. 283, 299. ^Hatada Takashi, Chosen Shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, i960), pp. 35-36; and Yi Pyung-do, Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (Seoul: Po Man Kak, 1961), pp. 104-105.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission 222
reform Korea, could not be considered too idealistic to
carry out in the 1890's. Rather, Jaisohn's exhortations for changes were
always accompanied by realistic criticisms and alternatives.
For example, he proposed the establishment of an impartial
legal system by suggesting the instituting, first, of only
one court in Seoul which would begin to acquire experience
in the fair execution of justice, and, if necessary, even
by hiring the assistance of a foreign expert. He also
spelled out reasonable alternatives to the unsanitary,
uneconomic, and dangerous housing problem by the practical
suggestions to attach grates and covers in fireplaces; and
for long-range planning he encouraged the expansion of the coal ml-m-ng industry, partly so that coal might be used in
Korean homes. His criticisms of the impure drinking water
in Seoul were followed by his short-term solution to keep
boiled water in a big pot in a cool place; and his
long-range advice was to urge the installation of water pipes to every house in Seoul from reservoirs that he con
tended should be built near the city. To finance such a
project, Jaisohn pointed out that, even if it were to cost
one million dollars, payments by the 4-0,000 families in
Seoul of 150 percent of what they currently spent for water, would be sufficient for "running expenses and repairs,
in addition to providing enough to repay 7 percent interest
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Jaisohn, however, compromised himself by recognizing
the absolute power of the monarch, in order to win the
monarch's assistance for his reform programs. It is quite
understandable that Jaisohn, who greatly suffered from the
failure of the 1884 coup, decided that another vehicle
toward reform— namely, a reform under the "benevolent" King Ko Jong— could more effectively unify the populace,
and Jaisohn perceived that he could put to good use the
well established tradition of absolute power of the monarch.
At the same time, Jaisohn put himself in a contradictory
position by advocating the people's rights as the funda
mental requirement for the continued peaceful coherence of
the nation. In his writings in The Independent and else
where, however, Jaisohn never dealt with this apparent
contradiction in assigning sovereignty to the people, on
some occasions, and to the monarch, on others.
Jaisohn wisely organized the Independence Club
(on July 2, 1896) as if it were to be solely an organi zation to build the Independence Arch and Independence Park,
at the site of Ang Eun Mun, or "Gate of Welcome and
Blessing" [of Chinese Missions to Korea]. The nationalistic
^The Independent, English ed., April 30, 1896. References to The Independent alone in this study refer to the Korean edition. Citations from the English edition are so indicated.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224
purpose of the organization, toward the construction of
these projects, brought the full cooperation of the conser
vative government and, also, a rapid and dramatic increase
in membership. The crown prince contributed one thousand won to the club, and, moreover, presented his own hand
written sign, reading "Tong Nip Kwan” ( ), or the "Independence Hall." And the government contributed a
building to be Independence Hall to the Independence Club.
The Independence Club moved on to prepare for a
political organization by sponsoring weekly discussion
periods. Understandably, the topics of the discussions in
the earlier period were of limited political significance.
As the strength and public support for the club increased,
the topics became more controversial, and subjects for debate which embarrassed the government appeared more frequently.^ These discussion meetings not only served to
strengthen reform convictions among the people, but also
contributed greatly to provide potential young leaders with
the training which was to be essential for leading the
enormous rallies that the club later sponsored. In the process of solidifying the base of his move
ment, Jaisohn never officially made public his connection
with the Independence Club, although his name appeared in
^See Chapter fn- 60.
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The Independent as publisher. But there is no doubt that
while Jaisohn publicly supported, he secretly guided the
club. Evidence is clear that he had absolute control over
the club although the presidency of the club was always
occupied by another man. Jaisohn was reluctant to identify
himself openly with the club; presumably he feared that,
because of his American citizenship and his record with the
1884 coup, and, more importantly, because many conservative
government officials were personal enemies of Jaisohn, such a clear association would make the club more vulnerable.
