Revision Notes On African Response to Colonialism - For Printing & Revision Only Detailed notes shall be served later-on

AFRICAN RESPONSE TO COLONIALISM

 Semei Kakungulu - a Career Opportunist and Collaborator  The Bambatha Rising (1906-07)  Nama & Herero Resistance in South West Africa (1904-1907)  The War of the Guns 1878 (Basuto War of Disarmament)  The Shona-Ndebele (Chemurenga) Rising (1896-97) [The Mashona-Matebele Revolt in Zimbabwe]  The Maji-Maji Rising in German East Africa (1905-07)  The Hut-Tax (Temne-Mende) war in Sierra Leone 1898  Why African resistance to colonialism failed

The Scramble for Africa was followed by its partition, which two were extensively peaceful. The exercise was soon followed by the imposition of colonial rule that was done through a combination of coercive and persuasive means. The intensity of European violence towards Africans influenced the reaction of African societies towards them, and the reaction of Africans as well influenced the behavior of the Europeans. In that regard therefore, it was a two-way process.

African response to colonialism refers to the reaction of Africans towards the imposition and consolidation of colonial rule in Africa. Such response ranged from collaboration to resistance; and if not, passive response (indifference).

African Collaborators included the Baganda Protestants (Semei Kakungulu), Lenana of the Masai, the Fante, Nuwa Mbaguta, Lobengula of the Ndebele, the Tokol Empire and the Barotse of Central Africa. Resistors included Kabalega of Bunyoro, Mwanga of Buganda, Samore Toure of the Mandika Empire, Kwaku Dua III (Prempe I) of Asante and Mkwawa of the Hehe, Menelik II of Ethiopia, the Nandi, the Zulu, the Coastal Arabs in East Africa, Muslims in Algeria, e.t.c.

Guiding Questions:

1.With specific examples, show the inadequacy of attempts to draw a sharp distinction between collaborators and resistors to colonial invaders.

2.Examine the statement that resistors were backward looking or heroes and collaborators forward looking or traitors.

3.Is it useful any longer to regard resistors as backward looking and collaborators as forward looking?

Page 1 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Determinants of the form of response to colonial rule

Africans reacted or responded differently in the face of not only different colonial masters but even in the face of the same colonial masters. While many resisted colonialism, many collaborated or remained indifferent. Various factors have been advanced to explain the diversity in African reaction to colonialism.

Circumstances prevailing in a given society at the advent of colonialism determined the mode of response. There are societies that had been attacked and weakened by natural calamities like small pox, jiggers, earthquakes, famine, periods of droughts, sleeping sickness, rinderpest and locust invasions. For instance the Masai and Banyankole would be resistors but were so hit by the natural calamities of diseases and epidemics. In Malawi, the Ngonde in fear of extinction due to Arab attacks supported the British in establishing their rule. The Lewanika of Barotseland allegedly collaborated because he wanted to consolidate his position over rebellious chiefs within his kingdom. The internal strife between the old and the new order in Buganda weakened the King’s authority leaving the Baganda Christian converts and their leaders to collaborate with the British imperialists.

Military strength of a given society; some felt they were militarily weak and sought for protection against internal and external enemies. Buganda was for instance faced with the Egyptian, Bunyoro and internal threats that made her to collaborate with the invaders (the British). On the other hand, societies that were united and militarily strong not to fear neighbors (internal enemies) such as the Ndebele, Mandinka and Bunyoro militarily resisted colonial rule.

Missionary influence; by fostering disunity along religious lines, Christianity undermined the capacity of Africans to resist colonial rule. These missionaries created the impression that colonialism was synonymous (identical/the same) with progress thereby turning the would be resistors into collaborators such as in Buganda, Bunyoro, the Hehe, Busoga and Sierra Leone. No wonder that where missionary influence was less significant such as in Bunyoro colonialism was strongly resisted.

Attitude of the invaders (colonialists) towards the invaded (Africans); background information by explorers and Christian Missionaries had created an impression in Europe that certain societies were naturally uncompromising while others were good e.g. Kabalega and Bunyoro already had a bad name in Europe due to the writings of Samuel Baker and missionary reports. Lobengula had also been painted ‘black’. Such ‘bad’ people and societies were therefore treated with hostility by the invaders hence provoking resistance. Societies that were treated with friendliness responded with friendliness and collaborated.

Previous experience with the European invaders; in West Africa where Europeans had been long before the scramble and partition, Africans had given them protection and comfort treating them as guests. When the very Europeans later came claiming to protect the Africans, resistance was provoked such as of Jaja of Opobo (1887), Tukolor Empire (1893) and of Illorin (1897). In Bunyoro kingdom Kabalega had defeated Samuel Baker in 1872. Later, Kabalega resisted the British hoping that history would repeat itself. In societies where earlier encounter with the Europeans had been cordial (pleasant) such as in Buganda and some parts of Senegal, collaboration was evident.

Page 2 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Presence of opportunists; where opportunists existed such as in Buganda and Masailand collaboration or utmost indifference were the modes of response. Where opportunists were few or even absent such as in Ethiopia and Bunyoro resistance was the main mode of response.

Degree of political organization of a society; centralized societies resisted or should have resisted because they had developed a sense of national identity. Such societies fought the invaders to preserve their independence and identity. Examples included Ethiopia, Mandika, Ndebele and Bunyoro. The leaders of centralized states were not only a symbol of unity but also of heritage and therefore fought for political as well as cultural independence. On the other hand non-centralized societies lacked attributes of national identity and therefore to a great degree collaborated.

The attitude of the African rulers; some African leaders were friendly to the European invaders while others were determined to preserve their independent indigenous political institutions at whatever cost. For instance, George Pepple of Bonny was pro-Europeans while Prembe I and Jaja Opobo were opposed, which explains their variation in response. In Ethiopia Menelik II and in Bunyoro Kabalega were clearly opposed to white supremacy in their nations hence they sternly resisted.

Interstate relations; where two neighboring states had hostility at the advent of colonialism one tended to collaborate against its enemy while the other resisted for it could not be a friend to its enemy’s friends. For instance Buganda Kingdom collaborated with the British while Bunyoro resisted. In West Africa, when the Fante collaborated ‘enemy’ Asante resisted. Where two states had cordial relations their response was similar. For instance the good relations that existed between Bechuanaland and Barotseland made Khama to collaborate in imitation of his friend Lewanika so as to defend their states against the Ndebele.

Presence of Islam; Islam has been for long regarded a traditional enemy of Christianity. Therefore where Islam was significant resistance against the European Christian ‘infidels’ was inevitable. Examples include the Mahdist revolt, Abushiri resistance and the Urabi rebellion. At the same time the presence of Islam made these who hated the militancy with which it was spread to collaborate with the invaders. For example the Bambara of upper Niger collaborated with the French to destroy the Tukolor Empire that was forcing them into Islam.

African Traditional Religion; the people’s faith in African religion, which Europeans dismissed as paganism, determined the method of response. African traditional religion inspired hope, provided the will for war engineered a sense of enthusiasm and nationalism. These aspects combined to inspire Africans against not only collaborators but also invaders. Indeed it has been argued that the moral conscious of the people to resist colonialism was embodied in African Traditional Religion. For instance the Mlimo (Mwari) cult was responsible for the Shona-Ndebele rebellion against the British (1896-7) while the Kalero cult inspired the Maji-Maji uprising against the Germans (1905-07).

Economic stability; economically strong kingdoms such as Ethiopia and Mandika could put up a remarkable resistance while the economically weak like the Masai could not.

Some responded by collaborating out of ignorance that the white man had come as a visitor and would soon go away. To some societies, it is (would) be evil to resist a visitor. Most Page 3 of 32 - By Charles Kasule African rulers were ignorant of the intensions of the Europeans and colonial agents. Some were softened by bribes and persuaded to sign treaties beyond their understanding e.g. Apollo Kaggwa, Lobengula, Omukama Kasagama and Samore Toure.

Some were opportunists (self-seekers) who responded by collaboration expecting a lot of rewards and war loot. For instance Semei Kakungulu, Nuwa Mbaguta of Ankole, Lenana of the Masai, Mumia of Luyia and Wanyiki of Kikuyu. They had personal interests to promote and to defend. Therefore one can regard them as traitors.

To some extent these collaborators can be termed as traitors due to the fact that they deliberately sold their independence to the whites through bribery just like Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda.

SEMEI KAKUNGULU – A Career Opportunist and Collaborator

The British needed good will and support of the local people in order to establish an effective and efficient colonial administration in Uganda. Semei Kakungulu was one of the most important local personalities in Buganda who fitted well in that British desire. His career illustrates the crucial role played by the Ganda Protestants in spreading British imperialism throughout Uganda.

