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Ontario History

Organizing for War in Canada, 1812-1814: The U.S. Army Experience Mark A. Olinger

Special Issue: The Résumé de l'article Volume 104, numéro 1, spring 2012 Cet article discute l’organisation, l’entrainement, et l’équipement de l’armée américaine pendant la guerre de 1812. Au début de la guerre, le Congrès a URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1065386ar autorisé l’expansion de l’armée régulière par l’emploi de volontaires DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/1065386ar temporaires et a mobilisé la milice. Les régiments existants étaient utilisés comme cadre pour l’organisation des forces nécessaires pour la guerre. Mais le Aller au sommaire du numéro manque de personnel qualifié et la courte durée des campagnes ont fait que ces régiments étaient organisés d’une façon ad hoc en brigades et divisions qui variaient énormément en nombre de quelques centaines à plusieurs milliers. La plupart des unités avaient peu d’entrainement et étaient mal equipées, de Éditeur(s) sorte que les forces combattantes étaient largement inefficaces. Nous The Ontario Historical Society examinons ici les types de régiment, de brigade, et de division employés par l’armée américaine dans les campagnes contre le Haut et le Bas Canada; nous comparons l’efficacité des miliciens et des soldats réguliers; et nous évaluons ISSN l’importance des batailles dans la région de Niagara. 0030-2953 (imprimé) 2371-4654 (numérique)

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Citer cet article Olinger, M. A. (2012). Organizing for War in Canada, 1812-1814: The U.S. Army Experience. Ontario History, 104(1), 21–44. https://doi.org/10.7202/1065386ar

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by Colonel (Retired) Mark A. Olinger, U.S. Army

n 19 April 1783, eight years to as infantry regiments supported by field the day after the first shots at artillery or as a legionary corps, they were Lexington, an armistice began raised by the states for a specified term of endingO the fighting in the War of Ameri- service unless discharged sooner. Led by can Independence; the Treaty of Paris Continental veterans, this small peace- was signed 3 September and ratified by time Regular Army gradually expanded Congress on 14 January 1784. The Trea- over time inheriting the rules, regula- ty of Paris formally ended the war, estab- tions, and traditions of the Continental lished the United States as a member of Army.2 Eventually the legislature would the community of nations, and fixed its create a military establishment based on boundaries. Almost immediately Con- regular and militia forces. gress began disbanding the Continental When the delegates to the Constitu- Army; the soldiers of the last regiment tional Convention met in Philadelphia received their discharges at West Point, in 1787, they recognized the need for a New York, on 20 June 1784. Planning for more permanent military establishment a peacetime force began in the spring of to meet the identified threats to national 1783 and was concluded when Congress security: civil insurrections, Indian at- created a peace establishment authoriz- tacks aided and abetted by the British ing a force of 700 soldiers.1 Organized on the frontier, and more remotely, inva-

1 Resolution of the Continental Congress Disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784 and Resolution of the Continental Congress Creating the Peace Establishment. 3 June 1784. 2 Resolution of the Continental Congress Expanding the Peace Establishment, 20 October 1784 and Resolution of the Continental Congress Renewing the Peace Establishment. 3 October 1787.

Ontario History / Volume CIV, No. 1 / Spring 2012 22 ONTARIO HISTORY Abstract This article examines the organizing, training, and equipping of the U.S. Army during the War of 1812. When the war began, Congress raised forces by expanding the Regular Army, authoriz- ing the use of volunteers, and calling out the militia. In organizing the required forces regimen- tal organizations were used. The lack of trained personnel and the short duration of campaigns would result in these regiments being organized into ad hoc brigades and divisions, which var- ied widely in strength from as small as in the hundreds to a few thousand. Most of the units had little training and were poorly equipped, creating largely ineffective fighting forces. Against this background, the types of regiments, brigades and divisions the U.S. Army employed in the campaigns against Upper and Lower Canada, a comparison of the effectiveness of the militia- men and regulars, and the significance of the battles in the Niagara River area, will be covered.

Résumé: Cet article discute l’organisation, l’entrainement, et l’équipement de l’armée améric- aine pendant la guerre de 1812. Au début de la guerre, le Congrès a autorisé l’expansion de l’armée régulière par l’emploi de volontaires temporaires et a mobilisé la milice. Les régiments existants étaient utilisés comme cadre pour l’organisation des forces nécessaires pour la guerre. Mais le manque de personnel qualifié et la courte durée des campagnes ont fait que ces régiments étaient organisés d’une façon ad hoc en brigades et divisions qui variaient énormément en nom- bre de quelques centaines à plusieurs milliers. La plupart des unités avaient peu d’entrainement et étaient mal equipées, de sorte que les forces combattantes étaient largement inefficaces. Nous examinons ici les types de régiment, de brigade, et de division employés par l’armée américaine dans les campagnes contre le Haut et le Bas Canada; nous comparons l’efficacité des miliciens et des soldats réguliers; et nous évaluons l’importance des batailles dans la région de Niagara.

sion by European powers; they set about the president as commander in chief of providing the means to face these pos- the regular forces and of the militia when sible threats.3 The Constitution allowed called into federal service.4 for a national regular army and navy and Congress passed the Militia Act of a militia under state control, but it took 1792, as amended in 1795, which were action to keep those forces under civilian a group of statutes that authorized the control. Providing for congressional con- President of the United States to assume trol of appropriations and designating command of the state militias when the

3 Robert K. Wright and Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Soldier-Statesman of the Constitution, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Center of Military History), 1987, 37. 4 Constitution of the United States of America, 17 September 1787. As ratified, the Constitution ad- dresses military issues in five sections located in Articles I (Legislative Branch) and II (Executive Branch). Sections 6 and 7 of Article I prevent regular officers from serving in Congress while retaining their com- missions and assign responsibility for initiating military revenue bills to the House of Representatives. Sec- tion 10 of the same article prohibits any state from maintaining troops or warships in peacetime without the consent of Congress, or from waging war unless that state is actually invaded or in imminent danger of invasion. Section 2 of Article II makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of militiamen while in federal service. The heart of the Constitution’s military provisions rests in the enumerated powers given to Congress in Section 8, Article I, including the key right to “provide for the common Defense.” organizing for war in canada 23

