Review article

The conservation movement in Zimbabwe: an early experiment in devolved community based regulation

Graham Child1 & Brian Child2* 1Trafalgar Place, Fish Hoek, Cape Town 2University of Florida, Florida, U.S.A., and Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies, University of Stellenbosch

Received 23 October 2012. To author for revision 17 April 2013. Accepted 20 June 2014

This paper describes how the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Act of 1941 nurtured a civic landholder-based conservation movement, the Intensive Conservation Area movement (ICA). This is not recorded in the published literature. It provides a rare insight into the efficacy of environmental regulation that legally devolves use rights and regulatory responsibility to communities of landholders, and favours democratic processes above top-down regulation. The main message is that natural resource governance is effective when (a) landholders are genuinely empowered with the rights to use and manage natural resources provided, and (b) this occurs within a framework of devolved and collective self-regulation through structures built democratically from the bottom up. The effectiveness of these structures is surprisingly sensitive to any reduction in democratic control. The ICA movement anticipates, and is aligned with, the emerging theories of common property, scale, management, systems thinking and new institutional economics. These have common roots in the principle that human affairs and complexity are best managed where hierarchies of nested institutions serve the bottom layers, not the top. This suggests that entitling landholders, including communities, with full choice to use and management natural resources, and relying on local collective action to control environmental abuses or externalities, will strengthen future approaches for natural resource governance, including for wildlife and southern Africa. Keywords: Zimbabwe, wildlife governance.

INTRODUCTION ment Programme for Indigenous Resources) Starting with the Natural Resources Act of 1941, programme, which was exceptionally bold in giv- Zimbabwe initiated a bold experiment in devolved ing to communities the rights to use, manage and and democratic natural resource governance on benefit from wildlife. The well-crafted nature of private and communal land, the Intensive Conser- CAMPFIRE is also noted in the literature (e.g. vation Area movement (ICA). This story is largely Borgerhoff Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005). However, invisible because, despite widespread local acclaim, people seldom ask where these ideas, or the confi- it has not been documented. We rely on a few dence in entrusting wild resources to local people, sources in the grey literature and personal discus- came from. In fact, as we will explain, Zimbabwe sions with its leaders and participants over many had been experimenting with devolved conserva- years to capture the lessons of how and why it tion for over fifty years, in ways that were remark- worked over five decades, and what factors later ably positive and uncontested. From the very start, undermined it.endnote i conservation was managed as a civic movement People are much more familiar with Zimbabwe’s which recognized that systems needed to be built pioneering CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Manage- from the bottom up, and to serve the interests of

*To whom correspondence should be addressed. the bottom in terms of landholder’s livelihoods, E-mail: [email protected] productivity and environmental sustainability. African Journal of Wildlife Research 45(1): 1–16 (April 2015) 2 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015

These bold policy experiments preceded much of resource movement to theorize about resource the literature with which we are now familiar, giving governance. The norms guiding this movement rise to ‘principles’ that were intuitively derived and are congruent with theories as wide-ranging as absorbed as societal norms long before they were systems thinking, common property theory, new codified by scholars. Key examples are the impor- institutional economics, governance and manage- tance of persuasion rather than compulsion in ment theory. This suggests that the success of the environmental regulation (see below), and the movement was no accident and that it provides norm of maximizing the amount of wildlife income important lessons for contemporary governance reaching the landholder. In the discussion we will of land and wild resources, including the emerging show how this conservation movement antici- Landcare movement on private land (Curtis & pated Ostrom’s design principles for common Lockwood, 2000; Mulder & Brent, 2006; Prager & property resource institutions by five decades Vanclay 2010), and community conservation. (Ostrom, 1990), and was true to and may well have stimulated Murphree’s principles of scale A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND TENURE AND (Murphree, 2000), in addition to new theories of USE IN ZIMBABWE organizational management which emerged in the Natural resources, through agriculture, mining, 1960s. and wildlife provided the mainstays of Zimbabwe’s Although the principles and norms spawned by economy.* The use and abuse of these renewable the ICA movement are almost invisible in the litera- resources caused enlightened concern from an ture, they have spread quietly but widely, perhaps early date, with demographic and consumption because they have universal import. It was only in pressures making resources susceptible to what is the 1970s and 1980s that these began to be generally perceived to be degradation, including codified. A good example is the ‘CAMPFIRE loss of grasses, trees, soil and soil water. principles’ (Child, 1996; Murphree, 2005). Here, Prior to white settlement in 1890, the indigenous we see the emphasis on devolved governance and black population numbered only about half a local economic benefit learned through the ICA million people, livestock numbers were low and movement being absorbed into the ‘CAMPFIRE cultivation was by hand. Pre-colonial settlement Principles’. These ideas then spread through the favoured light granite soils because these were region through the sustainable use movement and easily tilled by hand, and was centred on Great community conservation, and were re-tested and Zimbabwe and a crescent in the east and south of improved. They also spread globally with almost the country where rainfall was also reliable identical wording to that used by the sustainable (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986). use movement in southern Africa (SASUSG, White government, in the form of the British 1996, 2003) re-emerging in the Addis Ababa Prin- South Africa Company under Royal Charter from ciples and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Queen Victoria, coincided with a reduction in Biodiversity (CBD, 2004). warfare, and led to the emergence of a money The majority of this paper focuses on the history economy, modern agricultural technology includ- of the ICA movement, but the importance of this ing mould-board ploughs. Together with modern story lies in its theoretical interpretation, and in medicine and veterinary services this led to the its insights for the challenge of the cross-scale rapid growth of the human population and live- governance of natural resources. While the paper stock after the decimation of livestock and game focuses largely on private land, we also discuss in 1896 by the rinderpest pandemic. Cattle (Bos communal land. We have had to tread carefully to taurus) increased some 88 fold in 33 years from an avoid becoming embroiled in Zimbabwe’s highly estimated 28 000 head after the pandemic, to contested, emotional and racialized history, but 2.47 million in 1930 of which 1.56 million were black have persisted because this example has impor- owned (Southern Rhodesia, 1932). By 1939, the tant lessons for natural resource governance. indigenous population had trebled. There were Namely, that local communities resisted top-down 91 000 ploughs, and ecological deterioration was natural resource governance even when it was widespread and increasing (Gorden-Deedes, technically sound, but were appreciative of the 1961) as resource scarcities intensified. White much more inclusive and democratic approaches farmers also diversified and intensified production, exemplified by the ICA movement. *We refer to the country as Zimbabwe, although it was previously We use the experience of Zimbabwe’s natural called Rhodesia (1965–1980) and Southern Rhodesia (1898–1965) Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 3 causing further degradation of the resource base Journal in 1909 (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). In the by the 1930s (Kwashirai, 2006) as marketing absence of specialized environmental legislation, opportunities increased (Vincent & Thomas, 1961). legislative steps in 1913 used the existing ‘Water By the 1930s there was a dual land tenure Ordinance’ and ‘Herbage Preservation Ordinance’ system in Zimbabwe that encapsulated racial to ration public water and prevent indiscriminate inequalities. Colonial era division of land between veld burning that ‘caused accelerated soil ero- whites and blacks was initiated by the British sion’. Government before 1900 when the British South Also in 1913, the Rhodesian Agricultural Journal Africa Company was required to reserve a third of published its first bulletin on soil erosion by W. the country exclusively for blacks.Blacks could still Martin Watt. This advocated contour ploughing purchase land in the remainder of