By origin, Kakungulu was a Muganda from Kooki. By personality he was overwhelmingly ambitious and militarily talented. He has been variously described as a chief rival of yet another great British collaborator Sir Apollo Kaggwa for Protestant leadership in Buganda.

He began his career as a great elephant hunter an act that enabled him find his way to the king’s court in Buganda. He soon joined the Buganda military service where he quickly demonstrated that he was not just an ordinary soldier. He became a hero in the religious wars of the 1880’s and 1890’s in Buganda and an envied general in the British wars of conquest.

There was a civil war in Buganda between 1888 and 1890 where the Christians and Mwanga formed an alliance of convenience and succeeded in ousting the Muslims. They needed Mwanga because he still enjoyed the much needed popular support in Buganda. The Christians won partly due to the brilliant generalship of the Catholic commander Gabriel Kintu and the Protestant Semei Kakungulu. In these wars Kakungulu emerged the most able Protestant general and indeed was instrumental in the capture of Mengo the capital from the Muslims.

He joined the British when they embarked on the effective colonization of Uganda (and even Kenya) in the last decade of the 19th century as an ardent (enthusiastic/passionate) collaborator and opportunist. In 1892, the British in Buganda were concerned about the fighting between the different religious factions. The Catholics had fled to an island in Lake Victoria and to Buddu. A decision was made to send a military expedition to dislodge these Catholics from the Island and Buddu, which expedition was led by Kakungulu. After a brilliant performance, he was rewarded by being elevated from a sub-county chief to a county chief.

Page 4 of 32 - By Charles Kasule In 1892, he helped to subdue the Basoga for the I.B.E.A.Co. In 1893, he played a significant role in the Anglo-Ganda campaign against Bunyoro, the year in which there was a Moslem revolt in Buganda that was defeated by a combined Protestant-Catholic in a battle at Lubaga near the capital Mengo. The Moslems retreated to Toro, where they were pursued by a Protestant army under Semei Kakungulu, and then defeated. But he was not yet done by his collaborative role and in 1895 he commanded 900 Ganda volunteers, helping the British to silence a Bukusu resistance in Western Kenya.

When he was chased out of Bunyoro in 1894, he had been allocated Chief of the captured lands of Bugerere. He later (in 1899) helped to capture Kabalega and Mwanga who were waging a struggle against British rule. He then handed them to the British who promptly exiled them.

Sir Apollo Kagwa’s dominance deprived Kakungulu of the chance for political leadership he aspired to in Buganda. In the mid 1890’s Kakungulu was in charge of areas Buganda had acquired from Bunyoro but it became increasingly impossible for him to co-exist with Kaggwa. By 1898, he was commissioned by the British to round up dissidents (dissenters/rebels) to the far side of Lake Kyoga.

He used this opportunity to establish over the Kumam and create an empire for himself based on the Buganda model. This model comprised the establishment of the traditional structure of government akin (similar) to that in Buganda and the British claim to be the over ruling power above the structure. He did much in exporting the ‘Buganda model’ to other parts of the British protectorate.

In spite the numerous attacks from the Langi, by 1899, Kakungulu had managed to establish a fort at Kaweri Island in Lake Kyoga and was now in a stronger position to extend his influence eastwards. He established a fort among the Iteso at Serere from where he waged a serious war against the Langi whom he finally repulsed though never conquered.

By 1900 he was operating southwards to Budaka near current Mbale town of Eastern Uganda. He easily subdued the people around this area since they were inadequately armed and decentralized. By 1902, he had over 10,000 square miles under his control. He divided these areas into administrative counties by appointing officials and establishing the Buganda model of administration.

He used local labaour to build roads and forts. He appointed many Baganda who had flocked into his newly acquired ‘empire’ with hope of looting and gaining cattle and land. His success in Eastern Uganda however gave him a false impression which made him become too ambitious. He began to regard himself as king of Eastern Uganda and wished the British to recognize him as so- though it never came true and accounted for much of his frustrations in the exercise.

Meanwhile the British were alarmed by the swift but effective progress Kakungulu was making and consequently took over his headquarters at Budaka in 1901. He now moved to Mbale where he established his authority. In Mbale, he constructed roads, enforced cash crop production and afforestation.

In 1903, it was decided that Mbale becomes the seat of British administration in the region, as the British expected to introduce the Buganda type of administration in the area and

Page 5 of 32 - By Charles Kasule supervise it themselves. The problem was that the Bagisu population did not have central authority through which they would be controlled. Besides, the population was too large for a single British officer to handle.

As such the British Provincial Commissioner Boyle decided to take over the local Ganda administration as created by Kakungulu and make it an instrument of British authority. He was made a county chief of the ‘Mbale area’ and his system slightly modified by making his appointees not chiefs but agents and advisers of the local chiefs. The local chief would be obtained from the local population.

The Mbale experience was a clear sign that British were interested in curtailing (limiting) him. Having lost his authority in Mbale, he moved to Busoga in 1906 where he introduced the Buganda model. He subdivided the county into seven counties and introduced Baganda agents and advisors. He created the office of and made himself the first Paramount Chief (Kyabazinga) of Busoga.

While there, he did not like the idea of being supervised by the British. To his dismay his post in the Lukiiko of Busoga was scrapped in 1913 and he ordered to return to Bukedi as a mere Saza (county) chief. As a reward he was given a lot of land. But for Kakungulu who had offered his services in a bid to become king of Eastern Uganda, this was a great humiliation. As such frustrated, he turned into a resistor against British Imperialism which he had worked so hard to establish; nevertheless, it was too late.

Desperate Kakungulu now became interested in the Bamalaki religious sect, which had broken away from the Anglican Church in 1914. It was named Bamalaki after its foremost preacher Malaki Musajjakawa and it called itself ‘The Society of the one Almighty God.’ Its most prominent figure was Joshua Kate who has been described as the most important clan head in Buganda and also an important County Chief. The other prominent person was Kakungulu.

Kate and his sect criticized the lack of faith of the missionaries as exemplified in their dependence on medical doctors. As a result of opposition, the government thought Kakungulu who was once an ardent supporter was now a chief enemy and suspected him for not only opposing the British on religious grounds but also on political basis.

He regrettably died in 1929 cursing himself for having effectively and efficiently rendered service to the British without any meaningful tangible benefits. His career was a demonstration that the British colonialists in Uganda accorded the same treatment to Africans whether resistors or collaborators or opportunists.

Page 6 of 32 - By Charles Kasule THE BAMBATHA RISING (1906-1907)

The Bambatha rebellion was a war of resistance by the Zulu people of South Africa against the British. It began in 1906 and ended in 1907 under the leadership of Bambata - an Induna (military commander) of the Zulu army. The disintegration of the once mighty Zulu State had been completed in July 1879 with the British victory over the Zulu at the Battle of Ulundi. Like other secondary rebellions on the African continent, the Bambatha rebellion among the Zulu was an example of African reaction to colonial exploitative, oppressive and suppressive rule. A complexity of causes both long-term and immediate accounted for this early 20th century upsurge in South Africa. Its impact was varied but most of which destructive on the African peoples.

Causes of the Rising

Taxation; the British Imperial Government introduced a one pound poll tax per head irrespective of race, colour or income level of the taxpayer - in addition to the tax levied on land. In South Africa lived the Africans, Europeans, Cape Coloureds and Asians in order of their descending numbers. To the British colonial government, taxation had a double advantage. First, it was a revenue-generating device and secondly a tool for recruiting cheap labour. Many Europeans were earning twenty times as much as the Africans. It was therefore unfair that people were subjected to taxation rates irrespective of their income, hence the rebellion.

The mal-administration by the British and the Boers towards the Zulu was another cause. The destruction of the Zulu Nation in 1897 was followed by the “divide and refrain” policy as instituted by the conquerors. Zulu chiefs were deprived of their rights and powers to create an army. As a result there was anarchy as law and order could not be maintained. Zulu warlords were also ignored and not recognised. In 1906, there was a minor rising in Natal but was met by excessive Imperial British government brutality. The government declared martial law, sent in troops and sentenced many to death in militia courts. Executions were promptly effected without any further delay, which was over reaction. This lack of foresight amounted into gross maladministration (unpleasant/disgusting) making the situation fertile for rebellion.

The Zulu grievances over the colonial labour policies; these policies included forced labour and deliberate underpayment. Forced labour was implemented on a false assumption that Africans were by nature used to supplying free labour a false view developed from the African reciprocal (mutual/give-and-take) labour practices. Most unfortunate was that taxation was also used as a labour recruitment device. In spite of complaints and even warnings from the civil service, the colonial government did not listen. Such increasing burdens of the Africans could not be tolerated any longer by 1906 the rising come to pass to undo the unfair labour policies and the false belief that Africans were used to supplying free labour.