Therefore, without publicizing his role, he "secretly £ instructed" the club as to what to do next— as was the
case when the club launched its first major demonstration
on March 10, 1898, against Russian domination in Korea. A speculative question arises as to what would have
happened if Jaisohn had utilized the remnants of the 7 Tong Haksr for his reform movement. As Professors
^Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint edition by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959)» 182. ^The Tong Hak, or "Eastern learning " mmrompat, was originated in the 1860's by Choi Jai-wu ( ). Because Choi had failed the civil service e n several times, together with his dissatisfaction with gov ernment corruption and oppression, he organized the Tong Haks by teaching a Korean variety of shamanism combined with facets of Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and Taoism. Tong Hak teachings were quietly spread among the oppressed people. • In 1863, the government arrested Choi and the next year executed him, with the hope of suppressing
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Gregory Henderson and Chung-sik Lee pointed out, the Tong
Haks1 grass-roots strength, together with Philip Jaisohn1 s
intelligence and capability, or, that is to say, a combi
nation of the Tong Haks and the Independence Club, would
have been very great, indeed. A counterargument may be made to such speculation,
however. Pirst, it is important to understand that the Tong Haks had been badly defeated by the time Jaisohn came
back in 1896. And due to the government's hatred of, and
persecution of, the Tong Haks, an alliance with the remaining Tong Haks would have hindered Jaisohn1 s chances
for reform as well as limiting the possibility of attracting a large membership to the club. Furthermore, Jaisohn's keen
memory of the fiasco of the 1884 coup, and his Americanized
beliefs in open, as opposed to secret and illicit, organi
zations, could not have permitted him to consider seriously
further growth of antigovernment sentiments. However, the influence of these teachings persisted. When the magistrate of Kobu, Cho Pyung-kap, ruthlessly forced citizens to pay illegal taxes, the people of the district rioted. This epi sode was joined in by the not yet well-organized Tong Haks, and grew into an open rebellion against the central govern ment, when Tong Hak leader Chun Pong-joon began to receive wide support from oppressed citizens. The Tong Haks defeat ed many detachments of government troops and approached within twenty miles of Seoul. In desperation the Korean court requested Chinese troops to fight the Tong Haks. Although the Tong Haks were defeated3 and many of their leaders executed, the dispatch of Chinese soldiers to Korea set off the Sino-Japanese War. For more details on the Tong Haks, see Kuk Sa Pyun Chan Wiwonhoe, Tong Hak Nan Kirok, [Records of the Tong Hak rebellion], 2 vols. [Seoul: Samil Insoe Chusik Hoesa, 1959)-
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a Tong Hak-Independence Club alliance, even to further the
reforms both organizations agreed upon. Jaisohn instead
chose reform under the monarch. He did, however, come to
the defense of the Tong Haks when some Tong Haks were
reorganizing in the Kong Ju area. The Independent main
tained that "So far as they [the Tong Haks] have not openly
broken the law, therefore it is impossible for the officials D to attack them.” As to the club's activities against foreign domi
nation, the records of the Independence Club activities may
give the misleading impression that the club's strongest
motivation was its anti-Russian sentiment, as the Russian
minister in Seoul, De Speyer, once claimed. The truth is that Jaisohn did not exploit only the Russian activities
and policies, which were trying to penetrate ever more
deeply into Korea, as simply another good vehicle to stimu
late nationalistic feeling and thus strengthen the Indepen
dence Club, as was his purpose in the case of the building
of the Independence Arch. But he also succeeded in causing
the Russians to withdraw their aggressive programs. The
reason that the club did not set in motion serious cam
paigns against other powers is that those powers not only
had less vigorous policies than Russia, but, moreover,
^The Independent, June JO, 1896.
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handled their maneuverings in Korea with more subtlety than
Russia. But the Independence Club did force Japan to with
draw its coaling station from Deer Island when Russia was
made to withdraw hers from the island. Indeed, Jaisohn was
at odds with all foreign interventionists, even with
American Minister Allen, because, notwithstanding his
American citizenship and his high regard for the United 9 States, Jaisohn objected to American interests in Korea.
Therefore, Professor Asakawa's statement, "The anti-Russian
sentiment grew finally so strong that a large number of intelligent Koreans organized the Korean Independence Society. . . is not correct.
According to the findings of this research, several
important elements stand out as having contributed to the
end of the Independence Club movement. Pirst, the person most responsible for the end of the movement was Emperor Ko Jong. As indicated earlier,
Jaisohn chose to undertake his reform endeavors by securing
Ko Jong's support, and simultaneously using the tradition
of royalty as a focal point for stimulating the
^For a detailed account of this relationship, see Fred H. Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944-.), pp. 170-174.
^Kan'ichi Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Cause and Issues (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 19^4-)» p. 270.
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nationalistic emotions which were the prerequisites for
eventual freedom from foreign control and for winning inde
pendence. When Jaisohn came hack from America, however, he
discovered that, "Unfortunately the King was now far more
feeble than before.”"1'1 Having been beset by painful
experiences, such as the assassination of his wife, Queen Min, on the palace grounds, the Tong Hak Rebellion,
the Sino-Japanese War, and, most recently, the Russo-Japan
ese competition to control the Korean court. Ko Jong gave the impression.of having "an attitude
of cunning," and he was habitually disposed "to change his
mind . . . after [reaching a decision on] policy whenever he
thought that he was subjecting himself to the slightest I O risk." He was also accustomed to taking advice from two
sides at once, however fundamentally opposed they might be,
without interposing his own judgments. Furthermore, when
the club had gained greatly in strength and seemed to jeopardize those prerogatives he enjoyed— whether or not he
was indecisive in exercising them— he tried to balance
their force by giving anti-club conservatives high govern
ment appointments. After the first club rally was held on
March 10, 1898, which resulted in the cancellation of the
11F.A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea (London: Hodder and Stoughton [n.d.J), p, 82.
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entire Russian colonial scheme, Ko Jong pressured for
Jaisohn's departure from Korea, probably to check the club's
progress and power, and also, no doubt, hoping that such a
move would end the club movement. (The gullibility of the
emperor in heeding the advice of the conservatives in his
court especially was well known.