the country, but and grassed contour strips – measures that few did so and they lost this right when the country remain good farming practice to this day. Three was divided into ‘European’ and ‘Native’ (later years later Martin Watt called for legislation to ‘African’) areas by the Land Apportionment Act, protect trees within 50 feet (15.2 meters) of public 1931. streams. This may have alerted the Water Court, Almost all land in the European area was economi- under Justice McIlwaine, to survey river flows cally viable freehold, which legally could not be in 1917, which it found had become less perennial subdivided into sub-economic units until the as a result of soil erosion. McIlwaine’s report led to 1960s.For example, in the mid-1940s mixed farms Government protecting all timber within 200 feet in the medium rainfall Nyamandhlovu district could (61 meters) of public streams using the Mining not be less than 6000 acres (2428 ha). Land in the Law, and increased publicity against soil erosion. ‘African Area’was broadly divided into two catego- The ‘dust bowl’ in the United States during the ries: 1930s raised the profile of soil erosion in many a. that acquired under freehold title (Native countries (Beinart, 1984), but in Zimbabwe soil Purchase Areas). In 1960 this included about conservation and sound land management had 6000 farmers on eight million acres (3.2 million become almost an obsession even earlier. The ha) or 8.6% of the country: and importance of soil erosion was raised at annual b. that occupied communally in Native Reserves congresses of the Rhodesian Agricultural Union and Special Native Areas (SNA)ii. Amounting from 1918 to 1923, and the agricultural depart- to about 40% of the country, homestead sites ment published a series of bulletins on the topic and cultivations on this land were allocated from 1921 to 1934.The government assisted farm- under tribal law to individuals for so long as ers to peg contour ridges and Elspeth Huxley they continued to use them, by the local chief reports that by 1936 there were 1597 miles (2570 or his representative, while grazing areas km) of contour ridge on white-owned farms, remained communal (Krige, 1936; Bryant, increasing by 3% annually (Huxley, 1938). 1949; Child, 1965). In 1931 the Rhodesian Agricultural Union These differences in land tenure had a marked ‘appointed a Soil Erosion Committee whose report influence on conservation. For our purpose, this recommended the establishment of district enables us to contrast the emergence and spread conservation boards coordinated by a central soil of the national conservation movement in areas conservation advisory council to advise the with different cultures and land tenure arrange- government on general policy’. The committee ments. The conservation movement emerged at a also recommended soft loans for soil conservation time of increasing land hunger in communal areas. work, better legislation to control wildfire and This exacerbated increasingly serious interracial cutting timber, and that the ‘Water Act should be political conflict over land apportionment (Lado, extended to protect catchment areas’ (Huxley, 1999). 1938). There were also urgent calls to reduce overpop- EARLY CONCERNS AND ACTIONS ABOUT ulated ‘native stock’, which was causing wide- RESOURCE DEGRADATION spread soil erosion, and for better facilities to Lionel Cripps, a farmer and later speaker of parlia- promote the sale of this stock (Gordon-Deedes, ment, is credited with expressing the first public 1961). By the early 1940s, compulsory de-stocking concern at resource deterioration by drawing atten- and cattle auction sales were held in many admin- tion to soil erosion in the Rhodesian Agricultural istrative districts. These became monopolized by 4 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015 cartels of speculators which depressed prices, The first Board was named immediately after the leading to government replacing the system with Act came into force in November 1941. It first met weight and grade salesiii. This increased cattle on December 2nd, with Sir Robert McIlwaine K.C., sales, but the sales did not reduce stock densities chairman, and H.V.Gibbs (a later Chairman of the to sustainable levels and led to coercive de-stocking board and governor of Southern Rhodesia), H.R. that caused widespread resentment.iv Benzies and W. Sole as members. Importantly, The Hailey Report described soil erosion and neither the Chairman nor the members were civil desertification as serious constraints to develop- servants, although it was serviced by a small ment in Africa south of the Sahara (Hailey, 1938). secretariat of Government officials. The status of In Zimbabwe, mounting public concern led to the the Board’s membership is indicative of Govern- appointment of the Natural Resources (Parlia- ment’s recognition and support of its mission, mentary) Commission, under Justice McIlwaine, which lasted for over 40 years. Its main functions in 1938. McIlwaine, in many ways the founding were to: hero of this story, was energetic, farsighted, spent a) exercise general supervision over natural a lot of time in the field talking to landholders about resources; conservation, and recognized the importance of b) stimulate public interest in the conservation well-crafted legislation. The Commission he led and improved use of natural resources; and was charged with determining the extent of natural c) recommend to Government legislation and resource deterioration and improper use, and other measures for the proper conservation recommending measures to counteract the problem. and improved use of natural resources. It issued a damning report, with photographs of The civic board was politically and bureaucrati- resource damage, on April 28th, 1939. This led cally independent, and enjoyed wide powers in to the promulgation of the farsighted Natural overseeing the conservation and proper use of the Resources Act on August 1st, 1941, which incor- country’s natural resources. It, and the country- porated many of the report’s recommendations. wide grass-roots ICA movement it represented (arranged into geographical groups and regions), THE NATURAL RESOURCES ACT, 1941 became the democratic and popular custodians of The Natural Resources Act provided ‘for the the nation’s resources. The board, on behalf of its conservation and improvement of the Natural membership, could call for technical reports, sub- Resources of the Colony’ and matters incidental poena witnesses, examine them under oath, and thereto, including the creation of a Natural Re- impose restrictions or prohibitions on how owners sources Board (NRB). The Governor was to or occupiers of land used it and resources on it. appoint the board with special regard to having Likewise, the board could require they undertake members with knowledge and expertise in its protective measures to conserve or prevent injury remit, and covering such aspects as water sup- to natural resources or, under special circum- plies, agriculture, mining, African areas, forestry, stances, it or its agents could undertake resource and the like. The act also provided a framework reclamation in the name of the minister and recover to establish a countrywide network of volunteer all or part of the costs from the landowners in Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) committees question. and, from the outset, broadened the NRB’s man- Against these far-reaching powers, the NRB was date beyond soil conservation, by defining the obliged to accept representation from interested country’s natural resources holistically, as: parties on issues submitted to it for deliberation. It a) the soil, water and minerals; also had to ensure its actions were necessary and b) the animal, bird and fish life; in the interests of conservation and that they were c) the trees, grasses and other vegetation; just and equitable. Furthermore, the act provided d) the springs, vleis, sponges, reed-beds, for a Natural Resources Court to whom any person marshes, swamps and public streams; and aggrieved by a decision or order of the board, or e) such other things as the governor may, by who felt it was inequitable or unreasonably harsh, proclamation in the Gazette, declare to be could appeal. natural resources, including landscapes and The NRB seldom used its considerable powers, scenery, which in his opinion should be pre- preferring persuasion, negotiation, peer pressure, served on account of their aesthetic appeal and consensus building, to achieve its objectives. and scenic value. Solutions to conservation issues were often nego- Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 5 tiated compromises acceptable to both the affected partially or wholly to wildlife because it generated landholders and the Board, which tried never to be higher profits while allowing land to recover from high-handed. Often these measures were initiated past over-grazing (Child et al., 2012). and implemented locally through democratic ICAs and their committees. ADVISORY COMMITTEES OF THE NRB The NRB derived its authority and ability to act The board could appoint technical advisory com- quickly and decisively through its chairman having mittees, composed of board members and outside rapid statutory access to any minister of state, specialists. Gordon-Deedes (1961) considered including the prime minister. It also had an outstand- those for Native Affairs, Conservation Education, ing intelligence network, by virtue of the nationwide Subdivision of Rural Land, Wildlife and Forestry, coverage of ICAs, which quickly informed it of any and Catchment Protection to be most important. developments likely to prejudice natural