Page 7 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Loss of land; the colonial government used alienation policy with little reservation in Zululand as land went to the Britons and the Boers. Like in Transkei, Africans in Zululand were concentrated in increasingly crowded pockets of land known as reserves, coupled with changing patterns of life. The development of the white economy in South Africa based partly on mineral extraction which caused misery in the village reserves. Reserves became habitats for women, children and the old. They were places of poverty, scarcity of land, diseases and unbearable taxes. Such conditions triggered off a rural urban drift. But even then the good life in towns was conservation for the rich Europeans. Such a situation rooted the rebellion.

Loss of independence; in 1879 the Zulu were defeated at the Battle of Ulundi and their leader Chetswayo was exiled by the British. From this time, the Zulu nation itself received a number of British administrators who governed on their own accord despite the wishes of the Zulu. This loss of independence was resisted by the Zulu hence leading to the Bambatha rebellion.

Loss of cattle by the Zulu; cattle were their only hope for survival of the Zulu people which was lost to the British and the Boers. Unfortunately, about the same time a cattle disease struck some of the remaining stock of cattle. This cattle loss worsened the misery of the Zulu and caused suffering which was blamed on the whites hence the rebellion.

The religious forces; first was the belief in Ethiopianism - a religious movement with the slogan “Africa for Africans.” The movement became a popular wave in South Africa more so after the Adowa victory of 1896. Ethiopianism gained a strong ground among the Zulu and preached rebellion. It is therefore sound to suspect that this religious movement laid below the instinct for the Zulu rising. Religion still accounted for the belief that European bullets would never hurt Africans. All these religious beliefs combined to cause the 1906-7 Bambatha rebellion.

The Zulu desire to recapture their past history (historical legacy) by regaining their self- determination. Previously, the Zulu had been a powerful people all the way from the times of Shaka. They had a glorious and an independent nation and above all were the key players in the affairs of South Africa and beyond. But since the 1879 Battle of Ulundi, gone were the good days. Thus in discussing the Bambatha rebellion, it would be naive to ignore the political drive of the Zulu in the act of rising against their new uninvited masters.

The growth of independent Church movements in South and Central Africa led to the rebellion. The independent church movements were the churches that broke away from the main stream European Christian churches. They were completely opposed to any kind of foreign rule, and following Ethiopia’s victory over Italy in 1896, the independent church movements developed the principle of Ethiopians whose aim was to resist against the European colonial rule. It was therefore their preaching that inspired Bambata and other Zulu leaders to rise up against the British rule in 1906.

Page 8 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Worry for loss of trade to the British companies intensified the rebellion. When the British colonized the interior of South Africa, trade was made to be conducted entirely by the British South African Company of Cecil Rhodes and other Europeans. The trade in ivory, gold, copper among others which the Zulu used to dominate was now taken over by the British agents. Thus the desire to establish a strong hold in their trade relations made the Bambatha rebellion eminent.

The desire to safeguard their cultural values; the Zulu were worried about the teachings of European Christian missionaries in South Africa. The missionaries from Europe attacked the culture of the Zulu and disintegrated the powers of their political and spiritual leaders. Instead, the European missionaries campaigned for practices that were dispensable to the Zulu such as “love your neighbour as you love yourself” and the presence of monogamy, among others which led to the rebellion.

The hatred to Shona and Sotho warrant chiefs; the British also annoyed the Zulu by employing outsiders to work with the British administrators among the Zulu. Several Shona and Sotho people were employed by the British to administer the Zulu and yet the Shona and Sotho were formerly the subjects of the Zulu. Therefore making them bosses over the Zulu intensified the rebellion.

The emergence of leadership by a minor Induna Bambatha, perhaps was the immediate cause of the rebellion. He offered the necessary leadership and direction for the rebellious mood. Events unfolding in Zululand prior to 1906 had created a fertile ground for an uprising rendering Bambatha’s appearance on the scene necessary for action. The importance of Bambatha was paramount in this “rebellion” so much so that it got its name the Bambatha rebellion from him. His emergence was therefore relevant in enabling the Zulu to rise at the time they did.

The rebellion therefore broke out under the leadership of Bambatha. Although he did not have a defined plan of action, Bambatha was able to appeal to the Zulu national feelings prompting a number of Zulu leaders to join. As such the rising gained momentum and dragged on from 1906-07 with considerable impact.

Impact of the rebellion

Loss of life and destruction of property; as expected, the British colonial government found a reason - in fact an excuse to teach the over mighty Zulu a lesson and so employed a policy of genocide. Little effort was made by the British combatants/fighters to distinguish between the innocent and the rebels. Whoever and whatever was found was destroyed. By the end of the short-lived rising 3000 Africans vis-à-vis 32 whites were dead. Property was ruined and in the end the Zulu never regained the land they had fought for. Consequently, squatting and its accompanying poverty became the order of the day.

Page 9 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The Zulu identity and sense of nationalism and unity (as created by Shaka) was demonstrated. Credit should go to Shaka who laid the strong nationalistic foundation and to the subsequent leaders for keeping the foundation spirit alive. No wonder that appeals by Bambatha to rise were quickly heard by the Zulu peoples and leaders. Indeed it was a demonstration that the Zulu were not a heavily divided people.

Suffering of the Zulu in particular and the Africans in general increased. For instance the unfair poll tax that the Zulu rose against was not repealed (cancelled) after the war. Instead Africans were to pay the poll tax after the miserable humiliation at the battlefield. They continued to suffer in all sectors at the expense of the whites.

There was a clear demonstration of superior military technology and organisation by the Europeans vis-à-vis inferior and disorganised military arrangements of the Africans. The Zulu were used to open battles, cow-horn methods and the hand to hand combat, all of which could not stand the power of the multi-barreled maximum gunfire. It’s due to the military inferiority that the Zulu easily fell prey to the British canon fire.

The war caused famine; like with the rest of the African societies where resistance against colonial rule was witnessed, Bambatha caused hunger and famine in South Africa. This was through destruction of gardens and cultivation as well as the recruitment of able bodied men to go for war leaving the agriculture sector unattended to.

Africans were and have been credited for rising up in the Bambatha rebellion. This action helped in shattering the stereotype (typecast) belief that Africans could not resist. The Zulu like the Banyoro continued to be respected and hence gained considerable respect though it was loss at the battlefield.

It was a lesson to the rest of the Africans. Like in the Maji-Maji rising of 1905-07 in Germany East Africa, military approach to white rule was a fruitless venture although Menelik II of Ethiopia effectively employed it. Possibly this explains future nationalists’ policy of reconciliation. It was also learnt that a national strategy rather than individual group struggles was better.

Disarmament of the Zulu; unlike in the war of the guns where the Basuto were allowed to keep their guns after defeating the British, the Zulu loss of the war was followed with complete disarmament. This was a British strategy to make the Zulu refrain from the war attempts.

The British introduced the policy of genocide, just like the Germans in silencing uprisings in Germany East Africa and Namibia. The rising therefore demonstrated the similarity in European violence in silencing the African nationalistic voice. After all Cecil Rhodes had indicated that the map of Africa was to be “painted red” by planting the British flag from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo which was to be done at all costs. It can therefore be stated

Page 10 of 32 - By Charles Kasule that the Bambatha rebellion was a possible negative advertisement for the Imperial Government of South Africa.

The war caused migration of the Zulu people and the accompanying socio-economic effects. Many of the Zulu could not continue staying with in the empire because of economic hardships. The young and adults were forced to migrate further south to the towns of Durban, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth in mining centers such as Kimberly and Windhock, while some migrated to work in British farms. They began to look for salaried jobs because life was becoming unbearable with the Zulu Empire.

The war intensified torture for the Africans. Africans were further oppressed and suppressed as the whites embarked on revenge for the death of their 33 Europeans. More types of taxes unknown before, were introduced in the area. For instance, the Zulu were now made to pay property taxes such as tax on animals. Forced labour also became more rampant and intense than before as whites strongly believed that the Zulus could not rise against the whites any more.

In summary, these causes were varied and complex. A series factors seem to have combined to trigger off this early 20th century Anglo-Zulu drama. The results were also many and significant. But when all is said, the consequences amounted to an exorbitant/excessive cost for Africans for many years to come. Colonialism had come to stay.

Revision questions

1. Discuss the causes and effects of the Bambatha rebellion of 1906-07

2. Assess the effects and account for the defeat of the Bambatha rebellion by the British

3. Examine the causes and effects of the 1906-07 Bambatha rebellion in South Africa.

Page 11 of 32 - By Charles Kasule NAMA & HERERO RESISTANCE IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA (1904-1907)

Establishment of Germany rule in Africa commenced in 1884 following a change in Germany mood to favour colonial takeovers. South West Africa then consisted of three main African communities. These included the Agricultural Ovambo located in Northern Namibia and bordering Angola; the Pastoral Herero_a Bantu-speaking people living in the Central part of current Namibia and the Nama. Like the Herero, the Nama were cattle keepers and nomads. But unlike the Herero, they were not Bantu but Khoikhoi. Other minor ethnicities included the San, the Berg-Damara and the Rehobothers (mixed race).

