choose interaction partners than ticular, once people form and be- rent perspective, in Advances in Experimental (Vol. 4), L. Berkowitz, Ed, when they are asked to report how come relatively certain of their self- (Academic Press, NewYork, 1968), pp. 1-34, they feel about the feedback they en- conceptions, they may work to 3, W.B, Swann, |r., R.M, Wenzlaff, D.S. KruN, and B.W. Pelham, The allure of negative feed- counter. maintain them by systematically re- back: Self-verification strivings among de- The second theme concerns re- cruiting friends and intimates who pressed persons, journal of Abnormal Psy- chology (in press); W.B. Swann, Jr., R.M. cent suggestions that people behave will verify these conceptions. In this Wenzlaff, and R.W. Tafarodi, Depression and so as to re-create the conceptual way, people may alter the raw ma- the search for negative evaluations: More ev- idence of the role of self-verification strivings, equivalents of relationships experi- terials that enter into the cognitive journal of Abnormal Psychology (in press). enced earlier in life. First advanced construction process; they may cre- 4, W.B. Swann, Jr., B.W. Pelham, and D,S. Krull, Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? How by Freud in his discussions of trans- ate idiosyncratically skewed ver- people reconcile their self-enhancement and ference, the notion that people reen- sions of social reality that sustain self-verification needs, journal of Personality andSoaal Psychology, 57, 782-791 (1989), act earlier relationships has gained their firmly held beliefs about them- 5, W,B, Swann, jr,. A, Stein-Seroussi, and R,B, increasing currency within develop- selves—even if these beliefs are neg- Giesler, Why people self-verify, journal of Personality and Social Psychology (in press), mental psychology. Indeed, a grow- ative. Such is the power of people's 6, W,B, Swann, Jr,, J.G, Hixon, A. Stein-Sefoussi, ing body of research suggests that desire to remain in touch with social and D,T, Gilbert, The fleeting gleam of praise: Behavioral reactions to self-relevant feedback, the relationships children form with reality, however harsh that reality journal of Personality and Social Psychology. their primary caretakers will later may seem. 59, 17-26 (1990), 7, W,B, Swann, Jr,, ],], Griffin, S, Predmore, and B, help them—or haunt them—as they Gaines, The cognitive-affective crossfire: mature. Our data suggest that peo- Acknowledgments—This research and When self-consistency confronts self- enhancement, journal of Personality and So- ple's self-concepts may be an impor- preparation of this manuscript were sup- cial Psychology, 52. 881-889 (1987); Swann, tant vehicle through which child- ported by research funds IMH 37598] and Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham, note 3, a research scientist development award 8, W,B, Swann, Jr,, J.G, Hixon, and C, De La hood relationships are carried (MH 00498) from the National Institute of Ronde, Embracing ihe bitter "truth": Negative forward through life. Mental Health. I am grateful to Kelly self-concepts and marital commitment. Psy- Brennan, Chris De La Ronde, Nancy Ha- chological Science (in press), Finally, in recent years, there has zen, and Romin Tafarodi for their helpful 9, W.B, Swann, Jr,, and S,C, Predmore, Intimates been much talk among psycholo- comment5 on an earlier version of this as agents of social support: Sources of conso- lation Of despair? journal of Personality and gists about the tendency for people manuscript. Social Psychology. 49, 1609-1617 (1995) to "construct reality." With few ex- ceptions, these theorists have re- Recommended ferred to a cognitive construction Notes 5wann, W.B., Jr. (1983), Self-verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self, !n process through which people ac- 5oc/a/ Psychological Perspectives on the Self tively transform sensory data into be- 1, C.S. Cooley, Human nature and the social order (Vol, 2), J. Suls and A.G, Greenwald, Eds, liefs and expectations about the (C. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1902); G.H, (Eribaum, Hillsdaie, NJ), pp, 33-66, Mead, Mind, self and society (University of Swann, W.B,, Jr. (1990), To be adored or to be world. Our research suggests an- Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934). known: The interplay of self-enhancement other sense in which people may 2. P. Lecky, Self-consistency: A theory of personal- and self-verificalion. In Motivation and Cog- ity (Island Press, New York, 1945); E. Aron- nition (Vol, 2), R,M, Sorrentino and E,T, Hig- construct their social worlds. In par- son, A theory of cognitive dissonance; A cur- gins, Eds, (Guilford, New York),