resources. These committees extended the board’s compe- Thus, although the board was a reactionary insti- tence for accomplishing its agenda. Mention must tution, it was usually informed of potential environ- be made of the education committee which was mental impacts so early that its actions could be exceptional. It had its own staff, and led by John anticipatory in preventing environmental damage. Pile was entrusted with implementing the NRB’s Accountability for the board’s activities and those mandate to stimulate ‘public interest in the conser- to whom it made recommendations was assured vation and improved use of natural resources’. by it having to report its actions and the extent to With clear objectives, three or four public relations which its advice had been followed to parliament staff quickly ensured a well-informed broad public each year. The seriousness with which the house awareness of resource matters. School curricular viewed the board’s report is illustrated by a sugges- materials and field activities coupled with adult tion from the floor, during the mid-1970s, for the education provided a sympathetic climate in which appointment of a Select Committee of parliament, the NRB could achieve its goals by the early akin to the Select Committee for Public Accounts, 1960s. By the 1970s it had also catalysed nation- to consider the board’s reports (G. Child, person- wide environmental awareness. This extended ally witnessed). beyond conserving renewable resources to control- Although the act focused on soil conservation, it ling litter, banning non-recyclable containers, and was the overarching legislation for the proper recycling a wide range of reusable materials such management of all resources, some of which were as bottles, plastic packaging, paper and the like subject to separate acts. The Parks and Wild Life (Pile, 1961). Act, 1975, controlled wildlife utilization at two levels. It devolved the rights to use wildlife to the THE ICAS – A GRASSROOTS AND COUNTRY- landholder on whose land the wildlife occurs (other WIDE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT than Specially Protected and Protected animals The NRB was designed to rely on a network of and plants). However, externalities and any abuses ICA volunteer civic committees to implement its associated with mobile wildlife were managed mandate rather than any formal executive arm of dexterously and democratically through the ICAs. paid employees. Lovemore notes that ‘The con- Although fear was expressed by some that giving cept of a national body with very wide powers to landholders proprietorship of wildlife would result act as a trustee over … natural resources and of a in rapid losses, wildlife expanded rapidly once voluntary organization based on local committees landholders received use rights as has happened of landholders had been formulated in the frequent throughout southern Africa (Child, Musengezi, discussions between Sir Robert McIlwaine and Parent & Child, 2012). In contrast to South Africa, C. L. Robertson, Director of Irrigation, during their Namibia and Zambia, where fencing is a prerequi- travels on Water Court duties’ (Lovemore, 1977). site to the rights for wildlife, the experience of This refinement to the devolutionary process, Zimbabwe demonstrated that collective regulation suggested by the Soil Erosion Committee of the could substitute for expensive game fencing, Rhodesian Agricultural Union in 1931, had impor- thus reducing financial costs and preventing land tant consequences. Superficially similar to the soil fragmentation. Wildlife became a legitimate form conservation districts that emerged in the U.S.A. of land use, and saved many former livestock after the dustbowl, ICAs had two advantages; they ranches from ecological and financial bankruptcy were democratic rather than technocratic, and by the 1990s. Some 1000 ranchers switched were also smaller than administrative districts – 6 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015 making them more manageable geographical voluntary organizations, set up on the initiative of units with similar ecology and farming interests in local landholder communities. Committee members which members could meet face-to-face on a gave of their time gratis, but government provided regular basis. ICAs with a small annual grant to cover secretarial The Natural Resources Act allowed two thirds of costs, members’ travel to the regular monthly the landowners in an area to petition the minister, meetings and for representatives from the ICAs of their own volition, to establish an ICA in their and Groups to attend the annual National Conser- area.ICA Committees were then elected locally by vation Conferences. Besides the CONEX Officer their peers who were mostly farmers strongly com- attached to each ICA as a technical advisor, mitted to conservation and sound land use, with a experts from other government agencies like minority of rural miners. This ensured the political Forestry, National Parks and Wild Life Manage- and bureaucratic independence of the conserva- ment, (Agricultural) Research and Specialist tion movement. Thus, civic ICAs were the main Services, Irrigation, Mines and Native Affairs executive apparatus of the NRB. They promoted attended meetings, some on an ‘as and when conservation and improved use of the natural required’ basis. resources in their areas and in cooperation with The democratic ICAs provided the grassroots the NRB furthered the aims of the act. foundation for a national democratic conservation However, the natural resources movement took movement. Individual ICA’s were divided into some time to get going. The Natural Resources wards, each represented by a committee member Commission had called for a secretary and inspect- who reported on environmental conditions, includ- ing officers on the board’s staff in 1939, but World ing resource abuse, progress with remedial War II austerity prevented appointment of staff for measures and improved land use in the ward. three years. This delayed the creation of ICAs. ICAs had considerable formal powers to regulate Without them the board lacked contact with farmers their members. Counter-intuitively, these powers and was ineffective, and this was compounded by resulted in most natural resource abuses being the death of its chairman and leading champion, managed proactively and informally. Intransigent Sir Robert McIlwaine, in 1943. With only a part- landholders causing excessive soil erosion, tree time secretary, one conservation officer and some cutting, over-grazing and the like were referred to help from engineers in the Irrigation Department the NRB which could issue a legally binding order the movement faced apathy and suspicion among on the offender, although the threat to do so was the white farmers during its formative years. usually sufficient to achieve full compliance The first ICA was created in 1944, when an (Gorden-Deedes, 1961; H. Child, pers. comm.). In establishment of conservation officers was also the case of wildlife, the ICA committee could issue provided in the Irrigation Department that year a temporary 14-day order banning hunting on a (Harvey, 1985). An ecologist was appointed to the property, while the matter was reviewed by the Department of Agriculture in anticipation of it NRB. The NRB could extend the order by another assuming responsibility for conservation exten- 14 days, to allow the Director of National Parks and sion, but growth continued to be retarded by post- Wild Life Management to take any necessary ac- war stringencies. A major turning point took place tion. In fact, only one order was issued to curb in 1948, when the Department of Conservation hunting in the first decade after the Parks and Wild and Extension (CONEX) was formed as a sepa- Life Act came into force in 1975 (G. Child, pers. rate entity in the Ministry of Agriculture, under obs.). A number of other hunting restriction orders Charles Murray, a man of immense drive and were issued, but only as a legal device to regulate vision. It absorbed the 42 Conservation officers hunting on properties contiguous with parks and from the Irrigation Department, recruited additional reserves. professional staff and rapidly grew to be a highly ICAs were aggregated into geographical groups effective farmer-friendly, conservation and exten- in which the Chairmen of the constituent ICAs sion arm of government that worked primarily represented their Areas. The country was divided through ICAs. into four regions for administrative purposes, each Thereafter, there was a rapid spontaneous served by a district secretary. The district secre- increase in ICAs, with some 200 blanketing free- tary represented the board and attended its meet- hold land throughout the country by 1970. The ings, and as many group and ICA meetings as ICAs were bodies corporate and were entirely practical. The district secretaries provided liaison Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 7 between ICA and groups, the board, government recognizing it could only be a short-term pallia- agencies, the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union tive while other measures took effect; and, later, the African Farmers’ Union, ensuring c) the intensification of agricultural production by cooperation with these bodies that was important providing irrigation and the better distribution to the success of the conservation movement of stock watering points; and (Vaughan Evans, 1976). In the language of today, d) promulgation of the Native Land Husbandry this provided for horizontal and vertical cross-scale Act 1951, which recognized the ‘tragedy of the linkages necessary for the