United States-Colombian diplomatic relations, 1933-1943
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Authors Gallagher, Robert John, 1927-
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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317889 UNITED STATES-COLOMBIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSs
1933-1943
tgr
Robert John Gallagher
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'AA^'c._____ .( j i t / £ 6 A 7 RUSSELC C. EWING I (J Date Professor of Hist TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES OOPOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO IV
ABSTRACT oooooooooooaoooooooooooooooo V
Chapter
I . INTRODUCTION . 1
I I , SOME RESULTS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY ...... 7
I I I , THE LETICIA INCIDENT ...... 14
IF , ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS ...... 26
V. THE APPROACH TO WORLD WAR TWO: THE GERMAN INFLUENCE ...... 44
VI. UNITED STATES-COLOMBIAN COUNTERMEASURES ...... 59
V II. CONCLUSION ...... ?8
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 81
ill LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
lo FOREIGN BONDS OUTSTANDING FOR 1934 ...... 30
2o A CENTURY OF C0L0MB0-AHER1CAN TRADE ...... 39
3. COLOMBIAN EXPORT TRADES 1938 ...... 40
4. COFFEE EXPORT QUOTAS ...... 42
5 . COMPETITIVE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA ...... 45
i v ABS1BACT
The diplomatic relations between the United. States and Colom bia during the decade between 1933 and 1943 were, for all practical purposes, centered on the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt= In the opening years of the period, Colombia became con vinced that the United States was genuinely interested in an equality of treatment of her neighbors to the south and was respectful of their individual sovereignties 0 The acceptance by the “Colossus of the
North" o f th e p o licy o f n o n in terv en tio n , th e amendment to th e Smoot-
Hawley T a riff Act, and the abrogation o f the P la tt Amendment, coupled with the final withdrawal of the United States Marines from Haiti, acted as the catalyst« Colombia became more personal in its relation ship and requested the use of the good offices of the United States during its difficulties with Peru. Its presidents, Alfonso Ldpez Pu- marejo and Eduardo Santos, joined with Roosevelt in a feeling of trust and admiration. While the United States aided Colombia economically, the latter supported the former in various inter-American conferences and allowed the use of its territory for defense bases. In declaring war on the Axis in 1943, Colombia culminated a decade of cooperation which reflected the results of the diplomatic relations.
v I . INTRODUCTION
In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolute ly respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors A
Few nations of Latin America have had more reason to be dis trustful of the Unitejd States than has Colombia» The loss of Panama, allegedly through the interference of the United States via the Nash v i l l e in 1903, was a direct blow at the sovereignty and pride of the fourth most populous nation of Latin Americae The animosity created by the usurpation of territory which became the international gateway between the two greatest oceans of the world was profound„ The United
States seemed to be epitomized ty the phrase MColossus of the North, •* and Latin America appeared as a pawn to be used at the discretion of the northern nationa
As war clouds loomed over Europe with the rise of Adolf Hit ler, the leadership of the United States re-evaluated its relationship with the other nations of the Western Hemisphere on the basis of self- preservation. In its dealings with Colombia, the United States fo cused its attention on that very area where the great disagreement had occurred—Panama and the Panama Canal—but th e United S ta te s had to
1-Franklin D. Roosevelt, "First Inaugural A d d r e s s Nothing to Fears The Selected Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1932-1945. edo B. Do Zevin (Cambridges Houghton M ifflin Co., 1946), p. 16. overcome the deep m istrust which had permeated the relationship be tween th e two countrieso United States-Colom bian re la tio n s became a part of the whole, and was favorably influenced by the conduct of the former toward all of the nations of Latin America through the “Good
Neighbor P o licy 0M At th e same tim e, d ir e c t re la tio n s between the two countries were improved by a sympathetic attitude on the part of the
United States toward Colombia, and by a most cordial relationship which developed between the presidents of Colombia on one hand and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the other, Roosevelt°s Good Neighbor
Policy became the magnetic force which was the basis of United States foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, that policy was mirrored in the friendly offering of an open hand, less the “Big Stick6* of another era. The intent of the United States was evident in an appreciation of the dignity and equality of the neighboring nations to the south; and the policy brought about a temporary thaw which promulgated a period of inter-American cooperation during a time of crisis. It would not be sensible, however, to minimize the contributions made by the various international conferences of American States and the spe cial meetings of foreign ministers during the decade under considera tion, The atmosphere engendered by those conferences, and the many agreements reached, furnished the framework for hemispheric resistance to Nazism,
Just exactly when the Good Neighbor Policy began is a matter of conjecture. Some say the policy began with the “Mobile Address6* of
Woodrow Wilson, but-his continuing interference in the Caribbean gives reason to question that theory. Others point to the administration of Calvin Coolidge as the source of the policy, basing their reasoning on the President®s selection of quality personnel to represent the United
States in Latin America—.personnel sent there to "clean up imperial istic messes created by the United States» Again, however, some negative argument may be made on the basis of the continuance of armed intervention in Central America during the Coolidge regime. Indeed, the words of the President himself, and the overtones of a unilateral application of the Monroe Doctrine, were hardly conducive to the pol icy of a good neighbors
While it is well-established international law that we have no right to interfere in the purely domestic affairs of other nations in their dealings with their own citizens, it is equally well established that our Government has certain rights over and certain duties toward our own citizens and their property, wherever they may be located. The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the n a tio n , even when abroad .... The fundamental laws of justice are universal in their application. These rights go with the citizen. Wherever he goes, these duties of our Gov ernment must follow him .3
A more definite approach to the policy of the good neighbor may be seen in the Hoover administration. During the interim period between his election and inauguration, the President-elect travelled throughout Latin America on a goodwill tour. Then upon taking office,
Hoover found himself heir to the so-called Clark Memorandum. Prepared in 1928 by Under Secretary of State J, Reuben Clark, Jr. for the out going Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, the memorandum was a
^J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Secu r i t y % 1889-1960 (Austins University of Texas Press, 1961) , p. 113.
^Galvin Coolidge, "Speech Outlining United States World Policy," Mew York Times. April 26, 1927, p. 10. 4 repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt°s 18Corollary81 to the Monroe Doc trine—a sore point in Waited States-Latin American relations since
1904o In 1930 the Clark Memorandum was released ty the State Depart ment, and with it the United States rejected the controversial Corol la r y .^
Hoover°s empathy toward the peoples of Latin America was ex pressed early in 1929s
I mention one sinister notion as to the policies of the United States upon our relationships with our Latin-American neighbors. That is, fear of an era of the mistakenly called dollar diplomacy. The implications that have been colored by that expression are not a part of my conception of interna tional relations. I can say at once that it never has been and ought not to be the policy of the United States to inter vene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our citizens and foreign States or their citizens. Confidence in that attitude is the only basis upon which the economic co operation of our citizens can be welcomed abroad. It is the only basis that prevents cupidity encroaching upon the weak ness of nations—but, far more than this, it is the true ex pression of moral rectitude of the United States.5
Of added significance was the fact that Hoover followed up his declarations with deeds. In January, 1933» the United States withdrew its troops from Nicaragua. At the same time, preparations were being made to evacuate the Marines from Haiti when his tenure in office ended. The policy of non-recognition of unconstitutional, de facto governments, as follow ed by W ilson, was suspended. When Panama was
^"Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943)9 p. 222. See also Mecham, op. eit., p. 113=
^Herbert C. Hoover, 18Address of April 13, 1929," as quoted in Ray Lyman and Arthur Mastick Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937)) P° 589= struck by internal problems which led to the overthrow of the govern ment in 1931s and when Haiti was unable to meet amortization payments on i t s bonds 9 intervention was eschewed by the United-States and a hands-off policy was followed. It should be added, however, that much of th e progress in inter-A m erican re la tio n s was se t back when Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill in 1930. Hard-pressed by the world depression. United States businessmen wanted financial protec tion from foreign competition. While the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act gave them the legal buffer they desired, it also stifled Latin American exports to its largest consumer.^
If there is some question as to the beginning of the policy of the good neighbor, there seems to be none regarding its maximum orbit.
Subsequent to his inaugural address of March 4, 1933» in which he in troduced his Good Neighbor Policy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke be fore a special session of the governing board of the Pan American
Union on Pan American Day, April 12, 1933« In that address he mention ed once again his wish to dedicate the nation to a policy of the good neighbor, and added specifics applicable to Latin America. He spoke of the ^historical, cultural, economic, and social% ties that bound the twenty-one republics together, and for the first time there was mention of "continental self-defense." and the independent character of each nation. Said Roosevelt s
Tour Americanism and mine must be a structure built of confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only
k Donald Marquand Dozer, Latin Americas An Interpretive His tory (New York? McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 529. equality and fraternity» It finds its source and being in the hearts of men and dwells in the temple of the intellect <,?
For some time the United States had been under an intellectual attack from Latin .America, Their economic 9 political and social as p ira tio n s thw arted, many an in te lle c tu a l turned to th a t which he knew best—his own culture,® Culture became a cause, and the inner spirit ual quality something to be defended from the "crassly m aterialistic" interests of the United States,^ The United States became the "Colos sus of the North" and "Yahkeephobia" a Latin American disease. Unfor tunately, there was some historical basis for resentment, and it was this that Franklin Roosevelt began to chip away,
Latin Americans had heard eloquent statements uttered by high- minded North American officials before, While Roosevelt^s speeches may have stimulated Latin non-pragmatic intellectual yearnings, some thing by way of deed was needed to cement the spiritual quality with reality. This process began shortly after Roosevelt assumed the of fice of President, and was advanced in the international conferences of American States and by direct United States diplomacy in the name of the Good Neighbor Policy,
^U, S, Department of State, "Pan American Day Address of the President," Press Releases, (April 15 9 1933)» p» 243 (h e re in a fte r cited as Press Releases, plus date and page),
®Dozer, op, c it. , p, 472,
9John P„ G illin, "Some Signposts for Policy," Richard N, Adams e t a l. , Social Change in Latin America Todays Its Implications for United States Policy ("Vintage Books"; New Yorks Random House, I960), p , 38. I I . SOME RESULTS OF THE GOOD 1EIGHBQR POLICY
Through the early developmental years of the international
conferences of American States $ Latin Americans had attempted in vain to introduce clauses of non-intervention into various agenda» Most
centered around the Calvo Doctrine of the 1850°s and the Drago Doc trine of 1902. The former embraced non-intervention and absolute
sovereignty 0 Its main concern was the favored treatment which had been demanded by many foreigners$ even over the rights and privileges of nationals, and the foreigners® unwillingness to abide by the court decisions of the host nation. The Drago Doctrine, closely related, advocated the outlawing of intervention by force on the part of for eign governments for the purpose of debt collecting. In any ease,
Latin direction was toward non-intervention and the unilateral appli cation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States—a concern that was noted by the latter nation.
At the Seventh International Conference of American States, held at Montevideo in December of 1933s the United States began to dispel the old fears. %- signing the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, of which Article 8 stated that Mno state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another,M the United
States took its most positive step up to that time in lessening the
suspicion which had been generated over many years. Even though a reservation was attached to the United States acceptance, which centered on ’"'interpretations and definitions of <, » « fundamental term s911 the signing was a milestone in Latin American-United States relations. It was the initial step toward an agreement long sought by
Latin America 0
Complete fulfillm ent of Latin wishes regarding intervention did not occur; howevers until conditions in Europe made further coop eration between the United States and Latin America desirable, Ey
1936 the European situation had gone from bad to worse, and the Pres ident and Secretary of State of the United States had become alarmed.
With Germany$, Italy, and Japan becoming more m ilitant, “we did not dare wait.8i-^ Therefore, on January 30, 1936, President Roosevelt com municated a request to the President of Argentina, Agustfn P. Justo, identical copies of which were sent to the presidents of the other
Latin American republics, asking that '’an extraordinary inter-American conference be summoned . . . to determine how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded , , ,
The importance attached to the Buenos Aires Conference by
President Roosevelt may be gleaned from his late decision to attend the opening session. Bis appearance in Latin America—he visited
Brazil and Uruguay as well as Argentina—lent a personal touch to the occasion and was an indication of the seriousness with which the
United States regarded the conference. Also, his attendance may have
Cordell Bull, The Memoirs of Cordell lu ll (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, p. 493°
2press Releases (February 15, 1936), pp. 162-3° been prompted by the urging of the United States Ambassador in Berlin <>
Reporting that the German government was against Roosevelt0s partici pation at Buenos Aires $ the United States Ambassador countered the
German suggestion by insisting that "a great international effect would be produced by a visit of the President to the Conferenceo1^ In any event 9 on December 1 $ 1936$, Roosevelt addressed the delegates o He spoke of the accomplishments of Montevideo and directed his remarks toward the maintenance of peace in the hemispheres
In the determination to live at peace among ourselves we in th e Americas make i t a t th e same tim e cle a r th a t we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final deliberations that others who9 driven by war madness or land hunger, might seek to com mit acts of aggression against us will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good,^
The conference became a strengthening addition to the achievements of
Montevideoo Of the two treaties, eight conventions, and one protocol adopted, the United States ratified the treaties, the protocol, and six of the conventionso5
The significance of the Buenos Aires Conference was two-fold„
To Cordell Hull the conference strengthened the solidarity of the
Western Hemisphere against what seemed to be the inevitable engagement
3Uo So Department of State, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Hull)," Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 0 1936 (Washington: Uc So Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1954), V, p. 32 (hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations„ plus pertinent year, volume, publication date, and page).