United States was in imminent danger of that Congress considered necessary on a invasion from or had been invaded by any regimental basis, and the federal govern- foreign nation or Indian tribe, or to sup- ment used the volunteer regiments to press an insurrection in a state or states form divisions and brigades. within the country. This Act required the President George Washington first state militias to be organized into com- exercised his authority to employ the panies, battalions, regiments, brigades, militia for suppressing insurrection and and divisions. The Act further provided executing the laws of Congress in 1794, that each brigade consist of four two-bat- when he sent a large force of militia under talion infantry regiments. A militia divi- Major General Henry Lee into western sion could have an artillery company and Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebel- a cavalry troop, both of which were to be lion. The military policies of the United formed from volunteers within the bri- States evolved realistically in response gades at the discretion of the governors. to foreign and domestic developments. Major generals were to command divi- There was little actual military threat to sions and brigadier generals the brigades; the United States from a foreign nation. the only staff officer authorized was the Great Britain had no desire to regain brigade inspector, who was also to serve as control of its lost colonies, although both the brigade major. The strength of the bri- Great Britain and Spain sought to curb gade was to be approximately 2,500 men, the country from expanding beyond the and it was assumed that divisional strength borders established by the treaty in 1783. would vary; the statutes prescribed no set Free of the threat of foreign invasion, the number of brigades in a division. United States nevertheless faced a seri- As implemented, the militia divi- ous security problem to the west, where sions and brigades were generally paper settlers demanded protection against the organizations. Congress provided nei- Indians as well as an equitable admin- ther federal supervision nor effective sup- istration of the vast new territories ob- port for them and no provision was made tained in 1783. The Indian problem was for a militia force that would be available an old one. Under the relentless pressure immediately to react in an emergency. of the settlers and because of the land Shortly after Congress passed the militia grants made to soldiers after the Revolu- law, it authorized the use of volunteers, tionary War, the frontier was rapidly re- a third category of soldiers, for national ceding. The Indians fought the settlers all defense. Volunteers served freely, like sol- along the frontier. Tardily and somewhat diers in the Regular Army, but they were inadequately, the U.S. government at- not part of any standing or reserve force. tempted to respond to these challenges.5 Generally, the states raised the volunteers It would eventually deploy regular forces

5 Richard W. Stewart, American Military History Volume 1: The and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 2005), 116-20. 24 ONTARIO HISTORY

supported by various militia units in a se- civilian military agents located in the ries of expeditions that would last until Northern, Middle, and Southern De- the Indians were defeated at the Battle of partments, and the Army’s paymasters; Tippecanoe in 1811 (See map on p. 25). the military agents were confirmed by When President Thomas Jefferson the Senate on 29 April 1802. Under this and Secretary of War Henry Dearborn centralized system the Secretary of War reorganized the Army by the Act of 16 became the focal point of requisitions, March 1802, in addition to fixing the while supplies were dispersed through peacetime establishment they eliminated the military agents and assistants ap- the position of quartermaster general pointed as needed from among line of- and the Quartermaster Department. Its ficers. Under Dearborn, the system func- previous responsibilities were divided tioned reasonably well and in peacetime between the Secretary of War and three promoted economy. It did not set the

The Road to Fallen Timbers U.S. ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY Reinforced by mounted militia in July 1794, Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne led a force of about 3,000 sol- diers to within a few miles of Fort Miami; a post the British had recently established on the site of what is now Toledo, Ohio. There, on 20 August 1794, almost within sight of the British guns, the Indians attacked. The Americans held their ground and then with a furious bayonet charge drove the enemy out of the cover of the fallen trees that gave the Battle of Fallen Timbers its name. In the open prairie, the Indians were at the mercy of Wayne’s mounted volunteers; in less than an hour the rout was complete. The U.S. Army at this time was organized into a “legion,” a term widely used during the 18th century to mean a composite organization of all combat arms under one command. The Legion of the United States, instead of being composed of regiments, was made up of four sub-legions, each commanded by a brigadier general and each consisting of two infantry battalions, one battalion of riflemen, one troop of dragoons, and one company of artillery. organizing for war in canada 25

conditions for large-scale offensive war- of 1812 with practically no education in fare or extended campaigns by the forces strategy, let alone a through acquaintance operating on multiple fronts.6 with doctrine combined with organized During the closing years of Jefferson’s and trained forces capable of conducting administration and into James Madison’s offensive operations. When the war began, the United States moved closer to another the U.S. Congress raised forces by expand- war with Great Britain. The military policy ing the Regular Army, authorizing the use of the United States prepared the country of volunteers, and calling out the militia. for little more than a strategy of passive de- In organizing the forces required both the fense. On land the Jeffersonians preferred federal and state governments used regi- to rely upon citizen’s militia springing to mental organizations to form the brigades arms in emergencies, viewing security and divisions to be employed throughout from foreign aggression and Indian depre- the war. The events of war soon proved the dations as the primary missions of its mili- U.S. Army was not prepared for any type tary. U.S. military leaders entered the War of offensive operations.

6 Donald Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), p.78. 26 ONTARIO HISTORY

Background to War regiments up to seventeen of infantry, one of riflemen, two of dragoons, three he second war with England almost 8 Tbegan when the British warship of artillery, and one of light artillery. The Leopard attacked the American Chesa- Act which created them was remarkable peake in 1807. This aggression caused the in at least three ways: first, it provided U.S. Congress to add five Regular infan- for the largest regiments and battalions try regiments in 1808, the 3rd through authorized in the United States before the 7th, one regiment of light dragoons, the Civil War, second, it established an one regiment of light artillery, and also infantry organization that was at vari- to constitute the Regiment of Riflemen. ance with the seven existing regiments, The light dragoon regiment of eight com- and third, it added artillery and dragoon panies constituted the only cavalry in the regiments, which were expensive and not Regular Army until 1812, when a second usually necessary on the frontier. regiment was authorized. These two regi- As a result, in the first six months of ments were the designated cavalry force 1812 there were three different-sized in- of the Regular Army during the War of fantry regiments, besides one of riflemen. 1812, and at no time were they at full-au- The 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments made thorized strength. The Regiment of Ri- the military peace establishment, and had flemen was a product of the Revolution- ten companies with 76 enlisted men. The ary War experience and the first rifle unit 3rd through the 7th Infantry Regiments, since the end of the Legion of the United authorized in 1808, were designated the States in 1796.7 additional force, and comprised ten com- Aside from the augmentation of panies with two more officers and two 1808 there was no further preparation more enlisted men each than the 1st and for war until just six months before war 2nd had. Finally, the 8th through the 17th with England was declared. The increas- Infantry Regiments in no way resembled ing threat of war with Great Britain the other regiments; they had eighteen prompted Congress to authorize the ex- companies of 110 enlisted men, organ- pansion of the Regular Army in January ized into two battalions.9 1812. On 11 January 1812, Congress au- Although some of the eighteen com- thorized an additional ten infantry regi- pany regiments were raised, several never ments, one of dragoons, and two artillery acquired their second battalions. Re- regiments, bringing the total number of cruiting was so difficult that they lacked

