U.S. Allies Challenge Trump's Reversal on Property Seized in Cuba
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Lo Relevante En Medios Internacionales
MODO DE LECTURA RESUMEN INFORMATIVO: LO RELEVANTE EN MEDIOS INTERNACIONALES DÓLAR EURO LIBRA 19.42 21.41 23.93 Fuente: Banco de México 13 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2019 ESTADOS UNIDOS DESIGNA A UN DIPLOMÁTICO DE LÍNEA DURA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Fuente: Deutsche Welle La destitución de John Bolton como asesor de la Casa Blanca generó una serie de especulaciones sobre un posible cambio en la postura de Estados Unidos sobre Venezuela y otros temas de política exterior en América Latina. Sin embargo, esa incertidumbre podría quedar disipada muy pronto, ya que Estados Unidos nombró a Michael Kozak como su principal diplomático para las relaciones con América Latina. Se trata de un funcionario, especialista en derecho, considerado de línea dura. Desde 2017 estuvo al frente de la Oficina de Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Trabajo del Departamento de Estado, fue jefe de misión en la embajada de Estados Unidos en La Habana entre 1996 y 1999, y ayudó al ex Secretario de Estado James Baker en la negociación e implementación del acuerdo para poner fin al conflicto en Nicaragua. Kozak asumirá el cargo como Subsecretario interino de Estado para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental en sustitución de Kimberly Breier, quien renunció el pasado 8 de agosto aduciendo motivos personales. La portavoz del Departamento de Estado, Morgan Ortagus, quien notificó la decisión vía Twitter, señaló que el Embajador Kozak es “un experimentado defensor de los valores estadounidenses y los derechos humanos, con un profundo conocimiento de la región. Continuará promoviendo la restauración de la democracia para el pueblo de Venezuela”. Deutsche Welle: http://bit.ly/2ZV8W1v POLÍTICA EXTERIOR MÉXICO RECHAZA LA INVOCACIÓN DEL TRATADO INTERAMERICANO DE ASISTENCIA RECÍPROCA El 11 de septiembre, el Consejo Permanente de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) aprobó la invocación del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR) como respuesta a la situación actual de Venezuela. -
DIRECTING the Disorder the CFR Is the Deep State Powerhouse Undoing and Remaking Our World
DEEP STATE DIRECTING THE Disorder The CFR is the Deep State powerhouse undoing and remaking our world. 2 by William F. Jasper The nationalist vs. globalist conflict is not merely an he whole world has gone insane ideological struggle between shadowy, unidentifiable and the lunatics are in charge of T the asylum. At least it looks that forces; it is a struggle with organized globalists who have way to any rational person surveying the very real, identifiable, powerful organizations and networks escalating revolutions that have engulfed the planet in the year 2020. The revolu- operating incessantly to undermine and subvert our tions to which we refer are the COVID- constitutional Republic and our Christian-style civilization. 19 revolution and the Black Lives Matter revolution, which, combined, are wreak- ing unprecedented havoc and destruction — political, social, economic, moral, and spiritual — worldwide. As we will show, these two seemingly unrelated upheavals are very closely tied together, and are but the latest and most profound manifesta- tions of a global revolutionary transfor- mation that has been under way for many years. Both of these revolutions are being stoked and orchestrated by elitist forces that intend to unmake the United States of America and extinguish liberty as we know it everywhere. In his famous “Lectures on the French Revolution,” delivered at Cambridge University between 1895 and 1899, the distinguished British historian and states- man John Emerich Dalberg, more com- monly known as Lord Acton, noted: “The appalling thing in the French Revolution is not the tumult, but the design. Through all the fire and smoke we perceive the evidence of calculating organization. -
Travel Weekly Secaucus, New Jersey 29 October 2019
Travel Weekly Secaucus, New Jersey 29 October 2019 Latest Cuba restrictions force tour operators to adjust By Robert Silk A tour group in Havana. Photo Credit: Action Sports/Shutterstock The Trump administrations decision to ban commercial flights from the U.S. to Cub an destinations other than Havana could cause complications for tour operators. However, where needed, operators will have the option to use charter flights as an alternative. The latest restrictions, which take effect during the second week of December, will put an end to daily American Airlines flights from Miami to the Cuban cities of Camaguey, Hoguin, Santa Clara, Santiago and Varadero. JetBlue will end flights from Fort Lauderdale to Camaguey, Holguin and Santa Clara. In a letter requesting the Department of Transportation to issue the new rules, secretary of state Mike Pompeo wrote that the purpose of restrictions is to strengthen the economic consequences of the Cuban governments "ongoing repression of the Cuban people and its support for Nicholas Maduro in Venezuela." The restrictions dont directly affect all Cuba tour operators. For example, Cuba Candela flies its clients in and out of Havana only, said CEO Chad Olin. But the new rules will force sister tour operators InsightCuba and Friendly Planet to make adjustments, said InsightCuba president Tom Popper. In the past few months, he explained, Friendly Planet’s "Captivating Cuba" tour and InsightCubas "Classic Cuba" tour began departing Cuba from the north central city of Santa Clara. Now those itineraries will go back to using departure flights from Havana. As a result, guests will leave Cienfuegos on the last day of the tour to head back to Havana for the return flight. -