%>ress R eleases (December 5» 1936), p . 425.
^Foreign Relations* 1936, V, 195^$ PP° 33=40 10 in war of the European powers.^ To Latin Americag the conference be came the convincing factor that the United States %ad completely abandoned the principle of intervention® e,7
The United States had greatly impressed Latin America at the
Montevideo Conference of 1933» However, the reservation injected by the United States Secretary of State in signing the Convention on
Rights and Duties of States prohibited an absolute acceptance of non intervention , and at Buenos Aires the topic arose once again* At this later conference the United States signed the Additional Protocol Rel ative to Hon-Intervention, and did so without reservation* Article I of the Protocol was emphatic in its denial of interventions "The High
Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly 9 and for whatever reason, in the in ternal or external affairs of any other of the Parties » » , The
United States, therefore, clearly committed itself to a policy of non intervention by signing the Protocol„
In addition to participating in the inter-American conferences, the United States took other steps to improve its image in the Western
6H ull, op* e itoo p* 501*
^Edward 0= Guerrant, Roosevelt0s Good Neighbor Policy (Albu querque s University of New Mexico Press, 1950), p« 12®
®U. S* Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peaces Buenos Aires* Argentina* December 1-23* 1936* Department of State Publication No* 1088, Conference Series 33 (Wash ington* U* S* Government Printing Office, 193?)$ p« 12?* Hemisphere by correcting some areas which were long disputed by Latin
Americans, In the interim between the Montevideo and Buenos Aires
Conferencess, the United States indicated 9 by practical application, its desire to treat its sister republics in the hemisphere with re spect, The first opportunity for the United States to prove itself sincere in its new policy arose in Cuba, During 1933 and early 193^? the political situation in that Latin country was such that interven tio n by the United S ta te s was in th e o ffin g . The Machado government had been replaced by that of de Cesped.es 9 which soon fell in a coup d'etat. Dr. Grau San Martin then became provisional president, but was soon replaced by Carlos Mendieta with Fulgencia Batista in the background as the real power. The United States, however, remained true to the principle of non-intervention and recognized the new gov ernment on January 22, 193^° Furthering its good relations with Cuba, and with all of Latin America by the same token, the United States then took measures to abrogate the despised "Platt Amendment1’ of 1903,
The P latt Amendment prohibited Cuba from negotiating treaties or com pacts with any foreign power which might have endangered its independ ence. It allowed the United States to intervene wfor the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty , , . justified previous intervention by ratification and validation, and secured the perpetual use of Guantanamo as a naval base for the United
9Graham H, Stuart, Latin America and the United States (Hew Yorks Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955)V"p« 28° 12
Stateso The Platt Amendments signed by Cuba under duress 9 did nothing
to enhance the prestige or trust of the United States throughout the
hemispheres but that stigma was at last removed when the controversial
amendment was abrogated by tre a ty on May 29 9 193^°
If the Platt Amendment had adversly affected Latin Americans
emotionally 9 the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act affected them economically«
Cordell Hull 0 s personal dislike of the limitations and animosities
created by this tariff have been stated by him. Hull believed that it would have been "folly" to request Congress to repeal the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act or lower its rates,The act itself was reduced in sig nificance by the Trade Agreements Act, signed by the President on
June 12s 1934, The new act? an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley le g is la
tions allowed the President to negotiate trade agreements without sub mission to the Senate, to reduce tariffs up to fifty percent, and to negotiate such treaties with countries that did. not discriminate
against the United States, While the Trade Agreements Act assisted in
alleviating some pressure on trade with Latin America, the "restric
tive devices ’1 of the United States had been "too considerable to allow
for any return to the good old days of liberal, triangular trade."H
The curbing of the Smoot-Hawley ta riff, and the establishment
of bilateral, reciprocal trade, allowed Latin America to look with
some approval upon the United States proposal. On December 15, 1933,
l% u l l , op, c i t . , p . 358 =
llMeeham, op. c it, , p . 153= 13 a treaty of reciprocity was signed, with Colombia, the first of the kind since 1902„^ To supplement these accomplishments and to com plete the major assurances that the Good Neighbor Policy was more than lip service. United States Marines were withdrawn from Haiti in August of 193^ and a new tre a ty was made w ith Panama in March o f 1936«
The actions of the United States during the early years of the
Good Neighbor Policy made considerable headway in breaking down sus picions long held by Latin Americans= Those actions were sharply ob served by Colombia, and the progress made toward equality of treatment did much to impress Colombian leadership= It was to the United States and its good offices, then, that Colombia turned during a time of great difficulty with Peru.
•^Stuart, op. c it.o p. 28. I I I . THE LETICIA INCIDENT
A fter th e Wars o f Independence many a L atin American nation became involved in conflicts with its neighbors over the settlement of undefined boundary lines. For the most part, and where settlement was not made by force but by arbitration, the nations of the south turned to other Latin countries or to Europe for an arbitrator. These bound ary disputes continued well into the twentieth century, and one such dispute developed between Colombia and Peru. The two nations appeared to have peacefully settled their boundary differences when they ex changed ratification of a treaty on March 19» 1928. The treaty, orig inally signed in 1922 at Lima by Colombian Foreign Minister Fabio Lo zano and Peru9s representative Alberto Salomdn, is often referred to as the Salomdn-Lozano Treaty, or the Treaty of 1922—seldom as the
Treaty of 1928. The treaty necessitated certain land adjustments.
Portions once occupied by Colombia were ceded to Peru, while the la t ter made transfers to Colombia.- As a result, on August 17, 1930, the trapezium from the Putumayo to the Amazon, formerly a part of Peru9s
Department of Loreto, was yielded to Colombia.3-
Loeated in the southeasternmost part of Colombia9s newly ac quired land was the town of Leticia, whose population in 1932 was ap proximately three hundred. On September 1 , 1932, a group of Peruvians
^Gordon Ireland, Boundaries« Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (Cambridges Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 198.
1 # 15 who were not in favor of the land transfer seized Leticia and dis pelled the Colombian officials. Peru disclaimed responsibility for the seizure, but did little to correct the situation. Instead, Peru took advantage of the excited mood, attempted to villify the Salomon-
Lozano Treaty, and two months later her regular forces occupied the disputed area under the command of General Oscar H. Orddnez. In re sponse to Peru0s venture, Colombia prepared a contingent of troops to be sent to Leticia via the Atlantic and Amazon. The measures and countermeasures taken ty the rivals further fanned the already heated tempers of the citizenry of both countries, and it appeared that war was imminent.
On October 3s 1932, Peru appealed to the Permanent.Commission on Inter-American Conciliation to examine the difficulties, but Colom bia refused participation on the grounds that the affair was domestic fcy nature and not international. However, Eduardo Santos, Colombian
Minister in Paris, did communicate with the Secretary of the League of
Hations on January 2, 1933s concerning the mounting tension. On the
14th, and in an effort to pacify the disputants, the League called upon both parties for a peaceful solution. Colombia then appealed to the good offices of the United States and the signatories of the
Briand-Kellogg Treaty of 1928 1 and at about the same time, Brazil of fered to mediate the dispute while the League of Nations was already engaged in seeking a solution.%
%reland, op. cit., pp. 199- 200. 16
In an effort to meet the request for assistance made try
Colombia, United States Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson cabled
Ambassador Bearing in Lima instructing him to remind Peru of its re sponsibilities under the 1928 nonaggression agreement of Havana. Fur ther, he supported a Brazilian proposal which called for occupation of the trapezium by Brazilian troops, the re-establishment of the deposed
Colombian officials at Leticia, and an immediate meeting in Rio de
Janeiro of Peruvian-Colombian representatives. The message to Peru was, in fact, a strong stand against the Peruvian action even though
United States concern over Leticia was "considerably resented by
President Sanchez Cerro . . ,,f of Peru.3
As Sanchez Cerro offered no solution satisfactory to Colombia,
Colombian President Olaya Herrera contemplated sending requests for support to the presidents of the other American States, but upon sec ond thought he decided on making requests for favorable assistance in
Peru from the Presidents of the United States and Brazil. Stimson advised against such action on the grounds that the United States and
Brazil should not act independently of the other states. He recom mended, instead, that informal requests for support be made by the Co lombian ministers and ambassadors to the other nations. It was, in the end, the latter course which Olaya pursued.^
In February, Peruvian aircraft attacked Colombian vessels in
Brazilian and Colombian waters. As a result, the Colombian Minister
^Foreign Relations. 1932, V, 1948, p. 2?6.
^Tbid., pp. 279- 281. 17 in Lima was in stru c te d by h is government to req u est h is p assp o rts 9 while in Bogota the Peruvian Minister was handed his. Colombia did hot, however, contemplate a declaration of war-5 and requested that the
United States government assume charge of its interests in Peru--a re quest which was honored by Peru and agreed to by the United States
While no formal declaration of war existed, the year 1933 in cluded serious provocations by both sides, and skirmishes were held in the jungle area of the trapezium. As a result, in May of 1933? the
League proposed much the same plan that had been offered by Brazil at an earlier date, that is, evacuation of Leticia by Peru, occupation of the area by a League commission for a period not to exceed one year, and a conference of the disputants.