Like elsewhere in Africa, the mechanism of establishing colonial rule in South West Africa did not exclude Christian missionaries. Missionaries were on the scene as early as 1821 and became more permanent from 1840 when the Rhenish Mission Society took over from the London Missionary Society. The Missionary plea for Germany “protection” was answered in 1884 when the area was declared a Germany colony. But the gospel of subjugation had earlier been preached and paved the way for Germany rule.

Earlier responses by the main ethnic groups: the Ovambo, the Herero and the Nama to Germany encounters were negative. There was however a period of peaceful co-existence between 1893 and 1903. Soon after 1903, the people of Namibia violently opposed Germany rule not until 1907 when the Africans were violently crushed by the over mighty Germans.

The first to rise against Germany rule were the Herero under their paramount chief Samuel Maherero in January 1904. They organized a surprise attack on the Germans leaving over 100 of the German settlers, traders and soldiers dead. In October 1904 the Nama also rose up in arms against the Germans. The Nama rebellion dragged on up-to 1909 when the Germans finally bribed the Nama chief Simon Cooper to surrender.

Causes of the Herero and Nama Resistance

The causes of the Herero and Nama resistance were basically grievances over land, cattle, independence, labour policies, taxation and the religious influence.

The land question; by 1897, the number of German settlers in Namibia was swelling alarmingly. As the settler population increased, more and more fertile, productive and grazing land was alienated by the colonial administration. This land grabbing policy greatly annoyed the Herero and the Nama. Worse still it was being done without the consent of their paramount chiefs more so Samuel Maherero of the Herero. When the Germans even decided to construct a railway line, many more Africans were driven from their land. This all caused the resistance.

The loss of cattle had been a common practice for German traders to sell goods to Africans on credit. But in 1903 the colonial government passed a credit ordinance, which provided that Africans pay all they owed European traders in a period of one year. Failure to meet the deadline would render the debts invalid. For fear of invalidation, Germany traders went Page 12 of 32 - By Charles Kasule ahead to recover their debts by confiscating cattle from those Africans who seemed incapable of beating the deadline set by the credit ordinance. In the process as many as two or three cattle went for a debt of only one pound sterling. Also German settlers and traders through raiding out rightly stole some other cattle. The remaining cattle were attacked by rinderpest that swept across Southern Africa around 1897. It has to be emphasized that the Herero like most pastoral African societies enjoyed prestige by owning cattle. They are said to have attributed their loss of cattle to a punishment from God or to disease that had been brought by the new comers - the Germans. Naturally this resentment formed the basis for the uprising.

The independence question; German colonial rule in Namibia ignored the participation of traditional rulers in policy formulation and execution. Policies were pursued without consulting traditional rulers such as Samuel Maherero of the Herero and Hendrick Witbooi of the Nama. It should be emphasised that such rulers were still recognised and were a locus of authority for the Africans. Thus when the traditional leaders showed the willingness to organise their subjects against foreign oppressive rule, the resistance occurred.

Forced labour; the German settlers established agricultural plantations, which required labour. In spite of the need for labour, the scanty Herero and Nama population could not provide the required amounts of labour. Moreover the Nama and the Herero were primarily a pastoral and nomadic society not used to manual agricultural work. As such they were not ready and not willing to work on the German plantations. To solve the problem, Germans resorted to forcing the Nama and the Herero to offer free labour. Worse still, Africans were even flogged on the white farms. This labour mistreatment undoubtedly formed a potential cause for revolt as a way of undoing the hostile labour policies.

The taxation system; the taxation structure was characterised by brutal means of collection a situation that soiled the Afro-German relations in Namibia hence leading to revolt. Many were flogged in public and if not property confiscated for failure to pay such taxes on time.

The religious factor; it is recorded that prophet Sturman arrived in Namaqualand just on the eve of the outbreak of the war. The Nama had taken part in the independence movement of the Ethiopian church, which had separated itself from the missions and government in the 1880’s. It is said that Witbooi used the prophet to bind people to him and offer inspiration as well as hope for victory.

The able leadership of Samuel Maherero led to the outbreak of the Nama-Herero rebellion. Maherero mobilized the army of approximately 7,000 men, and united the Herero tribe against the Germans. In January 1904, the Herero attacked the Germans and by this, the rebellion had begun which later swept across the Nama areas.

Violation of the 1894 and 1890 treaties; following the first Nama-Herero resistance of 1884 and the defeat of African side, treaties of submission had been signed. In 1894 chief Witbooi of the Nama had signed such a treaty with the Germans and had even proceeded to work

Page 13 of 32 - By Charles Kasule hand in hand with them in domination of the fellow Africans in the neighborhood. The Herero had continued to challenge the Germans until the death of their Germans as the Nama had done. By 1904, the coming of the German imperial commissioner had started attacking societies which refused to sign a protection treaty with the Germans. On top of that, those societies which signed were being mistreated with exploitative colonial policies. It is therefore not surprising that the Africans returned to the state of war that they had abandoned a few years back.

Disrespect of African traditional institutions; the Nama and Herero detested Germans administration that ignored their traditional authority. The traditional chiefs were ignored in policy making which affected their people. The new rulers were considered illegitimate and hence the demand for the restoration of traditional power and independence. Although traditional rulers had been undermined, they still had a lot of influence among their people. This is why it became easy for them to organize the war.

The Bandle swat expedition; this expedition coincided with the plans of the Herero rise. All German military units were withdrawn from the Herero land and this left them free of German military presence that encouraged them to rebel in 1904.

The disarmament policy; following the 1894 resistance, the Germans had remained suspicious of the Nama who had staged a more disastrous resistance than the Herero and were constantly a challenge to Germans. German settlers requested the colonial government to disarm Nama and disperse them to avoid another resistance. By 1904 when the Herero revolt began, the plan to disarm the Nama became more sound that forced the Nama to join the Herero into a rebellion against Germans. o The oppressive and exploitative nature of German rule o The unity among the major two tribes of South West Africa o The upsurge of natural calamities like diseases e.g. rinder pest o Failure to appoint Africans representatives o The ever growing Germany population and their burdensome life to Africans

By 1904, it was clear that the Herero and the Nama did not like the oppressive rule of the Germans. The Herero particularly hated the manner in which the German traders recovered their debts. German stay had become so burdensome and riddled by all sorts of problems for the Africans. Hendrick Witbooi of the Nama equated the German burdens to “Carrying the Sun” on ones back when making a statement to Samuel Maherero of the Herero. What was left by 1904 was an opportunity for the Africans to strike.

For the Herero the opportunity came in January 1904. The German troops had departed from Herero country to silence an uprising by the Bondelswart people - under Samuel Maherero the Herero staged their revolt attacking the Germans by surprise. To the Nama, the spark came in October 1904 when the Germans attempted to disarm them something

Page 14 of 32 - By Charles Kasule that was rather provocative. For in 1894 the Germans and Witbooi signed a peace treaty that allowed the Nama to retain their guns only to turn around ten years later to disarm them.

Course of the Rebellion

The uprising started in 1904 by the Herero people under their paramount Chief Maherero. The white settlers were given a surprise attack by a force of about 7000 men. Before the Germans could organize to defend themselves, over one hundred settlers and soldiers had been killed. The Herero were not hostile to all Europeans, and just wanted the Germans.

The railway line from Swakopmund to Windlock was cut in several pieces and telegraph lines were broken. German settlements and garrisons were besieged until 1904 when German re- enforcements were sent to rescue them.

The Germans under Lentwein and Commander General Von Trotha began an offensive in June 1904. The, young and old Herero, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle were short as Trotha waged a war of extermination. The Herero were driven into the desert where they starved to death.

By December 1905, the Herero rebellion had been brought down but it was about the same time that the Nama under Witbooi rose up against the Germans. The Nama were more skilled at guerilla warfare than the Herero and so their rising lasted longer. Witbooi was killed in October 1906 and the leadership taken over by Morenga who also died in 1907. His successors Chief Simon Cooper maintained the Nama resistance until 1907 when he accepted to stay away from Namibia in return for a big bribe.

Effects of the Nama-Herero Resistance

Massive loss of life; the Germans used enormous military strength (armed forces consisted over 15,000 troops) with the aim of exterminating the Africans. Gen. Von Trotha who silenced the Herero for example devised a plan where as many people as possible were to be killed and the rest forced into the Kalahari Desert where they would die of starvation. He ordered that every Herero with or without cattle, armed or unarmed be short and it was done. By December 1905, it was discovered that out of the Herero population of 70,000 only 16,000 had survived the genocide. For the Nama with a population of 20,000 in 1892, only 9,800 had remained by 1911. Many of them died in war and in imprisonment camps.