ing that p). Recent research shows Pretense, , and the that even preschool children have Theory-of-Mind Module an impressive and spontaneous grasp of this mental source of action. Alan M. Leslie The acquisition of the knowledge and skills necessary to understand

Alan M. Lesfir is Senior Si'ifntist in Even mundane social life de- tions. A critical component of this the MRC Cognitive Development pends on the ability to comprehend commonsense knowledge is the Unit dt ttie UfiivE^sily of London. other minds and their informational concept of a propositional attitude. Address rorFCspondenre to him at states. We rely heavily on common- We often construe behavior as me- MRC Cognitive Dev«lopmenl sense folk psychology, or "theory of diated by an agent's holding or tak- Unit, Univ^r&ity College-LxKidon, mind," to understand other people's ing an attitude to a proposition p T7 Cjordon Srrpot, ionAon WC1 OAH. England. behavior and to predict their reac- (e.g., believing, hoping, or pretend-

Published by Cambridge University Press another person's mind bas become a and loved by European cblldren.) topic of interest to developmental The child Is shown a Smarties box SHARED P« : AN .^ One potentially im- and asked what it contains. "Smart- EARLY portant line of work in this area con- ies" is the invariable reply. Tbe cbild cerns the nature of cognitive deficits is tben sbown tbat, actually, the box in the neurodevelopmental disorder contains only a pencil. The pencil is Tbe preschool cbild makes rela- known as childhood autism. Al- placed back in tbe box, and tbe Md is tively slow progress in understand- though early biological damage to closed again. The child is reminded ing situations in wbich people act on the growing brain is likely to have a that bis or her friend is outside wait- false beliefs. Two-year-olds, bow- number of different consequences ing to come In. Tben the test ques- ever, understand at least one kind of for cognitive development, there is tion is asked: "Wbat will your friend situation in which people act in re- increasing evidence tbat, in autism, say [/tbInk] is in tbe box wben we sponse to imagined circumstances: one of tbe effects is a relatively fo- first sbow it to bim?" Again, most shared pretense. In shared pretense, cused and specific impairment in tbe 4-year-olds correctly predict one person's behavior communi- capacity to reason about mental "Smarties," wbereas most 3-year- cates an imaginary situation to tbe states. olds expect tbe friend to say, "pen- other person. I analyzed tbis ability, cil." which first emerges between 18 and Tbestudy of false bas come 24 months, by means of a cognitive to dominate much of the effort in this model that identified the nnain prop- EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF area since these findings. Interest in erties of tbe internal representations THE iEHIl-D'S THEORY false belief arose initially out of required.^ Tbese representations OFMlMti Premack and Woodruffs'* article on turned out to express tbe key infor- tbe question of whether or not chim- mation contained in propositional panzees have a . In a attitudes, leading me to suggest tbat Folk psychology arises naturally commentary on tbat article, Den- these same representational mecha- during the preschool years. One of nett^ suggested that a crucial test of nisms probably underlie the child's the most striking demonstrations of animals' understanding would in- capacity to acquire and elaborate this development comes from tbe volve not just belief but false belief. different theories of mind. In the pre- study of attribution of false beliefs. In understanding false belief, ani- schooler's "concept" of pretense, Imagine the following scene in mals must understand a belief tbat is we glimpse the specific innate basis which Sally is tricked by Anne. Sally not tbeir own and therefore does not of our capacity spontaneously to ac- puts her candy in a cupboard and reflect reality as tbey construe it. quire a "tbeory of mind." goes out to play. Naughty Anne Wimmer and Perner took up tbis Pretending, in the sense I was in- comes in, finds the candy, and idea and developed tbe above sce- terested in, is a playful activity and moves it to a nearby drawer. Now narios, testing not chimpanzees but does not have an ulterior motive, Sally comes back for her candy. human children instead. such as to deceive. It should also be Where does Sally think her candy is? Other, simplified, versions of distinguished from being confused: Wbere will she look for it? Working false belief tasks have been devel- If 1 pretend tbat a banana is a tele- at tbe Universities of Salzburg and oped. For example, Wellman and pbone, 1 know perfectly well wbat