7 John K. Mahon and Ramona Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 13 and Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russel Conner, Armor-Cav- alry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 7. 8 Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007), 25. 9 Mahon and Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army, 13 and 14. organizing for war in canada 27

the time to raise many before Congress U.S. economy, and finally, the alleged in- voted for another reorganization of the citement to violence of the First Nations infantry. Late in June 1812, the legisla- by the British Army.12 After an ideologi- tors changed the law and there were to cal rift in the House and spirited debate be 25 regiments of infantry, exclusive of in the Senate, Congress declared a state of the rifle regiment, each containing ten war between Great Britain and the Unit- companies of 102 men. This made all of ed States on 18 June 1812, that stated: the infantry regiments uniform on paper, That war be, and the same is hereby, declared and a standard of organization was estab- to exist between the United Kingdom of lished that persisted throughout the war. Great Britain and Ireland and the depend- Once constituted, all 25 infantry regi- encies thereof, and the United States of America and their Territories; and that the ments organized and recruited actively, President of the United States is hereby but during the first two years of the war authorized to use the whole land and naval their efforts brought in less than half force of the United States to carry the same of the total number of infantrymen au- into effect, and to issue to private armed thorized.10 For artillery the Regiment of vessels of the United States, commissions, Artillerists, was re-designated as the 1st or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, under the Regiment of Artillery, and the Regiment seal of the United States, against the vessels, of Light Artillery. The twenty companies goods, and effects of the government of the in each of the new regiments were divid- said United Kingdom of Great Britain and ed into two battalions rather than five, Ireland, and the subjects thereof.13 and each company had fourteen more The authorized strength of the Army soldiers than did the 1st Regiment.11 at the time was, on paper, respectable. In Among the significant causes of the reality, approximately half of the units war were the continuing clash over ter- had been legislated into being less than ritorial expansion and respect by Great six months before, and none were at full Britain of U.S. neutral rights at sea, the strength. In July, the entire Army num- issue upon which President James Madi- bered only 6,744 soldiers. Voting regi- son dwelt in his war message. Madison’s ments into existence was one thing, en- war message cited numerous grievances listing them another. What is more, the against Great Britain including impress- units that were raised were virtually un- ment, the practice of inspecting U.S. trained, and unprepared for the war on flagged ships in American territorial wa- which they embarked.14 ters, trade embargoes detrimental to the The desire of frontier expansionists

10 Ibid, 14. 11 McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, 25. 12 Russell F. Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 46 and 47. 13 An Act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their Territories, 18 June 1812. 14 Theodore J. Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” in Charles E. Heller 28 ONTARIO HISTORY

to attack Canada while Great Britain garrisoned by small Regular Army de- was preoccupied with the Napoleonic tachments stretched along the Canadian Wars became an offensive goal. When boundary: Fort Mackinac, on the straits Americans interpreted their purposes between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron; less modestly, they saw themselves as go- Fort Dearborn, on the site of what is now ing to war for the outright conquest of Chicago; Fort Detroit; and Fort Niaga- Canada. Regardless of the motivation ra, at the mouth of the Niagara River on the conquest of Canada was the logical Lake Ontario. An estimated 7,000 Brit- objective given the size and capabilities ish and Canadian regulars guarded the of the Regular Army, volunteer force, 900 miles of Canadian frontier and they and the militia. The Regular Army was could not be reinforced by Great Britain authorized almost 36,000 soldiers, the at the start of the war because of its strug- volunteer force 50,000 and a militia con- gle against France, and the American war tingent of 100,000 drawn from 700,000 was viewed as a sideshow. Potentially, listed on the rolls. Additionally, the Army U.S. militia reinforcements with the was now supplied with officers from its small U.S. Regular Army as a spearhead own military academy.15 The goal of just might outnumber and overwhelm the attacking Canada enough to win con- British and Canadians. Unfortunately, cessions from Great Britain might have it was never formulated before the war been attainable despite the lack of an of- how the Army would conduct offensive fensive military capability by the United operations, as it was now required to ex- States in its Army. Canada, like the Unit- ecute, perhaps because the Jeffersonians ed States, was largely undeveloped with were too deeply wedded to a defensive scattered settlements near the rivers and framework in the use of military power. lakes that divided the two nations. The Consequently, the political leadership principal fighting strength on both sides never informed the War Department during the war lay in the infantry, with what they were supposed to be preparing most of the artillerymen manning vari- for and later execute.17 ous ordnance pieces wherever they may There was no strategy for the war be- be posted; when required artillerymen yond the general agreement in the U.S. fought as infantry.16 government and War Department that Canada be attacked. The obvious line of Early Phases of the War attack against Canada would have been t the outbreak of the war, the Unit- the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Aed States had series of border forts route to Montreal. This would require and William A. Stofft,America’s First Battles, 1776-1965, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 33 and 42. 15 Ibid, 33. 16 McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, 26 and 27. 17 Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 47. organizing for war in canada 29 the United States to concentrate its forces requests placed on them to call out the around Albany and then push forward to militia. Without militia forces from New get astride the St. Lawrence at Montreal. England, it was proposed that a move If successful everything in Canada to the against Montreal could only be accom- west would be deprived support from plished after preliminary offensives from across the Atlantic and the more populous Detroit, Niagara, and Sackett’s Harbor. of the Canadian provinces. The U.S. failed The expectation was that these secondary to adopt this strategic approach and, upon efforts, which could use available local the outbreak of the war, U.S. military ac- militia, would siphon off British forces tivity was not toward Montreal but at the that could otherwise have been moved to western end of the Canadian frontier. The defend Montreal.19 enthusiasm of the western United States In the initial phases of the war along in support of the war helped produce this the border in 1812 the United States suf- strategic incongruity.18 fered a series of reverses, beginning when Taking Montreal or even Kingston Major General William Hull attempted in 1812 would have assured the United to invade Canada from Detroit. William States control and cut communications Hull, governor of the Michigan Terri- with the posts to the west, which would tory, was directed to conduct offensive have fallen of their own accord. President operations from Detroit and assumed Madison had favored such an approach, command of his forces at Fort Detroit on but difficulties prevented the necessary 5 July 1812, with a force of about 1,500 concentration of effort on a single objec- Ohio militiamen organized into three tive. To take Montreal quickly, it was es- regiments of volunteers and 300 regulars sential to employ the militias from New organized into an infantry regiment. He England, supposedly the best prepared in led them across the river into Canada a the country. When the president called week later. At that time the whole enemy for militia, Massachusetts Governor force on the Detroit frontier amounted Caleb Strong replied that he, rather than to about 150 British regulars, 300 Cana- the president, had the power to decide dian militiamen, and some 250 Indians when constitutional exigencies actu- led by Tecumseh. Most of the enemy forc- ally existed. Not expecting any invasions, es were at Fort Malden, about 20 miles he refused the request except for three south of Detroit, on the Canadian side companies that were sent to the Cana- of the river.20 Hull sent out several small dian border. Connecticut took a similar raiding detachments along the Thames view and furnished no forces. The gov- and Detroit Rivers, one of which re- ernors of New York, Pennsylvania, and turned after skirmishing with the British other states generally complied with the outposts near Fort Malden. Meanwhile,