Increased forced labour; after victory, the Germans dictated a labour policy on Africans. A new labour code that empowered Germans to exploit the Herero and the Nama more brutally than before came into force. As a result 25,000 Nama and Herero were forced into laboring (unskilled) jobs mostly on European farms. Reports indicate that by 1914 there were only 200 men from the two communities who were not in paid employment. This is not very surprising as the Africans were a spent force after the war and so helpless.

Page 15 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Loss of land by the Nama and Herero; after the war, the Germans enacted policies through which Africans lost their land. In Namaqualand, native policies required that all land be given to Germans. Herero country was declared a Germany colony (property) as opposed to a protectorate. People who remained on the land did so on the courtesy of the Germans. Thus formerly landed people were converted into impoverished pauper (poor) labourers.

Loss of independence; colonialism became more entrenched as the Herero & Nama lost their lands and Africans were now ruled as a defeated people. In fact the victory of the Germans over the Nama and the Herero rebellion was thorough such that unlike the Maji Maji, the Germans felt no need to soften their administration. For it was clear that the Africans in Namibia would never rise again.

The suffering of the Africans increased; for example, some of the Herero who survived the German genocide crossed to the Kalahari Desert and entered Bechuanaland (Botswana) where they lived as homeless wanderers. The remnant Herero were forbidden to keep cattle. All this increased on their miseries and poverty.

It increased the influx of the German settlers in Namibia since land for agricultural expansion was found and granted to them by the administration of the Germans. This increased the pace of land alienation, oppression and exploitation of the Africans.

Africans learnt a number of lessons; the effects of the Nama-Herero defeat demonstrated the useless of armed resistance against the superior imperial forces. The rebellion was a disaster to both the Herero and the Nama and the lesson was loudly taught.

The Nama and Herero virtually lost their cattle. They were reduced to poor communities that could not survive on their own. The uprising removed the little that was for miserable indigenous people. The only alternative left to them was to work on German farms for miserable wages. The Nama and the Herero actually benefited nothing from their rebellion.

The effects of the Nama-Herero rising had a lot of important lessons. The effects demonstrated the futility (ineffectiveness) of armed resistance against the superior imperial forces. The rebellion was a disaster to both the Herero and the Nama and a lesson loudly taught. The Nama and the Herero were swept aside by military means and the German presence made stronger. No surprise that the European population in Namibia had grown from 4,600 in 1905 to 15,000 in 1913.

Page 16 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Reasons as to why the rebellion failed [Failure of African Armed Resistance in Namibia (1884-1907)]

Though punctuated by periods of collaboration, German intrusion in South West Africa was resisted from its onset. The Ovambo who lived in Northern Namibia on the border with Angola resented German policies as well as the Nama. The Herero resisted German rule till when their leader Kamaherero died in 1890 that the primary Herero opposition to the Germans subsided. Later, in the opening years of the 20th century there arose the Herero and Nama rising of 1904-07. But even then, these risings had by 1909 been effectively silenced by the Germans. The failure of African armed resistance in Namibia was due to a number of factors:

Internal disunity; this was characterised by internal strife amongst the affected societies. For instance following the death of Kamaherero in 1890, a succession dispute broke out among the Herero that went on up to 1894 thereby enabling the Germans to help install Samuel Maherero. Such divisions greatly divided the Herero creating a situation that the Germans exploited to exert their influence over the Herero.

Divisions among African resisting societies; For-instance the Herero were easily defeated because they failed to solicit the support of other African communities to join them in the struggle against the Germans. Samuel Maherero’s efforts to obtain a military alliance with Witbooi Hendrick of the Nama in January 1904 against the Germans never materialised. Maherero was therefore defeated alone and when the Nama also rose up in October 1904, they fought alone and were defeated alone. The nationalistic spirit then had not yet developed.

The military weakness was another problem; Africans were poorly armed with spears, arrows, bows and a few old fashioned guns which made it difficult for them to stand the military might of the invader who easily shoot from a distance.

The economic base of the resisting peoples was weak; the Nama and the Herero thrived mainly on pastoralism yet sustaining a war requires massive resources. Africans were particularly disadvantaged in that they were fighting a people with a strong industrial base yet their cattle - the sole economic asset had either been stolen by Germans or killed by rinderpest. Thus whereas the Germans could afford a price of 20,000 marks on Morenga the Nama leader who was shot dead by the British police on the Cape border, the Africans could not. Indeed it was not surprising that the poor Africans were defeated.

The poor/weak African leadership also bedeviled (causing more trouble to) African armed resistance against Germans in Namibia. It is true that the original leaders of the armed struggles such as Samuel Maherero of the Herero and Witbooi Hendrick of the Nama were strong. But later, as for the case of the Nama, opportunistic leaders emerged. For instance Simon Cooper was bribed by the Germans so as to stay out of Nama territory an act that brought the well-intentioned rising to an inglorious (shameful) conclusion.

Page 17 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The small population of the Herero and the Nama, the most pronounced resistors in Namibia. It has been noted that even if all were mobilised for war, they would not form a formidable force to counter the well-armed German forces. Thus the resistance of the Nama and the Herero easily fell prey to the German Canon fire.

It was the age of the scramble and partition of Africa; by this time Europeans in general and Germans in particular were determined not only to acquire but also retain their African spheres of influence at whatever cost.

African communities more so in Namibia were characterized by low levels of political development. Most, if not all the societies that resisted in Namibia may be best described as non-centralised states. Their status was far from that of a kingdom namely of the Ovambo, the Herero and the Nama. Unfortunately such societies were resisting Germany that had just replaced France in Europe in 1870 as a European land power.

Revision Questions:

1. How did the people of Namibia react to German rule between 1884-1907?

2. “The Nama-Herero rebellion (1904-1907) was a reaction against foreign intrusion” justify the statement.

3. Analyse the causes and effects of the Nama-Herero uprising

Page 18 of 32 - By Charles Kasule THE WAR OF THE GUNS (1878)

(Basuto War of Disarmament)

It was in 1868, that the British Protectorate over the Basuto was declared, meaning the Basuto had lost their sovereignty. Two years later, Moshesh died, implying that the Basuto had lost their founder father as well. It’s worth noting that the Basuto had for long been a united and formidable force in South Africa, a force that had scored several war victories over the Boers in 1858 and 1865 and over other South Africa’s societies.

In 1871, the British Imperial Government handed the administration of Lesotho over to the Cape Colony. It was a step that was to ferment future trouble between the Basuto and the Cape colonists. In 1878 Sprigg the Cape Prime Minister procured an act requiring that all the Bantu surrender their arms. This policy of disarmament was to be applied to the Basotho as well. As events followed the Basuto resisted in what has come to be known as the Basuto War of Disarmament or the War of the Guns.

Causes of the war

The disarmament of the Basotho was the immediate cause for war. The Basuto were to be disarmed as required under the new law - the Peace Preservation Bill of 1878 passed by the Cape Colony to disarm Africans, which they rejected. In spite of the Cape colon’s insistence to disarm them, the Basuto did not heed arguing that firearms were an important means of self-defense in a hostile world. This eventually increased tension between the two parties prompting war.

The taxation problems also prompted the war. The Cape colony had proposed that the hut tax to be paid by the Basuto was to be increased a proposal that caused resentment.

Acceptance of white settlement in Southern Lesotho by the Cape government as well caused the war. It had been proposed that part of Moorosi’s land be opened for white settlement. This land grabbing policy of the Cape colonists particularly irked the Basuto peoples prompting them to unite against white rule.

The independence question; it is also possible to suggest that the Basuto desired to regain their independence, which they had lost just a decade ago to the British. Moreover memories of white encroachment on their political rights were still fresh and hot in their minds.

The good leadership; examples included Moorosi who ruled Southern Lesotho and also led the defiant Southern Sotho against the government till he was butchered in 1879. There was also Lerotholi who mobilized a large number of troops (i.e. 23,000) in all against the whites. He has been described as second only to Moshesh in ability and popularity. He was courageous, an excellent horseman and an inspiring leader in battle with excellent tactical sense. With such leadership the Basotho could not help but rise against the British.

Page 19 of 32 - By Charles Kasule It is significant to recall that although in Transkei and East Griqualand the rebels were crushed by April 1881 and in 1879 Moorosi was defeated and killed, generally Africans took the day. The Basotho combatants adopted guerrilla war tactics by avoiding direct confrontation with government troops and organising surprise attacks. Consequently the cape colony forces got demoralised, exhausted and failed to contain the situation. In April 1818, the Imperial High Commissioner Sir Hercules Robinson had to intervene lest the Basuto humiliate the Cape and an agreement was signed to end the war.