This impressionableness of Ko Jong was fully
exploited by the enemies of the club. When the club's
strength rose to a climax during 1898, the club in its
rallies, and in its other activities, took a hard line and
demanded many reforms and the dismissals of inept and corrupt officials. Interestingly enough, the club in almost
all cases succeeded in winning the dismissals of those
officials or in making the government accede to its demands. The monarch, possibly with the assistance of anti-club con
servatives, however, soon reappointed the dismissed officials, sometimes even with promotions, and never carried
out the promises pledged in the face of a rally's pressure.
Such repeated reneging contributed not only to frustrate the club members, but also provided the impetus to them to
continue their rallies, whose proceedings were often consid
ered too radical and too wild, even to impartial observers.
Second, the quality of leadership of the club after
Jaisohn's departure from Korea in May of 1898 certainly
contributed to the end of the Independence Club. Jaisohn's
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leadership in the club, though he never occupied an official
position of leadership, very effectively controlled club
activities. After his departure, Yun Chee-ho took over the
leadership of the club as well as the role of publisher of
The Independent. Yun was acting president from March, 1898,
when Yi Wan-yong left Seoul for a governorship, and in
August, 1898, Yun became the full-fledged president of the 15 club. As indicated in Chapter 3» he was a moderate and
bland gentleman, lacking Jaisohn's capacity to handle well
the difficult task of leading the club.
On September 4, at the first meeting after Yun Chee-ho had been elected president on August 28, 1898,
the club discussed ex-Premier Ito Hirobumi, who was in
Seoul at that time to negotiate the Seoul-Pusan railway
concession. When many of the more moderate government
officials left the club because increasing government pres sure might have embarrassed them, the younger and more
radical group came to the forefront. The more radical
section pressed for opposition to the Japanese scheme. With the support of the minority, Yun Chee-ho tried to
disregard the Japanese concession matter, presumably to
avoid Japanese pressure on the Independence Club.
(Yun Chee-ho had already editorialized in The Independent,
■^See Chapter 3? PP- 95-99.
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commenting favorably on Ito's visit to Korea.) Despite
Yun's opposition, the meeting voted to investigate with a
special committee Ito's scheme and, then, to meet again.
When the committee tried to convene the next club meeting to
report on their investigation and to propose future action,
Yun, the presiding officer, dismissed the meeting by
invoking the quorum rule, which had never before been applied at club meetings.^ Chong Kyo remembered that Yun
almost had to run out of the meeting because the majority
of members were loudly shouting, "with tears in their 16 eyes," against Yun's ruling. Though the majority of members did not insist on
action against the Japanese scheme, this meeting signaled the loss of confidence in Yun on the part of the majority.
The evidence is that Yun tacitly supported the radical
majority rather than attempting to lead them on a more
moderate path. Therefore the radicals came to control the club
meetings, which Yun described later, admitting that he had
been "... unable to keep them [the members] within the
^The Independent, August 30, 1898.
^Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa [History of Korea], I, reprint ed. by the Association for the Editing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959)5 229-230.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233
bounds of prudence and moderation."1*'7 One can accept the
argument that this internal division in the club hastened
bhe end of the movement. But to lay the main responsibility
for the end of the club on this division within the member ship surely is overstatement. Because the evidence shows
no division in the choice of activities, but rather that
the radical members of the club carefully manipulated to
lead the activities. Third, the club-led rallies placed too much con
fidence in their having won public support, as Professor
Chung-sik Lee pointed out. The club memorials often
claimed that the club represented the entire populace. In
retaliation, the conservative officials organized the
peddlers under the name of the Imperial Association, which also insisted on its patriotism, a kind not represented by
the Independence Club. This overconfidence in the public
support led the club to antagonize too many powerful con servatives at once without a correct estimate of the club's real strength— an overextension which proved fatal to the
club's existence. This overconfidence also helped to alienate some impartial observers who would have preferred to be asked for their opinions before the club claimed to
1^T.H. Yun [Yun Chee-ho], "Popular Movements in Korea," The Korean Repository, V (1898; reprint edition, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964j, 469.
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represent them. Finally, this feeling of overconfidence
directly contributed to end the Independence Club when it
inspired club members to recommend for Privy Council seats
Philip Jaisohn, who had been forced to leave the country,
and Pak Yong-hyo, who was considered by many to be a
traitor and a crony of the Japanese government. The foreign role in ending the Independence Club
movement is much more difficult to find supporting evidence for. Although Jaisohn claimed that "... foreign influence
was mainly responsible for the destruction of the Indepen- lfl dence Club," the evidence is that the influence of the
foreign powers in attempting to block the power of the club
was not as effective as Jaisohn claimed. Of course, none
of the colonial powers wanted to see strong nationalism in
Korea. Those foreign powers, however, excepting the
Russians, did not openly express their antagonism to the
club during the Independence Club era. Russia pressured
the club both directly, by calling it a group of 19 anti-Russian "do-nothing, unemployed" hoodlums, ' and indirectly, by threatening the Korean court to suppress the
anti-Russian rallies sponsored by the club. Russian
disapprobation, however, never caused the club a serious
^Quoted in F.A. McKenzie, Korea's Fight For Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920), p. 73-
^The Independent, March 10, 1898.