18 Ibid, 47 and 48. 19 Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 42 and 43. 20 Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, pp.80 - 82. 30 ONTARIO HISTORY

a small party of British regulars, Canadi- pardoned.22 With the fall of Mackinac, ans, and Indians, under Major General Detroit, and Dearborn, the entire terri- Sir Isaac Brock, moved to threaten Hull’s tory north and west of Ohio fell under tenuous line of communication along the enemy control. The settlements in- In shores of Lake Erie. Hull, discouraged by diana lay open to attack and the neigh- the loss of Fort Mackinac, whose 60 de- bouring Indian tribes hastened to join fenders had quietly surrendered on 17 the winning side. July to a small group of British regulars, Immediately after taking Detroit, fur traders and Indians, began to with- Brock transferred most of his forces to draw his force across the river into Fort the Niagara frontier, where he faced a Detroit on 7 August. The last American U.S. invasion force of 6,500 men. New had scarcely returned before the first of York militiaman Major General Stephen Brock’s force appeared and began set- van Rensselaer, the senior American com- ting up artillery opposite Detroit. By 15 mander, was in the vicinity of Lewiston August five guns were in position and with a force of 900 regulars and about opened fire on the fort. The Americans 2,300 militiamen. Inexperienced he at responded with fire from 24-pounders. least fought the enemy, which was more During the night Brock led his troops than could be said of the Regular Army across the river. Before an assault could Brigadier General Alexander Smyth. be launched, the Americans surrendered. Smyth and his 1,650 regulars and nearly The regulars were sent to Lower Canada 400 militiamen were located at Buffalo. as prisoners, but the militiamen were re- Lastly, about 1,300 regulars were sta- leased to return home on parole.21 tioned at Fort Niagara. U.S. attempts to Acting on orders from Hull, the day invade Canada across the Niagara in Oc- before the surrender, the small garrison tober and toward Montreal a month later at Fort Dearborn, had evacuated the post failed completely.23 and started out for Detroit. The column Van Rensselaer planned to cross was almost instantly attacked by a band the narrow Niagara River and capture of Indians who massacred the Americans Queenston and its heights, an escarp- before returning to destroy the fort. Lat- ment that ran perpendicular to the river er paroled, Hull returned to the United south of the town. From this vantage States to face a court-martial for his poor point, he intended to drive the British conduct during the campaign, was sen- out of the Niagara peninsula. Smyth, on tenced to be shot, and was immediately the other hand, wanted to attack above 21 Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 43 and A.J. Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 182-88 and 190-94. 22 Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 43; Langguth, Union 1812, 273, and Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, p.84. 23 Ronald J. Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, (Toronto: James Lormier and Company, Ltd., 2001), 27-29 and Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 87. organizing for war in canada 31

the falls, where the banks were low and soldiers, tired and outnumbered, put up the current less swift; and he refused to a stiff resistance on the heights but in the cooperate with the militia general. With end were defeated, with 300 Americans a force ten times that of the British oppo- killed or wounded and nearly 1,000 cap- site him, van Rensselaer decided to attack tured. Except for minor raids across the alone the morning of October 13. The as- frozen St. Lawrence, there was no further sault force numbered 600 men, roughly fighting along the New York frontier un- half of them New York militiamen, but til the following spring.25 the attack did not go well. Several boats During the Niagara campaign the drifted beyond the landing area, and the largest force then under arms, command- first troops to land, numbering far fewer ed by Major General Henry Dearborn, than 500, were pinned down for a time was in the vicinity of Albany, more than on the riverbank below the heights. The 250 miles from the scene of operations. men eventually found an unguarded Dearborn had served as Jefferson’s Sec- path, clambered to the summit and, retary of War. Persuaded to accept com- surprising the enemy, overwhelmed the mand of the northern theater, except fortified battery and drove them into for Hull’s forces, he was in doubt about Queenston.24 the extent of his authority. When it was Later in the morning the Americans clarified, he was reluctant to exercise it; repelled a counterattack, during which proposing to move his forces, which in- Brock was killed. This was the high point cluded seven regiments of regulars with of the battle. Although 1,300 men were artillery and dragoons, against Montreal successfully ferried across the river under in conjunction with a simultaneous op- persistent British fire from a fortified bat- eration across the Niagara River. At the tery north of town, less than half of them beginning of November he sent a large ever reached the U.S. line on the heights. force north to Plattsburg and announced Most of the militiamen refused to cross that he would personally lead it into the river, insisting on their legal right to Montreal, but most of his force got no remain on U.S. soil; and Smyth ignored farther than the border. When his ad- van Rensselaer’s request for regulars. vance guard was driven back to the vil- Meanwhile, British and Canadian rein- lage of Champlain by Canadian militia- forcements arrived in Queenston, and men and Indians, his Vermont and New Major General Roger Sheave, Brock’s York volunteers flatly refused to cross the successor, began to advance on the U.S. border, Dearborn quietly turned around position with a force of 800 troops and and marched back to Plattsburg, where 300 Indian skirmishers. Van Rensselaer’s he went into winter quarters.26

24 Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 29 and 30; Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 87; and Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 45-48 . 25 Op cit, 31-38 and Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 48. 26 Op cit, 48 and Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 88. 32 ONTARIO HISTORY

Before 1812 was over, Canada was Detroit and an attack on Canada across cleared of U.S. invasion forces, and the Lake Ontario. For the Detroit campaign, whole Northwest Territory beyond the Madison picked Brigadier General Wil- Ohio River was in danger of collapsing liam Henry Harrison, governor of the In- under British counterattacks. This dis- dian Territory and hero of Tippecanoe. astrous experience still failed to instruct The difficulties of a winter campaign were the U.S. leadership that they should ob- tremendous, but the country demanded serve the strategic principle of directing action. Harrison’s move to recapture De- their offensive efforts upon vital and troit was repulsed in January 1813, but vulnerable objectives, in this instance he checked British efforts to penetrate the St. Lawrence bottleneck into the Ca- deeper into the region at the west end of nadian interior. In the course of the war Lake Erie during the summer of 1813.28 U.S. military and political leaders never What can be said about the U.S. strategy recognized this strategic principle and along the border is that by 1813 they had concentrated their limited offensive ef- determined that to save their Northwest forts in operations along the western Ca- Territory and regain the initiative, they nadian frontier.27 must capture naval control of Lakes On- tario and Erie. (See map below) Second Year: 1813 In the race to build warships, the he objects of the U.S. campaign U.S. had a slight logistical advantage in Tplan for 1813 were the recapture of that it was easier for them to build and