The effects of the war

There was loss of life as both the whites and the Africans died in the war. The use the then up-to-date firearms from the European machinery greatly claimed African lives and property at a wide scope. Many homes as a result were deserted and villages destroyed and deserted.

The Sotho state remained with its former size according to the 1881 agreement, although the Cape Colony had been anxious to rob it of its remaining arable land. The Africans had joined the war with hopes of expanding their vicinity; but since they were defeated never came true.

The Africans lost their arms since they agreed that arms be retained by those Basotho who possessed them. However, the peace terms required that the Basotho register their guns. But because the Cape government withdrew its forces, these terms were not of any practical significance and were not enforced.

The Imperial British Government agreed and resumed its direct control over Lesotho in 1884, as demanded by the Basotho. This was also due to the fact that the Cape had demonstrated its full incapacity for a people who had been prepared by Moshesh for a special handling.

The Basotho were weakened in spite of their victory over the whites. Hostilities in Moshesh’s family were aroused between those who had collaborated in the war with the whites and those who had vehemently (passionately) fought to defend Sotho sovereignty. However, fear of renewed white encroachment triumphed over the forces of division and the Basotho continued to live a united people.

There was some reform in white rule; after the 1884 direct British resumption of control of the Sotho Crown Colony, the Resident British administrators did not rule by open use of force. The use of force was feared to provoke hostile responses as history had shown. Thus diplomacy and manipulation were adopted thereby allowing the Sotho to enjoy their status quo of a crown colony. It is not surprising that the Sotho king was left with more authority and power than the rest of African rulers in South Africa during the colonial period.

Page 20 of 32 - By Charles Kasule THE SHONA-NDEBELE (CHIMURENGA) UPRISING (1896-1897)

It was the Rudd Concession Treaty of October 1888 between Lobengula and Cecil Rhodes’ agent Charles Rudd that practically determined the eventual acquisition of Mashonaland and Matebeleland by the British. This followed the coming in of many whites that named themselves as the pioneer column. Using the Rudd Concession, Rhodes secured a charter from the British government granting the British South African Company (B.S.A.Co.) administrative and commercial rights over most parts of Central Africa.

Meanwhile after the B.S.A.Co. had obtained a charter to control Central Africa, in May 1890 some settlers who called themselves the Pioneer Column set off from the Cape and finally reached Mashonaland in September 12th 1890. In 1891, the B.S.A.Co. took over the ownership of the land occupied by the Pioneer Column in Mashonaland. But, the insatiable/greedy desire to raid Mashonaland for cattle by the Matebele was bound to make the (Matebele) conflict with the B.S.A.Co. Moreover there were also increasing numbers of white immigrants after the Pioneer Column that made the Matebele people feel unease for slowly, they were losing their land to the white new corners.

Events that followed led to a deterioration of relations between the whites and the Ndebele, which amounted into the outbreak of the Matebele war of 1893-94. The war ended with the defeat of the Ndebele. Lobengula fled and died in the wilderness in 1894.

After the company victory the kingdom was occupied and dismantled by the company. The British then instituted their administrative and economic policies. The whites also increased in number, which in turn led to more land grabbing by the whites. It was these policies that formed the basis of the Shona-Ndebele Rising of 1896-07. The Ndebele rose first and then the Shona.

Causes of the war

The land question; the company administration unsparingly encouraged white settlement following the occupation of Mashonaland and Matebeleland. Africans were pushed to less productive reserves and or turned into landless squatters on European farms where they had to pay rent in form of produce or cash so as to avoid expulsion. In Mashonaland, land was grabbed without permission from the local chiefs on the pretext that Lobengula had given land to the B.S.A.Co. in the Rudd concession - a claim that was most probably not true. Even then, the Shona Chiefs never regarded themselves as subjects of the Ndebele and one of their most cherished rights was the right to allocate land. This eventually set off the war.

Taxation; the Ndebele and Shona chiefs and their subjects were not happy with the imposition of hut tax. The tax was oppressive in nature and the population was forced to pay it under duress (threats). Those who had no cash to pay the tax had their cattle confiscated - so disturbing was it that in facing the problem, families were forced to congest

Page 21 of 32 - By Charles Kasule in a few huts. This congestion increased the suffering of the Africans and also helped to catalyse the spread of disease.

Forced labour; the Shona and the Ndebele hated the operation of the forced labour system. Labour was often recruited by force with the help of armed policemen. Flogging was a common practice and Africans were made to work under near slave conditions. This was accompanied by stringent supervision which was all never welcomed by the Africans hence the war.

Company/British interference with existing traditional/African economies; before the advent of company rule, the Ndebele were heavily dependent on raiding Shona cattle while the Shona had organized trade in arms, gold and ivory with the Portuguese. Ndebele raiding practices under the British company rule became criminal while the control of trade among the Shona shifted from the local traditional chiefs to the whites. The Shona were forced to buy goods from South Africa that were more expensive than those that they had been used to buying from the Portuguese. One therefore cannot rule out the possibility of the Ndebele- Shona rising being a result of the need to do away with white economic interference and domination.

Loss of cattle; following the 1893-04 Ndebele war, the British victors stole most cattle that belonged to the Ndebele. It is estimated that prior to the war the Ndebele had 250,000 heads of cattle but after only about 40,000 were left with the Matebele. The rest of the cattle had been distributed to the white soldiers, others eaten by the police and the rest driven to South Africa by white adventurers. The remaining cattle were unevenly distributed among the Ndebele chiefs who were collaborators with the British. The distribution of cattle was done by the British on the illogical argument that all cattle had belonged to the monarchy, and since it had been abolished, there was no need to return all the cattle to the Matebele. This as well caused the war.

Natural disasters; between 1894 and 1897, the Ndebele and the Shona were hit by a number of natural calamities. In 1895, there was a bad drought while in 1896 there was a locust attack which reduced on crops harvest. In 1896 a rinderpest outbreak swept herds of cattle and in trying to solve the problem cattle was slaughtered under company administration instructions something that was taken by Africans as an attempt to increase their misery. The disaster conditions created a desperate situation characterised by famine that made many dissatisfied and hence the rising.

The able leadership enabled the occurrence of the Chimurenga uprising. Leaders like Nyamando and Segmates arose to champion the cause against the British. They offered to lead the revolt, mobilized support from the mass, capitalizing on the grievances advanced. Thus in March 1896, the revolt began that went on upto 1897 with both the Ndebele and Shona fighting against the British rule.

Page 22 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The role of religion; amidst the Shona-Ndebele miseries of disease, famine and suffering, the religious leaders - the priests and Mhondros (Spirit Mediums) were important. To the religious leaders, the remedy to the African problems lay in fighting a religious war against the whites whom they blamed for their problems. The leaders argued that if there was to be peace, the whites needed to be driven out. They told Africans that locusts, diseases and misfortunes would be taken away and rain would come. Victory was promised and to those who could refuse to take up arms, punishment would come. In Matebeleland, Mkwati the religious priest urged his people to rise up. He said:

“Now go and kill these white people and drive them out of our fathers’ land and I will take away the cattle diseases and locusts and send you rain”

Sometimes Mkwati could threaten and issue more serious warnings that: “Mlimo will kill all who have made peace with whites, we are going to fight again…” In Mashonaland, the traditional priests Kagubi and a woman Nehanda played a significant role in inciting the people against the Europeans, consequently causing war.

The desire for self-determination/loss of political independence; having extended their rule into Zimbabwe, the British South African Company (B.S.A.C.) introduced new political reforms. The Ndebele age set system was abolished making the Ndunas powerless. Favouritism was offered to the Shona who for long the Ndebele regarded as subordinates. The Shona were appointed as policemen to rule over the Ndebele. The new political establishment accelerated the Ndebele grievance against the British. The end result was declaration of war in March 1896 which uprising by April spread throughout the country.

The use of Shona police in Matebeleland; natives were upset by the use of the Shona police who had been slaves of the Ndebele. The white recruitment of the Shona into police was welcomed as a chance for the Shona to revenge on Ndebele their traditional enemies. More to this the company rule took up the responsibility of punishing the African people in a brutal way involving flogging which was bitterly hated by the masses.

The hatred to Christianity; the Shona were deeply religious and strongly attached their traditional religion. But Christianity introduced by missionaries had had a tremendous impact on the Shona society. The spread of Christianity disrupted the Shona way of life and undermined their traditional institutions. This is why their traditional religious leaders played a leading role in the war. Because of the respect people had in their traditional religion, they turned their traditional religious leaders into military leaders to fight the British imperialism.

The failure of the Jameson Raid in 1895; in 1895, Jameson raid led the protectorate police to raid President Paul Kruger of the Boers in Transvaal. The Ndebele took this advantage as many white policemen had gone to raid. Ndebele attacked white settlement, raided farms, looted their cattle and cut off the communication lines. The news that Jameson raid had failed encouraged them. They realized that even the Whitemen could be defeated. The Ndebele began the war and the Shona followed.