President Trump Ramps up Cuba Sanctions Changes — Allows Litigation Against Non-U.S
May 1, 2019 PRESIDENT TRUMP RAMPS UP CUBA SANCTIONS CHANGES — ALLOWS LITIGATION AGAINST NON-U.S. COMPANIES CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN CUBA To Our Clients and Friends: Frustrated by Cuba’s continued support of the Maduro regime in Venezuela, the Trump administration announced on April 17, 2019 that it will permit U.S. individuals and companies to initiate litigation against foreign individuals and companies that have past or present business in Cuba involving property that the Cuban government confiscated in 1959. The administration made its announcement in a speech delivered by the president’s national security advisor John R. Bolton, who framed the administration’s decision in characteristically colorful rhetoric: “The ‘troika of tyranny’—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua —is beginning to crumble…The United States looks forward to watching each corner of this sordid triangle of terror fall.”[1] The same day, the Trump administration also announced several other significant changes to U.S. policy toward Cuba, including blocking “U-turn” financial transactions to cut off Cuba’s access to dollar-denominated transactions, limiting nonfamily travel to the island, imposing caps on the value of personal remittances, and enforcing visa restrictions regarding alien traffickers of property confiscated by Cuba. I. Title III of LIBERTAD to Become Effective on May 2, 2019 On April 17, 2019, President Trump lifted long-standing limitations on American citizens seeking to sue over property confiscated by the Cuban regime after the revolution led by Fidel Castro six decades ago. Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,[2] commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act, authorizes current U.S. -
LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR a DAILY PUBLICATION of the DIALOGUE Friday, May 3, 2019
LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR A DAILY PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUE www.thedialogue.org Friday, May 3, 2019 BOARD OF ADVISORS FEATURED Q&A TODAY’S NEWS Diego Arria Director, Columbus Group ECONOMIC Devry Boughner Vorwerk Will U.S. Sanctions First Lawsuits Corporate VP, Global Corporate Affairs Cargill Filed Over Seized Joyce Chang Global Head of Research, Force Ortega From Property in Cuba JPMorgan Chase & Co. The first of many lawsuits Marlene Fernández expected by U.S. citizens over Corporate Vice President for Power in Nicaragua? property confiscated during the Government Relations, Arcos Dorados Cuban Revolution were filed in a Peter Hakim U.S. court. President Emeritus, Page 2 Inter-American Dialogue Donna Hrinak President, Boeing Latin America BUSINESS Jon Huenemann Heineken Acquires Retired VP, U.S. & Int’l Affairs, Philip Morris International Majority Stake James R. Jones Chairman, in Ecuador’s Monarch Global Strategies Biela y Bebidas Craig A. Kelly The Dutch brewer acquired the Director, Americas International Large-scale anti-government demonstrations began more than a year ago in Nicaragua. A Gov’t Relations, Exxon Mobil stake in the Ecuadorean company demonstration last August is pictured above. // File Photo: Civic Alliance for Justice and John Maisto Democracy. from a group of investors. The Director, U.S. Education country’s economic growth and Finance Group Protesters in Nicaragua recently marked the one-year demographics led to the purchase, Nicolás Mariscal anniversary of large-scale demonstrations against the gov- a company executive said. Chairman, Page 2 Grupo Marhnos ernment of President Daniel Ortega. The administration of Thomas F. McLarty III Q U.S. -
Spotlight on Nicaragua
February 16, 2021 CLOSING OF POLITICAL AND CIVIC SPACES: SPOTLIGHT ON NICARAGUA TABLE OF CONTENTS February 16 Agenda ................................................................................................................ 2 Part I: Nicaraguan Spring: The Rise & Repression of a Protest Movement ............. 5 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space Part II: How Did We Get Here? Background on the Current Political Landscape ... 7 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space El Pacto: Leftist on Paper but Not in Practice Questionable Reelections Reforms Favor Authoritarianism An Economy in Ruins Impacts of COVID-19 and Hurricanes Eta & Iota The 2021 Election Part III: Recent Laws Limiting Civic Space .......................................................................... 15 Law of Regulation of Foreign Agents Special Law of Cybercrimes Law of Life Sentence Law of Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty, Self-determination for the Peace Penal Code Reform A Diverse and Divided Opposition Civic Alliance for Justice & Democracy White & Blue Unity Great National Coalition Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights U.S. Policy and the Biden Administration’s Challenges Speaker Biographies ................................................................................................................ 24 1 February 16, 2021 AGENDA AGENDA Welcome & Introduction Introduction to Topics for Meeting Understanding the Current Context of Nicaragua • Current Political -