Sussex, respectively, Wimmer and Bartsch*' found that 3-year-olds can the banana really is. To engage in Perner^^ used scenarios sucb as tbis pass a version of the Sally-and-Anne shared pretense, 1 have to under- one to show that 4-year-old children task in whicb the position of the tar- stand that someone else can have a could figure out what Sally wrongly get object is not known but guessed. pretend-type attitude to tbe imagi- thinks. The children were able to at- Whatever the child guesses, the ex- nary situation of the banana being a tribute a false belief to Sally and thus perimenter says that Sally thinks it is telephone, just such an ability is to predict her erroneous behavior. some other place. When asked to found in 2-year-oids. Their ability to Children younger than 4, bowever, predict Sally's search bebavior, represent a propositional attitude is would predict Sally's bebavior based tben, the child has to predict on tbe an index of tbeir capacity to acquire on the candy's current position, as if basis of Sally's different belief. Un- a tbeory of mind—including, for ex- Sally would know tbis. der tbese circumstances, most ample, an ability to employ a con- In a further study, Perner, 3-year-olds succeed. Apparently, cept of belief. Leekam, and Wimmer^ developed their efforts to represent Sally's belief Perbaps the easiest way to see the the "Smarties" task, which also tests are not swamped by current reality, connection between understanding for understanding false belief. if reality is only guessed at and not pretense In others and theory of {Smarties are a type of candy known known for sure. mind is to consider the following.

Copyright © 1992 American Psychological Society Suppose you are faced with trying to ties should give rise to a peculiarly mental states? In a follow-up study, understand why some particular limited social life. Together with my we used a picture-sequencing task to physical event has happened (e.g., colleagues in London, Simon Baron- compare, across these same three why your automobile's engine keeps Cohen and Uta Frith, I began work- groups, the children's ability to un- cutting out). You will consider only ing on these conjectures when it derstand mental and physical explanations based on actual cir- seemed to us that childhood autism events. Some sequences depicted cumstances, dismissing explana- might fit this profile.^ physical-causal events, and some tions based on imagined circum- What was already known about sequences depicted events that, it stances as irrelevant. When it comes autism was that pretense and imagi- seemed to us, could be appreciated to understanding the behavior of native abilities, intentional commu- only if one took into account the people, however, things are differ- nication, and social competence are mental states of the protagonists. ent. In such cases, we often consider all impaired. Indeed, these three fea- The results were again striking. The imaginary circumstances because tures are central to the behavioral di- autistic children showed a specific we know that people sometimes be- agnosis of autism. There were good difficulty. They performed well on have in relation to circumstances reasons for thinking that autism has a the physical-causal events but that are not real. A metal button can biological origin, and the pioneering slumped to chance performance on be attracted only by a magnet that is work of Hermelin and O'Connor'" the mental state stories. The younger really there, but a deluded Sally can showed that autism involves cogni- normal children were near ceiling be "attracted" to an empty box by a tive deficits. What we needed to dis- on the latter stories, and even the piece of chocolate that is no longer cover was whether autistic children more retarded Down's group outper- there. Or perhaps there never was a also show any inordinate difficulty formed the autistic group. Finally, piece of chocolate—perhaps Sally is with theory-of-mind concepts. We our analysis of the children's verbal just pretending there is something in started with false belief. descriptions of the stories showed the box. In either case, Sally is be- We presented three groups of that the autistic children produced having with respect to a situation children with a task adapted from much more physical-causal lan- that is only imaginary. Wimmer and Perner^—essentially guage but much less mental state the Sally-and-Anne scenario out- language than the other two groups. lined earlier. One of these groups In sum, the autistic children ap- consisted of normal 4-year-olds, the peared to be disadvantaged when it EVIDENCE other two of Down syndrome and came to understanding events that autistic children. We