Page 23 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The Course of the Rebellion

Ndebele events:

The Matebele rebellion which first broke out in March 1896 had not been planned at all. No precautionary measures had been instituted by rebels against whites. This was because the Ndebele regimental system had been disbanded and when the war broke out, the Ndebele army was raised in series.

In addition, they were poorly armed and not well organized. Their initial success therefore was because of absence of a strong company police that they had distributed in other parts of the country and leaving only 40 at the headquarters, as they never expected any war. Following the disbanding of the regimental system.

But after proving the abortion of the Jameson raid of 30th December 1895, the Ndebele and the Shona were encouraged to revolt as they thought that the company was not powerful. The British defeat by the Boers gave the Ndebele hopes to defeat them also.

The trouble began in 20th March 1896 when the Ndebele murdered two Shona policemen in their area working on behalf of the British. Three days later, the whole of Matebeleland was in a rebellion busy massacring European families, destruction of property on farms, in mines and stores.

Within two weeks about 143 Europeans had been killed. Only those living in Bulawayo, Gwero and Baligwe survived because they formed defensive enclosures made of Wagons around their towns.

Shona events:

On the side of the Shonaland, the action Vs the British began on 15th June 1896, it also began by killing Europeans on scattered settlements. In the first week, about 120 Europeans had been killed.

This followed the sending of British reserve troops that had been stationed in Cape Town. Fearing the war after some serious exchanges they also entered the bush and began the guerilla warfare tactic.

As hopes of success faded away, the remaining Shona rebels handed over their weapons to the British. Mkwati seems to have been killed by the Shona themselves because of false protection. Both Kakubi and Nehanda were captured and executed in 1898.

Page 24 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Organisation of the Rebellions

The Shona-Ndebele risings were well organised and large scaled. They were popular nationalistic risings involving most “tribes” and all types of Shona and Ndebele peoples and classes. Old men and young men, women and children participated. The ruling aristocracies, the lower (servile) castes all participated though the dominant fighters were the Shona speaking peoples.

After the fall of the Ndebele monarchy and the dismantling of the political system in 1893, the Ndebele found it difficult to re-organise their state. However, that was not the case in the rising. Early military leadership in Matebeleland was provided by Umluglu - the Chief Priest of the Ndebele nation and by Nyamanda - Lobengula’s eldest son. The two leaders provided the necessary leadership around which the Ndebele rallied to stage the rising. Umluglu particularly provided the focal point for the older generation while Nyamanda represented the aspirations of the young generation. Even then, Nyamanda and Umluglu worked together in the old Ndebele fashion that had bound them together.

There was generally greater use of traditional religion and traditional religious authorities in uniting people. The Holi caste and other subjects also got united through their common attachment to Mwari or Mlimo cult. Mkwati and Siginyamatse were two of the outstanding representatives of the Mwari cult who played an important role in the rebellion. Mkwati for his part has been considered as a person who formed the backbone of the spiritual unity of the Ndebele.

Revolutionary leadership emerged in the rebellions with some people claiming religious authority and powers that could render European weapons harmless. Representatives of the Mwari cult played a significant role in the Shona rising. Religion therefore provided a link between the Ndebele and the Shona. The belief that the traditional God would make participants bullet proof acted as a further booster for unity among the combatants.

In addition to Mwari representatives or priests were spirit mediums that emerged in Mashonaland Central and the Western districts. Prominent among the mediums were Kagubi and Nehanda. These mediums united the Indunas of Matebeleland with the Shona chiefs. This linkage provided a combination of leadership that gave the rebellion a unique inspiration.

A remarkable aspect in the organisation was the complex degree of planning and secrecy that characterised the rising. By design, both rebellions occurred simultaneously yet there was no indication that either side had planned for such a coincidence. Interesting to note is that the attack on the whites in all districts was planned to take place at the same time.

Page 25 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The Role of Religion in the Organisation of the Rebellion

19th Century Africa had a number of religions. There were alien faiths of Islam and Christianity. Whereas Islam was less significant in Matebeleland and Mashonaland of the time, Christianity was an intimate bedfellow of colonialism hence of no significance in the organisation of the rebellion. It was African traditional religion wrongly dismissed as paganism that played a largely positive role in the organisation of the Chemurenga rebellion. More specifically, it was the Mwari or Mlimo cult that was important in the organisation of the rebellion in the following respects.

Religion acted as a unifying factor against the imposition of colonial rule. The Mwari or Mlimo faith crossed tribal boundaries and brought the Shona and the Ndebele peoples to fight together. The Shona had to give up and “forget” the mistreatment they had suffered under the Ndebele and fought on the same side against the white encroacher.

Traditional religion was also significant in the provision of leadership. It has been pointed out that without traditional religious leaders the Shona-Ndebele uprisings of 1896-07 would have lacked leadership more so that they occurred after Lobengula’s untimely death in 1894. Kagubi and Nehanda who were Shona spirit mediums played a significant role in defending the African cause. They played a key role in scaring and killing any Africans who were seen as royal to the protectorate government. Indeed it was Mkwati a Ndebele priest and his priests who led a prolonged guerrilla warfare against company rule in Mashonaland.

Traditional religion acted as an inspiring force of the Shona and the Ndebele to fight against company rule giving them courage and the fear of defying the African cause. Traditional religious leaders made the Africans confident, fearless and courageous. A spirit of determination was crated that was necessary in challenging a more advanced and militarily advantageous people.

Religion acted as a justification for the revolt in the Chemurenga rising. According to religious priests and the Mhondros, it were the Whites who were the cause of African misfortunes and suffering that were manifested in prolonged drought, famine, locust attacks and rinderpest epidemics. The leaders argued that it was necessary to fight the foreign rulers as a solution to the hard hitting problems.

Religion also acted as a mobilising factor of the Africans against the imposition of white rule. In the Shona-Ndebele rebellion, intimidative appeals were used to mobilise Africans against white encroachment. Traditional priests and spirit mediums instigated rebellion amongst their people by appealing to religious sentiments. People were warned of their association with the white people since the later were regarded as the source of their problems and hence asked to return to their gods. In this way the Shona and the Ndebele were being mobilised for war.

Page 26 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The sustenance of the war effort was also dependent on traditional religion. The guerrilla warfare in Matopo hills among the Ndebele was sustained on the basis of predicting war victory and on the belief that the High God would punish those who would surrender to the whites. Through threats, warriors feared to enter negotiations with the Whites. The warriors were threatened that the super natural power was on the look out to destroy those who would give up.

Mwari and Mlimo cults were also used to guarantee security and protection to the warriors from the High God. In the rising, the warriors were promised protection from the High God and told that He also disliked the whites. Hence many Africans joined the war hoping that they would be protected.

It has to be noted however, that as events unfolded religion did not demonstrate that the predictions of the religious priests and the spirit mediums were real. True, traditional religion made people more determined to fight and fearless but the High God and the priests never provided up-to-date arms to fight the rebellions against the white encroacher. As a mobilising element, the traditional faith had helped to rally the people behind their leaders but later they had to be disillusioned (the disappointing loss of a belief/ideal). Confidence in the priests was lost as some flocked to Christianity in protest.

Combatants were convinced to hold on without significant material assistance towards winning the war. The people failed to understand why victory was delaying in a war backed by the supernatural. Moreover, starvation was killing the warriors. A sense of hopelessness erupted, they died in large numbers and some decided to surrender. Therefore, whereas religion was paramount in the justification and organisation of the Chemurenga rising, it was also responsible for its failure.

Assignment: Discuss the role played by traditional religion in African Resistance wars

(Reference: A Realistic Approach to African History 1855-1914, pg. 146-8)

Question: What accounted for the failure of the Shona-Ndebele rebellion of 1896-7?

Page 27 of 32 - By Charles Kasule Effects of the Rebellion

The Shona-Ndebele rising can be best described as a disaster to the parties involved more so to the Africans. Even then there were some cosmetic benefits that were reaped by some sections of Africans. The impacts of the rising include the following:

Loss of life and resources; silencing the rebellions called for heavy reinforcements that were too costly for the B.S.A.C. Moreover, faced with the danger of loosing the charter if the war continued Rhodes himself had to go to Matopo hills where he promised reinstatement of local Ndebele Indunas but this time with a pay. All this soured the financial status of the Company forcing it into bankruptcy that in 1900, the British had to step into establish direct control of what is now Zimbabwe. In terms of humans, loses were great. On the onset of the revolts the British were caught unaware. Thus while 143 Europeans were murdered in Matebeleland, 119 got killed in Mashonaland in the first week of the rebellions. To the Africans many deaths occurred as well. Many Shona chiefs were killed in the rebellion or due to starvation while others were executed after the war on conviction.