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problem, because the fear of exclusive Russian, domination in
Korea was shared almost unanimously among the other foreign
powers, among the people of Korea, and among the members of
the Independence Club.
Japan was pleased to see the club crush the Russian
colonial scheme by March, 1898, and, when Japan tried to
acquire the Seoul-Pusan railway concession, the club's new
president, Yun Chee-ho, blocked any action against this new involvement by the Japanese. The only evidence that Japan
seriously undertook any action that would lead to the
destruction of the club is the claim ascribed to Jaisohn that Japan helped those responsible for his forced departure 20 from Korea.
Great Britain was unhappy when Russia put pressure
on the Korean government to appoint the Russian,
Kir Alexeiff, to take over an influential post from the
British subject, J. McLeavy Brown, as advisor to the Finance
Ministry, and, in response, executed naval maneuvers at the
ports of H amilton and Inchon during December, 1897- This
British pressure even proved helpful to the Independence
Club when they set out on the difficult task of spoiling
the colonial schemes of-Russia. And the United States'
official policy was neutrality in Korean domestic affairs,
Pn See Chapter 4, p. 140.
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though the American minister carefully explored and located
opportunities in Korea for American commercial interests,
while he was at the same time carefully cultivating a close
relationship with the Korean court. Therefore, there were no damaging foreign pressures
on the Independence Club until it was abolished at the end of 1898. That the Independence Club could have enjoyed as
much success in carrying out so many parts of Jaisohn's
political and nationalistic platforms, if the club had been subjected to any considerable amount of foreign pressure,
is doubtful. Rather, it was Jaisohn's candidness— which also can
be termed tactlessness or an undiplomatic personality—
which unfortunately antagonized too many people. His
straightforwardness is well illustrated by the record of his first audience at the Russian legation with His Majesty,
after his return to Korea. He said bluntly: Your Majesty should go back to the palace. Korea is your land, and the people are your people. Your Majesty is abandoning everybody. . . . If you stay here any longer, everyone will laugh at you. 1
Jaisohn's strong personality negatively affected
many people. When Jaisohn opposed American Minister Allen's
^ K i m To-tae, So Jai-pil Paksa Chasojon [Autobiog raphy of Dr. So Jai-pil, or Philip JaisohnJ [Seoul: Susonsa, 1948), p. 211.
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effort to see that the Seoul-Inchon railway concession would
go to an American, hostility arose between the two men.
Allen later found a way to retaliate against Jaisohn by quietly supporting the anti-Jaisohn forces who were trying
to send Jaisohn back to the United States. Allen, however,
did support the Independence Club after the departure of
Jaisohn, because "... the Club seemed better than Japan 22 or Russia; and Allen threw his weight behind it.”
Another American, Clarence R. Greathouse, who was an
advisor to the Korean government, was a good friend of
Jaisohn. Jaisohn often praised Greathouse for his services
to Korea. But he was incapable of convincing Greathouse, who was in a highly privileged position and quite content
in it, that the newly reformed government would need the
services of a man like Greathouse. Greathouse, who was one
of the monarch's trusted associates, manipulated— probably
out of fear of losing his favored position— to bring thirty
mercenaries from Shanghai to guard the palace and thus make
himself and his conservative friends more secure, and, in
order to do this, to destroy the club, though this plan failed due to the club's opposition.
A zealot is rarely a gentle, tractable man, with a tactful, diplomatic personality, and Jaisohn was no
22 Harrington, op. cit., p. 308.
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exception. But surely his lack of delicacy in personal and
political dealings had a counterproductive effect for the
movement. It is important to determine whether the abolition
of the club marked the complete failure of the movement. Although it was not as successful as Jaisohn had hoped, the
movement caused many changes in Korean society at the time,
and, in addition, it is of significant import that the club
produced many of Korea's future leaders. For the first time in Korea the movement made it
possible for the common people to feel the need for equal status of all people and the right to participate in public
affairs; it taught corrupt and inept officials what their
duties and performance should be; commoners could, for the
first time, sue the Yang Ban and, moreover, win judgments
against them; and, most important, an equable legal system
was operating in a Seoul court, as Jaisohn had suggested. A contemporary wrote about H.N. Allen's observations and
her own, remarking about this period in Korean history:
. . . [T]he last four months of 1896 had seen more alterations than the previous twelve years of his residence in the country, and the three months of my last visit brought something new every week.23
.ind later Jaisohn, too, observed that his work had
^H.N. Allen paraphrased in Isabella B. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 16977,' p ."W: — ----
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not teen a total failure, when tie said:
The passing of the Independence Club was one of the most unfortunate things in the history of Korea, but there is one consolation to be derived from it, and that is, the seed of democracy was sown in Korea through this movement, and the leaders of the present Independence Movement in Korea are mostly members of the Old Independence Club, who somehow ^scaped with their lives from the wholesale persecution that followed the collapse of the Independence Club. Six out of the eight cabinet members elected by the people this year [19193 were the former active members of the Independence Club. 24-
^Qpoted in E.A. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
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Foreign Concessions in Korea 1896-1898
A. Russia 1. A Russian language school was established for Korean officials with Captain Birukoff as instructor (April, 1896).