polycentric governance commons’ (Hardin, 1971) in open access of complex social ecological systems (Ostrom, communal areas, and aimed at modernizing 2010). land tenure in Native Reserves and SNAs. The NRB applauded and promoted the Native The spread of conservation in the African Land Husbandry Act. This promoted freehold Areas ownership of homesteads and arable land, plus Initially ICAs were associated with private free- rights to graze a specific number of livestock units hold (white) land. Despite government support in communal grazing areas through a system of prioritizing the economically important white locally tradable permits. It aimed to make each commercial farming sector (e.g. funding of soil holding financially viable and convert it from a conservation measures), within a decade the communal into an individually owned financial movement had spread to the African area, largely asset. Early implementation of the act was suc- at the demand of black farmers. cessful because it was accomplished by extensive By the end of World War II communal lands were consultation between technically competent staff suffering from severe resource scarcity and degra- and the affected people. However, these early dation caused by population growth, open access successes led prime minister Garfield Toddto rush property regimes (every adult African had the right implementation of the Act for political reasons. to occupy land in his tribal home area), and poor This ignored the reality that highly participatory farming practices (e.g. ploughing up the slope). land reform processes take time and this, more Although an additional 8% of the country was than anything else, probably doomed it. added (as SNAs) to the African area during the By 1960 the act had been implemented in many early 1950s (H. Child, pers. comm.), rapid areas, encouraging an immediate improvement in population growth still reduced per capita holding land husbandry. However, progress was retarded from 18.9 ha in 1931 to 6.0 in 1970 (Zinyama & by a shortage of technical advisers and the high Whitlow, 1986). In an attempt to curb cattle num- density of people at some localities (Gordon- bers and overgrazing, the Native Affairs Depart- Deedes, 1961). Gordon-Deedes (1961) con- ment instituted compulsory de-stocking from the cluded that, encouraged by the shift from tradition 1940s. This was contentious and exploited by tenure to individual land ownership, African farm- anti-white nationalism. Similarly, it was also ers ‘are showing a new interest in farming’. He obvious that increasing land available to a black anticipated Agricultural Committees (equivalent population doubling every 18 to 20 years was not to ICAs) would soon form in communal areas the answer, which lay in modernizing land tenure where the Act had been implemented and, by and intensifying sustainable agricultural. It is 1961, he was convinced that good conservation beyond the scope of this paper to detail the depended on individual black as well as white land approach adopted by the Native Affairs Depart- ownership. ment (under the leadership of Harold Child) Gordon-Deedes’ (1961) conclusions were sup- responsible for ‘native economic development’ in ported by anecdotal evidence, but not substanti- the early 1950s. Briefly, this integrated strategy ated by objective studies. Whitlow used aerial consisted of: photography to show an inverse relationship d) creating rural growth points and African town- between soil degradation and land tenure; erosion ships around the main cities to encourage was advanced in the communal areas, followed by urbanization and relieve pressures on rural African Purchase Areas, and was light in white land – by 1982, 24.2% of the population, was areas with little occurring on state land (mainly urbanized (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986); parks and reserves) (Whitlow, 1988). Norton b) the acquisition of an additional eight to 10% of Griffiths reports better conservation and financial the country for rural settlement by blacks – returns on freehold land than customary tenure in 8 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015

Kenya (Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Norton- spreading across Africa in response to the ‘winds Grifiths, 2008). However, property rights enhance of change’. the scope for empowering grassroots democratic By this time the Native Land Husbandry Act was self-regulation, and we speculate that the collec- faltering in response to divergent political forces, tive oversight of natural resources through ICAs particularly black-nationalism’s exploitation of its contributed to the differences in erosion measured unpopular provisions to de-stock cattle. This 1951 by Whitlow (1988). act was conceptually decades ahead of its time, By 1960, formation of conservation committees promoting both private land holdings for Africans was progressing in the African area. Back in 1952 and tradable permits for sharing common pool black farmers from the Native Purchase Areas had resources like grazing. It worked well in pilot urged the NRB to establish ICA Committees in districts accompanied by high degrees of partici- their areas similar to those in the ‘European Area’ pation (H. Child, pers. comm.). However, unlike (Gorden-Deedes, 1961). Following strong NRB the NRB, impatience with the speed of uptake representations, Government agreed to establish resulted in implementation become more rigid Agricultural committees under the Native Councils and top-down, particularly in regulating grazing Act, where councils existed. However, these (Harvey, 1985). The urgency to protect land at the councils lacked the democratic credentials and expense of participatory processes doomed the independence of white ICAs and were politically act. While white farmers controlled each other’s unpopular among blacks (H. Child, pers. comm.); over-grazing through peer pressure, de-stocking ICAs only became popular in black areas after this in communal areas was state driven because it democratic deficit was addressed. Only nine com- was seen to be an ecological emergency.Further- mittees were established by 1959.v The first and more, while offering a sound technical solution to only national conference of agricultural commit- an immense ecological problem, agrarian reform tees in 1960 stressed the desire to divorce the failed because of de-stocking and because land committees from native councils and give them full titling was applied with too much haste in a political ICA status under the Natural Resources Act, to climate which was antagonistic (H. Child, pers. which government quickly agreed.We return to the comm.). importance of distancing natural resource collec- tive action from district governance below. AN EFFECTIVE COUNTRYWIDE In response the desires of black farmers and the CONSERVATION MOVEMENT massive conservation problems they faced, By contrast, the highly participatory and demo- the NRB petitioned government in 1966 to permit cratic ICA movement was both popular and effec- independent conservation committees under the tive. The NRB and its ICAs, with government tribal authorities in communal areas (i.e. Native technical support, achieved considerable progress Reserves and SNAs). By the end of 1977 there towards conserving complex renewable resources were 141 ICAs in the Tribal Trust Lands (the new and enhancing farm production. Preferring persua- name for Native Reserves and SNAs, Lovemore, sion and peer example to flexing its considerable 1977). These were served by an elaborate system statutory muscle (Gordon-Deedes, 1961), the move- for liaison at the district and national level, with ment was able to encourage effective conservation two black representatives on the NRB by 1971 and improved production from most resources, (G. Child, pers. obs.). The number of ICAs in the with white farming areas generally taking the lead. Purchase Areas rapidly increased to 95 (Love- For example, by 1960, most ploughing in both more, 1977). black and white farming areas was done on the Gordon-Deedes (1960) comments on the grow- contour and most arable land was protected by ing assistance to black farmers from the ICAs and contour ridges and grassed drainage lines.Approxi- white farmers generally. Black and white farmers mately a third of the white farms had been planned attended each other’s field days, and the growing ecologically and such planning was progressing mutual interest and assistance encouraged the well in the African areas.In 1960 alone, white farm- spread of conservation and sound farming prac- ers constructed 778 government subsidized farm tices. This ground swell of cooperation helped dams, and many others were built by the state in alleviate the shortage of technical staff in the the African area (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). Department of Native Agriculture, and is remark- In that year, the NRB and its committees advo- able against the contemporary political mood cated an impressive array of topics.These included: Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 9 conservation problems in the African area; lobby- Kwe) group, which is 98% ranch land, assembled ing government to increase agricultural and wild- information from experts to produce a ‘Game life research, to increase the establishment of management manual’ in 1980, to assist its professional extension and irrigation officers, and members incorporate wildlife and safaris into to offering them better conditions of service. It their farming ventures (Vaughn Evans, 1976). It supported the government’s construction of the also decided to encourage a system of short dura- Chibero Agricultural