deliberately ar- required a "theory of mind." Inci- ranged that the autistic group had a dentally, we also included se- The single capacity to pretend mental and chronological age con- quences depicting social interac- and to understand pretense in others siderably higher than that of the tions that we thought could be has important implications. It im- other groups. In fact, their IQs were understood without reference to plies the existence of a domain- in the borderline to normal range mental states. On these sequences, specific processing mechanism (mean = 82), whereas the children the autistic children did as well as whose task is to understand behavior with Down syndrome averaged an the normal children and better than in relation to mental states. This IQ of 64. We went to these lengths the Down's chiidren. mechanism is essentially innate and, to ensure that any difficulty the au- The findings of these initial stud- in some sense, a specific part of the tistic children might have with this ies have subsequently been con- brain. If all this were true, then we task would not be due to general in- firmed and extended in a number of might find an organic brain disorder tellectual level. This point was im- ways.^' For example, Baron-Cohen that detrimentally affects this mech- portant because our hypothesis was showed that even those autistic chil- anism while leaving many other ca- that autism involves a specific brain dren who pass a basic false belief pacities relatively intact. There mechanism. The results of this study task fail a more complex ("second should be individuals whose capac- were clear. Although around 85% of order") version that Down's children ity to pretend and to understand pre- both the normal and Down's groups often pass. Frith and I demonstrated tense in others is impaired. Individ- correctly predicted Sally's false be- that high-ability autistic children uals with this sort of organic damage lief, only 20% of the autistic group have difficulty with true belief as should also have problems with in- did so, despite their intellectual and well as false belief. Perner, Frith, tentional communication^ and spe- age advantage. Leekam, and I showed that most au- cific difficulties in acquiring and Autistic children may lack under- tistic children fail the Smarties task elaborating a theory of mind. Fi- standing of mental states, but do and do not take into account what nally, such developmental difficul- they lack only an understanding of another person knows while com-

Published by Cambridge University Press municating with that person. These Does the autistic child have a "iheory of THE mind"? Cognition, 21, 37-46 (1985); S, basic findings have received support Baron-Cohen, A.M. Leslie, and U. Frith, Me- from studies by other workers.'"^ THEORY-OF-MIND MODUtE chanical, behavioural and intentional under- standing of picture stories in autistic children, The classical view of autism, orig- British journal of , inated by Kanner''' and currently 4, 113-125 (1986). championed by Hobson,''' is that it I have argued that the normal and 10. B. Hermeiin and N. O'Connor, Psychological rapid development of theory-of- Experiments With Autistic Children (Perga- is primarily an affective disorder, but mon, London, 1970), the specific pattern of spared and mind knowledge depends on a spe- 11. S. Baron-Cohen, The autistic child's theory of cialized mechanism that allows the mind: A case of specific developmental delay, impaired abilities seems hard to ex- 'ournal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, plain in terms of a genera! affective brain to attend to invisible mental 30, 285-297(1989); A.M, Leslie and U. Frith, states.^' Very early biological dam- Autistic chiidren's understanding of seeing, disorder. Instead, Frith and l'^ have knowing and believing, British journal of De- argued that autism involves a cogni- age may prevent the normal expres- velopmental Psychology, 6, 315-324 (1988); sion of this theory-of-mind module 1. Perner, U. Frith, A.M. Leslie, and S.R. tive impairment specifically affect- Leekam, Exploration of the autistic child's the- ing metarepresentational capacity. in the developing brain, resulting in ory of mind: Knowledge, belief and commu- the core symptoms of autism.