In the meantime, Peruvian dictator, Sanchez Cerro had been assassinated, and General Oscar R, Benavides had been elected provi sio n al p re sid e n t the same day, A p ril 30, 1933= Benavides had spent much time in London, knew w ell, and had become g reat frie n d s o f the
Colombian Minister there, Alfonso Ldpez Pumarejo, In the middle of the crisis, Ldpez, then a private citizen, flew to Lima in order to
confer with his old friend, Ldpez 0 actions were "probably the only instance of an unsponsored private citizen proposing to settle an in ternational conflict by a person-to-person pact with the Chief Execu tive of a foreign power,"7
^Foreign Relations, 1933? IV, 1950, p. 479=
6Ibid,, p. 549,
^Kathleen Romoli, "Ldpez of Colombia," Inter-American Monthly (May, 1942), p , 48, Whether the Ldpez action was an influencing force in eventual ly settling the Leticia dispute is conjecture, but it may be noted that Peru accepted the League proposal four days after Ldpez 0 depar ture from Lima®—Colombia had accepted on May 12, 1933$ three days be fo re Ldpez 0 journey to Peru 0
Once its proposal was approved by Colombia and Peru, the
League of Nations appointed Colonel Arthur W» Brown, United States
Army, to head its commission, with other representatives from the
Brazilian navy, Spanish air force and Cuban government = % June of
1933 the disputed territory was occupied by the commission which em ployed the armed forces of Colombia,
In September of 1933» negotiations began in Rio de Janeiro be tween Peru and Colombia with the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Af fairs, Afranio de Mello Franco, presiding. Negotiations went on for more than a year with constant bickering and at least some complacency on the part of both major parties concerned. As the League commission was required to vacate the contested area by June 19$ 193^$ the delay created grave concern over the possibility of renewed hostilities,^
During early 1934, Roosevelt0s Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, kept abreast of developments and communicated with United States representatives in Bogota, Lima, Rio and Geneva, It appeared that when the commission withdrew from the trapezium fighting was likely to be renewed, '*1 am informed , , , that the Colombian officials talk 19 fre e ly o f th e prospects o f tro u b le when th e Commission moves outo Ap parently in the whole area from Iquitos to Manaos trouble is confi dently expected o
Times, however 9 seemed to work in favor of a peaceful settle ment 0 The co st to both sid es had become burdensome, and the in te rn a l situation in each country suggested that an early agreement would be wise. Finally, Dr, Solon Palo, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed United States Ambassador Bearing in Lima that Peru had ac cepted the Mello Franco proposal en toto, and that this included the return of Leticia to Colombia without territorial compensation. At the same time, the good offices of the United States were requested by-
Peru in an attempt to sway Colombia into accepting the offer,
The Mello Franco proposal was strongly supported by the United
States, whose very interest and backing had been sought by Mello Fran co, The presiding official°s plea was honored by Secretary of State
Hull who instructed United States representatives in Bogota and Lima to express the opinion that the Mello Franco plan was "equitable and
[that it offered] an honorable and peaceful method of reaching a per manent solution , , , oShortly th e re a fte r the proposal was signed by representatives of Colombia and Peru, and on June 19, 193^s> Leticia was returned to Colombia,
10"United States Representative in Geneva (Wilson) to Secre tary of State Hull," Ibid,, p, 325»
11"The Ambassador in Peru (Bearing) to the Secretary of State," Ibid, «, pp, 354-5°
l ^Ibid,, p, 357- 20
The signing was preceded by additional efforts on the part of the United States to quell hostilities, or at least to lessen the dan=. ger of a major conflict <> Docking, and repair facilities of the United
S tates in the Panama Canal Zone which might have been used by the d is putants to wage war were denied them in January of 1933° In early
1934% that policy was once again stated, bat in late May the ban was lifte d o 1^
Further complications developed when it was discovered that the Colombian Consul General in lew York was recruiting United States aviators and mechanics in violation of Sections 21, 22, and 23 of Ti tle 18 of the United States Code. Specifically, the Consul violated
Section 22—Offenses against Neutrality—in that he attempted to pro cure the services of United States- citizens to serve in the Armed
Forces of Colombia in peace and war. When informed of United States objection to the Consul°s activities. President Olaya Herrera ordered the Colombian representative to desist
The agreement reached between the Colombian and Peruvian dele gates became known as th e Rio de Janeiro P act. I t was n o t enough, however, that the delegates agreed to sign the pact. Ratification by the congresses of both nations was necessary, and here again difficul ties arose. While the Peruvian Constituent Assembly voted in favor of
13"The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Bern ) , 68 Ibid.. pp.,382-389-
14"Memorandum by the,Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs (Wilson ) , 16 Ibid., pp. 377-8. 21 the Rio Pact 6l to 11 on November 3» 193^»^ the pact became the foil of a group of Colombian Conservatives in Congress 0 Embroiled in do mestic politicss, and led by ultra-conservative laureano Gdmez, demands for amendments to the pact were made. The maneuvering delayed action on ratification and caused embarrassment to the Liberal administra tion = The United States ohargd in Bogoti, therefore, requested that the Secretary of State show concern over the delaying action to the
Colombian chargd in Washington, who was the son-in-law of one of the leading Conservative opponents, Dr. Pedro Marfa Carreno
Due to a split among liberals and Conservatives, the laurea- nistas found themselves in a position to force a tie in the voting of the Senate. It was reported that the underlying factor in the stall ing tactics was 8
Gdmez 0 personal hatred of Olaya and Urdaneta,-^ the desire of all the legislators to force the President to summon anoth er extraordinary session of Congress after the termination of the p resen t one on December 31, and the maneuvers of the Con servatives to increase their power over the Government. They may allow the Pact to pass after they have secured some con cessions from the liberals, but as yet they show no sign of being influenced by considerations of internationalismo^
1^ Ib id . . p . 369
l 6«The Chargd in Colombia (Washington) to the Secretary of State," Ibid . 0 p . 370°
■^Alfonso Ldpez became President of Colombia on August 7 9 193^° ©laya, at this time, while no longer the President, was still a powerful liberal, and on February 3, 1935 9 he replaced Roberto Urda- neta as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3-8"The ChargtS in Colombia (Washington) to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations. 1934, IV, 1951, pp° 370-1= 22
In the meantime, Peru had again sought the assistance of the
United States, hoping that the latter would continue a then current policy of high interest in the situation, but without magnifying the problem. The Secretary of State, in response, instructed the ohargd in Colombia to state the great interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and good relations among the American States and
"our confident hope that the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, already ratified by Peru, may receive ratification in Colombia before the date fixed in the Protocol for exchange of ratifications."^^ The concern of the
United States had some adverse effect, however, and the Colombian Sen ate held secret meetings where messages from the League of Nations,
United Kingdom, Brazil, and others were read. "Several Conservative
Senators vehemently protested against foreign intervention for the purpose of coercing the Colombian Senate."^ The matter of United
States and Brazilian "forceful intervention" also arose in the House of Representatives to cause additional anxiety.
The Rio Pact was favorably passed through the Colombian House in late December of 1934 during the absence of a large Conservative representation. However, when it reached the Senate, it was defeated by the Conservatives, whose leader, GSmez, prevented a vote from being taken. It was then that President Ldpez allegedly gave up on the pos- ( sibility of ratification and contemplated asking Peru for a delay of
19«fhe Secretary of State to the Ghargd in Colombia," Ibid. , P» 374. "The Chargd in Colombia to the Secretary of State," Ibid., p . 376. 23 one year. His hope was that the congressional elections of May would bring about Liberal control of the Senate and, thereby, a passing of the Rio Pacto Wnder those circumstances, and fearful of an extended delay, the United States ehargS in Colombia suggested that further appeals from without Colombia be made openly so as to arouse local public opinion, The suggestion was coupled with a note of caution against making it seem as if the appeal was led or prompted by the
United States „ ^ A watchfulness for ilyankeephobia e6 was apparently of some concern to the embassy in BogotS,
In January of 1935s the Colombian government received pleas for ratification of the Rio Pact from the League of Nations, Great
Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, The United States was hopeful that the appeal of the League, in conjunction with the person al involvement of Slaya Herrera, Minister of Foreign Affairs, would have a favorable effect. In time, the pact was reintroduced into the
Senate, went through committee, was finally approved, and on Septem ber 27, 1935s ratifications were exchanged between Colombia and Peru,
The change of heart which had transpired was brought about by several influencing forces, not the least of which was public opinion and the
Latin admiration for the League of Nations, Of a much more complex nature was the switch of the laureanistas, The pressure that that group brought upon the Ldpez administration may have been thought to have served i t s purpose, which was to make any le g is la tio n sought by
^ MThe Chargd in Colombia to the Secretary of State ,*8 Foreign Relations, 1935, IF, 1953, pp» 200- 1 , 24
the Liberal President as difficult to pass as possible» It appears
that the rising ire of the Colombian public 9 as weighed against fur
ther opposition, would end as a hindrance to the Conservatives in the long run and was plainly not worth i t 0
The participation of the United States in the settlement of the Leticia problem was looked upon with some satisfaction by Latin
Americao More e x a c tly 9 the acceptance of the League of Nations 9 to
gether with Mello Franco 9 as arbitrators, was an indication that the
United States had no intentions of demanding, or assuming, a dictato rial position in internal peace negotiations in the Western Hemi
sphere c22 The United States posture had been one of caution, lest its intentions be either misconstrued or deliberately twisted for propa
ganda purposes by self-interest groups in Latin America, The atti
tude, frustrating at best, was not entirely appreciated by influential persons in the United States either. Indeed, Sumner Welles, then Un der Secretary of State, complained sometime later thati
[T]he effort of the United States to play a helpful part in composing the sharp controversy between Colombia and Peru over the territory of Leticia was considerably weakened by an attitude which could more properly be adopted by a school teacher admonishing his pupils,^3
Facts, however, do not substantiate the Welles 0 admonition. The posi
tion of the United States in the early phases of Roosevelt0s Good
Neighbor Policy was one of countering a l8bull in the china shop"
2%echam, op, e it, , p, 113o
23stuaner Welles, The Time for Decision (New Yorks Harper and B rothers, 1944), p , 191» approach which often had been the technique of former administrations»
It was an approach which was aimed at gaining confidence in the United
States as truly a good neighbor 9 while at the same time it was hoped that it might lessen the fear of the ieColossus of the North»11 The policy of the United States in the controversy of Leticia was often based upon specific requests from both Colombia and Peru for assist ance—a policy which was helpful at the International Conference of
American States at Montevideo in 1933 and the Buenos Aires Conference fo r th e Maintenance of Peace in 1936= 17. ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
Prior to World War I s United States investments in Colombia followed much the same pattern as it did for Latin America as a whole0
The Latin nations were in the habit of securing financial aid from
Europe, but when that area was denied them during the war years they turned more and more to the United States for assistance. In the wan ing years of hostilities. United States investments in Latin America increased enormously 6fand not in all cases conservatively . „ „ „
When Mexico defaulted on interest payments in 1913=1914, the investors began to concentrate in South America. "By 1939 the Latin American portfolio of United States investors had become 90 percent a South
American portfolio and the question of government debts to that degree became a South American question.^2
In Colombia, investments increased rapidly after settlement of
the Panama d isp u te in 1920. They were m ostly by way o f lo an s to the national and local governments, with some investments in petroleum and
fruit. But the loans often proved unproductive in that they were fre
quently used to build roads, public buildings, bridges, etc., and did
not furnish a return needed for reinvestment. In addition, discounts
1Chester Lloyd Jones. The Caribbean Since 1900 (New Yorks Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), P° 336=
% illy Feuerlein and Elizabeth Hannan, Dollars in Latin America: An Old Problem in a New Setting (New York: Council on For- eign Relations, 1941), p. 13= 26 2? were large9 and loans often were accompanied try a "finder's fee." To make matters worse, Colombia imported goods heavily, as well as the
capital to defray the cost. Its economy, dependent upon the interna tional market, especially in coffee, was unprotected. Hhen the market failed to grow in the 1920°s, free trade was not realized. Prices
soared in the industrial countries, while the price for Latin American raw materials did not keep pace.3 Hhen the depression struck, money became scarce, and there was little desire on the part of the indus trial nations to lend that which they considered to be essential for
/ their own self-preservation.
The world's financial condition adversely affected Colombia's
economy, and ky 1931 the nation had a debit balance of $35, 662,000.^
Hhen difficulty with Peru arose in 1932$ Colombia's financial status was d esp erate. On November 25, P resid en t Olaya H errera declared a moratorium on private debts| however, the national government default
ed on the sinking fund only.-5
The possibility of war with Peru over the Leticia dispute united the Colombian population behind their shaky government. "Co lombians of all classes and conditions rallied to the banner. In one
day the war budget of ten million pesos was subscribed, and social
^Ibld.o p. 17o
% b id . , p . 16.
5e . Taylor Parks, Colombia and the United Statess 1765=1934 (Durhams Duke University Press, 1935), p° 479. — 28 depression and agitation were forgotten as Peru, rather than depres
sion, became the common enemy,
While in the depths of financial despair, there nevertheless
%as enough ready and available capital to buy up the war bonds in one day o o o „ Capital was there, in hiding, timid and fearful for in vestment in the bootstrap operation required to bring prosperity back to the nation,"7 The fact that Colombia could not afford to make pay ment on its foreign debt, but could afford to support a war, was over looked by Colombians, but not by the rest of the world,®
The Leticia affair accelerated Colombia0s plunge toward insol vency, In April of 1933» the Colombian government announced that it was suspending payments of interest on its externally funded debt and
on the "guaranteed" bonds of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank,9 The loss to foreign investors from the suspension of payments was expected
to be substantial, and United States citizens who had purchased Colom
bian bonds stood to take the heaviest brunt. The United States, how
ever, did not intervene on behalf of its citizens as it had before in like eases. Instead, Roosevelt insisted that the United States gov
ernment not involve itself as a collection agency for its citizens in
®Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millionss M ilitary Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh§ Univer sity of Pittsburgh Press, 1957)@ P» 45°
7Ib id , O Helen M, Bailey and Abraham P, Hasatir, Latin Americas The Development of Its Civilization (Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jerseys Sentice-Hali, Inc,, I960), p, 665,
^Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 1952, p. 254, 29 their dealings with foreign governments„ The President advocated keeping the debts private, and under his instigation, the Foreign
Bondholders® Protective Council was created in Washington on October
20, 19339 with Roosevelt himself attending the initial meeting
The newly established association advertised itself as a “dis tinguished organization [designed] to carry on the work of properly protecting American interests „ , » . One of its functions was to present a united effort in the seeking of just settlements. Bp to that time, negotiations were handled by so many different groups that i t compounded an already confused issu e .
Shortly after its founding, the Council began to negotiate with Colombia over defaults, but Colombia, uncertain of the Leticia outcome, refu sed to commit i t s e l f . The fo reig n bonds outstanding by
August 31 9 193^9 appear in TABLE 1.
During 1936 the United States Department of State began to re
ceive inquiries from holders of defaulted foreign securities. The bond holders desired to know what action the government of the United States was taking concerning the obligations of the defaulting governments.
The Department replied that it regarded the difficulties as private
and “as primarily matters for negotiation and settlement between the
^%hitney H. Shepardson and William 0. Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs: 1934-1935 (Council bn Foreign Relations; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp. 96-7.
•^Foreign Bondholders® Protective Council, Inc., Annual Report. 1934, p . 16. 30
TABLE 1
FOREIGN BONDS OUTSTANDING FOR 1934a
(In Millions of Dollars)
Country in Total Amount Amount in Percentage in Latin America Outstanding D efault D efault
Argentina 363.0 96.2 27.0
B olivia 59.4 59.4 100.0
B razil 376.9 359.4 95-3
Chile 311.3 311.3 100.0
Colombia 157.9 157.9 100.0
Cuba 128.5 128.5 100.0
Mexico 302.1 302.1 100.0
A ll Others 224.9 193.2 85.9
Total 1924.0 1610.0 83.6
a"Report of the Director of the Institute of International Finance to the Convention of the Investment Bankers Association," October, 193^» as quoted in The United States in World Affairs: 1934- 1225> P- 302. 31 parties directly in interest$, acting through agencies of their om."-^
It offered to facilitate discussions in an informal manner $ "but made it quite clear that it had no intentions of acting as the direct rep=» resentative of the bondholders $, nor would i t bring diplomatic pressure
to bear upon the defaulting governments o In answering the inquiries 9
the Department included information regarding the Foreign Bondholders0
Protective Council along with the suggestion that it be contacted for
further assistance.