2. Nisichenski acquired mining concessions at Kyung Won and Keum Sung in Ham Kyung Province (April, 1896).
5. Jules Bryner acquired a timber concession near the Yalu River and the Tumch River and Mu Sung Ulneung Island (April, 1896). 4. Three officers and ten soldiers from the Russian Army arrived in Seoul to train the Korean Army (October, 1896). These Russians continued to guard the king for four months after his return to the palace from the Russian Legation.
5. Thirteen more Russian officers arrived in Seoul (August, 1897)• 6 . Russians built a coaling station near Pusan (October, 1897)- 7. Kir Alexeiff was appointed advisor of the Korean Finance Ministry to succeed J. McL. Brown of Great Britain (October, 1897)- 8 . Reminoff was placed in charge of the Korean arsenal (November, 1897)• 9. The Russo-Korean Bank was established in Korea (March, 1898).
B. United States
1. A contract to build the Seoul-Inchon railway was awarded to James R. Morse (March, 1896).
240
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APPENDIX (continued)
B. United States (continued)
2. Morse was awarded the profitable mining concession of Unsan in Pyung An Province (April, 1896).
3. Standard Oil built a kerosene warehouse near Inchon (December, 1897). 4. A contract for the building of an electric railway, a power plant, and a water works were awarded to Colibran & Bostwick, who formed the Seoul Electric Company (February, 1898).
C. Japan
During this period, as indicated in Chapter 4, Japan was trying to protect her early gains. While the other powers concentrated on the concessions which brought quick profits such as mining and timber, Japan had a major investment in three major railways connecting to the north, the south, and the west tips of the peninsula.
1. The Seoul-Inchon railway, which had originally been awarded to Morse, was taken over by Japan (December, 1897). 2. The Seoul-Pusan railway was awarded to Japan (September, 1898). 3. The railway between Seoul and Euichu, which had originally been awarded to the French, was taken over by Japan.
D. Great Britain Because the government of Korea at that time was pro-Russian, Russia’s potential enemy in world politics could not obtain the supremacy in dealings with Korea which she enjoyed in neighboring China. She was not sent away empty-handed, however.
1. J. McLeavy Brown was placed in charge of the Korean Finance Ministry (March, 1896). (During a four-month absence of Brown, the Russians forced the Korean government to hire Alexeiff.)
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APPENDIX (continued)
D. Great Britain (continued)
2. Holm-Ringer and Company opened a branch of Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Inchon (October, 1896).
3. A.B. Stripling was appointed advisor to the Police Department (Pebruary, 1897). 4. Pritchard Morgan was awarded a large mining con cession (September, 1898). E. France As one of the three nations which had intervened against Japan, France was in a favorable situation although she was hardly active in Korea. A French syndicate was granted the railway line from Seoul to Euichu (July, 1896), which was later taken over by Japan.
F. Germany 1. R. Brinckmeier joined the Korean Customs (March, 1896).
2. E. Meyer and Company was granted the right to a mining concession (April, 1897)* 3. J. Bolljaim opened a German language school for the Korean government (July, 1898).
4. E. Meyer and Company was granted a mining concession at Keum Sung in Kang Von Province (July, 1898).
Sources: H.N. Allen, Korea: Fact and. Fancy (Seoul: Methodist Publishing House, 1904), pp. 195-207; Yi sun-keun, Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun (Seoul: Eulyu Munwhasa, 1966), pp. 767-784-; Isabella B. Eishop, Korea and Her Neighbors (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. , 18979 , PP- 427-444; Moon Il-pyung, Han Mi Kwankae Osipnyun Sa (Seoul: Cho Kwang Sa, 1945), •pp. 201-220; Pak Un-sik, Han Kuk long Sa, trans. Pak No-kyung (Taigu, Korea: Talsung Printing Co., 1946), pp. 76- 97; Chong Kyo, Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa, I, reprint edition by the Association for the liditing of National History (Seoul: Woo Chong Sa, 1959), 229-230; C.I. Eugene Kim and Han Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910)(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp« 83-102.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AMD FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS
1. Official Documents
Kukhoe Tosu Kwan [Korean Congressional Library], Ku Hanmal Choyak Icban ^ ) [Late Yi dynasty treaties collections]. Legislative Reference Materials Nos. 26 and 27. Seoul: Tong a Chulpan Sa, 1965. Kwan Bo (^Sfr ) [Government Gazette]. Seoul: Korean Gov ernment Publication, issues between 1894-1898.
Nihon Gaimu Sho [Japanese Foreign Ministry]. Nihon Gaiko Bunsho h.% ) [Japanese diplomatic documents J. Vols. 15, 26, 27 (two boohs), 28 (two books), 29, 30, 31 (two books). [Tokyo:] Nihon Kokusai Rengo K^okai.