The 2019 Venezuelan Blackout and the Consequences of Cyber Uncertainty O Blecaute Venezuelano De 2019 E As Consequências Da Incerteza Cibernética
JOSEPH DEVANNY, LUIZ ROGÉRIO FRANCO GOLDONI e BRENO PAULI MEDEIROS The 2019 Venezuelan Blackout and the consequences of cyber uncertainty O blecaute venezuelano de 2019 e as consequências da incerteza cibernética Rev. Bras. Est. Def. v. 7, nº 2, jul./dez. 2020, p. 37-57 DOI: 10.26792/RBED.v7n2.2020.75204 ISSN 2358-3932 JOE DEVANNY1 LUIZ ROGÉRIO FRANCO GOLDONI2 BRENO PAULI MEDEIROS3 INTRODUCTION1 Geopolitics and digital technologies are inextricably interconnected. This manifests in different ways, aligning with broader strategic issues, including: debates about foreign ownership or involvement in domestic infrastructure, such as the U.S.-led campaign to restrict the Chinese com- pany Huawei’s role in 5G communications networks across the globe; and concern about the potential for digital media, including social me- dia platforms, to be exploited to pursue disinformation and subversion, as occurred during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign. Digital technology and geopolitics also combine in contemporary debates about the practice and limits of digital espionage and offensive cyber opera- tions, particularly following the 2011-12 discovery of the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet/Op OLYMPIC GAMES cyber operation against Iranian nucle- ar infrastructure (Sanger 2012; Zetter 2014) and the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden about the extent of U.S. and allied digital surveillance capabilities (Ball, Borger & Greenwald 2013; Harding 2014; Harris 2014). State threats to digital infrastructure — and the strategic implications of those threats — were visible more recently in the major incidents regard- ing SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange (Alperovitch and Ward 2021; 1 Joe Devanny — Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and deputy director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s. -
H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond
H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond Fractured: Trump’s Foreign Policy after Two Years Essay by David C. Hendrickson, Colorado College Published on 29 January 2019 | issforum.org Editor: Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Shortlink: http://tiny.cc/PR-1-5BN Permalink: http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5BN-fractured PDF URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5BN.pdf he presidency of Donald Trump is the strangest act in American history; unprecedented in form, in style an endless sequence of improvisations and malapropisms.1 But in substance there is continuity, probably much more than is customarily recognized. It is hard to recognize the continuity, amid the Tdaily meltd owns (and biennial shutdowns), but it exists. In large measure Trump has been a Republican president, carrying out a Republican agenda. His attack on the regulatory agencies follows a Republican script. His call for a prodigious boost to military spending, combined with sharp cuts in taxes, has been the Republican program since the time of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. His climate skepticism corresponds with that of Republican leaders in Congress. On trade and immigration, Trump has departed most radically from Bush Republicanism, but even in that regard Trump’s policies harken back to older traditions in the Grand Old Party. He is different in character and temperament from every Republican predecessor as president, yet has attached himself to much of the traditional Republican program.2 It is in foreign policy, the subject of this essay, where Trump’s role has been most disorienting, his performance ‘up-ending’ in substance and method. -
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Updated November 18, 2019 Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a 5-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term); and some trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy market-oriented economic reforms, including the right to toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at private property and the promotion of foreign investment. isolating the government. However, the new constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the predominant role of In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s National shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president under the new the normalization of relations. The policy change included constitution, and two remaining old-guard revolutionary the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of leaders were removed from the downsized Council of State, international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of a reflection of generational change in the government. diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase Díaz-Canel has three months to nominate a prime minister. travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade, The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the increase in telecommunications, and banking and financial services U.S. sanctions, which impede international financial (accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to transactions with Cuba, and by Venezuela’s economic the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR], crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to Cuba. -