^^ nication. Child Development, 60, 689-700 Frith^^ provided the first detailed (1989). consideration of the connection be- 12. See, e.g., R. Eisenmajer and M. Prior, Cognitive linguistic correlates of "theory of mind" abil- tween theory-of-mind deficits and ity in autistic children, British lournai of De- the clinical picture of autism. Baron- Notes velopmental Psychology, 9, 351-364 (1991); J, Russell, N. Mauthner, S. Sharpe, and T. Cohen'^ showed that not all "theo- Tidswell, The "windows task" as a measure of retical" concepts in autistic children 1. See, e.g., J. Astington, P. Harris, and D, Olson, strategic deception in preschoolers and autis- are impaired. Roth and P^ found Eds., Developing Theories of Mind (Cam- tic subjects, British journal of Developmental bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988); G, Psychology, 9, 331-349 (1991), that although normal 3-year-old Butterworth, P.L. Harris, A.M. Leslie, and H. 13. L. Kanner, Autistic disturbances of affective children failed standard false belief Wellman, Perspectives on the Child's Theory contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217-250 (1943). of Mind (, Oxford, tasks, they could attribute proposi- 14. R.P. Hobson, On acquiring knowledge about 1991). people, and the capacity to pretend: A re- tionai attitudes to participants in a 2. H. WimmerandJ. Perner, Beliefs about beliefs: sponse to Leslie (1987), Psychological Re- conversation. Our autistic subjects, Representation and constraining function of view, 97, 114-121 (1990). wrong beliefs in young children's understand- 15. A.M. Leslie and U. Frith, Prospects for a cog- however, failed to perform even at ing of deception. Cognition, 13, 103-128 nitive neuropsychology of autism: Hobson's this 3-year-oid level. (1983). choice, Psycho/og/ca/ Review, 97, 122-131 3. J. Perner, S.R. Leekam, and H. Wimmer, Three- (1990). Further evidence that autistic year-olds' difficulty with false belief: The case 16. U, Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma (Black- children are not simply "delayed for a conceptual deficit, British journal of De- well, Oxford, 1989). velopmental Psychology, 5, 125-137 (1987). 17. S. Baron-Cohen, The autistic child's theory of 3-year-olds" comes from recent 4. D. Premack and G, Woodruff, Does the chim- mind: How specific is the deficit? British jour- work' ^ that extended Zaitchik's^" el- panzee have a theory of mind^ Behavioral and nal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 301- egant "false photographs" tasks to Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526 (1978). 314 (1991). 3. D.C, Dennett, Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral 18. 0, Roth and A.M. Leslie, The recognition of show that autistic children perform and Brain Sciences, I, 568-570 (1978). attitude conveyed by utterance: A study of preschool and autistic children, British journal weil (better than normal 4-year-olds) 6. H.M. Wellman and K. Bartsch, Young chil- of Developmental Psychology, 9, 315-330 on a task that is structurally similar to dren's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, (1991). 239-277 (1988). a false belief task. This task involves 19. A,M, Leslie and L. Thaiss, Domain specificity in 7. A.M, Leslie, Pretend play and representation in conceptual development: Neuropsychologi- not beliefs but photographs that be- the second year of life, paper presented to Brit- cal evidence from autism. Cognition (in come false by going out-of-date. ish Psychological Society Developmental press); S. Leekam and j, Perner, Does the au- Conference, Oxford (1983, September); A.M. tistic child have a "metarepresentational" def- This superior performance extends Leslie, Pretense and representation: The ori- icit? Cognition (in press), gins of "theory of mind," Psychological Re- to understanding a false map, lead- 20. D, Zaitchik, When representations conflict with view, 94, 412^26 (1987). ing to the conclusion that autistic reality: The preschooler's problem with false 8. S, Baron-Cohen, Social and pragmatic deficits beliefs and "false" photographs. Cognition, children are not impaired generally in autism, journal of Autism and Developmen- 35, 41-68(1990), in problem solving that, like "theory tal Disorders, 18, 379-402 (1988); U. Frith, A 21. A,M. Leslie, The theory of mind impairment in new look at language and communication in autism: Evidence for a modular mechanism of of mind," requires executive func- autism, British journai of Disorders of Com- development? in The Emergence of Mindread- tioning or counterfactual reasoning. munication, 24, 123-150 (1989); A.M. Leslie ing. A, Whiten, Ed. (Blackwell, Oxford, and F, Happ6, Autism and ostensive commu- 1991), pp. 63-78. These results support the idea that nication; The relevance of metarepresenta- tion. Development and Psychopathology, 1, 22. U. Frith, J. Morton, and A.M. Leslie, The cog- autism involves a damaged theory- 205-212 (1989). nitive basis of a biological disorder: Autism, of-mind module. Trends in Neurosciences, 14, 433-438 9. S. Baron-Cohen, A.M. Leslie, and U. Frith, (1991).

Copyright © 1992 American Psychological Society