The Council itself was a non-profit organization with little working capital, a point which often stymied its progress. From debts
collected, the Council charged a very low rate, supposedly enough to
cover expenses, but often it found itself suffering from a lack of
funds. Its personnel were well regarded, and some were former em
ployees of the Department of State, as for example J, Reuben Clark,
Jr, of "Memorandum68 fame, who was its president. Despite the profes
sio n al members on the Council, th ere were tim es when anim osity was
created by them in and out of Colombia, and Roosevelt himself became
peeved with their failure to negotiate more fully
With the outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939j the
importance of good relations with Latin America became more acute. It
followed then, that settlement, satisfactory to both creditor and
debtor, was essential if the relationship was to become a closely knit
12»ij«ke Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers in Latin America and Mexico,M Foreign Relations, 1936, V, 1954, pp, 149-150,
l^Feuerlein and Hannan, op, c it,, p, 40, entity opposing possible encroachment from abroad. The United States hadg therefore, the dmal problem of convincing Latin America that it was not going to be bullied by the United States, while at the same time satisfying its own citizens that their financial problems would not be relegated to oblivion. To disregard the plight of its own might have caused internal opposition to the legislation necessary for the defense of the Western Hemisphere—and the plight of the United
States investor in 1939 was real. In that year, had an investor de cided to rid himself of his holdings in South America, he might have done so at the rate' of 14 cents on the dollar,^
In Colombia, the United States Ambassador, Spruille Braden, offered the good offices of the United States in negotiating the re sumption of payments on the Colombian foreign debt. It should be noted that Braden operated informally and adherred to the Roosevelt policy of non-intervention. In private conversations with Dr, Carlos
Lleras Restrepo, Colombia°s Finance M inister, Braden became aware of the confusion generated by the "multiplicity of entities claiming to represent the bond owners, Further, the Finance Minister related that President Ldpez had sent a proposal to J, Reuben Clark, Jr. as e a rly as December of 1935; b u t had never received a re p ly . He was even more irritated by a cable which Francis White of the Foreign
^Ibid.o p. 14.
3-5!*The Ambassador in Colombia to the Secretary of S tate,M Foreign Relations, 1939$ V, 1957; p° 469. Bondholders0 Protective Council had sent to President Eduardo Santos on Inauguration Day9 August 7, 1938°"^
The Finance Minister desired a permanent solution and was against any temporary re lie f0 The proposal made under Ldpea0 adminis= tration was as follows 8
a* No reduction of principle*
bo Resumption of service with interest at 2$* to be increased annually by up to a total of
Co Amortization at the rate of 1$ to be used for the purchase of bonds in the open market, or a 25$ reduction in principle, with interest at 2$, to be increased annually by •§•$ up to a total of 4$,^'
This proposal, however, was rejected by the Foreign Bondholders0 rep resentative»
The feeling during the 1939 discussion was that the Colombian
Congress would not accept a proposal more severe than that which had been offered by lidpez and, in fact, desired an arrangement less de manding of Colombia» Even if the Ldpez terms proved to be the finan cial lim it of Colombia0s capability, Braden was of the opinion that
"rightly or wrongly, [the American people] would compare Colombia°s action with that of other countries „ „ „ ,si-^ and would not likely be pleased with the offer.
Arguments and counterarguments ensued between Colombia and the
Foreign Bondholders0 Protective Council until the early part of 1940,
-*-%ot published
^Foreign Relations, 1939, V, 1957, p. 470, 34 at which time a temporary solution was found. Colombia applied
$1 , 7305,000 toward servicing the outstanding debt of $45,000,000=-the
Colombian dollar issues of 192? and 1928. On accepting the temporary settlement, the Council added a statement "lamenting the non-adjustment of the guaranteed, departmental and municipal debts, a point which displeased President Santos. Finally, on December 14, 1940, a perma nent solution was reached by the parties concerned in reference to the national debt, but not until 194? was there an agreement on servicing the bonds of the various.states and municipalities.
While negotiations transpired over the Colombian default, the
United States took steps to strengthen the economy of its South Ameri can neighbor. On February 2, 1934, the First Export-Import Bank of
Washington, D. C. was created by Executive Order of President Roose velt. The bank was to have dealt with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, but because there was severe disagreement over the Czarist debt, operation was not as originally intended. In March of that same year, the Second Export-Import Bank was established. It remained dor mant for the most part except for extended loans to Cuba and China.
In 1935 s, the F irst and Second Export-Import Banks were merged by Con gress as a special agency of the United States government, but opera tions remained fairly inactive.^0 In September of 1940, Roosevelt
convinced Congress to raise the bank's loan ceiling from $200 million to $700 million. Thereafter, the bank was used mainly to finance
•^Foreign Relations. 1940, V, 1961, p . 697=
20(3uerrant, on. c it., pp. 99-100. 35 experts from the United States to Latin America,and of the $?00 mil lion to tal$ $500 million went to Latin Americao^-
As the lending power of the Export-Import Bank was increased so also were requests from Colombia for financial assistance,, The
Republic desired to make purchase of the necessary material to con struct and improve its railway, road and waterway systems „ Perhaps their greatest concern was over the Agricultural lank which, together with the Bank of the Republic, had committed some 13=5 million pesos from a legalised lim it of 16 million„ It was suggested in United
States quarters at that time that the financial assistance desired might be held out as the proverbial carrot in order to secure 6,a bet ter bargain for the bondholders»"^2
Colombia was not without its own methods of bringing pressure to bear. Aware of the desire of the United States for a closely knit defense in the Western Hemisphere against foreign infringement, Colom bian leaders pointed out that while their country was economically sound there existed the danger of a run on its banks should the popu lation become alarmed.over events in Europe„ Finance Minister Lleras
Restrepo further suggested that credit of $50 million would inspire confidence in its banking system.^3 The suggestion was not entirely
^Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and South Americag The Northern Republics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p . 105= 2266iphe Ambassador in Colombia to the Secretary of S tate,81 Foreign Relations. 1939, V," 1957, PP- 4-78-80.
2%bid. » pp. 500-2. ignored 9 for on May 9» 1940, the Export-Import Bank extended credit to the Government of Colombia for $10 m illion= The terms of the loan stipulated a 4$ charge over an eight-year period with amortization payments scheduled in approximately equal amounts during each of the eight years o The credit was to be used for the purchase of heavy equipment in the United States for the construction and repair of highways, rails and agricultural works„ In order to offer complete adhesion to the agreement, the Colombian Ambassador indicated that his government might voluntarily submit vouchers over the first five years of the program to demonstrate a purchase of at least $10 million of
United States heavy equipment 0 ^4 The loan was the beginning of peri odic assistance to Colombia 0 In July of 1941$ that country received an additional $12 million from the Export-Import Bank 9^ and by June of 1945 s $45 million had been len t»26
In addition to the above loans, the Secretary of the Treasury lent $3 million as a stabilization fund to the Colombian Stabilization
Fund, Bank of the Republic and the Government of Colombia in July of
1941—a loan which was beyond the legal ability of the Export-Import
Bank. The agreement contained certain criteriag
psfjith a view to maintaining stability of the United States dollar-Colombian peso rate of exchange| that no impor tant change w ill be made in the Colombian exchange control system without an opportunity for consultation by the United States| that diligence will be exercised by Colombia in the
^Foreign Relations. 1940, ¥, 1961, pp. 699 9 702.
^ Foreign Relations. 1941, ¥11, 1962, p. ? 2.
2%hitaker, loo, cit. 37 issuance of import permits and exchange approvals to avoid in so far as possible undue delays in payments for imports from the United States or in other remittances to the United States„27
Forever wary o f Colombia®s h isto ry of d e fa u lt and unstable
financial status—and certainly with some justification—the United
States had included a weak rider in the provisions for the treasury
loan. It suggested intervention, opened the door for possible argu ments in semantics, and smacked of the big brother advising his junior=
Despite that, Colombia accepted the proposal—and the loan.
The loans made by the United States to Colombia aided the la t
ter nation, but by no means did they solve the problem. Largely de
pendent upon the revenue gained from exports, Colombia was faced with
an in te rn a tio n a l commerce which was a t a low ebb in 1933° A so lu tio n
to the predicament, as seen by Roosevelt, and Hull, lay in the Trade
Agreements Act of June, 193^°^ The signing of the act made the trade
agreement of 1933 with Colombia obsolete—i t had never been enforced—
and negotiations between the two countries began anew. One immediate
advantage of the Trade Agreements Act was that i t required no enact
ment of legislation on the part of either of the participants—the
major cause for the 1933 agreement failure.
Shortly after the parley opened it was apparent that Colombia
was n o t overly e n th u sia stic about the new proposal made by th e United
27lbid„ p, 73°
2^Graham H, Stuart, ^Trade Reciprocity with Latin America,H World A ffa irs , (June, 1935/» P° 79° 38
States o ^9 The old treaty was to have been the basis of the new, but certain changes had been made which did not meet with Colombian ac cord. Among the controversial points were the exclusion of the anti dumping clause from the new proposal and certain phraseology. In both areas, Colombia was concerned with the protection of its coffee ex ports. That is to say, there was fear that surplus coffee might be dumped on the market, thereby driving the price down, while at the
same time there was concern over the wording which pertained to cus toms duties lest they be interpreted to make internal United States d u tie s p o s s ib le .30
Colombia so feared a possible danger to its coffee exports that the government changed its minister in Washington, substituting
Miguel Ldpez Pumarejo, who was a brother of President Alfonso and
somewhat of a coffee e x p e r t=31 ldpez negotiated with Cordell Hull,
and after some modifications were made which suited both parties, a new agreement was signed on September 13, 1935 which went into effect
on May 20, 1936. 32
United States-Colombian trade prior to the Trade Agreement of
1935, fluctuated greatly, and may be seen in TABLE 2. Under the new
298?The Chargd in Colombia to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations, 1934, IT, 1951, pp. 19- 20. Also, "The Minister in Guate mala to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations, 1934, V, 1952, pp. 284-5o
3QForeign Relations. 1935, IF, 1953, p. 436.
31I b id .
3 Executive Agreement," Series Ho. 89, Statutes of the United States of America, 1936 (Washington: U. S.. Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 333“373o 39
TABLE 2
"A CENTURY OF COLOMBO-AMERICAN TRADE"’3
1830 $ 1,201,999
1835 2,364,811 1840 223,761 "Decrease due largely to Colombian 1845 203,510 internal disturbances and discrimina tion against American products."
1850 1,145,173 "Discrimination was removed by the 1855 ... 2,108,910 Treaty of 1846." i 860 ... 4,345,930 1865 ... 8,666,584 1870 ... 8, 666,878 1875 . . . 16,717,030 1880 13,779,286 "Period of strong British competition 1885 ... 7,925,446 and American reciprocity negotiations." 1890 ... 6,161,081 1895 . . . 6,309,984 1900 7,018,502 "Increased trade in spite of Colombian 1905 ... 9,994,582 resentment of the American policy dur 1910 ... 11,465,027 ing the Panama Revolution o f 1903* 1916 ... 33,124,961 World War and post-war trade impetus— 1928 164,970,610 increase indicates possibilities."
1931- "The depression years (estim ated )." 1932 79,763,000 1933 42,286,196
bfi. Taylor Parks, "The Colombian Treaty: A Triumph for Mr. Hull," World Affairs (March, 1934), p. 50. 4 0 agreement, exports from the United States to Colombia went up 41.2$, while Colombian imports from other areas increased 30.1$. By 1938
Colombian export trade was:
TABLE 3
COLOMBIAN EXPORT TRADE: 1938°
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Total Export 91,293
Excess of Exports 2,223
Exports to U. S. 53,105
Percentage of Total Exports Taken by U. S. 58.2
Excess of Exports in Trade with U. S. 7,462
cFeuerlein and Hannan, op. c it.. p. 50.
All was not completely compatible, however, as the Colombian
Minister of Finance indicated when he allegedly asserted in 1939, that the United States must be pleased with the trade agreement since it had reduced Colombia's favorable balance from $30 million to $4 mil lion. In answer, it was pointed out to him that the United States was absorbing more of Colombia's exports than the latter was importing from the United States, whereas the opposite was true of G erm any.33
3311 The Ambassador in Colombia to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations. 1939, V, 1957, P* 477. 4 1
During the early years of the European war 9 many countries in
Latin America suffered from the loss of markets while others actually benefited for a time.