[Nihon] Gaimu Sho Joyaku Kyoku [Bureau of Treaties of the Foreign Ministry of Japan]. Kyu Joyaku Isan /fr %. ) [Old treaties collections J: Chosen,"l?yukyu. VolT III. [Tokyo:] [n.n.] 1934.
McCune, George M., and John A. Harrison (eds). Korean-American Relations, Vol. I, Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, (1883-1886). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1S5T: Palmer, Spencer J. (ed.). Korean-American Relations, Vol. II, Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplo macy of the tfnited States, [1887-18951^ Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963*
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. A Historical Summary of United States-Korean Relations, With a Chronology of Important Developments 1834-1962. Far Eastern Series, No. 115- Department of State Pub- lication No. 7446. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.
243
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Yi Dynasty Court. II Sung Rok ( 'Bjfr -$30 [The court diary]. Vol. 433 (July 9, 189o). Seoul: Korean Government Publication.
2. First-Hand Accounts
Chong Kyo ( ^ ). Han Kuk Ki Nyun Sa ) [History ox Korea]” Vol. I of 2 vols., reprint: edition by the Association for the Editing of National History. Seoul: Woo Chorg Sa, 1959* Hwang Hyun £5^ ). Mae Chun Ya Rok ) [Hwang Hyun’s inside storyjl Reprint edition by uhe Associa tion for the Editing of National History. Seoul: Shin Jee Sa, 1955* The Independent [Seoul] iu Korean edition: April 7, 1896-December 31, 1898. b. English edition: April 7, 1896-December 31, 1897•. Jones, George H. "The Status of Women in Korea,” The Korean Repository, III (1896), reprint ed. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964-. 223-229. Kim Ok-kyun ( ). "Kap Shin II Ki" (t? ^ B gL ) [1884- diary] , in Annex of Min Tae-won. Kap Shin Chung Pyun kwa Kim Ok Kyun (EP^JSdl.^ ) IThe 1884 coup and Kim Ok-kyun]. Seoul: Kukje'Munwha Hyup Hoe, 194-7* pp. 107-154-. Kim ( )• So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso^on (•^^1^ *t$-± ) [Autobiographyaphy 01 of Dr. Philip daisonn'Jaisohn' ((as aictareded to to Kim To-taeTo-tae);].);]. Seoul: Susonsa, 194-8.
Kim Yun-sik (^ /JJ ). Sok Um Chung Sa ( ^ ^ -Ha ) [Diary of daily occurrencesJ. 2 vols., reprint edition by the Association for the Editing of National History. Seoul: Sam II Insoe Sa, I960.
The Korean Repository. 5 vols.: I, 1892; II, 1895; IU, 1896; IV, 1897; V, 1898. Reprint edition. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964-.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Kuk Sa Pyun Chan Wiwonhoe ( ) [Association for the Editing of National History]. Tong Hak Nan Kirok ) [Records of the Tong Hak Rebellion]. 2 vols. Seoul: Sam II Insoe Chusik Hoesa, 1959* Pak Chi-won Ban stories], trans. Y w 194-7. So Jai-pil ( ^ ^ 1 * 3 ). "Che Mi Osip Nyun" ), [Pifty years' stay in the United States], m Annex of Min Tae-won. Kap Shin Chung Pyun kwa Kim Ok Kyun ) LThe 1884 coup and Kim Ok-kyun]. Seoul: Kukje Munwha Hyup Hoe, 194-7. PP- 87-94-. . "Hoe Ko Kap Shin Chung Pyun" ( LA recollection of the 1884- coup], in Annex of Min Tae-won. pp. 79-86.
[So Jai-pil] Philip Jaisohn. "Korean Finance," The Korean Repository, III (1896), reprint ed. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964. 166-168. Yun, T.H. [Yun Chee-ho]. "Popular Movements in Korea," The Korean Repository, Y (1898), reprint ed. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964. 465-469*
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Korean Sources Aeguk Tongji Wonhohoe ( ) [Association to Aid Patriotic Comrades]. Han Kuk Tong Nip Undong Sa (4ft d fcj [History of the Korean independence movement]. Seoul: Aeguk Tongji Wonhohoe, 1956.
Chang To-bin'(Si )• Im 0 M Ran kwa Kap Shin Chung Pyun (43RSSU4-) L1882 military mutiny and 1884 coupT* Seoul: Tjukheung Suhlim, 1927*
_ . Tai Won Kun kwa Myung Sung Whang Hoo ( fr-; LTai Won Kun and Queen Min J. Seoul: Dukheung Suhlim, 1927.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Cho Ki-0un )• Han Kuk Kyung Jae Sa [History 01 tae Korean economy]. Seoul: II Shin Sa, 1962 o Kang Man-keel (jL ~A ^ ), and others. Han Kuk Hyun Dae Sa: Siryun e seun Wangcho ) LModern history of Korea. Vol. 1, The dynasty under trial], 1863-1899. Seoul: Sinku Munwha Sa, 1969. Kim Pyung-gon ). Yicho Tang.jang Sawha ( ) [History of factionalism under the”Ti dynasty]. Seoul: Sam Jung Dang, 1967. Kim Seung-hak ) * Han Kuk Tong Nip Sa ( # 0 ) [History of Korean independencej. Seoul: Tong Nip Munwha S a, 1964. Kim Suk-hyung ("^ ), and others. Kim Ok Kyun Pyungyang: Sahoe Kwahak Yuksa Yunkuso, 1964.
