624
The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games
AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games January 4, 2012, Boston, MA January 11–12, 2013, San Diego, CA
Karl-Dieter Crisman Michael A. Jones Editors
American Mathematical Society
The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games
AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games January 4, 2012, Boston, MA January 11–12, 2013, San Diego, CA
Karl-Dieter Crisman Michael A. Jones Editors
624
The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games
AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games January 4, 2012, Boston, MA January 11–12, 2013, San Diego, CA
Karl-Dieter Crisman Michael A. Jones Editors
American Mathematical Society Providence, Rhode Island
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Dennis DeTurck, Managing Editor Michael Loss Kailash C. Misra Martin J. Strauss
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91-06, 91A05, 91A12, 91A20, 91B06, 91B08, 91B12, 91B14, 91B32, 91F10.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The mathematics of decisions, elections, and games / Karl-Dieter Crisman, Michael A. Jones, editors. pages cm. “AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games, January 4, 2012, Boston, MA, January 11-12, 2013, San Diego, CA.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8218-9866-6 (alk. paper) 1. Game theory. 2. Statistical decision. 3. Probabilities. I. Crisman, Karl-Dieter, 1975- editor of compilation. II. Jones, Michael A., 1967- editor of compilation. QA269.M387 2014 519.3–dc23 2014003691 Contemporary Mathematics ISSN: 0271-4132 (print); ISSN: 1098-3627 (online) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1090/conm/624
Copying and reprinting. Material in this book may be reproduced by any means for edu- cational and scientific purposes without fee or permission with the exception of reproduction by services that collect fees for delivery of documents and provided that the customary acknowledg- ment of the source is given. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, or for resale. Requests for permission for commercial use of material should be addressed to the Acquisitions Department, American Math- ematical Society, 201 Charles Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02904-2294, USA. Requests can also be made by e-mail to [email protected]. Excluded from these provisions is material in articles for which the author holds copyright. In such cases, requests for permission to use or reprint should be addressed directly to the author(s). (Copyright ownership is indicated in the notice in the lower right-hand corner of the first page of each article.) c 2014 by the American Mathematical Society. All rights reserved. The American Mathematical Society retains all rights except those granted to the United States Government. Copyright of individual articles may revert to the public domain 28 years after publication. Contact the AMS for copyright status of individual articles. Printed in the United States of America. ∞ The paper used in this book is acid-free and falls within the guidelines established to ensure permanence and durability. Visit the AMS home page at http://www.ams.org/ 10987654321 191817161514
Contents
Preface vii Redistricting and District Compactness Carl Corcoran and Karen Saxe 1 Fair Division and Redistricting Zeph Landau and Francis Edward Su 17 When Does Approval Voting Make the “Right Choices”? Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour 37 How Indeterminate is Sequential Majority Voting? A Judgement Aggregation Perspective Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato 55 Weighted Voting, Threshold Functions, and Zonotopes Catherine Stenson 89 The Borda Count, the Kemeny Rule, and the Permutahedron Karl-Dieter Crisman 101 Double-Interval Societies Maria Margaret Klawe, Kathryn L. Nyman, Jacob N. Scott, and Francis Edward Su 135 Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies Matt Davis, Michael E. Orrison, and Francis Edward Su 147 Selecting Diverse Committees with Candidates from Multiple Categories Thomas C. Ratliff 159 Expanding the Robinson-Goforth System for 2 × 2Games Brian Hopkins 177 Cooperation in n-Player Repeated Games Daniel T. Jessie and Donald G. Saari 189 The Dynamics of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules Michael A. Jones and Jennifer M. Wilson 207
v
Preface
The majority of papers in this collection accompanied talks from the AMS Spe- cial Sessions on the Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games from the 2012 and 2013 Joint Mathematics Meetings of the AMS and MAA. These sessions were organized by Karl-Dieter Crisman (Gordon College), Michael A. Jones (Mathemat- ical Reviews), and Michael Orrison (Harvey Mudd College). The one exception is the paper based on a talk from the AMS Special Session on The Redistricting Problem; this session was organized by Daniel Goroff (Harvey Mudd College) and Daniel Ullman (George Washington University) for the 2009 Joint Mathematics Meetings. The full programs for the 2012 and 2013 AMS Special Sessions on the Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games can be found online by searching jointmathematicsmeetings.org. Decision theory, voting theory, and game theory are three intertwined areas of mathematics that involve making optimal decisions under different contexts. Although these areas consist of their own mathematical results, much