In South America, where the economic derangement was most serious, conditions varied greatly as between countries. Ar gentina and Uruguay, for example, were helped ty an increased demand for meat and wool, while Brazil and Colombia were dis turbed ty th e dim inished demand fo r c o f f e e .34
As a result of the plight of the coffee producing countries of
L atin America, th e re was signed a t Sew York on November 28, 1940, the
Inter-American Coffee Marketing Agreement. It was an attempt at pro portional allocation of the world market, particularly that of the
United States, among the coffee countries. Of the fifteen nations that signed the agreement, Brazil and Colombia, by far the largest producers, gained the greatest allocations. Their quotas appear in
TABLE 4.
While the quota was not entirely satisfactory to Colombia they nevertheless signed along with the other nations. Colombia8s tendency was to constantly strive for greater participation, and can readily be appreciated when one considers the fact that coffee is its main source of revenue, as it was at the time of the New York meeting. "It is es timated that one-fourth of the entire population depends directly on coffee growing, and the remaining three-quarters are affected indi rectly by the trends of the coffee in d u s t r y. 1135
3^'The United States in World Affairs I 1946 (Council on For eign Relations? New Yorkg Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 225=
35Colombiag Economic Aspects. 1945. Present and Future (New York: Golombian-American Chamber o f Commerce, 1945), p . 5° 4 2
TABLE 4
COFFEE EXPORT QUOTASd
Bags of 60 Kilograms Net, or Equivalent Quantities
Quotas to the United States B razil ...... Colombia ......
Quotas for other than the United States B razil ...... Colombia ......
^Morris B. Schnapper (ed.) United Nations Agreements (Washing ton: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944), pp. 346-355; also U. S. Statutes at Large, LV, Part 2, p. 1148.
A goodly portion of the year 1940 was spent by the United
States in preparing itself for the possibility of war. Among the many problems facing the nation was one of a guaranteed supply of raw mate rials from Latin America with which to feed the industrial complex of the United States. Moreover, concern was for the prohibition of those same raw materials from reaching the Axis powers. As a consequence, the Metals Reserve Company was founded on June 28, 1940, by the Recon struction Finance Corporation with a capital of $5 million. The ob ject of the MRC was to acquire a reserve supply of critical metals.
Arrangements were made with Colombia to purchase all platinum produced in that country which was not needed locally. However, because of the excessive value of platinum and the relatively small quantity needed to acquire a high return, smuggling in that metal became a lucrative business in certain quarters. In 1942, there followed the creation of the Rubber Reserve
Company 9 whose function was similar to that of the MRC, and on July 3 9
1942, Colombia signed a rubber agreement with the United States com parable to that regarding metal.
Except for the German problem 9 discussed later, the economic relationship of the United States and Colombia remained much the same throughout the war. But that relationship unfortunately deteriorated at the end of hostilities. The great war machines began to disperse and there no longer existed the need to feed them with Latin raw mate rials. That, and the heavy concentration of the United States in the reconstruction of Europe, caused Latin America to suffer from the doldrums of inactivity.
The president of the Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce and the Frederick Snare Corporation echoed Colombia's mood soon after the war when he commented th a t Colombia was purchasing more from the
United States than it was exporting, and that if the unfavorable bal ance of trade was not corrected, Colombia could not long continue on a sound economic base.3^ Be that as it may, the summit of relations to date between the United States and Colombia had been reached. Fear of war and the repercussions thereof caused the President and the
United States to align with Colombia's interests» The approach to
World War II was the beginning of that alignment.
3%ew York Times * September 11, 1947 9 p. 45. Yo THE APPROACH TO WORLD WAR TWO: THE GERMAN INFLUENCE
It may be said that the greatest effort on the part of Germany to gain a solid foothold in Latin America was in the field of econom ics « While its then future partnerss Italy and Japan9 made commercial overtures to Latin America during the years between the World Wars,
Germany's program was so far greater than theirs that a favorable com parison is not possible* Possessing a reputation for fine craftsman ship, particularly in the areas of the scientific, mechanical, and related fields, they offered long term credit as a compliment to Latin
America while purchasing much of the latter°s exportso^
Germany was not o f th e novice c la ss in dealing w ith L atin
America* It had invested heavily in that area prior to World War % and had secured some 12 percent of Latin exports while delivering 16*5 percent of its own goods* Owing to the British blockade, however, its commercial arrangements all but disappeared* Soon after the cessation of hostilities, German interest was once again stimulated, and by 1928 the German-Latin American balance of trade was to Germany's advantage *^
Temporarily set back by the depression, Germany recovered to surpass
Great Britain in 1938* At the same time, German trade in Latin America
^Nicholas J* Spykman, Am erica's S trategy in World P o litic s (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p„ 234* p Lewis L* Lorwin, Economic Consequences of the Second World War (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 241-2* 44 45 cut into the dominating position of the United States, whose exports might have been greater were it not for the keen German r i v a l r y3 . An indication of Germany* s progress in trade with Latin America can be seen in TABLE 5*
TABLE 5
COMPETITIVE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA*
1929 m illio n s United States ...... $38.7 United Kingdom ...... 14.9 Germany ...... 10.8
1933 United States ...... 29.2 United Kingdom ...... 18.1 Germany ...... 11.5
1938 United States ...... 35.8 Germany ...... 17.1 United Kingdom ...... 12.2
aHoward J. Trueblood, "War and United States-Latin American Trade," Foreign Policy Reports (December 1 , 1939), p. 233.
It may be noted that German imports from Latin America consisted most ly of cereals, cotton and wool, beef and the by-products thereof, min erals, fruits, coffee and cocoa. Its main suppliers were Argentina,
Brazil, Central America, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Colombia.^
3Trueblood, loc. c it.
^Lorwin, loc. cit. Desiring to conserve its gold supply 9 Germany worked out an unusual system of barter9 which on the surface appeared to be a gen
erous arrangement for Latin America 0 However, with time and scrutiny9
the pattern which developed was decidedly in favor of the European power and greatly to the disadvantage of her "partners** in tradeo The
system became known as the Aski9 from Auslandersonderkonten fur In- landszahlungen—Foreign special accounts for domestic payments—and the German marks used for the special payments became known as Aski- markso Using th is method o f tra d e 9 Germany o ffered to make c e rta in purchases at prices which often exceeded that of the world market0 In lieu of cash payment, the Latin exporter was credited with Askimarks in Germany which could be used to purchase German goods, and German
goods only. Further 9 the value of the Askimark varied from one coun try to the other, and exchanging them, by and between Latin countries, was prohibitedo However, it was possible for the exporter who had accumulated a surplus of Askimarks in Germany to sell his credits to an importer in his own country who desired German goods, To compli
cate matters, Germany soon published a lis t of Askimark exportable items« This meant, then, that the Latin exporter could, with his
accumulated, credit, buy only those items which appeared on the lis t, while products he may have wanted could not be had. With that ar rangement, Germany could well afford to pay over-the-top prices for
Latin exports, inasmuch as i t controlled the worth of the Askimark, plus the additional advantage of selling, not necessarily what Latin importers wanted to buy, but rather what Germany desired to sell them. In 1935» Germany concentrated the purchase of her needed
coffee in Colombia <, fhe rapid accumulation of Askimarks ty the latter
so heavily bound her to the European power that in order to gain a re turn for the coffee exported Colombia imported heavily against the
Askimarkso As a result, Germany increased its share in Colombian im ports from 15«■3 percent in 1932 to 22.3 percent in 1936,^
The Aski arrangement was found to be totally unsatisfactory, not only to Colombia, but to all of Latin America, Cash from sales, instead of being readily available for prompt employment where it might prove advantageous, was tied up in German banks. The United
States Minister in Ecuador noted the attitude of at least one Latin
American banker s
[T]he higher p ric e s paid by Germany i s a myth since they are entirely dependent on the quotation of the askimark [in the local currency] which he considers excessively high. He further said that the present accumulation of credits in Ger many might be better described as the poor country , , , having made a loan to Germany in th a t amount.
Having replaced British trade interests in Colombia, but fail ing to surpass the economic inroads of the United States, Germany began a propaganda campaign which was highly critical of the United
States while it was threatening to Colombia, Much of their direction was toward Colombian businessmen and the post-war period—there being no doubt in the minds o f the Germans as to the outcome o f th e war,
German confidence in victory was high, and the then current Battle of
5Trueblood, "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," op, c it,, p . l6 l„
^61 The Minister in Ecuador (Gonzalez) to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations, 1937s V, 195^-s P° 515 = 4 8
Britain was to them a last stand for the westo MIn a few weeks, they
say, the war will he over with Chancellor Hitler master of Europe and
controlling all its markets, in which they assert Colombia must sell her coffeeoTheir confidence in victory in 1940 may be further seen in their cash guarantee to deliver steel in Latin America at prices below that quoted in the United States, and to make the delivery by
October of that year. Germany was searching to re-establish its com merce in a post-war world, and its guarantee to deliver a status com modity was based upon the belief that there soon would be no British blockade0 Coupled to this was Germany°s ability to actually produce the steel required. Ejy June of 194-0, the Haziiteontrolled 95 percent of the French steel industry plus that of Belgium and Luxembourg, was receiving iron ore from Sweden, had access to the Lorraine ore basin, and could add to this its own internal prowess. Under those circum
stances i t was within Germany9 s capability to produce some 4-0 million tons of steel yearly.^ While the German offer came as no surprise to the United States, the State Department could not substantiate the 10 percent reduction from the steel proposal of the latter country.9
Germany0 s campaign of propaganda intensified as the Second
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States approached. Said
^B ussell B. P o rte r, e,Mazis Use U. S. Funds in Colombia fo r Economic War on Democracies, w New York Times. August 16, 194-0, p. 5=
8Iron Age (June 20, 194-0), p. 95 =
9Iron Age (June 27, 194-0), p. 8?. 49 the German newspaper Essener National Zeitung0 owned ty Field Marshall
Herman Goerings
Germany and I ta ly w ill emerge from the war g re a tly strengthened economically,, and Germany w ill again come in to possession of her colonies $, thereby enabling her to build up her economic independence stronger than ever. Under these circumstances 9 the United States in setting up an export cartel would pursue a shortsighted policy9 completely shutting out the result of the war of 1939-1940.
The warning against United States monopolization of Latin trade was as threatening to Latin America as it was to the United States.
On the eve of the conference, Nazi propaganda was distributed which promised the re tu rn o f Panama to th e Republic o f Colombia if th e latter would desert the United States in favor of Germany and Italy .H
Throughout all of Latin America the Germans concentrated on convincing the Latins to maintain friendly relations. Their aim was against an economic union of the United States and Latin America, a union which they asserted “is a blind behind which the United States hopes to press i t s hegemony on the L atin American c o u n trie s.
Instructions for the Nazis in Latin America emanated directly from Berlin. In reference to the economic union of the United States
and Latin America, the German Foreign M inister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
telegraphed his personnel in all German missions in Latin Americas
-*-%ssener National Zeitung as quoted ty the New York Times. July 12, 1940, p. 6.
^New York Times. June 16, 1940, p. 28.
-^John Vo White, “Nazi Drive Grows in South America," New York Times. July 12, 1940, p. 1. 50
The complete collapse of British hopes for support on the European Continent makes i t probable that England and the UoSoAo as well w ill intensify their anti-German activity in Central and South America» Accordingly our defense must also be strengthened0 Effective arguments for that purpose may be found in the economic significance of Germany as a sup plier and purchaser. The great advantages which trade with Germany offered for the Latin American countries even before the war could be very considerably increased with the power ful economic expansion of the Reich which is to be expected after the end of the war, Ey the size of her population and her capacity to purchase, Germany can offer to these countries a larger market than any other country, and with her increased productive capacity she can supply all needs. I request that you impress these possibilities upon the Government there in the appropriate manner and in that con nection mention our intention of taking into account the present attitude of the above-named countries in the regula tion of our economic relations after the war. I also request that you make full use of all other channels for presenting these arguments to the circles that are influential politi cally and economically . . . . ^
German pressure was not without accomplishment as some Latins began to search for the "best possible bargain they could get from the victors, whoever they might be, and L atin America became so harassed th a t
Secretary of State. Hull warned Germany to cease interfering with the conference.-^ In the meantime, those Germans who were employed by
United States firms in Colombia often had the responsibility of plac ing advertising in the local media. A United States newsman in Colom bia pointed to the "effrontery of some of the advertising in question.
1documents on German Foreign Policyg 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. X, Department of State Publication 6491 (Washington. W. S. Gov ernment Printing Office, 1957)s> PP° 102-103*
l^Donald Harquand Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959 )9 p . 6l . .
15isiew York Times, July 12, 1940, p. 1. 51 which was placed w ith media favorable to Germany, w hile le s s sympa
thetic carriers of advertising were ignored « „ .