27 Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 48 28 Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence, 238-44. organizing for war in canada 33

Left-right: Gen. William Henry Harrison and Captain Oliver Hazard Perry as drawn by C.W. Jeffreys from an engraving after Wood that appeared in Anal- ectic Magazine and a portrait by Jarvis in the city hall of New York. Pictoral History of Cana- da, vol. 2 (Copp Clark: Toronto, 1963), 126. of Lake Ontario, would give the United States control of the lake and, equip warships than the British who had by cutting the British lines of communi- to transport key equipment and supplies cations, frustrate enemy plans for opera- from across the Atlantic. It would require tions in the west. When the time came to the uncommon leadership and initiative move, Dearborn and Chauncey, hearing from U.S. Navy Commodore Oliver Haz- a rumor that the British forces in King- ard Perry in building his squadron on ston had been reinforced, decided to by- Lake Erie. On Lake Ontario, U.S. Navy pass that objective and attack York first. Commodore Isaac Chauncey managed About 1,700 men sailed up Lake On- to build a squadron that at least matched tario without incident, arriving off York and sometimes surpassed the Royal Navy before daybreak on 27 April. Dearborn, squadron; but it never achieved more who was in poor health, turned over the than a stalemate.29 command of the assault to the explorer The Ontario campaign was entrusted Brigadier General . The to Dearborn, who was ordered to move landing, about four miles west of the his forces from Plattsburg to Sacket’s town, was virtually unopposed. Occupy- Harbor, where Chauncey had been as- ing a fortification about halfway between sembling a squadron. Dearborn was to the town and the landing was the British move across the lake to capture King- garrison of 600 men, which was over- ston and destroy the British flotilla there, whelmed after sharp resistance. Just as then proceed to York, the capital of Up- the Americans were pushing through the per Canada, to capture military stores. fort toward the town, a powder magazine Finally, he was to cooperate with a force exploded killing or disabling a number of from Buffalo in seizing the forts on the Americans and British soldiers; Pike was Canadian side of the Niagara River. The among those killed. The losses were heavy U.S. strategy was basically sound for the on both sides and the remnants of the capture of Kingston, the only tenable site garrison fled toward Kingston, 150 miles for a naval station on the Canadian side to the east. With Dearborn incapaci-

29 Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 49. 34 ONTARIO HISTORY

tated and Pike dead, the U.S. This was the turning point. soldiers began looting and Having suffered serious loss- burning the public buildings, es and in danger of being cut destroying the provincial off, the British withdrew to records. After holding the their ships.31 town for about a week, they On the same day Prevost crossed the lake to Niagara sailed against Sacket’s Har- to join an attack against the bor, Dearborn, at the west- forts on the Canadian side of ern end of Lake Ontario, the Niagara River.30 was invading Canada with a Meanwhile, Sacket’s Har- force of 4,000 soldiers. The bor was defended by about Gen. , by C.W. Jeffreys, operation began with a well- from a portrait by J.W. Jarvis, city 400 regulars and approxi- hall, New York. executed amphibious assault mately 750 militiamen under the com- led by Colonel with the mand of New York militiaman Brigadier U.S. Navy providing fire support. Out- General Jacob Brown. Brown posted his numbered by more than two to one, men in two lines in front of a fortified the British retreated, abandoning Fort battery to cover a possible landing. At George and Queenston to the Ameri- Kingston, Sir George Prevost, the Gover- cans. An immediate pursuit might have nor General of Canada, had assembled a sealed the victory, but Dearborn, after force of over 800 British regulars and mi- occupying Fort George, waited several litiamen with two 6-pounder guns. Tak- days and then sent about 2,000 men af- ing advantage of the absence of Chaunc- ter the enemy, advancing to within ten ey’s fleet, Prevost launched an attack on miles of the British. With slight regard Sacket’s Harbor with his entire force on for security and even less for the enemy’s the night of 26 May. Coming ashore un- audacity it halted for the night. During der heavy fire, the British pressed rapidly the night a force of about 700 British sol- forward, routed the first line, and pushed diers attacked the camp and routed the the second back into the prepared defens- Americans. Dearborn then withdrew his es, where the Americans held. The British entire force to Fort George. Two weeks then attempted two frontal assaults but later, a 500-man detachment ventured were repulsed with heavy losses. While 15 miles outside the fort and, when at- they were re-forming for a third attack, tacked, surrendered to a force of British Brown rallied the militia and sent it to- and Indians that was half as large. After ward the rear of the enemy’s right flank. these reverses there was no further action

30 Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 41-44 and Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence, 230-35. 31 J. Mackay Hitsman and Donald E. Graves, The Incredible War of 1812, (Toronto: Robin Bass Stu- dio, 1999), 142-48 and Patrick A. Wilder, The Battle of Sackett’s Harbor, (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Company of America, 1994), 119-22. organizing for war in canada 35

Remember the River Raisin! by Ken Riley (NATIONAL GUARD BUERAU ) Following Commodore Perry’s success at Lake Erie, a U.S. ground force engaged British forces 75 miles east of Detroit on 5 October 1813. The Battle of the Thames was revenge for an earlier massacre of Kentucky militia on the River Raisin. Coupled with Perry’s triumph, it ended a series of defeats and helped restore U.S. dominance in the northwest region. of consequence on the Niagara front for ry’s ships and the captured British vessels the remainder of the year. Dearborn, had been repaired, Harrison embarked again incapacitated by illness, resigned his forces and sailed against Fort Malden. his commission in early July.32 A regiment of mounted Kentucky rifle- On 10 September 1813 Perry’s men under Colonel Richard M. John- squadron defeated the Royal Navy fleet son moved along the shore of the lake on Lake Erie, restoring U.S. dominance toward Detroit. Outnumbered and now in the Northwest Territory beyond the open to attack from the water, the Brit- Ohio.33 Further it set the conditions for ish abandoned both Forts Malden and Harrison’s victory in western Canada at Detroit and retreated eastward. Leav- the Thames River on 5 October, which ing a detachment to garrison the forts, reestablished U.S. control over the De- Harrison set out after the enemy with troit area. As soon as the damage to Per- the Kentucky cavalry regiments, five bri-