Kim Yong-eui )« Chwa Ong Yun Chee Ho Suns eng Ryak Chun ) LBrief personal history of Yun Chee-^ho] /^5eoul:nidokkyo Cho sun Kamlihyo Chongli- won, 1934. Kong Po Sil ( ) [Republic of Korea, Office of Public Information]. Wol Nam Yi Sang Jae Sunseng Ryak Chun ( j LBrief personal history of Yi Sang-jae]. Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1956. Kwa Hak Won ( lil-1!; ) [North Korean Academy of Science]. Cho sun Keunaae Hyukmyung Undong Sa ( ^ ) LHistory of the modern Korean revolution]. Pyungyang: Kwa Hak Won Chul Pan Sa, 1962.
Min Tae-won )• Kap Shin Chung Pyun kwa Kim Ok Kyun ( tp & *1) ) L^he 1884 coup and Kim Ok-kyunJl' Seoul: Kukje Munwha Hyup Hoe, 1947-
Moon Il-pyung ( ^ ) • Han Mi Kwankae Osipnyun Sa [History of fifty years of Korean-AmericanrelationsJ. Seoul: Cho Kwang Sa, 1945-
Pak Ku-pyung ( ;fL /L.3& ) ? and others. Han Kuk Hyun Dae Sa: Yul Kang eiZ Chit Yak T O M LModern history of Korea. Vol. 2, Powers' aggression], 1885- 1905. Seoul: Sinku Munwha Sa, 1969.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Park Mun-ok CtVti- ). Han Kuk Chung Bu Ron [Study of the Korean government J. Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1963.
Pak Sung-ha ( ^ ). Unam Yi Seung Man Paksa Chun ) [The life of Dr. Syngman Rhee]. Seoul: ^yung? Se^Dang, 1956. Pak Tong-suh ). Han Kuk Kwanryo Chedo eui Yuksa chuk Chunkae ) LA histori cal analysis of the Korean bureaucratic system]. Seoul: Han Kuk Yunku Tosuhkwan, 1961.
Pak Un-sik ). Han Kuk Tong Sa (j^L |^J ^ ) [The psdpful history of Korea], trans. Pak Mo-kyung ). Taigu, Korea: Talsung Printing Co.,
Yi Buk-man (^ ) • ^i Cho Sahoe Kyungjae Sa Yunku ( r a . f l - ) L Hi story of the economy of the Yi dynastytsty J. Seoul:i3eoui: Tai Sung Chulpan Sa, 1948.
Yi Kwang-su (7| 4.5% ). Yi Kwang Su Chun Jip (“$ ) [Collected writings of Yi Kwang-su]. Vol. 17. Seoul: Sang Jung Dang, 1962.
Yi Pyung-do fayZ. }* Sa Tai Kwan ( [Comprehensive review of national history]. Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1961. Han Kuk Sa Tai Kwan (J|| feJ ) [Comprehen sive review of Korean historyj. Seoul: Po Mun Kak, 1969. iun-keun (5i Han Kuk Sa: Hyun Dae Pyun 'ft ^ [Modern Korean history]. Seoul: Eulyu Munwhala, 1966. . Han Kuk Tong Nip Undong Sa [History of the Korean independence movement], Seoul: Sang Mun Von, 195i<
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2. English. Sources
Allen, Horace N. Korea: Pact and Fancy. Seoul: Methodist Publishing House, 1904.
. Things Korean. Hew York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 33C5S. ------
Asakawa, Kan'ichi. The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Cause and Issues. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904.
Bishop, Isabella B. Korea and Her neighbors. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1897.
Bland, J.O.P. China Japan and Korea. London: William Heinemann, l92l.
Brown, Arthur Judson. The Mastery of the Far East. New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons, l9l9•
Cable, E.M. United States-Korean Relations 1866-1871. Seoul: Chosen Christian College, 1959*
Chien, Frederick F. The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy, 1876-1865« l_N.p.:J Shoe String Press, 196/.
Choi, Woonsang. The Fall of the Hermit Kingdom. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1967*
Chung, Henry (comp.). Korean Treaties. New York: H.S. Nichols, Inc., 1919•- Conroy, Hilary. The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19^0.
Creel, H.G. Confucius: The Man and The Myth. New York: John Day Co., 194-9 • David, F.D. Our Neighbors, the Koreans. New York: Field Afar Press, 194-9* Gale, James S. The Vanguard: A Tale"'of Korea. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1904.
Griffis, William E. Corea: The Hermit Nation: New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l907.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Griffis, William E. A Modern Pioneer in Korea: The Life
Ha, Tae Hung. Korea-Forty Three Centuries. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1962.