In September of 1937 9 Germany negotiated a new trade agreement
with Colombia which strengthened its position, Colombian coffee be
came a German monopoly in Europe, and Colombia lost its previously
held free market. The agreement permitted Germany to resell the cof
fee, and by regulating the Askimark, it was able to obtain enough 6f
the product to satisfy its own needs while dumping the excess, on the world m arket,1? As Germany gained cash w ith which to buy war m ateri
als from the dumping, the coffee-producing countries were hurt by the
plumeting price paid for their product, While the United States was
concerned with these German commercial tactics, greater attention,
however, was focused upon the la tte r8s prominence in Colombia’s air
lin e s and th e ir proxim ity to th e Panama Canal,
The mountainous terrain of Colombia, coupled with an inade
quate national transport system, has done much to foster regionalism
within the nation. In the early 1900”s, Colombia possessed no air
transport, and communication between areas was often most difficult,
if not impossible. The country offered virginal territory to any
group willing and able to take the initial steps of establishing an
air transport system. In 1919, there arrived in Colombia, two such
groups, one Austro-German, the other French, The French interest
Importer, loo, cit,
l^E, Taylor Parks, ’•Relations Between Colombia and the United States,” The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia0 ed. A, Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962), p, 273° 52 fa ile d to produce su ccessfu lly and l e f t th e country, but th e Hermans stayed on„ Composed of former German m ilita ry p ilo ts , th e group began experimental operations in 1920, which was advanced to regular service in 1 9 2 1 The company, known as Sociedad Golombo-Alemana de Trans- portes Aireos (SCA1TA), continued its growth, and became the first successful airline in South America 0 One specialist in the history of air transport has referred to SGADTA as M0ne of the oldest and most successful air transport companies in the world » <> = oei^^
SGADTA differed from other German airlines which were later established in Latin America, in that the German government, as far as is known, did not assist in financing the project. The success of
SGADTA, and its early acceptance by Colombia, was due primarily to the great advantages realized from the services rendered. A trip from
BogotS to Barranquilla, using both rail and steamship, took about a - week, providing weather conditions were favorable. SGADTA, on the other hand, lowered the time to about seven hour s. ^ So impressed was the Colombian government that i t subsidized SGADTA by giving it a vir tual monopoly on the sale of air mail postage stamps, and allowed the airline to use the proceeds as it saw fit.
Heading the managerial staff of SGADTA was Dr. Peter Paul von
Bauer. Most of his equipment was German, as were his pilots, and by
•^ W illia m A.. M. Burden, The Struggle for Airways in Latin America (lew Yorks Council on Foreign Relations, 1943), p. 36.
■ ^ O liv er James Lissitzyn, International Air Transport and Na tional Policy (lew York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1942), p. 331«
2°Burden, op. c it., p. 11. 53 the middle of the 19209 s he was reeeivimg support from the German air
c r a ft industry.The efficiency of von Bauer and the safety record of SCABTA in the early years helped in its receiving favorable public ity and acceptanceo So strongly did the airline become entrenched in
Colombia that outside competition was successfully withstood until Pan
American Airways bought into the enterprise in 1931° The fact that
Pan American secured 84.42 percent of the capital remained unknown for
some yearss and any advantage the United States might have realized was lessened by the continuance of German management and personnel by
contract. Further„ von Bauer retained at least 51 percent of the pur
chased stock in a voting trust.22
SCADTA maintained a large photo graphic-survey department and
had photographed much of the area of its operations. It has been sug
gested by more than one authority that the work of this department may
have been transmitted to German intelligence.23 Of significance also, is the fact that von Bauer received permission from the United States
and Panama to establish a regularly scheduled run between Colombia and
Panama. On March 27, 1929, SCADTA legally penetrated the Canal Zone with its first flight from Barranquilla.2^ From a military standpoint,
compromise of the canal9s defenses could, and undoubtedly was, assumed.
21Ibid.s p. 12.
22bissitzyn, op. eit., p. 332.
23Burden, op. c it., p. 68.
2^William D. McCain, The United States and the Republic of Panama (Durham, Horth CarolinaV Duke U niversity P re ss, 1937), p . 184. 54
The flights continued for slightly over a year at which time Panama
ended them. However 9 SGADTA maintained an airfield in Colombia which was well within striking distance of the canal.
Germans became in f lu e n tia l in Colombia°s a ir tra n sp o rt system via a natural growth. In other areas, howevers their presence was felt by way of deliberate design. The National Socialist party in
Colombia found its main source of guidance from a quasi-military or
ganization, or high command.25 Major policy emanated from Berlin, and passed through the German legation from which it was disseminated.
Bail E. Pruefert of Barranquilla was described as the "supreme party le a d er" fo r Germany in C o lo m b ia2& . Using his position as manager of a large chain of retail stores, he directed German propaganda and com mercial endeavors, as well as interests having a political connotation.
Situated in Barranquilla was the Nazi magazine Karbischer
Beobaehter, which described within its pages a fragment of the Nazi party organization in Colombia. The largest cities contained local
groups, Ortsgruppen. while the less important towns and villages had
Stutzpunkti. or support points. There were organizations for men, women and the youth which were reminiscent of like establishments in
Germany. Various clubs were formed, often with a health, sports, or
social suggestion, which were used to gather a large percentage of the
25Hugo Fernindez Artucio, The Nazi Underground in South Amer ica (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 261. ""
2% u sse ll B. P o rte r, "Nazis Have S et Up P arty in Colombia," New York Times. August 19, 1940, p. 34. 55 German population under one roof for the purpose of control. Contri
butions to the party were frequent9 regulated, and came by way of the
many social clubs. Those Germans who lost their positions as the war
approached were sent to businesses controlled by Germans who were s till
operating, while requirement to hire was mandatory.
Besides Pruefert, the most influential Germans directly en
gaged in the Nazi high command were Dr. Wolfgang D ittler, German Min
ister in Colombia| his wife, Margarete, who was the leader of the Nazi
womanhood movement; and Karl Reigner, F irst Secretary of the German
legation, who was described as the leading gestapo agent in the coun
try and assistant chief of the m ilitary high command of the Nazi
p a r t y2? . Also important as a leader was Herman Bock, who handled
party affairs in the capital, and Carl Hans Gottfried Schmidt, the
legation’s cultural and special attach#. His primary duty was propa
ganda .
The number of personnel attached to the German legation was
far beyond that normally required for such work, and even those as
signed did not appear capable of handling the work load of outgoing
propaganda. "German business firms supply extra clerical help and
messengers when they are needed by the propaganda m ill. Nazi
27Ibid.; also Fernindez Artucio, op. cit., p. 27. According to Fernindez, the high command in Colombia was the most important ele ment of the Nazi party in the Americas and consisted of a general staff which was sub-divided into a Coastal Command and a Command of the Interior. The high command, according to the author, was superior even to the legation. Fernindez6 work, however, is lacking in docu mentation . 56 businessmen also participate in the m ilitary organization and many of them are present or former officers in the German Army or Mayy,.8*^
The legation was used as a croupier 8 s stick to gather in the German nationals from the clubs and businesses throughout the country and to organize them into a purposeful unit.
German nationals were held in much higher esteem by Berlin than were individuals of mixed nationality. Indeed 9 measures were taken to separate the nationals from those other groups, and on
May 18 9 1938 9 Ernst Wilhelm Bohle^ of the Auslandsorganisation—for, eign organization of the National Socialist German Workers 8 Party con cerned with German nationals living abroad—communicated instructions to the Landesgrunnenleiters—heads of the local Anslandsorganisation— in Latin America. The message was delivered through local German m issions.
The situation requires the following measures in support of the work of the Anslandsorganisation: First, avoidance of any open activity, and concentration of forces on internal in doctrination. Second, separation from Volksdeutsche; dismis sal of Volksdeutsche and persons with double nationality from the Party, the German Labor Front, and their formations| sep aration of German nationals from volksdeutsch organizations with political objectives. Third, preparation for the estab lishment of organizations for German nationals led from with in the Party.
Porter, loc. cit.
2 % rn st Wilhelm Bohle was Head o f the A nslandsorganisation o f the Nazi Party, 1933-19^-51 also, he was State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-19^1.
3°“Circular of the Head of the Anslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry , 88 Telegram, Berlin, May 18, 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945. Series D, Vol. V, Department of State Pub lication 4964 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953)» p. 843. \ 57 R elations between Colombia and Germany became somewhat
stra in e d in November o f 1938. The Colombian M inister to B e rlin <,
Senor Jaramillo, attempted to photograph Jewish business establish ments which had been damaged during anti-Semitic demonstrations. The
Minister was accosted by the Berlin police, arrested, and detained for
several hours. "When Jaramillo declared himself diplomatically immune,
the Germans replied that inasmuch as he had not presented his letters
of credence he did not fall into the diplomatic'category. Facts in dicate that Germany had recognized the Minister, but that Hitler had
repeatedly delayed an audience. As a result, Jaramillo left Germany
for Paris, while the chargd d°affaires travelled to Copenhagen.3^
When the British blockade prohibited German ships in Colombia
from operating as they normally would have, the affected companies
continued to keep their headquarters open, despite the fact that they
could not conduct genuine business, and one company opened additional
branches despite the situation.^2 Undaunted, and unable to make de
liv e ry on many item s, the Germans purchased some goods in th e United
States and delivered them to Colombian accounts below the price quoted
in th e United S ta te s .^3 %r keeping th e ir o ffic e s open, th e Germans
were able to take advantage of the success of their war machine in
Europe, and their propaganda found a new impetus.
3%. P. Macdonald, Hitler Over Latin America (London: Jar- ralds, Ltd., 1940), pp. 197-8.
32FernSndez Artucio, op. e it.. p. 262.
33p0rter, "Nazis Use U. S. Funds in Colombia for Economic War on Democracies,n op. c it.. p. 5» 58
Accordingly, many Colombians are showing signs of pro- Germanism, partly because "nothing succeeds like success 6 and partly because of a deepening defeatist attitude that assumes th a t Germany i s bound to win world dom ination, th a t the United States cannot do anything about it and that Colom bia might just as,well resign herself to making the best of a bad situation
I t was to th e development o f th a t "'bad s itu a tio n 18 th a t the
United States was forced to turn. That a foreign m ilitant was making early gains in the Western Hemisphere would have been enough to serve as notice of alarm to the United States „ That the foreign power was an an tag o n ist of o ld , and maneuvering ad jacen t to the Panama Canal,
“our life line" and wa part of the coast line , 01 accelerated the warn ing of impending danger and led to the formulation of countermeasures»
3 % u ssell Bo P o rte r, "German Propaganda in Colombia Seen as Winning Conservatives, M Hew York TimesQ August 1?9 1940, p, 7= V I o UIMIIED STATES- COLOMBIAN C0IMTERMEASDKES
Although lacking the urgency which was generated around a possible danger to the Panama Canal, the countermeasures by the United
States against Germany in the economic field had an early inception«
The German advantage in Colombia0s trade over that of United States businessmen was duly noted by the Department of State in 1 9 3 5 ° United
States exporters complained about German competition which employed
68compensation," or the registered Askimark sy stem T h e Askimarks, having no international acceptance, were useful only to the Germans and their foreign associates, and acted to exclude competition. Of additional interest was the increased coffee export to Germany, re portedly up 59 percent in 1935 as against 1934, and a 90 percent in crease of German imports into Colombia for the same period. ^
The Trade Agreements Act of June, 1934, under which Colombia joined with the United States on September 13, 1935, helped to allevi ate the rising German economic pressure. At the same time, the United
States introduced its aid program into Colombia, lot until the Brit ish blockade of World War II, however, did German speculation in Co lombian coffee come to an end, and in 1940 the void was filled by the
United States via the Inter-American Coffee Agreement. It should be
166The Secretary of State to the Minister in Colombia , 61 Foreign Relations. 1935, IV, 1953, p. 442.
^MThe Minister in Colombia to the Secretary of State,1’ Ibid.. p . 443° 60 noted, however, that the greatest Axis gains in trade with Latin
America, while at times to the detriment of the United States, were largely at the expense of Great Britain and F r a n c e,5 This tended to lessen German competition as a threat to the United States»
Considerably more tension resulted from the proximity of the
German interests to the Panama Canal« In the early 1930°s, the re ports of the m ilitary attach# from Bogoti passed over the desk of
Henry Harley Arnold, who was serving at that time as Information Offi cer in Washington cA When word reached him that von Bauer was attempt ing to secure rights to extend his airlines through Central America and into the United States by way of a mail carrying contract, Arnold talked with Postmaster General New„ According to Arnold, Mew told him that since the United States had no airline in that area to carry its mail, von Bauer would probably be given the permission he sought.