College for blacks; agitated tion, high intensity grazing to conserve habitats against lenient subdivision of land into subeconomic and encourage wildlife (Swift, 1976). While the units (as by then government had gone soft on the technical merits of short duration grazing were minimal size of individual land holdings on free- questioned professionally, the group and local hold land); pressed for increased farm dam subsi- extension staff were satisfied that it led to better dies; supported devolution of responsibility for veld management, either because of inherent wildlife to landholders; commented favourably on strengths in the system proposed by Savory decreased wildlife poaching and more discrimi- (1988), because of increased farmer awareness nate use of pesticides; and warned against clear- of animal/habitat relationships, or simply through ing trees along drainage lines to control tsetse fly increased enthusiasm for conservation and in- (Glossina morsitans). It also concerned itself with group competitiveness. mining and mine pollution issues, was pleased with Landholder communities achieved remarkable progress in environmental education, and moves progress towards conserving individual resources towards better conservation and use of resources like soil, vegetation, wildlife, and the environment in complete catchment areas, but lamented con- as a whole. The movement was envied by a wide tinued over grazing by livestock, particularly in the audience outside Zimbabwe (see Morse et al., African area. 1960, Harvey, 1985) and is reputed to have influ- Morse and colleagues comment on the speed enced upgrading of conservation in the United with which the natural resources movement was States following the 1961 IUCN Arusha confer- able to catalyse advances in cooperation between ence in Tanganyika where NRB representatives government technical agencies, the organs of featured prominently (Gordon-Deedes, 1961; Pile, local government, and private landholders (Morse, 1961; T. Riney and J. Savanu, pers. comm.). Hadow, Hawes, Jenkins & Val Phillips, 1960). Eco- It was a tribute to McIlwaine and his Natural Re- logical farm planning had been viewed with suspi- sources Commission that the Natural Resources cion and as an intrusion on personal landholder Act and its basic provisions remained so relevant liberties by white farmers when proposed as a na- and effective for 40 years. The civic NRB and dem- tional strategy in the mid-1950s. Five years later, ocratic ICAs were favourably commented upon by over a third of all white-owned farms and a number farmers, conservationists and land managers who of large catchment areas, including land occupied visited the country (pers.obs.).The combination of by blacks, had been fully planned or was in the pro- voluntary participation (the Natural Resources Act cess of being planned (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). must have been accepted by at least 66% of the Likewise, custodianship of wildlife which was de- rural people it affected) and an excellent conserva- volved to landholders through the Parks and Wild- tion education system ensured that the NRB life Act of 1975 was readily accepted by ICAs became the vanguard of a conservation move- within two years. ICAs provided a collective institu- ment, at the heart of which were conservative, tion by which members could govern fugitive, pragmatic farmers, with different levels of educa- shared and high-value species like sable antelope tion. The NRB movement cultivated a common (Hippotragus niger) or eland (Tragelaphus oryx) conservation culture motivated by realization that by, for example, negotiating annual hunting quotas safeguarding one’s personal livelihood required where necessary. The massive increase in wildlife contour management, organic and inorganic fertil- numbers on private land (and the absence of izers, crop rotation, correct stocking rates, fire game fencing) would have been difficult without management, and the protection of streams, vleis the institutional foundation provided by ICAs. and sponges (Pile, 1961). Gordon-Deedes (1961) ICAs and groups devoted considerable effort to emphasizes the importance of a collective culture encouraging improved farming and enhanced of voluntary participation, conservation responsi- economic efficiency so as to minimize resource bility, the use of persuasion rather than compul- damage. For example, the Que Que (now Kwe sion, and faith in ‘the goodwill and common sense 10 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015 of the people’. He also warns that ‘success can ment, its decline in the late 1970s and 1980s was only be achieved if [the movement] is free from largely a result of pre-independence structural political influences [because] once political con- changes that reduced the democratic independ- siderations are permitted to encroach, the cooper- ence of the movement ahead of the momentous ation and goodwill of the people are endangered’ social change as the country moved from white (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). This was a prescient minority to black majority government. Many other statement as we see below. white farmer-led movements, like the Commercial Farmers’ Union, the commodity associations and THE DECLINE OF THE CONSERVATION much agricultural research, continued to be effec- MOVEMENT tive well after independence. Two events, instigated by Minister Mark Partridge Incorporating the ICAs into rural councils weak- while holding the portfolio for Natural Resources, ened them by shifting their basic accountability, eroded the independence and effectiveness of the and by enlarging them. From being conservation conservation movement from about 1976. Both bodies elected and responsible to landholders, emphasized technical efficiencies at the expense they became political entities elected by a political of the movement’s democratic character. Perhaps electorate with no obligatory concern for renew- the less important was replacing the board’s able resources. Districts were also larger than secretariat with a full blown Department of Natural ICAs, which lost much of their face-to-face Resources on February 23rd, 1976. The Depart- operability. These fundamental shifts in account- ment absorbed the Lands Inspectorate, a policing ability removed the almost single minded motiva- body responsible for enforcing aspects of the tion that had driven the movement, and to which it Natural Resources Act. This had been discreetly owed its success. Conservation committees separated from the NRB in the Department of became less nimble in adjusting to change and Lands, where it could not erode the board’s civic less able to support the NRB from whom, as character. Besides this unfortunate linking of con- sub-committees of rural councils, they were now flicting goals, the department actively guided the administratively divorced. Further blows were the board and unconsciously replaced civic leaders with declining effectiveness of the NRB’s education civil servants, weakening the board and its ICAs. programme, and the politicization and increasing The second action was persuading ICA Commit- centralization of the Department of Natural Re- tees to become Natural Resource Sub-Committees sources after Independence, a common feature of of their respective rural councils. Ever one to con- state agencies in newly Independent states solidate responsibilities, Partridge believed the (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). This evidence only move would strengthen conservation, but it had strengthens the contemporary arguments that the opposite effect. Although the change was touted natural resource governance flounders where as voluntary, it was championed by the minister, genuine decentralizing or democratization is not the chairman of the board, himself recently a occurring, or is even used cynically as a form minister, and the department, on the basis that of recentralization (Murombedzi, 1992; Ribot, ‘unity is strength’. By the end of the year, 30 ICA Agrawal & Larson, 2006). committees had succumbed, while others contin- The NRB lingered on, but its ICAs withered. This ued to resist in fora like the annual conservation was hastened by the weakening of the Department conference. They feared ICAs would lose their of Conservation and Extension and Research and identity, independence and effectiveness through Specialist Services, as the new government lost incorporation into rural district councils, to whom the services of many experienced technocrats. they would be subservient. These fears were well Some ICAs found resurrection in emerging wildlife founded, as the highly effective conservation conservancies based on corporate legal arrange- movement lost direction and momentum from the ments (Lindsey, Toit, Pole & Romanach, 2009). late 1970s. Supporting this, is the personal obser- The final death knell came with the destruction of vation that the committees that remained most white commercial farming from 1998, when Presi- effective were those emancipated by their parent dent Mugabe evicted white farmers from their land councils and mandated to continue functioning and placed it under state control. This resulted in a independently, as in the past. rapid decline in agricultural output, but associated Although the distractions of the escalating civil lawlessness and impunity had negative conse- war certainly impacted the conservation move- quences for natural resources abuse, particularly Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 11 of woodland and wildlife; the wildlife on former quickly a coercive or paternalist approach can white farms, that had grown and prospered