Hamilton, Angus. Korea. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. Harrington, Fred H. God Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884- l905» Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944^ Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. •
Hulbert, Homer B. The Passing of Korea. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1906. Kendall, Carlton Waldo. The Truth About Korea. San Francisco: Korean National Association, 1919- Kim, C.I.E., and Changboh Chee (eds.). Aspects of Social Change in Korea. Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korean Research and Publications, Inc., 1968.
Kim, C.I.E., anfl Han Kyo Kim. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism: 1876-1910. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19&7* Kim, Changsoon (ed.). The Culture of Norea. [N.p.:] Korean American Cultural Association, 1945- Lee, Chung-sik. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
Liem, Channing. America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohiu New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1952T Malozemoff, Andrew. Russian Far Eastern Policy,1881-1904. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.
McCune, Shannon [BoydJ. Korea: Land of Broken Calm. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Rostrand Co., 1966.
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McCune, Shannon [Boyd]. Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956. McKenzie, P.A. Korea's Right For Freedom. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1^20. The Tragedy of. Korea. London: Hodder and Stoughton,Ln. d.J. Meadows, Thomas Taylor, The Chinese and Their Rebellions. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 185&.
Portway, Colonel Donald. Korea: Land of the Morning Calm. London: George G.G. Harrap and Co., 1953•
Reischauer, E.O., and John K. Fairbank. East Asia: The Great Tradition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., I960.
______. East Asia: The Modern Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19^5 •
Romanov, B.A. Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906), trans. Susan Wilbur Jones. Ann Arbor, Michigan: J.W. Edwards, 1952. Ross, Rev. John. History of Corea. Paisley, Scotland: J. and R. Parlane, 1880. Underwood, Horace G. The Call of Korea: Political~Social- Religious. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1908.
Underwood, Dr. L.H. Fifteen Years Among the Top-Knots or Life in Korea. Boston: American Tract Society, 1904.
Underwood of Korea. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co77 1915: With Tommy Tompkins in Korea. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1905- Weems, Clarence N. (ed.). Hulbert's History of Korea. 2 vols. New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1962.
Wright, Mary C . The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism. New York: Atheneum, 1966.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
5. Japanese Sources
Chosen Sodoku Fu [Government-General of Korea]. Chosen Shi no Shxrube o LI'S' ) [Guide to KoreanliistoryJI Keijo LSeoulJi Chosen Insatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1936.
Hatada Takashi ( ).- Chosen Shi ) [History of Korea]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, i960.
Hosokawa. Karoku Shoku Min Shi [Colonial history]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, 19^1. Imanishi, Ryu ( ). Chosen Shi no Shiori <0 50: ) [A guide to Korean history]” Keijo [Seoul]: ChikiLzawa Shoten, 1936.
Kikuchi Ken jo )• Kindai Chosen Shi [History of modem Korea]. 2 vols. Tokyo: Dai Riku Kenkyu Sho, 1937• Kin Ki-mei ). Kosen Taiihkun to Binki ) [Tai Won Kun and Queen Min]. Tokyo:' Yoyosha, 1967. Tabohashi, Kiyosti ( Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Kankeishi ( k p ) L Hi story of modern Japanese foreign relations!. Tokyo: Toko Shoin, 1930.
Yamanabe Kentaro ( )• Nihon no Kahkoku Heigo (
4. Periodicals and Articles The [Baltimore] Sun, February 1, 1897• Choi Joon "Kojong Sidae Communication Hyungtae eui Kochal: Teukhee Tong Nip Shinmun kwa Hyuphoe leul Chungsim euro” [A study on the forms of communication during the reign of King Ko Jong], Sahak Yuenku (Jl M t ) LThe study of history], III (April, 195^)» 1424.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Chun Kwan-woo ). "Yuksipnyun gune Tyelbun Haetdun Kukhoe" ( H ) [There might, have been a Congress sixty years ago], Sin Tae Yang G^Jr'kKi ) [New Sun], VII :V (May, 1958), 158-163. -m 'M/7
Koh Byong-ik ). "Rowhang Jaikwansik e eui Saheng kwa Hanro Kyo sup" <^1T 4- ) [The mission for the Russian coronation dnd the Rus^o-Korean negotiation]., The Yoksa Hakbo [The Korean historical review], 28 (September, 1965), 41-69. "Yang Ban" (C$[ ), Tai Pak kwa Sa Jon [Korean encyclopedia]. Vol. IV.
5. Unpublished Works Choe, Ching-young. "The decade of the Tae-won'gun." Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Harvard University, I960. Han Eeung-soo. "Tong NipHyup Hoe e Kwan Han Yun Ku; 1896- 1898" ( ) [A study of the Inde pendence Club]. Unpublished1 Master's thesis, Yonsei [Seoul] University, 1963.
Ledyard, Gari Keith. "The Korean Language Reform of 1445: The Origin, Background and Early History of the Korean Alphabet." Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Columbia University, 1965- Nahm, Andrew Changwoo. "Kim Ok-kyun and the Korean Progres sive Movement." Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Stanford University, 1961.
Wagner, Edward W. "The Literati Purges." Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Harvard University, 1959-
Weems, Clarence N., Jr. "The Korean Reform and Independence Movement (1881-1898)." Unpublished Doctor's disser tation, Columbia University, 1954.
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