of the recent research in these areas involve developing and applying new perspectives from their intersection with other branches of mathematics, such as algebra, representation theory, combinatorics, convex geometry, dynamical systems, etc. The papers in this volume highlight and exploit the mathematical structure of decisions, elections, and games to model and to analyze problems from the social sciences. In what follows we give a short overview of the papers in this collection. To those new to the area, we wish to emphasize that many different types of mathe- matics can be profitably used in this interdisciplinary context. Both Redistricting and District Compactness by Corcoran and Saxe and Fair Division and Redistricting by Landau and Su focus on the redistricting problem: carving up a state into congressional districts. The former discusses different mea- sures used to evaluate proposed districting plans. These measures take into account the geometric shape of both the state and the districts as well as the spread of the population throughout the district. The latter paper offers a different perspective on redistricting by viewing it as a fair division or cake-cutting problem in which the state is viewed as a cake to be divided into districts that are allocated to one of two political parties. The next two papers fall under the topic of judgment aggregation, which may be viewed as being at the intersection of social choice theory and decision theory. While social choice theory is concerned with aggregating preferences of voters to arrive at a societal ranking, judgment aggregation is a burgeoning area focusing on aggregating individuals’ judgments on interconnected propositions to arrive at a collective judgment.
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viii PREFACE
In When Does Approval Voting Make the “Right Choices”?, Brams and Kilgour examine different contexts in which an individual voter approves of a proposal based on the proposal’s probability of being right (or good or just) and the voter’s proba- bility of making a correct judgment of whether it is right (or wrong). For multiple proposals in which more than one proposal can be approved and under probabilis- tic settings, they determine conditions for when the most approved proposals have the greatest probability of being right, relating their results to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Nehring and Pivato take a more axiomatic approach to judgment aggregation in How Indeterminate is Sequential Majority Voting? A Judgement Aggregation Perspective. Similar to other choice problems, the order in which decisions are made can matter. This paper continues a research program exploring in exactly what ways the order in which judgments are made can affect the actual final judgments on various propositions, in this case showing that a very large number of natural examples exhibit various forms of this indeterminacy in sequential majority votes. Several papers continue a long tradition in the field of using geometry and combinatorial objects to analyze a wide variety of voting questions. Stenson, in Weighted Voting, Threshold Functions, and Zonotopes, looks at a generalization of simple games and weighted voting systems. She explains how these games, and their winning/losing coalitions, correspond to vertices and other geometric aspects of particular polytopes and their duals. The Borda Count, the Kemeny Rule, and the Permutahedron by Crisman takes the geometric-combinatorial object called the permutahedron, and examines its symmetries with the goal of understanding social preference functions, which return not just winners but (sets of) rankings. The main result uses representation theory to characterize the most symmetric social preference functions as a one-dimensional continuum connecting the two rules in the title. In Double-Interval Societies, Klawe, Nyman, Scott, and Su consider the effect of geometric constraints in a model in which voters approve of positions in a linear spectrum. When each voter’s approval set is represented by two disjoint closed intervals and when every pair of voters agree on some position, the authors deter- mine a lower bound for the approval ratio. They also construct societies with low approval ratios by relating the double-interval models to the arrangement of n sym- bols in which each symbol appears twice, thereby relating the continuous geometry to discrete sequences. By contrast, Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies by Davis, Orrison, and Su focuses more on combinatorial aspects of agreeability, supposing that voters each approve of a certain size subset of candidates with a goal of selecting a com- mittee of a possibly different size. Using a graph called the Johnson graph, they prove a number of results regarding what proportion of voters will be satisfied with the results under different suppositions about the distribution of voters’ intent. Ratliff’s paper Selecting Diverse Committees with Candidates from Multiple Categories approaches committees from a different perspective. His focus is on selecting committees where candidates may be in several categories, and where it is desirable to have a committee with members from each of these categories. Using a combination of explicit examples and point-counting arguments with Ehrhart polynomials, both probabilistic and exact results regarding admissible ballot types to obtain these outcomes are derived.