With this information, Arnold returned to his office and drew an arbitrary airline throughout the Caribbean. Calling in a group of
Army officers and an ex-Iavy officer, Arnold proposed the formation of an airline. Gaining financial backing from Mew York, the new line planned a route which proved satisfactory to the Postmaster General, and Mew refused von Bauer when the latter applied for mail carrying rights and entry permission. Wrote Arnolds
%ichard F. Behrendt, "Foreign Influences in Latin America," The Annals (July, 1939)9 pp° 1=8.
^Arnold went on to become the first, and only. General of the Air Force (five-star rank). 61
It is not generally realised that the great international air lined Pan American Airways, was not started by any rich and powerful business combine, but actually was founded by three young Army officers and one ex-Mavy officer without a dime between them. In a sense, the formation of Pan American Airways turned out to be the first countermeasure the United States ever took ag ain st Nazi Germany , . «
However, much of the credit for the elimination of the German influ ence from SGADIA, and the eventual establishment of AVIANCA, should be attributed to the persistence of the United States Ambassador to Co lombia, Spruille Braden« It was he who first became alarmed at the number o f Germans attach ed to SCADTA, and i t was he whose bombardment of dispatches to the State Department emphasized a potential danger
The elimination of the Germans from SCADTA was long and tedi ous work, and could not have been accomplished were it not for the cooperation of Colombia 0 Besides the problem of actually removing the
Germans were c e rta in other d if f ic u ltie s which arose „ As th e Germans had been in Colombia for some time, many had married into Colombian families and had gained influential friends in important positions who willingly opposed Pan American Airways competition. Moreover, many of the Germans had become c itiz e n s of Colombia, This was thought to give them an advantage over their Pan American rivals in that Colombian law stated that by 19% all domestic airlines were to be nationalized, with 51 percent of all stock to be held by Colombians, Counter to
^Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 19^9), pp= 114-5°
^William L, Danger and S, Everett Gleason, 'The Challenge to Isolations 1937-1940 (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1952, p, 275 n. 62 that position, the Bogota government enacted a new law which decreed that Colombians participating in airlines ownership mast be "native- born citizenso"?
An a d d itio n a l s ta llin g p o in t la y in the a b ility o f th e Germans themselveso Their pilots had won a profound respect from air-minded
Colombian travellers, and they had gained a unique knowledge of flying techniques as they applied to the treacherous Andes» Before any re placement pilots could be considered f it to take command of the air lines, a thorough training program was required,, In any event, on
June 10, 1940, the Germans were removed from SCADIA, and Aerovfas Na tional es de Colombia (AVIABCA) was formed as a partnership between Pan
American Airways and the government of Colombia=
Shortly after the dismissal of the Germans from SCADTA, a few of th e ir members s ta rte d a small a ir lin e in the Llanos headed fcy Cap ta in Hans Hoffman, former c h ief p ilo t o f SCADTA. Hoffman had become a naturalized Colombian, had married locally, and was financed by his father-in-law. He had many influential connections in the country, and was himself admired by the P r e s i d e n t . & I t was some tim e, th ere fore, before AVIANCA gained control of Aerovfas Bamales Colombianas
(ARCO), but this was accomplished in May of 1941. At that moment
German influence in Colombia’s air transportation ended, and no satis factory explanation has ever been found for President Roosevelt’s
^Russell B. Porter, "Nazis in Colombia Halted by Air Coups," New York Times, August 15, 1940, p. 6.
^Foreign Relations, 1940. V, 1961, p. 733= 63 accusation o f September 11, 19^-1 9 that secret Nazi airfields were lo cated in Colombia within easy range of the Panama Canal.^ Wpon being informed of Roosevelt’s charge, Colombian officials investigated and issued a denial of the existence of any such airfields. Nor has docu mentation been established to support the content of Roosevelt’s speech of October 2?, 1941, in which he stated?
I have in my possession a s e c re t map made in Germany by H itler0s government, by the planners of the new world order. It is a map of South America and a part of Central America, as Hitler proposes to reorganize it. Today in this area there are fourteen separate countries. But the geographical experts of Berlin have ruthlessly oblit erated all existing boundary lines. They have divided South America into five vassal States, bringing the whole continent under their domination. And they have also so arranged it that the territory of one of these new puppet States includes th e Republic o f Panama and our g re a t l i f e lin e , the Panama Canal .10
In combatting German influence in Colombia, the United States was able to work in a favorable atmosphere. The relationship between
Roosevelt and President Alfonso Mpez Pumarejo had developed along warm, friendly lines. In 1934 Ldpez, a member of the liberal party, followed Olaya Herrera into the presidency. While Olaya was of the
L ib eral p a rty , and th e f i r s t such member to become p re sid e n t in some fifty years, his administration was essentially conservative. Ldpez, on the other hand, was not only of a liberal mind, but initiated and supported liberal legislation. His first term as chief executive is s till regarded by many as the most genuinely liberal in Colombia’s
%ew York Times. September 12, 1941, p. 4.
10New York Times. October 27, 1941, p. 4. 64 history. Much of his programing bore a great similarity to Roose velt0 s legislations and it was no secret that he admired the Ini ted
States President o^
On April 3s 1936s an incident at the Colombian legation in
Washington put the cordial relationship to a test, and could have re sulted in serious consequences» Three members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation illegally entered the legation “without previous no tice or consultation . . . and without warning , , „ , They ar rested, on the premises, a citizen of the United States who was employed as a chauffeur by the Colombian M inister, M, Ldpez Pumarejo.
The M inister, a brother of Colombia°s President, communicated to Sec retary of State Hull his “desire to learn, as a precedent for the fu ture, the way in which the Secretary0s Government believes the offices of foreign Legations should be respected, and the steps that may be taken to avoid a repetition of so clear a case of forcible entry of domicile „ „ . „6i"^ Hull ordered an investigation, and the arrested individual was returned to the legation., In apologizing to the Colom bian Minister, the Secretary of State expressed his profound regrets
Under the leadership of the present Presidents of our two countries, relations between Colombia and the United States have been firmly established upon a cordial and friendly ba sis, Into this favorable atmosphere of friendship and good w ill, I was shocked to learn of the intrusion of an incident
•^■Romoli, op. c it, , pp. 42-48.
■^“The Colombian Minister (Ldpez Pumarejo) to the Secretary of State,11 Foreign Relations, 1936, V, 1954, p. 368 = 13Ibid. 65 in which officers of this Government, contrary to interna tional practice, so consistently observed fcy this Government, violated the immunity of your Legation <, I sincerely hope that the incident will be regarded as the result of over- zealousness on the part of the subordinate officers concerned rather than of any disrespect on their part for the dignity and immunity of the Legation premiseso The action was wholly inconsistent with the high respect with which the Government and people of Colombia are regarded by the Government and people of the United States and cannot be viewed with other than the most sincere regret and disapprobation by both the A ttorney General and by me. In expressing my appreciation for the friendly manner in which you have acted in this case, I am hopeful that this regrettable incident will in no way prejudice the continuance of the cordial relations existing between the two countries, which are based upon mutual respect for each other°s rights and interests and the fullest measure of friendship and coop- eration<,-*-
The apology by the Secretary of State was accepted by the Co lombian Ministero Whether the outcome would have been so amicable had others than Roosevelt, Hull, and the Pumarejos involved themselves, is open to conjecture, but it certainly did not hurt matters. The atmos phere of trust which had developed since the introduction of Roose velt's Good leighbor Policy, and the mutual admiration of the two chief executives, had paid off handsomely. Not only was Colombia sat isfied, but other foreign interests were prohibited from using the affair for propaganda purposes which would surely have been most em barrassing to the host nation at this moment.
A few months after the incident at the legation, President
Ldpez forwarded to Roosevelt information concerning a visiting Japa nese trade mission which had made contact with 81 certain German
l^ MThe Secretary of State to the Colombian Minister (Ldpez Pumarejo),18 Foreign Relations. 1936, V, 1954, p. 370« 66 nationals in Colombia16 living close to the Panama border» Ldpez had placed the Germans and the Japanese under surveillance and suggested a meeting between the Chited States and Colombia regarding protection of the Canalo-*"5 His suggestion was accepted by Roosevelt, who instructed
Sumner Welles to l6meet this proposal more than half way,61"^
D espite measures to block i t s maneuvering in Colombia, Germany m aintained a favorable tra d e p o sitio n fo r some tim e. In 1939 Ambassa dor Braden noted th a t Germany was g e ttin g n early $125,000 more each month in free exchange than the amounts expected in the renewal of the
German-Colombian agreement of May 21, 1937
The Munich conference of September, 1938, preceded the Eighth
International Conference of American States by some four months, and on October 1 the German Army rolled unopposed into the Sudetenland. A year earlier the worsening situation in Europe had caused President
Roosevelt to declare in his famous "Quarantine66 speech?
The moral consciousness of the world must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others, and of putting an end to all acts of international aggression» It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease,
-^Foreign Relations, 1936, V$ 1954, pp. 438-9,
-^Ibid,, p. 439.
-^Foreign Relations, 1939, V, 1957, P» 476,
^ Press Releases, October 9, 1937, p. 279= The usurpation of Czechoslovakian “rights and liberties 11 was now met by the President with a proposal to create an alliance among the Amer ican republics as a defense against foreign aggression» “On this continent,6i Roosevelt said, “we are substantially unanimous in the belief that „ <, » we must be prepared to carry out the outline of the continental solidarity which was established at the Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires o1'-^
Out of Roosevelt°s proposal came the Lima Conference of Decem ber, 1938o Its results, while in many ways repetitious of previous conferences, contained a reaffirmation of solidarity and indicated at least an awareness of an impending danger. The President of the
United States was primarily interested in drawing the Western Hemi sphere closer together in defense. For a moment there appeared the possibility that the conference would bog down in academic debate on the feasibility of forming a League of American Nations, The league proposal was to have been introduced jointly by Colombia and the
Dominican Republic, United States negotiators feared that defensive considerations, so important to the survival of the hemisphere, would be relegated to a secondary place. These fears were dispelled, how ever, when i t became known th a t tM new p re sid e n t o f Colombia, Eduardo
Santos, was not in favor of the league, Santos informed the Dominican delegate at Lima that Colombia would not insist on adoption of the
l %ew York Times, November 16, 1938, p, 6, 68 plans while the United States was advised that Colombia intended mere ly to go through the motions of backing the league p r o p o s a l , ^
The most important work of the conference may be seen in the
Declaration of Lima. Here the principles of inter-American solidarity and the protocol of nonintervention9 both from the Buenos Aires Con ference, were reaffirmed. Procedure for consultation was established, and in order to make it possible to consult quickly the conference decided on this points .
The M inisters'for Foreign Affairs of the American Repub lics, when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation and without protocolary character. Each government may, under special circumstances or for special reasons, designate a representative as a substitute for its Minister of Foreign A f fa ir s .21
The machinery for defense which this inter-American system was establishing was not at all to the liking of Axis interests abroad, whose presence at the scene in an unofficial capacity caused some anx iety. The Germans attempted to split the conference during the debate pp over the Declaration of Lima, but in the end their interference was a wasted effort for the declaration was unanimously accepted.
The increasing tension in Europe burst into war in September of 1939 with the German attack on Poland. Declarations of war on
“The Ambassador in Brazil (Gaffery), Temporarily in Colom bia, to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations, 1938, V, 1956, 462.
21?ress Releases. December 24, 1938, pp. 4?4-5.
^%amuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totalitarian Issue,16 The Annals (July, 1939), pp. 9-16. 69 Germany "by both B rita in and France follow ed a t ©nee; and on the very day that the. Germans invaded Poland, President Santos requested a meeting of the foreign ministers to ascertain what cooperative action might be taken by the American Republics. He wrote to President
Roosevelts
In view of the extreme gravity of the events which are de veloping in Europe, I wish to reiterate to you the firm deter mination of the Government of Colombia, unanimously supported by its people, to proceed in close agreement with the Govern ments of America and on the basis of the principles of soli darity proclaimed at the Pan American Conferences, in defense of the essential rights which are common to mss the fullness of our independence and sovereignty, the normality of our eco nomic development, the essential features of our democratic Governments, and peace within whose fertile shade the peoples of this hemisphere desire to attain their destinies» It will be for my Government a pleasure and an honor to proceed in constant accord with Your Excellency's Government and to coop erate by whatever means are within its power to render Ameri can solidarity effective and to bring about all the benefits which we have the right to hope from it and to have, in these most bitter hours for mankind, the joint action of America exerted in behalf of the ideals which animate it, and in such a way that it may serve to avoid, mitigate, or remedy the threatening catastrophe.^
Santos9 petition for consultation initiated the first meeting of foreign ministers as set forth in the Declaration of Lima. The meeting took place at Panama from September 23 to October 3s 1939=
Beyond th e r e p e titio u s , the meeting produced the D eclaration of Panama
(Article XIV) and the Transfer of Sovereignty of Geographic Regions of the Americas Held by Mon-American States (Article XVI)« The former
23u, So Department of State, Bulletin (September 9$ 1939), P= 235 (hereinafter cited as Bulletin, plus date and page). 70 was an attempt at isolating the Western Hemisphere from the belliger ents of Europe try declaring an off-lim its area some 300 miles around the hemisphere, The idea, said to have been Roosevelt9s,^ was with out legal precedence in international law and was violated shortly after its formulation. Article XVI, however, was something quite dif ferent, It was concerned with the possible transfer of territory from one non-American state to another, Should such a transfer be attempt ed which was deemed Ha danger to the security of the American Conti nent, M provisions were made for future consultation among the American republics,25 Article XVI was the first important expression of con- . eern over the possibility of land transfers, and as such it was the seed fo r a more sp e c ific commitment a t Havana the next summer.