Observatorio Estados Unidos
CARI / COMITÉ ESTADOS UNIDOS OBSERVATORIO ESTADOS UNIDOS AGOSTO 2019 Número 91 EEUU EN AMÉRICA LATINA: MULTIPLES DESAFÍOS En momentos que Trump lidia con una agenda global difícil, aunque sin prioridad, la migración que busca entrar a EE.UU. a través del Río Grande y Venezuela, siguen teniendo relevancia relativa. El conflicto comercial con China; las manifestaciones en Honk Kong; las tensiones de la potencia asiática con Taiwán y Vietnam; el lanzamiento de misiles por Corea del Norte; el conflicto con Irán en el Golfo Pérsico y la próxima Cumbre del G7 son -entre otros- los problemas globales que concentran la atención de la Casa Blanca. De América Latina, sólo tienen cierta relevancia lo INDICE DE CONTENIDO que se vinculan a la política interna estadounidense: migraciones y Venezuela. Trump sigue presionando con éxito a México para que impida el paso a EE.UU. a través de su frontera de migrantes ilegales, la mayoría de los cuales proviene de América Central. Exige al Presidente electo de Guatemala (Giammattei) que cumpla el acuerdo para que Opinión y análisis del sea “tercer país seguro”, firmado por el gobierno que termina. Aumenta la presión económica sobre Cuba y Venezuela, Director del Comité EEUU, pero al mismo tiempo parece haber entablado comunicación con el número dos del Chavismo (Cabello) buscando Dr. Rosendo Fraga 1 quebrar la cohesión interna del régimen. Una política migratoria restrictiva es un reclamo de las bases electorales de Trump y el cambio de régimen en Venezuela, reclamo de la comunidad hispana liderada por los cubano-americanos, que apoyan al exilio venezolano. Política interna de EEUU 2 México endurece la política migratoria, Cuba adopta medidas para resistir el bloqueo estadounidense y el Presidente electo de Guatemala duda sobre el acuerdo migratorio. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 115 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 115 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION Vol. 164 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2018 No. 126 House of Representatives The House met at 9 a.m. and was Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Jour- strengthen education, and combat called to order by the Speaker pro tem- nal stands approved. human trafficking. I have always relied pore (Mr. CURTIS). f upon her counsel and appreciate her f forthrightness and her integrity. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE As she leaves my office and begins DESIGNATION OF THE SPEAKER The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the the next phase of her career working PRO TEMPORE gentleman from Maryland (Mr. BROWN) for a member of the California State The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- come forward and lead the House in the Senate, I know she will continue to fore the House the following commu- Pledge of Allegiance. serve the people of California well. nication from the Speaker: Mr. BROWN of Maryland led the f WASHINGTON, DC, Pledge of Allegiance as follows: July 26, 2018. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the REUNITE EVERY CHILD I hereby appoint the Honorable JOHN R. United States of America, and to the Repub- IMMEDIATELY CURTIS to act as Speaker pro tempore on this lic for which it stands, one nation under God, day. indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. (Mr. BROWN of Maryland asked and PAUL D. RYAN, f was given permission to address the Speaker of the House of Representatives. -
Russia's Central American Engagements
Russia Foreign Policy Papers Russia’s Central American Engagements Ivan Ulises Klyszcz All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Author: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz Eurasia Program Leadership Director: Chris Miller Deputy Director: Maia Otarashvili Edited by: Thomas J. Shattuck Designed by: Natalia Kopytnik © 2019 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute October 2019 COVER: Designed by Natalia Kopytnik. Our Mission The Foreign Policy Research Institute is dedicated to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. It seeks to educate the public, teach teachers, train students, and offer ideas to advance U.S. national interests based on a nonpartisan, geopolitical perspective that illuminates contemporary international affairs through the lens of history, geography, and culture. Offering Ideas In an increasingly polarized world, we pride ourselves on our tradition of nonpartisan scholarship. We count among our ranks over 100 affiliated scholars located throughout the nation and the world who appear regularly in national and international media, testify on Capitol Hill, and are consulted by U.S. government agencies. Educating the American Public FPRI was founded on the premise that an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S. to conduct a coherent foreign policy. Through in-depth research and events on issues spanning the geopolitical spectrum, FPRI offers insights to help the public understand our volatile world.