under undermine sound technical advances, in this case NRB stewardship, was reduced by 60 to 80%. The the intention to introduce individual and communal post-2000 decline in wildlife in Zimbabwe is a property rights in communal areas. predictable outcome of the dramatic weakening of New Institutional Economics, and especially, use rights and the re-centralized control associ- Williamson’s (2000) model of the interactions ated with a land reform process that was not care- between the four levels of an economy, is useful for fully conceptualized. interpreting how and why the ICA movement emerged so successfully. Williamson suggests DISCUSSION that a society’s culture (Level 1 – ‘culture’) deter- We end the paper by using the ICA movement mines which institutional possibilities are feasible to introduce to conservation managers a set of (Level 2 – the ‘rules’), with institutions being theories for guiding the design and management defined as the rules and norms that guide societ- of effective resource governance. We also com- ies interactions (North, 1990). Institutions such as ment on the processes through which systems of legislation, rules and norms in turn determine how governance can be changed using the lens on society is organized and managed (Level3–the New Institutional Economics. ‘players’), and this guides resource allocation The emergence of the civic conservation move- through day-to-day supply and demand transac- ment in Zimbabwe owed its success to a combina- tions (Level 4) (Williamson, 2000). Using this tion of factors, events and personalities – what we framework, we see that the innovative and call a critical juncture. The enlightened leadership devolutionary nature of Zimbabwe’s ICA legisla- of outstanding champions like Sir Robert McIlwaine, tion (Level 2) was made possible by the culture of Gordon-Deedes and many highly committed gov- the electorate with a highly independent but ernment officials like Charles Murray, combined well-resourced farmers’ government favouring with public concern for renewable resources, to bottom-up conservation governance (Level 1). encourage the emergence of a pragmatic, demo- The resulting organizational structure took the cratic ‘grass-roots’ conservation movement over form of highly devolved and democratic ICAs several decades. The guiding principle followed by (Level 3), with self-responsibility, collective action the NRB was ‘Salus populi est supreme lex’ – the and education combining to influence the day- welfare of the people is the supreme law (Gordon- to-day allocation and conservation of natural Deedes, 1961). resources in positive ways (Level 4). The example Political leaders and professional civil servants also illustrates three entry points for policy change. recognized that landholders were self-motivated First, champions were able to change the laws. and responsible (Theory-Y) rather than lazy and Second, successful pilot examples are critical. irresponsible (Theory-X, McGregor, 1960). They These led to the uptake of new laws by landhold- designed a system to empower rather than control ers, but also to additional legal reform such as the landholders (Gordon-Deedes, 1961) through an Parks and Wildlife Act that devolved use rights to institutional framework based on the primary private landholders in 1975 and to communal principle of local responsibility and accountability. villagers in 1982. Third, the NRB recognized that Reflecting what management gurus Peters & legislation (Level 2) seldom works in the absence Waterman (1982) coined ‘loose-tight’ manage- of a supportive cultural environment (Level 1), and ment, the board had extremely wide powers to over many years proactively strengthened a order landholders to conform to resource conser- culture of devolution, and environmental responsi- vation and protection measures but relied ‘upon bility through a multi-faceted environmental edu- persuasion rather than compulsion [and] the good- cation campaign. will and common sense of landholders’ (Gordon- The natural resources movement was also Deedes, 1961; Peters & Waterman, 1982). Thus remarkably well aligned with contemporary com- the NRB empowered farmers to protect resources mon property theory and, as we will show, it fulfils collectively but held them to high standards.These all eight of Ostrom’s design principles for long- democratic principles also led to the rapid spread enduring common property regime institutions. of the movement among black farmers.Indeed, we Thus, farm boundaries and ICA boundaries were provided the counter example of the Native Land clearly defined (i.e. Common Property Regime Husbandry Act precisely to emphasize how [CPR] principle 1). Most individuals affected by the 12 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015 operational rules could participate in modifying and because it relied upon persuasion rather than these rules (CPR3), resulting in strong congru- compulsion (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). ence between rules and local conditions (CPR2). One of the hardest challenges in natural resource Monitoring and auditing of governance processes governance is the design and governance of the and natural resources was done by the farmers multiple layers of nested enterprises (CPR8). themselves (CPR4). However, this was augmen- While Ostrom acknowledges the growing impor- ted by external monitoring provided by the Lands tance of polyvalent governance, we need to turn to Inspectorate, such as the annual land inspection Murphree for design principles for scaling up natural over-flights. Paradoxically, devolution often bene- resources institutions to retain (rather than fits from external oversight and conformance alienate) the cooperation, insight, resourcefulness monitoring, provided the purpose of this is to and accountability of landholders (Murphree, protect the aims of the majority from being under- 2000). Murphree (2000) emphasizes the impor- mined by a non-compliant minority. Thus, these tance of processes and power relationships in the inspections were always done in partnership with formation of scale jurisdictions, and introduces the ICA in a spirit of cooperation and empower- three design principles: ‘jurisdictional parsimony’ ment. in matching the scale of resource externalities to Fairness and accountability were essential the scale of resource jurisdictions; ‘delegated features of the ICA movement. Farmers who aggregation’ as the mechanism for expanding violated conservation norms were subjected to jurisdictional reach while ensuring that natural graduated sanctions usually through peer-pres- resource governance still originates with the land- sure but also through strong legal action in the few holders who live with these resources, and ‘con- cases this was necessary thus fulfilling Ostrom’s stituent accountability’ as the process of building fifth principle (CRP5). Similarly, participants civic structures that are accountable to their land- always had access to informal or formal conflict holder constituencies. resolution mechanisms through ICAs and the Murphree (2000) argues that meso-level institu- Natural Resource Court, respectively (CPR6). tions for regulating collective action need to form Local collective action is invariably embedded through bottom-up processes if they are to be within larger systems, and these relationships are downwardly accountable to their constituents.This critical. Thus, the Natural Resource Act recog- implies that scaled institutions should be carefully nized and encouraged the rights of landholders to sequenced, by first scaling down and only then organize (CPR7), and in doing so greatly reduced scaling up through a process of delegated aggre- transaction costs of collective action by providing gation. This suggests that ICAs were effective an enabling legislative and policy framework. The because private landholders came together volun- champions of the ICA movement recognized that tarily to form them, and set local regulations only local resource management is highly sensitive to through the agreement of the majority of members. the intersection and character of state–local inter- This seemingly simple action had profound out- actions (Gordon-Deedes, 1961). Only sparing use comes in terms of the legitimacy and effectiveness of these powerful laws was required, with most of the ICAs, and perhaps to collective action gen- corrective action being taken proactively and erally. The actions of ICAs were designed by and locally. The common property literature may well accountable to constituent landholders so that nat- underplay the importance of such champions, ural resource governance and government origi- especially government actors, in establishing nated in the landholders (Mansfield & Winthrop, common property regimes (Schoon, 2013). How- 2000). The important mechanism is that upward ever, it certainly highlights how quickly the incen- delegation of powers ensured that each ICA was tives for local action can be undermined if the state downwardly accountable to the farmers that centralizes responsibilities or is heavy handed in elected it. This accountability spread upward their application (Ostrom, 2000). ICAs seemed to through the nested layers of ICA government, get this balance right. Government research and which were always rooted democratically in ICAs extension was used to guide (not control) sound because powers could be taken back if they were land use.Government support including extension not used well. was neither effective nor trusted until it was pro- The effectiveness of the ICAs originated in their vided through and controlled by committees elected democratic character, and