In June of 1940 France fell to the Germans, and the British withdrew to their isles. The war thus drew closer to the Western
Hemisphere, as there was now the heightened possibility of German seizure of French and Dutch territory in the Caribbean, To forestall that possibility. Secretary of State Hull communicated to Germany,
Italy, and France that the United States ’’would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American Power to another non-American P o w e r ,”2^ Hull then requested that the foreign ministers of the American Republics
24%,anger and Gleason, op, c it, , p, 208,
25Bulletin (October 7? 1939), pp. 331=4,
2% uH , op. c i t . , p , 791 o 71 meet to discuss developments = Inasmuch as provisions for such a meet= ing had been contemplated at Panama; there was little left to be done but to select a date. On July 21, 19^09 the Second Meeting of Foreign
Ministers convened at Havana, Cuba.
In Colombia, on July 20, President Santos had faced the Con gress in BogotS and denounced Nazism. He declared that Colombia would make certain that the Panama Canal would never be attacked from its soil.^ Santos0 concern over the safety of the Canal may be consid ered genuine and, as suggested by Ambassador Braden, based upon a
“moral obligation" and economic dependence on the Canal its e lf.^ But the Colombian president came under the attack of Laureano Gdmez, no great lover of the United States and an alleged fascist. Gbmez struck at Santos and the United States in his newspaper, EL Siglo. the voice of the Conservative party. He suggested that the defense of the Pana ma Canal was the problem of the United States, and that Franklin
Roosevelt0s Good Neighbor Policy was nothing more than a disguised Big
S tick.^ Gdmez0 position—"he thinks that North Americans treat Co lombians as 0second-class0 citizens, and that we 0swindled0 Colombia out of the Panama Canal"3®==came as no great surprise and was weathered
27pacts On File (July 20, 1940), p. 302.
2^"The Ambassador in Colombia to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations. 1940, ¥, 1961, pp. 732-3°
2%1 Siglo. June 23, 1940, as cited in Dozer. Are We Good Neighbors?, pp. 6l, 98.
30John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New Xorkl Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 167. 72 fcy Santos9 whose Liberal party was sufficiently in control of the po litical situationo
The work to prevent the transfer of lands in the Western Hemi sphere, f i r s t begun a t th e Panama m eeting, was advanced s ig n ific a n tly at the Second Meeting of Foreign M inisters» The highpoint of the con ference was the Act of Habana, which declared §
That when islands or regions in the Americas now under the possession of non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations, taking into account the imperative need of continental security and the desires of the inhabitants of said islands or regions« may set up a regime of provisional admini stratien « „ „
The American rep u b lic s thus moved quickly to p ro h ib it Germany from ob taining possessions in the hemisphere. As a result, a temporary guardianship was formed to manage all Caribbean territories belonging to the conquered nations of Europe, One historian has summarized.
The fall of France , , , and the occupation of Paris, the spiritual home of cultivated Latin America, further accentu ated the feeling of insecurity in the Western Hemisphere, It was probably more responsible than any other event for con vincing Latin American nationalists of imminent danger from the Axis powers. It demonstrated that cooperation with both the United States and Great Britain was necessary for the sur vival of their own countries,32
In mid-19^1 President Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency. In conjunction with his declaration, he authorized the creation of the so-called ^Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nation als," The list was prepared by the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
31"Act of Habana," Bulletin (August 24, 1940), p, 138,
3 % © z e r , Are We Good Neighbors?, p, 6 5 , 73 and Commerce, in conjunction with the Attorney General, the Adminis trator of Export Control, and the Coordinator of Commercial and Cul tural Relations between the American Republics» The lis t comprised;
(a) certain persons deemed to be, or to have been acting or.purporting to act, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of, or under the direction of, or under the jurisdiction of, or on behalf of, or in collaboration with Germany or Italy or a national thereof| and
(b) certain persons to whom, or on whose behalf, or for whose account, the exportation directly or indirectly of any a r tic le or m ateria l exported from th e In ite d S ta te s , i s deemed to be detrimental to the interest of national defense
The Colombian Senate was net receptive to the Proclaimed List, and published a critical report which it intended to submit to the chancelleries of other American republics= Secretary of State Hull, when informed of this reaction by the United States ambassador at
Bogoti, was upset by the possible blow to hemispheric solidarity. The ambassador in BogotS was instructed to appeal to President Santos in the hope that "the President will find it possible within his consti tutional powers to withhold circulation of the report to the other
American c o u n t r i e s .
In the absence of President Santos from the capital, the Min ister of Foreign Relations withheld the report from distribution to the other Latin American governments. He expressed wonderment, how ever, that the United States could preoccupy itself with the Proclaim ed List, as he considered it to be trivial in comparison to other
^Bulletin (July 19, 1941), p. 42.
fo reig n Relations. 1941, VI, 1963? p. 304. 74 immediate matters regarding d e f e n s e 055 When Santos retu rn ed to Bogo- tSs he declared on Movember 21, 1941S
Under no circumstances would he permit the Senate report to be c irc u la te d to other .American Governments [and] he would instruct the Foreign Ministry to announce that constitution ally only the President had the right to communicate with other nations » , . ,5o
The position taken by the Colombian president, coupled with the strong status of his office, was enough to prevent circulation of the Senate8s report and to calm the nerves of his compatriots„
Soon after President Roosevelt8s declaration of an unlimited national emergency, German diplomats approached several governments in
Latin America to determine their reactions« While the Latin .govern ments refused to honor the German inquiry, Colombia8s refusal was no ta b ly c u r t . 57
The Japanese a tta c k on P earl Harbor on December 7$ 1941§ caused Colombia to break diplomatic relations with Japan the next daye
President Santos explained that he was delaying a break with the other
Axis aggressors in order 88to give the Government a little more time to take precautionary measures with regard to the German and Italian col onies in Colombia before the public knew of the rupture of r e l a t i o n s.58
Santos wrote formally to President Roosevelts
55Ib id o . p . 305o
58ibid.o p. 305 n.
57Bozer, Are We Good Neighbors?. p= 99°
58poreign Relations, 1941, VI, 1963s p° 81° 75 Ambassador Braden has officially advised me that as the Government of Germany and I ta ly have form ally declared war on the Government and people of the United States, the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States have declared a state of war with these governments„ In these circumstances Excellency I wish to renew directly to Your Ex cellency the resolution of the Government mad people of Co lombia already expressed by its constitutional organs that it is clearly and constantly faithful to the principles and rules of inter-American solidarity and cooperation which con stitute an essential part of our international policy. These principles and rules are freely accepted by us with all the consequences in a spirit of firm friendship for the great country whose destinies are directed by Your Excellency with such great nobility and with which all America unites in this decisive struggle for the security and high destinies of the continent for the ideals of liberty and democracy on which the present and future of a free America are based = 39
President Santos0 letter, while somewhat melodramatic and even righteous in its indications of his devotion to everything democratic, was nonetheless about.all that Colombia could sensibly offer, at the time. Its intentions were clearly to extend moral support, and cer tainly the United States expected no more under the circumstances.
On December 19 Colombia followed up its break with Japan by cutting off relations with both Germany and Italy. Speaking to the
Colombian nation, Santos said:
The declarations of principle of Lima and Buenos Aires, the policy defined in these Pan American Conferences and in Habana and in Panama have not been the artificial work of politicians but the almost spontaneous result of what has been and is American and what i t must be.
He expressed Colombia's intention of working to the maximum lim it of its capacity to "fight on the side of our allies.M
^ B u lle tin (December 20, 1 9 % ), p . 546. The laws of logic require that if we break diplomatic re lations with Japan because of her aggression against the Inited States and in doing so we do no more than fu lfill a positive provision of the Habama Agreement ratified by the Colombian Parliament, we observe an attitude similar to that of the Governments of Germany and Italy which allied them selves with Japan and accompanied her into war declared against the Government and people of the United States„ In any case our attitude must be identical„
Shortly before the United States entered World War II, some
$16,200,000 had been advanced Colombia for defensive purposeso^
In addition to economic assistance, the United States had increased the number of personnel at its various Armed Forces missions in Colom bia. The two governments had also consulted on defense in general and protection of the Panama Canal in particular. Now, in January of 1942, the foreign ministers met at Eio de Janeiro to discuss measures to be taken since one of the republics had been attacked, Colombia, togeth er with Mexico and Venezuela, introduced a resolution which would have required all the republics to sever relations with the Axis, But Ar gentina and Chile objected to the phrasing, and upon their insistance the wording was changed in the resolution so as to "recommend" that diplomatic relations be broken rather than making it mandatory.
Cooperation between the United States and Colombia continued in a friendly fashion and reached its ultimate point on November 27,
1943, when Colombia declared a state of belligerency with the Axis,
^Foreign Relations, 1941, VI, 1963, p. 81,
S, Statutes at Large. 1941, IV, Stat, 31. In so doing, Colombia joined in membership m th the Western Allies and assured itself a place in the United Nations, V IIo CONCLUSION
United States-Colombian diplomatic relationss at an all-time low just after the turn of the twentieth century, reached a fresh and friendly summit in the early years of the 1940°s, Colombia fit into the diplomacy of the United States as a member nation of the Western
Hemisphere, if for no other reason = As one of the twenty-one repub lics, it became a beneficiary of the Good Neighbor Policy» Whether directly engaged in a particular phase of the foreign policy of the
United States or standing as witness to the change which occurred, it was in a position to observe the shift from the "Big Stick" and "Dol lar Diplomacy" to one of equality of treatment«,
For a time, Colombia”s importance to the United States was en larg ed due to i t s proxim ity to th e Panama Canal and th e German in flu x which developed in the nation itself„ The desire of the United States to strengthen its friendship with Colombia was therefore accelerated, and the necessity to pacify the bad feelings engendered by the 1903 intervention became a diplomatic goal of the United States <>
At a time when the United States was pressing to change its image, Colombia came under the leadership of two liberal-minded pres idents o Alfonso Ldpez Pumarejo and Eduardo Santos cooperated with the United States to such a degree that the Good Neighbor Policy was accepted at an early date in Colombia,. Roosevelt”s program to combat the depression and to raise the standards of living appealed to Latins,
78 79 and this was particularly noticeable in Uruguay and ColombiaThere was a sense of identification with the norteamerieanos and their pres= ident, as they, as well as Colombians9 were struck by deprivation» By
1938 the United States President8s appeal was strong enough in Bogoti that he was nominated for honorary Colombian citizenship.. Inasmuch as the Colombian Senate was without the authority to approve such an act, an expression of gratitude and admiration was instead extended "for his effective defense of democratic ideas and systems, for his inter vention to safeguard peace within and without the continent, and for the loyal and constant carrying out of the 8good neighbor8 policy which is based upon respect of the sovereignty of all peoples
Ever watchful over the safety of the Panama Canal, the United
S tates had become fe a rfu l o f the German presence so close to the " lif e line," The German permeation of Colombia8s air transport system was seen in its worst light—as a threat to the safety of the Canal«
Mhether or not the danger was genuine is guesswork at best, but that a threat was thought to have existed is fact. The United States posi tio n regarding the Germans in SGADTA was one of apprehension§ but the policy followed was basically one of informal discussions and probings because of possible accusations of intervention in the internal af fairs of Colombia, "While some time expired before the desired results
1 Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New Yorks Columbia University P ress,1961), p, 302,
^Foreign Relations, 1938, V, 1956, pp. 464-5. 80 were achieved9 they were reached in the end with little or no loss of good neighborly momentum,
As to the economic endeavors o f the Germans in Colombia and
United States countermeasures, it must be said that before any results could be felt it was once again the British who achieved the immediate re su ltso The B ritis h blockade o f World War I I cut Germany o ff from its economic sources in Latin America« United States assistance was, then, a stopgap fo r Colombia, taking up th e vacuum l e f t by th e term i nation of European trade« Bat the United States did not approach the problem from the purely pragmatic point of view for which it is still renowned in Latin America, Rather, the approach was intellectual as well as practical in the years between 1933 and 194-3, and the powerful mystique of Franklin D, Roosevelt has not been felt quite so strongly since that time. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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