PREFACE ix
Finally, we have three papers examining game theory from different mathe- matical perspectives. In Expanding the Robinson-Goforth System for 2 × 2 Games, Hopkins considers the relationships between bimatrix games in which outcomes are ordinally ranked, but there may be ties between outcomes. Robinson and Goforth developed a group-theoretic classification for the no-tie case; Hopkins revisits this work from a graph-theoretic perspective and shows that the edges of an associated graph yield information for when there is a single tie. He expands the Robinson and Goforth system using a collection of simplices that includes all 2 × 2ordinal rank games with ties. Although the decomposition of Jessie and Saari in Cooperation in n-Player Repeated Games may be viewed as a type of classification, it is more of a tool to analyze behavior in games. For two-strategy, n-player games, they decompose the games’ n-matrix payoffs into behavioral and strategic components. For a specific game in a repeated setting, the strategic component captures the information nec- essary to determine Nash equilibrium behavior, while the behavioral component describes a type of cooperative behavior. This approach lends itself to the descrip- tion of all games with any specific type of behavior, and how this behavior changes as the components change. In a bankruptcy problem, a set of individuals have claims that when summed exceed the amount of an estate. A bankruptcy rule determines how to share the estate among the claimants. Motivated by the relationship between the two-player Contested Garment rule and the n-player Talmud rule, Jones and Wilson (The Dynamics of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules) define a dynamic averaging process in which a k-player rule is used on all subsets of size k, the outcomes are averaged, and the processed is repeated. They show that when the k-player rule satisfies a well-studied notion of consistency, then the dynamic process converges to the n-player solution for any initial allocation. In conclusion, as editors we want to thank all the authors for their interesting and strong papers. We enjoyed reading them, and hope that readers will experience that same pleasure in exploring the intersection between mathematics and the social sciences present in this volume.
Contemporary Mathematics Volume 624, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1090/conm/624/12476
Redistricting and district compactness
Carl Corcoran and Karen Saxe
Abstract. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that bizarrely shaped congressional districts threaten the equal voting rights of U.S. citizens. Attempting to quantify this bizarreness, myriad measures of compactness have been produced. In recent years, a new class of measures has emerged that takes into account the geometric shape of the district, the geometric shape of the state, and also the spread of the population throughout that district. These measures are hybrids of path-based and population measures, and use census blocks as the basic unit for calculation. By hybridizing path-based and population measures, some deficiencies in measures that take into account only geometric shape or population dispersion are overcome. We conclude with a discussion of criteria for evaluating the quality of a compactness measure.
1. Introduction: Redistricting and Gerrymandering According to the U.S. Constitution, every ten years a census must be taken to determine the population of the United States. From these data, seats in the House of Representatives are apportioned to the fifty states. This process is called reapportionment, and it determines how many legislators will represent each state in the House for the next decade. Once this number is determined, the states themselves are left to the task of determining which people are represented by each legislator. Each legislator represents a single-member geographic congressional district. For states apportioned only one representative, the entire state is an at large dis- trict. But for states with multiple legislators, the state is carved up into districts. These districts are subject to conditions, however, and the most significant is equal population. In 1964, the Supreme Court decided in Reynolds v. Sims that all dis- tricts in a given state should have as nearly equal populations as possible. Since the population of each district undoubtedly changes from census to census, states must redraw these districts to ensure equal population. This process is known as redistricting.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91-02; Secondary 91F10. Much of this paper was developed for the undergraduate Honors Thesis of the first author. Disclaimer: The second author served on the Minnesota Citizens Redistricting Commission (2011-2012); the views expressed here are her own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission. The authors would like to thank Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games AMS Special Session organizers Karl-Dieter Crisman, Michael A. Jones, and Michael Orrison, and all Session participants at the 2012 & 2013 Joint Mathematics Meetings.