32 Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 44-47. 33 Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 49. 36 ONTARIO HISTORY

gades of Kentucky volunteers, and a part emy threat in that sector was eliminated. of the U.S. 27th Infantry, a force of about There was no further fighting here for the 3,500 men. On 5 October he made con- rest of the war. tact with the British on the banks of the For the U.S. the expedition against Thames River about 85 miles from Mal- Montreal in the fall of 1813 was one of den. The enemy numbered about 2,900, the worst disasters of the war. It involved of whom about 900 were British regulars a simultaneous drive by two forces: one, and the remainder Indians under Tecum- of about 4,000 soldiers assembled at seh. Instead of attacking with infantry Plattsburg on Lake Champlain under the in the traditional line- command of Brigadier against-line fashion, Har- General Wade Hamp- rison ordered a mounted ton, and another of about attack. The maneuver suc- 6,000 men under the ceeded completely. Unable command of Major Gen- to withstand the charging eral , Kentuckians, the British which was to attack down surrendered in droves. The the St. Lawrence River Indians were routed; Te- Gen. James Wilkinson, by C.W. Jef- from Sacket’s Harbor. cumseh, who had brought freys from a portrait by C.W. Peale in Hampton and Wilkinson Independence Hall, Philadelphia. so much trouble to the were scarcely on speak- western frontier, was killed. Harrison, ing terms, and there was no one on the after discharging his Kentucky volun- ground to command the two of them. teers and arranging for the defenses of Neither had sufficient strength to capture the Michigan Territory, sailed after the Montreal without the other’s aid; each escaping British forces that numbered no lacked confidence in the other, and both more than 250.34 suspected that the War Department was This decisive victory illustrated suc- leaving them in the lurch. At first contact cessful employment of the principles of with the British, about halfway down offensive and mass while highlighting the the Chateaugay River, Hampton re- importance of combined land-sea opera- treated and, after falling back all the way tions, resulting in Lake Erie becoming an to Plattsburg, resigned from the Army. American lake. The Indian confederacy Wilkinson, after a detachment of about was shattered and the U.S. position on 2,000 men was severely mauled in an en- the Detroit frontier was reestablished, gagement just north of Ogdensburg, also a portion of Canadian territory was abandoned his part of the operation and brought under U.S. control, and the en- followed Hampton into Plattsburg.35

34 Stubbs and Conner, Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, 7, Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence, 2006, 261-70 and Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 53 and 54. 35 Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 54-59. organizing for war in canada 37

In the meantime, during Decem- ing, reorganization, and competent new ber 1813 the British took advantage of commanders. the weakened state of U.S. forces on the In the midst of the war Congress act- Niagara frontier. They recaptured Fort ed to rationalize the regimental recruit- George and crossed the river to take ing and force structure. Regulars at first Fort Niagara, which remained in Brit- could only enlist for five years, but late in ish hands until the end of the war. Before 1812 new recruits were given an opportu- evacuating Fort George, the Americans nity to enlist for the duration of the war. had burned the town of Newark and part All the while the states competed with of Queenston. In retaliation the British, the Regular Army for soldiers and the after assaulting Fort Niagara with unusu- shorter terms of service they offered drew al ferocity, let loose their Indian allies on men to enlist into their units. A bounty the surrounding countryside and burned of sixteen dollars was offered to stimulate the town of Buffalo.36 enlistments; a bonus of three months’ pay and 160 acres of land was added for Reorganizing the Army those who completed their service faith- uring the early phases of the war, fully.37 Congress directed the creation, Dthe Army was plagued by misman- in January 1813, of twenty new infantry agement in the War Department, incom- regiments to be enlisted for one year of petent generals, and militiamen who service. Nineteen of them were raised and refused to serve outside the boundaries designated as the 26th through the 44th of the United States. In early 1813 Madi- Infantry Regiments; later, they were con- son replaced his incompetent Secretary verted into standard infantry regiments. of War William Eustis with John Arm- The reality was that all of the units con- strong, who instituted a reorganization stituted after 1811 had soldiers in them that eventually resulted in the substitu- who had enlisted for different terms. For tion of younger, more aggressive field example, there were in a single regiment commanders for the aged veterans of one-year regulars, eighteen month men, the Revolution. Congress then author- three- and five-year men, and some in for ized an expansion of the U.S. Army staff the duration of the war.38 During the first to help the secretary manage the war. In two of the years, they attracted less than March it re-created the Offices of the the total number authorized. Adjutant General, Inspector General, The lack of trained personnel and Surgeon, and Apothecary General and the short duration of campaigns would assigned eight topographical engineers result in these regiments being organized to the staff. By 1814, the Army largely re- into ad hoc brigades and divisions, which deemed itself through improved recruit- varied widely in strength from as small

36 Ibid, 59. 37 Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812,” 34. 38 Mahon and Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army, 14. 38 ONTARIO HISTORY

as hundreds to a few thousand. Briga- compiled by William Duane, the Adju- dier General Joseph Bloomfield’s New tant General, in 1813 called for a brigade York militia brigade assigned to Major in the peace establishment to consist of General Henry Dearborn’s force in 1813 any number of battalions, but for field counted 1,400 strong; Brigadier General service it was not to exceed 4,000 men. Winfield Scott’s Regular brigade in 1814 A division could have from two to four before the Battle of Chippewa fielded brigades. During congressional delibera- 1,300 men; and the Pennsylvania volun- tions as to the number of general officers teer brigade that crossed the border into needed to conduct the war, Secretary of Upper Canada in 1814 numbered 413. War John Armstrong expressed that a The strength of the divisions fluctuated brigade should have only two regiments just as much. In 1812 the New York quo- because the management of 2,000 men ta for militia men was 13,500, which the in the field was ample duty for a briga- state organized into two divisions of four dier general. Also, in his opinion, the di- brigades each. At the same time, with a rection of 4,000 men was a suitable com- quota of 2,500 men, Tennessee organized mand for a major general.40 a division of two infantry regiments plus Few artillerymen were capable of em- a non-divisional cavalry regiment.39 ploying artillery in a battlefield environ- During the war U.S. Army leaders ment. Fewer yet understood the value of discussed the organization of brigades their arm, and infantry commanders had and divisions, and they sometimes disa- even less knowledge of artillery tactics. greed with the contemporary practice or The infantry battle lines usually formed with the laws then in effect. The Register just beyond the effective range of artil- of the Army published in 1813 stated that lery, about 500 yards, and artillery was a brigade would consist of two regiments limited to repelling the opposing force’s and a division of two brigades with but a attack. There was little possibility of sal- single staff officer, the brigade major, in vaging the situation, for the Army had each. The laws in force, however, author- no senior artillery officers to direct any ized a brigade staff of an inspector, sub- emphasis towards the arm. During the inspector, quartermaster, wagon master, war, a few companies of the 1st and 2nd and chaplain. When a brigadier general Regiments served as true field artillery commanded a brigade, his brigade ma- and were occasionally effective, as were jor and aides were included in the staff. the 12-pounder batteries at the Battle Major generals continued to command of Chippewa. Light artillery was a new divisions, and their staffs consisted of a institution in the United States, and the quartermaster, judge advocate, and two officers and men lacked peacetime, much aides. The official handbook for infantry less wartime, experience. The Regiment