contrasts with most from amongst their own local farming community, environmental regulations which rely on the Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 13 upward expropriation of powers by larger jurisdic- theories of management (McGregor, 1960; Peters tional units. Top-down environmental regulations & Waterman, 1982), common property (Ostrom, may look neat, but they tend to be ineffective 1990), and scale (Murphree, 2000). This congru- because the administrative centre lacks imple- ency suggests that these theories themselves mentational reach, especially where regulations may have a common origin. Indeed, the key to the lack social legitimacy and disempower or even paradigm shift initiated by Sir Robert McIlwaine alienate landholders and communities. Moreover, through the Natural Resources Act of 1941 was top-down regulation tends to accumulate many two-fold: most people are innovative, responsible functions higher up the administrative chain and to and self-actualizing, especially when subjected to overwhelm the systems’ managerial capacities. local face-to-face checks-and-balances. This in- Upward delegation is much better at matching the sight was incorporated into Zimbabwe’s unique scale of resource externalities to jurisdictional system of environmental governance by devolving scale, and accumulates responsibilities much the rights to use natural resources to landholder lower in the administrative chain which is better for while using democratic local collective action to managing local complexity. This is because land- manage externalities. The key to the ICA move- holders parsimoniously pass up only those powers ment was recognizing that true development lies is for which there are distinct advantages at higher the ability of individuals to self-actualize through levels because of significant externalities or scale freedoms of choice, transparency and opportunity economies. This allowed ICAs to focus parsimoni- (Sen, 1999). ously on a few important issues where they could The commonality between the ICA movement add genuine value. and Ostrom’s (1990) principles for effective com- The importance of the democratic nature and mon property regimes, suggests that Ostrom’s face-to-face scale of ICAs is emphasized by their principles also originate in a combination of indi- rapid decline when these conditions were violated vidual discretionary choice and self-actualization in the late 1970s by consolidation and amalgam- within a collective arrangement that encourages ation with the organs of Local Government. Before full and fair accountability. Thus Ostrom’s first this, ICAs focused on a single non-political function three principles and principle seven (i.e. clear – the collective governance of the environment and boundaries, locally appropriate rules, participation its associated complexities and externalities. in rule setting, recognized rights to self-determi- ICAs were directly accountable to landholders with nation) are about enabling individuals to partici- a personal commitment and interest in the out- pate fully in designing sound rules that bind them come of its actions. ICAs provided a scale at which collectively. The next three rules (monitoring, people were individually and collectively able to sanctions, and conflict resolution) ensure trans- internalize both ecological and financial costs and parency and fairness in adherence to these rules. benefits, with peer pressure and monitoring Similarly, Murphree’s (2000) design principles for strengthening ecological and economic feedback nested hierarchies ensure that higher levels of loops, and resulting in much higher levels of jurisdiction originate in and are accountable to accountability. Accountability was enhanced by participating individuals and communities. property rights, extension services, information, This does not imply that environmental gover- and environmental education of farmers, teachers nance should be a free for all, for this would result and students. The conservation movement was in chaos. The goal is to encourage personal autonomous and insulated from politics, although accountability but within clearly defined bound- it required Government support and worked aries and expectations of appropriate behaviour closely with State officials to achieve common and performance, which is why monitoring and goals. It illustrates an effective blending of public sanctions are critical. However, these boundaries and private endeavour across scale, for the pur- are set collectively and democratically, and should pose of wise environmental use or sustainable not be imposed by politicians or technocrats development, as later defined by the World Con- except through persuasion. servation Strategy (IUCN, 1980). Conservationists may be reluctant to entrust important and urgent environmental regulation to CONCLUSION a messy and slow democratic process. However, it A remarkable feature of Zimbabwe’s ICA move- is no coincidence that all large, rich nations are ment described in this paper is its congruency with democratic (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009), or 14 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015 that extractive and centralized institutions fail for time, but the true route to environmental gover- all but the elites by whom and for whom they are nance will require the courage to entrust resources structured. Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) develop to local control. This involves devolving full use the profound idea that inclusive institutions, and rights to landholders and communities. It also the checks and balances within them, result in the requires the bold step of devolving regulatory positive feedback loops that, for the first time in authority to communities of landholders though human history, have resulted in shared and multi- carefully crafted processes of local collective dimensional human prosperity. By contrast, top action, peer learning and control. These work best down institutions are invariable structured by the backed up by strong but light touch external verifi- elite to extract resource from the rest of society, are cation, both of the democratic process and conser- rarely associated with broad prosperity, and vation performance. strongly oppose technical and institutional innova- tion. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thus McIlwaine prioritized individual and collec- We are grateful to the late R.H. (Bob) Vaughan tive rights and responsibilities as the foundation of Evans for constructive comments on a draft of this socially inclusive ICAs, and this paper illustrates paper and for discussing its contents. He was a some of the resulting positive feedback loops. Im- Conservation and Extension Officer attached portantly, differences between the devolved and to ICAs and Groups for many years before becom- democratic ICAs envisaged by McIlwaine, and the ing Deputy Director of CONEX. Diana Child consolidation of ICAs with district councils in the encouraged and helped us in writing the paper.We name of technical efficiency by Minister Partridge also acknowledge the helpful comments of four in 1976, may seem minor but it had profound nega- reviewers. tive consequence on the performance of the con- servation movement; McIlwaine succeed because he recognized the power of human self-respon- ENDNOTES i. Graham Child, as Director of National Parks and sibility, fairness and collective responsibility, and Wild Life Management from 1971to 1986, had a Partridge undermined this progress because he close relationship with the NRB, hosting it for about a didn’t. Does this imply that we need to turn conser- week in most years. He also served on its Education , vation governance on its head so that the role of Forestry and Wildlife Committees and as Chairman national and international conservation institu- of its inter-ministerial working party preparing a Na- tions is not primarily to act, but to develop mecha- tional Conservation Strategy. Prior to that his father, nisms and processes that enable individual and Harold Child, had been a technical adviser to the local collective responsibility for the environment NRB (1949–1954) and (after retiring from Govern- ment) its first District Secretary (1955–1959). This much as McIlwaine did? On reflection, the emer- brought Graham into contact with many personali- gence of civic governance of natural resources ties of the formative years of the NRB, and he also was largely uncontested, in marked contrast to won the NRBs first Young Conservationist award in natural resource issues in general for the very 1951 while at school. Brian Child had considerable reason that the system was built from the bottom contact with ICAs as a government extension officer up to serve the needs of the bottom layers and researcher on private wildlife land (1989–1995) (Meadows 2008: 178). and as coordinator of the CAMPFIRE programme 1989–1995. In conclusion, we have long had the knowledge ii. These were legally similar except that residual pow- to design effective resource governance regimes; ers held by the British Government to protect the what is missing is the contemporary leadership to rights of people in Native Reserves did not apply in do so.However, this paper highlights how critical to SNAs. success is the intersection of bottom-up private iii. At this time, Harold Child was Native Commissioner action and top-down regulatory action, and that in Nyamandhlovu District where he catalysed weight the mindsets by which institutional structures are and grade sales, requiring the Cold Storage Com- governed are at least as important as the struc- mission to act as residual buyer at fair floor prices that aimed to upgrade the quality of stock on offer, tures themselves. The administrative design of and to encourage communal residents to sell more nested natural resource hierarchies is important. cattle. Yet the real lesson of this paper is the primacy of a iv. Gordon-Deedes (1961) attributed problems with culture of genuine democratization and participa- de-stocking to traditional mores which equated a tion to institutional governance. It may take more man's wealth and social status to his livestock hold- Child & Child: Early experiment in devolved community based regulation in Zimbabwe 15