Administration; a form of direct rule was introduced in local administration. In Mashonaland, the young Shona who had been earlier recruited into the Company police were disowned and a local government opened to more white settlers which confirmed Shona loss of independence. In Matebeleland, where the rebellion ended through negotiation, it was agreed that Rhodes would disband the company force for a small permanent police force. The Shona police was withdrawn with immediate effect.

Loss of land; There was forceful confiscation of land more so in Mashonaland. In 1898 Mashonaland was opened to more white settlers. Consequently, Africans were pushed to reserves as if they were a peculiar human species.

The Traditional religion was discredited; Africans learnt that reliance on traditional religious beliefs was old fashioned, as it could not help them to challenge the European armed forces. African religious beliefs never offered the promised protection against bullets. The Shona and the Ndebele therefore came to believe that European culture and religion were superior to African traditional religion and culture. They were disillusioned with the traditional beliefs and many turned to Christianity in protest. This marked a turning point in the erosion of traditional beliefs and customs.

Recognition of Ndebele leaders; after the war, Ndebele Indunas were officially recognised by the protectorate government. They were exempted from taxation, were to be given land and Rhodes promised that the colonial government would pay them a salary. However, the Ndebele warriors lost their military power, as the war settlement terms required that they are disarmed and weapons handed over to Cecil Rhodes.

Indeed apart from a few “benefits” that the Ndebele chiefs gained from the war, generally it was a disaster to both the Africans and company rule. The Company greatly failed due to this

Page 28 of 32 - By Charles Kasule rebellion. It became financially bankrupt, was discredited due to the war and the brutality with which it had been silenced and eventually the charter had to be withdrawn to give way to direct British control.

[Continue with the effects in ‘A Realistic Approach to African History 1855-1914’, pg. 144-5]

THE CHEMURENGA AND MAJI-MAJI UPRISINGS RISINGS COMPARED

In trying to draw similarities and differences between the Chemurenga and Maji Maji rising one has to focus on the causes of the rebellions, the course and organisation, effects and factors for failure. The following outline can provide a basis for discussion.

Similarities

 The two rebellions were all secondary or post primary reactions against established colonial rule. As such the rebellions had similar causes such as land alienation, forced labour, maladministration, disrespect for traditional culture, heavy taxation, etc.  Both rebellions were mass movements involving several peoples. The Chemurenga rising for example involved the Shona and the Ndebele. Men, women, children, from all castes fought in the war. In the Maji-Maji rising several ethnic groups such as the Matumbi, the Zaramo, Pogoro, Ngindo, Ngoni, Bena and Mbunga participated.  In terms of organisation and leadership, both rebellions were led by people claiming religious authority. In the Maji-Maji rising the Kalero cult was. Significant while in the Shona rising, the Mwari or Mlimo cult was significant. In both rebellions religion was important for unity, inspiration, sustenance of the war effort, etc.  In terms of military organisation the African combatants were relatively poorly armed. In both cases guerrilla war tactics were adopted such as by the Shona in the Chemurenga rising and by the Ngindo in the Maji-Maji rising.  The two risings ended with the defeat of Africans and confirmed loss of their independence. This was due to various factors such as military inferiority on the side of African combatants, poor organisation and the like.  There was also loss of respect for African culture and traditional religion in both rebellions on the part of Africans. All that was promised by African priests such as immunity from bullets of the Europeans and victory for the Africans never materialised, In effect many people joined Christianity in protest.  Disunity was a common phenomenon i.e. in Tanganyika the Zaramo-Mutumbi, Ngindo, Ngoni fought isolated just as the Shona-Ndebele were.  Loss of lives and property was the result of the uprising with losses registered both on the whites and natives.  The revolts became a foundation stone for the growth of African Nationalism as it was for TANU in Tanzania and ZANU in Zimbabwe.

Page 29 of 32 - By Charles Kasule  The revolts marked the beginning of effective establishment of colonial rule over these areas.

Differences

In contrast the two rebellions varied in scale and time though they were all large scaled. The Maji Maji was more wide scaled and more prolonged (1905-07) than the Chemurenga rising (1896-07). Moreover more ethnic peoples were engaged in the Maji Maji rebellion than in the Shona-Ndebele were actually only two ethnic groups were involved, that is, the Shona and the Ndebele.

The colonial powers also differed. The Shona-Ndebeie was against the British while the Maji Maji rising was against the Germans. Some historians raise the debatable argument that the Germans were more brutal.

The Shona and the Ndebele being a pastoral society, loss of cattle was significant in causing the rebellion. This was not a paramount cause for the Maji Maji rebellion.

Cultural abuses seem to have been more significant in causing the Maji Maji resistance. For instance German administrators openly raped the Ngindo wives. There was also little respect for African culture in the Chemurenga but is seemed to have not been as open and as offending as in the case of the Maji Maji.

Note: The above similarities and contrasts are mere outlines that are debatable. Interested readers are advised to beef up the arguments.

Page 30 of 32 - By Charles Kasule WHY AFRICAN RESISTANCE TO COLONIALISM FAILED

(Why European conquest of Africa was a success)

In specific terms, the reasons for failure of African resistance especially armed resistance to European rule varied in importance from resistance to resistance. However, generally, the resistances failed because of the following:

Military weakness; African armies were relatively poorly armed with spears, arrows, bows, and a few rifles. The combatants did not have modern 19th century powerful musket guns, which the European invaders possessed. Besides, the method of fighting for many African forces was massing of troops - a method that made them fall easy prey to European gunfire. The now well-intentioned and determined resistors such as Kabalega, Lobengula and Samore Toure were beaten into submission due to the military advantage the invader enjoyed.

Division among resistors; African armed resistors did not organise a coordinated struggle against the invaders, as each fought alone and was defeated alone. The weakness of division among resistors provided the European enemy with an opportunity to employ the divide and conquer technique. It was not surprising that Kabalega of Bunyoro and Mwanga of Buganda fought separately only to meet in exile all of them having been overthrown. In West Africa, Samore’s appeal to Ahmed Seku of Tukolor to form a united front against European invasion fell on deaf ears. In Namibia the Nama and the Herero were each defeated separately, not forgetting the Shona and Ndebele in Central Africa who also fought separately.

Disunity; Africa had not yet become a United Nation by the time of the advent of colonialism. Unlike contemporary Europe, Africa was still plagued by the problem of immature nationalistic feelings. The centralised states that would have demonstrated some degree of nationalism, were torn apart by succession disputes, civil strife and other internal conflicts. Africa divided was therefore easily overrun.

Weak economic base; many African societies were generally weak and had not yet fully put to utilisation of their natural resources. Whatever resources that had been exploited, had not been distributed for useful purposes such as maintaining a war against determined foreign invaders. African economies entirely depended on agriculture if not pastoralism punctuated with occasional raids. Slave trade as an economic asset to many African societies had been abolished by the last quarter of the 19th century - a period when serious armed rebellion was evidenced on the continent, hence causing their failure.

The role of opportunists and collaborators; the role played by African opportunists and collaborators for selfish and shortsighted gains made it difficult for resistors to crush the enemy. The opportunists and collaborators served the enemy with food, offered shelter, protection or even military support against African resistors. Perhaps this was the most dangerous weakness that made it impossible for African resistors to triumph. Page 31 of 32 - By Charles Kasule The missionary factor; Missionary influence penetrated the social and cultural life of the Africans. When culture that united Africans was attacked and dismantled, Africans easily fell prey to the European invaders. Worse still the spirit of resistance was checked as Africans were advised to be humble. This “humbleness” eventually made many would be resisting Africans not to do so. A case in point is Buganda kingdom during Mwanga’s regime when many Christian converts supported the people who were ruining Buganda’s sovereignty.

Natural calamities; European conquest of a society usually coincided with the occurrence of natural disasters such as rinderpest, jigger attacks and other epidemics. Thus the Ndebele and Asante resistance were for-instance weakened by outbreaks of diseases. Indeed, it can be doubted as to whether the European powers would have had such an easy conquest of Africa had disasters not befallen Africans.

Geographical factors; The absence of natural geographical defensive barriers like mountains, valleys and deserts in many places made it easier for European powers to triumph in their conquest of Africa. The open Savannah in West Africa for example suited European methods of warfare as opposed to Ethiopia’s mountainous geography that gave the Ethiopians a war advantage over their would be conquerors (Italians).

Population size; Many African societies that resisted were few such that even if all of them were mobilised they could not form a viable army. In Namibia for-instance, the resisting Nama and Herero were few and that’s why when Germans applied, genocide - a policy of killing whoever they came across, the resistors were to surrender lest their population gets wiped out.

Indeed many factors worked to ensure that European conquest of Africa succeeded and African resistance failed. But when all is said, it seems probable that the military factor played a greater role.

Page 32 of 32 - By Charles Kasule