39 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, (Wash- ington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 7 and 8. 40 Ibid, pp. 8 and 9 and Crackel, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 81 12,” 51 and 52. organizing for war in canada 39

Gen. Winfield Scott by C.W. Jeffreys based on an -en graving after Wood as first appeared in Analectic Maga- zine, 1814. of Light Artillery had been dismounted in 1809 and the War Department in- tended to mount the regiment, but with- in six months of the declaration of war, only half the companies were equipped as such. Because the terrain did not favor massed cavalry, many viewed horse artil- lery as unnecessary. The regiment seldom operated as light artillery and when it did it was by small detachments. By the end of the war, most of the companies in the regiment had been reequipped as infan- try. The 3rd Artillery Regiment served primarily as infantry on the New York – Canadian frontier, with some compa- the 9th, 11th, 22nd, and 25th Infantry nies performing as foot artillery along Regiments, near Buffalo, New York. A the Atlantic coast.41 student of European military training, While organizing brigades and divi- Scott in the spring of 1814 trained his sions in 1813, the question arose as to brigade into a disciplined force that took whether or not Regular Army and mili- the British by surprise when deployed to tia units should be “brigaded” together. block a British advance into New York.42 Because the drill and discipline of the In 1814 Congress would enact leg- regulars differed greatly from that of the islation to improve the structure of the militia, with each state prescribing its Army. Early in 1814 four more infantry own drill, the general practice was to bri- regiments and three more regiments of gade each category of troops separately. riflemen were constituted. In the end Raising and maintaining troops during 48 infantry regiments, numbered from the War of 1812 proved to be difficult the 1st to the 48th, were constituted, because of the opposition to the war. plus four rifle regiments, the 1st through Most of the units assigned to them had the 4th. This was the greatest number of little training and were poorly equipped, infantry units included in the Regular creating largely ineffective fighting forc- Army until the world wars of the twen- es. One notable exception was Scott’s tieth century. Further an effort was made Regular Army brigade, consisting of to raise the Army to strength, and nearly

41 McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, 27. 42 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, 8. 40 ONTARIO HISTORY

27,000 men were recruited but in spite of same caliber. One ammunition wagon this, four of the regiments had to be con- or caisson was allotted to each pair of solidated because they were too small. 3-pounders, one to each 6-pounder, two The 17th, 19th, 26th, and 27th were to each howitzer, two or at most three, joined to form a new 17th and a new were allotted to each gun larger than a 19th, while the two highest numbered, 6-pounder. Three wagons were author- the 47th and 48th, were re-designated ized for equipment and stores for each the 27th and 26th, respectively.43 Con- company and one for each half section. solidated into an eight troop command A traveling forge was authorized for each designated the Regiment of Light Dra- company of light artillery and for every goons were the two dragoon regiments. two companies of foot artillery.45 Although the consolidated regiment sel- Competent leadership, organization, dom operated as a single unit and a year and training meant little without suffi- later was disbanded, detachments saw cient logistical support; logistics, more action at Lundy’s Lane, Fort Erie, and than any other factor, determined the na- Bladensburg.44 ture of the military campaigns of the war. Congress reorganized the three artil- With the regular army geographically lery regiments under the Act of 30 March dispersed across the United States and on when it accepted the recommendation the frontier in posts seldom greater than of Secretary of War John Armstrong to company strength, there had been little consolidate the three regiments into bat- to no opportunity to exercise the sustain- talions, under the title Artillery of the ment of regimental let alone division size United States. The law provided for the formations. The logistics system in use at three regiments to be organized into the start of the war proved a resounding twelve battalions with 48 companies. failure, because peacetime economy was Strength of the artillery companies was achieved at the expense of military ef- increased by the addition of thirty-four fectiveness. The United States was fight- enlisted men and two lieutenants, one of ing a war on widely separated fronts that which was to be responsible for ordnance required moving supplies through a wil- equipment and supplies. Under this reor- derness where roads had to be built for ganization each company was to maneu- wagons and packhorses. While transpor- ver either four guns of the same caliber tation was a major challenge, it account- and two howitzers or six guns of not more ed for only part of the problem. Supply than two calibers. A company of artillery of ammunition, clothing, medical and was organized of two half divisions, each subsistence supplies proved inadequate. consisting of two guns of the same calib- Winter months found the soldiers with- er and one howitzer or three guns of the out blankets, inadequately housed, and 43 Mahon and Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army, 14. 44 Stubbs and Conner, Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, 7. 45 McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, 26 and 27. organizing for war in canada 41 without forage for their horses. ommend operations from Buffalo, but In a vain attempt to improve the sus- disagreement within the president’s cabi- tainment of the Army forces conducting net delayed adoption of a plan. A U.S. combat operations, Congress authorized advance from Plattsburg in March 1814, additions to the War Department staff led by Major General James Wilkinson, that included the Ordnance, Purchas- was checked just beyond the border. ing, and Quartermaster Departments. Expecting Commodore Chauncey’s na- Congress did not reinstate the Com- val squadron to be strong enough to missary and Hospital Departments. challenge the Royal Navy, Washington The Ordnance Department oversaw the decided upon a coordinated attack on reception, storing, maintaining, and re- the Niagara peninsula. (See map, p. 42) pair of munitions. Arms, ammunition, Secretary Armstrong instructed Brown clothing, accoutrements, and equipment to cross the Niagara River in the vicinity were provided by the Purchasing Depart- of Fort Erie and, after assaulting the fort, ment. The Quartermaster Department either to move against Fort George and was responsible for purchasing military Newark or to seize and hold a bridge over stores not procured by the Purchasing the Chippewa River, as he saw fit. On 3 and Ordnance Departments, except for July 3,500 men under Brown crossed the ration which contractors provided and Niagara River seizing Fort Erie in a coor- transported. To add flexibility to the dinated attack with Chauncey’s squadron system, in an emergency, a commanding and then advanced toward the Chippewa officer could authorize his quartermas- River, sixteen miles away. There, a British ter to purchase needed supplies locally.46 force had gathered to oppose the Ameri- Throughout the war Congress and the cans. Brown posted his forces in position War Department overlooked the great- behind a creek with his right flank resting est need for reform allowing the Army on the Niagara River and his left protect- to rely on contractors for the sustain- ed by a swamp. In front of the U.S. po- ment of its forces. With no centralized sition was an open plain, beyond which direction, the inefficient, fraud-racked flowed the Chippewa River; on the other contract system proved to be one of the side of the river were the British.48 gravest hindrances to military operations Brigadier General Winfield Scott’s throughout the war.47 1,300 strong brigade of Brown’s com- mand was unexpectedly confronted Final Campaigns in Canada by a large British force on 5 July while ritish control of Lake Ontario, preparing for an Independence Day pa- Bobliged the Secretary of War to rec- rade near the Chippewa River. In the 46 Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 78-80. 47 Stewart, American Military History Volume 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917, 148. 48 Dale, The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812, 69 and 70. 42 ONTARIO HISTORY