ings. Later, government agricultural officers showed Hardin, G.J. (1971). The tragedy of the commons. Sci- that over-stocking was a sound economic invest- ence, 162, 1243–1248. ment on open-access range. They calculated that Harvey, R.K. (1985). The conservation movement in the natural increase in livestock inventory, plus the Zimbabwe. Proceedings of the conference and work- value of milk, manure and draught power, gave cat- shops on the implementation of a National Conserva- tle on communal land with highly subsidized ser- tion Strategy in Zimbabawe, Harare. Huxley, E.(1938).Soil erosion.An African survey:a study vices an annual return on investment of around 60% of problems arising in Africa South of the Sahara.L. (Melville Read, pers. comm.). This compared with Hailey. London: Oxford University Press. 7.5%, at best, in the money market and was largely Krige, E.J. (1936). The social system of the Zulus. Pieter- independent of the weather, until prolonged maritzburg: Shuter and Shooter. droughts in the 1980s killed many animals. Kwashirai, V.C. (2006). Dilemmas in conservationism in v. A contributing factor may have been an over- colonial Zimbabwe, 1890–1930. Conservation and stretched Board staff, as the number jumped to 13 Society, 4, 541–561. that year when a District Secretary was appointed for Lado, C. (1999). Environmental resources, population the African Areas. and sustainability: evidence from Zimbabwe. Singa- pore Journal of Tropical Geography, 20(2), 148– REFERENCES 168.mm Lindsey, P., Toit, R.D., Pole, A. & Romanach, S. (2009). Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2012). Why nations nail: Save Valley. In: H. Suich & B. Child (Eds), Conser- the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. New vancy: a large-scale African experiment in coopera- York: Random House. tive wildlife management. Evolution & innovation Beinart, W. (1984). Soil erosion, conservationism and in wildlife conservation (pp. 163–184). Earthscan: ideas about development: a southern African explo- London. ration 1900–1960. Journal of South African Studies, Lovemore, D.F.(1977).The role of the Natural Resources 11, 52–83. Board in Conservation. Lecture to Tropical Re- Borgerhoff Mulder, M. & Coppolillo, P.(2005). Conserva- sources M.Sc. course, University of Rhodesia, Salis- tion. Linking ecology, economics, and culture. Prince- bury, mimeographed. ton: Princeton University Press. Mansfield, H.C. & Winthrop, D. (2000). Alexis de Tocque- Bryant, A.T. (1949). The Zulu people. Pietermaritzburg: ville. Democracy in America. Chicago: University of Shuter and Shooter. Chicago Press. CBD (2004). Addis Ababa principles and guidelines for McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise.New the sustainable use of biodiversity. Montreal: Secre- York: McGraw-Hill. tariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Meadows, D.H. (2008). Thinking in systems. A primer. Child, B., Musengezi, J., Parent, G. & Child, G. (2012). London: Earthscan. The economics and institutional economics of wildlife Morse, C., Hadow, G., Hawes, C.D., Jenkins, O.T. & Val on private land in Africa. Pastoralism Journal, 2(18), Phillips, J.F. (1960). Basutoland, Bechuanaland Pro- 1–32. tectorate and Swaziland: Report of an Economic Sur- Child, B. (1996). The practice and principles of commu- vey Mission. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office nity-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe: the (p. 555). CAMPFIRE programme. Biodiversity and Conserva- Mulder, J. & Brent, A.C. (2006). Selection of sustainable tion, 5, 369–398. rural agriculture projects in South Africa:case studies Child, H.F. (1965). The history and extent of recognition in the LandCare Programme. Journal of Sustainable of tribal law in Rhodesia. Salisbury: Government Agriculture, 28, 55–84. Printer. Murombedzi, J.C. (1992). Decentralization or recentrali- Curtis, A. & Lockwood, M. (2000). Landcare and catch- zation? – Implementing CAMPFIRE in the Omay ment management in Australia: lessons for state- Communal Lands of the Nyaminyami District.Harare: sponsored community participation. Society & Natu- Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of ral Resources, 13, 61–73. Zimbabwe. Gordon-Deedes, P. (1961). Integration of the conserva- Murphree, M.(2000).Constituting the commons: crafting tion and development of wild resources with sustainable commons in the new millennium.Multiple programmes of economic development in modern Boundaries, Borders and Scale, at the Eighth Bien- states.Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources nial Conference of the International Association for in modern African States, Arusha, Tanzania: IUCN & the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Blooming- UNESCO. ton, Indiana, U.S.A. Gordon-Deedes, P.(1961). Our natural resources: 1960 Murphree, M. (2005). Congruent objectives, competing annual report of the Natural Resources Board. Salis- interests, and strategic compromise: concept and bury: Government Printer (p. 50). process in the evolution of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE, Grindle, M.S. & Thomas, W. (1991). Public choices and 1984–1996. In: J.P. Brosius, A.L. Tsing & C. Zerner policy change. The political economy of reform in (Eds) Communities and Conservation. Histories and developing countries. Baltimore and London: Johns Politicis of Community-based Natural Resource Man- Hopkins University Press. agement (pp. 105–148). Oxford, U.K.: Rowman & Hailey, L. (1938). An African survey. Oxford: Oxford Uni- Littlefield Publishers. versity Press. North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and 16 African Journal of Wildlife Research Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2015

economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- Ribot, J., Agrawal, A. & Larson, A. (2006). Recentralizing versity Press. while decentralizing: how national governments North, D.C., Wallis, J.J. & Weingast, B.R. (2009). Vio- reappropriate forest resources. World Development, lence and social orders. A conceptual framework for 34,1864–1886. interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge: SASUSG (1996). Sustainable use issues and principles, Cambridge University Press. Southern Africa Sustainable Use Specialist Group, Norton-Griffiths, M., Said, M., Serneels, S., Kaelo, D., IUCN Species Survival Commission: 23. Coughenour, M., Lamprey, R.H., Thompson, D.M. & SASUSG (2003). Principles of sustainable use. Wind- Reid, R. (2008). Land use economics in the Mara hoek, Namibia Nature Foundation. area of the Serengeti ecosystem. In: A. Sinclair, C. Savory, A.(1988).Holistic resource management.Wash- Packer, S. Mduma & F.J. Chicago (eds) Serengeti III ington, D.C.: Island Press. (pp.379–416).Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Schoon, M. (2013) Governance in transboundary con- Norton-Grifiths, M. (2008). Revitalizing African Agri- servation: how institutional structure and path depen- culture. PERC Reports, 26, 33–36. dence matter.Conservation and Society, 11, 420–428. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolu- Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom.NewYork: tion of institutions for collective action, Cambridge, Anchor Books. MA: Cambridge University Press. Southern-Rhodesia (1932). Official year book of the col- Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of ony of Southern Rhodesia: statistics mainly for the social norms, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, period 1926–1930. Salisbury: Rhodesian Publishing 14, 137–158. and Printing Company: 804. Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond markets and states: poly- Swift, R. (1976). The practice and determiniation of centric governance of complex economic systems. objectives by ICA Committees and Groups by the American Economic Review, 100, 1–33. Bembezaan Rural Resources Sub-Committee. Peters, T. & Waterman, R.H. (1982). In search of Proceedings 28th Annual Conservation Conference, excellence.Lessons from America’s best-run compa- Victoria Falls. nies. London: Harper Collins Business. Vincent, V. & Thomas, R.G. (1961). An agricultural sur- Pile, J.A.(1961).Developing an appreciation for the need vey of Southern Rhodesia, 2 volumes. Salisbury: of conservation of nature and natural resources.Con- Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. servation of Nature and Natural Resources in Mod- Whitlow, R. (1988). Potential versus actual erosion in ern African States. Arusha, Tanzania: IUCN and Zimbabwe. Applied Geography, 8, 87–100. UNESCO. Williamson, O.E. (2000). The new institutional econom- Prager, K. & Vanclay F.(2010). Landcare in Australia and ics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Germany: comparing structures and policies for com- Literature, 38, 595–613. munity engagement in natural resource manage- Zinyama, L. & Whitlow, R. (1986). Changing patterns of ment. Ecological Management and Restoration, 11, population distribution in Zimbabwe.Geo Journal, 13, 187–193. 365–384. Responsible Editor: F. Dalerum