fighting, American troops stood their and Niagara when Chauncey’s fleet failed ground against a comparable number of to cooperate in the operation. Instead, British regulars. The British commander on 24-25 July 1814, Brown moved back watched the advancing American line to the Chippewa preparatory to a cross- and realized his mistake: “Those are country march along Lundy’s Lane to regulars, by God!” Scott’s well-trained the west end of Lake Ontario. Unknown troops broke the enemy line with a skill- to Brown, the British had concentrated fully executed charge, sending the sur- about 2,200 troops in the vicinity of Lun- vivors into a hasty retreat. British losses dy’s Lane and 1,500 more in Forts George were 137 killed and 304 wounded; U.S., and Niagara. On 25 July, Scott’s brigade, 48 killed and 227 wounded. It was Win- moving again towards Queenston in an field Scott’s brigade of infantry, drilled effort to draw off a British detachment through the previous winter into a disci- threatening Brown’s line of communica- plined force. It drove the British from the tions on the U.S. side of the Niagara, ran battlefield; better still, after two years of into the enemy at the junction of Queen- seemingly endless failures, it renewed the ston Road and Lundy’s Lane. The ensuing American soldier’s faith in himself and battle, which eventually involved Brown’s his leaders.49 force of 2,900 men and some 3,000 Brit- After Chippewa, Brown’s force ad- ish, was fiercely fought and neither side vanced to Queenston, but soon aban- gained a clear-cut victory. The Americans doned a proposed attack on Forts George withdrew to the Chippewa, but the battle

49 Ibid, 70-74 and Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, 8. organizing for war in canada 43

The Battle of Chippewa (U.S. ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY) On 5 July 1814 at Chippewa, Upper Canada, the British commander watched the advancing American line con- temptuously, for its soldiers wore the rough gray coats issued to the New York militia that he had easily defeated before. As the ranks advanced steadily through murderous grapeshot he realized his mistake: “Those are regulars, by God!” It was Winfield Scott’s brigade of infantry, drilled through the previous winter into a crack outfit. It drove the British from the battlefield; better still, after two years of seemingly endless failures, it renewed the American soldier’s faith in himself and his leaders. terminated Brown’s invasion of Canada. General of Canada, to call off his attack Casualties were heavy, the British losing on Plattsburg with 11,000 troops.50 878 and the Americans 854 in killed and wounded; both Brown and Scott were Post War Reorganization wounded and the British commander was fter the end of the war the militia wounded and captured. The British siege Aunits were released from federal of Fort Erie between 2 August and 21 Sep- service, the volunteers were discharged, tember 1814 failed to drive the Americans and the Regular Army units were even- from that outpost on Canadian soil, but tually reduced. Militia units performed, on 5 November they withdrew voluntar- on the whole, as well and as poorly as the ily. U.S. Navy Commodore Thomas Mac- Regular Army. The defeats and humilia- donough’s victory over the Royal Navy on tions of the regular forces during the first Lake Champlain on 11 September 1814 years of the war matched those of the mi- compelled Sir George Prevost, Governor litia, just as in a later period the Kentucky

50 Op cit, 74-78 and Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 52. 44 ONTARIO HISTORY

volunteers at the Thames proved that the tions that defended the coastal cities.52 state citizen-soldier could perform well. Eight infantry regiments and one ri- The keys to the militiamen’s performance fle regiment arose from the ruins of those were training and leadership, two areas in existence. There was no effort to pre- over which the federal government had serve the honors or traditional numbers little control. Occasionally competent, of any of the prewar regiments. The new the militia units were never dependable, numbers were based on the seniority though in relationship to the regulars of the colonels, with the senior colonel their record was comparable. commanding the 1st, and so forth. Re- No sooner was war over than Con- sulting in the 1st Infantry Regiment be- gress scrambled to fix the peacetime es- ing merged with other regiments and re- tablishment of the military. An Act of 3 designated the 3rd, and the old 2nd, 3rd, March 1815 set the peace establishment 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th were likewise lost at 10,000 soldiers, divided among artil- in the remains of disbanded regiments. lery, infantry, and rifle regiments. De- The eight remaining infantry regiments spite the arguments in Army circles for were smaller than their war predecessors a small mounted force, Congress stood because, while the number of companies firm in its dedication to economy and a in each remained at ten, every company minimum standing Army. Cavalry was was authorized 78 men instead of 103. As eliminated. The Regiment of Dragoons a consequence of the reduction, 25,000 was disbanded on 15 June 1815, and for infantrymen were separated from the seventeen years the Regular Army again service. Another consequence was that had no cavalry.51 Congress authorized the organization of the infantry regiment the retention of the Corps of Artillery as was set for the next thirty years. Not un- prescribed in 1814, but reduced the Reg- til the Mexican War, 31 years later, was it iment of Light Artillery to the strength substantially expanded.53 authorized in 1808. With the units se- Although the United States failed verely understrength, Congress on 17 to conquer Canada or obtain conces- May 1815 reduced it to eight battalions. sions on neutral rights, the Army’s con- Some of the artillery units served in the duct earned respect abroad and inspired field with the forces on the frontier, but a newfound sense of national pride and most of the companies were in scattered confidence. With the war over the Army detachments along the seaboard to serve returned to its former duties of patrolling the guns emplaced in numerous fortifica- the frontier and guarding the coastline.

51 Stubbs and Conner, Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve, 7. 52 McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003, 31. 53 Mahon and Danysh, Infantry Part I: Regular Army, 14-15.